Performance as promised

Performance as promised Restructuring the US civil space programme

Ronald D. Brunner

Projects in the US civil space programme typically cut back capabilities, slip schedules and overrun cost estimates. Such shortfalls in performance are normal but not inevitable. They call into question NASA's viability as an institution, jeopardize long-term support for the space programme and waste resources that could be used to advance space science, exploration and applications. A restructured programme, built up from relatively modest and discrete projects, would allow project managers to improve performance as promised and would provide the resilience necessary for the programme as a whole to adapt to changing national needs and the lessons of experience. Restructuring requires leadership brought to bear on certain key decisions to establish the expectation that performance counts. In any case, restructuring of some kind may be unavoidable over the next few years. Ronald D. Brunner is with the Center for Space and Geosciences Policy, University of Colorado, Campus Box 361, Boulder, CO 80309, USA. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Thirteenth Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Bethseda, MD, 25 October 1991. The author gratefully acknowledges research support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and comments on an earlier draft from colleagues at the University of Colorado and elsewhere, including Brad Abrahamson, continued on page 117

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Projects in the US civil space programme typically cut back capabilities, slip schedules and overrun their cost estimates. The recurrence of the pattern in project after project encourages the expectation that such shortfalls in performance are inevitable at the cutting edge of space exploration, science and applications. The expectation is reinforced when the public needs to be reassured that new problems are normal. For example, in September 1990, after N-AS.A's fourth unsuccessful attempt to launch the Space Shuttle Columbia, the local headline of a wire service story proclaimed that 'Even in glory days, NASA had problems'. 1 -Among those interviewed for the story, astronauts and other veterans of the -Apollo era also pointed out that the agency now works under more difficult circumstances that it did in the glory days. Such shortfalls in performance are not inevitable, for at least three reasons. First, although shortfalls in performance have become the norm, there are exceptions to the norm. -Apollo and various smaller, less spectacular projects have performed as promised or come close to it. 2 But projects in the civil space programme normally do take about 60% more time and 150% more money than initially estimated, according to one recent study. 3 Second, in 1980-81 a N A S A study team concluded that cost and schedule growth could be reduced despite unforeseen technical problems - if known principles of sound management and available management tools were applied, and if their application were verified by NASA's top management. 4 Third, the conclusions and recommendations of the N A S A study team are supported by a much broader base of experience and theory that is hardly known, much less appreciated, within the space policy community. So far we lack sufficient leadership to apply what we already know towards improving performance as promised. Some, but not all, public officials have subordinated performance in the civil space programme to other purposes. Of these other purposes, the most important are pursuing a vision of the human exploration of space under US lead0265-9646/92/020116-21 © 1992 Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd

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ership; meeting NASA's perceived needs as an institution; and moving money and jobs to N A S A centres, contractors and congressional constituencies. (The latter purpose transforms the civil space programme into the political equivalent of public works.) Over the last two decades these purposes have shaped the nation's de facto space policy, continued from page 116 Paul Bowersox, Radford Byerly, Jr, Elaine Hansen, Donald P. Hearth, Brent Helleckson, Arthur Hingerty, Morgan Jones, Mike Loucks, David H. Moore, Roger A. Pielke, Jr, Steve Primm, Robert W. Smith, William Smith, S. Alan Stern, Pete Warren, Albert D. Wheelon and Ray Williamson. Responsibility is the author's alone. 1Apparently, the Associated Press story came from a press conference at Cape Canaveral. It appeared in the Boulder (Colorado) Sunday Camera, 23 September 1990, p 8A. 2For example, the Solar Mesosphere Explorer (SME) performed as promised, according to research in progress by Arthur Hingerty. Further research may confirm that the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) is also a success by this criterion. 3John Pike, Earth Observing System: The Return of the Spanish Armada, presentation to the EOS Engineering Review Advisory Committee, 24 July 1991, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC, p 31 and Appendices 2 and 3. The estimates should be considered preliminary pending refinement of the data set. "Donald P. Hearth, 'Notes on conclusions and recommendations to accompany the briefing charts on the NASA Project Management Study', January 1981. This document is available from the NASA history office. See also Donald P. Hearth, 'Project management in NASA: 1980 and today',

and the policy in turn has served these purposes rather well. 5 In any case, recurring shortfalls in performance are a matter of policy decision, not inevitability. Performance will not improve unless or until more public officials insist that performance counts. Anticipating that performance may eventually count, this article considers restructuring the civil space programme to improve performance as promised. The first section reviews the de facto space policy of the post-Apollo era, showing how the structure of the civil space programme propagates shortfalls in project performance and frustrates corrective action in the decision process. The second section outlines a policy to restructure the civil space programme, showing how it can ameliorate current problems in performance and in the decision process. The third section considers how restructuring might be initiated. Finally, in conclusion, the article contends that present policy is probably not sustainable; hence some kind of restructuring may be unavoidable over the next few years. The purpose of this article is to stimulate consideration of alternatives to present policy.

P r e s e n t policy Present policy attempts to institutionalize the vision of US leadership in the human exploration of space through the Shuttle, the Space Station and the proposed mission to the Moon and Mars. But structuring the civil space programme around these centrepieces compromises project performance. This policy is de facto because neither the priority of the vision over other goals nor the shortfalls in performance are explicitly authorized.

Overview Priority goal. The priority goal of the space programme is the human SHowever, note the ambiguity of 'US lead- exploration of space under US leadership, but other goals have been ership in the human exploration of space'. and continue to be advocated in the space policy process. Authoritative From the standpoint of inputs, perhaps a sources have typically left priorities ambiguous and called for a 'bacase can be made that the USA leads in the amount of resources invested. From lanced' space programme because they cannot achieve consensus on the the standpoint of outputs, a case can be priority of any single goal. The major goals typically reaffirmed for a made that the (former) USSR leads in the balanced programme are space science, exploration and applications, number of people launched into space and in the number of person-days spent in along with instrumental goals such as technology advancement and low-cost access to space. 6 These goals are suitable for clarifying the space. 6National Commission on Space, Pioneer- directions of the civil space programme, justifying the programme and ing the Space Frontier, Bantam, New York, NY, 1986, p 226. In the Commission's own mobilizing enthusiasm and support. They are too general and openwords, the major goals are 'Advancing our ended to be suitable for assessing performance, but performance is a understanding of our planet, our Solar Sys- secondary consideration at best. tem, and the Universe; Exploring, prosThe unauthorized but effective priority of the vision stems from pecting and settling the Solar System; and Stimulating space enterprises for the direct planning for the post-Apollo era. (The vision itself can be traced back at benefit of the people on Earth'. The in- least to Wernher yon Braun's seminal statement in Collier's in 1952.) In strumental goals are 'Advancing technology across a broad spectrum to assure September 1969 the Space Task Group under the chairmanship of Vice timely availability of critical capabilities; President Agnew affirmed the vision of human exploration in its report and Creating and operating systems and to President Nixon: 'As a focus for the development of new capability, institutions to provide low-cost access to we recommend the United States accept the long-range option or goal of the space frontier'. Issues in NASA Program and Project Management, Spring 1991, pp 5-10.

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manned planetary exploration with a manned Mars mission before the end of this century as the first target.'7 The capabilities included a space station comprised of modules, a space transportation system based on a reusable manned shuttle, and advanced technology development, s NASA issued contracts to define the work required for a space station, its first priority, in the summer of 1969. This was one indication of NASA's confidence in the political and economic feasibility of the vision. 9 The frustration of these grandiose plans in the wake of Apollo's success led to present policy. In late 1969, with the nation in no mood for another spectacular space initiative, the Nixon administration refused to make a commitment beyond studies of a space station and a shuttle in the proposed FY 1971 budget. To pursue those studies under the agency's smallest budget request since 1963, NASA headquarters decided to postpone the Viking mission to land instruments on Mars, suspend production of the Saturn 5 rocket, and stretch out the remaining Apollo lunar landings, as well as to lay off personnel. 10The agency's priorities, among other factors, were manifest in these decisions. After congressional hearings on the FY 1971 budget, it became apparent to NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine that 'with the lunar landings achieved, with America's concerns turning increasingly inward, and with competing budgetary demands by rapidly growing social programs, the current congressional mood was for diversified and practical space goals pursued at a moderate and economical pace'. 1~ Paine did not mention that the political and economic foundations of Apollo had already begun to erode well before the end of 1960s, when the focus of the Cold War shifted from Sputnik and the space race to Vietnam, and stagflation marked the onset of chronic problems in the US economy. For most of the nation Apollo became a historical anomaly, a relic of unprecedented prosperity and the Cold War. But Apollo also became the central symbol in a myth of the golden age that continues to inspire the space exploration community. The tension between these two Apollos is fundamental to an understanding of the post-Apollo era. Structure. NASA did not abandon the priority of the vision in favour of

7Space Task Group Report to the President, The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Washington, DC, September 1969, p iii; emphasis in the original. 81bid, pp 14-15. 9Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1990, p 24. 1°William J. Normyle, 'US space pace slowed severely', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 January 1970, p 16. l~Thomas O. Paine, 'What lies ahead in space?', delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, 14 September 1970, in Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXVII, 15 October 1970, p 27.

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'diversified and practical space goals', but attempted to institutionalize the priority over the years in a series of 'next logical steps' in the human exploration of space: the reusable manned shuttle first approved for FY 1972; the permanently manned space station first approved for FY 1985; and the proposed manned mission to the Moon and Mars endorsed by President Bush on 20 July 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first manned lunar landing, but not yet funded beyond studies. Over the last two decades NASA has structured the civil space programme around these centrepieces by various means, of which the following are most important: •

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First, multiple goals have been used to justify the centrepieces and to obscure the priority of the vision. This avoids a showdown over the priority of the vision, diverts attention from performance commitments and provides flexibility to adapt multiple project objectives to the needs of multiple potential constituencies. Second, the centrepieces (and other projects) have been scaled up to become 'all things to all people'. This suppresses choices among separable elements of the scaled-up project, allows more consti-

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tuencies to acquire a bigger stake in the project over a longer period of time and generates pressure to expand the agency budget. Third, the centrepieces have been coupled to each other and to other projects by design and political justification. This deters micro-management, budget cuts and termination because it leaves other projects vulnerable to disruption of the centrepieces and makes the centrepieces indispensable to the whole space programme.

As argued below, shortfalls in project performance relative to promises are inherent in the structure of the civil space programme, and particularly in its lack of resilience. If this argument is correct, then reforms that fall short of restructuring are not likely to improve performance as promised. In short, the structure of the civil space programme is a monument to NASA's insecurity regarding the political viability of its vision for the human exploration of space. The agency has avoided a clean political test of the vision over the last two decades, evidently because it does not expect the vision to prevail in such a test. Hence the political viability of the vision is unclear and its priority remains controversial. In December 1990 the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US Space Program, chaired by Norman R. Augustine of the Martin Marietta Corporation, implicitly acknowledged and explicitly rejected the priority of human exploration. The Committee's first recommendation was 'That the civil space science program should have first priority for NASA resources • . .,12 The Augustine Committee also preferred to constrain the pace of space exploration according to the availability of funds, rather than push the pace according to a fixed schedule.

12Reportof the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US Space Programme, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, December 1990, p 25; emphasis added. 131nthe floor debate on the FY 1972 NASA Authorization Act, Senator Walter Mondale reviewed the details and concluded that 'in an incredible "about face" over a 1-year period, NASA has completely changed the shuttle's mission and its justification'. See the Congressional Record - Senate, 28 June 1971, p 22372. 14Bruce Murray, 'Civilian space: in search of presidential goals', Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1986, p 28. 15Robert W. Smith, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1989, p 74. SPACE POLICY May 1992

Primary examples• Having failed to sell a reusable shuttle as 'the next logical step' in the human exploration of space for FY 1971, NASA dropped the vision from its public justification of the Shuttle for FY 1972.13 Instead, NASA promoted the Shuttle as cost effective relative to the alternatives, including the existing fleet of expendable launch vehicles. The plausibility of the cost-effectiveness justification, however, depended on very high flight rates. Hence estimated Shuttle flight rates were set high enough to force nearly all payloads onto the Shuttle; indeed, they were set higher than the number required to launch all payloads• Thus NASA scaled up the Shuttle programme to encompass virtually all payload launch objectives - military, scientific and commercial applications, including those that did not require a human crew and in the process compromised technical requirements to gain political support, especially from the military. Thus the rest of the space programme was coupled to the Shuttle and became dependent on it. On the one hand, as Bruce Murray put it, 'NASA was able to insist that new automated missions use the Shuttle whether or not their designers wanted to do so. Some called this "forced busing in space". '14 On the other hand, managers learned to promote their projects within the agency by coupling them to the Shuttle, as Robert W. Smith observed in his history of the space telescope: 'the packaging together of the telescope and the shuttle would become a major means by which NASA managers sought to move the telescope from a marginal to a central position in the agency'. 15 NASA promised, in the words of President Nixon, that 'the space shuttle will give us routine access to space by sharply reducing costs in 119

Performance as promised dollars and preparation time' and that 'The resulting economies [from reusability] may bring operating costs down as low as one-tenth of those for present launch vehicles. '16 Significant additional economies would be achieved through the Shuttle's high flight rates and replacement of nearly all other launch vehicles supporting the nation's space effort. Moreover, NASA reduced estimated Shuttle development costs down to the highest amount consistent with programme approval, given NASA's assessment of the political situation. This was significantly less than the amount the Administrator knew would be required to develop the Shuttle. 17 In short, the promises made for the Shuttle were driven by political expediency, not technical feasibility. The Shuttle programme had no chance to meet these inflated promises. Roger A. Pielke, Jr, recently documented the shortfalls in performance. He compared NASA's 1972 estimates of Shuttle performance (if not commitments or promises) with actual performance through 1990.18

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16United States Civilian Space Programs, 1958-1978, report prepared for the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Serial D, Vol 1, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, January 1981, p 588. 17McCurdy, op cit, Ref 9, pp 31-32. 18Roger A. Pielke, Jr, 'The Space Shuttle program: "performance vs promise"', Center for Space and Geosciences Policy, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, 1991, which is forthcoming in Radford Byerly, Jr, ed, Space Policy Alternatives, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. ~gReport of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US Space Program, op cit, Ref 12, p 32. 2°Hans Mark, The Space Station: A Personal Journey, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1987, pp 127-128, 237-240.

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Capabilities. The Shuttle programme achieved only 37 Shuttle flights through 1990 (a flight rate average of four per year), or 94% less than the 1972 estimate of 580 (an average flight rate of 48 per year from 1979 through 1990). The average payload capacity of the three orbiters is only about 49 000 lb, or 33% less than the estimate of 65 000 lb. Costs (in 1990 dollars). Including development costs, the average cost per flight was $1.7 billion, or 19 times more than the 1972 estimate of $88 million. Excluding development costs, the average cost per flight was $1.1 billion, or 78 times more than the 1972 estimate of $14 million. The total cost of Shuttle development and operations through 1990 was $65 billion, or 27% more than the estimate of $51 billion. Schedule. The first flight was promised for 1978 and delivered in 1981. The Shuttle has consistently failed to meet flight schedules and is still not fully operational a decade after first launch.

The Augustine Committee concluded in December 1990 that 'the most significant deficiency in the nation's future civil space program is an insufficiency of reliable, flexible and efficient space launch capability'. 19 The consequences of almost exclusive dependence on the Shuttle were illustrated most tragically when the USA lost the Challenger in January 1986. The subsequent grounding of the civil space programme for nearly two and a half years exacerbated schedule slips, cost overruns and capability cutbacks in the many other projects designed to be dependent on the Shuttle. NASA's space station initiative was frustrated by the Carter administration but resurrected at the beginning of the Reagan administration in 1981. The top priorities of the new Administrator and Deputy Administrator were, first, 'to pay more attention to the NASA institution', and specifically to stop the decline of civil service employment; second, to make the Shuttle operational; and third, to initiate 'a permanently orbiting manned space station' programme. 2° As part of the subsequent effort to justify a space station initiative, a NASA committee selected the largest station concept consistent with political and fiscal circumstances and the Shuttle's capabilities. According to the Deputy Administrator, The committee believed that only a manned space station of some type could

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Performance as promised carry with it sufficient political imperative to interest the president and his advisors. The committee also argued that an unmanned platform would not take full advantage of the capabilities of the shuttle since the shuttle would have people on board during every flight,zl In a parallel effort to broaden support and participation, NASA contracted with eight aerospace firms 'to identify user requirements in space science and applications, technology development, commercial activities a n d . . , national security' for a permanently manned station. 22 This effectively precluded consideration of multiple alternatives to a permanently manned station, with each alternative focused on one requirement. It also coupled together multiple user requirements, despite technical incompatibilities among some requirements. NASA headquarters also insisted on a piece of the action for all NASA centres - despite the additional managerial complications involved in widespread agency participation. The President and Congress approved the Space Station as a concept for FY 1985. The concept and the multiple goals used to justify it helped NASA avoid specific commitments for the most part. But NASA did promise a Space Station that could be 'bought by the yard' (by adding discrete elements as funding became available) under a design-to-cost commitment of $8 billion. The $8 billion design-to-cost commitment was the highest amount expected to be consistent with project approval, but well below the amount that would be needed for Station development according to the NASA Administrator. 23 The design-to-cost commitment was quickly abandoned, and the Station was scaled up to its maximum extent in May 1986 at Systems Requirements Review. Since then NASA has been forced to redesign the Space Station a number of times and at considerable cost to conform to the annual budget and to address engineering problems not covered in programme reserves. The present Station falls quite short of the more optimistic estimates made either in August 1984, shortly after first approval, or in May 1986. •

211bid, p 139. 22Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters, The Space Station: A Description

of the Configuration Established at the Systems Requirements Review (SRR), June 1986, p 1. 231n an interview with Space News, 9-15 September 1991, p 30, James Beggs acknowledged that 'deep down I knew that they could not do the job for that amount of money'. 24Unfunded elements considered by some observers to be essential parts of the Station programme include an Assured Crew Return Vehicle and a large centrifuge for life sciences experiments important for long-term human exploration of space. 25M. Mitchell Waldrop, 'Space Station cost estimate double', Science, 27 February 1987, p 965.

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Capability. The crew size has been reduced from eight to four, the habitat modules have been reduced about 40% in length to 27 ft, and a closed life-support system and improved space suit for EVA activities have been deleted. Solar dynamic power has been deleted and photovoltaic power has been reduced from 75 kW to 56.25 kW. The dual keels and various 'hooks and scars' for attaching experiments and instruments have been eliminated, and the central truss has been reduced to 353 ft. Other elements deleted from the Space Station programme include the US co-orbiting and polar-orbiting platforms, the Flight Telerobotics Servicer and a stationary servicing facility.24 Schedule. The First Element Launch (FEL) has been slipped from October 1992 to the first quarter of 1996. Permanent manned capability is now scheduled for FY 2000, even though President Reagan, in his State of the Union address in January 1984, directed NASA 'to develop a permanently manned space station and do it within a decade'. Cost. The $8 billion (in 1984 dollars) design-to-cost commitment had more than doubled in real terms by 1987 and has continued to increase. 25 (NASA officials retrospectively refer to the $8 billion as an estimate rather than a commitment.) The General Accounting

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Office recently estimated development costs at about $32 billion in 1984 dollars, equivalent to about $40 billion in 1991 dollars. 26 In March 1991 the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council concluded that the redesigned Space Station 'does not meet the basic research requirements of the two principal scientific disciplines for which it is intended: (1) life sciences research necessary to support the national objective of long-term human exploration of space, and (2) microgravity research and applications'. 27 Nevertheless, the priority of the Station as 'the next logical step' was reasserted on 6 June 1991 when the House of Representatives adopted a floor amendment supported by NASA. The amendment restored funding for the Space Station by deleting half a billion dollars from other space projects and potentially twice that amount from non-space projects. In this respect the pattern for the post-Apollo era was set in the FY 1971 budget cycle when. as we have seen, NASA protected studies of a manned space station and a manned reusable shuttle at the expense of other projects. 28

Understanding performance shortfalls

26See the statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General, before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, House Committee on Government Operations, GAO/T-NSIAD-9126, 1 May 1991. 27National Research Council, Space Studies Board, Position on Proposed Redesign of Space Station Freedom, March 1991, p 1. 28Moreover, the pattern of cutbacks in the capabilities of the Station suggests that permanent manned presence - the top priority in terms of the vision - will be the last capability deleted in so far as NASA has a choice. 29James M. Beggs, 'Space Station: the next logical step', Aerospace America, September 1984, p 7.

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Shortfalls in project performance relative to promises are inherent in the structure of the civil space programme and the centrepieces. Disruption of the Shuttle and Station programmes tends to disrupt other projects coupled to them in the civil space programme. And the centrepieces are especially vulnerable to disruption because they were scaled up. Scaling up builds constituencies, but adds unnecessary technical and managerial complexities that undermine performance relative to promises. Multiple goals lead to multiple objectives and to design compromises among those objectives which are incompatible. For example, the Shuttle cannot be manned and reusable without compromising its low-cost objective; the Station cannot be permanently manned without compromising its use as a base for microgravity experiments or precise observations that would be disrupted by people moving about and Shuttles docking. Large scale leads to a more elaborate division of labour that requires the integration of more human, hardware and software elements, and more interfaces among those elements. According to NASA Administrator James Beggs, management was the biggest challenge of the Station programme after it was approved. 29 Longduration projects defer ground and flight tests of critical elements and their integration, which precludes the early detection and correction of engineering problems. Long-duration projects also tend to become technically and politically obsolete before their operational phases are completed. In general, the probability of critical mistakes, accidents, turnovers in personnel and the like increases with the number of non-redundant elements in the project and with the period of time the project is exposed to their failure. Hence the multiple purposes, large scale and long duration of the centrepieces leave them, by design, especially vulnerable to internal disruptions. Scaling up in these ways also makes the centrepieces especially vulnerable to external disruptions when the administration or the Congress is compelled, or chooses, to cut budgets or micro-manage. The large scale makes them highly visible targets with large opportunity costs that attract proponents of alternative uses of the money. The

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Performance as promised multiple objectives - especially incompatible and changing objectives suggest ways of decoupling Shuttle roles or Station programme elements, and transferring, deferring or deleting some of them. The long duration requires sustained political support despite the turnover of elected officials on two, four and six-year cycles, and without near-term operational tests that would, if successful, help sustain that support. Disruptions of the centrepieces, whether internal or external, tend to ripple through other interdependent projects when reserves are insufficient. Former N A S A Administrator James C. Fletcher explained the consequences of interdependence through coupling in a 1989 speech to the Explorers Club of New York: The program we are trying so hard to bring to fruition is an integral, interdependent whole - and, therefore, vulnerable to serious dislocation in the face of even small perturbations. The funds being requested do not permit us the luxury of backups, of alternatives, of programmatic robustness. Virtually every element of the program is being pursued on a success schedule - and we know in advance there will be unforeseen technical problems to solve and dilemmas to face which will require internal adjustments and constraints. 3°

3°James C. Fletcher, 'US space leadership in danger: to lead - or to follow', Vital Speeches of the Day, LV, 1 March 1989, p 299. 31To elaborate, interdependence leaves the entire project vulnerable to deviations from 'success' schedule by any nonredundant element. For example, suppose a piece of software is needed to test the functional integration of some hardware. If the software is delayed beyond scheduled delivery for any reason, the workers dependent on that software have to 'march in place' until it is delivered, and other workers downstream from them are also delayed. Eventually, delays become endemic and costs soar. 320n the lack of resilience in the Space Station programme, see Ronald D. Brunner and Radford Byerly, Jr, 'The Space Station programme: defining the problem', Space Policy, Vol 6, No 2, May 1990, pp 131-145. More generally, see Albert D. Wheelon, 'Toward a new space policy', in Radford Byerly, Jr, ed, Space Policy Reconsidered, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1989, Ch 3, pp 53-69.

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Thus even a small change forces serious dislocations on interdependent projects, and the 'success' schedule presumes and requires that everything will work out as planned. 3~ Wittingly or unwittingly, this is a deterrent to budget cuts and other externally imposed changes, and a plausible explanation of any performance shortfalls when internal or external disruptions inevitably occur. But this is not prudent policy or management if performance counts. In short, the structure of the civil space programme lacks resilience. Resilience is the capacity to perform satisfactorily despite disruptions. Resilience is necessary in the space programme because project performance is subject to disruptions from specific events that N A S A cannot predict or control. 32 Events of this kind - mistakes, accidents, turnovers, micro-management and budget cuts - are discounted or ignored in 'success-oriented' planning. But when these events inevitably occur, project managers are forced to compromise plans and promises by cutting back capabilities, slipping schedules, or both, and by accepting the cost overruns entailed by such changes. Hence project performance falls short of the promises made at the time of project approval and at later dates.

Understanding decision process failures The lack of any obvious improvement in aggregate performance over time indicates failures in the decision process. A decision process in good working order can improve performance, even if goals are ambiguous and technologies are uncertain, by applying the lessons of experience from one project to the next. Among other things, such learning depends on an enforceable agreement to evaluate project performance, accountability for performance under the agreement, and flexibility to incorporate the lessons. Of course these conditions are not likely to be met if performance as promised is a secondary consideration for those who make the decisions. An enforceable agreement is frustrated by the consequences of scaling up projects to become 'all things to all people'. General and open-ended goals are emphasized over relatively limited and specific project objectives. Multiple objectives are seldom prioritized. Estimates of performance relevant to objectives may not be understood as

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33Fletcher, op cit, Ref 30, p 299, contends that 'Restudy after restudy simply reinforces the conclusion that Station Freedom is well conceived and managed but very sparingly financed.' 341bid. 35The administration and Congress do, however, control the pace of the civil space programme through the amount appropriated each year.

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commitments on NASA's part. Initial approval may be misunderstood as a long-term funding commitment on the part of the administration or Congress. Such obscure, multiple or questionable 'commitments' open the door for expedient reconstructions of the initial agreement. For example, defenders of the Shuttle characterize it as a technical success, and in doing so ignore estimated flight rates and other promises used to sell the Shuttle. Defenders of the Space Station blame its problems on underfunding, and in doing so presume that the administration and Congress made some unspecified long-term funding commitments at some unspecified levels. 33 Accountability for performance under an initial project agreement would be frustrated even if the agreement were enforceable. Because of 'success' schedules and interdependence among projects, a project may easily fail to perform as promised for reasons beyond the project manager's control. The more people and offices who are plausibly responsible for shortfalls in performance, the more difficult it is to hold any of them accountable. Moreover, scaling up may leave the larger projects, like Shuttle and Station, effectively unaccountable: at some point in the development process the size of the political investment may push them 'over the hump', where it becomes politically expedient if not necessary to carry them along regardless of performance. The civil space programme does not maintain reserves or margins sufficient to incorporate the lessons of experience. As James C. Fletcher observed in his 1989 speech to the Explorers Club, 'The funds being requested do not permit us the luxury of backups, of alternatives, of programmatic robustness. '34 And as we have seen, the funds requested are reduced from what is required to what is considered to be the maximum politically feasible; unrealistic 'success' schedules are disrupted by appropriations that fall short of requests and by technical problems not covered through project reserves; and those disruptions force cost overruns and other shortfalls in performance that ripple through the space programme. Within this vicious circle, the Shuttle and the Space Station represent large-scale encumbrances on future budgets over decades of development and operations. Thus the structure and performance of the civil space programme leave little room for new projects. But new projects are needed in relatively large numbers to incorporate the lessons of experience from older projects and generate new lessons. Moreover, proposed new projects are needed in relatively large numbers for the administration and the congressional authorization committees to gain control over the direction of the civil space programme. NASA now controls the direction by withholding modest alternatives to the projects it proposes, as well as by making politically expedient promises. For example, in the early 1970s N A S A proposed a reusable manned shuttle to cover nearly all launch requirements, not multiple launch vehicles each optimized for a different requirement such as low-cost access to space for unmanned missions. In the early 1980s NASA proposed a permanently manned space station, not multiple platforms, manned or unmanned, each focused on a particular objective such as microgravity experiments on materials. Thus alternatives are 'absorbed' within NASA. The administration and the authorization committees devolve control over the direction of the civil space programme when they fail to insist on alternatives and on honest estimates for each alternative. 35

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Performance as promised

Because performance as promised is not a priority inside the space policy decision process, it is not surprising that the decision process fails to improve performance over time. When insiders know that the public 'commitments' made at project approval are not enforceable or expected to be enforced, the 'commitments' may become fig leaves of respectability to cover special interests that cannot survive public scrutiny. For example, project managers can choose to underestimate schedules and costs and exaggerate capabilities as they deem necessary in order to sell a project. Administrators at headquarters can choose to tolerate or encourage the practice in order to help the institution survive and prosper relative to other agencies in the current budget cycle. Elected officials can choose to look the other way when shortfalls in performance materialize. They may be predisposed to do so, despite their oversight responsibilities, because the space programme can be a useful pawn in playing Washington power games, in associating with popular symbols or in delivering more tangible benefits to their constituencies. Outsiders can know little about the situation, and do less, without an extraordinary investment of time and effort.

A restructured policy A restructured policy based on modest and discrete projects would allow project managers to improve performance as promised. At the same time it would provide the resilience necessary for the civil space programme as a whole to adapt to changes in the priority of space goals, to the lessons of experience and to other events that cannot be predicted or controlled. Overview Basic criterion. The basic criterion for a restructured programme is

36See Lee Dye, 'Countdown for NASA: restructuring movement launched as time runs out for ailing space agency', Los Angeles Times, 20 August 1990, p B3. See also Thomas G. Denham, 'Lost in the void: because of NASA, the US space program has gone astray', Barron 's, 15 July 1991, p 10.

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performance as promised. This means that the administration and Congress hold NASA accountable for each project's initial commitments on capabilities, schedules and costs. The commitments pertain to the specific and limited objectives of each project, not to the general and open-ended goals of the civil space programme. The difference is important because only the objectives are relevant to improving performance as promised. Moreover, we can achieve consensus on priorities among the objectives of a single project even though we have not been able to achieve consensus on priorities among the goals of the civil space programme in the post-Apollo era. What is the justification for this criterion? First, performance as promised will improve NASA's viability as an institution. Persistent shortfalls in performance, on the other hand, are both symptom and cause of institutional decline. For example, when workers are repeatedly forced to descope and delay their projects, the agency's morale and productivity suffer. When new project proposals are considered against a background of poor performance, the agency's credibility and influence are diminished in the competition for funds. When scattered problems are perceived as part of an institutional pattern, the future of the agency itself is called into question. This happened to NASA in 1990, when problems in the Station design, an optical flaw in the Hubble Space Telescope and hydrogen leaks in the Shuttle fleet focused attention on the viability of the agency itself. 36 Second, performance as promised will help sustain the civil space

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programme. Performance as promised means accountability, and accountability is necessary to adapt the programme to changing national needs and thereby to renew its base of long-term public support. On the other hand, when projects persistently promise one thing and do another, they are effectively unaccountable to the public and may be used for purposes that cannot be justified in public. This jeopardizes long-term public support. Only a programme in harmony with changing national needs, as assessed by those outside the programme, is sustainable in an open political system. Third, performance as promised will advance space science, exploration and applications, which, after all, are the principal justifications of the civil space programme. Performance as promised means efficiency in the use of the resources invested. Shortfalls in performance, on the other hand, represent the waste of talent, time and money. Much of that waste stems from unnecessarily complex projects that are placed on 'success' schedules without adequate reserves and coupled to other projects, leaving them vulnerable to costly disruptions elsewhere in the space programme. Such waste is unnecessary because it can be avoided. And, by avoiding it, resources will be freed up to reinvest in the space programme. The criterion of performance as promised is neutral with respect to continuing controversy, over the relative priority of space science, exploration and application goals, and the relative priority of manned and automated means. Any goal, vision or direction for the civil space programme may be justified on procedural grounds, if on a regular basis the public and public officials outside NASA are allowed to decide among projects leading in different directions by different means, and if they are given dependable information on the worth of each project. These are necessary and sufficient conditions for the administration and the congressional authorization committees to regain control over the direction of the space programme.

Structure. To meet the criterion of performance as promised, and to evolve in directions warranted by the lessons of experience and changing national needs, the civil space programme must be restructured. This requires a mix of multiple, modest and discrete projects that can adapt smoothly over time as circumstances warrant - in contrast to one vision locked in through dependence on a few large centrepieces designed to resist change. •

•

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First, each project should be decoupled from parallel R&D projects wherever possible in order to minimize disruptions and performance shortfalls from the ripple effect. For example, rely on proven (operational) technologies and pursue redundant technologies when proven technologies are not available. Second, each project should be simplified to eliminate technical and managerial complexities that unnecessarily threaten performance as promised. In particular: (a) Each project should be focused on a single objective wherever possible, in order to allocate resources effectively towards that objective. This need not preclude secondary objectives that are in fact secondary. (b) Each project should be small enough to simplify management and technical interfaces. This includes locating the entire project within one centre, or putting one centre clearly in charge in multicentre projects. (c) Each project should be quick enough to eliminate mistakes early through ground

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•

and flight tests, not merely paper and computer tests. The alternative is to compound those mistakes in further design and development. These approaches to minimizing managerial and technical complexity are mutually reinforcing: a focused project tends to be small, a small project tends to be quick, a quick project tends to be focused. Such projects leave room for multiple projects, and choices among them, under the agency's budget constraint. Third, each project should be sufficiently well defined to support realistic capability, schedule and cost commitments at the time of project approval, and to facilitate agreement on those commitments. Reserves and margins should be adequate to meet unanticipated contingencies, given an estimate of project risks.

A space programme built up from such projects need not preclude grand visions like the human exploration of space. Such a vision can be realized through modest and discrete steps - if there are enough steps, the successful steps are cumulated, and the vision remains in harmony with national needs. Given the profound ambiguities and uncertainties faced by the space programme over periods measured in years and decades, the only rational way to proceed is through multiple, modest and discrete steps. A locked-in, 'success-oriented' approach is irrational with respect to performance and to all goals or objectives that depend upon performance. 37

Primary examples. The Shuttle, the Space Station and other projects are being transformed into relatively modest and discrete alternatives to what was initially approved, despite the best efforts of NASA to defend what was initially approved. Moreover, relatively modest and discrete alternatives were available at the time of initial approval. Hence this approach to restructuring can be illustrated by considering the end result of present trends, and by reconsidering the alternatives initially available. Realities have forced NASA to shift many military, commercial and scientific missions from the Shuttle to unmanned expendable launch vehicles, both before and after the loss of the Challenger. For example, when the Air Force mothballed the Vandenberg Shuttle launch facility, missions that required a polar orbit were decoupled from the Shuttle. The Shuttle's role has been reduced in the direction of missions, such as maintenance or recovery in orbit by astronauts, that require its unique capabilities and help justify its high costs. In the early 1970s the available alternatives to a reusable manned shuttle included a fleet of operational expendable launch vehicles, each suitable for launching a 37For an introduction to theories of pro- somewhat different class of unmanned or manned payloads. The cedural rationality, for which Herbert A. present launch system bears a closer resemblance to the launch system Simon won the Nobel Prize in Economic that existed in 1971 than to the Shuttle-dominated system proposed in Science, see his Reason in Public Affairs, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1971. 1983. See also James G. March, 'Theories Similarly, NASA has been forced to decouple and to delete, defer or of choice and making decisions', Society, transfer many elements of the Space Station programme because of November/December 1982, pp 29-39. ~Report of the Advisory Committee on the unanticipated technical, political and fiscal realities. In December 1990 Future of the USA Space Program, op cit, the Augustine Committee recommended that further 'steps should be Ref 12, p 29. 39Ronald D. Brunner, Radford Byerly, Jr, taken to reduce the station's size and complexity' and 'permit greater and Roger A. Pielke, Jr, 'The future of the end-to-end testing prior to launch', among other things. 3s The restrucSpace Station program', forthcoming in turing of the Space Station completed early in 1991 is probably not the Radford Byerly, Jr, ed, Space Policy Alternatives, Westview Press, Boulder, last. One possible outcome is a man-tended capability, rather than the CO. permanent manned presence NASA prefers. 39 In the early 1980s one

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alternative was a space platform, advocated within N A S A by the Marshall Space Flight Center, that would have been man-tended initially, but could have evolved into a permanently manned station. Something like this was suggested in the Senate appropriations bill for FY 1984. 4o Something like this was implied by the claim that Congress could 'buy it by the yard', a claim which N A S A leaders used to promote the Space Station. More recently, under pressure from Congress and an engineering review panel appointed by the White House, NASA has reluctantly announced that it is prepared to break up the six massive platforms of the Earth Observation System (EOS) into about 18 medium-sized satellites. According to one report in the trade press, Lennard Fisk, NASA associate administrator for space science, [said] he still believes large EOS platforms 'give you the most measurements.., in the least amount of time, for the least amount of money.' However, Fisk said the 'serious drawback' to large platforms 'is that they are relatively inflexible' when technical problems occur or when budgets do not grow as much as expected. 41 According to another report, the agency is considering a fundamental reversal of 'the trend toward large, expensive spacecraft that take a decade or more to develop and fly,.42 EOS itself was originally conceived as a free-flying platform within the Space Station programme. The proposed Moon/Mars mission is being reconsidered along similar lines. The report of the Augustine Committee calls for 'an evolutionary, flexible long-range plan' and a 'framework within which to develop at least six new technology bases and program elements'. (Whether these technology bases should be developed as discrete projects is left unclear.) The report also recommends that 'the Mission from Planet Earth be configured to an open-ended schedule, tailored to match the availability of funds'. 43 A recent report by the Office of Technology Assessment on Exploring the Moon and Mars is even more explicit: 4°The relevant part is quoted in Mark, op cit, Ref 20, p 198: 'In reference to the Space Station, the Committee suggests that NASA devote additional effort to exploring the potential benefits that can be derived through the design of a fully automated space platform. The Committee believes that an evolutionary approach to a manned Space Station is the most effective way of proceeding.' 41Douglas Isbell, 'EOS platforms will shrink, multiply to 18', Space News, 19 August 1991, p 1. 42james R. Asker, 'Earth Observation System satellites likely to be split for Atlas launches', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 August 1991, p 24. Also William J. Broad, 'NASA moves to end Iongtime reliance on big spacecraft', New York Times, 16 September 1991, p AI. 43Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US Space Program, op cit, Ref 12, p 28. 4"Office of Technology Assessment, Exploring the Moon and Mars: Choices for the Nation, OTA-ISC-502, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, July 1991, p 15. The entire paragraph is emphasized in the original. 4Slbid, p 16.

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US experience with large science and technology projects and long-range goals suggest that program planners need to maintain considerable planning flexibility and a broad set of intermediate goals within the general direction. Operational success in each successive phase should be favored over forcing a fit to a detailed long-term plan. 44 The report explicitly warns that 'Planners should not attempt to "freeze" or "lock-in" a large-scale, long-term plan tightly coupled to expected funding. '45 Thus the trend of events and the climate of opinion appear to be moving in favour of a more resilient space programme based on relatively modest and discrete projects. Questions of realism are better directed towards the multipurpose, scaled-up and highly coupled alternative.

Improving performance There are reasons to believe that restructuring the civil space programme around modest and discrete projects - relatively decoupled, simplified and well defined - can improve performance as promised. The reasons include experience and theory outside space policy, and the findings of the 1980-81 N A S A study of project management to contain cost and schedule growth. One body of experience and theory underscores the value of breaking a complex problem down into its separable parts. An example is the

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invention of the fixed-wing airplane, a process that extended 110 years from the publication of the basic concept in 1799 to the demonstration of practical aircraft at the Reims Air Show in 1909. 46 More than 100 different designs were built and tested over this period, often at great expense, but progress was slow and sporadic. The Wright brothers succeeded in developing their first aeroplane in only four years because they took a different approach: 'Most inventors spent their time constructing and testing complete craft; the Wright Brothers worked by isolating a problem, finding a system to test potential solutions, and integrating their solution back into an airplane design. '47 First they isolated the problem of lateral control, invented a system to warp wings that could be tested with a kite, and found a satisfactory solution that was eventually integrated into all subsequent designs. Then, having solved the problem of lateral control, they proceeded in a similar manner to isolate and solve other problems (including lift and propulsion) one at a time. Breaking the problem down is superior to the alternative for complex problems because it reduces the number of design alternatives to be tested. For example, if there are 10 design alternatives in each of three subsystems, there are only 30 subsystem alternatives (10 + 10 + 10) to test in the search for a satisfactory solution, but 1000 system alternatives (10 × 10 × 10). Moreover, breaking the problem down provides more direct feedback. If a wing shape fails to show adequate lift in a wind tunnel test, the failure can be attributed directly to the wing shape; if a flight test fails, there are more possibilities to consider. 48 Hence it is counterproductive to couple subsystems together in a comprehensive plan until solutions to subsystem problems have been found. The general theoretical point is that 'complex systems will evolve from simple systems much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate forms than if there are not'. 49 Similarly, a complex problem can be solved much more rapidly if there are stable solutions to its separable parts. These are central conclusions from theories of procedural rationality, which are based on observations of behaviour and recognize that ambiguities in goals and uncertainties about means are inherent in any complex decision situation. Theories of substantive rationality, in contrast, are based on an ideal of rationality that presumes a God-like omniscience encompassing all alternatives, all consequences and all preferences. 5° 'Success-oriented' planning in the space programme is an attempt to implement this ideal in practice. Another body of experience and theory underscores the worth of reserves and margins in the parts of a system, and redundancy among the parts, as opposed to optimal efficiency. The history of public 46This example is based on Gary Bradadministration exhibits persistent tendencies towards streamlining sysshaw and Marsha Lienert, 'The invention tems for optimal efficiency - indicated by zero reserves, margins and of the airplane', Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, redundancy - making each part an essential link in a tightly organized 1991. chain of means and ends. According to Martin Landau, 'In such 4~lbid, p 1. systems, especially when large, there is a tendency for even minor errors 481bid, p 5. 49Herbert A. Simon, 'The architecture of to be so amplified along the length of the chain as to make the end-result complexity', in The Sciences of the Artifiquite unreliable . . . The failure, then, of a single part can mean the cial, 2nd ed, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, failure of the entire system . . .,51 The alternative to a serial arrange1981, p 209. 5°Simon, op cit, Ref 37. ment of parts is a parallel arrangement, which, like a dual braking SlMartin Landau, 'Redundancy, rationality, system in a car, allows the system to perform even if one part fails. In and the problems of duplication and overshort, the performance of the system can become more reliable than any lap', Public Administration Review, Vol 29, July/August 1969, p 350. of its parts through redundancy, and the reliability of any one part can

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Performance as promised Table 1. Selected conclusions of the NASA Project Management Study, 1980-81. (1) The following have been significant contributors to cost and schedule growth of several NASA projects: (a) Technical complexity of the projects. (b) Inadequate definition, prior to the NASA decision to proceed with project implementation, and the agency's commitment to the OMB and the Congress, including: • • •

Limited advanced technology and development and inadequate definition of the technical, cost, and schedule requirements for the project to be implemented... Over-optimism, in terms of the cost and schedule requirements for new projects, resulting from NASA's internal project advocacy process during the budget cycle. Inadequate evaluation of the project's technical complexity and risks leading to either insufficient or inappropriate reserves (fiscal, schedule, and technical).

(c) NASA's tendency to select the low bidder in the competitive acquisition process used for major system development. This is recognized by industry and can have an adverse effect on the project's performance when artificially low bids are accepted by NASA and used to rationalize low completion costs and annual funding requirements. (d) Poor tracking of contractor accomplishments against approved plans in a timely fashion, leading to late identification of problems... (7) In some cases, the management of technically complex projects has been assigned to multiple NASA Centers without proper consideration of each Center's capability or of the management and technical relationships between the Centers. The management problems and intercenter friction resulting from such a situation can contribute to cost growth.

Source: Donald P. Hearth, 'Notes on conclusions and recommendations to accompany the briefing charts on the NASA Project Management Study', January 1981.

S2Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US Space Program, op cit, Ref 12, p 19. 53David Collingridge, 'Technology organizations and incrementalism: the Space Shuttle', Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol 2, 1990, p 181. The case studies are pulled together in a book in press tentatively entitled The Manage-

ment of Scale: Big Organizations, Big Technologies, Big Mistakes. S4Hearth, op cit, Ref 4, p 7.

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(8) A project will experience increased technical, schedule, and cost risk when it is dependent on the parallel development of critical supporting project systems that are outside of the Project Manager's authority.

be improved through reserves and margins. Hence, from the standpoint of system performance, back-ups and alternatives are not luxuries as former Administrator Fletcher suggested; a 'success' schedule, like other forms of streamlining, makes little sense; and the Augustine Committee's concern about overcommitment of the space programme is quite reasonable. 52 Another body of experience and theory underscores the worth of resilience in the development and performance of technology. David Collingridge examined six cases of inflexible technology - the Space Shuttle, nuclear power, North Sea oil, videotex, large irrigation schemes in developing countries, and high-rise system building in the UK. He found that 'long lead time, large unit size, capital intensity and the need for supporting infrastructure' are the key characteristics of inflexible technology. These characteristics 'make errors in the planning, development and implementation of the technology both likely and expensive'. He concluded that 'In general, a technology that performs better is one which can be developed in a series of small steps, with choices made in a decentralized way. '53 Theory and experience are consistent with the conclusions of the 1980-81 NASA project management study. The study team, chaired by Donald P. Hearth, surveyed all NASA projects and focused on 13 representative projects to understand how to contain cost and schedule growth. As shown in Table l, several conclusions point to coupling (8), complexity (la, ld, 7) and inadequate definition (lb and lc) as factors contributing to cost and schedule growth. The recommendation for adequate reserves addressed all three of these problems: NASA management should establish a policy that all major NASA projects will include adequate reserves... The level of the reserves should be a function of project definition maturity, technical complexity, and the risks anticipated during implementation, including the complexity and risk associated with concurrent developments of major interfacing systems.54 Other recommendations involved strengthening project definition as a

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more realistic baseline for project implementation; minimizing management interfaces, or giving authority and control to one centre in multicentre projects; and visibility for contractor activities to track progress and identify problems quickly. But the report did not mention decoupling, or reducing complexity through relatively focused, small and quick projects. 55 In these respects the present restructuring alternative goes beyond the study team's recommendations but addresses factors the team identified as major contributors to shortfalls in performance.

Improving the decision process

55The first recommendation was that 'NASA should continue to pursue technically advanced projects and expect cost growth in some of its projects in the future.' Of course technically advanced projects may be relatively focused, small and quick, or they may be the opposite,

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A restructured programme would permit improvements in the decision process. First, a project that is decoupled, simplified and well defined minimizes risks and uncertainties. Hence it would be easier to negotiate an enforceable agreement that requires only limited and specific commitments from each party. NASA could accept a few such commitments on project capability, schedule and cost with some confidence that they could be met, and that, in any case, one modest and discrete project alone would not jeopardize the agency or the space programme. In the interest of performance, the administration and Congress could grant multiyear authorizations and appropriations for a modest and discrete project and not jeopardize their discretion in future budget cycles to any significant extent. In any case, there is less need for multiyear commitments to programmes that are completed quickly. Second, such an agreement would define and simplify the interfaces among the parties involved, and therefore would facilitate accountability. NASA headquarters, the administration and Congress could be held accountable more easily for any unilateral attempt to attenuate or abandon their specific and limited commitments. Moreover, they would have less reason to micro-manage a modest and discrete project that does not jeopardize their basic interests, and less opportunity if there are many such projects to oversee at the same time. Thus the project manager might actually be allowed to manage the project, with discretion to allocate a reliable flow of authorizations and appropriations to meet the project's performance promises. The project manager might therefore be held accountable by NASA for successes and failures under the initial agreement. In short, performance can count if the project is sufficiently modest and discrete that NASA, the administration and Congress do not consider it indispensable. And performance can be reflected in their decision to follow up or terminate a project. Third, more focused, smaller and quicker projects would allow the administration and Congress to set the direction of a restructured civil space programme because they would have more programme choices to make. Consider a hypothetical example that deliberately ignores complicated details to highlight the evolutionary logic: If the average project took three years from approval to completion, then a third of the projects would be completed and a third of a constant agency budget would be freed up in an average year. If the funds appropriated fell short of a constant agency budget, the administration and Congress could make up the difference by deferring approval of some new projects while protecting all ongoing projects still meeting their performance commitments. If the funds available exceeded a constant agency budget, the administration and Congress would be able to approve more new projects. In either case, they could revise the

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Performance as promised direction of the space programme by adjusting the mix of projects to reflect recent performance and emerging national needs. The key to improvements throughout the decision process is to establish the expectation that project performance counts. For example, if performance is expected to count, prospective project managers will tend to insist on realistic estimates of capabilities, schedules and costs (including adequate reserves) in order to protect their careers. NASA headquarters will tend to screen out projects that are not relatively decoupled, simplified and well defined for peformance in order to protect the agency's budget from overruns that would preclude new starts. The administration and Congress will tend to abstain from micro-managing or cutting ongoing projects because of more opportunities to advance their interests, at less political cost, by focusing on new project approvals. In short, as the expectation that performance counts begins to be established, everyone begins to adapt as a matter of narrow self-interest. But the adaptations also serve the common interest as formulated in the performance commitments of projects approved.

Initiating restructuring Initiating the process of restructuring requires leadership applied to key decisions in order to establish the expectation that performance counts. The major barriers appear to be self-serving assumptions rooted in the past of the civilian space programme.

56Interview conducted by the author on 12 July 1989 in Boulder, CO. 57Interview conducted by the author on 2 November 1989 in Washington, DC.

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Leadership In the absence of strong leadership the civil space programme will tend to perpetuate business as usual by incorporating only those changes it cannot avoid. For example, the loss of the Challenger forced the USA to reduce the role of the Shuttle in the launch system, but otherwise left the de facto policy of the post-Apollo era largely intact. Inertia is the default mode for any large undertaking, and especially for one designed to resist adaptation. Hence strong leadership is necessary to initiate restructuring of the space programme to improve performance. The question is where the necessary leadership will come from. Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is that leadership can come from NASA (including scientists and engineers associated with the agency), the administration or Congress - and leadership will most probably come from an informal coalition of leaders from each of these institutions. The significant political cleavage is not between these institutions, but between those who are satisfied with business as usual in the civil space programme and those who are not. The latter can be found in each institution. Dissatisfaction in and around NASA is seldom expressed in public, and therefore tends to be underestimated outside the agency. But dissatisfaction is not difficult to document and illustrate from private interviews and reports. For example, an official who had played an important role in the Space Station programme began his personal appraisal of the programme with the observation that 'We created a monster and we did it to ourselves.'S6 Another official at headquarters became visibly upset when NASA's record on performance as promised led him to conclude that 'NASA's word doesn't mean much anymore. '57 From personnel at NASA centres come persistent reports of frustration when, for example, project development is repeatedly disrupted by SPACE POLICY May 1992

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'what if' excuses stemming from the ripple effect; or the flow of technical information is inhibited by political rivalries among the centres; or reports of newly discovered technical problems or opportunities are absorbed without effect as they move up through multiple layers of management in which public relations become increasingly important. 5s A coalition of space scientists and engineers working in and around several NASA centres found it prudent to transmit their proposals for reform directly to Norman Augustine, chairman of the Advisory Committee, with a request for anonymity if the proposals were circulated to the entire Committee. Within the administration, the Space Council under the leadership of Vice President Dan Quayle pressed for establishment of the Augustine Committee, a Synthesis Group on America's Space Exploration Initiative chaired by Thomas P. Stafford and an engineering review panel to reconsider the Earth Observation System. These initiatives were taken in response to concern, if not dissatisfaction, with business as usual in the civil space programme. It remains to be seen whether their respective reports will serve to buy time in the expectation that concern will dissipate, or to initiate reform if not restructuring. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the administration is consistently more generous than Congress in funding the civil space programme. For example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has cut more from NASA's annual request for the Space Station than the Congress has cut from the President's request for the same programme. 59 Within the Congress, the House Appropriations Subcommittee under the leadership of Chairman Bob Traxler and ranking minority member Bill Green attempted to eliminate the Space Station from the FY 1992 budget. This attempt failed on the floor of the House on 6 June 1991. It was the latest in a series of attempts in Congress to terminate the Space Station, reflecting persistent dissatisfaction with the performance of the programme, increasingly severe funding constraints and various other concerns that go well beyond space policy. Wherever leaders come from, their first task is to question the worth of business as usual through appeals to experience that bear on the interests of people involved in the space programme. These interests include progress with respect to space science, exploration and application goals, as well as the sustainability of the civil space programme and NASA's viability as an institution. Resistance to restructuring will begin to dissipate in the space programme when people begin to realize that business as usual increasingly undermines these interests. Resistance also will begin to dissipate when elected officials begin to realize that they have little control over the direction of the civil space programme under business as usual. The parallel task of leadership is to move towards modest, discrete projects that can perform as promised, and modifications in the decision process to improve performance over time. SeRichard P. Feynman emphasized this The task of leadership is n o t to commission another advisory panel as communication problem in his personal a substitute for decisions and actions that address the structural probassessment of the Challenger accident. 'For a successful technology, reality must lems of the space programme. Until recently, perhaps, advisory panels take precedence over public relations, for have too often been commissioned to rejustify present policy or to study Nature cannot be fooled.' See his What Do You Care What Other People Think?, symptoms of its structural problems until demands for redirection, W.W. Norton, New York, NY, 1989, pp reform or restructuring dissipate. 'Rounding up the usual suspects' has 215, 237. become a cynical reference to the practice of asking scientists, engineers SgRecent figures are summarized in David and managers to help elected officials and their top appointees avoid the C. Morrison, 'Lost in space', National Journal, 6 July 1991, p 1672. more difficult policy and political issues.

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K e y dec&ions

There are a number of key decisions at which leadership can be brought to bear to initiate restructuring. However, de f a c t o policy over the two decades of the post-Apollo era has left no good alternatives. Any significant decision will be painful in one way or another. Decisions on the Shuttle and Station are key because so much of the agency's future resources are tied up in them. Restructuring could be advanced by recognizing that piecemeal deferral and deletion of Shuttle launch roles and Space Station elements are not aberrations, but continuing trends forced by technical, fiscal and political realities. Fewer resources would be wasted by anticipating the eventual outcomes of those trends and by moving to secure those eventual outcomes as quickly as possible. More resources could be freed up by terminating the Space Station, which has budget run-outs large enough to 'make well' many smaller programmes in and outside the space programme for a long time. Annual authorization and appropriation decisions on all projects are key to establishing the expectation that project performance counts. When the budget available is not sufficient to cover the agency's requirements, terminate those ongoing projects with the poorest performance records in order to protect and help stabilize the others. For proposed new projects, screen out those that are not decoupled, focused, small, quick and well defined for performance, and select from those remaining according to changing national needs. Where projects have had a chance to perform as promised, weigh their performance into the assessment of new projects from the same project managers and NASA centres. In establishing the expectation that performance counts, rewarding good performance is as important as penalizing poor performance. Decisions affecting the overall size and structure of the civil space programme are key to enhancing choice. The difference or 'wedge' between the agency's extrapolated budget trend and the combined budget run-outs of approved projects is an index of future choice: it represents the capacity to choose to add new projects without destablilizing ongoing projects. The 'wedge' has been negative for some years. 6° The proportion of decoupled or discrete R&D projects represents the capacity to choose to terminate ongoing projects without disrupting other projects. The multiple goals of space policy represent the capacity to revise the directions of the space programme according to the lessons of experience and changing national needs - if there is choice among programmes of different kinds. Breaking up NASA is an alternative way of enhancing choice and the capacity to revise the directions of the space programme. NASA centres should be reorganized into separate agencies to advocate separate missions - for example, space science, exploration or applications; 6°See The NASA Core Program in the manned or automated missions; R&D projects or operations - and 1990s and Beyond, a special study of the therefore to compete for authorizations and appropriations with each Congressional Budget Office, May 1988. For an extension of the study, see David H. other and with all other agencies in the federal budget. This is a drastic Moore, 'A budget-constrained NASA prog- alternative, but it merits consideration if all else fails. ram for the 1990s', in Radford Byerly, Jr, ed, Space Policy Reconsidered, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1989, Ch 1, pp 13-32. These analyses anticipated that budget constraints would eventually force a choice between the Space Station and widespread disruption of other projects.

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Barriers to initiation

Certain assumptions stand in the way of initiating the restructuring process. One is that individual space projects, the vision of human exploration or NASA itself could not survive in the federal budget

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process if forced to make open, honest commitments prior to project approval. Put another way, some assume it is necessary to overestimate benefits and underestimate the costs of space programmes in order to compete successfully for limited funds. The realism of this assumption cannot be assessed until it is put to the test of practice. In the meantime the assumption manifests doubts about the value of the space programme as assessed by outsiders; it suggests that a space project, the vision or N A S A itself is a worthy end that justifies unworthy means; and it presumes that those inside the space programme are authorized to balance space interests and other national interests. Under the US system of government only the elected representatives of the public have the authority to balance competing interests, and they require a range of alternatives and dependable information on each alternative in order to find a reasonable balance. Hence if a space or non-space alternative cannot be honestly and openly justified, it should not be approved. Another assumption is that a grand vision like the human exploration and colonization of space requires a grand, premeditated design. This assumption is reminiscent of the creationists' 'argument from design' for the existence of God, an argument which predates Darwin. According to one student of evolution, 'We are entirely accustomed to the idea that complex elegance is an indicator of premeditated, crafted design. This is probably the most powerful reason for the b e l i e f . . , in some kind of supernatural deity.'61 Theology aside, it is hubris to presume that mere mortals have the God-like omniscience necessary to anticipate, control and integrate all the myriad factors - technical, fiscal and political required for the premeditated designs of the Shuttle and Station programmes to perform as promised. The vision will be realized, if it is realized at all, through the cumulation of large numbers of small steps that prove to be successful in practice. The vision's grand rhetoric may be used to inspire the nation to take those steps, but not without the risk of more hubris. Another assumption is that we cannot eliminate politics. This is clearly true if it means that different interests must be reconciled in space policy decisions. It is clearly false if it means that special interests must dominate common interests, or that the two cannot be reconciled. Special interests are those not used or not accepted to justify a choice among alternatives in open and honest debate; common interests are those both used and accepted to justify a choice under those circumstances. In this procedural sense, moving money and jobs to N A S A centres, contractors and congressional constituencies are serving special interests; space policy goals and project performance promises are serving common interests. A project that delivers on its performance promises and advances space policy goals can also move money and jobs in the short run, and in the long term such projects are necessary to sustain the flow of money and jobs. Hence the special and common interests in the civil space programme can be reconciled.

Conclusion 61Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, W.W. Norton, New York, NY, 1987, p xii.

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This article has contended that shortfalls in project performance are inherent in the structure of the civil space programme, and particularly in its lack of resilience. Other alleged problems - including underfunding, changing project requirements, and procurement contracts that

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62Andrew Lawler, 'NASA faces 1993 budget showdown', Space News, 26 August 1991, pp 3, 29.

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encourage cost overruns - are symptoms of the lack of resilience that will persist until the civil space programme is restructured around a mix of modest and discrete projects. This alternative requires more than hardware changes, however. It also requires stronger political leadership applied to certain key decisions to establish the expectation that performance counts. Whatever the problem, pressures to reform or restructure the civil space programme have been accumulating for some time and will continue to do so. The difficulties in funding the N A S A core programme anticipated by the Congressional Budget Office in 1988 were temporarily masked by generous N A S A budget increases that have averaged more than 12% per year since FY 1986. For FY 1992, however, appropriations conferees approved $14.3 billion for NASA. This is a 3% increase, which is less than the rate of inflation and much less than the 13% increase requested by the President or the 10% real increase assumed by the Augustine Committee. For FY 1993 the OMB estimates that N A S A would require $17.1 billion to maintain current programmes. 62 With more cutbacks and stretch-outs required, more participants in the civil space programme will be inclined to make their grievances public, adding additional pressure to reform or restructure. The unravelling of consensus within the space programme has already begun with the decision to disrupt most other NASA projects in order to protect the Space Station in FY 1992. The cumulation of pressures under present policy cannot be sustained indefinitely, despite tendencies to avoid the issue or to entertain such magic solutions as a near-term improvement in the fiscal situation. The termination of the Station, the loss of another orbiter or some other event could easily collect and focus these pressures on the need to reform or restructure. The purpose of this article has been to stimulate the consideration of alternatives to present policy in anticipation of such eventualities.

SPACE POLICY May 1992