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Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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Andreas Ufen GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany
2.1
Introduction
This chapter focuses on political parties and parliaments because they are often perceived by the wider public as undermined by illegal practices. A Transparency International survey in 2009 on institutions affected by corruption (scores were between: “1, not at all corrupt” and “5, extremely corrupt”) showed a very critical assessment of political parties in the region. The scores for these parties in Brunei (2.1), Singapore (2.1), Cambodia (3.0), Philippines (4.0), Malaysia (3.9), Indonesia (4.0), and Thailand (4.1) were above the overall average except in the first three countries mentioned here. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 (Transparency International, 2013), in Indonesia 86% of respondents felt that political parties were “corrupt or extremely corrupt.” Other “corrupt or extremely corrupt” institutions were parliaments (89%), and the judiciary (86%), whereas only the police were perceived as being worse (91%). The respective scores for political parties, parliaments, the judiciary, and the police were in Cambodia 28%, 16%, 60%, and 37%, in Thailand 68%, 45%, 18%, and 71%, for Vietnam 27%, 28%, 49%, and 72%, for the Philippines 58%, 52%, 56%, and 69%, and for Malaysia 69%, 44%, 35%, and 76%). This indicated that young democracies such as Thailand (until 2014) and the Philippines or highly competitive authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia are more prone to foster forms of corruption within political parties and parliaments. In systems in which civil liberties and political rights are more restricted such as Vietnam, corruption seems to be less concentrated in parties and parliaments but are more centralized by elites who have direct and uncontrolled access to state resources. Against this background, the paper looks at political finance in Southeast Asia that encompasses the funding of political parties and candidates and includes donations by individuals and groups or companies and public money. Political corruption is often an effect of the failed regulation of political finance and is manifested by clientelistic exchange, patronage, vote-buying, and the increasing power of business elites in politics. Movements in opposition to the deeply ingrained behavioral patterns of lax regulations and law enforcement are still weak but are challenged by some innovative practices invented by civil society groups. The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-101109-6.00002-2 Copyright © 2017 Andreas Ufen. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
The chapter starts with a broad overview of the development of expenses by candidates and political parties and by presenting recent incidents of political corruption in order to substantiate a trend of commercialization of politics. As this tendency is uneven, the chapter focuses on regimes with a higher degree of political competition and outlines the main factors for the rising costs and the resulting corruption. It concludes with a description of initiatives for reform.
2.2
The costs of competition
In most Southeast Asian countries, political parties and candidates spend much more money today than in the past. But this trend is not always easy to verify (Schafferer, 2006). It is impossible to get exact data on the illegal spending of candidates and parties. Instead, observers are often dependent on anecdotal evidence. The so-called professionalization of campaigning with surveys, TV, “spin doctors,” and others has resulted in skyrocketing costs (Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Qodari, 2010). In the first democratic elections in Indonesia (1955), surveys were unknown and television did not play a role. Door-to-door campaigning and rallies organized by committed party followers stood at the center of voter mobilization. Therefore, costs were still quite low. This has been transformed only recently. There is now a clear trend of commercialization in comparison to the 1950s, especially since the country’s redemocratization in 1998. Political parties spend most of their budgets for media advertisements. Since the mid-2000s, campaigning has been much more based on surveys. Arguably, the introduction of direct elections in 2004/05 at all levels has raised election costs immensely. Candidates have to bear a major part of campaign costs. A gubernatorial candidate disburses between Rp60 billion and Rp100 billion (c. US$6 million to US$10 million) for campaigning. Presidential campaigns are, not surprisingly, even more expensive. According to their official reports, in the last presidential elections the pair of candidates Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa spent Rp166.5 billion (US$14.3 million), whereas the subsequent winners Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Jusuf Kalla paid almost double the amount, Rp311.9 billion (The Jakarta Post, 2014). Prabowo and Hatta spent Rp88.2 billion on media advertisements, Rp57.5 billion on campaign activities and Rp13.1 billion on campaign paraphernalia. The JokowiKalla camp disbursed Rp151.2 billion alone on media advertisements. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, patronage distribution was a central campaign strategy by candidates, and vote-buying was widespread and had obviously increased in comparison to earlier polls (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). Today, the majority of Indonesian MPs are entrepreneurs or managers. In contrast, the Philippines were much more advanced in election spending from early on, may be because Indonesia had only once, in 1955, competitive elections before 1999. Vote-buying, bribing, and others, generous expenses for foods and drinks, paraphernalia, and others “drove the price of election up 10-fold between Magsaysay’s 1953 victory and Macapagal’s 1961 triumph” (Brands, 1992, p. 277).
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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In 1960/61, campaigners spent 14 times more in the Philippines than in the United States on each vote relative to the average industrial wage (cf. Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002, p. 83). In 1969, Ferdinand Marcos won the presidential elections because he expended one-quarter of the government budget for campaigning (Brands, 1992, p. 277). He even hired the former consultant of US presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Joseph Napolitan. The engagement of such professionals has become a common practice. In the late 1980s, for example, Corazon Aquino engaged media consultant David Sawyer (Perron, 2008, p. 365). Although in the Philippines, expenses seem to have been very high since the 1950s, may be with a peak in the late 1960s, costs of campaigning in Thailand began to rise significantly from the late 1970s/early 1980s onward. It has risen steadily since then because entrepreneurs saw politics as a means to improve business opportunities and began to “invest” huge amounts of money in gaining public positions. Within parties, these businesspeople as “godfathers” together with their followers formed factions and employed regional vote-canvasser networks (Waitoolkiat & Chambers, 2015). In 1996, the per capita costs of the elections (relative to average wages) were four to five times higher than in the United States (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002, p. 83). In Malaysia, costs rose steadily over the years, but only recently have they soared significantly (Gomez, 2012, p. 1381). This trend has deepened in 2013. The federal government paid RM531 million (US$175 million) for advertisements during the first half of that year, most of it ahead of the national elections, whereas the opposition only disposed of a tiny fraction of such an amount. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s Department organized the most expensive campaign in the history of the country and distributed c. US$19 billion from April 2009 until May 2013 for different kinds of subsidies, bonuses, services, and others (Ufen, 2015). Likewise, the Cambodian Communist Party (CCP), which is to a large extent identical with the state apparatus, had to raise US$15 million for its campaign in 2013, whereas the main contenders, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) spent c. US$3.5 million and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) US$500,000 (COMFREL, 2013, p. 26); these amounts of money do not even incorporate media expenditures, gifts, and vote-buying. The high costs are also a result of stronger competition in relation to previous polls. But there are exceptions to the regional trend. Although Singapore has the highest per capita income in Southeast Asia, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) expended only S$5.3 million for the 89 seats it contested in the 2015 elections, which was S$2.16 (PAP) and 73 cents (the opposition parties combined) per voter (The Straits Times, 2015). In this case, the authoritarian government is interested in reducing competition and restricting campaigning. In addition, the fight against corruption is effectively implemented as part of a state-led developmental strategy. The PAP is an example of a regime party in which leadership positions are achieved on the ground of a meritocratic system, although good connections to the established political and administrative elites may help. Yet, gaining party offices through “money politics” is very improbable, in contrast to many other parties in
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
Southeast Asia. In this vein, it has to be stressed that the commercialization of politics is also visible within political parties. In Malaysia, within the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO), this was a result of a rise of businesspeople. Beginning in the 1980s, intraparty competition was more and more decided by illicit financial transfers. At the 1984 UMNO elections, more than RM20 million (US$8.5 million) were spent to bribe delegates, whereas in 1993 RM200300 million were handed out by one faction alone (Gomez, 2012, p. 1386). In order to confine “money politics” and vote-buying within UMNO, the leadership decided to widen the selectorate at the UMNO elections in 2013, but, arguably, this did not eradicate these practices. In Indonesia, as another example, intraparty competition is often based on illicit or at least questionable financial transfers (Mietzner, 2015). A few years ago, according to the former treasurer of the Partai Demokrat, a few million US$ were handed out to delegates ahead of the party elections (The Jakarta Globe, 2013). Recently, during the last National Congress of the Golkar Party in May 2016, businessman Setya Novanto was elected as the party chairman although he was suspected of being involved in shady deals with US-based mining company PT Freeport. He was the richest candidate with officially US$8.7 million in assets and was backed by Aburizal Bakrie (The Jakarta Post, 2016). Bakrie, the former Golkar chairman, belongs to Indonesia’s oligarchy such as Jusuf Kalla (Golkar), Sutrisno Bachir (National Mandate Party), and Surya Paloh (Nasdem Party) who were able to take over leading positions because they disposed of large financial resources. In the Philippines, and increasingly in Indonesia, many parties are mere vehicles of designated presidential candidates and financed by them or their rich supporters. In Thailand, former prime minister, media mogul, and billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra built his own Thai Rak Thai (“Thais Love Thais”) party, engaged managers from his companies for party work, paid “his” MPs extra salaries, and induced opposing parties and politicians to switch into his camp. In these cases, financiers and parties are almost similar.
2.3
Corruption as a result
Some parties and candidates need a huge amount of money. Among their incomes are public subsidies and indirect public funding, indigenous and foreign private donations by individuals or corporations, membership fees, levies from members of parliament, and sometimes commercial profits by political parties. In contrast to European parties, membership fees are usually nonexistent or extremely small in Southeast Asia. The fact that MPs have to donate a part of their salaries to their respective parties in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, but not in the Philippines, shows the weakness of political parties in the latter country. State subsidies are usually rather low. In Indonesia in the mid-2000s, they were even reduced by c. 90% from 1000 rupiah to 108 rupiah for each vote won (The International Herald Tribune, 2013).
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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The increasing political competition in tandem with rising costs results in a commercialization that makes transparency and regular financing almost impossible. A cursory view on the biggest recent scandals in Southeast Asia vindicates this assumption. In Indonesia, for example, until 2011, 155 regional heads (out of around 530), among them half the governors, were named corruption suspects (The Jakarta Post, 2016). At the national level, the Democrat Party (PD) of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (200414) and the Islamist and Justice and Welfare Party (PKS), once to many a religion-based model for clean politics, lost many of its supporters ahead of the 2014 elections because of illegal party financing. Supporters of the PD were stunned by their own party treasurer who chose to spill the beans about the wheeling and dealing of the president’s party. Later, the public heard about the enormous wealth and the various amatory adventures of the ever-smiling chairman and some of his party colleagues in the PKS (Kramer, 2014). In the Philippines, members of parliament, senators, and former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were accused of embezzling 10 billion pesos (US$220 million). The money was channeled through fake nongovernmental organizations. These “pork barrels” from disaster relief and development funds were obviously used as kickback payments for the benefit of the legislators (Abjorensen, 2015). But Philippine voters are accustomed to excesses of money politics at least since the reign of former autocrat Ferdinand Marcos. Macapagal Arroyo’s predecessor, Joseph Estrada, was removed from office via impeachment because he was allegedly involved in illegal gambling. Even worse were developments in Malaysia where prime minister Najib Razak received almost US$700 million prior to the 2013 elections. When the Wall Street Journal reported on the bank transfers to his personal account in mid-2015 (The Wall Street Journal, 2015) and pressure on the prime minister in his home country grew, he denied any wrongdoing, sacked deputy prime minister Muhyiddin and the attorney general and did everything to hinder independent investigations by the Central Bank, a parliamentary commission, and the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. Najib muzzled media outlets, ordered the arrest of whistleblowers, and spoke of a “personal donation” from a prince of Saudi Arabia’s royal family. Later, international investigations suggested that more than a billion US$, much of it was skimmed from state investment firm 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), had been sent to Najib. 1MDB, which was founded by him in 2009, is mired in US$10 billion debt (The Wall Street Journal, 2016).
2.4
Factors for rising costs and corruption
The main factor for rising costs and corruption is the political system at large. The more there is competition between parties and candidates, the more candidates/parties have to strive to mobilize voters. Under authoritarian rule, party politics is marginalized. Political parties, thus, do not need to establish intricate organizational machines. Campaigning, if it exists at all, is restricted. Southeast Asian examples of
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
authoritarian systems with multiparty elections that were only rudimentary competitive are Indonesia under Suharto from the late 1960s until 1998 and the Philippines under Marcos from the late 1970s until 1986. In both these regimes, costs of campaigning were relatively low. Although the Indonesian regime party, Golkar, had more or less direct access to state money and business donations, opposition parties in the country were cash-strapped. Political finance as part of electoral laws was not a topic of much interest. Likewise, in the Philippines, only after redemocratization did the expenses for campaigning rise to predictatorial levels. Within competitive authoritarian and especially electoral democratic systems, there is a tendency to inflate expenses. More often than not, wealthy groups have an interest in cost-intensive campaigns. The more competition, the more money is spent to woo voters. Corporations decide to donate money to candidates and parties in spite of (or in addition to) bribing bureaucrats. Individuals invest into party politics because they can use their positions as politicians to further their business interests. Politics is thus becoming itself a part of the economy. Competition is also enhanced by specific electoral systems. A candidatecentered system (through direct elections and majoritarian or plurality vote, especially in multimember districts) often strengthens the impact of corrupt practices because it raises the costs for campaigning. Countries with competitive elections and multiparty systems such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand try to evade public scrutiny, but civil society is becoming stronger. That means, in these countries, a frequent, but often ineffective redesigning of regulatory frameworks, is characteristic. Countries with a relatively good rating from Freedom House, a pro-democracy, US-based non-governmental organization, are not necessarily ranked better than authoritarian regimes such as Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia in terms of corruption control (see Table 2.1). Campbell and Saha (2013) even found a clear relationship between democratization and corruption. Democratization at the beginning reduces corruption, later on increases it, and reduces it substantially with increasing democratic deepening. But different scores for corruption control could also be a result of divergent socioeconomic conditions. The three countries with the highest GDP per capita (Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia) are the ones with the best scores with respect to corruption control. In contrast, the three worst scores for “control of corruption” are those for Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos where the GDP per capita is very low. It seems that higher economic development strengthens state capacities and, thus, law enforcement. Arguably, corruption is essentially a result of the relations between economic and political actors. In most countries, there is an increasing direct and indirect involvement of businessmen in politics. The dominant party in Malaysia, UMNO, was for a long time a party of teachers and bureaucrats that morphed into a vehicle for businesspeople (or politicians-cum-entrepreneurs) in the 1970s and 1980s. In Thailand, this business influence grew markedly from the 1980s onward, in Indonesia after 1998 and accelerating since the mid-2000s. Only in the Philippines have private entrepreneurs (in the 1950s often as big landholders) always been the dominant party stalwarts and were able to subordinate the administrative apparatus.
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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2.1 Major indicators: corruption, political rights/civil liberties, and GDP per capita in Southeast Asia
Table
Country
TPIa rank 2015 (168 countries)
TPI score 2015 (highest score 100)
Control of corruptionb (ranges from 22.5 to 2.5) (2010)
Freedom House (2016) (political rights/civil liberties)
Nominal GDP per capita (US $, 2014)c
Brunei Cambodia East Timor Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
150 123 88 139 54 147 95 8 76 112
21 28 36 25 50 22 35 85 38 31
0.86 21.21 20.95 20.73 21.07 0.12 21.68 20.82 2.18 20.34 20.58
6 and 5 6 and 5 3 and 3 2 and 4 7 and 6 4 and 4 6 and 5 3 and 3 4 and 4 6 and 5 7 and 5
36,607 1081 3638 3534 1693 10,804 1221 2865 56,319 5445 2053
a
Transparency International measures how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be and draws on data from expert and business surveys. The “Control of corruption” score is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank. It measures perceptions of petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as state capture by elites and private interests. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. c International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (October 2014). b
Therefore, scholars working on the Philippines stressed, over a long period of time, the outstanding role of landed interests and patronclient relations and of bossism. Sidel (1997, p. 961) distinguishes a range of its manifestations: economic machine politicians, local business magnates, members of landed clans, urban bosses, logging-based “warlords,” and others. Thailand witnessed the rise of a party, the TRT, which can be described as a “business firm party” (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999). These are led by very rich individuals, often media magnates (akin to Berlusconi in Italy). Thaksin, like Berlusconi, used his wealth and his TV and radio stations to “sell” a political party and its product in vague terms but with the promise to renew the country. The organization of the party is top-heavy, the leader reigns like the owner of a business conglomerate, marketing and advertising is professionalized. Party financing is monopolized, and Thaksin was even able to “buy” other parties or factions of them in order to establish a large majority in parliament. Quah (2003) stresses the role of low salaries of the civil servants and politicians, and the high chance of being exempted from punishment for corruption in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In all of the countries covered by the International IDEA (2016), for example, vote-buying as well as foreign donations to political parties are usually forbidden, but noncompliance with and nonenforcement of legal norms, weak oversight, and feeble sanctions are endemic.
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
The Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL), for example, observed hundreds of cases of systematic misuse of state resources banned by different laws during the flawed July 2013 elections (COMFREL, 2013, p. 27). Policy-makers consider, from the very beginning, opportunities to circumvent regulations. These are frequently mere devices for window-dressing. Regulatory frameworks are often quite impressive on paper, but de facto in many countries, parties and candidates can receive as much money as they want; they only have to conceal the names of very big donors who donate more than the allowed sums of money. This can be done by using fictitious names of donors, for example. It has to be borne in mind that “Western” notions of illicit behavior are not always helpful to understand politics in Southeast Asia. Min-Wei and Yu (2014) show that the perception of public sector corruption differs markedly between international experts and domestic citizens. A reason could be that in some countries, a form of vote-buying (i.e., handing out of food, smaller amounts of money, etc.) is part of generally accepted norms of everyday life. In Thailand, poll watcher ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Election), for example, found vote-buying in the form of “in-kind gifts, cash handouts, electronic transfer of funds, payment to attend party rallies, politicians funding birthday parties, free telephone cards and supermarket coupons, transfer of money through fake wins at gambling, and free ‘sightseeing’ trips” (ANFREL, 2011, p. 54). Many voters perceive this as a negligible, even a welcome form of campaigning.
2.5
Initiatives for reform
In Southeast Asia, major problems of party and candidate financing are the predominance of clientelistic over programmatic linkages between politicians and voters, resulting in the uncontrolled flow of “black money.” Income from membership dues is, in most cases, insignificant and candidates often finance their campaigns independently from political parties. Expensive political marketing strengthens entrepreneurs seeking to influence policy making. As a consequence, private donations (often from corporations or a handful of wealthy individuals) play an important role. Moreover, state funding is often marginal (or even nonexistent). Even in countries where state subsidies are paid such as in Indonesia, Thailand, and East Timor, it does not form the mainstay of party incomes and is merely an addition. Attempts at curbing illicit forms of funding and/or the predominance of rich people in politics have been manifold. One way is to install powerful electoral commissions or agencies such as the powerful Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) in Indonesia. Another is stronger regulation and the introduction of public funding. Free airtime and restrictions on TV and radio advertising, for instance, is seen as a potential good means to cut costs for all competitors. Particularly since the 1990s, reforms of political finance regulations are gaining traction in an array of Asian countries. The main reason for this is the wave of democratization that swept from Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia to Thailand
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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(until the latest military coups), Indonesia, and East Timor. It does not mean that democratization leads automatically to stricter and better regulations. In some cases, the heightened competition among parties and/or the establishment of cartels as well as commercialization and increasing business influence may enhance oversight and enforcement problems. Moreover, Scarrow (2007, p. 201) noted that “regulations can have the perverse effect of ‘scandalising’ previously tolerated behaviour.” Among the most active proponents of reform are different nonstate organizations. In the Philippines, the Pera at Pulitika 2010 Consortium (Balgos, Mangahas, & Casiple, 2010) represents inter alia the Consortium on Electoral Reforms (CER), a national coalition of 47 organizations. In Indonesia, nongovernmental organizations like Indonesia Corruption Watch, Perludem, and Transparency International cooperate to fight questionable forms of political finance. In Malaysia, organizations such as the election watchdog, Malaysians for Free and Fair Elections (Mafrel), are working on election-related issues. In 2007, 2011, 2012, and 2015 tens of thousands of demonstrators demanded free and fair elections in Kuala Lumpur. They gathered under the leadership of the opposition movement Bersih, the “Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections” (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil). Covering the whole region, ANFREL (the Asian Network For Free Elections) monitors elections, conducts research and education and training, and engages in advocacy work. Such initiatives support innovations by civil society activists who have invented new forms of crowdfunding. Joko Widodo, elected president in Indonesia since 2014, financed his campaign partly with the help of a dense network of volunteers and received donations from 60,000 individuals. This is a new development in Indonesian politics. Likewise, the new president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, issued scratch cards that allowed people to donate money via SMS to a gateway number. Crowdfunding can be complemented by crowdsourcing when citizens observe elections and inform state supervisory bodies on incidences of votebuying, overspending, illegal use of state resources, and others. In the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, even the voting tabulation from polling stations was controlled with the mobile phone application Kawal Pemilu (“Guard the Elections”). Moreover, despite major structural hindrances, there are still ways to better regulate political finance (Ufen, 2014). In the “New DelhiDeclaration on Political Finance Regulation in South Asia” (2015), for example, clear and realistic standards for regulatory frameworks are defined. These should not allow loopholes and be sensitive to local contexts. They should incorporate limits on private donations, limits or even bans on anonymous and foreign donations, and public funding in connection with demands for more transparency and/or intraparty democracy. On the basis of a meticulous disclosure of incomes and spending by candidates and political parties, independent supervisory and enforcement bodies must be able to detect fraud and to meet out clearly defined and proportionate sanctions. In this way, it is possible that campaigning will be radically transformed in some Southeast Asian countries with more positive repercussions on the linkages between political parties and voters, on accountability, and on reducing political corruption.
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
References Abjorensen, N. (2015). Philippines takes a long and winding road dealing with corruption. Inside Story, 1.7.2015. hhttp://insidestory.org.au/philippines-takes-a-long-and-windingroad-dealing-with-corruptioni Accessed 22.7.16. ANFREL (The Asian Network for Free Elections) (2011). Report of the International Election Observation Mission: THAILAND General Election, 3rd July 2011. hhttp://anfrel.org/ wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ThaiEOMReport_Edit_4-final_edit.pdfi Accessed 3.4.16. Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, M. (Eds.), (2016). Electoral dynamics in Indonesia. Money politics, patronage and clientelism at the grassroots Singapore: NUS Press. Balgos, C. C. A., Mangahas, M., & Casiple, R. (Eds.), (2010). Campaign finance reader: Money politics and the May 2010 elections. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and the Pera at Pulitika 2010 Consortium. Brands, H. W. (1992). Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines. New York: Oxford University Press. Campbell, N., & Saha, S. (2013). Corruption, democracy and Asia-Pacific countries. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 18(2), 290303. Committee For Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) (2013). 2013 National Assembly Elections Final Assessment and Report. hhttp://www.comfrel.org/eng/ components/com_mypublications/files/781389Final_Report_and_Assessment_National_ Assembly_Elections_Final_ 24_12_2013.pdfi Accessed 11.8.14. Gomez, E. T. (2012). Monetizing politics: Financing parties and elections in Malaysia. Modern Asian Studies, 46(5), 13701397. Hopkin, J., & Paolucci, C. (1999). The business firm model of party organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy. European Journal of Political Research, 35(3), 307339. International IDEA (2016), Political finance data base. hwww.idea.int/political-financei Accessed 10.5.15. Kramer, E. (2014). A Fall From Grace? “Beef-gate” and the Case of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party. Asian Politics & Policy, 6(4), 555576. Mietzner, M. (2015). Dysfunction by design: Political finance and corruption in Indonesia. Critical Asian Studies, 47(4), 587610. Min-Wie, L., & Yu, C. (2014). Can corruption be measured? Comparing global versus local perceptions of corruption in East and Southeast Asia. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 16(2), 140157. New DelhiDeclaration on Political Finance Regulation in South Asia (2015). hhttp://www. idea.int/asia_pacific/upload/PN68_17122015.pdfi Accessed 1.6.16. Perron, L. (2008). Election campaigns in the Philippines. In D. W. Johnson (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of political management (pp. 360369). London: Routledge. Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2002). Financing politics: A global view. Journal of Democracy, 13(4), 6986. Plasser, F., & Plasser, G. (2002). ), Global political campaigning. A worldwide analysis of campaign professionals and their practices. Westport CT: Praeger. Qodari, M. (2010). The professionalisation of politics: The growing role of polling organisations and political consultants. In E. Aspinall, & M. Mietzner (Eds.), Problems of democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, institutions and society (pp. 122140). Singapore: ISEAS. Quah, J. S. T. (2003). Causes and consequences of corruption in Southeast Asia: A comparative analysis of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Asian Journal of Public Administration, 25(2), 235266.
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Scarrow, S. E. (2007). Political finance in comparative perspective. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 193210. Schafferer, C. (Ed.), (2006). Election campaigning in East and Southeast Asia: Globalization of political marketing Aldershot & Burlington: Ashgate. Sidel, J. (1997). Philippine politics in town, district, and province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu. The Journal of Asian Studies, 57(4), 947966. The International Herald Tribune, Plague of Corruption Rises Anew in Indonesia, 31.5.2013. The Jakarta Globe, Andi Bought Democratic Chairmanship, Anas’s Lawyer Claims, 1.8.2013. The Jakarta Post, Jokowi outspends Prabowo in campaign, 19.7.2014. The Jakarta Post, Setya Novanto takes helm of Golkar, 17.5.2016. The Straits Times, GE2015 spending: PAP candidates spent $5.3m while the eight opposition parties’ expenses totalled $1.8m, 29.10.2015. The Wall Street Journal, Investigators Believe Money Flowed to Malaysian Leader Najib’s Accounts Amid 1MDB Probe, 2.7.2015. The Wall Street Journal, Malaysia Says Saudis Gave Prime Minister Najib Razak a $681 Million ‘Donation’, 26.1.2016. Transparency International (2013). Global corruption barometer 2013. hhttps://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country 5 indonesiai Accessed 23.5.16. ¨ hman (Eds.), Ufen, A. (2014). Political finance in Asia. In E. Falguera, S. Johns, & M. O Funding of political parties and election campaigns: A handbook on political finance (pp. 82127). Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Ufen, A. (2015). Laissezfaire versus strict control of political finance: hegemonic parties and developmental states in Malaysia and Singapore. Critical Asian Studies, 47(4), 564586. Waitoolkiat, N., & Chambers, P. (2015). Political party finance in Thailand today: Evolution, reform and control. Critical Asian Studies, 47(4), 611640.
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Andreas Ufen GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany
2.1
Introduction
This chapter focuses on political parties and parliaments because they are often perceived by the wider public as undermined by illegal practices. A Transparency International survey in 2009 on institutions affected by corruption (scores were between: “1, not at all corrupt” and “5, extremely corrupt”) showed a very critical assessment of political parties in the region. The scores for these parties in Brunei (2.1), Singapore (2.1), Cambodia (3.0), Philippines (4.0), Malaysia (3.9), Indonesia (4.0), and Thailand (4.1) were above the overall average except in the first three countries mentioned here. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 (Transparency International, 2013), in Indonesia 86% of respondents felt that political parties were “corrupt or extremely corrupt.” Other “corrupt or extremely corrupt” institutions were parliaments (89%), and the judiciary (86%), whereas only the police were perceived as being worse (91%). The respective scores for political parties, parliaments, the judiciary, and the police were in Cambodia 28%, 16%, 60%, and 37%, in Thailand 68%, 45%, 18%, and 71%, for Vietnam 27%, 28%, 49%, and 72%, for the Philippines 58%, 52%, 56%, and 69%, and for Malaysia 69%, 44%, 35%, and 76%). This indicated that young democracies such as Thailand (until 2014) and the Philippines or highly competitive authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia are more prone to foster forms of corruption within political parties and parliaments. In systems in which civil liberties and political rights are more restricted such as Vietnam, corruption seems to be less concentrated in parties and parliaments but are more centralized by elites who have direct and uncontrolled access to state resources. Against this background, the paper looks at political finance in Southeast Asia that encompasses the funding of political parties and candidates and includes donations by individuals and groups or companies and public money. Political corruption is often an effect of the failed regulation of political finance and is manifested by clientelistic exchange, patronage, vote-buying, and the increasing power of business elites in politics. Movements in opposition to the deeply ingrained behavioral patterns of lax regulations and law enforcement are still weak but are challenged by some innovative practices invented by civil society groups. The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-101109-6.00002-2 Copyright © 2017 Andreas Ufen. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
The chapter starts with a broad overview of the development of expenses by candidates and political parties and by presenting recent incidents of political corruption in order to substantiate a trend of commercialization of politics. As this tendency is uneven, the chapter focuses on regimes with a higher degree of political competition and outlines the main factors for the rising costs and the resulting corruption. It concludes with a description of initiatives for reform.
2.2
The costs of competition
In most Southeast Asian countries, political parties and candidates spend much more money today than in the past. But this trend is not always easy to verify (Schafferer, 2006). It is impossible to get exact data on the illegal spending of candidates and parties. Instead, observers are often dependent on anecdotal evidence. The so-called professionalization of campaigning with surveys, TV, “spin doctors,” and others has resulted in skyrocketing costs (Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Qodari, 2010). In the first democratic elections in Indonesia (1955), surveys were unknown and television did not play a role. Door-to-door campaigning and rallies organized by committed party followers stood at the center of voter mobilization. Therefore, costs were still quite low. This has been transformed only recently. There is now a clear trend of commercialization in comparison to the 1950s, especially since the country’s redemocratization in 1998. Political parties spend most of their budgets for media advertisements. Since the mid-2000s, campaigning has been much more based on surveys. Arguably, the introduction of direct elections in 2004/05 at all levels has raised election costs immensely. Candidates have to bear a major part of campaign costs. A gubernatorial candidate disburses between Rp60 billion and Rp100 billion (c. US$6 million to US$10 million) for campaigning. Presidential campaigns are, not surprisingly, even more expensive. According to their official reports, in the last presidential elections the pair of candidates Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa spent Rp166.5 billion (US$14.3 million), whereas the subsequent winners Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Jusuf Kalla paid almost double the amount, Rp311.9 billion (The Jakarta Post, 2014). Prabowo and Hatta spent Rp88.2 billion on media advertisements, Rp57.5 billion on campaign activities and Rp13.1 billion on campaign paraphernalia. The JokowiKalla camp disbursed Rp151.2 billion alone on media advertisements. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, patronage distribution was a central campaign strategy by candidates, and vote-buying was widespread and had obviously increased in comparison to earlier polls (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). Today, the majority of Indonesian MPs are entrepreneurs or managers. In contrast, the Philippines were much more advanced in election spending from early on, may be because Indonesia had only once, in 1955, competitive elections before 1999. Vote-buying, bribing, and others, generous expenses for foods and drinks, paraphernalia, and others “drove the price of election up 10-fold between Magsaysay’s 1953 victory and Macapagal’s 1961 triumph” (Brands, 1992, p. 277).
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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In 1960/61, campaigners spent 14 times more in the Philippines than in the United States on each vote relative to the average industrial wage (cf. Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002, p. 83). In 1969, Ferdinand Marcos won the presidential elections because he expended one-quarter of the government budget for campaigning (Brands, 1992, p. 277). He even hired the former consultant of US presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Joseph Napolitan. The engagement of such professionals has become a common practice. In the late 1980s, for example, Corazon Aquino engaged media consultant David Sawyer (Perron, 2008, p. 365). Although in the Philippines, expenses seem to have been very high since the 1950s, may be with a peak in the late 1960s, costs of campaigning in Thailand began to rise significantly from the late 1970s/early 1980s onward. It has risen steadily since then because entrepreneurs saw politics as a means to improve business opportunities and began to “invest” huge amounts of money in gaining public positions. Within parties, these businesspeople as “godfathers” together with their followers formed factions and employed regional vote-canvasser networks (Waitoolkiat & Chambers, 2015). In 1996, the per capita costs of the elections (relative to average wages) were four to five times higher than in the United States (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002, p. 83). In Malaysia, costs rose steadily over the years, but only recently have they soared significantly (Gomez, 2012, p. 1381). This trend has deepened in 2013. The federal government paid RM531 million (US$175 million) for advertisements during the first half of that year, most of it ahead of the national elections, whereas the opposition only disposed of a tiny fraction of such an amount. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s Department organized the most expensive campaign in the history of the country and distributed c. US$19 billion from April 2009 until May 2013 for different kinds of subsidies, bonuses, services, and others (Ufen, 2015). Likewise, the Cambodian Communist Party (CCP), which is to a large extent identical with the state apparatus, had to raise US$15 million for its campaign in 2013, whereas the main contenders, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) spent c. US$3.5 million and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) US$500,000 (COMFREL, 2013, p. 26); these amounts of money do not even incorporate media expenditures, gifts, and vote-buying. The high costs are also a result of stronger competition in relation to previous polls. But there are exceptions to the regional trend. Although Singapore has the highest per capita income in Southeast Asia, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) expended only S$5.3 million for the 89 seats it contested in the 2015 elections, which was S$2.16 (PAP) and 73 cents (the opposition parties combined) per voter (The Straits Times, 2015). In this case, the authoritarian government is interested in reducing competition and restricting campaigning. In addition, the fight against corruption is effectively implemented as part of a state-led developmental strategy. The PAP is an example of a regime party in which leadership positions are achieved on the ground of a meritocratic system, although good connections to the established political and administrative elites may help. Yet, gaining party offices through “money politics” is very improbable, in contrast to many other parties in
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
Southeast Asia. In this vein, it has to be stressed that the commercialization of politics is also visible within political parties. In Malaysia, within the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO), this was a result of a rise of businesspeople. Beginning in the 1980s, intraparty competition was more and more decided by illicit financial transfers. At the 1984 UMNO elections, more than RM20 million (US$8.5 million) were spent to bribe delegates, whereas in 1993 RM200300 million were handed out by one faction alone (Gomez, 2012, p. 1386). In order to confine “money politics” and vote-buying within UMNO, the leadership decided to widen the selectorate at the UMNO elections in 2013, but, arguably, this did not eradicate these practices. In Indonesia, as another example, intraparty competition is often based on illicit or at least questionable financial transfers (Mietzner, 2015). A few years ago, according to the former treasurer of the Partai Demokrat, a few million US$ were handed out to delegates ahead of the party elections (The Jakarta Globe, 2013). Recently, during the last National Congress of the Golkar Party in May 2016, businessman Setya Novanto was elected as the party chairman although he was suspected of being involved in shady deals with US-based mining company PT Freeport. He was the richest candidate with officially US$8.7 million in assets and was backed by Aburizal Bakrie (The Jakarta Post, 2016). Bakrie, the former Golkar chairman, belongs to Indonesia’s oligarchy such as Jusuf Kalla (Golkar), Sutrisno Bachir (National Mandate Party), and Surya Paloh (Nasdem Party) who were able to take over leading positions because they disposed of large financial resources. In the Philippines, and increasingly in Indonesia, many parties are mere vehicles of designated presidential candidates and financed by them or their rich supporters. In Thailand, former prime minister, media mogul, and billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra built his own Thai Rak Thai (“Thais Love Thais”) party, engaged managers from his companies for party work, paid “his” MPs extra salaries, and induced opposing parties and politicians to switch into his camp. In these cases, financiers and parties are almost similar.
2.3
Corruption as a result
Some parties and candidates need a huge amount of money. Among their incomes are public subsidies and indirect public funding, indigenous and foreign private donations by individuals or corporations, membership fees, levies from members of parliament, and sometimes commercial profits by political parties. In contrast to European parties, membership fees are usually nonexistent or extremely small in Southeast Asia. The fact that MPs have to donate a part of their salaries to their respective parties in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, but not in the Philippines, shows the weakness of political parties in the latter country. State subsidies are usually rather low. In Indonesia in the mid-2000s, they were even reduced by c. 90% from 1000 rupiah to 108 rupiah for each vote won (The International Herald Tribune, 2013).
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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The increasing political competition in tandem with rising costs results in a commercialization that makes transparency and regular financing almost impossible. A cursory view on the biggest recent scandals in Southeast Asia vindicates this assumption. In Indonesia, for example, until 2011, 155 regional heads (out of around 530), among them half the governors, were named corruption suspects (The Jakarta Post, 2016). At the national level, the Democrat Party (PD) of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (200414) and the Islamist and Justice and Welfare Party (PKS), once to many a religion-based model for clean politics, lost many of its supporters ahead of the 2014 elections because of illegal party financing. Supporters of the PD were stunned by their own party treasurer who chose to spill the beans about the wheeling and dealing of the president’s party. Later, the public heard about the enormous wealth and the various amatory adventures of the ever-smiling chairman and some of his party colleagues in the PKS (Kramer, 2014). In the Philippines, members of parliament, senators, and former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were accused of embezzling 10 billion pesos (US$220 million). The money was channeled through fake nongovernmental organizations. These “pork barrels” from disaster relief and development funds were obviously used as kickback payments for the benefit of the legislators (Abjorensen, 2015). But Philippine voters are accustomed to excesses of money politics at least since the reign of former autocrat Ferdinand Marcos. Macapagal Arroyo’s predecessor, Joseph Estrada, was removed from office via impeachment because he was allegedly involved in illegal gambling. Even worse were developments in Malaysia where prime minister Najib Razak received almost US$700 million prior to the 2013 elections. When the Wall Street Journal reported on the bank transfers to his personal account in mid-2015 (The Wall Street Journal, 2015) and pressure on the prime minister in his home country grew, he denied any wrongdoing, sacked deputy prime minister Muhyiddin and the attorney general and did everything to hinder independent investigations by the Central Bank, a parliamentary commission, and the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. Najib muzzled media outlets, ordered the arrest of whistleblowers, and spoke of a “personal donation” from a prince of Saudi Arabia’s royal family. Later, international investigations suggested that more than a billion US$, much of it was skimmed from state investment firm 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), had been sent to Najib. 1MDB, which was founded by him in 2009, is mired in US$10 billion debt (The Wall Street Journal, 2016).
2.4
Factors for rising costs and corruption
The main factor for rising costs and corruption is the political system at large. The more there is competition between parties and candidates, the more candidates/parties have to strive to mobilize voters. Under authoritarian rule, party politics is marginalized. Political parties, thus, do not need to establish intricate organizational machines. Campaigning, if it exists at all, is restricted. Southeast Asian examples of
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
authoritarian systems with multiparty elections that were only rudimentary competitive are Indonesia under Suharto from the late 1960s until 1998 and the Philippines under Marcos from the late 1970s until 1986. In both these regimes, costs of campaigning were relatively low. Although the Indonesian regime party, Golkar, had more or less direct access to state money and business donations, opposition parties in the country were cash-strapped. Political finance as part of electoral laws was not a topic of much interest. Likewise, in the Philippines, only after redemocratization did the expenses for campaigning rise to predictatorial levels. Within competitive authoritarian and especially electoral democratic systems, there is a tendency to inflate expenses. More often than not, wealthy groups have an interest in cost-intensive campaigns. The more competition, the more money is spent to woo voters. Corporations decide to donate money to candidates and parties in spite of (or in addition to) bribing bureaucrats. Individuals invest into party politics because they can use their positions as politicians to further their business interests. Politics is thus becoming itself a part of the economy. Competition is also enhanced by specific electoral systems. A candidatecentered system (through direct elections and majoritarian or plurality vote, especially in multimember districts) often strengthens the impact of corrupt practices because it raises the costs for campaigning. Countries with competitive elections and multiparty systems such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand try to evade public scrutiny, but civil society is becoming stronger. That means, in these countries, a frequent, but often ineffective redesigning of regulatory frameworks, is characteristic. Countries with a relatively good rating from Freedom House, a pro-democracy, US-based non-governmental organization, are not necessarily ranked better than authoritarian regimes such as Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia in terms of corruption control (see Table 2.1). Campbell and Saha (2013) even found a clear relationship between democratization and corruption. Democratization at the beginning reduces corruption, later on increases it, and reduces it substantially with increasing democratic deepening. But different scores for corruption control could also be a result of divergent socioeconomic conditions. The three countries with the highest GDP per capita (Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia) are the ones with the best scores with respect to corruption control. In contrast, the three worst scores for “control of corruption” are those for Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos where the GDP per capita is very low. It seems that higher economic development strengthens state capacities and, thus, law enforcement. Arguably, corruption is essentially a result of the relations between economic and political actors. In most countries, there is an increasing direct and indirect involvement of businessmen in politics. The dominant party in Malaysia, UMNO, was for a long time a party of teachers and bureaucrats that morphed into a vehicle for businesspeople (or politicians-cum-entrepreneurs) in the 1970s and 1980s. In Thailand, this business influence grew markedly from the 1980s onward, in Indonesia after 1998 and accelerating since the mid-2000s. Only in the Philippines have private entrepreneurs (in the 1950s often as big landholders) always been the dominant party stalwarts and were able to subordinate the administrative apparatus.
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
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2.1 Major indicators: corruption, political rights/civil liberties, and GDP per capita in Southeast Asia
Table
Country
TPIa rank 2015 (168 countries)
TPI score 2015 (highest score 100)
Control of corruptionb (ranges from 22.5 to 2.5) (2010)
Freedom House (2016) (political rights/civil liberties)
Nominal GDP per capita (US $, 2014)c
Brunei Cambodia East Timor Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
150 123 88 139 54 147 95 8 76 112
21 28 36 25 50 22 35 85 38 31
0.86 21.21 20.95 20.73 21.07 0.12 21.68 20.82 2.18 20.34 20.58
6 and 5 6 and 5 3 and 3 2 and 4 7 and 6 4 and 4 6 and 5 3 and 3 4 and 4 6 and 5 7 and 5
36,607 1081 3638 3534 1693 10,804 1221 2865 56,319 5445 2053
a
Transparency International measures how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be and draws on data from expert and business surveys. The “Control of corruption” score is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank. It measures perceptions of petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as state capture by elites and private interests. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. c International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (October 2014). b
Therefore, scholars working on the Philippines stressed, over a long period of time, the outstanding role of landed interests and patronclient relations and of bossism. Sidel (1997, p. 961) distinguishes a range of its manifestations: economic machine politicians, local business magnates, members of landed clans, urban bosses, logging-based “warlords,” and others. Thailand witnessed the rise of a party, the TRT, which can be described as a “business firm party” (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999). These are led by very rich individuals, often media magnates (akin to Berlusconi in Italy). Thaksin, like Berlusconi, used his wealth and his TV and radio stations to “sell” a political party and its product in vague terms but with the promise to renew the country. The organization of the party is top-heavy, the leader reigns like the owner of a business conglomerate, marketing and advertising is professionalized. Party financing is monopolized, and Thaksin was even able to “buy” other parties or factions of them in order to establish a large majority in parliament. Quah (2003) stresses the role of low salaries of the civil servants and politicians, and the high chance of being exempted from punishment for corruption in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In all of the countries covered by the International IDEA (2016), for example, vote-buying as well as foreign donations to political parties are usually forbidden, but noncompliance with and nonenforcement of legal norms, weak oversight, and feeble sanctions are endemic.
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The Changing Face of Corruption in the Asia Pacific
The Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL), for example, observed hundreds of cases of systematic misuse of state resources banned by different laws during the flawed July 2013 elections (COMFREL, 2013, p. 27). Policy-makers consider, from the very beginning, opportunities to circumvent regulations. These are frequently mere devices for window-dressing. Regulatory frameworks are often quite impressive on paper, but de facto in many countries, parties and candidates can receive as much money as they want; they only have to conceal the names of very big donors who donate more than the allowed sums of money. This can be done by using fictitious names of donors, for example. It has to be borne in mind that “Western” notions of illicit behavior are not always helpful to understand politics in Southeast Asia. Min-Wei and Yu (2014) show that the perception of public sector corruption differs markedly between international experts and domestic citizens. A reason could be that in some countries, a form of vote-buying (i.e., handing out of food, smaller amounts of money, etc.) is part of generally accepted norms of everyday life. In Thailand, poll watcher ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Election), for example, found vote-buying in the form of “in-kind gifts, cash handouts, electronic transfer of funds, payment to attend party rallies, politicians funding birthday parties, free telephone cards and supermarket coupons, transfer of money through fake wins at gambling, and free ‘sightseeing’ trips” (ANFREL, 2011, p. 54). Many voters perceive this as a negligible, even a welcome form of campaigning.
2.5
Initiatives for reform
In Southeast Asia, major problems of party and candidate financing are the predominance of clientelistic over programmatic linkages between politicians and voters, resulting in the uncontrolled flow of “black money.” Income from membership dues is, in most cases, insignificant and candidates often finance their campaigns independently from political parties. Expensive political marketing strengthens entrepreneurs seeking to influence policy making. As a consequence, private donations (often from corporations or a handful of wealthy individuals) play an important role. Moreover, state funding is often marginal (or even nonexistent). Even in countries where state subsidies are paid such as in Indonesia, Thailand, and East Timor, it does not form the mainstay of party incomes and is merely an addition. Attempts at curbing illicit forms of funding and/or the predominance of rich people in politics have been manifold. One way is to install powerful electoral commissions or agencies such as the powerful Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) in Indonesia. Another is stronger regulation and the introduction of public funding. Free airtime and restrictions on TV and radio advertising, for instance, is seen as a potential good means to cut costs for all competitors. Particularly since the 1990s, reforms of political finance regulations are gaining traction in an array of Asian countries. The main reason for this is the wave of democratization that swept from Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia to Thailand
Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: causes and challenges
31
(until the latest military coups), Indonesia, and East Timor. It does not mean that democratization leads automatically to stricter and better regulations. In some cases, the heightened competition among parties and/or the establishment of cartels as well as commercialization and increasing business influence may enhance oversight and enforcement problems. Moreover, Scarrow (2007, p. 201) noted that “regulations can have the perverse effect of ‘scandalising’ previously tolerated behaviour.” Among the most active proponents of reform are different nonstate organizations. In the Philippines, the Pera at Pulitika 2010 Consortium (Balgos, Mangahas, & Casiple, 2010) represents inter alia the Consortium on Electoral Reforms (CER), a national coalition of 47 organizations. In Indonesia, nongovernmental organizations like Indonesia Corruption Watch, Perludem, and Transparency International cooperate to fight questionable forms of political finance. In Malaysia, organizations such as the election watchdog, Malaysians for Free and Fair Elections (Mafrel), are working on election-related issues. In 2007, 2011, 2012, and 2015 tens of thousands of demonstrators demanded free and fair elections in Kuala Lumpur. They gathered under the leadership of the opposition movement Bersih, the “Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections” (Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil). Covering the whole region, ANFREL (the Asian Network For Free Elections) monitors elections, conducts research and education and training, and engages in advocacy work. Such initiatives support innovations by civil society activists who have invented new forms of crowdfunding. Joko Widodo, elected president in Indonesia since 2014, financed his campaign partly with the help of a dense network of volunteers and received donations from 60,000 individuals. This is a new development in Indonesian politics. Likewise, the new president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, issued scratch cards that allowed people to donate money via SMS to a gateway number. Crowdfunding can be complemented by crowdsourcing when citizens observe elections and inform state supervisory bodies on incidences of votebuying, overspending, illegal use of state resources, and others. In the 2014 Indonesian presidential election, even the voting tabulation from polling stations was controlled with the mobile phone application Kawal Pemilu (“Guard the Elections”). Moreover, despite major structural hindrances, there are still ways to better regulate political finance (Ufen, 2014). In the “New DelhiDeclaration on Political Finance Regulation in South Asia” (2015), for example, clear and realistic standards for regulatory frameworks are defined. These should not allow loopholes and be sensitive to local contexts. They should incorporate limits on private donations, limits or even bans on anonymous and foreign donations, and public funding in connection with demands for more transparency and/or intraparty democracy. On the basis of a meticulous disclosure of incomes and spending by candidates and political parties, independent supervisory and enforcement bodies must be able to detect fraud and to meet out clearly defined and proportionate sanctions. In this way, it is possible that campaigning will be radically transformed in some Southeast Asian countries with more positive repercussions on the linkages between political parties and voters, on accountability, and on reducing political corruption.
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