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Port arthur tragedy “it could never happen here — But it did”
PORT A R T H U R
TRAGEDY
" I T COULD NEVER HAPPEN HERE - BUT IT D I D " Grant Lennox President Tasmanian Branch
!.
The Unpredictability of Shooting massacres
The Port Arthur massacre like others in Australia and overseas was unpredictable. Australasia has experienced
The massacre at Port Arthur on Sunday 28 April 1996 stunned the nation to its core. In one afternoon Tasmania's reputation as a quiet idyllic island was
other shooting massacres 1971
m u r d e r - l O killed
shattered with the worst civilian shooting massacre by a lone gunman in world history. A horrifically violent crime
1987
semi automatic weapons at and near the Port Arthur
Hoddle Street, Melbourne -
7 killed, 17 injured
- thirty five people killed and 21 injured with high calibre historic site.
Hope Forest, South Australia, domestic mass
1987
Queens S t r e e t - Australia Post Building, Melbourne - 8 killed, 17 injured
1988 Northern Territory - domestic mass murder
- 5 killed 1990 Aramoana, New Zealand
13 killed 1991
Strathfield Shopping Plaza, S y d n e y -
7 killed During the month prior to the Port Arthur massacre the small village of Dunblane, Scotland experienced a similar tragic mass shooting of 16 schoolchildren and their teacher.
2.
Concepts for dealing with Emergencies and Disasters in Australia
Australian communities need to be able to deal with a variety of hazards, natural and man-made. Some natural hazards, such as cyclones, flood and bushfires are seasonal and regional but some hazards caused by man-including those arising from technology, human fault and hostile acts - such as the shootings at Port Arthur are less predictable and could occur almost anytime, anywhere. Emergency Management Australia, formerly known as the National Disasters Organisation urges four key concepts for dealing with emergencies and disasters in Australia.
2. I The All Hazards Approach Under the all hazards approach management arrangements and training must ensure the ability to carry out all the necessary tasks to deal with whatever emergency or disaster arises - from floods to fires to violent acts.
50
Z2 ComprehensiveApproach - Prevention,
Preparedness, Response and Recovery The four key elements of emergency and disaster management are: prevention/mitigation of hazard impact preparedness with the community effective response immediately after any hazard and recovery of the community affected.
Z3 All Agencies (or integrated) approach Arrangements for dealing with major emergencies and disasters in Australia require an active partnership between Commonwealth, State/Territory and local levels of government, statutory authorities and voluntary and community organisations. State governments exercise control over most of the functions which are essential for effective emergency/disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery - through legislative and regulatory arrangements within which the community and various agencies operate, through provision of police, fire, ambulance, medical, hospital and emergency services, and through government and statutory agencies which provide services to the community. The role of the Commonwealth is to provide guidance and support to states and territories in developing their capacity for dealing with emergencies and disasters. They provide physical assistance to requesting states or territories in the event that an emergency/disaster occurs which is beyond its response capability. Local government plays a major role in the management partnership, as do the many voluntary organisations in Australia which assist in dealing with emergencies and disasters.
52
For successful emergency/disaster management, the Commonwealth Government advocates the establishment of arrangements to involve all agencies. This is called 'THE ALL AGENCIES APPROACH' to emergency/disaster management or sometimes called 'THE INTEGRATED APPROACH'.
Z4 The Prepared Community From the community viewpoint the three vital links in dealing with emergencies/disasters are individuals, voluntary organisations, and local government. Individuals can do much to help themselves and others within their community by: being aware of local hazards and recommended protective measures; taking appropriate individual precautions against those hazards; being actively involved in community-based voluntary organisations; and making sure that their local government has effective arrangements in place. Voluntary organisations can play a vital role in the area of preparedness and response. However, to be effective they must be supported by the community and be fully integrated into its emergency/disaster management arrangements. In times of emergencies and disasters, individual and community self-help can often provide the most decisive and effective relief, as it cannot be assumed that assistance from external sources will always be available or will arrive promptly. Local government and community organisations provide the basis for organising self-help. Experience shows that affected communities turn first to their local agencies for advice, assistance and support. The Commonwealth sees the community as the primary focus, in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Local government is seen as the most immediate agent through which appropriate systems can be set up. Governments argue that any successful emergency/disaster management system relies upon effective arrangements being in place at local level.
3.
The Events of Sunday 28 April 1996
As a person has been charged with numerous offenses relating to the events of Sunday 28 April, there are legal restrictions governing what can be said about the specific events of the day with the case yet to go to trial. The person has been charged with 35 counts of murder, 19 counts of attempted murder, 7 counts of wounding, five counts of aggravated assault, two counts of causing grievous bodily harm, one count of arson and one count of unlawfully setting fire to property. Without going into further details it is possible to describe how the ambulance hospital medical services responded to this tragic series of events. The tragedy because of its scale and its remote location presented an enormous challenge for Tasmania's police, medical and emergency services - a challenge that had to be met lest the death toll rose even further beyond those killed almost instantly by high calibre weapons fired at close range. While there was no formal declaration of a state of emergency on the day of the Port Arthur massacre the tragedy was very much handled in accordance with the principles of effective emergency management. Every organisation whether it was a State, Local or a voluntary agency knew its role and speedily put in place its response, control, co-ordination or resource support arrangements which had been developed and understood through effective past planning. There was clear overall command and control mechanisms in place for each of the organisational elements of the State's emergency plans and nothing was left to chance. There was extremely effective coordination of support resources mobilised to deal with the tragedy. The Australian and international media's thirst for knowledge of the event resulted in several hundred, local, national and international journalists covering the event and its aftermath. The media management of the tragedy has drawn very high praise (see later comment) nationally and internationally and as a result, with just a few exceptions, the media's handling of the tragedy was appropriate and aided in effective community recovery strategies.
4.
Overview Of Port Arthur
Port Arthur is situated on the Tasman Peninsula, one and half hours drive south east of Hobart. The Port Arthur Historic site, where most of the shootings occurred is regarded as one of Australia's foremost tourist attractions being the site of the infamous convict prison. Sunday 28 April 1996 was a day like any other in Port Arthur's recent history - somewhere around 700 tourists arrived at the historic site by bus and car. Tour guides escorted groups on walking tours of the site and some joined boat tours of the Isle of the Dead. Sadly the lives of tourists to Port Arthur that day and the site's staff were shattered by events which started shortly after 1.30 p.m. Many of those who died or who were injured and hundreds of the witnesses to some of the shootings were from various States and Territories of Australia and as well as from overseas countries.
5.
The Tasman Peninsula- a Prepared Community
Despite its small population the Tasman Peninsula was and is a "prepared community". At the historic site 90% of the staff have first aid training and a number are qualified volunteers with one or other of the various emergency services (ambulance, fire or State Emergency Service). On the day of the tragedy the training of those staff was vital. The historic site's Security Officer Ian Kingston is also the Tasman Peninsula's State Emergency Service coordinator. His swift actions enabled several hundred people potentially in the path of the alleged gunman to flee to safety. He also led staff to control the stunned crowd as rescue and treatment efforts began. The first calls to police and ambulance services were made by another historic site staff member Wendy Scurr, a trained Volunteer Ambulance Officer. After calling for help she helped marshall staff (whom she had herself trained in first aid) for initial triage and treatment. Historic site staff also ensured securing of two telephone lines at the site to maintain precious contact with Police and Ambulance Services in Hobart as they rapidly deployed personnel and resources to the scene. This community has very active networks of volunteer ambulance, fire and state emergency services personnel. Its two general practitioners, Drs. Pam and Steven Ireland whose practice nearby have both done additional training in the early management of severe trauma.
The Tasman Peninsula has always been identified as a potential risk for a large multi-casualty incident with the highest potential being of an accident involving a tourist bus. Over the years the Peninsula area has been the scene of training exercises and the focus of numerous "tabletop" disaster planning exercises. As a result many of the logistical issues arising from the Port Arthur tragedy travel times, locations of supplies and personnel etc. were instantly known to those co-ordinating a response to the tragedy.
6.
Preparednessal the Slate Level and Significant prior events
Tasmania is regarded as having in place a very effective set of State and local level disaster plans in each of the lead response agencies, (Police, Fire, Ambulance, State Emergency Service and hospital and medical organisations). All have clearly defined roles and plans in place to deal with a range of potential hazards. In the week preceding the tragedy there was a two day aviation emergency seminar in Hobart where every facet of emergency management was covered including media management and community recovery. The Royal Hobart Hospital, the State's major teaching and referring hospital in Hobart completely and extensively reviewed its emergency plans over an eight month period. The final report of that review was completed on Friday 26 April, two days before the Port Arthur tragedy. When the tragedy occurred, those responsible for the plan knew instantly the various steps to put into place to bring the plan into action. The Tasmanian Ambulance Service and the State's emergency medicine, surgical and other hospital specialists have a strong commitment to improving the capacity of the smaller rural and remote areas of the State to handle disasters and emergencies. At the very time shootings were occurring at Port Arthur there were two training courses underway in Hobart, the participants of which became actively involved in the response to the tragedy. At Ambulance Headquarters in Hobart, 18 Volunteer Ambulance Officers were in a training course. Once the
54
magnitude of events at Port Arthur became clear the most experienced of those volunteers enabled rapid availability of additional ambulance crews as experienced volunteers were matched up with professional staff and either deployed by road ambulance to the scene or deployed to operationally cover the city of Hobart. Hobart based Paramedics skilled in helicopter rescue work were sent to the scene by helicopter. The less experienced volunteers were used to scribe and keep records of events as they occurred, to assist staff in packing and dispatching medical supplies and equipment to the scene and assisting at the helicopter landing site not far from the Royal Hobart Hospital. At Royal Hobart Hospital, the Royal Australian College of Surgeons was conducting an Early Management of Severe Trauma (EMST) course for rural and other doctors. This was aimed at adding to the State's capacity to respond to rural emergencies. The Hospital's Directors of Emergency Medicine and Surgery were both lecturing at the Course and were instantly available to take charge. The course participants and those involved in their training were also able to be deployed in various roles in the hospital.
7. lasmanianAmbulanceService Response The early actions of historic site staff in triage, treatment and crowd control made a significant impact of the life chances of many of those who were injured. In the State Ambulance Communications Centre in Hobart the Paramedic Supervisor of Communications John Geappen and Supervisor of Tactical Operations Peter Morgan and other Communications Officers controlled deployment of ambulance personnel and equipment to the scene and also the important flow of information between operational ambulance units and the hospitals. At the same time they still had to ensure continuation of normal operations throughout the State. Normally Tasmania (because of its small population) has only one rescue helicopter available. Luckily on the day there were three helicopters and pilots available to dispatch six paramedics together with medical supplies to Port Arthur. At the same time two ambulances left by road from Hobart as well as two ambulance station wagons together carrying eight staff and more medical supplies. The ambulance crew reached the tollgate crime scene within fourteen minutes and their arrival was progressively followed by the two local general practitioners and a
volunteer unit which had two volunteers and an off duty paramedic who lived on a farm in the area. The first two paramedics arriving by helicopter (Peter Stride and Warwick Allen) were both highly experienced rescue trained paramedics and on arrival they took control of the scene until Andrew O'Brien an ambulance supervisor arrived shortly afterwards by road to act as the Field Commander. The initial tasks of the ambulance personnel were to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of patients and they commenced triaging in and around the Broad Arrow Cafe and the bus car park sites with the Tasman Volunteer Ambulance Officers already having triaged at the toll booth and the Dunalley crew having triaged at the Fox and Hounds Resort and Seascape area.
7. I Important bystander support The Historic site staff did a magnificent job in controlling the crowd of tourists and prevented them fleeing towards the Seascape Cottage. They assisted in treatment and several bystanders provided invaluable help. These included an off-duty Hobart nurse, Robyn Croger, and two doctors visiting the site as tourists from interstate and an off-duty NSW police officer who did a sterling job of crowd control and protecting the crime scene for later forensic and ballistics examination.
7.2 Injury Overview The fatal injuries were predominantly gunshot wounds to the head, chest or both, mostly at very short range. The critical injuries were all high calibre gunshot wounds to the upper body (chest, neck, jaw, head and shoulder and other injuries included gunshot wounds to peripheries (limbs and legs and penetrating fragment injuries).
7.3 Communicationsfrom the Scene There were initial problems with emergency communications because of the rugged terrain and its impact on good radio coverage for response agencies (police and ambulance) and subsequently as telephone exchanges were overloaded by people contacting relatives. However while the radio problems posed constraints they were overcome by dedicating telephone lines for emergency services lines once established were then kept continuously open to ensure a steady flow of information for police and ambulance services.
The Casualty collecting area was set up outside the Broad Arrow cafe because there were 20 deceased persons inside and the weather was fine and it was close to the area set aside for helicopter landing. It also enabled good access to ambulances.
7.4 Medical Suppliesand Equipment There were sufficient medical supplies and equipment either at or sent to the scene to ensure there was no compromise to the care of those injured. This included the historic site's own first aid equipment together with equipment from the arriving ambulances and the local general practitioners. Additional supplies and equipment had also been rapidly dispatched by road and helicopter including multi-casualty incident kits, cardiac monitors, morphine, surgical collars, drug kits, blankets and IV equipment, oxygen and longboards.
7.5 Scenecommand Rescue Paramedic Warwick Allen (1st helicopter crew) and thereafter Andrew O'Brien, Ambulance Field Commander, commanded the scene coordinating triage and establishing communications - dedicating a telephone line to be kept constantly open to update the ambulance communications centre in Hobart. The telephone line proved a vital means of information flow from the site. Scene command duties included designating a casualty collecting area reporting details of the incident and determining the level of assistance needed in terms of personnel, equipment and crowd control. Doctors, paramedics, volunteer ambulance officers, trained bystanders and first aid staff were allocated patient care and transport roles by the scene commander who also liaised with Police, State Emergency Service and historic site staff.
7.6 ClinicalManagementat the Scene There were no resuscitation attempts on patients deemed deceased from high calibre gunshot wounds to the head and chest. All live patients were conscious and co-operative. Most patients were treated under normal ambulance procedures and protocols and there were eventually sufficient personnel and trained bystanders at the scene to ensure almost one-on-one care for the injured.
7.7 TransportCoordination 56
7.8 Dispatchof patients from Port Arthur Whilst Port Arthur is one and a half hours drive from Hobart through a narrow road which traverses hilly countryside the site is only 12-14 minutes from Hobart by helicopter. The first patient was dispatched by helicopter at 14.56 unaccompanied by any trained ambulance personnel. The first ambulance crew who arrived by helicopter had to make the difficult decision of rapidly dispatching the helicopter back to Hobart to pick up more staff and medical supplies yet not being able to leave the scene themselves with so many injured requiring treatment. The police officer on board the helicopter accompanied the first patient. A further four patients were transported from the scene by helicopter all of whom were critical, and they departed at 15.07, 15.40, 15.55 and 16.16. The remaining 13 patients were dispatched by four road ambulances and a bus which carried 7 patients under the care of two paramedics and volunteer ambulance officers. The bus also carried a number of immediate family of the injured.
7.9 Hobart's HelicopterLaudingArea The landing area is approximately 1 kilometre from Royal Hobart Hospital. Ambulance crews were waiting for the patients arriving by helicopter and Police had arranged priority road access through road blocks from the landing area to the hospital. Medical supplies were regularly taken to the landing area to enable further supplies to be transported to the scene. Police were deployed on return trips to bolster numbers.
8.
Royal Hobart Hospital responseto the tragedy
The Department of Emergency Medicine was first notified of the shootings at 13.50 p.m. and activated its Code Brown emergency response shortly thereafter. The preparation phase of the plan involved: clearing the emergency department calling in and allocating staff to various roles creating in-patient beds preparing theatres, the intensive care unit and a receiving ward
roles as messengers and the nursing staff call-in was aided by the timing of the event coinciding with the changeover of shifts. Nurses assigned to the Department of Emergency Medicine had all had experience in the area. As the in-patient bed component of the hospital's disaster plan was implemented forty in-patient beds were made available prior to the first patient arriving. Elective surgery cases were cancelled and sixteen ambulant patients transferred to another hospital a kilometre away with that task carried out by the hospital's patient services unit and the discharge centre. A receiving ward was emptied and patients began arriving at regular intervals from 1518 witl~ the last patients arriving by bus at 1820.
establishing a control centre and a discharge centre notifying private hospitals and ensuring adequate stores of blood creating a police blockade near the hospital. The recently revised hospital plan proceeded fluently and the twelve patients in the emergency department at the time of the shootings were rapidly dealt with. Three were admitted, one was sent to a private hospital and eight were discharged. All emergency beds were free prior to arrival of the first patient. The decision was made not to send a medical response team to Port Arthur, given the skill levels of the two general practitioners at the site both of whom were EMST trained and one of whom had considerable experience in emergency medicine. Regard was also given to the calibre and experience of the ambulance paramedics dispatched to the scene. The key roles of Director of Emergency Medicine, Co-ordinator of the Hospital's Emergency Plan and Coordinator of surgical teams were allocated and the hospital rapidly had in place eight fully staffed resuscitation teams and five fully staffed theatres ready to receive the first patients. The hospital's staff call-in arrangements worked smoothly with many medical and nursing staff responding without being called having heard news of the event on the radio or on television. At one point there were 42 doctors in the emergency medicine department with the numbers having been swelled by the EMST Course underway when shooting began. A full surgical complement of staff was also available, general surgeons, a neurosurgeon, cardiothorasic, orthopaedic, vascular, plastic and burns specialists. Eighteen medical students were also assigned
There was simultaneous triage and identification of patients on arrival at the hospital by the hospital's Director of Emergency Medicine and senior nursing personnel. There were pre-prepared resuscitation records and histories. All the necessary specialists were immediately available in the Department of Emergency Medicine for consults. There were also anaesthetists in the department for urgent intubation and liaising with theatres via mobile phones regarding priorities and instruments. In total there were 22 patients treated at the hospital for injuries sustained at or near Port Arthur with four of the patients arriving the next day, three of whom had stayed in hotels overnight with minor injuries. The fourth was the person later charged by Police in his hospital bed in a specially arranged "Court sitting". Altogether 16 patients were admitted and 11 operations were performed on the Sunday night, 9 operations the next day and a further 4 operations ahead as some patients had multiple surgery. Four patients were discharged to interstate hospitals by air ambulance and the remainder were discharged over the following days and weeks. One of the unique aspects of the hospital's role during the disaster was that as a stand alone tertiary referral centre it received all the patients, all the deceased and the alleged gunman. Over the days ahead a great deal of community anger against the alleged gunman unfortunately was directed at the hospital and its staff through a steady stream of abusive phone calls and two bomb threats which forced more emergency procedures to be set in train. The hospital's staff met the enormous challenges caring for the victims as well as the normal patient load while being the focus of international media attention.
9. StrategicCo-ordinationand Media Management While the State Disaster and Emergency Plans were not formally activated in response to the Port Arthur tragedy all the Agencies operated to the principles and procedures contained in the State Disaster Plan and embodied in their training regimes. Clearly this training "paid off' and a co-ordinating group of Chief Executive Officers of lead agencies (Premier and Cabinet, Police, Community and Health Services and Justice) left their staff to handle response while they focused on strategic and coordination issues. They showed enormous confidence in the operational leaders and without the burden of operational imperatives they were able to give focus to strategic coordination issues between agencies and to directing operational activities in other areas. These including liaising with churches and non-government organisations and ensuring Tasmania's schools would be prepared to cope with the potential impacts on the following day for children traumatised after learning of the tragedy from television news on Sunday. The strategic coordination group was also able to consult internationally with others who had played leadership roles in response to recent dramatic events including those involved in management of the Dunblane massacre, Mt Eribus aircrash and the Aramoana massacre in New Zealand. One of the key strategic decisions made at the outset by this group was for the State to be as open and cooperative with the media as possible, only withholding information which would compromise operational efficiency or the prosecution of the alleged offender. This decision proved invaluable in managing the "international fallout" of the incident and also stopped potentially inappropriate media actions to obtain news coverage. The level of international media interest in the Port Arthur tragedy was immense in world terms. BBC radio broadcast news of the events within 45 minutes of the shootings and in America the tragedy was the major story on the American late night news. European talkback radio started making calls to the State overnight on Sunday. The high intensity of international press interest
58
in the event lasted for a week with the Port Arthur tragedy being the top news story for three consecutive days and nights on the American CNN network which usually has very little overseas news. News coverage of the tragedy in the USA was such that it was the most time ever devoted to an Australian news story on the American networks easily surpassing events such as Sydney gaining the 2000 Olympics and the tragic bush fires in New South Wales. More than 200 journalists from across the world came to Tasmania to cover the story and their needs were fully considered. An experienced Government press officer went to Port Arthur on the Sunday afternoon of the tragedy where he remained for several weeks for on-site media coordination. Experienced New South Wales and Victorian Police media staff were seconded to help Tasmania's police media officers and other media personnel to cope with the intensity of international and national media interest. The media set up several satellite dishes on the front lawns of Royal Hobart Hospital and a constant throng of journalists waited for further snippets of news as the world's attention shifted from Port Arthur to the hospital. As part of their media management strategies the police and the hospital provided "talking heads" who were regularly able to give the media updates. The official spokespeople were all trained, capable and articulate and this was greatly appreciated by the media. The Hospital's CEO Lindsay Pyne spoke regularly to the media and the Director of Surgery, Stephen Wilkinson, came directly from theatre still in theatre gown, to provide the media with updates on patients recovery after surgery. The media management of the event was considered "world best practice" according to key media groups internationally and nationally, with the CNN network rating the State's media management as being "99 out of 100" and as an example for other countries to follow.
10. RecoveryStrategies Port Arthur has affected many people with the most immediate impact being on survivors, witnesses, relatives and friends of victims and those who had to respond and assist them. The recovery strategy commenced on the afternoon of the shootings within 11/2 hours of shots being fired. In the various emergency services, critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) team members began the task of
debriefing emergency service personnel in accordance with a critical incident management plan which is a joint initiative of all of Tasmania's emergency services. CISD members were involved at the site overnight and their efforts continued in the days ahead for all members of police, ambulance, fire and State Emergency Service who responded to the tragedy. Team leaders went to State Emergency Service headquarters on Sunday afternoon from where they dispatched eight community counsellors to the Tasman Peninsula. They also arranged a major counselling debrief for that evening at the Police Academy for relatives of victims and witnesses to the tragedy. 20 trauma counsellors were involved in counselling 120 clients at that venue. In addition 12 counsellors were involved in manning a Police hotline on Sunday night to speak to relatives and friends of victims who came from all parts of Australia and overseas. On the first day logistical arrangements were also carried out for transport and overnight accommodation as many of those who witnessed the event were interstate tourists, some due to leave Tasmania on the Sunday night. Counselling teams were also sent to two major Hobart hotels to assist affected tourists and there was great cooperation from hotels in providing toiletries for those dislocated in their accommodation. Altogether there were 463 staff from State and Commonwealth departments, non-government organisations and private practitioners involved in the community recovery strategies in the period from Sunday 28 April to 10 May 1996. Of these 408 had expertise in psychology, psychiatry, trauma or critical incident stress counselling. In the early stages after the tragedy there were just under 1000 clients listed on the response database with just under 1700 support services provided. There was widespread use of the 24 hour information and counselling hotline setup from Sunday 28 April with calls to the hotline averaging 48 minutes each. A key principle for the community recovery process has been to encourage and support the community to manage its own recovery and to ensure a local focus for residents of the Tasman Peninsula. There are also networks for trauma counselling information and advice for people throughout Australia for people affected by the events of the 28 April. Victims and others affected are receiving a newsletter and updates to keep them informed of issues ranging from the
Port Arthur appeal, legal issues and ongoing counselling available for criminal injuries compensation. Community recovery strategies also included production of several pamphlets "on the family and personal crisis", "children and trauma" and "coping with a tragic event" which were widely distributed throughout Tasmania to the public, family doctors and other health and community service professionals. One of the pamphlets was delivered free by Australia Post to every household in Tasmania providing advice on how to cope with a tragic event and how help could be obtained. Realistically the community recovery process will be continuing for many years.
1 i. Supportfrom within Australia and overseas The tasks of Tasmania's hospital, ambulance, and counselling personnel involved in response to the Port Arthur tragedy has been greatly aided by the messages of support and encouragement from hospitals and health organisations from throughout Australia. Special messages were also received from others who had experienced tragedies "first hand" such as those who responded to the Dunblane massacre. In addition direct support was provided by other States in many ways including CISD personnel from Queensland and Victorian ambulance authorities and relief medical and nursing staff from a Victorian hospital who gave Royal Hobart Staff a much needed break. This level of support showed the great sense of bonding felt by all those involved in the health industry.
Lessonsfrom the Port Arthur Tragedy There are many prevention initiatives arising from the Port Arthur tragedy and one of them - the focus on tougher gun control legislation - is occupying a considerable amount of attention in all Australian States and Territories through the political process. The tragedy put a great deal of steel into the resolve of the national's political leaders to prevent a similar tragedy ever occurring again. A key lesson from the tragedy is that no community should ever adopt the attitude of "it won't happen here". If such an attitude is adopted then communities won't be prepared to cope with whatever natural or man-made hazards that could potentially confront them in the future.
TRAGEDY
" I T COULD NEVER HAPPEN HERE - BUT IT D I D " Grant Lennox President Tasmanian Branch
!.
The Unpredictability of Shooting massacres
The Port Arthur massacre like others in Australia and overseas was unpredictable. Australasia has experienced
The massacre at Port Arthur on Sunday 28 April 1996 stunned the nation to its core. In one afternoon Tasmania's reputation as a quiet idyllic island was
other shooting massacres 1971
m u r d e r - l O killed
shattered with the worst civilian shooting massacre by a lone gunman in world history. A horrifically violent crime
1987
semi automatic weapons at and near the Port Arthur
Hoddle Street, Melbourne -
7 killed, 17 injured
- thirty five people killed and 21 injured with high calibre historic site.
Hope Forest, South Australia, domestic mass
1987
Queens S t r e e t - Australia Post Building, Melbourne - 8 killed, 17 injured
1988 Northern Territory - domestic mass murder
- 5 killed 1990 Aramoana, New Zealand
13 killed 1991
Strathfield Shopping Plaza, S y d n e y -
7 killed During the month prior to the Port Arthur massacre the small village of Dunblane, Scotland experienced a similar tragic mass shooting of 16 schoolchildren and their teacher.
2.
Concepts for dealing with Emergencies and Disasters in Australia
Australian communities need to be able to deal with a variety of hazards, natural and man-made. Some natural hazards, such as cyclones, flood and bushfires are seasonal and regional but some hazards caused by man-including those arising from technology, human fault and hostile acts - such as the shootings at Port Arthur are less predictable and could occur almost anytime, anywhere. Emergency Management Australia, formerly known as the National Disasters Organisation urges four key concepts for dealing with emergencies and disasters in Australia.
2. I The All Hazards Approach Under the all hazards approach management arrangements and training must ensure the ability to carry out all the necessary tasks to deal with whatever emergency or disaster arises - from floods to fires to violent acts.
50
Z2 ComprehensiveApproach - Prevention,
Preparedness, Response and Recovery The four key elements of emergency and disaster management are: prevention/mitigation of hazard impact preparedness with the community effective response immediately after any hazard and recovery of the community affected.
Z3 All Agencies (or integrated) approach Arrangements for dealing with major emergencies and disasters in Australia require an active partnership between Commonwealth, State/Territory and local levels of government, statutory authorities and voluntary and community organisations. State governments exercise control over most of the functions which are essential for effective emergency/disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery - through legislative and regulatory arrangements within which the community and various agencies operate, through provision of police, fire, ambulance, medical, hospital and emergency services, and through government and statutory agencies which provide services to the community. The role of the Commonwealth is to provide guidance and support to states and territories in developing their capacity for dealing with emergencies and disasters. They provide physical assistance to requesting states or territories in the event that an emergency/disaster occurs which is beyond its response capability. Local government plays a major role in the management partnership, as do the many voluntary organisations in Australia which assist in dealing with emergencies and disasters.
52
For successful emergency/disaster management, the Commonwealth Government advocates the establishment of arrangements to involve all agencies. This is called 'THE ALL AGENCIES APPROACH' to emergency/disaster management or sometimes called 'THE INTEGRATED APPROACH'.
Z4 The Prepared Community From the community viewpoint the three vital links in dealing with emergencies/disasters are individuals, voluntary organisations, and local government. Individuals can do much to help themselves and others within their community by: being aware of local hazards and recommended protective measures; taking appropriate individual precautions against those hazards; being actively involved in community-based voluntary organisations; and making sure that their local government has effective arrangements in place. Voluntary organisations can play a vital role in the area of preparedness and response. However, to be effective they must be supported by the community and be fully integrated into its emergency/disaster management arrangements. In times of emergencies and disasters, individual and community self-help can often provide the most decisive and effective relief, as it cannot be assumed that assistance from external sources will always be available or will arrive promptly. Local government and community organisations provide the basis for organising self-help. Experience shows that affected communities turn first to their local agencies for advice, assistance and support. The Commonwealth sees the community as the primary focus, in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Local government is seen as the most immediate agent through which appropriate systems can be set up. Governments argue that any successful emergency/disaster management system relies upon effective arrangements being in place at local level.
3.
The Events of Sunday 28 April 1996
As a person has been charged with numerous offenses relating to the events of Sunday 28 April, there are legal restrictions governing what can be said about the specific events of the day with the case yet to go to trial. The person has been charged with 35 counts of murder, 19 counts of attempted murder, 7 counts of wounding, five counts of aggravated assault, two counts of causing grievous bodily harm, one count of arson and one count of unlawfully setting fire to property. Without going into further details it is possible to describe how the ambulance hospital medical services responded to this tragic series of events. The tragedy because of its scale and its remote location presented an enormous challenge for Tasmania's police, medical and emergency services - a challenge that had to be met lest the death toll rose even further beyond those killed almost instantly by high calibre weapons fired at close range. While there was no formal declaration of a state of emergency on the day of the Port Arthur massacre the tragedy was very much handled in accordance with the principles of effective emergency management. Every organisation whether it was a State, Local or a voluntary agency knew its role and speedily put in place its response, control, co-ordination or resource support arrangements which had been developed and understood through effective past planning. There was clear overall command and control mechanisms in place for each of the organisational elements of the State's emergency plans and nothing was left to chance. There was extremely effective coordination of support resources mobilised to deal with the tragedy. The Australian and international media's thirst for knowledge of the event resulted in several hundred, local, national and international journalists covering the event and its aftermath. The media management of the tragedy has drawn very high praise (see later comment) nationally and internationally and as a result, with just a few exceptions, the media's handling of the tragedy was appropriate and aided in effective community recovery strategies.
4.
Overview Of Port Arthur
Port Arthur is situated on the Tasman Peninsula, one and half hours drive south east of Hobart. The Port Arthur Historic site, where most of the shootings occurred is regarded as one of Australia's foremost tourist attractions being the site of the infamous convict prison. Sunday 28 April 1996 was a day like any other in Port Arthur's recent history - somewhere around 700 tourists arrived at the historic site by bus and car. Tour guides escorted groups on walking tours of the site and some joined boat tours of the Isle of the Dead. Sadly the lives of tourists to Port Arthur that day and the site's staff were shattered by events which started shortly after 1.30 p.m. Many of those who died or who were injured and hundreds of the witnesses to some of the shootings were from various States and Territories of Australia and as well as from overseas countries.
5.
The Tasman Peninsula- a Prepared Community
Despite its small population the Tasman Peninsula was and is a "prepared community". At the historic site 90% of the staff have first aid training and a number are qualified volunteers with one or other of the various emergency services (ambulance, fire or State Emergency Service). On the day of the tragedy the training of those staff was vital. The historic site's Security Officer Ian Kingston is also the Tasman Peninsula's State Emergency Service coordinator. His swift actions enabled several hundred people potentially in the path of the alleged gunman to flee to safety. He also led staff to control the stunned crowd as rescue and treatment efforts began. The first calls to police and ambulance services were made by another historic site staff member Wendy Scurr, a trained Volunteer Ambulance Officer. After calling for help she helped marshall staff (whom she had herself trained in first aid) for initial triage and treatment. Historic site staff also ensured securing of two telephone lines at the site to maintain precious contact with Police and Ambulance Services in Hobart as they rapidly deployed personnel and resources to the scene. This community has very active networks of volunteer ambulance, fire and state emergency services personnel. Its two general practitioners, Drs. Pam and Steven Ireland whose practice nearby have both done additional training in the early management of severe trauma.
The Tasman Peninsula has always been identified as a potential risk for a large multi-casualty incident with the highest potential being of an accident involving a tourist bus. Over the years the Peninsula area has been the scene of training exercises and the focus of numerous "tabletop" disaster planning exercises. As a result many of the logistical issues arising from the Port Arthur tragedy travel times, locations of supplies and personnel etc. were instantly known to those co-ordinating a response to the tragedy.
6.
Preparednessal the Slate Level and Significant prior events
Tasmania is regarded as having in place a very effective set of State and local level disaster plans in each of the lead response agencies, (Police, Fire, Ambulance, State Emergency Service and hospital and medical organisations). All have clearly defined roles and plans in place to deal with a range of potential hazards. In the week preceding the tragedy there was a two day aviation emergency seminar in Hobart where every facet of emergency management was covered including media management and community recovery. The Royal Hobart Hospital, the State's major teaching and referring hospital in Hobart completely and extensively reviewed its emergency plans over an eight month period. The final report of that review was completed on Friday 26 April, two days before the Port Arthur tragedy. When the tragedy occurred, those responsible for the plan knew instantly the various steps to put into place to bring the plan into action. The Tasmanian Ambulance Service and the State's emergency medicine, surgical and other hospital specialists have a strong commitment to improving the capacity of the smaller rural and remote areas of the State to handle disasters and emergencies. At the very time shootings were occurring at Port Arthur there were two training courses underway in Hobart, the participants of which became actively involved in the response to the tragedy. At Ambulance Headquarters in Hobart, 18 Volunteer Ambulance Officers were in a training course. Once the
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magnitude of events at Port Arthur became clear the most experienced of those volunteers enabled rapid availability of additional ambulance crews as experienced volunteers were matched up with professional staff and either deployed by road ambulance to the scene or deployed to operationally cover the city of Hobart. Hobart based Paramedics skilled in helicopter rescue work were sent to the scene by helicopter. The less experienced volunteers were used to scribe and keep records of events as they occurred, to assist staff in packing and dispatching medical supplies and equipment to the scene and assisting at the helicopter landing site not far from the Royal Hobart Hospital. At Royal Hobart Hospital, the Royal Australian College of Surgeons was conducting an Early Management of Severe Trauma (EMST) course for rural and other doctors. This was aimed at adding to the State's capacity to respond to rural emergencies. The Hospital's Directors of Emergency Medicine and Surgery were both lecturing at the Course and were instantly available to take charge. The course participants and those involved in their training were also able to be deployed in various roles in the hospital.
7. lasmanianAmbulanceService Response The early actions of historic site staff in triage, treatment and crowd control made a significant impact of the life chances of many of those who were injured. In the State Ambulance Communications Centre in Hobart the Paramedic Supervisor of Communications John Geappen and Supervisor of Tactical Operations Peter Morgan and other Communications Officers controlled deployment of ambulance personnel and equipment to the scene and also the important flow of information between operational ambulance units and the hospitals. At the same time they still had to ensure continuation of normal operations throughout the State. Normally Tasmania (because of its small population) has only one rescue helicopter available. Luckily on the day there were three helicopters and pilots available to dispatch six paramedics together with medical supplies to Port Arthur. At the same time two ambulances left by road from Hobart as well as two ambulance station wagons together carrying eight staff and more medical supplies. The ambulance crew reached the tollgate crime scene within fourteen minutes and their arrival was progressively followed by the two local general practitioners and a
volunteer unit which had two volunteers and an off duty paramedic who lived on a farm in the area. The first two paramedics arriving by helicopter (Peter Stride and Warwick Allen) were both highly experienced rescue trained paramedics and on arrival they took control of the scene until Andrew O'Brien an ambulance supervisor arrived shortly afterwards by road to act as the Field Commander. The initial tasks of the ambulance personnel were to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of patients and they commenced triaging in and around the Broad Arrow Cafe and the bus car park sites with the Tasman Volunteer Ambulance Officers already having triaged at the toll booth and the Dunalley crew having triaged at the Fox and Hounds Resort and Seascape area.
7. I Important bystander support The Historic site staff did a magnificent job in controlling the crowd of tourists and prevented them fleeing towards the Seascape Cottage. They assisted in treatment and several bystanders provided invaluable help. These included an off-duty Hobart nurse, Robyn Croger, and two doctors visiting the site as tourists from interstate and an off-duty NSW police officer who did a sterling job of crowd control and protecting the crime scene for later forensic and ballistics examination.
7.2 Injury Overview The fatal injuries were predominantly gunshot wounds to the head, chest or both, mostly at very short range. The critical injuries were all high calibre gunshot wounds to the upper body (chest, neck, jaw, head and shoulder and other injuries included gunshot wounds to peripheries (limbs and legs and penetrating fragment injuries).
7.3 Communicationsfrom the Scene There were initial problems with emergency communications because of the rugged terrain and its impact on good radio coverage for response agencies (police and ambulance) and subsequently as telephone exchanges were overloaded by people contacting relatives. However while the radio problems posed constraints they were overcome by dedicating telephone lines for emergency services lines once established were then kept continuously open to ensure a steady flow of information for police and ambulance services.
The Casualty collecting area was set up outside the Broad Arrow cafe because there were 20 deceased persons inside and the weather was fine and it was close to the area set aside for helicopter landing. It also enabled good access to ambulances.
7.4 Medical Suppliesand Equipment There were sufficient medical supplies and equipment either at or sent to the scene to ensure there was no compromise to the care of those injured. This included the historic site's own first aid equipment together with equipment from the arriving ambulances and the local general practitioners. Additional supplies and equipment had also been rapidly dispatched by road and helicopter including multi-casualty incident kits, cardiac monitors, morphine, surgical collars, drug kits, blankets and IV equipment, oxygen and longboards.
7.5 Scenecommand Rescue Paramedic Warwick Allen (1st helicopter crew) and thereafter Andrew O'Brien, Ambulance Field Commander, commanded the scene coordinating triage and establishing communications - dedicating a telephone line to be kept constantly open to update the ambulance communications centre in Hobart. The telephone line proved a vital means of information flow from the site. Scene command duties included designating a casualty collecting area reporting details of the incident and determining the level of assistance needed in terms of personnel, equipment and crowd control. Doctors, paramedics, volunteer ambulance officers, trained bystanders and first aid staff were allocated patient care and transport roles by the scene commander who also liaised with Police, State Emergency Service and historic site staff.
7.6 ClinicalManagementat the Scene There were no resuscitation attempts on patients deemed deceased from high calibre gunshot wounds to the head and chest. All live patients were conscious and co-operative. Most patients were treated under normal ambulance procedures and protocols and there were eventually sufficient personnel and trained bystanders at the scene to ensure almost one-on-one care for the injured.
7.7 TransportCoordination 56
7.8 Dispatchof patients from Port Arthur Whilst Port Arthur is one and a half hours drive from Hobart through a narrow road which traverses hilly countryside the site is only 12-14 minutes from Hobart by helicopter. The first patient was dispatched by helicopter at 14.56 unaccompanied by any trained ambulance personnel. The first ambulance crew who arrived by helicopter had to make the difficult decision of rapidly dispatching the helicopter back to Hobart to pick up more staff and medical supplies yet not being able to leave the scene themselves with so many injured requiring treatment. The police officer on board the helicopter accompanied the first patient. A further four patients were transported from the scene by helicopter all of whom were critical, and they departed at 15.07, 15.40, 15.55 and 16.16. The remaining 13 patients were dispatched by four road ambulances and a bus which carried 7 patients under the care of two paramedics and volunteer ambulance officers. The bus also carried a number of immediate family of the injured.
7.9 Hobart's HelicopterLaudingArea The landing area is approximately 1 kilometre from Royal Hobart Hospital. Ambulance crews were waiting for the patients arriving by helicopter and Police had arranged priority road access through road blocks from the landing area to the hospital. Medical supplies were regularly taken to the landing area to enable further supplies to be transported to the scene. Police were deployed on return trips to bolster numbers.
8.
Royal Hobart Hospital responseto the tragedy
The Department of Emergency Medicine was first notified of the shootings at 13.50 p.m. and activated its Code Brown emergency response shortly thereafter. The preparation phase of the plan involved: clearing the emergency department calling in and allocating staff to various roles creating in-patient beds preparing theatres, the intensive care unit and a receiving ward
roles as messengers and the nursing staff call-in was aided by the timing of the event coinciding with the changeover of shifts. Nurses assigned to the Department of Emergency Medicine had all had experience in the area. As the in-patient bed component of the hospital's disaster plan was implemented forty in-patient beds were made available prior to the first patient arriving. Elective surgery cases were cancelled and sixteen ambulant patients transferred to another hospital a kilometre away with that task carried out by the hospital's patient services unit and the discharge centre. A receiving ward was emptied and patients began arriving at regular intervals from 1518 witl~ the last patients arriving by bus at 1820.
establishing a control centre and a discharge centre notifying private hospitals and ensuring adequate stores of blood creating a police blockade near the hospital. The recently revised hospital plan proceeded fluently and the twelve patients in the emergency department at the time of the shootings were rapidly dealt with. Three were admitted, one was sent to a private hospital and eight were discharged. All emergency beds were free prior to arrival of the first patient. The decision was made not to send a medical response team to Port Arthur, given the skill levels of the two general practitioners at the site both of whom were EMST trained and one of whom had considerable experience in emergency medicine. Regard was also given to the calibre and experience of the ambulance paramedics dispatched to the scene. The key roles of Director of Emergency Medicine, Co-ordinator of the Hospital's Emergency Plan and Coordinator of surgical teams were allocated and the hospital rapidly had in place eight fully staffed resuscitation teams and five fully staffed theatres ready to receive the first patients. The hospital's staff call-in arrangements worked smoothly with many medical and nursing staff responding without being called having heard news of the event on the radio or on television. At one point there were 42 doctors in the emergency medicine department with the numbers having been swelled by the EMST Course underway when shooting began. A full surgical complement of staff was also available, general surgeons, a neurosurgeon, cardiothorasic, orthopaedic, vascular, plastic and burns specialists. Eighteen medical students were also assigned
There was simultaneous triage and identification of patients on arrival at the hospital by the hospital's Director of Emergency Medicine and senior nursing personnel. There were pre-prepared resuscitation records and histories. All the necessary specialists were immediately available in the Department of Emergency Medicine for consults. There were also anaesthetists in the department for urgent intubation and liaising with theatres via mobile phones regarding priorities and instruments. In total there were 22 patients treated at the hospital for injuries sustained at or near Port Arthur with four of the patients arriving the next day, three of whom had stayed in hotels overnight with minor injuries. The fourth was the person later charged by Police in his hospital bed in a specially arranged "Court sitting". Altogether 16 patients were admitted and 11 operations were performed on the Sunday night, 9 operations the next day and a further 4 operations ahead as some patients had multiple surgery. Four patients were discharged to interstate hospitals by air ambulance and the remainder were discharged over the following days and weeks. One of the unique aspects of the hospital's role during the disaster was that as a stand alone tertiary referral centre it received all the patients, all the deceased and the alleged gunman. Over the days ahead a great deal of community anger against the alleged gunman unfortunately was directed at the hospital and its staff through a steady stream of abusive phone calls and two bomb threats which forced more emergency procedures to be set in train. The hospital's staff met the enormous challenges caring for the victims as well as the normal patient load while being the focus of international media attention.
9. StrategicCo-ordinationand Media Management While the State Disaster and Emergency Plans were not formally activated in response to the Port Arthur tragedy all the Agencies operated to the principles and procedures contained in the State Disaster Plan and embodied in their training regimes. Clearly this training "paid off' and a co-ordinating group of Chief Executive Officers of lead agencies (Premier and Cabinet, Police, Community and Health Services and Justice) left their staff to handle response while they focused on strategic and coordination issues. They showed enormous confidence in the operational leaders and without the burden of operational imperatives they were able to give focus to strategic coordination issues between agencies and to directing operational activities in other areas. These including liaising with churches and non-government organisations and ensuring Tasmania's schools would be prepared to cope with the potential impacts on the following day for children traumatised after learning of the tragedy from television news on Sunday. The strategic coordination group was also able to consult internationally with others who had played leadership roles in response to recent dramatic events including those involved in management of the Dunblane massacre, Mt Eribus aircrash and the Aramoana massacre in New Zealand. One of the key strategic decisions made at the outset by this group was for the State to be as open and cooperative with the media as possible, only withholding information which would compromise operational efficiency or the prosecution of the alleged offender. This decision proved invaluable in managing the "international fallout" of the incident and also stopped potentially inappropriate media actions to obtain news coverage. The level of international media interest in the Port Arthur tragedy was immense in world terms. BBC radio broadcast news of the events within 45 minutes of the shootings and in America the tragedy was the major story on the American late night news. European talkback radio started making calls to the State overnight on Sunday. The high intensity of international press interest
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in the event lasted for a week with the Port Arthur tragedy being the top news story for three consecutive days and nights on the American CNN network which usually has very little overseas news. News coverage of the tragedy in the USA was such that it was the most time ever devoted to an Australian news story on the American networks easily surpassing events such as Sydney gaining the 2000 Olympics and the tragic bush fires in New South Wales. More than 200 journalists from across the world came to Tasmania to cover the story and their needs were fully considered. An experienced Government press officer went to Port Arthur on the Sunday afternoon of the tragedy where he remained for several weeks for on-site media coordination. Experienced New South Wales and Victorian Police media staff were seconded to help Tasmania's police media officers and other media personnel to cope with the intensity of international and national media interest. The media set up several satellite dishes on the front lawns of Royal Hobart Hospital and a constant throng of journalists waited for further snippets of news as the world's attention shifted from Port Arthur to the hospital. As part of their media management strategies the police and the hospital provided "talking heads" who were regularly able to give the media updates. The official spokespeople were all trained, capable and articulate and this was greatly appreciated by the media. The Hospital's CEO Lindsay Pyne spoke regularly to the media and the Director of Surgery, Stephen Wilkinson, came directly from theatre still in theatre gown, to provide the media with updates on patients recovery after surgery. The media management of the event was considered "world best practice" according to key media groups internationally and nationally, with the CNN network rating the State's media management as being "99 out of 100" and as an example for other countries to follow.
10. RecoveryStrategies Port Arthur has affected many people with the most immediate impact being on survivors, witnesses, relatives and friends of victims and those who had to respond and assist them. The recovery strategy commenced on the afternoon of the shootings within 11/2 hours of shots being fired. In the various emergency services, critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) team members began the task of
debriefing emergency service personnel in accordance with a critical incident management plan which is a joint initiative of all of Tasmania's emergency services. CISD members were involved at the site overnight and their efforts continued in the days ahead for all members of police, ambulance, fire and State Emergency Service who responded to the tragedy. Team leaders went to State Emergency Service headquarters on Sunday afternoon from where they dispatched eight community counsellors to the Tasman Peninsula. They also arranged a major counselling debrief for that evening at the Police Academy for relatives of victims and witnesses to the tragedy. 20 trauma counsellors were involved in counselling 120 clients at that venue. In addition 12 counsellors were involved in manning a Police hotline on Sunday night to speak to relatives and friends of victims who came from all parts of Australia and overseas. On the first day logistical arrangements were also carried out for transport and overnight accommodation as many of those who witnessed the event were interstate tourists, some due to leave Tasmania on the Sunday night. Counselling teams were also sent to two major Hobart hotels to assist affected tourists and there was great cooperation from hotels in providing toiletries for those dislocated in their accommodation. Altogether there were 463 staff from State and Commonwealth departments, non-government organisations and private practitioners involved in the community recovery strategies in the period from Sunday 28 April to 10 May 1996. Of these 408 had expertise in psychology, psychiatry, trauma or critical incident stress counselling. In the early stages after the tragedy there were just under 1000 clients listed on the response database with just under 1700 support services provided. There was widespread use of the 24 hour information and counselling hotline setup from Sunday 28 April with calls to the hotline averaging 48 minutes each. A key principle for the community recovery process has been to encourage and support the community to manage its own recovery and to ensure a local focus for residents of the Tasman Peninsula. There are also networks for trauma counselling information and advice for people throughout Australia for people affected by the events of the 28 April. Victims and others affected are receiving a newsletter and updates to keep them informed of issues ranging from the
Port Arthur appeal, legal issues and ongoing counselling available for criminal injuries compensation. Community recovery strategies also included production of several pamphlets "on the family and personal crisis", "children and trauma" and "coping with a tragic event" which were widely distributed throughout Tasmania to the public, family doctors and other health and community service professionals. One of the pamphlets was delivered free by Australia Post to every household in Tasmania providing advice on how to cope with a tragic event and how help could be obtained. Realistically the community recovery process will be continuing for many years.
1 i. Supportfrom within Australia and overseas The tasks of Tasmania's hospital, ambulance, and counselling personnel involved in response to the Port Arthur tragedy has been greatly aided by the messages of support and encouragement from hospitals and health organisations from throughout Australia. Special messages were also received from others who had experienced tragedies "first hand" such as those who responded to the Dunblane massacre. In addition direct support was provided by other States in many ways including CISD personnel from Queensland and Victorian ambulance authorities and relief medical and nursing staff from a Victorian hospital who gave Royal Hobart Staff a much needed break. This level of support showed the great sense of bonding felt by all those involved in the health industry.
Lessonsfrom the Port Arthur Tragedy There are many prevention initiatives arising from the Port Arthur tragedy and one of them - the focus on tougher gun control legislation - is occupying a considerable amount of attention in all Australian States and Territories through the political process. The tragedy put a great deal of steel into the resolve of the national's political leaders to prevent a similar tragedy ever occurring again. A key lesson from the tragedy is that no community should ever adopt the attitude of "it won't happen here". If such an attitude is adopted then communities won't be prepared to cope with whatever natural or man-made hazards that could potentially confront them in the future.