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Primitive classification and the sociology of knowledge: A response to Bloor
DISCUSSIONS JOSEPH WA YNE SMITH” PRIMITIVE CLASSIFICATION AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: A RESPONSE TO BLOOR THE
present paper seeks to present a critical response to David Bloor’s recent attempt to defend the position of Durkheim and Mauss, that the classification of things reproduces the classification of men. If Bloor’s defence of Durkheim and Mauss’ position is to be cogent, he must defend them against both an empirical criticism (C,), a theoretical criticism (C,), a logical criticism (CJ and a further theoretical criticism (C,). I will argue that Bloor’s defence fails on all the above accounts. Criticism (CJ it will be argued stands or falls, only if (C,) is satisfactorily answered. But Bloor’s use of Hesse’s network model is illegitimate if he wishes to defend the relativism and conventionalism which he has become famous for. Further the explicit empirical arguments which Bloor develops to rebut (C,) actually constitute a reductio ad absurdum of the Durkheim - Mauss position. Finally, Bloor’s attempt to rebut the circularity claim (C,) fails, as his account is inconsistent with the empirical argument used to rebut (C,). For a consistent epistemological holist such internal theoretical discord is intolerable. Consequently, the occasion to exhume Primitive Classification has not yet come. David Bloor’ has presented an interesting defence of the Durkheim - Mauss thesis that the classification of things reproduces the classification of men;* a thesis which he has already defended against both Gerd Buchdahl and Steven Lukes.3 Since Bloor has (I believe) cogently argued that neither of his critics have addressed his central arguments, a further reply is in order.
*School Australia.
of Social Sciences,
The Flinders
University
of South
Australia,
Bedford
Park,
5042,
Received 20 March 1983. ‘D. Bloor,
‘Durkheim
and Mauss
Revisited:
Classification
and the Sociology
of Knowledge’,
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 13 (1982), 267. ‘E. Durkheim
and
M. Ma&,
‘De Quelques Formes Primitives de Classification’, Annde and introduction in R. Needham, Primitive Classification.
Sociologique, 1901- 2 (1903);translation
(Cohen and West, London, 1%3). “D. Bloor, ‘A Reply to Gerd Buchdahl’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 13 (1982), 305. ‘ A Reply to Lukes’, Stud. H&t. Phil. Sci., 13 (1982), 319.
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 237 -243, Printed
in Great
Britain.
1984.
0039-
Steven
3681/84 %3.00+ 0.00 Pergamon Press Ltd.
238
Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science
I
All systems of knowledge involve classifications, serving to distinguish the like from the unlike, and Durkheim and Mauss proposed that primitive classifications ‘reproduced the pattern of social inclusions and exclusions’.4 This position has been subjected to a series of criticisms by Benoit-Smullyan, Dennes, Gehlke, Goldenweiser, Schaub and Worsley.5 These criticisms have been generally taken by the sociological community as indicating the untenability of Durkheim and Mauss’ position in Primitive Classification. If Bloor’s defence of Durkheim and Mauss’ position is to be cogent, he must succeed in defending them from each of the following criticisms: (C,) Empirical criticism: Durkheim and Mauss’ ethnographic data is false. The statistically significant correlation between the cognitive systems and social classifications discussed in Primitive Classification was not established. (C,) Theoretical criticism: If knowledge reproduced the patterns of social relationships then it could not reproduce the patterns of nature. (C,) Logical criticism: The social occasions of classification are dependent upon the wider practice of classification, so that Durkheim and Mauss’ position is circular. To these criticisms Bloor adds a fourth: (C,) Theoretical criticism: Durkheim and Mauss fail to give an adequately general model of the classification process. Thus to satisfactorily defend Durkheim and Mauss, Bloor must rebut criticisms (C,) - (C.,). The bulk of the paper which Bloor has presented is directed towards answering criticisms (C,) and ( C,). Criticism (C,) Bloor also responds to by appealing to the general model of the classification process which involves the acceptance of Mary Hesse’s ‘network model of universals.’ 6 Bloor states: . . . the answer to the problem is that the social message comprises one of the coherence conditions, whilst the negotiability of the network provides the resources for reconciling those demands with the input of experience. The idea that knowledge is a channel which can convey two signals at once requires us to drop the assumption that nature and society are polar opposites. It also requires us to become less ‘Bloor, op. cit., Note 1, p. 267. “E. Benoit-Smullyan, ‘The Sociologism of Emile Durkheim and his School’, An Introduction to the History of Sociology, H. E. Barnes (ed.) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948). ch. XXVII; W. R. Dennes, ‘The Methods and Presuppositions of Group Psychology’, University of California Publications in Philosophy, 6, (1924), 1- 182; C. E. Gehlke, ‘Emile Durkheim’s Contributions to Sociological Theory’, Columbia University Studies in H&tory, Economics and Public Law, LX11 (1913, 1- 188; A. A. Goldenweiser, ‘Methods and Principles’, American Anthropologist, 17 (1915), 719-735; E. L. Schaub, ‘A Sociological Theory of Knowledge’, Phil. Rev., 29, (1920), 319- 339; P. M. Worsley, ‘Emile Durkheim’s Theory of Knowledge’, Sociological
Review, 4 (1956), 47-62. 6M. Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference, (London:
Macmillan,
1974). ch. 2.
Primitive Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge:
A Response to Bloor
239
complacent about what it is to ‘fit the physical world’. This is where the network model is crucial.’
The response of Bloor to criticisms (C,) and (C,) thus stand or fall together. It appears that Bloor accepts criticism (C,) as it applies to Durkheim and Mauss’ position. He attempts however to produce new empirical arguments to support this position dealing primarily with the historical development of the corpuscular philosophy, but citing also in passing the case of cerebral anatomy in early nineteenth century Edinburgh.* It is reasonable for critical purposes to restrict our considerations to Bloor’s most extensively developed case study. The final part of Bloor’s argument is a response to criticism (C,), the circularity claim. The cogency of this response is independent of the cogency of previous arguments and must therefore be assessed on an independent basis. There, to summarize, it is maintained that critics have confused ‘properties of the individual’ with ‘specifically social’ properties, and once this distinction is explicated and defended, the circularity charge dissolves.9 In the following sections of the present paper, I will consider the responses made to criticisms (G), (G) and (G).
II On Hesse’s network model, scientific theories are understood to be a network of concepts related or linked by laws, and where only a relative distinction can be made between the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘observable’. The testability of laws is dependent upon the state of the whole theory, as in part is the truth or falsity of observation statements: the truth of statements is determined by the coherence within a whole theoretical network. This much Duhem and Quine have already told us. Hesse however attempts to support their theoretical holism with arguments primarily about the nature of classification and universals. A resemblance theory of universals is advocated: a property P is predicated of objects a and b on the resemblance theory in respect of the way in which they resemble each other and differ from c, d, e, . . . . Hesse’s position incorporates two further elements. First, the correspondence conditions: (1) there are some recognitions of similarities or resemblances that cannot be further verbalized in terms of other predicates; (2) such recognitions, whilst not necessarily infallible must be correct at least on some occasions. Second, there are the coherence conditions which process and organize the classifications made on the basis of resemblance recognitions; these conditions ‘Bloor, op. cit., note 1, BBloor, op. cit., note 1, 9Bloor, op. cit., note 1,
p. 293. pp. 291- 292. p. 296.
240
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
include symmetry, analogy, parsimony, conformity with various other types of theories and models and so onlo Does it follow from Hesse’s position, as Bloor proposes, that ‘the organization of a classificatory system is not, and cannot be, determined by the way the world is; that there is no such thing as a natural or uniquely objective classification’?” Insofar as what is denied here is that there is a ‘oneness’ between knowledge and the world, such that reality acts as a filter ultimately eliminating those theories which do not represent accurate descriptions of the world, Bloor seems to be right. There is no universal agreement that, to cite but two examples, the neo-Darwinist theory of evolution and Einsteinian special relativity are satisfactory theories.12 This simply means that even the best-accepted of scientific theories may be false, not merely as a logical, but as a genuine empirical possibility. On the other hand Hesse is explicit that she is not arguing for a conventionalism, where ‘any theory can be imposed upon any facts regardless of coherence conditions’.‘3 Contrary to Bloor, it may well be that given a specific domain of facts and coherence conditions, there is a ‘unique’ classification and that there are not, in Bloor’s words once more, ‘endless possibilities for reclassification’.14 Nothing in Hesse’s position implies this claim and Bloor has no explicit independent argument for it. Yet it is precisely such a claim which Bloor makes in asserting that criticism (C,) can be rebutted. It thus seems that (C.,) is not satisfactorily dealt with.
III
To rebut (C,) Bloor gives a discussion of the sociological implications of the corpuscular philosophy. According to this position, matter is inert and could neither move itself or organize itself, mechanically obeying the laws of motion. The position which viewed a kind of anima mundi in nature, as exemplified by Aristotle was vigorously attacked by Robert Boyle. Wherein lies the cause for this change in preference for the mechanical philosophy over the animalistic philosophy? The answer for Bloor lies in the ideological significance of the passivity of matter. The sectaries carried a social message which both Boyle and Newton found disturbing: the redistribution of property, social and political equality, lay preaching and a concern to derive religious truth and morality from their own revelations and conscience. This package of social reform was “‘Hesse, op. cit., note 6, p. 52. “Bloor, op. cit., note 1, p. 269. “C.f G. Webster and B. C. Goodwin, ‘The Origin of Species: Sot. und Biol. Structures, 5, (1982), 15 -47: L. Essen, ‘Einstein’s Proc. R. Znstn. Ct. Br., 45, (1972), 141- 160. lJHesse, op. cit., note 6, p, 43. “Bloor, op. cit., note 1, p. 278.
A Structuralist Special Theory
Approach’, J. of Relativity’,
Primitive Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Response to Bioor
241
supported theologically by an identification of God with nature. The corpuscular philosophy of Boyle and his circle was an attempt to bolster up social and political policies opposed to the sectaries. Thus Bloor concludes that the classification of things reproduced the classification of men. I am generally sympathetic to Bloor’s sociology, but not his more far reaching philosophical conclusion that we have thus given a secure bridgehead to the Durkheim - Mauss thesis. It is precisely unclear how in fact the classification of the world reproduced the classification of persons. Let us concede that a prima facie case has been made by Bloor, and that Boyle and Newton accepted the metaphysical assumption of the passivity of matter for political reasons, and that structurally this principle legitimized the naturalness of the status quo. This in itself is an interesting and highly informative sociological hypothesis. However the Durkheim - Mauss thesis requires a much stronger claim: as the case of the proposed sevenfold classification of space in the Zuni Cosmology was taken to depend upon their sevenfold social organization with its sevenfold arrangement of camps, some theoretical connection must be drawn on the one hand between the properties of the objects of scientific, religious or metaphysical theories, and the social structure on the other. The example which Bloor has chosen to support the Durkheim - Mauss thesis reduces this thesis to absurdity rather than supporting it. For what must now be argued, parallel to Durkheim and Mauss’ own example of the Zuni Cosmology, is that there is a similarity relationship between the classification of the passivity of matter on the one hand and the social structural properties of Boyle and his circle (e.g. their class positions) on the other. This, however, is absurd; Boyle and his circle were anything but socially inert, passive and lifeless like their matter. It is therefore unclear how Hesse’s network model can be applied here without such absurd results. On the other hand, if we accept that Boyle’s position was ideologically motivated, we need not necessarily embrace Hesse’s network model to advance this thesis. What is needed then, is nothing more than strong empirical arguments. In particular one would need to show that the metaphysical principle of the activity of matter was of important social significance to the sectaries, and that their position socially threatened Boyle. Further we would need to show that the ideological use of nature was commonplace in the period and would be of social significance and not merely ignored as yet another abstract musing of the intellectuals.Bloor succeeds in making aprima facie case for the ideological nature of corpuscular philosophy and of course it is for the specialists to assess these empirical arguments and the primary data. We do not have here, even if these empirical arguments are correct, a new domain of facts which confirm the thesis of Primitive Classification.
242
Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science
IV
We turn finally to Bloor’s response to criticism (C,). The contention here is that the social occasions of classification are dependent upon the wider practice of classification, so that Durkheim and Mauss’ position is circular. This line of argument has it that only if a general capacity to recognize successive events existed, could the periodicity of primitive religious ceremonies be in turn recognized. Bloor’s reply to this is that Durkheim and his critics are arguing at cross purposes. For Durkheim, the categories are social phenomena, collective representations and not merely properties of the individual mind. An ‘isolated individual’ could no more generate a category, than as one individual could generate a moral obligation.15 As Bloor concisely puts it: “ ‘What truly constitutes a classification’ possesses properties which could not possibly arise from individual cognitive achievements of the kind that have just been ‘admitted’.“16 I have no interest in defending methodological individualism. Still, one should note that even if the position of methodological individualism is rejected, a social holism of the form embraced by Durkheim (especially in his idea of collective representations) need not be embraced. Our individuals need not be the ‘isolated individuals’ which Bloor speaks of, but socially related individuals. In fact Bloor attributes many significant social properties to one such individual in his discussion of the ideological implications of corpuscular philosophy - namely, Robert Boyle. We have, after all, just been told a story about Boyle’s financial interests and his explicit verbal attacks upon the sectaries. But this is not an explanation involving an appeal to ‘collective representations’, ‘external norms’ and other Durkheimian phenomena. It is a saga of power politics, pure and simple, involving socially related individuals. Consequently it is not Bloor’s critics who confuse properties of the individual with the specifically social, but Bloor himself. Therefore Bloor’s attempt to rebut the circularity argument fails. V The main strands of my argument may now be summarized. Bloor does not succeed in defending Durkheim and Mauss against criticisms (C,), (C,) and (G) [and hence (CJ]. His use of Hesse’s network model is illegitimate if he wishes to defend the relativism and conventionalism for which he has become infamous.” Further, the explicit empirical arguments which Bloor develops to ‘6Blo~r, op. cit., note 1, p. 296. “Bloor, op. cit., note 1, p. 296. “D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); ‘Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus’, Br. J. H&t. Sci., 11, (1978), 245 - 272; ‘Hamilton and Peacock on the Essence of Algebra’, Social History of Nineteenth Century Mathematics, H. Mehrtens, H. Bos and I. Schneider (eds.) (Boston: Birkhaiiser, 1981).
Primitive Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Response to Bloor 243 rebut (C,) actually constitute a reductio ad absurdurn of the Durkheim - Mauss position. Finally, Bloor’s attempt to rebut the circularity claim (C,) fails, as his account is inconsistent; epistemological holist such internal theoretical discord is intolerable. Consequently, the occasion to exhume Primitive Classification has not yet come.
present paper seeks to present a critical response to David Bloor’s recent attempt to defend the position of Durkheim and Mauss, that the classification of things reproduces the classification of men. If Bloor’s defence of Durkheim and Mauss’ position is to be cogent, he must defend them against both an empirical criticism (C,), a theoretical criticism (C,), a logical criticism (CJ and a further theoretical criticism (C,). I will argue that Bloor’s defence fails on all the above accounts. Criticism (CJ it will be argued stands or falls, only if (C,) is satisfactorily answered. But Bloor’s use of Hesse’s network model is illegitimate if he wishes to defend the relativism and conventionalism which he has become famous for. Further the explicit empirical arguments which Bloor develops to rebut (C,) actually constitute a reductio ad absurdum of the Durkheim - Mauss position. Finally, Bloor’s attempt to rebut the circularity claim (C,) fails, as his account is inconsistent with the empirical argument used to rebut (C,). For a consistent epistemological holist such internal theoretical discord is intolerable. Consequently, the occasion to exhume Primitive Classification has not yet come. David Bloor’ has presented an interesting defence of the Durkheim - Mauss thesis that the classification of things reproduces the classification of men;* a thesis which he has already defended against both Gerd Buchdahl and Steven Lukes.3 Since Bloor has (I believe) cogently argued that neither of his critics have addressed his central arguments, a further reply is in order.
*School Australia.
of Social Sciences,
The Flinders
University
of South
Australia,
Bedford
Park,
5042,
Received 20 March 1983. ‘D. Bloor,
‘Durkheim
and Mauss
Revisited:
Classification
and the Sociology
of Knowledge’,
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 13 (1982), 267. ‘E. Durkheim
and
M. Ma&,
‘De Quelques Formes Primitives de Classification’, Annde and introduction in R. Needham, Primitive Classification.
Sociologique, 1901- 2 (1903);translation
(Cohen and West, London, 1%3). “D. Bloor, ‘A Reply to Gerd Buchdahl’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 13 (1982), 305. ‘ A Reply to Lukes’, Stud. H&t. Phil. Sci., 13 (1982), 319.
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 237 -243, Printed
in Great
Britain.
1984.
0039-
Steven
3681/84 %3.00+ 0.00 Pergamon Press Ltd.
238
Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science
I
All systems of knowledge involve classifications, serving to distinguish the like from the unlike, and Durkheim and Mauss proposed that primitive classifications ‘reproduced the pattern of social inclusions and exclusions’.4 This position has been subjected to a series of criticisms by Benoit-Smullyan, Dennes, Gehlke, Goldenweiser, Schaub and Worsley.5 These criticisms have been generally taken by the sociological community as indicating the untenability of Durkheim and Mauss’ position in Primitive Classification. If Bloor’s defence of Durkheim and Mauss’ position is to be cogent, he must succeed in defending them from each of the following criticisms: (C,) Empirical criticism: Durkheim and Mauss’ ethnographic data is false. The statistically significant correlation between the cognitive systems and social classifications discussed in Primitive Classification was not established. (C,) Theoretical criticism: If knowledge reproduced the patterns of social relationships then it could not reproduce the patterns of nature. (C,) Logical criticism: The social occasions of classification are dependent upon the wider practice of classification, so that Durkheim and Mauss’ position is circular. To these criticisms Bloor adds a fourth: (C,) Theoretical criticism: Durkheim and Mauss fail to give an adequately general model of the classification process. Thus to satisfactorily defend Durkheim and Mauss, Bloor must rebut criticisms (C,) - (C.,). The bulk of the paper which Bloor has presented is directed towards answering criticisms (C,) and ( C,). Criticism (C,) Bloor also responds to by appealing to the general model of the classification process which involves the acceptance of Mary Hesse’s ‘network model of universals.’ 6 Bloor states: . . . the answer to the problem is that the social message comprises one of the coherence conditions, whilst the negotiability of the network provides the resources for reconciling those demands with the input of experience. The idea that knowledge is a channel which can convey two signals at once requires us to drop the assumption that nature and society are polar opposites. It also requires us to become less ‘Bloor, op. cit., Note 1, p. 267. “E. Benoit-Smullyan, ‘The Sociologism of Emile Durkheim and his School’, An Introduction to the History of Sociology, H. E. Barnes (ed.) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948). ch. XXVII; W. R. Dennes, ‘The Methods and Presuppositions of Group Psychology’, University of California Publications in Philosophy, 6, (1924), 1- 182; C. E. Gehlke, ‘Emile Durkheim’s Contributions to Sociological Theory’, Columbia University Studies in H&tory, Economics and Public Law, LX11 (1913, 1- 188; A. A. Goldenweiser, ‘Methods and Principles’, American Anthropologist, 17 (1915), 719-735; E. L. Schaub, ‘A Sociological Theory of Knowledge’, Phil. Rev., 29, (1920), 319- 339; P. M. Worsley, ‘Emile Durkheim’s Theory of Knowledge’, Sociological
Review, 4 (1956), 47-62. 6M. Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference, (London:
Macmillan,
1974). ch. 2.
Primitive Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge:
A Response to Bloor
239
complacent about what it is to ‘fit the physical world’. This is where the network model is crucial.’
The response of Bloor to criticisms (C,) and (C,) thus stand or fall together. It appears that Bloor accepts criticism (C,) as it applies to Durkheim and Mauss’ position. He attempts however to produce new empirical arguments to support this position dealing primarily with the historical development of the corpuscular philosophy, but citing also in passing the case of cerebral anatomy in early nineteenth century Edinburgh.* It is reasonable for critical purposes to restrict our considerations to Bloor’s most extensively developed case study. The final part of Bloor’s argument is a response to criticism (C,), the circularity claim. The cogency of this response is independent of the cogency of previous arguments and must therefore be assessed on an independent basis. There, to summarize, it is maintained that critics have confused ‘properties of the individual’ with ‘specifically social’ properties, and once this distinction is explicated and defended, the circularity charge dissolves.9 In the following sections of the present paper, I will consider the responses made to criticisms (G), (G) and (G).
II On Hesse’s network model, scientific theories are understood to be a network of concepts related or linked by laws, and where only a relative distinction can be made between the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘observable’. The testability of laws is dependent upon the state of the whole theory, as in part is the truth or falsity of observation statements: the truth of statements is determined by the coherence within a whole theoretical network. This much Duhem and Quine have already told us. Hesse however attempts to support their theoretical holism with arguments primarily about the nature of classification and universals. A resemblance theory of universals is advocated: a property P is predicated of objects a and b on the resemblance theory in respect of the way in which they resemble each other and differ from c, d, e, . . . . Hesse’s position incorporates two further elements. First, the correspondence conditions: (1) there are some recognitions of similarities or resemblances that cannot be further verbalized in terms of other predicates; (2) such recognitions, whilst not necessarily infallible must be correct at least on some occasions. Second, there are the coherence conditions which process and organize the classifications made on the basis of resemblance recognitions; these conditions ‘Bloor, op. cit., note 1, BBloor, op. cit., note 1, 9Bloor, op. cit., note 1,
p. 293. pp. 291- 292. p. 296.
240
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
include symmetry, analogy, parsimony, conformity with various other types of theories and models and so onlo Does it follow from Hesse’s position, as Bloor proposes, that ‘the organization of a classificatory system is not, and cannot be, determined by the way the world is; that there is no such thing as a natural or uniquely objective classification’?” Insofar as what is denied here is that there is a ‘oneness’ between knowledge and the world, such that reality acts as a filter ultimately eliminating those theories which do not represent accurate descriptions of the world, Bloor seems to be right. There is no universal agreement that, to cite but two examples, the neo-Darwinist theory of evolution and Einsteinian special relativity are satisfactory theories.12 This simply means that even the best-accepted of scientific theories may be false, not merely as a logical, but as a genuine empirical possibility. On the other hand Hesse is explicit that she is not arguing for a conventionalism, where ‘any theory can be imposed upon any facts regardless of coherence conditions’.‘3 Contrary to Bloor, it may well be that given a specific domain of facts and coherence conditions, there is a ‘unique’ classification and that there are not, in Bloor’s words once more, ‘endless possibilities for reclassification’.14 Nothing in Hesse’s position implies this claim and Bloor has no explicit independent argument for it. Yet it is precisely such a claim which Bloor makes in asserting that criticism (C,) can be rebutted. It thus seems that (C.,) is not satisfactorily dealt with.
III
To rebut (C,) Bloor gives a discussion of the sociological implications of the corpuscular philosophy. According to this position, matter is inert and could neither move itself or organize itself, mechanically obeying the laws of motion. The position which viewed a kind of anima mundi in nature, as exemplified by Aristotle was vigorously attacked by Robert Boyle. Wherein lies the cause for this change in preference for the mechanical philosophy over the animalistic philosophy? The answer for Bloor lies in the ideological significance of the passivity of matter. The sectaries carried a social message which both Boyle and Newton found disturbing: the redistribution of property, social and political equality, lay preaching and a concern to derive religious truth and morality from their own revelations and conscience. This package of social reform was “‘Hesse, op. cit., note 6, p. 52. “Bloor, op. cit., note 1, p. 269. “C.f G. Webster and B. C. Goodwin, ‘The Origin of Species: Sot. und Biol. Structures, 5, (1982), 15 -47: L. Essen, ‘Einstein’s Proc. R. Znstn. Ct. Br., 45, (1972), 141- 160. lJHesse, op. cit., note 6, p, 43. “Bloor, op. cit., note 1, p. 278.
A Structuralist Special Theory
Approach’, J. of Relativity’,
Primitive Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Response to Bioor
241
supported theologically by an identification of God with nature. The corpuscular philosophy of Boyle and his circle was an attempt to bolster up social and political policies opposed to the sectaries. Thus Bloor concludes that the classification of things reproduced the classification of men. I am generally sympathetic to Bloor’s sociology, but not his more far reaching philosophical conclusion that we have thus given a secure bridgehead to the Durkheim - Mauss thesis. It is precisely unclear how in fact the classification of the world reproduced the classification of persons. Let us concede that a prima facie case has been made by Bloor, and that Boyle and Newton accepted the metaphysical assumption of the passivity of matter for political reasons, and that structurally this principle legitimized the naturalness of the status quo. This in itself is an interesting and highly informative sociological hypothesis. However the Durkheim - Mauss thesis requires a much stronger claim: as the case of the proposed sevenfold classification of space in the Zuni Cosmology was taken to depend upon their sevenfold social organization with its sevenfold arrangement of camps, some theoretical connection must be drawn on the one hand between the properties of the objects of scientific, religious or metaphysical theories, and the social structure on the other. The example which Bloor has chosen to support the Durkheim - Mauss thesis reduces this thesis to absurdity rather than supporting it. For what must now be argued, parallel to Durkheim and Mauss’ own example of the Zuni Cosmology, is that there is a similarity relationship between the classification of the passivity of matter on the one hand and the social structural properties of Boyle and his circle (e.g. their class positions) on the other. This, however, is absurd; Boyle and his circle were anything but socially inert, passive and lifeless like their matter. It is therefore unclear how Hesse’s network model can be applied here without such absurd results. On the other hand, if we accept that Boyle’s position was ideologically motivated, we need not necessarily embrace Hesse’s network model to advance this thesis. What is needed then, is nothing more than strong empirical arguments. In particular one would need to show that the metaphysical principle of the activity of matter was of important social significance to the sectaries, and that their position socially threatened Boyle. Further we would need to show that the ideological use of nature was commonplace in the period and would be of social significance and not merely ignored as yet another abstract musing of the intellectuals.Bloor succeeds in making aprima facie case for the ideological nature of corpuscular philosophy and of course it is for the specialists to assess these empirical arguments and the primary data. We do not have here, even if these empirical arguments are correct, a new domain of facts which confirm the thesis of Primitive Classification.
242
Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science
IV
We turn finally to Bloor’s response to criticism (C,). The contention here is that the social occasions of classification are dependent upon the wider practice of classification, so that Durkheim and Mauss’ position is circular. This line of argument has it that only if a general capacity to recognize successive events existed, could the periodicity of primitive religious ceremonies be in turn recognized. Bloor’s reply to this is that Durkheim and his critics are arguing at cross purposes. For Durkheim, the categories are social phenomena, collective representations and not merely properties of the individual mind. An ‘isolated individual’ could no more generate a category, than as one individual could generate a moral obligation.15 As Bloor concisely puts it: “ ‘What truly constitutes a classification’ possesses properties which could not possibly arise from individual cognitive achievements of the kind that have just been ‘admitted’.“16 I have no interest in defending methodological individualism. Still, one should note that even if the position of methodological individualism is rejected, a social holism of the form embraced by Durkheim (especially in his idea of collective representations) need not be embraced. Our individuals need not be the ‘isolated individuals’ which Bloor speaks of, but socially related individuals. In fact Bloor attributes many significant social properties to one such individual in his discussion of the ideological implications of corpuscular philosophy - namely, Robert Boyle. We have, after all, just been told a story about Boyle’s financial interests and his explicit verbal attacks upon the sectaries. But this is not an explanation involving an appeal to ‘collective representations’, ‘external norms’ and other Durkheimian phenomena. It is a saga of power politics, pure and simple, involving socially related individuals. Consequently it is not Bloor’s critics who confuse properties of the individual with the specifically social, but Bloor himself. Therefore Bloor’s attempt to rebut the circularity argument fails. V The main strands of my argument may now be summarized. Bloor does not succeed in defending Durkheim and Mauss against criticisms (C,), (C,) and (G) [and hence (CJ]. His use of Hesse’s network model is illegitimate if he wishes to defend the relativism and conventionalism for which he has become infamous.” Further, the explicit empirical arguments which Bloor develops to ‘6Blo~r, op. cit., note 1, p. 296. “Bloor, op. cit., note 1, p. 296. “D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); ‘Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus’, Br. J. H&t. Sci., 11, (1978), 245 - 272; ‘Hamilton and Peacock on the Essence of Algebra’, Social History of Nineteenth Century Mathematics, H. Mehrtens, H. Bos and I. Schneider (eds.) (Boston: Birkhaiiser, 1981).
Primitive Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Response to Bloor 243 rebut (C,) actually constitute a reductio ad absurdurn of the Durkheim - Mauss position. Finally, Bloor’s attempt to rebut the circularity claim (C,) fails, as his account is inconsistent; epistemological holist such internal theoretical discord is intolerable. Consequently, the occasion to exhume Primitive Classification has not yet come.