Potential for co-management approaches to strengthen livelihoods of forest dependent communities: A Kenyan case

Land Use Policy 41 (2014) 304–312

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Potential for co-management approaches to strengthen livelihoods of forest dependent communities: A Kenyan case Felix Lamech Mogambi Ming’ate a,∗ , Hamish G. Rennie b , Ali Memon c a b c

Department of Environmental Studies and Community Development, Kenyatta University, PO Box 43844-00100, Nairobi, Kenya Department of Environmental Management (DEM), Lincoln University, PO Box 84, Lincoln 7647, Christchurch, New Zealand Research, Investigations and Monitoring Unit, Auckland Council, Private Bag 92300, Auckland 1142, New Zealand

a r t i c l e

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Article history: Received 16 May 2013 Received in revised form 1 June 2014 Accepted 12 June 2014 Keywords: Co-management Livelihoods Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Forest-dependent communities Kenya Institutional design

a b s t r a c t Many natural resource management researchers have focused either on institutional design and evaluation or on livelihood outcomes per se without explicitly acknowledging and rigorously examining linkages between the two. Thus, a major gap in the current literature on co-management institutional arrangements is the extent to which co-management has strengthened the livelihoods of poor forestdependent communities. This gap is addressed in this paper by developing and testing an argument that well-designed co-management arrangements have strengthened the livelihood outcomes of poor forestdependent communities in a Kenyan case study. The hybrid analytical framework developed for this analysis situates Ostrom’s (1990) design criteria for co-management institutions in the broader context of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework. It then uses this analytical framework to evaluate the ArabukoSokoke Forest Reserve (ASFR) co-management initiative in Kenya, based on a three-step process. First, the paper provides an overview of current institutional arrangements for governance of the ASFR comanagement regime. Second, it evaluates the extent to which these governance arrangements can be characterized as devolved collaborative governance, informed by Ostrom’s (1990) design principles and; third, it evaluates the extent to which the livelihood outcomes of forest dependent communities that are participants in the co-management project have had their livelihoods strengthened as a result of the ASFR co-management governance arrangements. The paper demonstrates that the institutional arrangements for ASFR co-management are relatively nascent and emerging because the governance arrangements for the ASFR co-management project cannot be characterized as fully devolved de jure collaborative governance. Notwithstanding this, the findings reveal that participant forest-dependent communities in the co-management project had improved livelihoods compared to forest-dependent communities outside the co-management scheme. It is suggested that this is due to the de facto co-management arrangements. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Introduction In recent decades, there has been a shift globally from a topdown, state-centred model of management of natural resources to a more decentralized approach in which a range of actors participate in the governance of natural resources (Brown et al., 2007). Co-management, or the sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local resource users, is an arrangement whereby such partnerships can come about (Berkes,

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +254 721351892. E-mail addresses: [email protected], ming’[email protected] (F.L.M. Ming’ate), [email protected] (H.G. Rennie), [email protected] (A. Memon). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.06.008 0264-8377/Published by Elsevier Ltd.

2009). There is no single universally accepted definition of comanagement (Armitage et al., 2007; Berkes, 2009). The term often refers to a range of arrangements, with different degrees of power sharing, for joint decision-making by the state and communities (or user groups) about a set of resources or an area (Armitage et al., 2007; Berkes, 2009). A key question in the current literature is to what extent co-management approaches are appropriate for tropical forest governance and delivery of sustainable livelihood outcomes in developing countries where poverty is a major concern? Tropical forests are diverse, and so is the range of people who look to such forests to meet a variety of subsistence and income needs. These multiple interests may include overlapping management systems: traditional management for local people’s access to a range of products, forest land, and jobs; industrial management for

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timber harvesting, and governmental efforts to manage for conservation and other goals (Wunder, 2001). Prior to the 1990s, tropical forests were largely managed through top-down highly centralized bureaucracies. Rules and regulations concerning permitted uses were made by remote bureaucrats with little input from local people. As a result, forest-dependent people often have declining access to resources that are vital to their families’ welfare and lack fair representation in forest-related decisions that affect their daily lives (Tole, 2010). In Kenya, for example, until recently, state forest management objectives mostly excluded local resource users from forest decision-making. There were minimal and stringent provisions for subsistence extraction and use of forest products. In general, the Forest Department (now the Kenyan Forest Service (KFS) has wielded tremendous power and authority over forest resources, with no accountability to local communities living adjacent to forest areas and decision-making in the Forest Department has been quite hierarchical. This practice originated during the colonial period and was continued after independence. Ironically, in spite of the strict protectionist strategy adopted by government forest managers, the destruction and degradation of Kenya’s forest resources has been a problem and forest cover continued to decline (Abwoli et al., n.d.; Matiru, 2000). Thus, improving forest cover and reducing forest destruction and degradation emerged as key goals of Kenya’s national development strategy (Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing & Kenya Forests Working Group, 2006). Central to this is the government’s recognition of the role to be played by forest-dependent communities in ensuring that tree cover is maintained. A key, often implicit, assumption in the forestry co-management literature is that co-management approaches will make the livelihoods of adjacent poor forest-dependent communities significantly more sustainable. However, the contribution that collaborative forest management can make to the sustainability of the livelihoods of the rural poor forest-dependent communities may be questioned on several grounds. For example, Carter and Gronow (2005) emphasize that ease of access to forests and low capital and skill requirements enable large numbers of people to generate some income from forest products, although rarely enough to escape poverty altogether. Other critics note that, from the perspective of the poor, sustainable forest use can only provide contributions rather than whole livelihoods: it can enhance the contribution of forests to improving the living standards of households in rural areas, but it is not a long-term solution to poverty (Jumbe and Angelsen, 2007); has a weak track record in poverty reduction and empowerment of the marginalized (Bene and Neiland, 2004); does not often provide the shortest route out of poverty (Sayer, 2005); appears to, at best, have no significant positive impacts on the livelihoods of the poor who depend on the forest (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003); and is not a panacea for legitimacy of the governance arrangements (Jentoft, 2000). It is useful to note, however, that despite these criticisms the role of devolution of natural resources to local people for poverty alleviation is not as well studied as other devolution outcomes (e.g. equity, sustainable forest management and participatory inclusiveness) (Tole, 2010). The above arguments raise an important research question that this paper addresses: Does forest co-management strengthen the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities and make them more sustainable? The research hypothesis in this article is that a welldesigned co-management regime will strengthen the livelihoods of poor forest-dependent communities and make them more sustainable. In arguing thus, we do not see a sustainable livelihood as merely one that does not erode its resource base, but as one that is also able to withstand shocks. A stronger livelihood is one that will provide more security against shocks and thereby make the community more sustainable. This hypothesis is predicated on an

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Table 1 Break down of the sample size from the two communities under study. Type of participant

Breakdown of participants in the study

Communities piloting co-management

Dida

14

Kahingoni Kaftson Detailed household case studiesa

12 12 9

Kaliapapo A

10

Kaliapapo B Shela Mongotini Detailed household case studiesa

7 9 15 6

Communities not piloting co-management

Key informants Total number of interviewsa

Households Organizational

Number of participants in the study

8 9 109

a The total number of interviews includes the second round of interviews labelled as detailed household case study participants. Therefore, a total of 94 individuals were interviewed.

assumption that the co-management regime in the case study is well-designed and operating effectively. Study method The study area, the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve (ASFR), is located in the Kilifi and Malindi districts on the north coast of Kenya (Fig. 2). There are approximately fifty villages adjacent to the forests that are considered largely dependent on the forest (Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2002). For nearly two decades, a pilot co-management regime was adopted between three of these villages (Kahingoni, Dida and Kafitsoni) and four government agencies (the Kenya Forest Service, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forestry Research Institute and National Museums of Kenya). Despite not having advanced beyond its ‘pilot’ phase, this arrangement has come to be regarded as co-management, the only one involving a forest reserve in Kenya (Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2002). The research methods used were designed to elicit understandings and experiences primarily of local inhabitants about the co-management arrangements and their effectiveness in the delivery of sustainable livelihoods in the above three pilot villages compared to those of inhabitants in four non-pilot forest-dependent villages: Kaliapapo A, Kaliapapo B, Shela and Mongotini. Data collection combined overtly living in and observing the study communities and participating in community activities, document analysis and 109 semi-structured interviews with village inhabitants and key organizational informants (government and NGO officials) (Table 1). Included in the 109 interviews is a second round of interviews with 15 householders which explored in greater depth the details of their household livelihoods. These interviewees were chosen based on the initial round as being reasonably representative of particular types of livelihoods (e.g. bee-keeping). Interviewees were initially identified on the basis of their positions in organizations involved in the co-management arrangement based on documentary evidence. Additional interviewees were identified through the snowball technique. The fieldwork was conducted by one of the authors, a male Kenyan fluent in the dominant language of the area and carried

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H=Human Capital S= Social Capital N=Natural Capital P=Physical Capital F= Financial Capital Livelihood Assets I n

Design Principles for CPRs

H

Vulnerability Context

N

S - Shocks - Trends - Seasonality

P

Influence & access

F

1. Defined boundaries 2. Proportional equivalence between benefits & costs 3. Collective choice arrangement 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanctions 6. Conflict resolution mechanisms 7. Minimal recognition ofrights to organise 8. Nested enterprises

Livelihood Strategies

o r d e r t o a c h i e v e

Livelihood Outcomes - More income -Increased Well-being -Reduced vulnerability -Improved food security -More sustainable use ofNR base

Fig. 1. Including Ostrom’s (1990) design principles in the Sustainable Livelihood Framework. Modified from DFID (1999).

out over 6 months in 2011. All the interviews were voice recorded, on the understanding that the usual precautions against identifying the views of any particular individual would be followed.

Linking co-management with sustainable livelihoods The standard Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) for assessing changes to livelihoods considers livelihoods in terms of individual or community: access (to various types of capital, livelihood strategies and decision-making bodies and sources of influence); the terms of exchange between different types of capital; and returns (economic and otherwise) to any given livelihood strategy (DFID, 1999). Capital includes natural (the biophysical resources), human (education and skill levels), social (levels of trust, community connectedness and cultural traits), physical (built road and water infrastructure, housing), and financial (ability to raise loans, insure against hard times). A key component in the SLF approach is the set of structures and institutions that govern the assets on which livelihoods are based and which assist in turning those assets into sought after outcomes. These may exacerbate or reduce the degree of vulnerability of the asset base to matters such as extreme droughts. Co-management can be conceptualized as an institutional intervention used in a strategy to achieve desired community outcomes, including reducing the vulnerability of natural resources. The extent to which a co-management regime can be seen as having had an effect on livelihoods is likely to depend on the nature of the co-management regime. Consequently, in using the SLF as an evaluative framework for assessing the contribution of co-management to sustainable livelihoods, there needs to be an assessment of the nature of the relevant co-management regimes; how well do these arrangements deliver the expected outcomes of co-management? Ostrom’s (1990) design principles have been developed from studying successful co-management, and despite criticism are simple, well configured and appropriate for designing institutions

for governance of common pool resources (Quinn et al., 2007; Ashutosh and Tadao, 2001). The principles address such matters as the clarity with which boundaries are defined for the management of and access to a natural resource, but also highlight distributional issues of benefits and costs, the processes for making collective decisions, effective monitoring (of the resource and its use), mechanisms to resolve conflicts and graduated sanctions to deal with those who do not follow the collective decisions. A starting point for co-management is that at least minimal rights to self-organize are recognized and that the varying scales of systems involved (from household to international) necessitates the nesting of some arrangements at different levels to others. This paper employs Ostrom’s design principles as a guide for evaluating the nature of a co-management regime in the DFID framework (Fig. 1). This places the emphasis on, and provides criteria for analysing the institutional design of the ASFR co-management regime in relation to its effect on the sustainability of the livelihoods of the poor forest-dependent communities. This integration of Ostrom’s principles with the SLF directs attention towards the positive and negative livelihood (e.g. socioeconomic) impacts associated with co-management efforts that is appropriate where a co-management regime has been used as a specific structural intervention as it has in ASFR. The outcomes can be assessed through an examination of the relationships between the consequential interventions that derive in part from co-management and the implications or changes for various livelihood assets or capital stocks held by individuals and households: qualitatively, following DFID (1999), how does the institutional context influence livelihood outcome?

Governing Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve The forest covers 41,600 ha in the ASFR, and is the largest single block of coastal forest remaining in East Africa (Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2002). ASFR is located in a hot and humid

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307

Fig. 2. Map showing the location of ASFR.

climate with an average temperature of around 29 ◦ C. Four distinct vegetation types are identified: mixed forest; Brachystegia woodland; Cynometra forest and thicket (Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2002; Muriithi and Kenyon, 2002). The forest comprises tree species of commercially valuable timber for both the furniture and construction industry (Muriithi and Kenyon, 2002). As the nearby cities of Malindi and Mombasa grew, the forest became a major source of fuel wood, timber and poles for an expanding urban population. In recent years, growth of the international tourism industry along the north coast has led to additional demands on the forest for timber for construction and souvenirs. By 1995, despite being managed by the Kenyan Forest Service as a protected forest reserve set aside to protect biodiversity, it was estimated that only about 25 percent of the remaining forest had not suffered significant degradation (Fairclough et al., 1995). This led to renewed efforts to conserve the ASFR, focussed on the establishment of the ASFR co-management project (Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2002). The management of the ASFR is overseen by the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team (ASFMT) which comprises a small team of central government bureaucrats (namely: the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), the Kenya Forest Research Institute (KEFRI) and the Kenya Forest Service (KFS), donors (NGOs) and community representatives governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Three Community Forest Associations (CFAs) have been formed in the study area. Each CFA is expected to work closely with the Village Forest Development and Conservation Committees (VDFCCs) within its jurisdiction (Fig. 3). One of the CFA in the study area is the Dida Forest Area Adjacent Forest Association (DIFAAFA) for the Arabuko-Sokoke area. The DIFAAFA is the umbrella committee for the three village communities currently piloting co-management: Kahingoni, Dida and Kafitsoni. It is responsible for all the co-management-related

activities in these three communities. The DIFAAFA, as the umbrella organization for the three villages, comprises 21 committee members. These include the chairman, the vice chairman, the treasurer, the secretary and the vice-secretary who are selected from a combination of the seven user groups; one representative each from the seven user groups; one elders’ advisory group representative from each of the 3 VDFCCs; and the six stakeholders’ representatives (Fig. 3). Each VDFCC has seven user groups under it namely: beekeepers, butterflies, fuel wood, timbers, pole cutters, herbalists and on-farm tree growers. In addition, each VDFCC has an elders’ advisory group that interacts with government stakeholders (the KFS, the Wildlife Service (KWS), and National Museum (NMK) and the United Kingdom Development Assistance officials and NGOs such as Birdlife International and Nature Kenya relating to the management of the forest. There are 15 committee members in each VDFCC. Each user group elects a member to represent it at the VDFCC making a total of seven members from the user groups. The elders’ advisory group and the user groups’ executive committee elect one person each to represent them at the VDFCC. There are six slots available for the other stakeholders (government and NGO) that work in the area piloting the co-management regime, one of which must be for the KFS. How devolved is the ASFR’s co-management arrangement for pilot villages? The extent to which the pilot ASFR co-management arrangement for pilot villages can be characterized as devolved governance has been determined by assessing it against Ostrom’s design principles based on empirical analysis of the decision-making processes and through observations and interviews.

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DIDA FOREST AREA ADJACENT FOREST ASSOCIATION-DIFAAFA (21 COMMITTEE MEMBERS)

KAHINGONI VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AND FOREST CONSERVATION COMMITTEE (15 MEMBERS)

DIDA VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AND FOREST CONSERVATION COMMITTEE (15 MEMBERS)

KAFITSONI VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AND FOREST CONSERVATION COMMITTEE (15 MEMBERS)

Executive committee (1 representative)

Elders advisory group (1 representative)

Other stakeholders (6 representatives including 1 KFS)

Butterflies user group (1 representative)

Fuel wood user group (1 representative)

On-farm forestry user group (1 representative)

Herbalists user group (1 representative)

Bee-keeping user group (1 representative)

Timber cutters user group (1 representative) Pole cutters user group (1 representative)

Fig. 3. The framework for participation by village inhabitants in forest governance in the pilot project.

An incomplete co-management structure Seventeen years after it was initiated, the co-management regime is still in a ‘pilot’ phase and only being applied to a small set of communities in part of the ASFR. As noted earlier, the comanagement governance structure comprises a nested ‘hierarchy’ of the ASFMT, CFAs, VDFCCs and forest resources user groups. The ASFMT operates on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the government agencies. The next tier of the institutional structure is the community forest association, which coordinates and brokers between the VDFCCs and the ASFMT. The DIFAAFA is the CFA chosen as the pilot for implementing co-management arrangements. The structure combines government agency representatives with representatives elected from the VDFCCs. These VDFCCs include representatives from the village elders and elected representatives from forest user groups, but no government agency representatives. Membership of the user groups is through self-selection by the forest users’ resident within five kilometres of the Reserve. There is therefore a strong local community and user group representation in the structures through which the co-management initiatives are implemented in the three pilot villages. Ostrom’s clear boundary principle is also met in terms of who may participate. Despite this level of representation, the study found that in the piloting communities the level of interaction between the stakeholders is relatively limited, other than when there is conflict with government officials and a resolution is being sought. The central government is only involved in such meetings if the conflict is serious. The structure is therefore not providing the opportunities to

forge relationships and develop social capital. This may make it difficult for the effective governance of the forest and improvements in the livelihoods of the forest-dependent communities. That the co-management arrangement has not extended to the rest of ASFR is also problematic, in that those outside it feel let down. Moreover, for the co-management agreement to have full legal backing it must be formally recognized by central government. To date, this has not occurred and the regime is operating on trust and goodwill of local inhabitants towards central government based on the ASFMT MOU. Limited devolution of governance powers to the communities The ASFR governance arrangement has the dual goals of the conservation of the ASFR and the establishment of ways that can help the communities to obtain sustainable livelihoods from the forest’s resources. The co-management regime appears to provide a reasonably transparent structure for collaborative decision-making by the piloting communities and rules related to the allocation and use of the forest resources have and are being developed with local input. However, the analysis of decision making arrangements indicates that there is limited devolvement of governance powers by the government to either the piloting or non-piloting communities in the management of the forest resources. Effectively, these powers are held by the ASFMT and the individual central government departments operating within their own mandates. Even though the ASFMT has produced operational guidelines that have given the communities a chance to participate in the co-management arrangement (Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2005), communities have limited powers to make decisions about the

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use of the forest resources. Consequently, the power remains with the government and this is well-understood in the community, as exemplified by interviewee (HC132): This forest, truly speaking, on the side of the community, they haven’t got permission that allows them to manage it. Most of the management of the forest is on the side of the government. The government is the one holding the biggest share. The government is the one with most of the authority. If the ASFMT is not prepared to advance matters, then the community has no avenue other than to make a direct appeal to their elected central government politicians. This finding is important to the sustainability of the resources in the sense that a lack of collective decision-making means community support could wane. They may withdraw from co-management and increase the current minimal level of poaching. This situation has parallels in the cases reported by Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2007) and Mason et al. (2010). If the experience from those studies is repeated in the ASFR and progress is not made on such issues, particularly formalizing the agreements, then the community members may come to see co-management as a failure. This may result in gains made through co-management being placed in jeopardy. However, there were no significant indicators that the community was feeling so disgruntled that this would happen in the near future. Unclear co-management objectives The interviews with community householders revealed that even after the piloting households had spent years in the comanagement regime, the households were not fully clear on its purpose. The ASFR co-management partners have not been able to gain the communities’ understanding of the issues to be addressed, or what must be achieved and the purpose of co-management. For example, new income generating activities have been introduced through funding made available to pilot co-management and some of these rely on forest biodiversity (e.g. butterfly farming), but households, generally, do not consider the issues of biodiversity sustainability as important to them. This is perhaps due to their lack of involvement in the design of the various projects and understanding of the overall impact of their activities on the forest. The households also appear not to recognize problems with income generating projects (such as a lack of markets) as these projects were introduced by the government department co-management partners and the donors rather than being promoted authentically from the communities and the benefits do not necessarily accrue to those making the sacrifices. As one organizational informant summed up the situation: The first thing is that . . . they should know from the start the objectives of the co-management. . . when somebody talks of benefits from the forest they think in terms of cutting the forest or timber lumbering, that is what comes into their thinking. So they should be made aware from the start. What are we talking about when we talk of getting some benefits from the forest? Because . . . they have that mentality that we shall get benefits from the forest and then they will find out that those benefits that they were talking about are not nearby (KOI01) Corruption in accessing forest products Comments from the interviewees frequently demonstrated that despite the co-management regime, corruption in accessing the forest resources exists at ASFR. For example, due to limited permits for access to trees of sufficient quality to use for building and timber, the households in both pilot and non-pilot communities felt that they have been left with no alternative but to bribe the forest

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officials or the forest guards to access these resources illegally, and to release them if they are caught stealing. The cost of purchasing trees for building or permits to harvest them directly is very high relative to the cost of a bribe. Consequently, the poaching of the trees is likely to be most common among those who do not have the cash to bribe – the poor. One household in the non-piloting communities captured what happens in both the communities: You have to go there begging, please let me give you something, so that I can cut some trees for building, as long as it is not known, but the forest guards themselves know how they will do it. You have to use this stealing method and then the forest guard will steal for you, we steal with the forest guard (HC201)

Withdrawal of donors Donor funding no longer exists to support the extension of co-management to those communities who depend on forest resources, or even to support the activities of the communities that have already been introduced to co-management. This is a common problem in implementing co-management and Shackleton et al. (2002) warn that unhealthy reliance on external funds can result in the collapse of initiatives when funders withdraw. Until the co-management activities generate sufficient returns to be self-sustaining, they may fail and their failure could lead to cynicism over the benefits of these activities – especially if they have raised expectations or led to a decline in the activities that used to support these households. There are no funds to support the various co-management-related activities, such as implementation, coordination, monitoring and enforcement of the rules. This indicates that co-management approaches may work much better if those households given responsibilities are provided with financial and other support. As Emtage (2004) explains, for community organizations to be sustainable, they need to be assured of dependable incomes to finance their activities and sustain community interest. The households confirmed this unhealthy reliance on donors: The biggest stakeholders in co-management are the donors because without them there is nothing that can continue down here in the village, then we have the other organizations like the KEFRI, KWS and the community is now the last one (HC133). . . . the major one are the donors because KWS and KFS, KEFRI are government departments, you see and they don’t have enough funds . . . the pulling of out of donors, has demoralized the conservation process here, because one, if we get funds, we would have created co-management around the forest, and the activation of the forest conservation and the law. . . (HK102).

Limited property rights and collective choice A property right is the exclusive authority to control how a resource is used, whether that resource is owned by government or by individuals (Larson et al., 2010; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Even though the households adjacent to the forest recognize that they have the rights as forest-adjacent communities to access the forest resources, the communities do not have full legal ownership rights to use the resources, nor do the communities control the allocation of those rights (the permits) or have the knowledge to optimize use and ensure conservation of the resources. Additionally, both the piloting and non-piloting households do not have secure and permanent resource use rights – the permits are temporary and lack flexibility – but the piloting communities consider they are more secure than do the non-piloting communities. Furthermore the research found that the co-management piloting

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communities felt they had much more responsibility to enforce their claim over the resources against outsiders: . . .if I see somebody with that behavior (violating the rules for the co-management arrangement) I go and report, we report the person to the government, the forest guards (HC133) . . . if we get them destroying the forest we just make a call to the forest guards to come and arrest this person (HC137) There are some examples of graduated sanctions within the co-management villages, for instance, in the increased levels of punishment for repeat poaching of trees. Monitoring of the overall changes in the forest and of the use of it by the villagers is largely non-existent, and while there are some local community appointed village forest guards, their effectiveness is limited without resources to carry out their tasks. Based on the above findings, despite the fact that the comanagement arrangement has not been fully and formally implemented in a de jure sense, its de facto implementation at the local level in the pilot community has resulted in a variety of benefits. The piloting communities have developed more faith in the co-management system compared to the non-piloting communities; new alternative income generating activities to support the development of co-management among the pilot communities dependent on the forest have been, even if problematically, integrated into the co-management arrangement, and; networks with central government organizations (KWS, NMK, KEFRI and KFS), donors and NGOs have developed that has enabled these inhabitants to benefit from their various capabilities. A high number of the respondents testified that once they see a person destroying the forest resources, they report the incident to the government through the government forest guards (HC137). The overall conclusion then is that even though governance remains relatively centralized, and formal devolution has not occurred, in many respects there has been sufficient progress to implement co-management to assess its potential for strengthening the livelihoods of the pilot community.

Implications for sustainable livelihood outcomes for pilot villages How co-management contributes to the community’s livelihoods sustainability is often left implicit (Baumann, 2000; Pagdee et al., 2006) or as a presumed outcome (Jumbe and Angelsen, 2007) of sustaining a resource base. As the following discussion sets out, the ASFR co-management institutional arrangements have substantially increased the extent to which households’ livelihood assets enable them to achieve livelihood goals. For instance, through incomes and skills gained from the new income generating activities, interviewees reported that the villages’ human capital has been developed, households are able to pay school fees, meet their hospital fees and purchase food and clothes, which has resulted in higher quality of life. Households’ and organizational interviewees explained these by saying: So many parents are now taking their children to school, something that never used to happen before (KOI01) I know people who have educated their children using butterfly income, through to secondary level (KH05) Interviewees also indicated that the co-management arrangement had increased trust and social capital, for example, through the formation of resource user groups and associated social links or networks. The butterfly farming, bee keeping, aloe vera, and the on-farm forestry user groups have all developed through the introduction of these new income generating activities to the pilot villages (HC103 and HC201). External networks have also

expanded, including with visitors from outside the co-management communities who have come to study co-management: one key organizational informant explained this finding: KEFRI has done research on co-management here, it is successful and we are proud of it. We are a role model here, may be because we receive many visitors. We take a hand in learning [teaching] co-management activities here (HKI02) Moreover, the study demonstrated that co-management approaches had strengthened natural assets of forest-dependent communities and their physical assets. For example, despite the evidence on forest destruction in both the piloting and non-piloting communities’, interviews revealed there was much more poaching of forest resources in non-piloting villages compared to the piloting villages (KOI03). For instance, referring to the ASFR’s natural capital in their area, one non-piloting community household commented: There is nothing there [forest], there is nothing now. It has been destroyed. It is now like a play field. It is not any more a forest. There is nothing inside that forest. The only trees that you can see are the ones they have planted recently, but there is nothing inside that forest. They have stolen and replaced them with the ones they have planted, but the old trees are all gone. If you go to some sections of this forest, you can walk without getting anything touching you. They have made the forest to disappear. It is like somebody clearing land for cultivation (HC201) The quality and quantity of the forest resources (e.g. trees) has improved in the piloting communities compared to the nonpiloting communities because households have changed their perception towards the forest and are more ready to protect it. One key organizational informant remarked: It has improved because before co-management people just, saw the forest as wood but now see the forest into different ways, tourism, butterfly farming, and bee farming so I can say the quantity in terms of products has improved (KOI02). This change of perception is the view of one of the key organizations and contrasts somewhat with views from a number of householders interviewed, but had support from others, notably those involved in some new income generating activities like beekeeping which rely on forest water and shade. It was attributed to the co-management income generating activities the piloting communities are involved in (e.g. butterflies, bees, herbs and or onfarm tree planting) which provides them with alternative sources of livelihoods. A key point here is that it is more a greater awareness of the ecosystem services that the forest provides, and the need to sustain these, than it is protection of the forest’s biodiversity that has driven improvements in the pilot community’s use of the forest. The piloting communities have accumulated additional physical assets (e.g. by roofing their houses with iron sheets, constructing toilets and buying bicycles as a cheap means of transport) due to the incomes earned from the co-management income generating activities (KHI107). Household and organizational informants reported that through donor funding linked to the co-management agreement they have managed to build community schools (e.g. Dida, Kahingoni and Kafitsoni primary schools) and equipped them with desks (HC138 and KOI04). While there were some significant signs that co-management improved the standard of living of the villages involved in it and thus might reduce the vulnerability of communities generally, when questioned specifically on such issues the results were somewhat surprising. In both the piloting and non-piloting communities, there was little evidence that co-management had improved their perception of their resilience to situations of heightened vulnerability. For example, the ASFMT used the carrot of co-management as a basis for fencing ASFR to prevent elephants from invading and

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damaging the villages and crops of both sets of communities and this has significantly reduced community vulnerability and helped to protect the elephants. This was generally recognized by both communities. However, there are serious questions about the introduced income generating activities and it is not clear how long these can survive. The activities appear as though they may not be sustainable because they produce low and unpredictable incomes due in part to the lack of reliable markets. For example, the butterfly farmers’ reported an inability to predict the market that meant sometimes there was an oversupply to the market and farmers were unable to sell their butterflies. Some income generating activities, like the aloe vera, have not yet established a market. Although the butterfly farmers remain positive, this has demotivated a number of aloe vera farmers. Even though the lack of markets for the income generating activities may be seen as a norm of market demand and supply, this failure of the income generating activities is likely to lead some households to withdraw from participating in the co-management arrangement. But the real issue is that the ASFR comanagement approach has not established mechanisms that can help the households when they are faced with this new type of vulnerable situation – a situation created by the very projects that are intended to improve their economic well-being. The perception of vulnerability also appeared to have been altered due to the co-management regime. Most of the households in the piloting communities (about 72 percent) fear drought while the majority (about 50 percent) in non-piloting communities fear hunger. This difference seems to reflect the greater importance the households piloting co-management have placed on the income generating activities introduced by the ASFR comanagement arrangement. The piloting communities’ households highlighted that when drought strikes it affects these activities (e.g. tree nurseries, bees and the butterflies) which, in turn, impacts on their sources of livelihood, whereas the majority of the households not involved in co-management fear hunger because it affects them directly as they do not have alternative sources of livelihoods. This finding supports the emergence of a more systemic understanding of the cause of potential disaster among the co-management village interviewees despite the shift in their dependence from direct use of forest resources to the cash economy that the new alternatives offer. In this sense, the penetration of capital into the local communities has been aided by the institutional structure, but rather than shifting the locus of their vulnerability to the market it has sharpened their awareness of their dependence on ecosystem services. It also suggests that the greater income enjoyed from such activities has lessened the directness of the threat of drought and that to some extent, the co-management households are shielded from these impacts – they appear less likely to experience hunger as a direct consequence of droughts. Drought also pushes households into competing with the local wildlife (e.g. elephants) over scarce water. This may lead to them taking risks to obtain water that has been set aside for wildlife thus making them more vulnerable to animal attacks. However, the piloting community has received support for the installation of piped water and drilled boreholes due to the co-management arrangement. This has helped these villages reduce their water related vulnerability and also reduced the risk to the wildlife in drought situations, thus meeting both the biodiversity and community needs. These findings question DFID’s (1999) view that the vulnerability context is the part of the framework that lies furthest outside people’s control, both in the short or medium term and on an individual or small group basis, and that there is little that can be done to alter it directly. It is arguable that the theoretical attractiveness of co-management approaches, even when not fully implemented, reduce the vulnerability of households by

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drawing resources from donors to help install infrastructure (e.g. piped water) to help address vulnerability situations (such as drought, hunger, and wildlife conflicts). However, while it was the co-management framework that attracted funding to these villages, it is recognized that the funding could have been provided regardless of any institutional changes. In effect the comanagement arrangement became an institutional structure and a social asset that could be marketed to gain additional funding to benefit those within the arrangement. Without such funding availability in future, the degree to which co-management may be able to be extended to other ASFR communities is unclear. It is also worth noting that even though the projects were introduced to improve the livelihoods of the poor, the rich and middle level income earners were also benefitting. However, from discussions with communities and field observations, it was apparent that the poor had acquired more livelihood opportunities from co-management than the middle and rich income earners. The extent to which the community socio-economic wellbeing (income, poverty, food security and sustainability of the forest) are attributable outcomes of the co-management arrangement was specifically addressed in the interviews. Somewhat surprisingly, the research found that there was little difference between the two communities’ households views on the overall improvement of their socio-economic wellbeing over the time the co-management regime had been in place. For instance, about 74 percent of the co-management households’ surveyed reported that their socio-economic well-being was below 50 percent of their expectations, even after the introduction of the co-management arrangement. While in the non-piloting communities the results showed that about 70 percent of the households’ socio-economic well-being was below the 50 percent mark. Although the difference is negligible one would have expected this figure to be reversed or even significantly in the opposite direction, with those in co-management communities feeling they were meeting their livelihood expectations to a much better extent then were the non-co-management communities. That this is not the case, suggests that although the standard of living and ability to provide for their livelihoods has improved in the co-management communities to a greater degree than it has for those in non-pilot communities, households in the piloting community may have developed higher expectations with regard to their socio-economic well-being than the non-piloting communities. The finding may also give an indication that the development impact of the co-management arrangement was small but nevertheless significant to families struggling to make ends meet in a very poor area.

Conclusion In summary, the ASFR governance arrangements are not able to be characterized as significantly devolved collaborative governance in terms of Ostrom’s (1990) guiding design principles. The main reasons for this are that despite almost two decades of piloting co-management in ASFR it remains constrained to a small number of villages, has yet to receive formal endorsement and legal backing from the central Kenyan Government, and lacks a level of collective choice decision-making and monitoring that one would expect. Efforts made by the localized government officials, donors and communities, user groups and individual community members to implement a de facto co-management arrangement may be at risk with the departure of donors and uncertainties about new income generating projects’ abilities to generate consistent incomes. However, despite the failure to fully implement the comanagement approach in the ASFR, its partial implementation does reveal some significant differences between the communities

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piloting co-management and those that are not. Those involved in co-management have improved their livelihoods and especially have improved their understanding of the ecosystem services that the forest provides. Thus, the co-management arrangement has strengthened the livelihoods of households dependent on the forest. However, whether this is due to the co-management structure or to the simple provision of external funding to projects in the village is less clear, and indeed the extent to which comanagement is linked to the provision of new funding for facilities and income generating activities distorts the picture and may make co-management’s implementation in other communities somewhat difficult if similar new funding is not part of that implementation. Unless the government formalises the co-management arrangements and genuine decision-making is enabled at the community level, then it is difficult to see what might attract donors to such an approach again. References Abwoli, B., Ongugo, P., Bahati, J., Mwangi, E., Andersson, K., n.d. Resource, recourse and decisions: incentive structures in forest decentralization and governance in East Africa. Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2002. Arabuko-Sokoke Strategic Forest Management Plan 2002–2027. Kenya Forest Services, Nairobi, Kenya. Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Management Team, 2005. Conserving Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Empowering the Communities: Operational Guide. Kenya Forest Services, Nairobi, Kenya. Armitage, D., Berkes, F., Doubleday, N., 2007. Adaptive Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning and Multi-level Governance. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. Ashutosh, S., Tadao, I., 2001. Design principles in long-enduring institutions of Japanese irrigation common-pool resources. Agric. Water Manage. 48, 89–102. Baumann, P., 2000. Sustainable livelihoods and political capital: arguments and evidence from decentralization and natural resource management in India. Working Paper No. 136, Overseas Development Institute, London. Bene, C., Neiland, A.E., 2004. Empowerment reform, yes. . . but empowerment of whom? Fisheries decentralization reforms in developing countries: a critical assessment with specific reference to poverty reduction. Aquat. Resour. Cult. Dev. 1, 35–49. Berkes, F., 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and social learning. J. Environ. Manage. 90, 1692–1702. Brown, P.C., Lassoie, J.P., Wolf, S.A., 2007. An analytic approach to structuring comanagement of community forests in Cameroon. Prog. Dev. Stud. 7, 135–154.

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