- Email: [email protected]
Rapid detection of Francisella tularensis by its fatty acid profile
S764
Abstracts / Journal of Biotechnology 136S (2008) S763–S765
film showed that the cell wall and the cell membrane decomposed first, and with further illumination, the cytoplasm was gradually decomposed. When the illuminated time was up to 10 s, the concentration of MDA reached 1.04 M, and the K+ concentration was 1.1 ppm, which showed that there was lipid peroxidation in cells, and the permeability of cell membrane was destroyed. The results suggested that photocatalytic bacterial inactivation with Ag/TiO2 thin film has the potential for use as a new tool for ballast water treatment, and the cell death was mainly caused by the photocatalytic degradation of the cell structure.
References Bax, N., Williamson, A., Aguero, M., Gonazlez, E., Geeves, W., 2003. Marine invasive alien species: a threat to global biodiversity. Marine Policy 27, 313–323. Lewis, P.N., Hewitt, C.L., Riddle, M., McMinn, A., 2003. Marine introductions in the Southern Ocean: an unrecognised hazard to biodiversity. Marine Pollution Bulletin 46, 213–223.
doi:10.1016/j.jbiotec.2008.07.1651 IX1-P-003 Bioterrorism and biosecurity practical solutions
ments essential for biological weapon proliferation or any acts of bioterrorism, i.e. human resources of skilled personal, a select list of pathogens universally or regionally agreed to, dual use technology and dual use research. Strengthening of the BTWC, involvement of the WHO, FAO and OIE and independent think tanks like the SIPRI and Australia group should be elicited so that genuine scientific research benefiting humanity, research in pure sciences and generative commercial activities do not suffer. Monitoring is also needed on sister sciences like physics and chemistry that are useful in weaponizing even common biological agents. Intelligence agencies should develop analytical tools and programs to create triggers, which could detect any dubious dual use research or developments. The various issues of biosafety and the much broader issues of biosecurity should be debated in various forums like symposiums and workshops to find effective solutions to curb the menace of Bioterrorism without hampering genuine beneficial scientific research. doi:10.1016/j.jbiotec.2008.07.1652 IX1-YP-004 Rapid detection of Francisella tularensis by its fatty acid profile
Sharad S. Chauhan
Yanyan Li, Liping Wang, Shengfang Wu, Feng Shi, Ye Li, Xiaoyuan Wang ∗
Punjab Police Academy, Phillaur 144410, India Keywords: Biological weapons; Bioterrorism; Biosafety; Biosecurity; Dual use research
State Key Laboratory of Food Science and Technology, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, China
The subject of biological weapons in the recent past has intrigued the mindset of the scientists, medical community and the common man. The nightmarish prospect of a pervert microbiological or a ribald practitioner in genetic engineering spelling doom in any corner of the globe with biological munitions are either glaringly projected or is out rightly rejected by different quarters. The post September 11 (11.9.2001) scenario brought in its wake more spine chilling realization. The terrorist actions dreadfully shook the slumbering humanity, terrorist experts and the counter terrorism strategists to a sudden and rude awakening by forcefully demonstrating that the brute force of science coupled with fanatic motivation and insane determination of a misguided terrorist can destroy mankind in a small interval of time. We should address to the variegated issues of bioterrorism in full measures of earnestness and concentration so as to objectively evaluate the extent and range of potential threats. This will help us to plan and put in place serious inputs to forestall the possible outbreak of any event in a biological spectrum, before it is too late to retrace our steps from self-inflected annihilation. Biological sciences and security dangerously interact to create a sense of fear of biological weapon proliferation. The rapid pace of development of science and technology has created a genuine fear that terrorists, criminals, non-state actors, or white-collar criminals might misuse biological sciences to create terror, economic harm or asymmetric warfare. There is a need for broad consensus for need to monitor dual use scientific research and its dissemination. Areas of concern include the mandate of research, the pathogen accountability, transportation and information security and personnel responsibility. Multifaceted approach with the gamut of stakeholders like researchers, government and security officials, academicians’ research institution non-governmental agencies and activity is required. A universally acceptable internal code of conduct and ethics with a just transparent legal sanction is required to curb nefarious dual use research. A balanced globalized measured are needed for control of biological agents and research for reasons of universal acceptance. Monitoring is needed for all ele-
E-mail address: [email protected] (X. Wang). Francisella tularensis is an intracellular pathogen that can cause tularemia (Ellis et al., 2002). It is also an organism of concern as a biological threat agent. In this study, we have developed a new method for rapid detection of F. tularensis. Briefly, F. tularensis subsp. novicida U112 and Escherichia coli W3110 were grown up to the late-log phase and the cells were harvested. The cell pellets were resuspended in 4 M NaOH solution, and incubated at 90 ◦ C for 60 min. The fatty acids were extracted from the reaction mixture by chloroform, dried and trimethylsilylated. The resulting trimethylsilyl derivatives of the fatty acids were analyzed by using GC/MS/MS (Varian-1200L, USA). The spectra showed that the fatty acid profile from U112 was quite different from that of W3110. In E. coli W3110 there were mainly the six fatty acids: C10:0, C12:0, C14:0, C16:0, C18:0 and C18:1. In F. tularensis U112, however, additional long chain fatty acids were also observed, such as C20:0, C22:0, C22:1 and C24:0. Moreover, the chain length of 3-hydroxy fatty acids were also different in both strains of U112 and W3110. F. tularensis U112 made 3-OH fatty acids of C16:0 and C18:0, while E. coli W3110 only made 3-OH fatty acid of C14:0. The profile of 3-OH fatty acids in U112 is consistent with the structure of its lipid A (Wang et al., 2006). Our results indicate that the fatty acid profile in F. tularensis is specific and could be used as a fingerprint for rapid detection of this organism. References Ellis, J., Oyston, P.C., Green, M., Titball, R.W., 2002. Tularemia. Clinical Microbiology Reviews 15, 631–646. Wang, X., Ribeiro, A.A., Guan, Z., McGrath, S.C., Cotter, R.J., Raetz, C.R., 2006. Structure and biosynthesis of free lipid A molecules that replace lipopolysaccharide in Francisella tularensis subsp. novicida. Biochemistry 45 (48), 14427–14440.
doi:10.1016/j.jbiotec.2008.07.1653 IX1-YP-005
Abstracts / Journal of Biotechnology 136S (2008) S763–S765
film showed that the cell wall and the cell membrane decomposed first, and with further illumination, the cytoplasm was gradually decomposed. When the illuminated time was up to 10 s, the concentration of MDA reached 1.04 M, and the K+ concentration was 1.1 ppm, which showed that there was lipid peroxidation in cells, and the permeability of cell membrane was destroyed. The results suggested that photocatalytic bacterial inactivation with Ag/TiO2 thin film has the potential for use as a new tool for ballast water treatment, and the cell death was mainly caused by the photocatalytic degradation of the cell structure.
References Bax, N., Williamson, A., Aguero, M., Gonazlez, E., Geeves, W., 2003. Marine invasive alien species: a threat to global biodiversity. Marine Policy 27, 313–323. Lewis, P.N., Hewitt, C.L., Riddle, M., McMinn, A., 2003. Marine introductions in the Southern Ocean: an unrecognised hazard to biodiversity. Marine Pollution Bulletin 46, 213–223.
doi:10.1016/j.jbiotec.2008.07.1651 IX1-P-003 Bioterrorism and biosecurity practical solutions
ments essential for biological weapon proliferation or any acts of bioterrorism, i.e. human resources of skilled personal, a select list of pathogens universally or regionally agreed to, dual use technology and dual use research. Strengthening of the BTWC, involvement of the WHO, FAO and OIE and independent think tanks like the SIPRI and Australia group should be elicited so that genuine scientific research benefiting humanity, research in pure sciences and generative commercial activities do not suffer. Monitoring is also needed on sister sciences like physics and chemistry that are useful in weaponizing even common biological agents. Intelligence agencies should develop analytical tools and programs to create triggers, which could detect any dubious dual use research or developments. The various issues of biosafety and the much broader issues of biosecurity should be debated in various forums like symposiums and workshops to find effective solutions to curb the menace of Bioterrorism without hampering genuine beneficial scientific research. doi:10.1016/j.jbiotec.2008.07.1652 IX1-YP-004 Rapid detection of Francisella tularensis by its fatty acid profile
Sharad S. Chauhan
Yanyan Li, Liping Wang, Shengfang Wu, Feng Shi, Ye Li, Xiaoyuan Wang ∗
Punjab Police Academy, Phillaur 144410, India Keywords: Biological weapons; Bioterrorism; Biosafety; Biosecurity; Dual use research
State Key Laboratory of Food Science and Technology, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, China
The subject of biological weapons in the recent past has intrigued the mindset of the scientists, medical community and the common man. The nightmarish prospect of a pervert microbiological or a ribald practitioner in genetic engineering spelling doom in any corner of the globe with biological munitions are either glaringly projected or is out rightly rejected by different quarters. The post September 11 (11.9.2001) scenario brought in its wake more spine chilling realization. The terrorist actions dreadfully shook the slumbering humanity, terrorist experts and the counter terrorism strategists to a sudden and rude awakening by forcefully demonstrating that the brute force of science coupled with fanatic motivation and insane determination of a misguided terrorist can destroy mankind in a small interval of time. We should address to the variegated issues of bioterrorism in full measures of earnestness and concentration so as to objectively evaluate the extent and range of potential threats. This will help us to plan and put in place serious inputs to forestall the possible outbreak of any event in a biological spectrum, before it is too late to retrace our steps from self-inflected annihilation. Biological sciences and security dangerously interact to create a sense of fear of biological weapon proliferation. The rapid pace of development of science and technology has created a genuine fear that terrorists, criminals, non-state actors, or white-collar criminals might misuse biological sciences to create terror, economic harm or asymmetric warfare. There is a need for broad consensus for need to monitor dual use scientific research and its dissemination. Areas of concern include the mandate of research, the pathogen accountability, transportation and information security and personnel responsibility. Multifaceted approach with the gamut of stakeholders like researchers, government and security officials, academicians’ research institution non-governmental agencies and activity is required. A universally acceptable internal code of conduct and ethics with a just transparent legal sanction is required to curb nefarious dual use research. A balanced globalized measured are needed for control of biological agents and research for reasons of universal acceptance. Monitoring is needed for all ele-
E-mail address: [email protected] (X. Wang). Francisella tularensis is an intracellular pathogen that can cause tularemia (Ellis et al., 2002). It is also an organism of concern as a biological threat agent. In this study, we have developed a new method for rapid detection of F. tularensis. Briefly, F. tularensis subsp. novicida U112 and Escherichia coli W3110 were grown up to the late-log phase and the cells were harvested. The cell pellets were resuspended in 4 M NaOH solution, and incubated at 90 ◦ C for 60 min. The fatty acids were extracted from the reaction mixture by chloroform, dried and trimethylsilylated. The resulting trimethylsilyl derivatives of the fatty acids were analyzed by using GC/MS/MS (Varian-1200L, USA). The spectra showed that the fatty acid profile from U112 was quite different from that of W3110. In E. coli W3110 there were mainly the six fatty acids: C10:0, C12:0, C14:0, C16:0, C18:0 and C18:1. In F. tularensis U112, however, additional long chain fatty acids were also observed, such as C20:0, C22:0, C22:1 and C24:0. Moreover, the chain length of 3-hydroxy fatty acids were also different in both strains of U112 and W3110. F. tularensis U112 made 3-OH fatty acids of C16:0 and C18:0, while E. coli W3110 only made 3-OH fatty acid of C14:0. The profile of 3-OH fatty acids in U112 is consistent with the structure of its lipid A (Wang et al., 2006). Our results indicate that the fatty acid profile in F. tularensis is specific and could be used as a fingerprint for rapid detection of this organism. References Ellis, J., Oyston, P.C., Green, M., Titball, R.W., 2002. Tularemia. Clinical Microbiology Reviews 15, 631–646. Wang, X., Ribeiro, A.A., Guan, Z., McGrath, S.C., Cotter, R.J., Raetz, C.R., 2006. Structure and biosynthesis of free lipid A molecules that replace lipopolysaccharide in Francisella tularensis subsp. novicida. Biochemistry 45 (48), 14427–14440.
doi:10.1016/j.jbiotec.2008.07.1653 IX1-YP-005