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Other factors determining the choice of a comparison other
JOURNAL
OF
EXPERIMENTAL
Other
SOCW
PSYCHOLOGY
Factors Determining Comparison A. JOHN
ARROWOOD
AND
5,
233-239
the Other1
(1969)
Choice
of a
FRIEND
RONALD
University of Toronto III an attempt to accommodate some of the disparate data on the locus of social comparison (Hakmiller, 1966; Thornton and Arrowood, 1966; Wheeler, 1966), Wheeler and a number of his associates (Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper, Robinson, Gruder, and Butzine, 1969) have argued that a person’s choice of a referent other is influenced by at least two factois: (a) A need to determine the boundaries of the scale (of measurement and evaluation), and (b) given these boundaries, a desire to confirm similarity with people having desirable traits or lacking undesirable traits. In an experiment designed to explore some of the implications of this line of reasoning, Wheeler et al. varied whether the trait being measured was positively or negatively valued (Pos vs. Neg) and whether’ the approximate range of scores for the group was or was not given (R vs. NR). Subjects, tested in groups of nine, were given their own numerical scores, told that they ranked fifth in their group, and then given the opportunity to see one other score-of, in another variation, to interact with one other group member (Score vs. Person). The authors predicted that (a) NR subjects will attempt to establish the range by seeking to learn the highest numerical score in the group; (b) R subjects will attempt to co&m similarity with those better off than themselves by seeking the scoie of someone in the positively valued direction, and (c) this will tend to be the next-best-off other. Although the data are reasonably consistent with these predictions, we wish to suggest that this consistency does not necessarily entail support for the motivational assumptions on which the predictions are based. We shall argue that the data fit at least as well within an alternative framework suggested by Thornton and Arrowood ( MS), and shall attempt to support this argument by examining, I&St, the derivation of the experimental hypotheses and, second, certain trends in the &a not emphasized by the authors. ',The Preparation Of this Mental Health Foundation.
paper
was
assisted
233
under
Grant
No.
110 of me
Ontario
234
ARROWOOD
AND
FRIFND
The Range of What? “When the range of the group is not given, a subject will attempt to establish this range by seeking the score of the numerically highestscoring group member” ( p. 222). This statement of Hypothesis 1 raises at least two questions. First, how can a subject establish a range with only one choice ? Granted that the subject can begin to do so with only one choice, at the time at which he is making his Srst choice he is unaware that the opportunity for making a second choice will be forthcoming. Second, why is that particular choice predicted? One can, after all, begin to establish a range by choosing to learn about either end of the distribution. Wheeler et al. have anticipated this second question by adding that “choice of the highest score to determine the range is predicated on the subject’s common sense assumption that the lowest possible score is zero” ( p. 221). That the subject assumes the lowest possible score to be zero is, first, an empirical question and, second, reflective of some confusion as to what range, if any, is being sought. Although the subject may well assume that the lowest possibb score on the scale is zero, this is no reason to assume further that the lowest obtained score in the group is also zero. Indeed, analysis of data gathered locally for another purpose revealed that only 3 of 287 subjects estimated the (obtained) score of the bottom rank in groups of seven to be zero.2 Thus, if the subject is trying to learn the range of the group-as Wheeler et aZ. assert in Hypothesis l-the assumption that the bottom score is zero is by no means common sense. This assumption is a reasonable one, however, if a subject is interested, instead, in the boundaries of the scale as Wheeler et al. suggest in their abstract. Further, if the lower bound of the scale is assumed to be zero, then the subject might wish to learn the highest obtained score, since this would be his best estimate of the upper bound of the scale. This line of reasoning, while plausible, has one drawback in the light of the Wheeler et al. argument: It fails to accommodate the data from one of the three studies which the authors are attempting to synthesize. Subjects in Hakmiller’s (1966) high threat condition chose to learn the highest (most negatively valued) score even though they had previously been told that the range of the scale was O-109 (p. 35). Thus, for the attempted synthesis to be viable even in principle, it would appear that the range which the subject is assumed to be seeking must be that of the group rather than of the scale. If so, however, then ‘Friend, R. Defensive processes progress, University of Toronto.
and
self-evaluation.
Doctoral
dissertation
in
CHOICE
OF
A COMPARISON
OTHER
235
there is no reason to expect the subject to establish this range “by seeking the score of the numerically highest-scoring group member” any more than by seeking the score of the lowest-scoring member. Positive
Instances
and Desirable
Goals
That a subject will prefer the highest score available to him is predictable in terms of Thornton and Arrowood’s (1966) analysis of the motives underlying the choice of a comparison other. They suggest, from studies of concept attainment, that the information afforded by a positive instance of a concept or characteristic (i.e., a high score) is more useful for self-evaluation or more readily interpretable than is that afforded by a negative instance (low score). A second hypothesized motive, selfenhancement, predicts the choice of the desirable other and, therefore, a stronger tendency to choose the highest score for positively valued than for negatively valued characteristics, since a high score is a desirable goal only when the characteristic in question is positively valued. The data which Wheeler et al. present in Table 1 provide an opportunity to evaluate this line of argument. First, it is clear that the highest numerical score (positive instance) is overchosen relative to chance expectation; nearly one-half the Score subjects wish to learn the highest score although the expected proportion is only one-eighth. It is also clear that this choice is more frequent among NR than R subjects (F = 16.69, p < .OOl), as Wheeler et al. predicted. Finally, the positive instance is also chosen significantly more often by Pas than Neg subjects (F = 6.63, p < .Ol). There is no interaction between these two variables (F < 1). These data may also be examined in terms of the frequency with which the lowest numerical score is chosen. Since, in the Neg conditions the lowest score is the most desirable score, it should be of greater interest to Neg than to Pos subjects, This expectation is confirmed; signi6cantly more Neg than Pos subjects select the lowest score (F = 8.32, p < .Ol). Th ere is no difference between R and NR subjects in this respect, nor is there a significant interaction between these two variables. The difference between Pos and Neg subjects may be illuminated further through an examination of the frequency with which they elect to compare with the best-of other. Comparison with the most desirable score (highest for Pos subjects but lowest for Neg subjects) is SignScantly more frequent in the Pos than the Neg conditions (F = 6.43, p < .oz). It is not affected by the R-NR variable, nor is there a sign&ant interaction. This outcome is also expected because in the Pos conditions the highest numerical score is both the positive instance and the desirable
236
ARROWOOD
AND
FFUFiVD
goal; in the Neg conditions, the positive instance and the desirable goal lie at opposite ends of the distribution. All of these significant differences between the Pos and Neg conditions reflect the contention that the highest score should be overchosen in both the Pos and Neg conditions, while the lowest score should be overchosen only in the Neg conditions. The Wheeler et al. data permit a direct assessment of this contention. Of the 32 subjects in the Pos conditions, 59% chose the highest score. This frequency differs significantly from the expected 12.5% (z = 7.75, corrected for continuity; p < .OOl). Only two Pos subjects chose the lowest score. Of the 34 35% chose the highest score and 2Q% subjects in the Neg conditions, chose the lowest. Both of these frequencies differ significantly from those expected (z = 3.75, p < .OOl; and z = 2.72, p < .Ol, respectively). In view of these findings, we suggest that to dismiss the positive instance-desirable goal argument on grounds that Pos-Neg differences are negligible is, at best, premature. Similarity:
What
is Assumed
and What
is Demonstrated?
“When the range of the group is given, a subject will seek the score of someone in the positively valued direction” (p. 222). Both this choice and the choice of the most similar better-off other, predicted in Hypothesis 3, are said to be “mediated by the desire to confirm similarity with people having desirable traits or lacking undesirable traits” ( p. 221). Although such a desire may well be operative, it is difficult to see how the choice of any better-off other would reflect it. This difficulty is apparent even in the case of the next-best-off other. Consider the information at the subject’s disposal while he is making his choice. He knows that his score is 310, that he is fifth out of nine, and that the highest score is somewhere between 550 and 600. Even though the person at Rank 4 is necessarily the next-best-off other (in the Pos condition), the subject has no way of knowing whether the score at Rank 4 is 311 or 547. Under these circumstances, choosing the nextbest-off other could confirm dissimilarity just as easily as confirming similarity. The argument is further complicated when Wheeler et aI. assume a subsidiary desire to confirm dissimilarity with others worse off than oneself. We suggest that, in the absence of either the manipulation or at least the measurement of similarity, it is risky to attribute a subject’s behavior to a desire to confirm either it or its obverse. In an earlier paper, Wheeler (1966) did measure assumed similarity under circumstances roughly comparable to the present Pos-R condition, and found a correlation between direction of comparison choice and
CHOICE
OF
A
COMPARISON
OTHER
237
direction of greater assumed similarity. It is worth noting, however, that in the 1966 High Motivation-(R) condition only 7% of the subjects chose to learn about the score associated with Rank 1 while 41% of the present Pos-R subjects did so (x2 = 9.52, corrected for continuity; p < .Ol). This rather striking difference between apparently comparable conditions makes us reluctant to generalize from the first experiment to the second. Finally, the dominance of “the dominant motive . . . to determine the degree of similarity with very similar others” (p. 228) is disputable. Of the 31 subjects in the Range conditions who compared with someone better off than themselves, 15 chose to learn the score of the next-bestoff other, while 16 did not. Of these 16, 12 chose to learn the score of the best-off other, even though this information was routinely, albeit roughly, provided as a part of the Range manipulation. Since Rank 4 was not selected significantly more often than Rank 1, the attribution of dominance to one motive over another is unwarranted.
Person us. Score Wheeler et al. make a fourth
prediction-namely that “in all (the Person) conditions similarity will be the major determinant of preference” (p, 222). This prediction is based on the assumption that “the behavior of a person with a personality trait score similar to one’s own should be the best indication of what it means behaviorally to have the score that one has” (p. 222) and is buttressed by the suggestion that “motives other than establishing ranges and engaging in comparison with similar others should also be involved” ( p. 226). If subjects wish, for example, to avoid the possible unpleasantness of interacting with someone much better off or much worse off than themselves, they might display “relatively less tendency to establish the range and somewhat more inclination to make similar choices” ( p. 226). Although the investigators provide no analyses of the first choices of Person subjects, some of the implicit contrasts between the Person and Score conditions can be made explicit in a three-way analysis of variance-the Person-Score variable being the third factor. Such an analysis reveals that choice of the best-off other is (a) not affected by the R-NR variation, (b) significantly more frequent in the Pos than the Neg conditions (F = 9.37, p < .Ol) and (c) significantly more frequent in the Score than the Person conditions (F = 8.13, p < .OI). There were no significant interactions. If the analysis is performed on choice of anyone better off than oneself, rather than simply best-off, there are still significantly fewer Person than Score subjects choosing better-off others (F = 5.24, p < .025). Yet, despite these data, Wheeler et aI.
238
ARROWOOD
AND
FRIEND
conclude that “the necessity of interacting publicly with the referent person increases the choice of the most ‘attractive’ others” (p. 220). This conclusion, of course, is based on the investigators’ analysis of both first and second choices and on the finding that the most frequent (but not significantly so) two-choice strategy involved the selection of the two best-off others. That this pattern of choices should emerge in the Person conditions, even though Person subjects are significantly less interested than are their Score counterparts in “intellectually attractive others” on their first choices, is probably due to a methodological flaw on the part of Wheeler et al. Person subjects were asked to make a second choice on the ground that their first choice might not be available as an interaction partner. Score subjects, by contrast, were asked to make a second choice on the ground that it might be possible for additional information to be supplied. Thus, second choice means “instead of my first choice” to Person subjects, but “in addition to my first choice” to Score subjects. This confounding has two implications for the interpretation of the Wheeler et al. data. First, it becomes difficult to conclude that Person subjects are interested independently in interacting with the two best-off others, since the second choice is merely a substitute for the first. Second, it becomes difficult to contrast modal two-choice strategies in the Person and Score conditions. If, however, the first-choice data (which are not affected by this artifact) are considered, it is clear that the necessity of interacting publicly with the referent person decreases the choice of the most “attractive” others. Concluding Comments Our re-examination of the Wheeler et al. data was based on the contention that people, in attempting to evaluate their abilities, are interested in answers to at least two questions. The first question, “How much of this characteristic do I have?” can be answered by comparison with a positive instance. The second question, “How far am I from the good guys?” can be answered by comparison with the desirable goal.3 The Wheeler et al data have been shown to be highly amenable to this analysis, as evidenced by the several Pos-Neg differences reported above. This formulation, in addition to accommodating certain consistent trends in the data which Wheeler and his associates do not emphasize, also provides a more defensible basis for predicting some of their *This conceptualizationrepresentsa modificationin emphasis of the one presented by Thornton and Arrowood (1966) in that we now suggest that interestin the positive instanceand in the desirable goal both reflect a desire for self-evaluation rather than for self-evaluation and self-enhancement respectively.
CHOICE
OF
A
COMPARISON
OTHER
239
explicitly hypothesized outcomes. People will choose the highest numerical score because of the information afforded by a positive instance. People will compare in the positively valued direction in order to place themselves relative to where they wish to be. Finally, quite apart from matters of conceptualization, we have taken issue with two of the investigators’ empirical conclusions. First, the nextbest-off other, although chosen significantly more often than one would expect by chance, was not chosen significantly more often than was the best-off other. Second, the necessity of interacting publicly with the referent other does not increase the choice of the most “attractive” others. REFERENCES HAKMIUER,
K.
L.
Experimental
Threat
as a determinant
Social Psychology, 1966,
of downward comparison. Journul Suppl. 1, 32-39. A. J. Self-evaluation, self-enhancement
of
D. A., AND ARROWOOD, and the locus of social comparison. Journal of Experimentul Social Psychology, 1966, Suppl. 1, 40-48. WHEELER, L. Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Suppl. 1, 27-31. WHEELER, L., SHAVER, K. G., JONES, R. A., GOETHALS, G. Ft., COOPER, J., ROBINSON, J. E., Gmmnn, C. L., AND BUYZNE, K. W. Factors determining choice of a comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 219-232.
THORNTON,
(Received
November
11,
1963)
OF
EXPERIMENTAL
Other
SOCW
PSYCHOLOGY
Factors Determining Comparison A. JOHN
ARROWOOD
AND
5,
233-239
the Other1
(1969)
Choice
of a
FRIEND
RONALD
University of Toronto III an attempt to accommodate some of the disparate data on the locus of social comparison (Hakmiller, 1966; Thornton and Arrowood, 1966; Wheeler, 1966), Wheeler and a number of his associates (Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper, Robinson, Gruder, and Butzine, 1969) have argued that a person’s choice of a referent other is influenced by at least two factois: (a) A need to determine the boundaries of the scale (of measurement and evaluation), and (b) given these boundaries, a desire to confirm similarity with people having desirable traits or lacking undesirable traits. In an experiment designed to explore some of the implications of this line of reasoning, Wheeler et al. varied whether the trait being measured was positively or negatively valued (Pos vs. Neg) and whether’ the approximate range of scores for the group was or was not given (R vs. NR). Subjects, tested in groups of nine, were given their own numerical scores, told that they ranked fifth in their group, and then given the opportunity to see one other score-of, in another variation, to interact with one other group member (Score vs. Person). The authors predicted that (a) NR subjects will attempt to establish the range by seeking to learn the highest numerical score in the group; (b) R subjects will attempt to co&m similarity with those better off than themselves by seeking the scoie of someone in the positively valued direction, and (c) this will tend to be the next-best-off other. Although the data are reasonably consistent with these predictions, we wish to suggest that this consistency does not necessarily entail support for the motivational assumptions on which the predictions are based. We shall argue that the data fit at least as well within an alternative framework suggested by Thornton and Arrowood ( MS), and shall attempt to support this argument by examining, I&St, the derivation of the experimental hypotheses and, second, certain trends in the &a not emphasized by the authors. ',The Preparation Of this Mental Health Foundation.
paper
was
assisted
233
under
Grant
No.
110 of me
Ontario
234
ARROWOOD
AND
FRIFND
The Range of What? “When the range of the group is not given, a subject will attempt to establish this range by seeking the score of the numerically highestscoring group member” ( p. 222). This statement of Hypothesis 1 raises at least two questions. First, how can a subject establish a range with only one choice ? Granted that the subject can begin to do so with only one choice, at the time at which he is making his Srst choice he is unaware that the opportunity for making a second choice will be forthcoming. Second, why is that particular choice predicted? One can, after all, begin to establish a range by choosing to learn about either end of the distribution. Wheeler et al. have anticipated this second question by adding that “choice of the highest score to determine the range is predicated on the subject’s common sense assumption that the lowest possible score is zero” ( p. 221). That the subject assumes the lowest possible score to be zero is, first, an empirical question and, second, reflective of some confusion as to what range, if any, is being sought. Although the subject may well assume that the lowest possibb score on the scale is zero, this is no reason to assume further that the lowest obtained score in the group is also zero. Indeed, analysis of data gathered locally for another purpose revealed that only 3 of 287 subjects estimated the (obtained) score of the bottom rank in groups of seven to be zero.2 Thus, if the subject is trying to learn the range of the group-as Wheeler et aZ. assert in Hypothesis l-the assumption that the bottom score is zero is by no means common sense. This assumption is a reasonable one, however, if a subject is interested, instead, in the boundaries of the scale as Wheeler et al. suggest in their abstract. Further, if the lower bound of the scale is assumed to be zero, then the subject might wish to learn the highest obtained score, since this would be his best estimate of the upper bound of the scale. This line of reasoning, while plausible, has one drawback in the light of the Wheeler et al. argument: It fails to accommodate the data from one of the three studies which the authors are attempting to synthesize. Subjects in Hakmiller’s (1966) high threat condition chose to learn the highest (most negatively valued) score even though they had previously been told that the range of the scale was O-109 (p. 35). Thus, for the attempted synthesis to be viable even in principle, it would appear that the range which the subject is assumed to be seeking must be that of the group rather than of the scale. If so, however, then ‘Friend, R. Defensive processes progress, University of Toronto.
and
self-evaluation.
Doctoral
dissertation
in
CHOICE
OF
A COMPARISON
OTHER
235
there is no reason to expect the subject to establish this range “by seeking the score of the numerically highest-scoring group member” any more than by seeking the score of the lowest-scoring member. Positive
Instances
and Desirable
Goals
That a subject will prefer the highest score available to him is predictable in terms of Thornton and Arrowood’s (1966) analysis of the motives underlying the choice of a comparison other. They suggest, from studies of concept attainment, that the information afforded by a positive instance of a concept or characteristic (i.e., a high score) is more useful for self-evaluation or more readily interpretable than is that afforded by a negative instance (low score). A second hypothesized motive, selfenhancement, predicts the choice of the desirable other and, therefore, a stronger tendency to choose the highest score for positively valued than for negatively valued characteristics, since a high score is a desirable goal only when the characteristic in question is positively valued. The data which Wheeler et al. present in Table 1 provide an opportunity to evaluate this line of argument. First, it is clear that the highest numerical score (positive instance) is overchosen relative to chance expectation; nearly one-half the Score subjects wish to learn the highest score although the expected proportion is only one-eighth. It is also clear that this choice is more frequent among NR than R subjects (F = 16.69, p < .OOl), as Wheeler et al. predicted. Finally, the positive instance is also chosen significantly more often by Pas than Neg subjects (F = 6.63, p < .Ol). There is no interaction between these two variables (F < 1). These data may also be examined in terms of the frequency with which the lowest numerical score is chosen. Since, in the Neg conditions the lowest score is the most desirable score, it should be of greater interest to Neg than to Pos subjects, This expectation is confirmed; signi6cantly more Neg than Pos subjects select the lowest score (F = 8.32, p < .Ol). Th ere is no difference between R and NR subjects in this respect, nor is there a significant interaction between these two variables. The difference between Pos and Neg subjects may be illuminated further through an examination of the frequency with which they elect to compare with the best-of other. Comparison with the most desirable score (highest for Pos subjects but lowest for Neg subjects) is SignScantly more frequent in the Pos than the Neg conditions (F = 6.43, p < .oz). It is not affected by the R-NR variable, nor is there a sign&ant interaction. This outcome is also expected because in the Pos conditions the highest numerical score is both the positive instance and the desirable
236
ARROWOOD
AND
FFUFiVD
goal; in the Neg conditions, the positive instance and the desirable goal lie at opposite ends of the distribution. All of these significant differences between the Pos and Neg conditions reflect the contention that the highest score should be overchosen in both the Pos and Neg conditions, while the lowest score should be overchosen only in the Neg conditions. The Wheeler et al. data permit a direct assessment of this contention. Of the 32 subjects in the Pos conditions, 59% chose the highest score. This frequency differs significantly from the expected 12.5% (z = 7.75, corrected for continuity; p < .OOl). Only two Pos subjects chose the lowest score. Of the 34 35% chose the highest score and 2Q% subjects in the Neg conditions, chose the lowest. Both of these frequencies differ significantly from those expected (z = 3.75, p < .OOl; and z = 2.72, p < .Ol, respectively). In view of these findings, we suggest that to dismiss the positive instance-desirable goal argument on grounds that Pos-Neg differences are negligible is, at best, premature. Similarity:
What
is Assumed
and What
is Demonstrated?
“When the range of the group is given, a subject will seek the score of someone in the positively valued direction” (p. 222). Both this choice and the choice of the most similar better-off other, predicted in Hypothesis 3, are said to be “mediated by the desire to confirm similarity with people having desirable traits or lacking undesirable traits” ( p. 221). Although such a desire may well be operative, it is difficult to see how the choice of any better-off other would reflect it. This difficulty is apparent even in the case of the next-best-off other. Consider the information at the subject’s disposal while he is making his choice. He knows that his score is 310, that he is fifth out of nine, and that the highest score is somewhere between 550 and 600. Even though the person at Rank 4 is necessarily the next-best-off other (in the Pos condition), the subject has no way of knowing whether the score at Rank 4 is 311 or 547. Under these circumstances, choosing the nextbest-off other could confirm dissimilarity just as easily as confirming similarity. The argument is further complicated when Wheeler et aI. assume a subsidiary desire to confirm dissimilarity with others worse off than oneself. We suggest that, in the absence of either the manipulation or at least the measurement of similarity, it is risky to attribute a subject’s behavior to a desire to confirm either it or its obverse. In an earlier paper, Wheeler (1966) did measure assumed similarity under circumstances roughly comparable to the present Pos-R condition, and found a correlation between direction of comparison choice and
CHOICE
OF
A
COMPARISON
OTHER
237
direction of greater assumed similarity. It is worth noting, however, that in the 1966 High Motivation-(R) condition only 7% of the subjects chose to learn about the score associated with Rank 1 while 41% of the present Pos-R subjects did so (x2 = 9.52, corrected for continuity; p < .Ol). This rather striking difference between apparently comparable conditions makes us reluctant to generalize from the first experiment to the second. Finally, the dominance of “the dominant motive . . . to determine the degree of similarity with very similar others” (p. 228) is disputable. Of the 31 subjects in the Range conditions who compared with someone better off than themselves, 15 chose to learn the score of the next-bestoff other, while 16 did not. Of these 16, 12 chose to learn the score of the best-off other, even though this information was routinely, albeit roughly, provided as a part of the Range manipulation. Since Rank 4 was not selected significantly more often than Rank 1, the attribution of dominance to one motive over another is unwarranted.
Person us. Score Wheeler et al. make a fourth
prediction-namely that “in all (the Person) conditions similarity will be the major determinant of preference” (p, 222). This prediction is based on the assumption that “the behavior of a person with a personality trait score similar to one’s own should be the best indication of what it means behaviorally to have the score that one has” (p. 222) and is buttressed by the suggestion that “motives other than establishing ranges and engaging in comparison with similar others should also be involved” ( p. 226). If subjects wish, for example, to avoid the possible unpleasantness of interacting with someone much better off or much worse off than themselves, they might display “relatively less tendency to establish the range and somewhat more inclination to make similar choices” ( p. 226). Although the investigators provide no analyses of the first choices of Person subjects, some of the implicit contrasts between the Person and Score conditions can be made explicit in a three-way analysis of variance-the Person-Score variable being the third factor. Such an analysis reveals that choice of the best-off other is (a) not affected by the R-NR variation, (b) significantly more frequent in the Pos than the Neg conditions (F = 9.37, p < .Ol) and (c) significantly more frequent in the Score than the Person conditions (F = 8.13, p < .OI). There were no significant interactions. If the analysis is performed on choice of anyone better off than oneself, rather than simply best-off, there are still significantly fewer Person than Score subjects choosing better-off others (F = 5.24, p < .025). Yet, despite these data, Wheeler et aI.
238
ARROWOOD
AND
FRIEND
conclude that “the necessity of interacting publicly with the referent person increases the choice of the most ‘attractive’ others” (p. 220). This conclusion, of course, is based on the investigators’ analysis of both first and second choices and on the finding that the most frequent (but not significantly so) two-choice strategy involved the selection of the two best-off others. That this pattern of choices should emerge in the Person conditions, even though Person subjects are significantly less interested than are their Score counterparts in “intellectually attractive others” on their first choices, is probably due to a methodological flaw on the part of Wheeler et al. Person subjects were asked to make a second choice on the ground that their first choice might not be available as an interaction partner. Score subjects, by contrast, were asked to make a second choice on the ground that it might be possible for additional information to be supplied. Thus, second choice means “instead of my first choice” to Person subjects, but “in addition to my first choice” to Score subjects. This confounding has two implications for the interpretation of the Wheeler et al. data. First, it becomes difficult to conclude that Person subjects are interested independently in interacting with the two best-off others, since the second choice is merely a substitute for the first. Second, it becomes difficult to contrast modal two-choice strategies in the Person and Score conditions. If, however, the first-choice data (which are not affected by this artifact) are considered, it is clear that the necessity of interacting publicly with the referent person decreases the choice of the most “attractive” others. Concluding Comments Our re-examination of the Wheeler et al. data was based on the contention that people, in attempting to evaluate their abilities, are interested in answers to at least two questions. The first question, “How much of this characteristic do I have?” can be answered by comparison with a positive instance. The second question, “How far am I from the good guys?” can be answered by comparison with the desirable goal.3 The Wheeler et al data have been shown to be highly amenable to this analysis, as evidenced by the several Pos-Neg differences reported above. This formulation, in addition to accommodating certain consistent trends in the data which Wheeler and his associates do not emphasize, also provides a more defensible basis for predicting some of their *This conceptualizationrepresentsa modificationin emphasis of the one presented by Thornton and Arrowood (1966) in that we now suggest that interestin the positive instanceand in the desirable goal both reflect a desire for self-evaluation rather than for self-evaluation and self-enhancement respectively.
CHOICE
OF
A
COMPARISON
OTHER
239
explicitly hypothesized outcomes. People will choose the highest numerical score because of the information afforded by a positive instance. People will compare in the positively valued direction in order to place themselves relative to where they wish to be. Finally, quite apart from matters of conceptualization, we have taken issue with two of the investigators’ empirical conclusions. First, the nextbest-off other, although chosen significantly more often than one would expect by chance, was not chosen significantly more often than was the best-off other. Second, the necessity of interacting publicly with the referent other does not increase the choice of the most “attractive” others. REFERENCES HAKMIUER,
K.
L.
Experimental
Threat
as a determinant
Social Psychology, 1966,
of downward comparison. Journul Suppl. 1, 32-39. A. J. Self-evaluation, self-enhancement
of
D. A., AND ARROWOOD, and the locus of social comparison. Journal of Experimentul Social Psychology, 1966, Suppl. 1, 40-48. WHEELER, L. Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Suppl. 1, 27-31. WHEELER, L., SHAVER, K. G., JONES, R. A., GOETHALS, G. Ft., COOPER, J., ROBINSON, J. E., Gmmnn, C. L., AND BUYZNE, K. W. Factors determining choice of a comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 219-232.
THORNTON,
(Received
November
11,
1963)