Poor relief policy in antebellum New York state: The rise and decline of the poorhouse

EXPLORATIONS

IN ECONOMIC

HISTORY

22, 233-256 (198s)

Poor Relief Policy in Antebellum New York State: The Rise and Decline of the Poorhouse* JOAN UNDERWLL

HANNON

Department of Economics, University qf California, Berkeley In the past 15 years, numerous policies and programs to improve the economic welfare of our poorest citizens have been implemented. Partly as a result of this antipoverty effort, a rapid increase in the number of welfare beneficiaries and the value of available welfare benefits occurred. Although this growth in welfare led to a reduction in income poverty, a “welfare crisis” emerged. The dimensions of the crisis were perceived differently by politicians, taxpayers, and welfare recipients, but all became convinced that the existing welfare system needed reform (S. Danzinger and R. Plotnik (1978), University of Wisconsin, Madison. Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 517-78). That our poor laws are manifestly defective in principle, and mischievous in practice, and that under the imposing and charitable aspect of affording relief exclusively to the poor and infirm, they frequently invite the able-bodied to partake of the same bounty, are propositions very generally admitted (J. V. Yates, (1824), The Almshouse Experience: Collected Reports. New York: Arno Press). 0 1985 Academic Press, Inc.

1. INTRODUCTION In 1981, President Reagan encouraged all states to experiment wit compulsory work progams as his sblution to the welfare crisis. By the end of 1982, 22 states had adopted pj-ovisions requiring welfare recipients to work off their grants (Kuttner an$l Freeman, 1982), and one California county even had opened a poorhouse.] * Jeffrey Williamson, Peter Lindert, and members of the Economic History Seminars at the University of California, the University of Chicago, and Indiana University have all provided helpful comments on early vers~ions of this paper. The research assistance of Marlene Kim and partial funding from the Universitv of California Committee on Research are gratefully acknowledged. ’ Sacramento County opened a poorhouse m 1982 as a mandatory substitute for general assistance welfare cash grants to childless adults. The policy has been challenged in the California Supreme Court which recently ruled, pending further review, that the county must offer applicants the choice of a cash grant or poorhouse residence. But the idea seems to be spreading to other states. See Oakland Tribune (February, 1983, pp. BI, B6; April 2, 1983. p. A2); and The Milwaukee ~014rnal (November 12, 1983, p. 2). 233 0014-4983185 $3.00 Copyright 0 198 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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The perceived need for reform of the public welfare system is not new. In the 19th century alone, one can identify at least four major welfare reform movements (Katz, 1983, p. 2). Nor is the poorhouse an innovation. Poorhouses existed in some of the larger colonial cities, and the period from the 1820s to the 1840s brought a major movement toward poorhouse relief (Rothman, 1971). Historians generally agree that the antebellum poorhouse movement represented a dramatic and lasting change in American public welfare policy (Katz, 1983; Rothman, 1971; Leiby, 1978). There is little consensus, however, about the origins and goals of the poorhouse movement. Most accounts emphasize the coincidence of the poorhouse movement with the early stages of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, which purportedly caused public relief rolls and expenditures to rise to crisis levels, especially in large cities. The poorhouse is described as a costreducing response to this crisis (Leiby, 1978, pp. 42-46; Coll, 1969, pp. 14-23; Stafford, 1941, p. 48; Trattner, 1974, p. 44; Schneider, 1938, pp. 21 l--218).’ Others have placed the poorhouse within the context of a broad social reform movement led by urban elites whose overriding goal was to restore and maintain social control over an increasingly heterogeneous, mobile, and urbanized population (Rothman, 1971; Boyer, 1978; Heale, 1973). According to this interpretation, the origins of the poorhouse are found in a changed perspective on poverty. Within the context of relatively stable communities governed by a well-defined social hierarchy, the poor in colonial America were seen as unfortunate neighbors. In the context of urban growth, geographic, and social mobility in the Jacksonian period, the poor lost their former status as neighbors in a stable community and their position in a hierarchical order; and became suspicious and culpable characters, whose existence was not only a social problem, but also a threat to the social order (Rothman, 1971, pp. 155-156).3 The growing alarm with which contemporary elites viewed the poor was accompanied by a profound optimism about the possibility of eliminating poverty and restoring social order (Rothman, 1971; Rimlinger, 1971, pp. 46-47). The poorhouse, which would reform rather than simply relieve the poor, represented a means of achieving these goals.4 ’ The reduction of costs could occur either because the poorhouse reduced costs per recipient or because it deterred potential applicants. 3 Boyer (1978, pp. 89-94) suggests that the perceived threat to society was threefold. First, poverty might lead to riots, gang wars, and perhaps even social criticism or revolutionary violence. Second, there was the possibility that moral evil would spread from the poor to the larger society. On the other hand, there was a fear that the poor might simply accept their lot and cut themselves off from the larger society, forming a deviant and perhaps dangerous subculture. 4 It is important to emphasize that, according to this view, the value of the poorhouse did not arise from its deterrent effect. Rothman (1971) stresses rehabilitation of poorhouse inmates. The poorhouse could also serve to reduce the immediate threat to the social order

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A case study of antebellum relief policy in New York State suggests that the traditional histories and the social control perspective each capture only part of the story behind the poorhouse. The evidence suggests that two groups of people with differing views of poverty and sometimes different goals shaped antebellum relief policy in New York. Urban elites may have been influential in shaping the state’s poor law. But the law left a good deal of power in the hands of local officials who did not always accept and act upon the viewpoints and goals of urban elites. The interaction of these two groups produced a pattern of relief policies and practices in New York which differed sharply from that implied by either traditional histories or social control theory. 2. PAUPERISM,

RELIEF EXPENDITURES,

AND THE 1824 POOR LAW

Prior to 1824, the system of public poor relief in New York varied across towns. A few large towns operated poorhouses. Other towns farmed the poor out as a group to a subcontractor or auctioned the poor off individually to the lowest bidder for their support. Most simply provided outdoor relief to the poor in their own homes.5 Responding to mounting pressure from reform groups, the state legislature in 1823 directed the Secretary of State, John Yates, to conduct a study of the state’s relief system and to formulate recommendations for reform (New York State Legislature, 1823a, p. 937; 1823b, p. 360). Yates submitted his report in February 1824, and in November, the legislature passed “An Act to Provide for the Establishment of County Poorhouses,” which directed counties to build poorhouses. Thereafter, all qualified relief applicants were to be sent to the poorhouse “unless the sickness of the pauper prevent.“6 This section provides evidence which suggests that noted by Bayer (1978). Poorhouse inmates would be removed from the community, thereby checking the spread of moral evil. At the same time as the poorhouse provided decent care to the worthy poor, it would help to reinforce in the larger society the perception of the poor as a separate and personally culpable class. In this way, it could help to prevent the emergence of criticism or anger against a social and economic system that produced poverty. 5 The state poor law stated simply that “every city and town shall support and maintain their own poor,” without specifying the form that support should take (New York State Legislature, 1778, Chap. 62; Schneider, 1938, pp, 112-l 19). information on the system of relief is available only for 51 towns in 1823. Of these, 18 relatively large, industrial towns operated a poorhouse. Thirteen towns farmed the poor out to a subcontractor and 7 auctioned the poor off to the lowest bidder. These systems tended to prevail in mediumsized towns which had a mixed economy. The remaining 13 towns, which used outdoor relief’ exclusively, were predominantly rural-agricultural. Calculated from Yates (1824). 6 Like the previous state poor law, the 1824 law did not provide guidelines for determining who’ qualified for relief. It simply specified that an elected county overseer of the poor and a justice of the peace should investigate the circumstances of each applicant to determine whether he/she qualified. In addition, the law simplified settlement requirements and abolished removals of paupers across county lines. See New York State Legislature (1824c, Chap. 331).

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the 1824 poor law was not simply a cost-cutting response to an explosion in public relief rolls or spending. The Yates Report provides data on the number of relief recipients and relief expenditures in 1823 in 367 cities and towns, representing 63% of the state’s population. By combining these data with data from the New York Secretary of State’s (1836-1860) Annual Reports on Statistics of the Poor, and with evidence on public relief in New York City prior to 1823, one can document trends in the state’s pauperism rate (public relief recipients as a fraction of the population) and relief expenditures across the antebellum period.’ The evidence, summarized in Table 1, suggests that the first quarter of the 19th century was marked by relatively slow growth in the state’s pauperism rate. The 1.83 annual percentage rate of growth shown in column 1 of Table 1 is an upper-bound estimate of the growth from 1800 to 1823 in the fraction of the state’s population which received public relief.’ The annual rate of growth in pauperism accelerated to 4.17% in 1823-1835, 4.62% in 1835-1849, and 6.46% in 1849-1859.9 Evidence from New York City suggests that relief spending also grew relatively slowly over the first quarter of the century. Nash’s (1976) data on relief spending in colonial New York City show real per capita relief spending growing at an average annual rate of about 2% between 171 l/1720 and 1771/1775. Real per capita relief expenditures as reported to Yates in 1823 were twice as high as Nash’s estimate for 1771/1775, an average annual rate of growth of only 1.36%. lo Since real per capita expenditures on the New York City poorhouse alone in 1798 were already 85% higher than total per capita relief spending in 1771/1775, most of the post’ The Yates Report data were collected by sending questionnaires to local relief officials throughout the state. The New York Secretary of State’s (1836-1860) Annual Reports contain county level data based on annual reports from county superintendents of the poor. The evidence on public relief in New York City prior to 1823 is from Mohl (1971, pp. 86-91); and Nash (1976, pp. 557-559). An appendix providing a detailed discussion of the data is available from the author on request. See also Hannon (1984b, Figs. l-2); and Hannon (1984a, Tables 1, 3, and 4). ’ The estimating procedure is discussed in Hannon (1984b, Figs. l-2). Briefly, it involves using poorhouse data to construct an upper-bound estimate of the rate of growth of pauperism in New York City and assuming that pauperism in the rest of the state grew as rapidly from 1800 to 1823 as it did from 1823 to 1835. The estimated growth rate implies a pauperism rate of 0.74% percent in New York State in 1800, compared with 1.13% in 1823. 9 1823, 1835, 1849, and 1859 are all years in which the level of business activity was either on or very close to the long-run trend (Vedder, 1976, pp. 316-3 17). I0 Nash’s figure for 1771/1775 was converted from f sterling to dollars using exchange rates from United States Census Bureau (1957, Series 2357). Since the David and Solar (1977) price index used to deflate relief expenditures in 1823 extends back only to 1798, it was necessary to link the David-Solar index with the Warren-Pearson WPI on the overlapping years, 1798-1810, to derive a deflator for 1771/1775.

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OF THE POORHOUSE

TABLE 1 Public Poor Relief in New York State, 1800-1859 Average annual percentage change Recipients as percentage of population New York State 1800-1823” 1823-1835 1835-1849 1849-1859 New York City 1800-1823” 1823-1835 1835-1849 1849-1859 Rest of state 1800-1823” 1823-1835 1835-1849 1849-1859

Real per capita expenditures ($1860)

Real spending per recipient ($1860)

1.83 4.17 4.62 6.46

0.89 - 1.75 4.60 2.49

-0.95 -5.93 -0.01 -3.96

1.oo 2.17 - 1.75 1.52

1.36 - 2.67 5.52 -2.01

0.34 - 4.84 7.26 -9.58

3.76 3.76 8.69 5.10

0.78 -1.94 3.62 4.01

-2.98 -5.70 - 1.00 -6.10

Sources. Calculated from Mohl(l971, pp. 86-91); Yates (1824); and New York Secretary of State (1836-1860). The underlying data for 1823 are estimates based on the 367 towns that reported to Yates. The estimating procedure is detailed in Hannon (1984a, Table 3). The data from New York Secretary of State (1836-1860) have been corrected for obvious inconsistencies in the underlying county reports, and each year a few counties have been eliminated because of either missing reports or uncorrectable errors. Prior to 1839, only 17 counties (including New York City) consistently included both poorhouse and outdoor relief in their reports. The statewide estimates for 1835-1838 are calculated by assuming that the ratios of total recipients and total expenditures in the 16 counties (excluding New York City) to those in the 49 counties (excluding New York City) for which 1839 data are available remained constant at their 1839 level over the period 18X-1839. An appendix detailing procedures used to correct the data is available from the author on request. The deflator is from David and Solar (1977). County population estimates for intercensus years are b,ased on the assumption of constant exponential growth between censuses and are calculated from New York Secretary of State (1877, p. 2). il The figures for 1800-1823 are upper-bound estimates. See text and Harmon (1984b, Figs. l-2).

Revolutionary growth must have occurred before the turn of the century.” Thus, the 1.36% rate of increase in real per capita relief spending shown in Table I for New York City, 1800-1823, is undoubtedly an upperbound estimate. If we accept this estimate for New York City and assume that per capita relief spending in the rest of the state grew as rapidly ” Annual expenditures on the New York City almshouse from 1798 to 1816. cited in Mohl (1971, p. 91), have been deflated by the David and Solar (1977) price index.

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from 1800 to 1823 as it did over the next 20 years, real per capita relief spending in the state grows at only a 0.89% annual rate from 1800 to 1823.12 From 1823 to 1835, per capita relief spending declined. Thereafter it grew, but not as rapidly as the pauperism rate so that spending per recipient fell continuously. Though the first quarter of the century stands out as a period of relatively slow growth in pauperism and relief spending, a series of events did strain the relief system during the decade immediately preceding the Yates investigation. The Embargo followed by the War of 1812 and then a severe depression combined to increase the fraction of New York City’s population that was in the poorhouse by 39% between January 1810 and January 1820 (Hannon, 1984b, Fig. 2). Real ($1860) per capita annual expenditures on the New York City poorhouse, which averaged only $0.39 from 1798 to 1807, averaged $0.49 over the next 9 years and climbed to a peak of almost $0.60 in 1818-1819.‘3 The rest of the state also experienced an increase in poor taxes during the depression. For 14 counties, representing 25% of the state’s population, the Yates Report provides data on poor taxes from 1816 to 1822; and for an additional nine counties, representing 22% of the population, these data are available for 5 years from 18 17 to 1822. As shown in Table 2, real per capita poor taxes in the 14 counties rose by 39% between 1816 and 1817. The next year, per capita poor taxes increased by 18% in New York City and by 7% in the other 22 counties. Poor taxes declined with economic recovery, but in 1822 they were still 16% above their 1816 level in the 1Ccounty sample.i4 Exactly how big the public relief burden has to be before it generates a movement for reform is difficult to say, but Lebergott (1975, pp. 5369) presents evidence that poor relief spending per full-year recipient in the United States remained within a narrow range of 22 to 31% of the annual earnings of common labor over the whole period from 1850 to 1970. Poor relief expenditures per full-year equivalent recipient in New York, 1823, are reported in Table 3. If Lebergott’s range represents the maximum generosity that taxpayers will allow before pressure for costreducing reform mounts, then one might expect little pressure for reform I2 Note that this involves assuming that relief spending grew as rapidly between 2 years of normal business activity (1800 and 1823) as it did between a normal year and the midst of a depression (1843), an assumption which undoubtedly yields an upper-bound estimate of the growth of relief spending from 1800 to 1823. I3 Calculated from Mohl (1971, p. 91); and Yates (1824, p. 1014). I4 On a per capita basis, poor taxes in New York State appear trivial even in depression years. Yet the public relief system absorbed almost 30% of all tax revenues in 1822 (Yates, 1824, p. 1066). By comparison, social security, pensions, welfare, unemployment compensation, veter-ans’ benefits, health, and hospitals combined amounted to less than 30% of all government spending and 35% of nonmilitary spending in 1973 (Ackerman and Zimbalist, 1972, pp. 305-306).

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TABLE 2 Real Poor Taxes per 1000 Population: New York State, 1816-1822 ($1860) 23 countiesb 14 counties” total Excluding excise taxes’ 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 Including excise taxesC 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822

Total

New York City

Excluding New York City NA $122.26 127.62 120.50 113.54 108.32 95.32 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

75.39 104.78 119.55 113.44 106.17 97.93 87.60

218.32 207.31 184.58 177.76 160.27

NA $494.90 597.61 571.55 483.99 465.11 418.88

103.27 143.55 163.77 155.40 145.44 134.15 120.00

$2;1!24 300.68 285.52 254.21 244.82 220.73

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

Sources. Nominal poor taxes calculated from Yates (1824, pp. 1064-1065). Deflator from David and Solar (1977). Intercensus county population estimated as in Table 1 from New York Secretary of State (1877, p. 2). a The 14 counties (Chautauqua, Chenango, Delaware, Dutchess, Genesee, Greene, Madison, Rensselaer, Richmond, Saratoga, Schenectady, Steuben, Suffolk, and Warren) represent 25% of the state’s 1820 population. ’ The 23 counties, representing 47% of the state’s 1820 population, include the counties listed above plus Albany, Allegany, Broome, Columbia, Cortland, Herkimer, Montgomery, New York, and St. Lawrence. ’ The county data include only property taxes. In 1822, excise taxes accounted for 27% of all poor relief funds in the state. The figures labeled “including excise taxes” are estimates based on the assumption that excise taxes were 27% of all poor relief funds throughout the 1816-1822 period in both the 14 and the 23 county samples.

in New York in 1823. The state as a whole, large cities and small, industrial and agricultural towns all fell within or below Lebergott’s range. l5 In short, conditions in New York State over the period leading up to the 1824 law do not seem consistent with traditional explanations of the poorhouse movement. Contrary to that literature, the adoption of a law providing for a poorhouse system did not follow an acceleration in urIs It should be noted that in New York City, expenditures per full-year recipient declined from 1810 to 1823 (Hannon, 1984a, Table 1).

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Relief Expenditures

New York State” 367 reporting towns” Classified by population O-2499 2500-4999 5000-9999 New York City

HANNON

TABLE 3 per Full-Year-Equivalent

Recipient, 1823

Expenditures per full-year-equivalent recipientb (9

Percentage of common labor earnings

41.91 (46.17) 37.58 (43.18)

20.42 (22.49) 18.31 (21.04)

49.44 47.93 52.31 22.44 (32.76) Classified by percentage of labor force nonagricultural o-9.99 55.22 10-19.99 49.54 20-29.99 49.84 30-100 24.59 (32.94)

24.09 23.35 25.48 10.93 (15.96) 26.90 24.14 24.28 11.98 (16.04)

Source. Expenditures per full-year equivalent recipient are calculated from Yates (1824). The urban unskilled wage index reported in Williamson (1976, p. 333) was used to extend the Lebergott (1964, Table A25) series on the annual earnings of common labor back to 1823. See Hannon (1984a). a 367 towns reported to Yates. Classification by size and labor force structure was done only for these 367 towns. The figure for New York State is derived from statewide estimates of expenditures and recipients based on the assumption that expenditures and recipients per capita in the nonreporting towns matched those in the non-New-York-City-reporting towns. b Expenditures per full-year-equivalent recipient calculated by counting each part-year recipient as one-quarter of a full-year equivalent. The figures in parentheses are weighted averages of expenditures per year per poorhouse resident in New York City, as reported to Yates, and expenditures per full-year equivalent in the other towns, where the weights are the fractions of all full-year equivalents in New York City and in the rest of the relevant sample.

banization, industrialization, or immigration. I6 Nor did it follow an extended period of exceptionally rapid growth in pauperism or public relief costs. Admittedly, the decade immediately preceding the enactment of the law may have strained the relief system, but even contemporaries must have recognized that conditions in the late teens were exceptional and that I6 The urban share of the state’s population actually declined from 1800 to 1820 (Williamson, 1971, p. 429). The nonagricultural share of the labor force also declined from 1810 to 1820 (Lebergott, 1964, Table Al). And 1824 certainly precedes the period of mass immigration (Easterlin, 1968, Table B2).

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the return of prosperity was reducing pauperism and poor taxes without any reform of the relief system.17 In 1823, relief spending per recipient remained well within the range which seems to have prevailed in the late 19th and 20th centuries. The social control literature, on the other hand, captures quite well the language of the poorhouse movement as expressed in the Yates Report and in the law itself. Yates (1824, pp. 952-955) found the methods of disbursing relief in New York in 1823 to be unsatisfactory. Subcontracting and auctioning, he argued, often meant inhumane treatment for the poor and sometimes resulted in public payments to family or neighbors who should have cared for the poor without public subsidy. Outdoor relief encouraged people to go on the dole, while it provided no way of reforming the poor. Under an outdoor relief system, children were left without moral guidance or education and adults were left without the work which was necessary to inculcate industrious habits. Only the poorhouses escaped criticism from Yates, whose major recommendation for reform was the establishment of county poorhouses (1824, pp. 956-957). In arguing for the poorhouse system, Yates made it clear that he viewed relief recipients as personally culpable.” He also seems to have shared the reformers’ optimism about the eventual elimBut he did not have much faith in the deterrent ination of pauperism.” power of the poorhouse, for he advocated (p. 957) a much more direct form of deterrence, a prohibition of aid to able-bodied adult males. The poorhouses, as Yates saw them, viiould serve mainly to reform the poor through education for children; employment, discipline, and moral training for adults (pp. 956, 958-960, 1060-1061). The legislature did not adopt Yates’ recommended prohibition of relief to able-bodied adult males, and several provisions of the 1824 law suggest that legislators were more concerned with removal from the community ” In 1823, for example, New York City’s Mayor described recent levels of poverty as a temporary situation that would cure itself in time. Cited in Rothman (1971, p. 160). ‘* Yates (1824, pp. 941-943) argued, for example, that two-thirds of the permanent pauperism and at least half of the occasional pauperism in New York could be attributed to intemperance. He also mentioned a fear that “pauperism will . form a fruitful nursery for crime . . .“; and he emphasized “the necessity of a rigid police for compelling the sturdy vagrant to abandon his vicious pursuits . .” (pp. 941-943). I9 Yates (1824, pp. 943, 949, 1111-1117) noted that New York’s pauperism rate was much lower than that in Europe, a difference which he attributed to the superior “character. habits and manners” of the American population. But with the proper public policy, Yates (p. 963) thought that the pauperism rate could be reduced even further. “The improved state of society, the diffusion of useful knowledge by means of common schools . ., the vast tracts of territory yet to be reclaimed and cultivated, the spirit of enterprise and habits of irrdustry which so generally pervade our country, the purity of our laws, the excellence of all our civil institutions, and our remote situation from European conflicts, oppression, and slavery, offer strong inducements for believing that pauperism may. with proper care and attention, be almost wholly eradicated from our soil . .”

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and reform of the poor than with simple deterrence. Most notably, not only relief applicants, but also disorderly people and beggars could be sent to the poorhouse. Even an inmate who entered voluntarily could not leave the poorhouse until discharged by order of the superintendent; and discharge was contingent on the pauper being “able to provide for himself or herself.” A law which was aimed at simply reducing the relief rolls would hardly have included such provisions. Moreover, while the law provided no guidelines for determining who qualified for relief, it specified in great detail that poorhouse inmates should be required to work and comply with a strict system of discipline, while children were to be instructed in “useful labor” (New York State Legislature, 1824c, Chap. 33 1). In short, both the Yates Report and the 1824 law suggest an emphasis on reform of the poor rather than simple deterrence or cost cutting. To be sure, Yates (1824, pp. 961, 1060) made a strong case for the cost efficiency of the poorhouse. He estimated that it cost between $33 and $65 per year to support a pauper on outdoor relief. With proper administration and provision for pauper labor, he predicted that the average annual cost of poorhouse relief would be only $30. But one gets the impression that his primary goal was to assure skeptics that the noble cause of reform could be achieved without any additional costs. 3. THE RISE OF THE POORHOUSE: SECTIONAL PATTERNS,

TRENDS AND CROSS1824-l 845

Both the traditional histories and the social control perspective suggest that the poorhouse movement originated and was most pronounced in urban-industrial areas. Writing specifically about New York, for example, Heale (1973, pp. 338-347) asserts that the poorhouse movement was “conducted by state governments and enlightened urban elites,” while in rural areas relief policy remained “unsystematic, informal, and personal.” Heale’s characterization is consistent with the pattern of relief policies observed in New York in 1823, and support for the county poorhouse system was by no means universal in 1824. Indeed, the first paragraph of the 1824 law exempted 38 of the state’s 54 counties from the provision requiring the establishment of poorhouses. However, as shown in Table 4, support for the 1824 law was strongest in the less densely settled, less urbanized, and less industrialized counties of the state.” *’ The exemptions clearly reflected strong opposition to the law. Only 55% of the representatives from exempted counties voted for the act. Only one county whose representatives voted unanimously against the act was required to open a poorhouse. The other 15 counties included in the poorhouse provision all voted unanimously in favor of the act. ” Admittedly when New York City (which cast all four of its votes against the act) is excluded, the fraction voting for the act in the most densely settled and most urbanized counties rises to 87%. But it is difficult to interpret this as very strong support for the

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OF THE POORHOUSE

TABLE 4 Industrialization, and the 1824 Poor Law Vote Number of counties

Percentage of counties exempted

New York State 55 69 Classified by county density (persons per square mile) O-24.99 16 63 25-49.99 15 60 50-14.99 17 16 75+ 7 86 Classified by percentage urban O-24.99 13 62 25-49.99 14 50 50-74.99 19 84 75-100 9 78 Classified by percentage nonagricultural o- 9.99 10 50 10-19.99 24 63 20-29.99 14 79 30-100 7 100

Provotes as % of total 66 71 64 61 63 67 72 53 6% 13 80 61 25

Sources. Density: Persons per square mile for 1825 calculated from New York Secretary of State (1877, p. 2); and Spafford (1981, p. 590). Percentage urban: Following the old census definition, urban is defined as communities with a population of at least 2500. Percentage urban by county in 1825 calculated from New York Secretary of State (1857, pp. xvi-xxxii); and New York Secretary of State (1877, p. 2). Percent nonagriculturah Calculated from U.S. Census Bureau (1821). Five counties (Erie, Livingston, Monroe, Wayne, and Yates) which were created between 1820 and 1824 have been classified OR the basis of the 1820 employment distribution of their parent counties. Exemptions: Calculated from New York State Legislature (1824c, Chap. 331). Votes: Calculated from New York State Legislature (1824a, pp. 1359-1360).

The Yates Report provides some evidence which may help to explain the 1824 vote. Eighty-two of the letters from local relief officials which are abstracted in the Yates Report express opinions on the merits of various relief systems. These 82 letters may not be perfectly representative of the opinions of relief officials throughout the state; but Yates did not suppress opposition to the poorhouse, and the cross-sectional patterns revealed in the letters are consistent with the voting pattern shown in poorhouse when 75% of these counties were exempted. Moreover, New York City was not the only large city to oppose the act. The counties in which the state’s three largest cities were located were all exempted; and only 28% of their representatives voted for it. Fourteen of the seventeen counties which had at least one city of 5000 or more in population were exempted, and the act got only 57% of the vote in these counties.

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Table 4. Local relief officials in rural-agricultural areas were more likely to favor a poorhouse system than were those in urban-industrial areas.22 While urban elites, state officials, and legislators may have been concerned with the morals of the poor and optimistic that the poor could be reformed within poorhouses, the letters suggest that those who worked in the relief system were skeptical. Only about half of the poorhouse proponents who provided an explanation for their preference specifically mentioned the reduction of pauperism, and over half of these clearly had a simple deterrent effect in mind.23 The overriding concern and major division among local relief officials was their assessment of the relative costs of various relief systems. Over 60% of the poorhouse proponents specifically mentioned cost reduction; almost all of the poorhouse opponents argued that a poorhouse would increase costs.24 Some officials who favored a poorhouse in principle suggested that ‘* Dividing the letters into two groups based on the degree of urbanization groups based on the degree of industrialization reveals the following patterns:

Total Rural counties (G 50% urban) Urban counties (> 50% urban) Agricultural counties (< 20% nonagricultural) Industrial counties (3 20% nonagricultural)

and two

Antipoorhouse (%I

Total letters

Propoorhouse @‘I

82 29 53

56 62 53

44 38 47

28

61

39

54

50

50

23 Only nine letters, four from relief officials in rural counties (36% of the rural relief officials who gave a reason for their support of the poorhouse) and five from relief officials in urban counties (23% of the urban relief officials who gave a reason for their support of the poorhouse), specifically mentioned reform of the poor. 24 Relief officials in rural-agricultural areas who supported the poorhouse typically speculated that since paupers would work in the house, costs would be lower. Those rural-agricultural relief officials who opposed the poorhouse either argued that subcontract or auction systems also required paupers to work without the fixed costs of building and operating a poorhouse or expIained that there were few paupers and even fewer able-bodied paupers in their county so that they would gain little by shifting from outdoor relief to any system that required paupers to work. No relief official in an urban-industrial county advocated an outdoor relief system; in these counties the debate centered on the choice among the poorhouse, auction, and subcontract systems. The majority of the urban-industrial relief officials explained that their town had experimented with at least one of these alternatives to outdoor relief, and they simply concluded from experience that costs were lower under one system or another. Elsewhere, I have shown that, cem-US paribus, towns which had adopted any alternative to outdoor relief (whether it was a poorhouse, an auction, or a subcontract system) had significantly lower pauperism rates and lower expenditures per capita in 1823. But the effects were small, and there were no significant differences between the poorhouse and the auction or a subcontract systems. Thus, it is not surprising that experience with alternative systems did not produce a consensus among relief officials. See Hannon (1983); and Hannon (1984b, Table 3).

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such a system might not be politically feasible.25 Others added that they found it less expensive to provide short-term relief to paupers in their own homes, reserving the poorhouse for long-term recipients; and some stated that they would oppose any law which denied local officials this option.2” Three years later, the law was revised to allow the provision of outdoor relief, not to exceed $10, to those whose need for relief was deemed to be temporary (New York State Legislature, 1827, Part I, Chap. 20, Title I). After this revision, the poorhouse spread quickly across the state. By 1835, 51 of the state’s 55 counties were operating poorhouses; but no county stopped granting outdoor relief.27 Over the period from 1835 to 1839, 37% of all relief recipients in New York (47% of those outside of New York City) were sent to a poorhouse.*’ As shown in Table 5, by 1840/1844 that fraction had fallen to 29% (37% outside of New York City). Table 6 provides simple rank correlations between the fraction relieved in the poorhouse in 1840/1844 and various characteristics of eight regions in New York State.29 Contrary to what the traditional literature might 25 The supervisor of Hunter in Greene County, for example, wrote that the poor and their family and friends would defeat the plan (Yates, 1824, p. 993). A Montgomery County Supervisor noted that a poorhouse system had been defeated overwhelmingly at a meeting of representatives from all towns in the county (p. 1005). Yates himself noted, “in some towns the local feelings and interests of justices, overseers, and constables may be arrayed against this plan: nor is it the least item in their objections . that the paupers themselves and their connexions . . will indulge in feelings hostile to the system” (p. 1061). Other sources of local opposition noted by Yates were the shopkeepers and physicians, who sold goods and services to outdoor relief recipients, and the subcontractors, who received both payments from the government and free labor under the subcontract and auction systems (p. 10611. ‘6 Other things equal. relief costs in 1823 were lower in towns that combined poorhouse relief with temporary outdoor relief than in towns that sent all paupers to the poorhouse. See Hannon (1983) and Hannon (1984b, Table 3). ” The auction and subcontract systems virtually disappeared. *’ Calculated from New York Secretary of State (1836-1840). Prior to 1838, counties were not required to report separately on poorhouse and outdoor relief. But since the reports give the number in the poorhouse at the end of the previous year and the number received and born in the house during the year, it was possible to estimate the number relieved in the poorhouse. For many counties, this estimate equaled or exceeded the reported total number of recipients, suggesting that these counties only covered poorhouse relief in their reports. Many of these counties specifically mention that they limited their report to ,poorhouse relief because they had no reliable records on outdoor relief recipients, so one cannot simply assume that these counties did not provide outdoor relief. There is a sample of 17 counties that consistently included both outdoor and poorhouse relief in the reports, and the statewide estimates of the fraction relieved in the poorhouse for 1835 1838 are b’ased on these 17 counties. The estimate may be too low. In 1839, the fraction relieved in the poorhouse in the 17 counties was only 30% while that in the state as a whole was 37%. ” An appendix containing descriptions of the regions is available from the author on request.

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TABLE 5 Poorhouse as Percentage of Total Recipients and Expenditures, Region, 1840-1859 _ Region“ New York City Recipients Expenditures New York City Area Recipients Expenditures Hudson Valley’ Recipients Expenditures Mohawk Valley Recipients Expenditures Central Recipients Expenditures Genesee Valley Recipients Expenditures Far We& Recipients Expenditures

5-Year Averages by

1840-1844

1845-1849’

1850-1854

1855-1859

21.23 80.09

28.37 69.48

25.73 71.67

16.98 74.24

19.64 43.27

18.49 60.49

36.65 75.93

21.45 75.82

37.27 (43.71) 63.40 (64.07)

34.85 (34.73) 61.45 (61.48)

42.35 49.15

33.07 44.92

22.41 43.37

16.07 32.21

46.55 50.43

35.46 44.18

28.69 39.37

22.15 40.86

31 .oo 39.86

51.66 48.31

23.39 38.41

22.43 40.18

37.35 (49.99) 58.95 (63.11)

23.01 (46.45) 68.37 (62.36)

22.59 (23.53) 43.47 (50.74)

16.25 (11.04) 56.42 (41.55)

38.36 52.67

34.55 52.72

17.79 44.36

30.04 59.58

27.35 59.79

19.20 60.80

30.60 52.23

28.61 53.88

21.52 55.83

Northeast Recipients 40.60 Expenditures 60.38 New York State Recipients 28.87 Expenditures 63.98 Excluding New York City Recipients 36.94 Expenditures 54.54

(3g6)

(3;;9)

(6&

(6::3)

Source. Calculated from New York Secretary of State (1841-1860). An appendix providing annual data on the number of recipients of and expenditures on outdoor and poorhouse relief along with a description of how these data were calculated is available from the author on request. n The counties included in each region are as follows: New York City: New York City and County; New York City Area: Kings, Queens, Richmond. Suffolk; Hlrdson Valley: Albany, Columbia, Dutchess, Greene, Orange, Putnam, Rensselaer, Rockland, Schenectady, Sullivan, Ulster, Washington, Westchester; Mohawk Valley: Delaware, Fulton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Montgomery, Oneida, Oswego, Gtsego, Schoharie; Central: Broome, Cayuga, Chemung, Chenango, Cortland, Madison, Onandaga, Ontario, Schuyler, Seneca, Steuben. Tioga, Tompkins, Wayne, Yates; Genesee Valley: Allegany, Genesee, Livingston, Monroe, Orleans, Wyoming; Far West: Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Niagara; Northeast: Clinton, Essex, Franklin, Hamilton, Saratoga, St. Lawrence, Warren.

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predict, the use of the poorhouse was, if anything, negatively correlated with the nonagricultural share of the labor force (PCTNAG) and the urban share of the population (PCTURB). Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the fraction relieved in the poorhouse (PCTALMS) was strongly negatively correlated with both pauperism rates (PCTPAUP) and per capita relief costs (EXPPC).30 The rural-agricultural areas which had voted for the 1824 poor law continued to use the poorhouse most extensively. In urban-industrial areas, where pressures on the relief system were greatest, the overwhelming majority of relief applicants were given outdoor relief. Contemporary proponents of the poorhouse might have been disappointed to find that expenditures per recipient (EXPREC) were strongly positively correlated with the fraction relieved in the poorhouse. It should be noted, however, that EXPREC is influenced by both the weekly cost of relief and the average length of time for which relief was granted.3i The average length of relief (AVLEN) was positively correlated with both EXPREC and PCTALMS. Indeed, the estimated average length of relief in the poorhouse in the early 1840s was 22 weeks, whereas the typical outdoor recipient remained on the rolls for an estimated 5 weeks.32 The fact that local relief officials tended to provide outdoor relief to the short-term poor is not surprising. Consider the relative costs of 3o This could be a testament to the strong deterrent power of the poorhouse; but the rural-agricultural regions, which used the poorhouse most extensively in 1840/1844, also tended to have relatively low pauperism rates in 1823, when poorhouses existed only in a few large cities. Moreover. regression analysis of the 1823 data indicates that, other things equal, poorhouses had only a weak impact on pauperism rates. See Hannon (1984b, Table 3). 3’ Weekly costs per recipient of poorhouse relief are reported by county in New York Secretary of State (1836-1860), and they are not significantly correlated with the fraction relieved in the poorhouse. Unfortunately data on weekly outdoor relief costs per recipient are not available so that it is impossible to determine whether the use of the poorhouse was negatively correlated with the ratio of poorhouse to outdoor relief costs. It is difficult, however, to think of any reason why weekly outdoor relief costs should have been systematically higher in rural-agricultural areas, which used the poorhouse most, than in urbanindustrial areas. ” The average length of relief is estimated by dividing annual expenditures per recipient of poorhouse and outdoor relief by the average weekly costs of poorhouse relief (Hannon. 1984b, Table 2). b Data are not available for 1845; and for New York City, they are not available for 1848. Figures for New York City and New York State for 1845-1849 include 3 years, 1846, 1847, and 1849. Figures for rest of state include four years, 1846-1849. ’ Data for Albany County are available only for 1840-1843 and 1849. The figures reported for Hudson Valley and New York State include Albany only in those years. The figures in parentheses exclude Albany throughout. ’ Data for Erie County are not available for 1840 and 1844. Figures in parentheses exclude Erie County throughout.

-0.76"

-0.40 0.81**

(2)

PCTURB

-0.79* 0.40

0.33 -0.14 -0.43

0.62

0.19

(4)

PCTF

(3)

PGROW

0.50

0.48 0.23 0.79* 0.17 0.76* 0.98**

-0.93** 0.79*

(6)

EXPPC

-0.95** O.Sl**

(5)

PCTPAUP

-0.48 -0.24 -0.79* -0.69* -0.98**

-0.?31**

0.95**

(7)

EXPREC

Matrix,

0.70* -0.38 -0.07 -0.76* -0.95** -0.76* -0.69* 0.76*

AVLEN (8)

TABLE 6 of Regional Relief Policies, Rank Correlation

0.55 0.05 0.29 -0.67* 0.76* -0.38 -0.36 0.38 0.69*

PCTMALE (9)

1840-1844

0.34 0.29 -0.31 0.26 0.07

-0.26

-0.36 0.60 0.45 -0.55

PCTABLE (10)

0.48

0.00 0.71s

0.50

-0.43 -0.02 -0.82' -0.69* -0.76* 0.69*

-0.50

-0.10

0.64*

fW

INFOR

0.69* -0.69* -0.69* -0.07 -0.62 -0.69* -0.81* 0.69* 0.45 0.26

PCTCHAR (11)

Sources: PCTNAG and PCTURB calculated from United States Census Bureau (1841, pp. 83-123). PGROW and PCTF calculated from New York Secretary of State (1877, pp. 2-3). PCTALMS from Table 5. PCTPAUP, EXPPC, EXPREC, AVLEN, PCTMALE, PCTABLE, PCTCHAR, and INFOR calculated from New York Secretary of State (1840-1846). For statewide figures, see Hannon (1984a, Tables 3-5); and Hannon (1984b, Tables I, 2, and 5). Regional figures are presented in an unpublished appendix available from the author on request. Variable definitions. PCTALMS: percentage of relief recipients relieved in poorhouse, 1840-1844. PCTNAG: percentage of labor force employed in nonagricultural sector, 1840. PCTURB: percentage of population in towns of at least 5000, 1840. PGROW: regional population growth rate, 1820-1840. PCTF: foreign born as percentage of population, 1845. PCTPAUP: relief recipients as percentage of population, 1840-1844. EXPPC: per capita relief expenditures, 1840-1844. EXPREC: relief expenditures per recipient, 1840-1844. AVLEN: estimated average length of relief, 1840-1844. PCTMALE: males as percentage of relief recipients, 1845. PCTABLE: able-bodied as percentage of relief recipients, 1845. PCTCHAR: percentage of relief recipients described as intemperants, debauchees, idlers, or vagrants, 184.5. INFOR: foreign born as percentage of all relief recipients divided by PCTF, 1845. * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level.

PCTALMS PCTNAG PCTURB PGROW PCTF PCTPAUP EXPC EXPREC AYLEN PCTMALE PCTABLE PCTCHAR

PCTNAG (1)

Determinants

P 5 2

F

E

2 iFi

%

3

RISE AND DECLINE

OF THE POORHOUSE

249

poorhouse versus outdoor relief. Poorhouse relief involved fixed costs as well as administrative and supervisory costs which might be avoided with outdoor relief. Moreover, in the poorhouse, the public had to provide for all of the recipients’ needs whereas outdoor relief could take the form of a few dollars to buy food or heating fuel or to help pay the rent or medical expenses. On the other hand, there may have been economies of scale in the provision of food, shelter, and medical care that would favor the poorhouse; and the cost of poorhouse relief would be reduced to the extent that poorhouse residents worked to contribute to their own support. Contemporary poorhouse advocates may have been correct in arguing that the average cost of supporting a full-year pauper would be lower in the poorhouse. But even in 1823, only 36% of the relief recipients in New York were supported for a whole year. By the early 184Os, the average length of relief is estimated at slightly over IO weeks; and many outdoor recipients probably were given only pa&I reIief (Hannon, 198410, Table 2), With such a high turnover rate, the administrative costs, combined with the necessity of providing total support within the poorhause, might very well offset any economies of scale; and it might be very difficult to organize, train, and supervise the fluctuating pauper labor force. Even with the provision of outdoor relief to the short-term recipients in the early 184Os, the annual value of pauper labor in the poorhouse just covered the extra administrative costs of poorhouse relative to outdoor reIief.33 The deterrent power of the poorhouse may have varied with the length of relief as well. The unemployed, for example, who faced a choice between the poorhouse and either local employment (at perhaps a lower wage then they earned in a previous job) or outmigration, may have been more likely to choose the former if they expected their ~nemployme~t spell to be short term. Finally, employers whose demand for labor was seasonal may have favored the provision of outdoor relief to the seasonally unemployed. In order to ensure the availability of a labor force large enough to satisfy peak season requirements, such employers (in the absence of seasonal migration) must offer that labor force a contract which ensures them an armual utility at least as large as they could obtain in alternative jobs (minus the cost of migration to those jobs). Public relief during the offseason might be part of an implicit contract through which empIoyers offer workers this level of utility, passing some of the costs on to the 33 From 1840 to 1844, administrative costs per recipient in the poorhouse averaged $2.42 per year, compared with only $0.44 for outdoor relief. The annual value of pauper labor in the poorhouse averaged $2.17 per recipient. Calculated from New York Secretary of State (1841-1845).

250

JOAN UNDERHILL

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taxpaying public (Boyer, 1982). If a given expenditure on poorhouse relief provided less utility to the recipient than the same expenditure on outdoor relief and if employers bore at least some of the relief costs, then such employers would prefer the provision of outdoor relief to the seasonally unemployed.34 These considerations may explain why PCTALMS was negatively correlated with PCTPAUP, for the latter was negatively correlated with AVLEN. In other words, in regions where the pauperism rate was relatively high, there were more short-term recipients; and it simply was not optimal to send the short-term poor to the poorhouse. Notice, however, that AVLEN was not significantly correlated with either PCTNAG or PCTURB, so the variation in AVLEN may not fully account for the cross-regional variation in the use of the poorhouse. Indeed, in the rural-agricultural regions which used the poorhouse most extensively, there was very little difference between the average lengths of poorhouse and outdoor relief, suggesting that some other criterion governed who was provided outdoor relief.35 The social control literature suggests that this other criterion may have been the personal character and behavioral traits of the recipients. By the 184Os, only about a quarter of all relief recipients in New York State were described by local relief officials as having a character problem. Combined with children, for whom the poorhouse might serve as an educational institution, this group represented less than half of all relief recipients (Harmon, 1984b, Table 1). There was, however, a significant difference between rural-agricultural and urban-industrial regions in this regard. While urban-industrial regions may have had a larger fraction of able-bodied adults among their recipients, rural-agricultural relief officials were more likely to attribute the need for relief to character traits (Table 6, columns 10-I 1). If this was true throughout the period from the early 1820s to the early 1840s it may help to explain the 1824 voting pattern and the cross-regional patterns in the use of the poorhouse. As shown in Table 6, PCTALMS was significantly positively correlated with the fraction of relief recipients who were judged to have character problem (PCTCHAR) . In summary, the 1824 poor law required that poorhouses be established and outdoor relief abolished in only 15 counties; and 3 years later, local relief officials throughout the state were again given discretion over the 34 This argument might lead one to expect more outdoor relief in agricultural than in urban areas. However, many kinds of unskilled urban work (construction, dock work, seamen, etc.) also involved seasonal employment. See Mohl(l971, pp. 28-29); Katz (1983, pp. 11, 45-46, 83); Montgomery (1968); and Yates (1824, p. 1010). 35 The difference between the average lengths of poorhouse and outdoor relief varied from a low of 3 weeks in Central New York to a high of 19 weeks in New York City, and it was significantly negatively correlated with the fraction relieved in the poorhouse.

RISE

AND

DECLINE

OF THE

POORHOUSE

251

choice between indoor and outdoor relief. Cross-sectional patterns in local relief policies over the next two decades suggest that the choice may have been governed by both cost considerations and the perception of the poor. But since it was local relief officials who made the choice, it was their assessment of relative costs and their view of poverty, rather than that of urban elites or state legislators, which mattered. Contrary to the impression conveyed in the social control literature, which tends to focus on the views of urban elites, relief oficials in ruraiagricultural areas were more likely than were those in urban-industrial areas to view the poor as personally culpable and perhaps to see the poorhouse as a reform institution. While pauperism rates were relatively low in rural-agricultural regions, they rose as rapidly from the early 1820s to the early 1840s as did those in urban-industrial regions (Harmon, 1984b, Table 4). Yet, if conditions in America were sufficiently different from those in Europe to hold out the promise of the eventual elimination of pauperism, poverty on the frontier must have seemed totally enigmatic. Indeed, the very fact that pauperism rates were relatively low may have bolstered the view that those few who did need public relief had only themselves to blame. Moreover, as shown in Table 6, column 12, the foreign born were more likely to be disproportionately represented among relief recipients relative to their share of the population in rural-agricultural than in urban-industrial regions-a fact that must have reinforced a tendency to view the poor in rural-agricultural areas as an alien class rather than as unfortunate neighbors. The result was a cross-sectional pattern of relief policies that differed markedly from that implied by either the social control literature or traditional histories. The poorhouse movement in New York did not originate, nor was it most pronounced in urban-industrial areas. 4. THE DECLINE

OF THE POORHOUSE,

1845-I 859

Over the period from 1845 to 1859, the county poorhouse system was subject to mounting criticism (Schneider, 1938, pp. 243-246). In 1856, a committee appointed by the state senate found the poorhouses to be “badly constructed, ill-arranged, ill-warmed, and ill-ventilated.” Educational facilities for children were found to be virtually nonexistent; and the committee complained of “enforced idleness” among the able-bodied. The committee concluded its report with recommendations that the worthy able-bodied poor be removed from poorhouses and relieved in their own homes, that children be moved to orphanages, and that better regulation of poorhouses be adopted (New York State Senate Select Committee, 18.56). The legislature failed to act on any of these recommendations, but the importance of the poorhouse in actual practice declined continuously. As shown in Table 5, by 1855/1859 only 19% of all relief recipients were sent to a poorhouse.

252

JOAN LJNDERHILL

HANNON

Neither the traditional nor the social control literature provides an adequate explanation for the decline of the poorhouse. The deterioration of conditions within the poorhouse might have been predicted by traditional histories which describe the poorhouse as purely a cost-cutting institution. But this view cannot account very well for the declining use of the poorhouse in a period of rapidly rising pauperism and relief costs. For the social control historians, the deterioration of poorhouses into mere custodial institutions during a period of rapid immigration, industrialization, and urbanization represents an abandonment of the original reform impulse in the very period when urban elites might be expected to be most concerned with regaining social control.36 Rothman’s (1971, pp. 194, 287-289) argument that the public simply lost interest and refused to finance their project is hardly an adequate explanation. It does seem likely, however, that the public, and local relief officials in particular, eventually realized that many of the poor did not need reform and that the poorhouse was not a cost-effective method of providing relief to most paupers. As pauperism rose across the antebellum period, its nature changed. The elderly, disabled, and children, who accounted for almost 60% of all relief recipients in the early 1840s continued to need support. But increasingly they were joined by working people who had fallen on temporary hard times. By the late 1850s almost threequarters of all relief recipients in New York could be classified as ablebodied adults; and the average recipient remained on the rolls for only 8 weeks. Moreover, there was no longer a significant correlation between either pauperism rates or the characteristics of recipients and urbanization or industrialization (Hannon, 1984b, Tables 1, 2, and 6). Given the rise in short-term, able-bodied pauperism it must have become increasingly difficult to maintain the notion that the poor were a small, separate, and personally culpable class. Even if urban elites maintained this view, local relief officials did not. By the late 185Os, only 15% of all relief recipients were described by relief officials as having a character problem; 57% were described as simply indigent and destitute.37 The promise of the poorhouse as a reform institution simply faded as the nature of poverty changed. By the late 1850s poorhouses were used 36 The rate of urbanization in New York reached its 19th century peak in the 185Os, while the growth of the nonagricultural labor force peaked in the 1840s. Immigration flows peaked in the period from 1845 to 1855. Moreover, the period from the 1830s to the 1850s was a time of almost continuous disorder and turbulence among the urban poor. See Williamson (1971, p. 429); Lebergott (1964, Table Al); Easterlin (1968, Table B2); Boyer 1978, pp. 68-80); and Schneider (1938, pp. 254-281). 37 The tendency to attribute pauperism to character defects declined in rural-agricultural as well as urban-industrial areas; and by 1855/1859, the fraction of recipients so described was no longer correlated with either PCTNAG or PCTURB (Hannon, 1984b, Tables 1 and

6).

RISE AND DECLINE

OF THE POORHOUSE

253

to fulfill the functions that the traditional literature ascribes to them. They were cost-minimizing institutions for the long-term, disabled, and elderly poor and deterrents for the few relief applicants who were deemed to be personally culpable.38 At the same time, however, a declining fraction of the able-bodied poor were deemed to be unworthy and at least some local officials were reluctant to deny decent relief to the able-bodied whose need for relief was clearly caused by general economic conditions. For example, when the Albany County Board of Supervisors appointed a committee to investigate an increase in poorhouse spending during the panic of 1857, the superintendent of the poorhouse defended himself by noting that the poorhouse inmates that winter were “respectable mechanics,” who “should be provided with better kind of clothing, and better quality food . . .q’3’p One should not conclude that local relief officials responded to the changing character of pauperism by abandoning cost considerations. While an increasing fraction of recipients were given outdoor relief, real expenditures per outdoor recipient declined from $3.76 In 184QJ1844 to $3.07 in 1855/1859 (Hannon, 1984a, Table 4). As they had done th~onghout the antebellum period, local relief officials continued to balance pressures from the poor and from reform groups as well as their own charitable instincts against constraints imposed by local taxpayers. 5. CONCLUSION This paper has not disputed the existence of elite concern with the maintenance of social and moral control over an increasingly heterogeneous, mobile, and urbanized population. Nor has it removed the poorhouse from the list of institutions to which enlightened ehtes turned in their quest for control. Indeed, in the absence of rapid growth in pauperism or relief costs, it is difficult to explain the mounting pressure for reform of New York’s poor relief system over the first quarter of the 19th century without adopting the social control perspective. Moreover, this perspective is quite consistent with the language of the 1824 poor law. Urban elites, however, were not able to dominate relief policy totally. ” The beginnings of a shift in emphasis from reform to deterrence is evident as early as the 1830s. Whereas Yates (1824) had stressed reform, by the 1830s the Secretary of State was including in his Annual Reporrs continued references to the rule that provisions for the able-bodied should be kept to a minimum so as not to provide an inducement to go on the dole. See New York Secretary of State (1834, p. 6; 1835. p. 5; l&36. p. 5; 1837. pp. 6-7). By the late 185Os, the fraction of all recipients sent to the poorhouse was almost exactly equal to the sum of the disabled, elderly, intemperant, debauchees. idlers, and vagrants (Hannon, 1984b, Table 1). Of the variables included in Table 6. only PCTCHAR was significantly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.83, significant at the 1% level) with PCTALMS in l&55/1859. For further evidence supporting this characterization of poorhouse inmates, see Katz (1983, pp. 5.5-89) and Rothman (1971, pp. 286-289). 3’ Cited in Schneider (1938, p. 279). See also pp. 269-280.

254

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The 1824 law appears to have been a compromise act which facilitated the spread of the poorhouse, but did not impose the system on any county that did not wish to adopt it. Moreover, with the 1827 revision, the law left the choice between outdoor and indoor relief in the hands of local officials. The latter may have been drawn from elite ranks, but they also were elected officials who had to respond to constituencies that included both property-holding taxpayers and the poor themselves; and their daily contact with the poor may have given them a more realistic perspective on poverty. Ironically, though perhaps not surprisingly, relief officials in ruralagricultural areas, where pauperism rates were relatively low, were most likely to share the perspectives of the so-called enlightened elites. Thus, the vote on the 1824 poor law was inversely correlated with density, urbanization, and industrialization; the most densely settled, urbanized, and industrialized counties were exempted from the law, and when the use of the poorhouse was at its peak, a higher fraction of relief recipients were sent to poorhouses in rural-agricultural than in urban-industrial regions of the state. Criticism of the poorhouse by humanitarian reformers who revealed the deplorable conditions within them may have contributed to the movement away from the poorhouse in the late antebellum period. But the changing nature of poverty, and a recognition of that change by local officials, may have been equally important.40 The poorhouse movement was rooted in a perception of the poor as a separate class whose poverty could be attributed to their own personal failures. As economic development across the antebellum period placed an increasing number of working people in a position where they periodically needed temporary and partial relief, the reality of poverty undermined the original precepts and goals along with the perceived economic advantages of poorhouse relief. Indeed, the poorhouse appears to have been largely an inappropriate response to the relief problems of antebellum New York State. REFERENCES Ackerman, F., and Zimbalist, A. (1972), “Capitalism and Inequality in the United States.” In R. Edwards, M. Reich, and T. Weisskopf (Eds.), The Capitalist System. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Pp. 297-307. Boyer, G. (1982). The Economic Role of the English Poor Law, 1780-1834. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison. Boyer, P. (1978). Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. Coil, B. D. (1969). Perspectives in Public Welfke: A History. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office. 4o The Senate Committee (1856) accompanied its criticism of the poorhouse with the conclusion that many poorhouse inmates were “persons of great worth and respectable character, reduced to extreme poverty not by any vice or fault of their own . . .”

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