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Small group adaptation to unprogrammed change
O"RC~ANIZATIONAL BEIIAVIOR AND HUMAbI PERFOR1VLAI%CE 2 ,
73--83 (1967)
Small Group Adaptation to Unprogrammed Change ~ ORLA-N'DO BEHLING,
NICOLAS
COADY,
AND
TED
G. HOPPLE
The Ohio State University One of the least understood phenomena in task-oriented team performance is the manner of adjustment to unprogrammed changes. These may be defined as changes emanating from forces exogenous to the group or as a result of unanticipated forces within the group. This study investigated the way in which teams detect and compensate for such changes. Through an introduction o~ experimental confederates into task-
oriented work teams, it was possible to manipulate various aspects of the adjustmental process and to determine that the nature of the change and the pattern of attack on the problem employed by the team influenced their ability to adjust to unprogrammed change. There were no significant effects on adjustment found attributable to variations in the number of successful applications of an original decision rule. Nor was any effect found which could be ascribed to the interaction of the nature of the deviation from the original rule and the number of successful applications of the rule. Team success in developing compensatory decision rules when confronted with unprogrammed change was correlated with the ease of development of the original decision rule. No evidence of a relationship between absolute scores on the flexibility scale of the California Psychological Inventory and role taken by individual team members was found. Since t h e classic s t u d y b y Coch a n d F r e n c h (1948), i n d u s t r i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s a n d sociologists h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o n s i d e r a b l e b o d y of e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d sources of r e s i s t a n c e to c h a n g e a m o n g m e m b e r s of t a s k - o r i e n t e d groups or t e a m s . Coch a n d F r e n c h f o u n d t h a t a n i m p e n d i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n could be a c c o m o d a t e d w i t h a m i n i m u m of d i s r u p t i o n if w o r k t e a m m e m b e r s or t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e p l a n n i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e change. T h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n called for a m i n i m u m of role d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e t e a m . T h a t is, t h e m o s t effective a d j u s t m e n t s were m a d e w h e r e t h e s u p e r v i s o r b e c a m e e s s e n t i a l l y a n o t h e r m e m b e r of t h e t e a m . U n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s t e a m efficiency a n d m e m b e r s a t i s f a c t i o n were higher t h a n those w i t h i n a c o n t r o l group. T h e l a t t e r 1This study was performed under terms of a research grant from the Social Science Program of The Mershon Center for Education in National Security. 73
74
BEHLING~ COADYt AND HOPPLF~
faced the change with maximum differentiation between an autocratic leadership role and subordinate roles. Later studies have in large part supported the hypothesis that a low degree of role differentiation leads to greater productivity. Lawrence and Smith (1955) found that work groups participating in decisions concerning production objectives showed significantly higher increases in output relative to groups engaging in similar discussions but without the establishment of work goals. Studies such as these have prompted Rensis Likert (1961) to state that "within the range of participation that ordinarily exists in the organization, the greater the amount of participation the greater tends to be the productivity of the unit and the satisfaction of its members." This brief survey might be seen to reflect the basic tenet that the greatest possible differentiation in work group roles during adjustment to change results in a minimal disruption of the groups' performance. In summary Vroom (1964) states, When the entire pattern of results is considered, we find substantial
basis for the belief that participation in decision making increases produetivity. There is experimental and correlational evidence indicating that high levels of influence by workers in making decisions that they are to carry out results in higher productivity than low levels of influence. While there is little question that this represents an important contribution of the behavioral sciences to the practice of .management, the general applicability of the results has yet to be demonstrated. Most of the studies have been concerned with only one type of change: that type in which the major elements of the change are specified and controlled by a member or members of the group designated to perform that function. Such changes may be called "programmed changes." While the study of such programmed changes has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the processes which occur within taskoriented work groups, a second category of changes which offers promise of equal or greater contribution has remained almost totally unexplored. This category, which includes those changes resulting from factors outside the control of group members or under the control of group members not formally or informally recognized as change agents by group members may be called "unprogrammed changes." In many ways an understanding of unprogrammed changes and of the ways in which task-oriented work teams adjust to them may represent a substantial advance on our understanding of factors that influence work team effectiveness. Two reasons may be offered to support such a statement. First, unprogrammed changes are probably far more numerous than are programmed changes. Though it is difficult to make any meaningful comparisons of the relative magnitudes of impact on team per-
UNBROGRAXIMED CHANGE
75
formance, it is obvious that the effects of unprogrammed changes can be substantial, if only because they are more frequent. Second, the exploration of the processes by which individuals and teams adjust to unprogrammed changes niay represent an important contribution to knowledge in that it may well provide the link by which nmeh of the research which has been performed on task-oriented groups may be related to the expanding body of knowledge of adaptive systems in general. The failure to investigate the manner in which such unprogrammed changes are detected and compensated for seems to be an unfortunate by-product of the scramble to explore and exploit the more immediately fruitful area of programmed change. This is not the only reason, however. It appears that the reluctance of experimenters to explore this area has been due at least in part to the lack of an adequate methodology which could be used to examine this aspect of task-oriented team behavior. Hall (1957) reported on an experimental task which offered some promise, but which involved a fairly complex instrumentation and was somewhat limited in its flexibility. It was not until 1960 that Leavitt (though he states that Bavelas began work on the technique several years previously), first reported on a technique, called the Commort Target Game, which afforded an effective entry to this area. This technique, or more accurately, experimental task, provides a basis for the controlled laboratory study of how decision rules governing individual member contributions to the efforts of task-oriented groups develop and of how they are modified in response to unprogrammcd changes. This study represents an attempt to use an adaptation of the original Common Target Game to provide an understanding of how unprotrammed changes are detected and compensated for; to determine what factors influence group effectiveness in dealing with these changes and how this adjustmental process differs from that for programmed changes. The specific hypotheses tested are: 1. There is a positive correlation between the rapidity with which teams develop an original, workable set of decision rules covering member contributions and the rapidity with which teams will successfully detect and deal with unprogrammed changes requiring modifications of such decision rules. In other words, there is a single factor or set of factors present in teams which determines their effectiveness in the establishment of successful decision rules, regardless of whether they are formed in response to a lack of structm'e in relations among the team members or designed to compensate for unprogrammed changes. 2. The rapidity with which teams detect and successfully compensate
76
BEI-ILING~ COADY~ AND HOPPLN
for unprogrammed changes will correlate positively with the degree of differentiation of tasks among members. Where teams have similar degrees of task differentiation among members, effective compensatory behavior will be proportional to the total number of shifts in rule shown by the two team members. 3. The nature of differentiation of tasks within teams is dependent upon personal characteristics of team members. Specifically, it is dependent upon "the adaptability of a person's thinldng and social behavior" as measured by the flexibility scale (Fx) of the California Psyehological Inventory (1964). 4. There is a negative correlation between the number of successful pre-ehange applications of a decision role covering member contributions and the rapidity with which teams will discover and successfully adjust to unprogrammed changes, that is, there is an interference effect resulting from previous learning which detracts from the ability of team members to detect unprogrammed changes and to compensate for them. This interference is, within the limits of this study, directly proportional to the number of reinforcements of the original decision rule (for a general discussion of this phenomenon, see Woodworth, 1964). METHOD A total of 54 three-member teams participated in the study. Each team consisted of two naive subjects selected from among male junior and senior volunteers enrolled in the College of Commerce and Administration. The third member of each team was, unknown to the other two team members, an experimental confederate. The experimental task was a modification of the Common Target Game. In this modification for each of a total of 50 training and experimental trials, the experimenter verbally presented the team with a target number. This number was randomly selected from a list of three digit numbers evenly divisible by three. None of the target numbers was repeated for any one team. Each team ,member was required, without communicating with the other members, to write down on an estimaterecording sheet a number which, when added to those written down by the other team members, would equal the target number. The experimenter added the numbers and then verbally reported to the team members the total and an indication of whether the sum of the three numbers did or did not equal the target number. He then proeeeded to the next trial. Each subieet was guaranteed $1.00 for participating in the experiment and in addition each received $.05 every time the team made a correct estimate. During the pre-experimental trials the confederate, as instructed,
UNPROGRA.LV-[MED CHA.NGE
77
always chose one-third of the target number as his share. Eventually in all teams the other two members also chose one-third of the target number resulting in what has been designated as an "equal thirds" decision rule. A total of nine conditions were imposed on six teams each by varying the point at which, and the manner in which, the confederate deviated from this established equal thirds decision rule. Through coded marks appearing on his estimate-recording sheet, the confederate was instructed to deviate after 3, 9, or 15 reinforcements (consecutive, successful applications of the equal thirds decision rule) and was also given information as to whether he should take as his share one-quarter, onehalf, or two-thirds of the target number during the experimental trials. These three fractions were ehosen on the basis of pilot studies which revealed that they were of respectively low, medium and high ease of detection. Measures were made of (a) the number of trials required by each team to develop the equal thirds decision rule and to demonstrate this by three consecutive successful applications of the rule, (b) the number of correct estimates within 20 trials after the confederate's deviation t~rom the equal thirds decision rule, and (c) the frequency of shifts in percentage of target numbers taken by individual subjects after confederate deviations. In addition, scores on the flexibility scale (Fx) of the California Psychological Inventory were obtained for 78 of the 108 subjects. RESULTS A variety of statistical analyses were performed to determine the effects of certain independent variables on (a) the quality of team per:formanee as measured by the number of correct team estimates in the 20 trials immediately following the confederate deviation from the equal thirds decision rule and (b) the nature of individual attempts to develop new decision rules after the confederate deviation. The nature of individual attempts to develop compensatory decision rules was determined by examination of the number of shifts in percentage of the target number taken as the individual's share during the 20 trials immediately following the confederate deviation from the equal thirds decision rule. Where a team was successful in developing an adequate compensatory decision rule within 20 trials immediately following the subject shift, an extrapolation of the number of shifts was made in order to obtain comparable figures. In addition analyses were performed to determine if partieular modes of team attack were significantly more effective than others in terms of
78
BEHLING~ COADY~ AND HOPPLE
performance quality in the 20 trials immediately following the deviation from the rule. In all cases the .01 level of significance was employed.
Effects of Independent Variables on Quality of Team Performance The three major variables investigated in terms of their relationship to quality of t e a m performance were (a) the number of reinforcements, (b) the nature of confederate deviation, and (c) the number of trials required to attain five consecutive successful applications of the original equal thirds decision rule. TABLE 1 MEAN ~UMBER OF CORRECT t:[ESPONSES WITHIN 20 TRIALS AFTER THE CONFEDERATE DEVIATION FOR TEAMS OPERATING UNDER THE ~INE COMBINATIONS OF VARYING ~UMBERS OF I~EINFORCEMENTS AND ~ATURE OF CONFEDERATE DEVIATION
Nature of confederate deviation No, of reinforcements prior to confederate deviation
From 1/3 to 1/4 of total
From 1/3 to 1/2 of total
From 1/3 to 2/3 of total
Mean
3 9 15 Mean
1.33 0.00 .17 .50
6.00 .83 6.33 4.38
5.33 11.17 8.00 8.17
4.22 4.00 4.83 4.35
The mean number of correct responses for the nine groups of six t e a m s each operating under the various experimental conditions is shown in T a b l e 1. An analysis of variance (Table 2) was performed to determine the statistical significance of the differences found. The variations attributable to the effects of varying the number of reinforcements was not statistically significant, nor was the variance attributable to the interaction of reinforcements with the nature of the shift. Variation attributable to the changes in nature of confederate shift were significan~ at the .001 level. A subsequent application of the New Multiple Range TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EFFECTS OF I~EINFORCEMENTS AND NATURE OF CONFEDERATE DEVIATION ON QUALITY OF TEAM ~ERFORMANCE DURING THE TWENTY TRIALS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CONFEDERATE DEVIATION Source Reinforcements N a t u r e of Shift Reinforcements X n a t u r e
Error p
=
,001,
df
MS
F
2 2 4
6.67 264.52 54.02
-13.93 ~ 2.84
45
18.99
~NPROGRAM~ CHAN~
79
Test (Duncan, 1957) revealed that differences among the three conditions were significant at the .01 level, The relationship betweeen number of trials required to obtain the five consecutive successful applications of the original equal thirds decision rule and the number of correct estimates within 20 trials after confederate deviation was deteermined by the calculation of a Pearson r. These calculations yielded a value of --.23 which, when tested by Student's t with 52 degrees of freedom, is significant at the .001 level. Thus, again in terms of this experiment, the rapidity with which the original decision rule was developed correlated positively with the rapidity with which an adequate compensatory rule was developed.
Ef]ects o] Independent Variables on Team-Member Method o] Attack The effects of the nature of the confederate deviation and of the number of reinforcements on the way in which the individual members responded to the task of developing an adequate compensatory decision rule were studied. The average numbers of shifts for the twelve individuals in each of the nine experimental groups are shown in Table 3. An analysis of variance was performed and no statistically significant effects were found in this aspect of the study. TABLE 3 AVER.aGE NUMBER OF SHIFTS EXTRAPOLATED TO 20 TRIALS FOR EFFECTS OF I~EINFORCEMENTS AND MATURE OF CONFEDERATE DEVIATION~ BY INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
Nature of confederate deviation No. of reinforcements prior to confederate deviation
From 1/3 to 1/4 of target No.
From 1/3 to 1/2 of target No.
From 1/3 to 2/3 of target No.
Mean
3 9 15
5.16 2.92 3.42
6.16 3.75 5.00
4.83 7.00 6.50
5.38 4.56 4.97
3.83
4.97
6.11
4.97
Mean
An examination was made of the relationship between scores on the flexibility scale (F~) of the California Psychological Inventory and the number of individual subject shifts. Scores were obtained for 78 of the 108 subjects in the experiment and a Pearson r was calculated to determine the relationship between individual Fx scores and the number of shifts shown by the subject. The value (r = .04, df = 77) was not statistically significant. Thus, in terms of this experiment, absolute scores on this measure are not adequate predictors of the nature of indi-
80
BEHLING, COADY, AND HOPPLE
vidual response to the problem of developing adequate compensatory decision rules. It is interesting to note, however, that among 18 of the 25 teams for which Fx scale scores were available for both members of the team, the individual with the higher score on the Fx scale showed a greater number of shifts than did his partner.
Effects of Group Attack Pattern on Quality o] Group Per]ormanee To examine the effects of this variable on group performance, the teams were classified into six categories on the basis of the number of shifts ,made by members in percentage of the target number taken as their share in the 20 trials immediately following the confederate shift. These categories were (a) FF (Frequent-Frequent) in which both naive subjects made four or more shifts in percentage of target number taken as their share during the 20 trials, (b) CC (Change-Change) in which both naive subjects made at least one but not more than three shifts during the 20 trials, (c) NN (None-None) in which neither naive subject made a shift during the 20 trials, (d) FC (Frequent-Change) in which one subject made four or more shifts while the other made between one and three shifts, (e) FN (Frequent-None) in which one subject made four or more shifts during the 20 trials and the other made none, and (f) CN (Change-None) in which one naive subieet made between one and three shifts and the other made no shifts during the 20 trials. The mean number of successful estimates in the 20 trials following the confederate shift are shown in Table 4. TABLE 4 GROUP PERFORMANCE AS I~UMBER OF CORRECT ESTIMATES IN THE T0 TRIALS IMMEDIATELY FOLLO~,VING THE CONFEDERATE DEVIATION BY PATTERN OF INDIVIDUAL ATTACK
Pattern of attack
FF Mean No. of correct estimates 2.17 N 6
CC
NN
FC
FN
0.00 8
0.00 4
3.47 15
8.45 2O
CN 1.00 1
A chi-square ratio for a 1 by k table was calculated. The NN, CN, and CC categories were combined, in order to provide a minimum expeered frequency in every cell of greater than five. (X2 = 140.97, p .001, df = 3.) Subsequently calculated t ratios revealed that those teams employing the FN pattern of attack performed significantly better at the .01 level than did those teams employing any other attack in terms of number of successful estimates by the FF and FC groups, which, though signifi-
UNPROGR&MMED CHANGE
81
eantly more effective than the combined NN, CN, and CC groups, did not vary from one another to a statistically significant degree. DISCUSSION This study was performed in order to examine certain aspects of the process by which task-oriented teams detect and compensate for unprogrammed changes requiring modifications in the pattern of member contributions. A consideration of the implications of the results obtained, however, must be preceded by a recognition that the nature of the study places certain limitations on the generalizations which can be drawn from these results. First, the pre-experimentaI trials, while providing an opportunity for the development of an original decision rule, differ in some respects from the interactions by which work teams normally develop expectations as to other members' behavior. A far more complete and subtle set of appraisals are likely developed in such situations than were permitted in this experiment. The nature of their impact has not been fully explored. Further, restrictions on intra-group communications imposed during the experiment also tend to divorce this study from ,many situations in the "real" world by (a) preventing verbalization and overt agreement on a specific decision rule, a process which might well change the response of team members to an unprogrammed change and (b) making impossible the most logical and fruitful response to a suspected deviation from a decision rule, that is, direct inquiry of other members as to the nature of their actions. Despite these limitations, it is felt this study does yield some important information about development of compensatory decision rules. The study indicates that some understanding of team success in developing such rules is possible. The rapidity with which teams develop an original decision rule, the nature of the confederate deviation and the pattern of attack chosen by the team are all shown to be related to the rapidity with which the team develops an adequate compensatory decision rule. Further and of equal interest, within the limitations of this study, the number of reinforcements of the original decision rule showed no relationship to the rapidity with which the teams developed compensatory rules, nor were there any significant variations uncovered in the fashion in which deviations of varying natures interacted with number of reinforcements in determining the rapidity of development of a compensatory decision rule. The following implications may be considered. First, the significant effects of variations in the nature of the eonfedeJate deviation (from one-third of the target number as his share to
82
BEHLING~ COADY~AND HOPPLE
one-quarter, one-half, two-thirds of the target number) are of importance primarily because they verify that one of the conditions of the experiment, that a variety of levels of difficulty of problems be included, was met. The selection of these three deviations was based upon pilot runs. No explanation of why these three tasks varied in difficulty is offered here, though it appears that the concept of prominence as discussed by Leavitt (1960) offers a possible explanation of the processes underlying these differences. The absence of significant effects attributable to the number of reinforcements of the original decision rule represents one of the most interesting findings of this study. Obviously caution must be exercised in concluding that no differences exist merely because none were found in this particular experiment. These results do, however, tend to differ markedly from "common sense" conclusions which would indicate that the more times a particular decision rule had been applied successfully, the less likely would be a successful readjustment to an unprogrammed change. If these experimental results are supported in future research, it appears that much of current thought about the nature of patterns of adjustment in task-oriented groups will have to be revised to allow for the fact that either (a) the process of interference by previously learned patterns with the development of new patterns of behavior in individual human beings does not occur in situations where the learned pattern is concerned with decision rules in small groups or (b) the nature of the group interaction process is such that it blurs any measurement of an interference effect to the extent that it is no longer discernible in terms of measurements of group output. The significant negative correlation between the number of trials required to develop the original equal thirds decision rule and the number of correct estimates within 20 trials after the confederate deviation lends credence to the hypothesis that some common characteristic of the teams or of certain members of the teams determines their ability both to develop an original decision rule in response to a relatively unstructured situation and to detect and compensate for deviations from such rules. On the basis of this study, it appears that a crucial factor determining the ability of teams to adjust to unprogrammed changes is the nature of the approach chosen to the problem. Primarily it appears that those teams which showed the highest degree of role differentiation during the search process were most effective in developing an adequate compensatory decision rule. That is, those teams in which one member constantly held to the original equal thirds decision rule and the other shifted frequently in search of an adequate new rule were significantly more effective than any other group in rapidly developing and adequate eompensa-
UNPROGRAMMED CHANGE
~3
tory decision rule. Where role differentiation was less complete, ability to detect and compensate for unprogrammed change was progressively less. The only exception to this rule was that of the teams in which one member changed infrequently and the other not at all. This is, generally speaking, in line with our original hypothesis that those teams with a low total number of shifts will, other things being equal, be less effective in settling upon an adequate pattern of adjustment to an unprogrammed change. Successful adaptation to unprogra,mmed change then hinges, within the limitations of this study, upon a basically different approach from that required to successfully aeeomodate programmed change. Much of the research in the latter area supports the hypothesis that minimal role differentiation within the work group will contribute not only to increased member satisfaction with the group and the task but far more significantly for our purposes to heightened productivity. If both of these conclusions are demonstrated to be generally valid there must be an intermediate optimal degree of role differentiation which is desirable but which must be altered as the social environment surrounding the work team and the problems confronting it are modified. REFERENCES CALIFORNIAPSYCHOLOGICALINVENTORY.Revised ed. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1964. CocH, L., AND FRENCh, J. R. P., JR. Overcoming resistance to change. Human relations, 1948, 1, 521-522. D~NCAN, D. B. Multiple range and multiple F tests. Biometrics, March, 19.55, 11 (1), 1~2. HALL, R. L. Group performance under feedback that confounds responses of group members. Sociometry, 1957, 20, 297-305. LAWRENCE, LOIS C., AND SMITH, PATRICIA C. Group decision and employee pation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1955, 39, 334-337.
partici-
LI~AWTT, H. J. Task ordering and organizational development in the common target game. Behavio~'al s~ience, July, 1960, 5(3), 233-239. LEVINE, E., AND BUTLER, J. Lecture vs. group decision in changing behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 19'52, 3'6, 29-33. L:~KERT,1~. New patterns in management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. VR00M, V. H. Worl~ and motivation. New York: Wiley, 1964. WO'0~WORTH, R. W. Reinforcement and perceptual learning. In L. M. Stolurow (Ed.), Readings in learning. New York: Prentice Hall, 1953. RECEIVED:
June
20, 1966
73--83 (1967)
Small Group Adaptation to Unprogrammed Change ~ ORLA-N'DO BEHLING,
NICOLAS
COADY,
AND
TED
G. HOPPLE
The Ohio State University One of the least understood phenomena in task-oriented team performance is the manner of adjustment to unprogrammed changes. These may be defined as changes emanating from forces exogenous to the group or as a result of unanticipated forces within the group. This study investigated the way in which teams detect and compensate for such changes. Through an introduction o~ experimental confederates into task-
oriented work teams, it was possible to manipulate various aspects of the adjustmental process and to determine that the nature of the change and the pattern of attack on the problem employed by the team influenced their ability to adjust to unprogrammed change. There were no significant effects on adjustment found attributable to variations in the number of successful applications of an original decision rule. Nor was any effect found which could be ascribed to the interaction of the nature of the deviation from the original rule and the number of successful applications of the rule. Team success in developing compensatory decision rules when confronted with unprogrammed change was correlated with the ease of development of the original decision rule. No evidence of a relationship between absolute scores on the flexibility scale of the California Psychological Inventory and role taken by individual team members was found. Since t h e classic s t u d y b y Coch a n d F r e n c h (1948), i n d u s t r i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s a n d sociologists h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o n s i d e r a b l e b o d y of e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d sources of r e s i s t a n c e to c h a n g e a m o n g m e m b e r s of t a s k - o r i e n t e d groups or t e a m s . Coch a n d F r e n c h f o u n d t h a t a n i m p e n d i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n could be a c c o m o d a t e d w i t h a m i n i m u m of d i s r u p t i o n if w o r k t e a m m e m b e r s or t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e p l a n n i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e change. T h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n called for a m i n i m u m of role d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e t e a m . T h a t is, t h e m o s t effective a d j u s t m e n t s were m a d e w h e r e t h e s u p e r v i s o r b e c a m e e s s e n t i a l l y a n o t h e r m e m b e r of t h e t e a m . U n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s t e a m efficiency a n d m e m b e r s a t i s f a c t i o n were higher t h a n those w i t h i n a c o n t r o l group. T h e l a t t e r 1This study was performed under terms of a research grant from the Social Science Program of The Mershon Center for Education in National Security. 73
74
BEHLING~ COADYt AND HOPPLF~
faced the change with maximum differentiation between an autocratic leadership role and subordinate roles. Later studies have in large part supported the hypothesis that a low degree of role differentiation leads to greater productivity. Lawrence and Smith (1955) found that work groups participating in decisions concerning production objectives showed significantly higher increases in output relative to groups engaging in similar discussions but without the establishment of work goals. Studies such as these have prompted Rensis Likert (1961) to state that "within the range of participation that ordinarily exists in the organization, the greater the amount of participation the greater tends to be the productivity of the unit and the satisfaction of its members." This brief survey might be seen to reflect the basic tenet that the greatest possible differentiation in work group roles during adjustment to change results in a minimal disruption of the groups' performance. In summary Vroom (1964) states, When the entire pattern of results is considered, we find substantial
basis for the belief that participation in decision making increases produetivity. There is experimental and correlational evidence indicating that high levels of influence by workers in making decisions that they are to carry out results in higher productivity than low levels of influence. While there is little question that this represents an important contribution of the behavioral sciences to the practice of .management, the general applicability of the results has yet to be demonstrated. Most of the studies have been concerned with only one type of change: that type in which the major elements of the change are specified and controlled by a member or members of the group designated to perform that function. Such changes may be called "programmed changes." While the study of such programmed changes has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the processes which occur within taskoriented work groups, a second category of changes which offers promise of equal or greater contribution has remained almost totally unexplored. This category, which includes those changes resulting from factors outside the control of group members or under the control of group members not formally or informally recognized as change agents by group members may be called "unprogrammed changes." In many ways an understanding of unprogrammed changes and of the ways in which task-oriented work teams adjust to them may represent a substantial advance on our understanding of factors that influence work team effectiveness. Two reasons may be offered to support such a statement. First, unprogrammed changes are probably far more numerous than are programmed changes. Though it is difficult to make any meaningful comparisons of the relative magnitudes of impact on team per-
UNBROGRAXIMED CHANGE
75
formance, it is obvious that the effects of unprogrammed changes can be substantial, if only because they are more frequent. Second, the exploration of the processes by which individuals and teams adjust to unprogrammed changes niay represent an important contribution to knowledge in that it may well provide the link by which nmeh of the research which has been performed on task-oriented groups may be related to the expanding body of knowledge of adaptive systems in general. The failure to investigate the manner in which such unprogrammed changes are detected and compensated for seems to be an unfortunate by-product of the scramble to explore and exploit the more immediately fruitful area of programmed change. This is not the only reason, however. It appears that the reluctance of experimenters to explore this area has been due at least in part to the lack of an adequate methodology which could be used to examine this aspect of task-oriented team behavior. Hall (1957) reported on an experimental task which offered some promise, but which involved a fairly complex instrumentation and was somewhat limited in its flexibility. It was not until 1960 that Leavitt (though he states that Bavelas began work on the technique several years previously), first reported on a technique, called the Commort Target Game, which afforded an effective entry to this area. This technique, or more accurately, experimental task, provides a basis for the controlled laboratory study of how decision rules governing individual member contributions to the efforts of task-oriented groups develop and of how they are modified in response to unprogrammcd changes. This study represents an attempt to use an adaptation of the original Common Target Game to provide an understanding of how unprotrammed changes are detected and compensated for; to determine what factors influence group effectiveness in dealing with these changes and how this adjustmental process differs from that for programmed changes. The specific hypotheses tested are: 1. There is a positive correlation between the rapidity with which teams develop an original, workable set of decision rules covering member contributions and the rapidity with which teams will successfully detect and deal with unprogrammed changes requiring modifications of such decision rules. In other words, there is a single factor or set of factors present in teams which determines their effectiveness in the establishment of successful decision rules, regardless of whether they are formed in response to a lack of structm'e in relations among the team members or designed to compensate for unprogrammed changes. 2. The rapidity with which teams detect and successfully compensate
76
BEI-ILING~ COADY~ AND HOPPLN
for unprogrammed changes will correlate positively with the degree of differentiation of tasks among members. Where teams have similar degrees of task differentiation among members, effective compensatory behavior will be proportional to the total number of shifts in rule shown by the two team members. 3. The nature of differentiation of tasks within teams is dependent upon personal characteristics of team members. Specifically, it is dependent upon "the adaptability of a person's thinldng and social behavior" as measured by the flexibility scale (Fx) of the California Psyehological Inventory (1964). 4. There is a negative correlation between the number of successful pre-ehange applications of a decision role covering member contributions and the rapidity with which teams will discover and successfully adjust to unprogrammed changes, that is, there is an interference effect resulting from previous learning which detracts from the ability of team members to detect unprogrammed changes and to compensate for them. This interference is, within the limits of this study, directly proportional to the number of reinforcements of the original decision rule (for a general discussion of this phenomenon, see Woodworth, 1964). METHOD A total of 54 three-member teams participated in the study. Each team consisted of two naive subjects selected from among male junior and senior volunteers enrolled in the College of Commerce and Administration. The third member of each team was, unknown to the other two team members, an experimental confederate. The experimental task was a modification of the Common Target Game. In this modification for each of a total of 50 training and experimental trials, the experimenter verbally presented the team with a target number. This number was randomly selected from a list of three digit numbers evenly divisible by three. None of the target numbers was repeated for any one team. Each team ,member was required, without communicating with the other members, to write down on an estimaterecording sheet a number which, when added to those written down by the other team members, would equal the target number. The experimenter added the numbers and then verbally reported to the team members the total and an indication of whether the sum of the three numbers did or did not equal the target number. He then proeeeded to the next trial. Each subieet was guaranteed $1.00 for participating in the experiment and in addition each received $.05 every time the team made a correct estimate. During the pre-experimental trials the confederate, as instructed,
UNPROGRA.LV-[MED CHA.NGE
77
always chose one-third of the target number as his share. Eventually in all teams the other two members also chose one-third of the target number resulting in what has been designated as an "equal thirds" decision rule. A total of nine conditions were imposed on six teams each by varying the point at which, and the manner in which, the confederate deviated from this established equal thirds decision rule. Through coded marks appearing on his estimate-recording sheet, the confederate was instructed to deviate after 3, 9, or 15 reinforcements (consecutive, successful applications of the equal thirds decision rule) and was also given information as to whether he should take as his share one-quarter, onehalf, or two-thirds of the target number during the experimental trials. These three fractions were ehosen on the basis of pilot studies which revealed that they were of respectively low, medium and high ease of detection. Measures were made of (a) the number of trials required by each team to develop the equal thirds decision rule and to demonstrate this by three consecutive successful applications of the rule, (b) the number of correct estimates within 20 trials after the confederate's deviation t~rom the equal thirds decision rule, and (c) the frequency of shifts in percentage of target numbers taken by individual subjects after confederate deviations. In addition, scores on the flexibility scale (Fx) of the California Psychological Inventory were obtained for 78 of the 108 subjects. RESULTS A variety of statistical analyses were performed to determine the effects of certain independent variables on (a) the quality of team per:formanee as measured by the number of correct team estimates in the 20 trials immediately following the confederate deviation from the equal thirds decision rule and (b) the nature of individual attempts to develop new decision rules after the confederate deviation. The nature of individual attempts to develop compensatory decision rules was determined by examination of the number of shifts in percentage of the target number taken as the individual's share during the 20 trials immediately following the confederate deviation from the equal thirds decision rule. Where a team was successful in developing an adequate compensatory decision rule within 20 trials immediately following the subject shift, an extrapolation of the number of shifts was made in order to obtain comparable figures. In addition analyses were performed to determine if partieular modes of team attack were significantly more effective than others in terms of
78
BEHLING~ COADY~ AND HOPPLE
performance quality in the 20 trials immediately following the deviation from the rule. In all cases the .01 level of significance was employed.
Effects of Independent Variables on Quality of Team Performance The three major variables investigated in terms of their relationship to quality of t e a m performance were (a) the number of reinforcements, (b) the nature of confederate deviation, and (c) the number of trials required to attain five consecutive successful applications of the original equal thirds decision rule. TABLE 1 MEAN ~UMBER OF CORRECT t:[ESPONSES WITHIN 20 TRIALS AFTER THE CONFEDERATE DEVIATION FOR TEAMS OPERATING UNDER THE ~INE COMBINATIONS OF VARYING ~UMBERS OF I~EINFORCEMENTS AND ~ATURE OF CONFEDERATE DEVIATION
Nature of confederate deviation No, of reinforcements prior to confederate deviation
From 1/3 to 1/4 of total
From 1/3 to 1/2 of total
From 1/3 to 2/3 of total
Mean
3 9 15 Mean
1.33 0.00 .17 .50
6.00 .83 6.33 4.38
5.33 11.17 8.00 8.17
4.22 4.00 4.83 4.35
The mean number of correct responses for the nine groups of six t e a m s each operating under the various experimental conditions is shown in T a b l e 1. An analysis of variance (Table 2) was performed to determine the statistical significance of the differences found. The variations attributable to the effects of varying the number of reinforcements was not statistically significant, nor was the variance attributable to the interaction of reinforcements with the nature of the shift. Variation attributable to the changes in nature of confederate shift were significan~ at the .001 level. A subsequent application of the New Multiple Range TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EFFECTS OF I~EINFORCEMENTS AND NATURE OF CONFEDERATE DEVIATION ON QUALITY OF TEAM ~ERFORMANCE DURING THE TWENTY TRIALS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CONFEDERATE DEVIATION Source Reinforcements N a t u r e of Shift Reinforcements X n a t u r e
Error p
=
,001,
df
MS
F
2 2 4
6.67 264.52 54.02
-13.93 ~ 2.84
45
18.99
~NPROGRAM~ CHAN~
79
Test (Duncan, 1957) revealed that differences among the three conditions were significant at the .01 level, The relationship betweeen number of trials required to obtain the five consecutive successful applications of the original equal thirds decision rule and the number of correct estimates within 20 trials after confederate deviation was deteermined by the calculation of a Pearson r. These calculations yielded a value of --.23 which, when tested by Student's t with 52 degrees of freedom, is significant at the .001 level. Thus, again in terms of this experiment, the rapidity with which the original decision rule was developed correlated positively with the rapidity with which an adequate compensatory rule was developed.
Ef]ects o] Independent Variables on Team-Member Method o] Attack The effects of the nature of the confederate deviation and of the number of reinforcements on the way in which the individual members responded to the task of developing an adequate compensatory decision rule were studied. The average numbers of shifts for the twelve individuals in each of the nine experimental groups are shown in Table 3. An analysis of variance was performed and no statistically significant effects were found in this aspect of the study. TABLE 3 AVER.aGE NUMBER OF SHIFTS EXTRAPOLATED TO 20 TRIALS FOR EFFECTS OF I~EINFORCEMENTS AND MATURE OF CONFEDERATE DEVIATION~ BY INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
Nature of confederate deviation No. of reinforcements prior to confederate deviation
From 1/3 to 1/4 of target No.
From 1/3 to 1/2 of target No.
From 1/3 to 2/3 of target No.
Mean
3 9 15
5.16 2.92 3.42
6.16 3.75 5.00
4.83 7.00 6.50
5.38 4.56 4.97
3.83
4.97
6.11
4.97
Mean
An examination was made of the relationship between scores on the flexibility scale (F~) of the California Psychological Inventory and the number of individual subject shifts. Scores were obtained for 78 of the 108 subjects in the experiment and a Pearson r was calculated to determine the relationship between individual Fx scores and the number of shifts shown by the subject. The value (r = .04, df = 77) was not statistically significant. Thus, in terms of this experiment, absolute scores on this measure are not adequate predictors of the nature of indi-
80
BEHLING, COADY, AND HOPPLE
vidual response to the problem of developing adequate compensatory decision rules. It is interesting to note, however, that among 18 of the 25 teams for which Fx scale scores were available for both members of the team, the individual with the higher score on the Fx scale showed a greater number of shifts than did his partner.
Effects of Group Attack Pattern on Quality o] Group Per]ormanee To examine the effects of this variable on group performance, the teams were classified into six categories on the basis of the number of shifts ,made by members in percentage of the target number taken as their share in the 20 trials immediately following the confederate shift. These categories were (a) FF (Frequent-Frequent) in which both naive subjects made four or more shifts in percentage of target number taken as their share during the 20 trials, (b) CC (Change-Change) in which both naive subjects made at least one but not more than three shifts during the 20 trials, (c) NN (None-None) in which neither naive subject made a shift during the 20 trials, (d) FC (Frequent-Change) in which one subject made four or more shifts while the other made between one and three shifts, (e) FN (Frequent-None) in which one subject made four or more shifts during the 20 trials and the other made none, and (f) CN (Change-None) in which one naive subieet made between one and three shifts and the other made no shifts during the 20 trials. The mean number of successful estimates in the 20 trials following the confederate shift are shown in Table 4. TABLE 4 GROUP PERFORMANCE AS I~UMBER OF CORRECT ESTIMATES IN THE T0 TRIALS IMMEDIATELY FOLLO~,VING THE CONFEDERATE DEVIATION BY PATTERN OF INDIVIDUAL ATTACK
Pattern of attack
FF Mean No. of correct estimates 2.17 N 6
CC
NN
FC
FN
0.00 8
0.00 4
3.47 15
8.45 2O
CN 1.00 1
A chi-square ratio for a 1 by k table was calculated. The NN, CN, and CC categories were combined, in order to provide a minimum expeered frequency in every cell of greater than five. (X2 = 140.97, p .001, df = 3.) Subsequently calculated t ratios revealed that those teams employing the FN pattern of attack performed significantly better at the .01 level than did those teams employing any other attack in terms of number of successful estimates by the FF and FC groups, which, though signifi-
UNPROGR&MMED CHANGE
81
eantly more effective than the combined NN, CN, and CC groups, did not vary from one another to a statistically significant degree. DISCUSSION This study was performed in order to examine certain aspects of the process by which task-oriented teams detect and compensate for unprogrammed changes requiring modifications in the pattern of member contributions. A consideration of the implications of the results obtained, however, must be preceded by a recognition that the nature of the study places certain limitations on the generalizations which can be drawn from these results. First, the pre-experimentaI trials, while providing an opportunity for the development of an original decision rule, differ in some respects from the interactions by which work teams normally develop expectations as to other members' behavior. A far more complete and subtle set of appraisals are likely developed in such situations than were permitted in this experiment. The nature of their impact has not been fully explored. Further, restrictions on intra-group communications imposed during the experiment also tend to divorce this study from ,many situations in the "real" world by (a) preventing verbalization and overt agreement on a specific decision rule, a process which might well change the response of team members to an unprogrammed change and (b) making impossible the most logical and fruitful response to a suspected deviation from a decision rule, that is, direct inquiry of other members as to the nature of their actions. Despite these limitations, it is felt this study does yield some important information about development of compensatory decision rules. The study indicates that some understanding of team success in developing such rules is possible. The rapidity with which teams develop an original decision rule, the nature of the confederate deviation and the pattern of attack chosen by the team are all shown to be related to the rapidity with which the team develops an adequate compensatory decision rule. Further and of equal interest, within the limitations of this study, the number of reinforcements of the original decision rule showed no relationship to the rapidity with which the teams developed compensatory rules, nor were there any significant variations uncovered in the fashion in which deviations of varying natures interacted with number of reinforcements in determining the rapidity of development of a compensatory decision rule. The following implications may be considered. First, the significant effects of variations in the nature of the eonfedeJate deviation (from one-third of the target number as his share to
82
BEHLING~ COADY~AND HOPPLE
one-quarter, one-half, two-thirds of the target number) are of importance primarily because they verify that one of the conditions of the experiment, that a variety of levels of difficulty of problems be included, was met. The selection of these three deviations was based upon pilot runs. No explanation of why these three tasks varied in difficulty is offered here, though it appears that the concept of prominence as discussed by Leavitt (1960) offers a possible explanation of the processes underlying these differences. The absence of significant effects attributable to the number of reinforcements of the original decision rule represents one of the most interesting findings of this study. Obviously caution must be exercised in concluding that no differences exist merely because none were found in this particular experiment. These results do, however, tend to differ markedly from "common sense" conclusions which would indicate that the more times a particular decision rule had been applied successfully, the less likely would be a successful readjustment to an unprogrammed change. If these experimental results are supported in future research, it appears that much of current thought about the nature of patterns of adjustment in task-oriented groups will have to be revised to allow for the fact that either (a) the process of interference by previously learned patterns with the development of new patterns of behavior in individual human beings does not occur in situations where the learned pattern is concerned with decision rules in small groups or (b) the nature of the group interaction process is such that it blurs any measurement of an interference effect to the extent that it is no longer discernible in terms of measurements of group output. The significant negative correlation between the number of trials required to develop the original equal thirds decision rule and the number of correct estimates within 20 trials after the confederate deviation lends credence to the hypothesis that some common characteristic of the teams or of certain members of the teams determines their ability both to develop an original decision rule in response to a relatively unstructured situation and to detect and compensate for deviations from such rules. On the basis of this study, it appears that a crucial factor determining the ability of teams to adjust to unprogrammed changes is the nature of the approach chosen to the problem. Primarily it appears that those teams which showed the highest degree of role differentiation during the search process were most effective in developing an adequate compensatory decision rule. That is, those teams in which one member constantly held to the original equal thirds decision rule and the other shifted frequently in search of an adequate new rule were significantly more effective than any other group in rapidly developing and adequate eompensa-
UNPROGRAMMED CHANGE
~3
tory decision rule. Where role differentiation was less complete, ability to detect and compensate for unprogrammed change was progressively less. The only exception to this rule was that of the teams in which one member changed infrequently and the other not at all. This is, generally speaking, in line with our original hypothesis that those teams with a low total number of shifts will, other things being equal, be less effective in settling upon an adequate pattern of adjustment to an unprogrammed change. Successful adaptation to unprogra,mmed change then hinges, within the limitations of this study, upon a basically different approach from that required to successfully aeeomodate programmed change. Much of the research in the latter area supports the hypothesis that minimal role differentiation within the work group will contribute not only to increased member satisfaction with the group and the task but far more significantly for our purposes to heightened productivity. If both of these conclusions are demonstrated to be generally valid there must be an intermediate optimal degree of role differentiation which is desirable but which must be altered as the social environment surrounding the work team and the problems confronting it are modified. REFERENCES CALIFORNIAPSYCHOLOGICALINVENTORY.Revised ed. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1964. CocH, L., AND FRENCh, J. R. P., JR. Overcoming resistance to change. Human relations, 1948, 1, 521-522. D~NCAN, D. B. Multiple range and multiple F tests. Biometrics, March, 19.55, 11 (1), 1~2. HALL, R. L. Group performance under feedback that confounds responses of group members. Sociometry, 1957, 20, 297-305. LAWRENCE, LOIS C., AND SMITH, PATRICIA C. Group decision and employee pation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1955, 39, 334-337.
partici-
LI~AWTT, H. J. Task ordering and organizational development in the common target game. Behavio~'al s~ience, July, 1960, 5(3), 233-239. LEVINE, E., AND BUTLER, J. Lecture vs. group decision in changing behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 19'52, 3'6, 29-33. L:~KERT,1~. New patterns in management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. VR00M, V. H. Worl~ and motivation. New York: Wiley, 1964. WO'0~WORTH, R. W. Reinforcement and perceptual learning. In L. M. Stolurow (Ed.), Readings in learning. New York: Prentice Hall, 1953. RECEIVED:
June
20, 1966