Reactions to social vs self-evaluation: Moderating effects of personal and social identity orientations

JOURNAL

OF RESEARCH

IN PERSONALITY

22, 513-524 (1988)

Reactions to Social vs Self-Evaluation: Moderating Effects of Personal and Social Identity Orientations BYRON D. BARNES AND EILEEN

MASON

University of Texus nt Austin MARK R. LEARY Wake Forest Universit.v AND

JEFF LAURENT,

CAROL GRIEBEL,

AND ALLEN

BERGMAN

University of Texas at Austin People differ in the degree to which their identities are based on personal versus social identity characteristics. This experiment tested the hypothesis that people are most concerned about evaluations that are relevant to their salient identity orientation. The Aspects of Identity Questionnaire was used to classify subjects as low or high in personal and social identities. Subjects then anticipated taking a test, believing that their performance would be known by only them, by only a research assistant, by both them and a research assistant, or by no one. Subjects then completed thought-listing and self-report measures of evaluation apprehension. Subjects who scored high in social identity reacted more strongly to the social evaluation than subjects low in social identity. Although subjects high in personal identity were not particularly threatened by private feedback, personal identity seemed to buffer subjects against the threat of social-evaluation. The results are discussed in the context of recent work on private and public aspects of the self. 0 1988 Academic Press. Inc.

After many years of debate regarding the relative merit of intrapsychic versus interpersonal models of the self, there is growing agreement that both private and public self-processes are involved in the regulation of behavior (Axsom, in press; Baumeister, 1986; Buss, 1980; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Greenwald, 1982; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Schlenker, Correspondence and reprint requests should be sent to Mark R. Leary, Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC 27109. 513 0092-6566/88 $3.00 Copyright 0 1988 hy Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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1985; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Although differing in specifics, these theorists agree that people’s behavior is affected by both private and public self-motives. Greenwald’s theory of ego-task analysis is perhaps the most straightforward exposition of this idea (Greenwald, 1982; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). Ego-task theory posits the existence of four distinct, though interrelated facets of the self-the diffuse, collective, private, and public selves. These aspects of the self are sensitive to different aspects of selfevaluation and perform different “tasks” in the service of protecting the ego. For example, the public self “is sensitive to the evaluations of others and seeks to win the approval of significant outer audiences,” whereas the basis of evaluation for the private self involves the individual’s internalized standards (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985, p. 132-133). Schlenker (1985) made a similar point, proposing that self-identifying behaviors may be directed toward various “audiences”; for example, people may characterize themselves to other people or to themselves. (See, also, Buss, 1980.) According to these approaches, some settings evoke a concern for one’s private self, focusing attention on the congruency between one’s behavior and relevant internal standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Leary, Barnes, & Griebel, 1986). Other settings evoke a concern for one’s public self and make others’ evaluations salient (Schlenker, 1980). In addition, some situations may activate both public and private self-processes (Leary, Barnes, Griebel, Mason, & McCormack, 1987). Further, people differ in the degree to which their behavior is mediated by private versus public self-processes. Greenwald and Breckler (1985) discuss several individual difference variables that reflect an orientation toward the private versus the public self. They suggest, for example, that private and public self-consciousnesses (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) reflect the degree to which people are oriented toward private versus public ego-tasks, respectively. Similarly, need for approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) appear to involve an emphasis on the public self, whereas achievement motivation (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953) reflects a private selforientation. The present study focused on the hypothesis that people’s proclivity for engaging in private versus public ego-tasks is related to the importance they place on various aspects of their identities. The characteristics that constitute people’s identities may be dichotomized into personal and social elements (James, 1890; Sampson, 1978). Personal aspects of identity are facets of identity that uniquely “belong” to the individual, such as beliefs, abilities, and goals. Social aspects of identity involve aspects of

EVALUATION

AND

IDENTITY

ORIENTATION

515

oneself that are rooted in one’s social roles and relationships, such as group memberships, friendships, and family. Although everyone’s identity includes both personal and social elements, people differ in the importance they place on each of these components (Sampson, 1978). Rather than reflecting opposite ends of a single continuum, social and personal characteristics are best construed as distinct dimensions of identity (Cheek & Briggs, 1982). Some people have a strong personal identity orientation, but a relatively weak social identity, deriving their identity largely from personal attributes. Other people’s identities are founded primarily upon their roles and social relationships, and only weakly on personal attributes. Other individuals place importance on both personal and social identity orientations, whereas yet others base their identities only weakly on personal and social characteristics (Cheek & Briggs, 1982). The importance people place on personal and social identity characteristics has implications for behavior. People who place greater importance on their personal identities think more about the private aspects of themselves, are more resistant to social influence, feel more guilty when they violate their personal standards, prefer occupations that provide personal rather than social rewards, and engage in sport activities for personal rather than social reasons. On the other hand, people who emphasize their social identities think more about the public aspects of themselves, feel more shameful when they violate social standards, prefer occupations that provide interpersonal rewards, engage in sports for social reasons, and are more concerned about the social appropriateness of their behavior than persons whose identities are less socially derived (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cheek & Hogan, 1983; Cutler, Lennox, & Wolfe, 1984; Hogan & Cheek, 1983; Leary. Wheeler, &Jenkins, 1986; Penner & Wymer, 1983). These findings suggest that personal and social identity orientations reflect, in part, people’s tendencies to engage in private versus public ego-tasks (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985). Persons who are high in personal identity should be particularly sensitive to potential threats to private self-esteem (i.e., their private self-evaluation), whereas people with a predominately social identity orientation should be particularly attuned to potential threats to social-esteem (i.e., how they are regarded by others). In each case, individuals should be most bothered by evaluations that involve those areas of self that form the central core of their identities. In the present study, subjects completed a measure of social and personal identity orientations, and then faced the prospect of receiving private and/or public evaluative feedback. We hypothesized that subjects would be most apprehensive about evaluations that were relevant to their salient aspect of identity.

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METHOD Subjects Subjects were 160 undergraduate students who participated in partial fulfillment of a course research requirement. They were assigned randomly to experimental conditions.

Procedure Subjects were run individually by one of two male or two female experimenters, each of whom ran an equal number of subjects in each condition. Upon arriving at the lab, subjects read an instruction sheet that explained that the study was designed to investigate the use of computerized intelligence tests and provided a general description of the study. After signing an informed consent form, subjects completed the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ; Cheek, 1982) and filler items. The AIQ measures the degree to which people’s identities are based on personal and social attributes. For each of 21 aspects of identity, subjects indicate how important the attribute is “to my sense of who I am.” The personal identity score reflects the degree to which respondents report that personal identity characteristics (e.g., my emotions and feelings; my thoughts and ideas; my goals and hopes for the future) are important to their sense of who they are. The social identity score reflects the degree to which respondents report that their identities are based on social identity characteristics (e.g., my reputation; my attractiveness to other people; belonging to the various groups that I am a member of). The scale has adequate interitem reliability and demonstrated evidence of construct and criterion validity (e.g., Cheek, 1982; Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cheek &Hogan, 1983; Leary. Wheeler, &Jenkins, 1986: Penner & Wymer. 1983). Subjects then received instructions that contained the experimental manipulations. In the no-evaluation condition, subjects were told that, after they completed the computerized test, they would erase their answers from the computer so that neither they nor anyone else would ever see their scores. This procedure was justified by telling them that it was necessary only for subjects to go through the process of taking the test. In the selfevaluation only condition, subjects were told that, as they took the test, the computer would score each answer and provide them with continuous feedback regarding their performance, along with an interpretation of their scores when they had finished. However, once they were through, they would erase their answers and scores so that no one else, not even the experimenter, would ever learn how they had performed. In the social-evaluation only condition, subjects learned that the computer would provide continuous feedback on an item-by-item basis to a research assistant who would monitor their performance on another terminal as they took the test. Once the assistant saw the scores, they would be erased from the computer’s memory and no one else, not even the subject, would ever see them. Finally, in the self- and social-evaluation condition, subjects were told that the computer would provide continuous feedback to both them and the research assistant as they took the test, after which their scores would be erased. These four conditions constitute a 2 (self-evaluation, no/yes) by 2 (social-evaluation, no/yes) randomized factorial design. After reading the instructions containing the experimental manipulation, subjects completed a thought-listing procedure based on Cacioppo & Petty (1981). Subjects were told that the researchers were interested in people’s thoughts and feelings just before taking the test on the computer. They were given 2.5 min to list all thoughts they had as they waited to take the computerized test. Subjects were given a sheet containing spaces for 12 thoughts and were instructed to write one idea or thought in each space. Although subjects were told to write down every thought they had in the “last few moments,” they were told not to worry if they didn’t fill every space. These thoughts were later rated for expressed

EVALUATION

AND

IDENTITY

ORIENTATION

517

apprehension. This procedure has been used in previous studies of evaluation apprehension and social anxiety with good results (e.g., Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979; Leary, Barnes, & Griebel, 1986; Leary et al., 1987). Subjects then completed a questionnaire containing self-report measures of anxiety and other items. Subjects indicated how concerned they were with doing well on the test, rated their nervousness on 12-point scales, and then rated themselves on 20 anxiety-relevant adjectives from the State Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Finally, a manipulation check item asked subjects who would see their test scores and asked them to check one of the four possible conditions. After completing these items, subjects were informed that they would not be taking the test after all, and were thoroughly debriefed, with the rationale behind the study and all deceptions explained in detail.

RESULTS Reliability

and Manipulation

Check Data

AZQ data. The interitem reliabilities of the Personal Identity and Social Identity subscales of the AIQ were acceptably high; Cronbach’s (Y coefficient was .73 for personal identity and .82 for social identity. The two scales correlated .34, p < .OOl. Manipulation check. All but 4 of the 160 subjects correctly answered the question that asked how their tests would be scored. Thus, the selfevaluation and social-evaluation manipulations appear to have induced the desired perceptions. Performance expectations. We were concerned initially that personal or social identity might correlate with performance expectations on the test, thereby obfuscating whatever results were obtained. However, no effects of any of the manipulated or measured factors, singly or in interaction, were obtained on the question asking subjects how intelligent the test would show they were, all ps > .20. Cognitive Apprehension

Two judges independently rated subjects’ thoughts on the thoughtlisting measure for expressed apprehension or anxiety from 0 to 3 (0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high). When summed across thoughts for each subject, the judges’ ratings correlated 90, indicating high interrater reliability. The total apprehension score was divided by the number of thoughts listed by the subject to yield the average apprehension expressed per thought. This apprehension index was analyzed in a multiple regression analysis that utilized self-evaluation (no/yes), social-evaluation (no/yes), personal identity, social identity, and all possible interactions as predictor variables. (All analyses were performed on standardized data.) Each main effect and interaction was tested while partialing out all effects with which it was confounded (i.e., all effects of equal or lower order; see Cohen & Cohen, 1975).

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TABLE EFFECTS

OF SELF-EVALUATION,

AL.

I

SOCIAL-EVALUATION. APPREHENSIVE

AND PERSONAL

IDENWY

ON

THOUGHTS

Social-evaluation No

Yes

Self-evaluation

Personal identity

No

Yes

No

Low High

I.8 I.60

I.7,, -L,,

I.%, 1.7,

Self-evaluation Yes ?.3,, 7.1,

Note. Numbers can range from 0 (no apprehension) to 3 (high apprehension). Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly by tests of simple effects. ps i 45.

The regression analyses obtained significant main effects of social identity, F(1, 144) = 5.44, p < .02, and self-evaluation, F( 1, 144) = 6.82, p < .Ol, and a significant interaction of self-evaluation x social-evaluation x personal identity, F (1, 144) = 4.43, p < .04. First, social identity was positively associated with apprehension, I’ = .12. Second, the main effect of self-evaluation showed that subjects who expected to see their scores (M = 2.0) expressed greater apprehension than those who did not expect to see their scores (M = I .7). replicating Leary et al. (1986). Thesignificantthree-wayinteractionofself-evaluation,social-evaluation, and personal identity is shown in Table I. Although the data were analyzed via multiple regression analyses to maintain the continuity of the AIQ scores, median splits were performed on the two scales and “cell” means were calculated to facilitate presentation of the interaction results. Tests of simple main effects revealed that, when there was no socialevaluation, the prospect of personally receiving feedback about one’s performance increased apprehension for subjects who were high in personal identity, p < .05, but not for subjects who were low in personal identity. However, when a social-evaluation was to occur, both low and high personal identity subjects expressed greater apprehension when they would also see their scores than when they would not see their scores, p’s < .05. Also, subjects who scored high in personal identity expressed greater apprehension than those who scored low in the face of selfevaluative feedback only when there was no social-evaluation, p < .05. In addition to these effects, the social-evaluation x social identity interaction approached significance, F (I, 144) = 2.76. p < .10. Because this effect was explicitly predicted, we examined it even though it did not reach a conventional level of significance. The pattern was precisely as expected: subjects who were low in social identity were unaffected

EVALUATION

AND

IDENTITY TABLE

EFFECTS

OF SELF-EVALUATION

519

ORIENTATION

2

AND SOCIAL-EVALUATION ABOUT THE TEST

ON SELF-REPORTED

CONCERN

Social-evaluation No

Self-evaluation No Yes

5. I,,.,, 7.2,

Yes 6.5,, 6.3

Nofe. Responses were on a l2-point scale. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly by tests of simple main effects, ps < .05.

by the social-evaluation (MS = 1.8 and 1.7 when a social-evaluation would vs would not occur, respectively), F( 1. 144) = .06, p > 30. However, subjects high in social identity expressed more apprehension when facing a social-evaluation (M = 2.2) than when no one else would see their scores (A4 = 1.8). F(1, 144) = 6.68, p < .Ol. Self-Reported

Concern and Anxiety

The item asking subjects how concerned they were with doing well on the test revealed main effects of self-evaluation, F(1, 144) = 7.18, p < .Ol; social identity, F(1, 144) = 29.73, p < .Ol; and personal identity, F( 1, 144) = 4.63, p < .04, which were qualified by three significant twoway interactions. We will discuss each of these interactions in turn. First, the self-evaluation x social-evaluation interaction, shown in Table 2, replicated the pattern obtained by Leary et al. (1987), F(1, 144) = 5.04, p < .03. Compared to the no-evaluation condition, either a selfevaluation, F( 1, 144) = 14.58, p < .Ol, or a social-evaluation, F( 1, 144) = 3.99, p < .05, significantly increased evaluative concern. However, the presence of both types of evaluation induced no more concern than either one alone. Second, the social-evaluation x social identity interaction, F(1, 144) = 12.34, p < .OOl, confirmed the prediction that subjects high in social identity would be more concerned about the test than low social identity subjects only when others would see their scores (see Table 3). When others would not see their scores (i.e., no social evaluation would occur), subjects low and high in social identity did not differ significantly, F(1, 144) = 1.65, p > .20. However, in the social-evaluation condition, high social identity subjects were significantly more concerned about performance than low social identity subjects, F(1, 144) = 20.99, p < .OOOl. Finally, an unpredicted social-evaluation x personal identity interaction was obtained on this item, F(1, 144) = 5.80, p < .02. Inspection of means in Table 4 suggests that being high in personal identity may buffer

520

BARNES

TABLE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL

IDENTITY

ET

AL.

3

AND SOCIAL-EVALUATION ABOUT THE TEST

ON SELF-REPORTED

CONCERN

Social-evaluation Social identity

No

Yes

Low High

5.8

4.1,

6.6,

8.L.h

Note. Responses were on a If-point scale. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly by tests of simple main effects, ps < .OS.

people against potential threats to social esteem. Whereas subjects who scored low in personal identity expressed greater concern when others would see their scores than when others would not see their scores, p < .05, high personal identity subjects did not differ significantly as a function of social-evaluation, p > .40. Furthermore, low and high personal identity subjects did not react differently when no social-evaluation would occur, but subjects who were low in personal identity expressed significantly more concern than those who were high in personal identity when their scores would be seen by others, p < .05. Contrary to predictions, personal identity did not moderate reactions to personally receiving self-evaluative feedback. Only main effects of personal identity, F(1, 144) = 4.17, p < .04, and social identity, F(1, 144) p < .Ol, were obtained on the Trait Anxiety Scale. Personal identity correlated negatively with anxiety (r = - .07), whereas social identity correlated positively with anxiety (r = .20). Identical effects were obtained on the single-item measure of relaxation-nervousness. Personal identity correlated - .16 with nervousness, F(1, 144) = 8.48, p < .Ol; social identity correlated .08 with nervousness, F(1, 144) = 4.45, p < .04. TABLE EFFECTS OF PERSONAL

IDENTITY

4

AND SOCIAL EVALUATION ABOUT THE TEST

ON SELF-REPORTED

CONCERN

Social-evaluation Personal identity

No

Yes

Low High

6.0, 6.3

7.L

5.6,

Note. Responses were on a 12-point scale. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly by tests of simple main effects, ps < .OS.

EVALUATION

AND

IDENTITY

ORIENTATION

521

DISCUSSION

Our results show clearly that personal and social identity moderate reactions to self- and social-evaluations. The data demonstrate the usefulness of distinguishing between personal and social identity orientations (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Sampson, 1978), support the validity of the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (Cheek, 1982), and provide insight into the moderating effects of identity orientations on reactions to self-relevant feedback. As expected, subjects who defined themselves in terms of socially relevant attributes were more threatened by the possibility of making an unfavorable impression on others than subjects who did not base their identity as strongly on social factors. Subjects who scored high in social identity reported more apprehension and concern when others would see their scores, whereas subjects low in social identity did not respond differentially as a function of social-evaluation. Furthermore, subjects high in social identity expressed greater concern than those low in social identity only when their performance was public. Because their relationships with others form the basis of their sense of self, people whose identities are socially based become concerned when events may undermine their public identities. The findings regarding personal identity were less straightforward and not fully consistent with predictions. On the thought-listing data, personal identity moderated reactions to self-evaluation only when there was no social-evaluation, as predicted. However, when another person would see their scores, both low and high personal identity subjects expressed greater apprehension when they personally would receive performance feedback than when they would not receive feedback. One interpretation of this finding involves the effects of public, social events on private self-esteem. Social events, including others’ evaluations, have the potential to increase and decrease private self-esteem. Indeed, some have suggested that, aside from whatever effects it has on one’s interpersonal concerns, public scrutiny serves to intensify threats to private self-esteem per se. Self-awareness theory, for example, posits that public scrutiny causes people to compare salient aspects of self with personal standards, often resulting in lowered self-esteem (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). Thus, imagined social failures not only damage one’s social esteem, but may lower private self-esteem as well (Baumeister & Tice, 1986; Schlenker, 1985). This is one reason why it is often difficult to distinguish the effects of private and public ego-threats (see Tetlock & Manstead, 198.5). The pattern obtained on the thought-listing measure suggests that subjects who scored high in personal identity were bothered by purely private

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feedback, whereas those who scored low in personal identity were not. However, both lows and highs were concerned when both they and the researcher would see their scores. One way of interpreting this is that low personal identity subjects have a higher threshold for potential threats to private self-esteem than those high in personal identity. Whereas purely private feedback triggered apprehensive thoughts among subjects with a personal identity orientation, both types of evaluation were needed to exceed the “ego-threat threshold” for those who were low in personal identity. Contrary to our expectations, personal identity did not moderate the effects of private self-evaluation on concerns about doing well on the test. However, the unexpected personal identity by social-evaluation interaction suggested that being high in personal identity may buffeer people against the ego-threat associated with social-evaluation. This finding is consistent with Rogers (1959) and others who suggest that a strong personal identity renders one less susceptible to social influences. Research on other “inner” psychological orientations, such as private self-consciousness (Scheier, 1980) and low self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987), has obtained similar findings. Much has been written recently about the usefulness of attempting to distinguish between private, intrapsychic self-processes and public, social self-processes. The distinction has been attacked on both conceptual (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987) and methodological grounds (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Although we agree that problems exist with the way public and private self-processes are often conceptualized and studied, the present study supports the utility of the distinction by showing that public self-relevant feedback and private self-relevant feedback have different effects on people characterized by different identity orientations. Furthermore, the fact that the self- and social-evaluations did, in fact, produce different effects suggests that attempts to distinguish between them are not as futile as some have suggested (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985; see, also, Leary et al., 1986). Whereas most previous studies that have attempted to distinguish between public and private threats have manipulated the publicity of subjects’ responses to the ego-threat, the present study manipulated the publicity of the evaluation itself. Although it is true that potential, real, and imagined threats to social-esteem can affect self-esteem and vice versa, the data suggest that the paradigm used here allows us to meaningfully distinguish between reactions to public and private evaluations. REFERENCES Axsom, D. (in press.) A contextualist approach impression management models of behavior.

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AND IDENTITY ORIENTATION

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