- Email: [email protected]
Population dynamics, housing economics, and the future of the American habitat
II. WHERE
WILL
ALL
THE
PEOPLE
LIVE?
Population Dynamics, Housing Economics, and the Future of the American Habitat
The habitat of future Americans is likely to be shaped at least as much by the interaction of demography and economics as by traditional preferences or by the new inspirations of designers and architects. Powerful forces in both the structure of the U.S. population and the economics of its housing market are now converging to bring pressure for reshaping the nation’s long-established housing patterns. Through these pressures, U.S. housing of the future may come more and more to resemble that of longer-established and more densely developed European nations. Or, conceivably, new but uniquely American patterns could emerge. One way or another, however, Americans will find it necessary to strike a new balance between their changing needs for shelter space and their even more sharply altered physical and economic resources. Ironically, the forces that are now moving the nation in this direction have nothing to do with overpopulation. Quite the contrary: one of the most influential of them has been a drastically reduced rate of population growth. This declining growth rate has been accompanied by changes in household size and composition. which already have reduced the amount of interior space required by each household. Some of these changes also suggest the desirability of a shift toward more densely packed structural configurations. At the same time, the costs of providing and of maintaining each square foot of dwelling space have increased-recently at a far more rapid pace than incomes. A growing proportion of American households are finding the costs difficult to meet. These trends of changing housing needs and increased housing costs are mutually reinforcing. Their combined effects run counter to traditional American preferences for commodious, well-separated dwellings. The resulting adaptations may be quite stressful. However, Americans have never been as highly bound by tradition as some other peoples; and they may not hold to it long if the price of doing so should be a rapid deterioration in their overall living standard. Fortunately, a considerable degree of adaptation seems possible before most U.S. households can be considered ill-housed by any reasonable comparison with * The author
is consulting
senior
associate.
143
most other nations. In fact, it is quite possible that with appropriate help from the design professions in the redesign of their habitat. many Americans will find that somewhat less housing space can contribute to considerably greater satisfaction in living.
CURRENT
U.S. HOUSING
PATTERNS
The American housing consumer has long been quite lavish in his use of space, both between and within his dwellings, compared to most of his counterparts in Europe and many other nations. This has never been more true than in recent decades. The current situation is described quite well by 1970 Census statistics. At that time, 69’2) of all U.S. year-round housing units were single detached dwellings. A high proportion of these were relatively new and were located in the spread-out, tree-shaded suburban subdivisions which came increasingly to dominate the American metropolitan landscape after World War II. In 1970, close to half (47”,,) of U.S. year-round dwellings of all types had been built in the past 20 years. [l] Within their dwellings, most Americans today also enjoy a rather lavish standard of living space. In 1970, the median American household consisted of 2.6 persons. By comparison, the median American dwelling contained five rooms. Those five rooms, by the Census Bureau’s enumeration standards, were exclusive of any bathrooms, foyers, or kitchenettes which might be present. [1] Between 1960 and 1970, moreover, all the net growth in the U.S. housing stock was at the upper end of the size spectrum. Housing units with six rooms increased in number by 2.5”;, and those with seven rooms or more by over 37”;. Concurrently, there was a slight net loss among units with three rooms or less. [l] Thus, the recent trend has been decidedly toward more housing space per household, and away from more compact dwellings. Overcrowding continued to plague some less fortunate Americans in 1970, particularly members of minority groups confined to the older and deteriorating central cities. Still, most U.S. families did not personally experience it. In 1970 only one American household in fourteen had more than one person per room-which Americans generally consider overcrowded, but would not be so viewed in many nations. Fewer than 25:; were overcrowded to the extent of over 1.5 persons per room. On the other hand, 51% of all U.S. households had two room or more prr person. [l]
THE
HIGH
COSTS
OF
HOUSING
ABUNDANCE
America’s spread-out mode of residence has had its disadvantages. It has brought a sprawling, unfocused pattern of metropolitan development that has confounded planners and public officials charged with the efficient and cost-effective provision of essential public services. Sprawl has greatly increased the cost of America’s infrastructure, particularly that intricate network of pipes, cables, wires. roads, and mobile transport machinery which brings vital services to American homes and enables their occupants to move around freely. It has led, for many, to exceedingly long commutes by car between home and work-which, as gasoline becomes increasingly scarce and expensive, will become more and more burdensome in money as well as time. By the same token, it has made it virtually impossible for the United States to employ the highly efficient systems of mass transport found in most European cities.
The abundance of living space inside American homes has also had its negative aspects. As it becomes clearer that America cannot continue to rely on cheap, easily transported, and apparently inexhaustible supplies of fossil fuels, the growing cost of heating all this interior space looms as one of the greatest threats to the integrity of American family budgets over the next several decades. National surveys of energy consumption and costs by the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies show that the per-unit cost of natural gas in residential use increased by 40”. between 1973 and 1975 alone. Gas now heats about three-fifths of all U.S. dwellings. [2] Even if the cost of heating all this space were not a growing economic deterrent, the cost of building it would be. For decades, abundant resources made decent housing relatively cheap and affordable by the average U.S. family. Recently, however, every major element contributing to the completed cost of a dwelling unit has escalated rapidly --land, materials, labor, and financing. In 1950, the median value of owner-occupied houses in the United States was $7400. [3] By 1960 it had risen to $12,000, [l] by 1970 to $18,200, [l] and by 1973 to $24.100. [4] The increase of 32”; in median housing value between 1970 and 1973 was about twice the percentage growth in median family income for the same period. [S] Part of this historic increase was due to larger living space and improved amenities, but not all of it. Recently, these factors have hardly figured at all. In 1970, the average per-square-foot cost of a new single-family dwelling was $14. By 1973 that cost had risen to $17, and by 1974 to $19, [6] despite the fact that many builders were reducing amenities to hold down costs. By all indications. most Americans still have a strong preference for the traditional single-family home. In a recent survey by the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, three-fourths of a sample of Washington area residents indicated they “would like very much” to live in a single-family house on a large lot. Only 9”; expressed a similarly strong preference for a highrise apartment. [7] But as space comes increasingly to be seen as less of a boon and more of a burden, which seems likely, Americans may be driven to a reassessment of its value for them. As they do, they may conclude that the recent changes in their own households no longer call for the same kinds of living arrangements that their parents considered so desirable. These changes in household characteristics have been dramatic, to put it mildly. The term “revolutionary”, which may have been overworked a bit of late, does not seem too strong to describe them. Some have become grist for “Dear Abby” and popular literature. Others, which may be at least equally inportant. have not. Unfortunately, none have yet received from the behavioral sciences the kind of attention they deserve in terms of their implications for the society as a whole and for individual human needs. The trends at issue are several, and their interaction complex. To sum up their impact on the average American household, they have made that household: (1) less childoriented; (2) less family-oriented; (3) less permanent: and (4) substantially smaller than in the recent past. THE “BABY
BUST”
Of all the population trends involved, none is more dramatic has come to be known popularly as the “baby bust”. U.S. fertility
than the one which has recently slumped
146
Grorye
Grier
far below any previously recorded level. The total fertility rate (the number of children each woman will bear in her lifetime at current age-specific birth rates) is now well below the “replacement level” which will, if colltinued, bring the nation eventually to zero popLIlation growth. That level is 2.1 children per woman-one child to reptace each parent, with a small additional allowance for attrition due to early deaths and other factors. [8] In 1972. the total fertility rate slipped below the 2.1 level for the first time. It has continued to decline steadily each year since. While final birth data for 1975 are not yet available at this writing. a provisional estimate by Bureau of the Census statisticians based on data through November places the level at 1.81. [9] While fertility seemed to be leveling out a bit in the early part of 1975, the birth data for September through November suggest a resumption of the rapid decline-with the seasonally adjusted fertility rate for November 1975 being IO!<, below that for November 1974. [lo] This unprecedented downturn may eventually come to be viewed as one of the landmark population events in the nation’s history. It could have a long-range impact comparable to the great westward migration. That earlier event set the stage for America’s greatest period of population and economic growth. It began the transformation of millions of square miles of sparsely populated territory into productive farmland and bustling cities, as well as facilitating the unbridled exploitation of America’s vast mineral and forest resources. The current trend could mark the nation’s transition from indefinite rapid population increase to much slower growth or even stability. The precipitous drop in the birth rate is no short-term aberration; it has been underway since 1958, as Fig. 1 shows. The fertility curve turned down in that year, and its downward course has continued with virtually no hesitation ever since. (The rate shown here is the “general fertility rate”, which is the number of children born per 100 women age 1544.) In 1957, women were having an average of almost 3.X children each, as Table 1 shows. The current rate is less than half as high. For some reason-perhaps the influence of the growth psychology which had long permeated the nation-rapidly accumulating evidence of a fundamental change in the U.S. FERTILITY RATES, ,809. ,375 (NOVEMBER) Births Per ,000 Women Aged 15 - 44
Population
Dvnarnics
Table I. Total fertiliry (children Averages: 192&1924 1925-1929 193G1934 1935-1939 1940 1945 1947 1950 1955 1957 1960 1961
3.248 2.840 2.376 2.235 2.301 2.49 1 3.274 3.091 3.580 3.767 3.654 3.629
and Housiny Ecorwnics
147
rate(“) U.S. 19X1 ro 1975 per woman)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 196X 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
3.474 3.333 3.208 2.928 2.736 2.573 2.477 2.447 2.480 2.275 2.022 1.896 I .8621h’ l.810’h’
‘“‘The total fertility rate, as here given. indicates how many children an individual woman would have if, at every age. she bore children at the agespecific birth rates prevailing in the particular year. ‘b’ Provisional estimates. Sources: Data for 192&1969: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-23. No. 49. “Population of the United States, Trends and Prospects: 195G1990.” Issued May 1974. Data for 197CL1974: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-20. No. 219. “Population Profile of the United States: 1974.” Issued March 1975. Datum for 1975: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20. No. 288. “Fertility History and Prospects of American Women: June, 1975.” Issued January 1976.
nation’s population dynamics escaped the attention not only of the general public but even of most demographic technicians until late in 1971. At that point, the fertility curve was already nearing its previous all-time low. Since then, the Census Bureau’s four traditional series of population projections-which still did not reflect the fertility downturn-have been revised several times and, in 1975, were replaced by three completely new series. [l l] Expert opinions differ as to whether and when the fertility curve will reverse itself, and how far any renewed upward movement may carry it. Unfortunately. they must remain for the moment exactly that-opinions, and no more. At this time there exist no surrogates for barometers or whether satellites to aid the prediction of future fertility. There is, however, no uncertainty at all about its shape during the period covered by Fig. 1. Not only is the current level unprecedentedly low, but its rate of descent since 1958 has been extremely sharp. Even if the curve where to reverse itself at this point and return once more to its former high level, it is difficult to envision its ascent being any faster than its recent decline. If it were to move upward again as rapidly as it descended, it would take at least 17 years to reach its former high point. Thus, the “baby bust” is likely to span considerably more than an entire generation. Even if it does not mark a transition to entirely new fertility patterns, its effects will be felt for many years to come.
Like most other population trends, the fertility decline is likely to be self-limiting. Though complete control over births is now technically possible, it is extremely unlikely that American women will decide to have no babies at all. But it is obviously not true-as some U.S. demographers believed just a few years ago-that the national fertility rate cannot drop below replacement level. Not only has it now descended well below that level, but it has remained below it for several years. The possibility that the U.S. population could go into decline, which not long ago was dismissed out of hand by most expert sources, can no longer be ignored. Any fertility rate below 2.1 will eventually bring it to that point, unless counteracted by immigration. The current Census Series III projection (which assumes 1.7 children per woman) shows the U.S. reaching virtual population stability by the year 2OOGwith only 5 million more Americans to be added in the ensuing 25 years, and those chiefly by immigration. [Ill] If the U.S. were to follow the lead of some European countries. its fertility could drop even further. How current U.S. fertility compares to that of other nations, and how much lower it might possibly go, is shown by the comparative fertility statistics in Table 2. They indicate clearly that U.S. fertility now approximates that of some highly developed European nations--yet still remains much higher than others. A few years ago, a “second post-World-War II baby boom” was almost universally predicted. The basis for that expectation was that the number of potential parents was approaching an all-time high as the first post-World-War II baby-boom generation neared maturity. But as the number of young women was increasing. the number of babies born per woman was decreasing even more rapidly. As a result. births in the 12 months ending with November 1975 totalled only 3.16 million [lo] -27”,, fewer than the 4.31 million born in 1960, when the number of young women in the highly fertile 18-24 age group was only 58”/, as large. [12] Theoretically, at least, the potential for a new “baby boom” still exists. The number of young adults aged 18 through 24 will continue to increase until 1980. dropping off thereafter. But current economics do not favor a resumption of the high fertility
United Canada
68. I 79.8
States
West Germany East Germany France Sweden United Kingdom
4x.x 61.6 72.5 65.0 73.1
Japan
67.7
India
169.9
Burundi
203.0
Sourer: United Nations. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat. Srlrctrtl IVorld Dcmoyrtrphic
Indictrrorr
hy Cow-
I Y5&2000 IJNEAA. P:WP.S5. 28 May, 1975.
tries.
Population
Dynamics
and Housiy
Economics
149
of the 1950’s. Neither the insecure economy, nor the high and growing cost of even a minimum dwelling, offer any encouragement to unfettered baby-having. Nor do current attitudes. Young married women age 1824 now expect to have an average of less than 2.2 children, according to the latest Census survey data. [9] This is very close to replacement level, and does not take into account the growing number of women who remain unmarried. In all, 75:):, of U.S. wives aged 18-24 expected to have no more than two children in 1975, compared to 453; in 1967. All the reasons for the recent changes in attitudes toward child-bearing and child-rearing as a woman’s principal occupation are by no means clear. However, there is no current evidence to suggest that these attitudinal shifts have run their course and are shortly to be reversed. To the contrary, the new viewpoints appear to be continuing to gain in currency, in frankness of expression, and in breadth of support. As long as they do, the downturn in the fertility level will continue to receive strong support from underlying attitudes. Only months after the fertility decline first came to public recognition, its effects were already being felt in the body politic. Among the first institutions to be affected were the school systems-many of which had become overbuilt in anticipation of still greater pupil loads at the very time that the birth rate was declining. In a number of localities, schools built only a few years ago are now being closed. Other major public facilities programs are now being reassessed in order to determine whether the planned investments are justified in light of the new population dynamics. In metropolitan Washington, D.C., for example, multimillion-dollar plans for expansion of area-wide sewage disposal systems are undergoing re-examination. While its impact will eventually be felt in virtually every area of life, nowhere is the fertility decline likely to have more far-reaching influence than in housing.
THE
“MARRIAGE
BUST”
Related to the “baby bust”, but by no means solely responsible for it, is another phenomenon which we may dub the “marriage bust”. There is no reason to believe that the institution of marriage is on its way to being abolished in America, any more than there is reason to expect that American women will stop having children altogether. However, there is no question that marriage is undergoing profound changes. In all likelihood, the roots of these changes are both deep and complex. The changes themselves, therefore, are likely to be long-term and sweeping in their impact. Statistically. the “marriage bust” is evidenced in a number of ways. More marriages are breaking up. The divorce rate more than doubled from 2.2 divorces per 1000 persons in 1962 to 4.6 per 1000 in 1974the highest national divorce rate on record. [13] The last time it approached this level was 1946, when many war-born marriages were coming apart. Still, the rate that year was only 4.3 per 1000; and the total number of divorces was only- about 610,000 compared to 970,000 in 1974. [14] Marriages are occurring later. The median age at first marriage in 1975 was 23.5 years for men and 21.1 years for women. The last time the age for men was that high was 1947; for women, even earlier (Table 3). These figures, like all averages, are somewhat misleading. They reflect not only the fact that most people are waiting longer to enter marriage, but that more are not getting married at all. The medians also understate the trend over time. The percentage of women 2&24 years old who were
150
George Grim
Year
MaI@’
Female
Year
Malech’
Female
1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1947
26.1 25.9 25.1 24.6 24.3 24.3 23.7
22.0 21.9 21.6 21.2 21.3 21.5 20.5
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
23.3 22.7 22.8 22.9 23.0 22.8 23.0 22.6 22.5 22.6
20.4 20.3 20.3 20.4 20.2 20.2 20.3 20.2 20.1 20.3
195X 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
22.6 22.5 32.X 22.8 22.7 22.X 23.1 22.X 22.8 23.1 23.1 23.2 23.2 23. I 23.3 23.2 23.1 23.5
20.2 20.2 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.5 20.5 20.6 20.5 20.6 20.X 20.8 20.8 20.9 20.9 21.0 71.1 21.1
G’ Figures are for entire U.S. in 1960-75, and for coterminous U.S. in 189Gl959. ‘WFigures for 1947 to 1975 are based on Current Population Survey data supplemented by data from the Department of Defense on marital status by age for men in the Armed Forces. Figures for earlier dates are from decennial censuses. Source: US. Bureau of the Census, Currenr Popultrrior~ Rc~ports. Series P-20, No 287. “Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1975.” Issued Dec. 1975.
still single increased from 28yo in 1960 to 40% in 1974, even though the median age of first marriage increased by less than a year. 1141 Alternatives to conventional marriage-ranging from temporary relationships without legal responsibility on either side to new forms of contractual arrangements such as incorporation-are increasingly common, although no adequate statistics are kept on them at this time. The statistics are quite clear, however, on the increasing number of households which are not conventional families. Between 1970 and 1975. the most notable change in American households was a shift away from families and toward non-family households, i.e. households in which the members were all unrelated. [15] Such households consist of either one person living alone or two or more unrelated individuals. In 1970 these non-family households comprised 19”<, of all U.S. households. Only 5 years later, they had increased to 22%. These proportions somewhat understate the magnitude of the trend. Non-family households accounted for nearly half (47”J of the total increase in U.S. households between 1970 and 1975. A majority of this increase was concentrated among younger adults. Fifty-six per cent of the total increase among primary individuals in the first half of the 1970s was composed of persons under 35. Thus, more and more U.S. households are not traditional families, but consist instead of either single adults or two or more adults who are not married or otherwise related in any way. They are not in the majority, and may never be; but they are a substantial and rapidly growing minority, especially among the young whose lifestyles will set the pattern for a growing proportion of all adults.
Population
Dynamics and Housing Economics
1.51
Traditionally, those who build and market housing have tended to pay most attention to the most rapidly growing sectors of their potential market. This is a growth sector which does not yet seem to be receiving its share of attention. Non-family households may or may not be less stable than the more traditional family households in individual instances; overall, however, there is little question that they do not possess the inherent permanence of families bound together by ties of marital or other relationships. This fact must obviously affect their needs in regard to housing at least as much as in other necessities of life. SMALLER HOUSEHOLDS AND MORE FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS U.S. households have been getting smaller of late-partly due to the “marriage bust” and the “baby bust”, but also due to a complex of other factors including longer lifespans and the recent departure of large numbers of maturing adults from their parents’ homes. The trend toward smaller households is a longterm phenomenon. It has been apparent every since World War II, although there was a period immediately following the war in which it was temporarily halted due largely to the rising number of births in that period (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, average household sizes did not increase substantially, and in the mid-1960’s resumed their downward trend. A milestone of sorts was passed in 1974, when the average population per household dropped below three persons for the first time. By 1975, it was down to 2.94 persons. This means that the average household is now too small to encompass the traditional combination of husband, wife and one or more children. In fact, measured in terms of the percentage distribution of household sizes, households containing only one or two persons are approaching a majority. They already comprised almost 487; of the total in 1970. [l] More and more often, the household has a woman at its head. In 1940 women headed 15% of all U.S. households. In 1950 they were still 15%. By 1960, however,
their proportion had risen to 18”,, and by 1967 to 20”<,. By 1975, 241; of all U.S. households-nearly one in four-had female heads. In the 35-year span between 1940 and 197.5, the total number of households approximately doubled, but the number headed by women more than tripled. Moreover, while in 1940 female heads of families were nearly twice as frequent as female heads of non-family households, by 1975 women who headed non-family households were substantially more frequent than family heads of the same sex. [14]
THE
GROWlNG SPACE
DISPARITY BETWEEN HOUSING AND HOUSING NEEDS
The relationship between recent trends in household sizes and in housing unit sizes has been inverse. Between 1960 and 1970, as noted earlier, the most rapid growth in the size distribution of housing units was at the upper end. Larger units of six rooms or more accounted for 580,; of the total increase in the housing stock. There was a small net loss (about 300,000) among compact dwellings with three rooms or less. At the same time, households were shrinking in size. The most rapidly growing part of the household size distribution was the lower end, with one-person households increasing in number by 64”;, and two-person households by 30”,,. Households with six or more persons remained virtually unchanged in number, increasing by less than 17;. [l] Thus the majority of the more than 10 million housing units added throughout this period were keyed to the space needs of a category of households which were scarcely growing in number. At the same time, more compact units which presumably could have been better suited to the space requirements of the more than 8.8 million additional one- and two-person households were not being added to the housing stock at all. In gross statistical terms, these contrary trends may yield the overall impression of a rapidly improving housing situation-with more housing space per person. A somewhat closer look at the data yields a somewhat different interpretation. Housing conditions have improved for many. Yet it would appear that many Americans are decidedly over-housed today in relation to their need for space adequate to sleep, eat, recreate and perform the other functions associated with the home. Furthermore, the disparity between space needs and space availability has been growing. This trend may contribute somewhat to comfort and satisfaction. There is little question that most people would prefer more rather than less room to spread out, and will quickly find ways to fill all the space they can acquire. But how long can the appetite-for sheer space, unrelated to basic needs. survive its growing cost relative to income? And how well suited are the housing patterns of the past to the households of the present and probable future?
DEMOGRAPHY
AND HOUSING
CHOICES
If we can assume that the family-oriented American households of the immediate post-World War II period had a fairly high degree of freedom in their choice of housing, and if we assume that this choice reflected their preferred lifestyles with some accuracy, then the sprawling tracts of detached single houses which came to be dubbed the “bedroom” suburbs appear in retrospect to have been a reasonable reflection of their housing needs and choices. These. in turn. were strongly shaped by demography.
With the raising of several small children in view. ample and safe playspace-preferably within watch of the house-was a prime consideration. While other design solutions might have been equally suitable, this requirement was reasonably well met by the single detached home. Inside the house. ample and well-separated space for sleeping and indoor recreation was also a desideratum. This was achieved by inclusion of several bedrooms and the ubiquitous family room or recreation room. With offspring occupying so much of the family’s time and attention. most of its activities centered overwhelmingly upon the home. The TV set (which by 1960 was already owned by 87’& of all U.S. households) [ 161 served to provide entertainment. The adequacy of recreational and cultural facilities exterior to the home was of comparatively little concern, at least while the children were young. Schools, on the other hand, were paramount. Small wonder then that most American neighborhoods built in that fecund era consisted of houses, schools, shopping centers and little else. Small wonder, also, that fathers were willing to endure long, arduous commutes to reach them. “For the sake of the children” was the dominant slogan. Today’s family, being far less child-oriented and much more oriented toward work and other adult activities. can reasonably be expected to have considerably different housing needs than when children occupied center stage. Outside playspace is no longer nearly so important: neither are multiple bedrooms. Homes can be more compact in terms of interior space, and closer together as well. Schools will not be nearly as important to adult-oriented families. However, the adequacy of cultural and recreational facilities outside the home may well gain in significance. It is probably no accident that movies are currently thriving, and that TV-watching has dropped off slightly of late, even as the adult population has continued to increase. Locationally, the family with few or no children may be less attracted to sparsely populated areas. It may be more interested in residing in more densely populated places where convenience to work is better, and adult cultural and recreational opportunities may be broader. This assumes, of course, that both the needed kinds of housing and the desired amenities are available there. Unfortunately, while the vast sprawling suburbs were being developed. the amenities of many central cities were also falling into neglect: so that these cities are not necessarily a desirable alternative. The household which is neither child-oriented IZOI’family-oriented almost certainly has housing needs which differ even more from those of the child-oriented family. Such households may find detached homes in distant locations distinctly to their personal disadvantage. They do have need, presumably, for dwellings that are reasonably convenient to outside sources of recreation, and to opportunities for socialization with other unattached adults. They may place a considerably higher value on easy access to places of work. and housing that meets their requirements for locational convenience may come to seem more desirable even if it is packed more closely together. Many also may wish to retain more flexibility than is normally permitted by a mortgage. Households whose lifestyle is not oriented toward children or even toward marital partners may desire to keep their options flexible-preferring the freedom to move in search of jobs, companionship or simply new experiences. This, then, is still another way in which the “traditional” pattern of suburban home ownership would not appear to be to their liking. On the other hand, adult-oriented households doubtless place as high a value on personal safety as any others. Their membersPparticularly the growing number of single women-may be even more concerned to reside in neighborhoods where they can feel
154
Georgr
Grim
reasonably safe from intrusion and able to leave their homes at night without undue fear of attack. In this respect, America’s central cities with their unfortunate but fairly gained reputations for crime do not offer a viable alternative for many.
THE CHALLENGE The American habitat, or at least that part of it developed since World War II, is suited primarily to the needs of the family with several small children, one or more cars, and a rising living standard based in major part on plentiful and cheap energy. Recent population trends have brought much smaller families and households that are not families at all. Recent economic trends have made housing more costly to build and to maintain; energy, in particular, is becoming scarce and expensive. These new dynamics pose a challenge of formidable magnitude to planners, architects, builders, and the public in general. Under other conditions, the central cities with their relatively dense collections of smaller dwellings might afford desirable habitation for the new generation of American households. But while the nation was single-mindedly building its family-oriented suburbs, it was allowing many of its cities to fall into serious disrepair-instead of constantly maintaining. renewing and rebuilding them as befits the extremely valuable properties they are. What, then, will the future habitat of Americans be like‘? Will previously existing patterns continue to be repeated. however inappropriate? Or will there be a concerted effort to find new solutions applicable to a greatly changed situation? Will the world’s most prosperous nation muster the will and the resources to reverse the tide of decay in its central cities? Will the now-ailing new communities movement-which once produced bright new towns like Reston, VA, and Columbia, MD-be revived once more? Will new design approaches and new technologies-such as modular construction, portable housing and plastic foam-be brought to bear in order to produce housing that is both more adaptable and more economical’? Or will America continue to try to build housing by techniques that are ill suited to rapidly changing conditions? These are formidable questions; but the search for viable answers is crucial to the future living patterns of an entire nation. In some way or other, the conflicting pressures discussed in this article must be resolved. If this resolution is permitted to fall entirely to chance, there is a good possibility that American households of the future will be housed neither as comfortably nor as affordably as their forebears.
REFERENCES I.
2. 3. 4. 5.
6.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census of Housing: 1970. Componenfs of Inventory Chanyr. Final Report HC (4)-l, United States and Regions. Data used in this reuort are based on a sample and may differ slightly from other Census statistics. Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies. National Survey of Household Activities, 1973 and 1975. Unpublished data assembled from utility company records on a representative sample of U.S. households. U.S. Bureau of the Census. li.S. Census of Housing: 1950. Report H-AI, Table S. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Hominy Reports. Series H-150-73A. Annual Housing Survey, 1973, Part A. “General Housing Characteristics for the United States and Regions: 1973.” Issued 1975. Calculated by Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies from US. Bureau of the Census data on housing values and family incomes, drawn from the decennial Census of Population, the Current Population Survey, and the Annual Housing Survjey. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Construction Rrporrs, Series C-25. “Characteristics of New One-family Homes, 1974.” Issued 1975.
Populukm 7.
Drnumics
and Housing Economics
155
Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies. Special Survey of Housing and Neighborhood Preferences, conducted for the D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development. Unpublished data. 8. A detailed discussion of the recent fertility trend and some of its implications is contained in George Crier. The B&r Bust (Washington. D.C.: Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1971). 9. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 6urrrnt Population Report: Populurion Chkacteristics. “Fertility History and Prosnects of American Women: June 1975”. Series P-20. No. 288. Issued Jan. 1976. The 1975 provisional fertility estimate will be found on p. 2. IO. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Monthly Vital Stutisrics Reports, Vol. 24, Nos. l-11 (Jan.-Nov. 1975). 11. The latest Census projection series (Nos. I. II and Ill) are found in US. Bureau of the Census, Current Popultrrion Reports. Series P-25, No. 601, “Projections of the Population of the United States: 1975 to 2050”. issued Oct. 1975. They are based on assumed completed fertility rates of 2.7, 2.1 and 1.7. The lowest of these three series is closest to current fertility experience. As recently as 1971, the Bureau’s then lowest projection series (Series D) assumed a completed fertility of 2.5. Fertility dropped below that level by 1968. 12. Calculated by Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies from U.S. Bureau of the Census data, drawn from the 1960 U.S. Census of Population and 1975 estimates contained in 11 above. 13. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Monthly Vital Statisrics Report, ProcGsional Statistics: Annual Summtrr!~,fiw rhe L’nirad Slurrv, lY74. Vol. 23, No. 13, 30 May (1975). 14. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics. “Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1975”. Series P-20, No. 287. Issued Dec. 1975. 15. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Populution Reports: Population Characteristics. “Households and Families by Type: March 1975” (Advance Report), Series P-20, No. 282. Issued July 1975. 16. U.S. Bureau of the Census. L’.S. Crnsus of Housing: 1960. Final Report HC(l)-1. United States Summary: States and Small Areas. 17. The authors wishes to express his gratitude to his colleagues at the Washington Center for their thoughtful review and contributions to this article. They include Eunice S. Grier, Janice Outtz, Marian Shamu, Atlec Shidler. Roberta Spalter-Roth, and Kathryn Stone. None is in any way responsible for the conclusions.
WILL
ALL
THE
PEOPLE
LIVE?
Population Dynamics, Housing Economics, and the Future of the American Habitat
The habitat of future Americans is likely to be shaped at least as much by the interaction of demography and economics as by traditional preferences or by the new inspirations of designers and architects. Powerful forces in both the structure of the U.S. population and the economics of its housing market are now converging to bring pressure for reshaping the nation’s long-established housing patterns. Through these pressures, U.S. housing of the future may come more and more to resemble that of longer-established and more densely developed European nations. Or, conceivably, new but uniquely American patterns could emerge. One way or another, however, Americans will find it necessary to strike a new balance between their changing needs for shelter space and their even more sharply altered physical and economic resources. Ironically, the forces that are now moving the nation in this direction have nothing to do with overpopulation. Quite the contrary: one of the most influential of them has been a drastically reduced rate of population growth. This declining growth rate has been accompanied by changes in household size and composition. which already have reduced the amount of interior space required by each household. Some of these changes also suggest the desirability of a shift toward more densely packed structural configurations. At the same time, the costs of providing and of maintaining each square foot of dwelling space have increased-recently at a far more rapid pace than incomes. A growing proportion of American households are finding the costs difficult to meet. These trends of changing housing needs and increased housing costs are mutually reinforcing. Their combined effects run counter to traditional American preferences for commodious, well-separated dwellings. The resulting adaptations may be quite stressful. However, Americans have never been as highly bound by tradition as some other peoples; and they may not hold to it long if the price of doing so should be a rapid deterioration in their overall living standard. Fortunately, a considerable degree of adaptation seems possible before most U.S. households can be considered ill-housed by any reasonable comparison with * The author
is consulting
senior
associate.
143
most other nations. In fact, it is quite possible that with appropriate help from the design professions in the redesign of their habitat. many Americans will find that somewhat less housing space can contribute to considerably greater satisfaction in living.
CURRENT
U.S. HOUSING
PATTERNS
The American housing consumer has long been quite lavish in his use of space, both between and within his dwellings, compared to most of his counterparts in Europe and many other nations. This has never been more true than in recent decades. The current situation is described quite well by 1970 Census statistics. At that time, 69’2) of all U.S. year-round housing units were single detached dwellings. A high proportion of these were relatively new and were located in the spread-out, tree-shaded suburban subdivisions which came increasingly to dominate the American metropolitan landscape after World War II. In 1970, close to half (47”,,) of U.S. year-round dwellings of all types had been built in the past 20 years. [l] Within their dwellings, most Americans today also enjoy a rather lavish standard of living space. In 1970, the median American household consisted of 2.6 persons. By comparison, the median American dwelling contained five rooms. Those five rooms, by the Census Bureau’s enumeration standards, were exclusive of any bathrooms, foyers, or kitchenettes which might be present. [1] Between 1960 and 1970, moreover, all the net growth in the U.S. housing stock was at the upper end of the size spectrum. Housing units with six rooms increased in number by 2.5”;, and those with seven rooms or more by over 37”;. Concurrently, there was a slight net loss among units with three rooms or less. [l] Thus, the recent trend has been decidedly toward more housing space per household, and away from more compact dwellings. Overcrowding continued to plague some less fortunate Americans in 1970, particularly members of minority groups confined to the older and deteriorating central cities. Still, most U.S. families did not personally experience it. In 1970 only one American household in fourteen had more than one person per room-which Americans generally consider overcrowded, but would not be so viewed in many nations. Fewer than 25:; were overcrowded to the extent of over 1.5 persons per room. On the other hand, 51% of all U.S. households had two room or more prr person. [l]
THE
HIGH
COSTS
OF
HOUSING
ABUNDANCE
America’s spread-out mode of residence has had its disadvantages. It has brought a sprawling, unfocused pattern of metropolitan development that has confounded planners and public officials charged with the efficient and cost-effective provision of essential public services. Sprawl has greatly increased the cost of America’s infrastructure, particularly that intricate network of pipes, cables, wires. roads, and mobile transport machinery which brings vital services to American homes and enables their occupants to move around freely. It has led, for many, to exceedingly long commutes by car between home and work-which, as gasoline becomes increasingly scarce and expensive, will become more and more burdensome in money as well as time. By the same token, it has made it virtually impossible for the United States to employ the highly efficient systems of mass transport found in most European cities.
The abundance of living space inside American homes has also had its negative aspects. As it becomes clearer that America cannot continue to rely on cheap, easily transported, and apparently inexhaustible supplies of fossil fuels, the growing cost of heating all this interior space looms as one of the greatest threats to the integrity of American family budgets over the next several decades. National surveys of energy consumption and costs by the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies show that the per-unit cost of natural gas in residential use increased by 40”. between 1973 and 1975 alone. Gas now heats about three-fifths of all U.S. dwellings. [2] Even if the cost of heating all this space were not a growing economic deterrent, the cost of building it would be. For decades, abundant resources made decent housing relatively cheap and affordable by the average U.S. family. Recently, however, every major element contributing to the completed cost of a dwelling unit has escalated rapidly --land, materials, labor, and financing. In 1950, the median value of owner-occupied houses in the United States was $7400. [3] By 1960 it had risen to $12,000, [l] by 1970 to $18,200, [l] and by 1973 to $24.100. [4] The increase of 32”; in median housing value between 1970 and 1973 was about twice the percentage growth in median family income for the same period. [S] Part of this historic increase was due to larger living space and improved amenities, but not all of it. Recently, these factors have hardly figured at all. In 1970, the average per-square-foot cost of a new single-family dwelling was $14. By 1973 that cost had risen to $17, and by 1974 to $19, [6] despite the fact that many builders were reducing amenities to hold down costs. By all indications. most Americans still have a strong preference for the traditional single-family home. In a recent survey by the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, three-fourths of a sample of Washington area residents indicated they “would like very much” to live in a single-family house on a large lot. Only 9”; expressed a similarly strong preference for a highrise apartment. [7] But as space comes increasingly to be seen as less of a boon and more of a burden, which seems likely, Americans may be driven to a reassessment of its value for them. As they do, they may conclude that the recent changes in their own households no longer call for the same kinds of living arrangements that their parents considered so desirable. These changes in household characteristics have been dramatic, to put it mildly. The term “revolutionary”, which may have been overworked a bit of late, does not seem too strong to describe them. Some have become grist for “Dear Abby” and popular literature. Others, which may be at least equally inportant. have not. Unfortunately, none have yet received from the behavioral sciences the kind of attention they deserve in terms of their implications for the society as a whole and for individual human needs. The trends at issue are several, and their interaction complex. To sum up their impact on the average American household, they have made that household: (1) less childoriented; (2) less family-oriented; (3) less permanent: and (4) substantially smaller than in the recent past. THE “BABY
BUST”
Of all the population trends involved, none is more dramatic has come to be known popularly as the “baby bust”. U.S. fertility
than the one which has recently slumped
146
Grorye
Grier
far below any previously recorded level. The total fertility rate (the number of children each woman will bear in her lifetime at current age-specific birth rates) is now well below the “replacement level” which will, if colltinued, bring the nation eventually to zero popLIlation growth. That level is 2.1 children per woman-one child to reptace each parent, with a small additional allowance for attrition due to early deaths and other factors. [8] In 1972. the total fertility rate slipped below the 2.1 level for the first time. It has continued to decline steadily each year since. While final birth data for 1975 are not yet available at this writing. a provisional estimate by Bureau of the Census statisticians based on data through November places the level at 1.81. [9] While fertility seemed to be leveling out a bit in the early part of 1975, the birth data for September through November suggest a resumption of the rapid decline-with the seasonally adjusted fertility rate for November 1975 being IO!<, below that for November 1974. [lo] This unprecedented downturn may eventually come to be viewed as one of the landmark population events in the nation’s history. It could have a long-range impact comparable to the great westward migration. That earlier event set the stage for America’s greatest period of population and economic growth. It began the transformation of millions of square miles of sparsely populated territory into productive farmland and bustling cities, as well as facilitating the unbridled exploitation of America’s vast mineral and forest resources. The current trend could mark the nation’s transition from indefinite rapid population increase to much slower growth or even stability. The precipitous drop in the birth rate is no short-term aberration; it has been underway since 1958, as Fig. 1 shows. The fertility curve turned down in that year, and its downward course has continued with virtually no hesitation ever since. (The rate shown here is the “general fertility rate”, which is the number of children born per 100 women age 1544.) In 1957, women were having an average of almost 3.X children each, as Table 1 shows. The current rate is less than half as high. For some reason-perhaps the influence of the growth psychology which had long permeated the nation-rapidly accumulating evidence of a fundamental change in the U.S. FERTILITY RATES, ,809. ,375 (NOVEMBER) Births Per ,000 Women Aged 15 - 44
Population
Dvnarnics
Table I. Total fertiliry (children Averages: 192&1924 1925-1929 193G1934 1935-1939 1940 1945 1947 1950 1955 1957 1960 1961
3.248 2.840 2.376 2.235 2.301 2.49 1 3.274 3.091 3.580 3.767 3.654 3.629
and Housiny Ecorwnics
147
rate(“) U.S. 19X1 ro 1975 per woman)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 196X 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
3.474 3.333 3.208 2.928 2.736 2.573 2.477 2.447 2.480 2.275 2.022 1.896 I .8621h’ l.810’h’
‘“‘The total fertility rate, as here given. indicates how many children an individual woman would have if, at every age. she bore children at the agespecific birth rates prevailing in the particular year. ‘b’ Provisional estimates. Sources: Data for 192&1969: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-23. No. 49. “Population of the United States, Trends and Prospects: 195G1990.” Issued May 1974. Data for 197CL1974: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-20. No. 219. “Population Profile of the United States: 1974.” Issued March 1975. Datum for 1975: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20. No. 288. “Fertility History and Prospects of American Women: June, 1975.” Issued January 1976.
nation’s population dynamics escaped the attention not only of the general public but even of most demographic technicians until late in 1971. At that point, the fertility curve was already nearing its previous all-time low. Since then, the Census Bureau’s four traditional series of population projections-which still did not reflect the fertility downturn-have been revised several times and, in 1975, were replaced by three completely new series. [l l] Expert opinions differ as to whether and when the fertility curve will reverse itself, and how far any renewed upward movement may carry it. Unfortunately. they must remain for the moment exactly that-opinions, and no more. At this time there exist no surrogates for barometers or whether satellites to aid the prediction of future fertility. There is, however, no uncertainty at all about its shape during the period covered by Fig. 1. Not only is the current level unprecedentedly low, but its rate of descent since 1958 has been extremely sharp. Even if the curve where to reverse itself at this point and return once more to its former high level, it is difficult to envision its ascent being any faster than its recent decline. If it were to move upward again as rapidly as it descended, it would take at least 17 years to reach its former high point. Thus, the “baby bust” is likely to span considerably more than an entire generation. Even if it does not mark a transition to entirely new fertility patterns, its effects will be felt for many years to come.
Like most other population trends, the fertility decline is likely to be self-limiting. Though complete control over births is now technically possible, it is extremely unlikely that American women will decide to have no babies at all. But it is obviously not true-as some U.S. demographers believed just a few years ago-that the national fertility rate cannot drop below replacement level. Not only has it now descended well below that level, but it has remained below it for several years. The possibility that the U.S. population could go into decline, which not long ago was dismissed out of hand by most expert sources, can no longer be ignored. Any fertility rate below 2.1 will eventually bring it to that point, unless counteracted by immigration. The current Census Series III projection (which assumes 1.7 children per woman) shows the U.S. reaching virtual population stability by the year 2OOGwith only 5 million more Americans to be added in the ensuing 25 years, and those chiefly by immigration. [Ill] If the U.S. were to follow the lead of some European countries. its fertility could drop even further. How current U.S. fertility compares to that of other nations, and how much lower it might possibly go, is shown by the comparative fertility statistics in Table 2. They indicate clearly that U.S. fertility now approximates that of some highly developed European nations--yet still remains much higher than others. A few years ago, a “second post-World-War II baby boom” was almost universally predicted. The basis for that expectation was that the number of potential parents was approaching an all-time high as the first post-World-War II baby-boom generation neared maturity. But as the number of young women was increasing. the number of babies born per woman was decreasing even more rapidly. As a result. births in the 12 months ending with November 1975 totalled only 3.16 million [lo] -27”,, fewer than the 4.31 million born in 1960, when the number of young women in the highly fertile 18-24 age group was only 58”/, as large. [12] Theoretically, at least, the potential for a new “baby boom” still exists. The number of young adults aged 18 through 24 will continue to increase until 1980. dropping off thereafter. But current economics do not favor a resumption of the high fertility
United Canada
68. I 79.8
States
West Germany East Germany France Sweden United Kingdom
4x.x 61.6 72.5 65.0 73.1
Japan
67.7
India
169.9
Burundi
203.0
Sourer: United Nations. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat. Srlrctrtl IVorld Dcmoyrtrphic
Indictrrorr
hy Cow-
I Y5&2000 IJNEAA. P:WP.S5. 28 May, 1975.
tries.
Population
Dynamics
and Housiy
Economics
149
of the 1950’s. Neither the insecure economy, nor the high and growing cost of even a minimum dwelling, offer any encouragement to unfettered baby-having. Nor do current attitudes. Young married women age 1824 now expect to have an average of less than 2.2 children, according to the latest Census survey data. [9] This is very close to replacement level, and does not take into account the growing number of women who remain unmarried. In all, 75:):, of U.S. wives aged 18-24 expected to have no more than two children in 1975, compared to 453; in 1967. All the reasons for the recent changes in attitudes toward child-bearing and child-rearing as a woman’s principal occupation are by no means clear. However, there is no current evidence to suggest that these attitudinal shifts have run their course and are shortly to be reversed. To the contrary, the new viewpoints appear to be continuing to gain in currency, in frankness of expression, and in breadth of support. As long as they do, the downturn in the fertility level will continue to receive strong support from underlying attitudes. Only months after the fertility decline first came to public recognition, its effects were already being felt in the body politic. Among the first institutions to be affected were the school systems-many of which had become overbuilt in anticipation of still greater pupil loads at the very time that the birth rate was declining. In a number of localities, schools built only a few years ago are now being closed. Other major public facilities programs are now being reassessed in order to determine whether the planned investments are justified in light of the new population dynamics. In metropolitan Washington, D.C., for example, multimillion-dollar plans for expansion of area-wide sewage disposal systems are undergoing re-examination. While its impact will eventually be felt in virtually every area of life, nowhere is the fertility decline likely to have more far-reaching influence than in housing.
THE
“MARRIAGE
BUST”
Related to the “baby bust”, but by no means solely responsible for it, is another phenomenon which we may dub the “marriage bust”. There is no reason to believe that the institution of marriage is on its way to being abolished in America, any more than there is reason to expect that American women will stop having children altogether. However, there is no question that marriage is undergoing profound changes. In all likelihood, the roots of these changes are both deep and complex. The changes themselves, therefore, are likely to be long-term and sweeping in their impact. Statistically. the “marriage bust” is evidenced in a number of ways. More marriages are breaking up. The divorce rate more than doubled from 2.2 divorces per 1000 persons in 1962 to 4.6 per 1000 in 1974the highest national divorce rate on record. [13] The last time it approached this level was 1946, when many war-born marriages were coming apart. Still, the rate that year was only 4.3 per 1000; and the total number of divorces was only- about 610,000 compared to 970,000 in 1974. [14] Marriages are occurring later. The median age at first marriage in 1975 was 23.5 years for men and 21.1 years for women. The last time the age for men was that high was 1947; for women, even earlier (Table 3). These figures, like all averages, are somewhat misleading. They reflect not only the fact that most people are waiting longer to enter marriage, but that more are not getting married at all. The medians also understate the trend over time. The percentage of women 2&24 years old who were
150
George Grim
Year
MaI@’
Female
Year
Malech’
Female
1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1947
26.1 25.9 25.1 24.6 24.3 24.3 23.7
22.0 21.9 21.6 21.2 21.3 21.5 20.5
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
23.3 22.7 22.8 22.9 23.0 22.8 23.0 22.6 22.5 22.6
20.4 20.3 20.3 20.4 20.2 20.2 20.3 20.2 20.1 20.3
195X 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
22.6 22.5 32.X 22.8 22.7 22.X 23.1 22.X 22.8 23.1 23.1 23.2 23.2 23. I 23.3 23.2 23.1 23.5
20.2 20.2 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.5 20.5 20.6 20.5 20.6 20.X 20.8 20.8 20.9 20.9 21.0 71.1 21.1
G’ Figures are for entire U.S. in 1960-75, and for coterminous U.S. in 189Gl959. ‘WFigures for 1947 to 1975 are based on Current Population Survey data supplemented by data from the Department of Defense on marital status by age for men in the Armed Forces. Figures for earlier dates are from decennial censuses. Source: US. Bureau of the Census, Currenr Popultrrior~ Rc~ports. Series P-20, No 287. “Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1975.” Issued Dec. 1975.
still single increased from 28yo in 1960 to 40% in 1974, even though the median age of first marriage increased by less than a year. 1141 Alternatives to conventional marriage-ranging from temporary relationships without legal responsibility on either side to new forms of contractual arrangements such as incorporation-are increasingly common, although no adequate statistics are kept on them at this time. The statistics are quite clear, however, on the increasing number of households which are not conventional families. Between 1970 and 1975. the most notable change in American households was a shift away from families and toward non-family households, i.e. households in which the members were all unrelated. [15] Such households consist of either one person living alone or two or more unrelated individuals. In 1970 these non-family households comprised 19”<, of all U.S. households. Only 5 years later, they had increased to 22%. These proportions somewhat understate the magnitude of the trend. Non-family households accounted for nearly half (47”J of the total increase in U.S. households between 1970 and 1975. A majority of this increase was concentrated among younger adults. Fifty-six per cent of the total increase among primary individuals in the first half of the 1970s was composed of persons under 35. Thus, more and more U.S. households are not traditional families, but consist instead of either single adults or two or more adults who are not married or otherwise related in any way. They are not in the majority, and may never be; but they are a substantial and rapidly growing minority, especially among the young whose lifestyles will set the pattern for a growing proportion of all adults.
Population
Dynamics and Housing Economics
1.51
Traditionally, those who build and market housing have tended to pay most attention to the most rapidly growing sectors of their potential market. This is a growth sector which does not yet seem to be receiving its share of attention. Non-family households may or may not be less stable than the more traditional family households in individual instances; overall, however, there is little question that they do not possess the inherent permanence of families bound together by ties of marital or other relationships. This fact must obviously affect their needs in regard to housing at least as much as in other necessities of life. SMALLER HOUSEHOLDS AND MORE FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS U.S. households have been getting smaller of late-partly due to the “marriage bust” and the “baby bust”, but also due to a complex of other factors including longer lifespans and the recent departure of large numbers of maturing adults from their parents’ homes. The trend toward smaller households is a longterm phenomenon. It has been apparent every since World War II, although there was a period immediately following the war in which it was temporarily halted due largely to the rising number of births in that period (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, average household sizes did not increase substantially, and in the mid-1960’s resumed their downward trend. A milestone of sorts was passed in 1974, when the average population per household dropped below three persons for the first time. By 1975, it was down to 2.94 persons. This means that the average household is now too small to encompass the traditional combination of husband, wife and one or more children. In fact, measured in terms of the percentage distribution of household sizes, households containing only one or two persons are approaching a majority. They already comprised almost 487; of the total in 1970. [l] More and more often, the household has a woman at its head. In 1940 women headed 15% of all U.S. households. In 1950 they were still 15%. By 1960, however,
their proportion had risen to 18”,, and by 1967 to 20”<,. By 1975, 241; of all U.S. households-nearly one in four-had female heads. In the 35-year span between 1940 and 197.5, the total number of households approximately doubled, but the number headed by women more than tripled. Moreover, while in 1940 female heads of families were nearly twice as frequent as female heads of non-family households, by 1975 women who headed non-family households were substantially more frequent than family heads of the same sex. [14]
THE
GROWlNG SPACE
DISPARITY BETWEEN HOUSING AND HOUSING NEEDS
The relationship between recent trends in household sizes and in housing unit sizes has been inverse. Between 1960 and 1970, as noted earlier, the most rapid growth in the size distribution of housing units was at the upper end. Larger units of six rooms or more accounted for 580,; of the total increase in the housing stock. There was a small net loss (about 300,000) among compact dwellings with three rooms or less. At the same time, households were shrinking in size. The most rapidly growing part of the household size distribution was the lower end, with one-person households increasing in number by 64”;, and two-person households by 30”,,. Households with six or more persons remained virtually unchanged in number, increasing by less than 17;. [l] Thus the majority of the more than 10 million housing units added throughout this period were keyed to the space needs of a category of households which were scarcely growing in number. At the same time, more compact units which presumably could have been better suited to the space requirements of the more than 8.8 million additional one- and two-person households were not being added to the housing stock at all. In gross statistical terms, these contrary trends may yield the overall impression of a rapidly improving housing situation-with more housing space per person. A somewhat closer look at the data yields a somewhat different interpretation. Housing conditions have improved for many. Yet it would appear that many Americans are decidedly over-housed today in relation to their need for space adequate to sleep, eat, recreate and perform the other functions associated with the home. Furthermore, the disparity between space needs and space availability has been growing. This trend may contribute somewhat to comfort and satisfaction. There is little question that most people would prefer more rather than less room to spread out, and will quickly find ways to fill all the space they can acquire. But how long can the appetite-for sheer space, unrelated to basic needs. survive its growing cost relative to income? And how well suited are the housing patterns of the past to the households of the present and probable future?
DEMOGRAPHY
AND HOUSING
CHOICES
If we can assume that the family-oriented American households of the immediate post-World War II period had a fairly high degree of freedom in their choice of housing, and if we assume that this choice reflected their preferred lifestyles with some accuracy, then the sprawling tracts of detached single houses which came to be dubbed the “bedroom” suburbs appear in retrospect to have been a reasonable reflection of their housing needs and choices. These. in turn. were strongly shaped by demography.
With the raising of several small children in view. ample and safe playspace-preferably within watch of the house-was a prime consideration. While other design solutions might have been equally suitable, this requirement was reasonably well met by the single detached home. Inside the house. ample and well-separated space for sleeping and indoor recreation was also a desideratum. This was achieved by inclusion of several bedrooms and the ubiquitous family room or recreation room. With offspring occupying so much of the family’s time and attention. most of its activities centered overwhelmingly upon the home. The TV set (which by 1960 was already owned by 87’& of all U.S. households) [ 161 served to provide entertainment. The adequacy of recreational and cultural facilities exterior to the home was of comparatively little concern, at least while the children were young. Schools, on the other hand, were paramount. Small wonder then that most American neighborhoods built in that fecund era consisted of houses, schools, shopping centers and little else. Small wonder, also, that fathers were willing to endure long, arduous commutes to reach them. “For the sake of the children” was the dominant slogan. Today’s family, being far less child-oriented and much more oriented toward work and other adult activities. can reasonably be expected to have considerably different housing needs than when children occupied center stage. Outside playspace is no longer nearly so important: neither are multiple bedrooms. Homes can be more compact in terms of interior space, and closer together as well. Schools will not be nearly as important to adult-oriented families. However, the adequacy of cultural and recreational facilities outside the home may well gain in significance. It is probably no accident that movies are currently thriving, and that TV-watching has dropped off slightly of late, even as the adult population has continued to increase. Locationally, the family with few or no children may be less attracted to sparsely populated areas. It may be more interested in residing in more densely populated places where convenience to work is better, and adult cultural and recreational opportunities may be broader. This assumes, of course, that both the needed kinds of housing and the desired amenities are available there. Unfortunately, while the vast sprawling suburbs were being developed. the amenities of many central cities were also falling into neglect: so that these cities are not necessarily a desirable alternative. The household which is neither child-oriented IZOI’family-oriented almost certainly has housing needs which differ even more from those of the child-oriented family. Such households may find detached homes in distant locations distinctly to their personal disadvantage. They do have need, presumably, for dwellings that are reasonably convenient to outside sources of recreation, and to opportunities for socialization with other unattached adults. They may place a considerably higher value on easy access to places of work. and housing that meets their requirements for locational convenience may come to seem more desirable even if it is packed more closely together. Many also may wish to retain more flexibility than is normally permitted by a mortgage. Households whose lifestyle is not oriented toward children or even toward marital partners may desire to keep their options flexible-preferring the freedom to move in search of jobs, companionship or simply new experiences. This, then, is still another way in which the “traditional” pattern of suburban home ownership would not appear to be to their liking. On the other hand, adult-oriented households doubtless place as high a value on personal safety as any others. Their membersPparticularly the growing number of single women-may be even more concerned to reside in neighborhoods where they can feel
154
Georgr
Grim
reasonably safe from intrusion and able to leave their homes at night without undue fear of attack. In this respect, America’s central cities with their unfortunate but fairly gained reputations for crime do not offer a viable alternative for many.
THE CHALLENGE The American habitat, or at least that part of it developed since World War II, is suited primarily to the needs of the family with several small children, one or more cars, and a rising living standard based in major part on plentiful and cheap energy. Recent population trends have brought much smaller families and households that are not families at all. Recent economic trends have made housing more costly to build and to maintain; energy, in particular, is becoming scarce and expensive. These new dynamics pose a challenge of formidable magnitude to planners, architects, builders, and the public in general. Under other conditions, the central cities with their relatively dense collections of smaller dwellings might afford desirable habitation for the new generation of American households. But while the nation was single-mindedly building its family-oriented suburbs, it was allowing many of its cities to fall into serious disrepair-instead of constantly maintaining. renewing and rebuilding them as befits the extremely valuable properties they are. What, then, will the future habitat of Americans be like‘? Will previously existing patterns continue to be repeated. however inappropriate? Or will there be a concerted effort to find new solutions applicable to a greatly changed situation? Will the world’s most prosperous nation muster the will and the resources to reverse the tide of decay in its central cities? Will the now-ailing new communities movement-which once produced bright new towns like Reston, VA, and Columbia, MD-be revived once more? Will new design approaches and new technologies-such as modular construction, portable housing and plastic foam-be brought to bear in order to produce housing that is both more adaptable and more economical’? Or will America continue to try to build housing by techniques that are ill suited to rapidly changing conditions? These are formidable questions; but the search for viable answers is crucial to the future living patterns of an entire nation. In some way or other, the conflicting pressures discussed in this article must be resolved. If this resolution is permitted to fall entirely to chance, there is a good possibility that American households of the future will be housed neither as comfortably nor as affordably as their forebears.
REFERENCES I.
2. 3. 4. 5.
6.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census of Housing: 1970. Componenfs of Inventory Chanyr. Final Report HC (4)-l, United States and Regions. Data used in this reuort are based on a sample and may differ slightly from other Census statistics. Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies. National Survey of Household Activities, 1973 and 1975. Unpublished data assembled from utility company records on a representative sample of U.S. households. U.S. Bureau of the Census. li.S. Census of Housing: 1950. Report H-AI, Table S. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Hominy Reports. Series H-150-73A. Annual Housing Survey, 1973, Part A. “General Housing Characteristics for the United States and Regions: 1973.” Issued 1975. Calculated by Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies from US. Bureau of the Census data on housing values and family incomes, drawn from the decennial Census of Population, the Current Population Survey, and the Annual Housing Survjey. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Construction Rrporrs, Series C-25. “Characteristics of New One-family Homes, 1974.” Issued 1975.
Populukm 7.
Drnumics
and Housing Economics
155
Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies. Special Survey of Housing and Neighborhood Preferences, conducted for the D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development. Unpublished data. 8. A detailed discussion of the recent fertility trend and some of its implications is contained in George Crier. The B&r Bust (Washington. D.C.: Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1971). 9. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 6urrrnt Population Report: Populurion Chkacteristics. “Fertility History and Prosnects of American Women: June 1975”. Series P-20. No. 288. Issued Jan. 1976. The 1975 provisional fertility estimate will be found on p. 2. IO. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Monthly Vital Stutisrics Reports, Vol. 24, Nos. l-11 (Jan.-Nov. 1975). 11. The latest Census projection series (Nos. I. II and Ill) are found in US. Bureau of the Census, Current Popultrrion Reports. Series P-25, No. 601, “Projections of the Population of the United States: 1975 to 2050”. issued Oct. 1975. They are based on assumed completed fertility rates of 2.7, 2.1 and 1.7. The lowest of these three series is closest to current fertility experience. As recently as 1971, the Bureau’s then lowest projection series (Series D) assumed a completed fertility of 2.5. Fertility dropped below that level by 1968. 12. Calculated by Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies from U.S. Bureau of the Census data, drawn from the 1960 U.S. Census of Population and 1975 estimates contained in 11 above. 13. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Monthly Vital Statisrics Report, ProcGsional Statistics: Annual Summtrr!~,fiw rhe L’nirad Slurrv, lY74. Vol. 23, No. 13, 30 May (1975). 14. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics. “Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1975”. Series P-20, No. 287. Issued Dec. 1975. 15. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Populution Reports: Population Characteristics. “Households and Families by Type: March 1975” (Advance Report), Series P-20, No. 282. Issued July 1975. 16. U.S. Bureau of the Census. L’.S. Crnsus of Housing: 1960. Final Report HC(l)-1. United States Summary: States and Small Areas. 17. The authors wishes to express his gratitude to his colleagues at the Washington Center for their thoughtful review and contributions to this article. They include Eunice S. Grier, Janice Outtz, Marian Shamu, Atlec Shidler. Roberta Spalter-Roth, and Kathryn Stone. None is in any way responsible for the conclusions.