Small is beautiful?

373

SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL? Technology small-island

futures Pacific

in the

Tony Marjoram

industrialization and the application of modern technology is the dominant development model, but how far can this model be applied in small developing countries? This article examines technology, development and possible futures in the Pacific islands (as distinct from the rim). The isolated and relatively traditional islands are increasingly dependent on and disturbed by the internal and external effects of Western technology, particularly the overwhelming threat of the greenhouse effect and sea-level rise-which will destroy many islands and the identity of many islanders. Despite this concern, there has been little technology ‘futures’ or ‘impact’ thinking in or regarding the island Pacific. This is unfortunate, as sophisticated techniques are not essential for futures study in the what is more useful is an analysis of technological trends in the regionWest and their likely effects in the islands. The article has relevance for developing island countries elsewhere, and ‘islands’ within larger developing countries.

Many contemporary headlines regarding the South Pacific relate to the management, application and impact of Western technology-mining at Bougainviife, ‘wall of death’ driftnet fishing, nuclear testing at Moruroa and toxic waste disposal on Johnston island. Surmounting this is the catastrophic prospect of the greenhouse effect and a possible sea-level rise of 65 centimetres over the next 50 years. I Because the islands are generally low-lying (atolls are generally less than 2 metres high) and most islanders are coastal dwellers or ‘salt water people’, such a sea-level rise would destroy many islands and undermine the identity of all islanders-islanders have a close identity with their land (as illustrated in Bougainville and other land-tenure issues around the region). The three main regional issues chosen by the heads of island governments to debate at the 1990 South

Tony Marjoram is the Dyason Fellow at the Development Technologies Melbourne, Faculty of Engineering, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia.

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0016-3287/91/040373-19@I991

Unit,

University

Butterworth-Heinemann

of

Ltd

374

Smaii

is beaufiful?

Pacific Forum meeting were the greenhouse effect and sea-level rise, drift-net fishing and toxic waste disposal at Johnston Island.2 Away from the headlines, an equally important consideration is the increasing amount of Western technology being transferred to the islands through imports and aid-since islanders were first exposed to the awesome power and some of the wonders of Western technology in the 194Os, a technological revolution has begun in the South Pacific.3 The rapidly increasing amount of technology transfer to the South Pacific, coupled with increasing trade imbalances, particularly increases in technology imports combined with the limited technological infrastructure in the islands, is also causing and increasing technological dependence in the region.4 As countries have reached political independence, the dependence on external aid, particularly for finance and technology, has increased inversely. Trade balances are almost universally negative in island states and becoming increasingly so, as imports increase and exports stagnate or decline (prices for most island commodities have declined in recent years). The islands are similar to their largest neighbour-‘industrially marginalized’ but ‘technophilic’ Australia, 5 the main neo-colonial power in the Pacific,‘j except that the islands are on the margin of the industrial margin, and rural areas or outer islands are on the margin of the margin of the margin.

Within the rim The small-island Pacific that is the focus of this article are the 13 developing, independent island states of the South Pacific Forum-the Cook Islands, the Islands, Nauru, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Niue, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Tokelau, Vanuatu and Western Samoa (Australia and New Zealand are also Forum members). The South Pacific region also includes islands north of the Equator-although the region was initially defined in terms of the independent small-island countries of the South Pacific, political independence is expanding in the region to include island states north of the line. Many outsiders regard the South Pacific or the Pacific as synonymous with the countries of the Pacific rim, forgetting or ignoring the islands of the Pacific ‘lake’. As Ward has observed, ‘Those who talk of the “Pacific Century” see the Pacific as a doughnut. Everything that matters is on the rim. The middle is a hole. It is an empty quarter-something to be crossed’.’ Many discussions of development in the region are also based on development in the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the Pacific and Taiwan. This is problematic, rim-Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore because the NlCs are unlike the small Pacific islands, and the NlCs model of industry-led development does not readily transfer to the small Pacific islands, despite apparent interest in such a model in some island countries and donor agencies.

‘Adjust your ~;nd‘-is/and

realities

fare not at fault1

Outsiders are advised to ‘adjust your mind’ and ‘tune in‘ to the overriding realities of the South Pacific-smallness and isolation at national and provincial levels (see Tables 1 and 2 for data on South Pacific countries).

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TABLE 1. THE SQUTH PACIFIC--OVERALL

PHYSICAL

AND DEMOGRAPHIC

f~F~~MATl~~. -

Land area

Sea area

km”

103km*

Popuiation growth rate %

persons/km2

1 a30 2 978 1290 3 550 2131 320 390 3120 1340 700

240 701 18272 690 181 21 259 462 243 27 556 699 26 II 880 2 935

Total Total excl. PNG

525 703 63 460

1934s 16229

51227130 1659 400

40 439 5 288

1488 1352

394 054 138283

900 680 120

0.3 3.5 2.0 2.4 2.9 1.0 -4.7 2.3 3.7 0.2 I.7 3.3

71 139 40 96 209 419 10 7 f7 136 327 12 55

17100 97 700 725 500 67 700 37 000 8 800 2500 3 463 300 292 000 94 800 8500 145 000 162 000

Cook Islands FSM Fiji Kiribati Marsha.11 islands Nauru Niue PNG Solomon fsfands Tonga Tuvafu Vanuatu W. Samoa

Average Average excl. PNG

Population density

Population 1987

0.6

9.7

2152 2.300

26.2

Source: Most data are drawn from various editions of Soultt Summary (Noumea, South Pacific Commission, various years).

Pacific

Economies:

Statistical

Despite certain similarities and a ‘uniq in diversity in the region, there are also significant differences between and even within many islands, their peopies and cultures. island states range from small coral islands and atolls to large volcanic islands-from the 21 km2 of Nauru and 2500 people of Niue, to the 500000km2 and 3.3 million people of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Land:sea

TABLE 2. THE SOUTH PACIFIC-OVERALL

Total A$109

Cook Island FSM Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Nauru Niue PNG Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu W. Samoa Average Average excl, PNG

GDP Per Capita A$

50235 117044 1514116 36 874 52 662

293s I 372 2 087 545

43z 4403610 209 630 81643 5 034 177610 147 767

15;: 1272 718 865 614 1225 912

566 731 217 906

1330 1444

1514

ECONOMIC

1986/87.

Balance of Trade (7986) Per Capita Total A$ A$103

Aid f1987) Totai Per Capita A$103 A$

-32735 -616f 6 -238 362 -18956 -39303 +65724 -2 359 +173492 +9601 -51155 -4034 - 57 653 - 56 088

-1914 .--631 -329 -280 -7 040 $7469 - 947 i-50 +33 -540 -475 -378 -346

15745 60 591 24 601 21933 24 297 77 7 255 500 825 35184 18393 7438 36 090 25 793

921 642 34 324 662 9 2 902 145 120 194 676 249 159

-24111 -40 578

-63 -293

59 a63 23116

152 167

Economies:

Sta~jstic~l

Source: Most data are drawn from various editions of South Summary (Noumea, South Pacific Commission, various years).

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INFORMATION,

Pacif$

376

Small is beautiful?

ratios average I:37 (1:256, if PNC is excluded). With the exceptions of Nauru and Niue, all countries of the region are archipelagic. The Pacific islands are developing countries, albeit rather unique. They share many characteristics common to developing countries, Nearly 70% of islanders live in small communities in rural areas or outer islands-in relatively traditional lifestyles, with some basic ‘conveniences’ of modern technology, although most rural islanders are without electric power, adequate water or sanitation facilities. Natural and human resources are generally limited. Per capita income is low, but without the grinding poverty of the poorest developing countries -varying from A$545 for Kiribati, to A$2919 for the Cook Islands (excluding Nauru). Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa are defined by the UN as least developed countries, and other island countries could fit into this category. Population growth rates include the highest in the world (3.3% for the Solomon Islands, average 2.2%) and populations are young-in some islands over 50% of the population are under 15. Population density varies widely-419 people/km2 in Nauru (with more at some urban locations-over 2300/km2 on Ebeye, next to Kwajalein, the US missile range in the Marshall Islands), down to 7/km2 in PNG. Gone are the days (if there ever were any) of ‘subsistence affluence’a-the islands are ‘beautiful, but no place to live’,g as attested by the high internal rural-urban migration, and external outmigration (mainly to New Zealand and Australia) of those islanders able to migrate. There is a high and increasing amount of overseas aid {particularly bilateral) to the region. The islands are among the highest per capita aid recipients in the world-A$2900 for Niue, with an annual average of A$lS2. Over 50% of the total budget in several countries derives from aid (generally for development rather than recurrent budgets). Much aid to the region is tied to donor countries and is of more commercial than political or humanitarian importance. Island states benefit from the small country bias in most donor programmes-as the Jackson Report review of Australian aid commented, ‘small states carry the same voting weight in the UN as large, so the strategic and political imperatives of aid tend to favour small countries’. On the developmental side, the report continues that ‘the faster development takes place the better Australian strategic and economic interests will be served. As development programs succeed, the need for aid will decline and ultimately disappear’.l* Viewed from within, however, small islands are not as beautiful as they appear to outsiders, and many islanders would not share this roseate view of the success of development projects, or the declining need of development aid. As a Samoan laments, Over half our annual budget is from foreign aid. Like most other Pacific countries, we’ve become a permanent welfare case. I can’t see us ever getting out of the hole. Many of our leaders don’t want to: foreign aid is now built into their view of development, into their way of life. It is also in the interest of foreign powers (our supposed benefactors) to keep us hooked on their aid.”

The high out-migration from some countries, particularly Niue, Tokelau, the Cook Islands and Western Samoa, results from internal push and external ‘the most valuable export’ in several counpull. Migrants have become tries.12

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Migration is facilitated by modern air transport and telecommunications - ‘technological change in transport and greater involvement with the market economy have increasingly marginalised the smaller island countries in relation to Pacific rim countries’.13 There has become a ‘transnational corporation of kin’.14 One consequence of this is that migrant islanders face huge overseas telephone bills-in 1987, Tonga was second only to the USA for the highest per capita expenditure on international telephone calls, most of which were reverse/collect calls, paid by metropolitan relatives. Remittances from migrants are a valuable source of income for many islanders and the main national income for several island countries, although remittances tend to decline over time, as migrants settle and their financial commitments increase. Problems of welfare, health and nutrition are increasing, as indicated by the increase in diabetes in many islands. Similar to technological dependence, the increasing consumption of imported food and drinks accounts for over 30% of total imports in some countries leads to an increasing displacement of traditional foodstuffs and food dependency. There is a consequent rise in Western diseases, particularly among the wealthier islanders. Such diseases include cancer, heart conditions, asthma, diabetes and ulcers-a ‘CHADU’, was formed in Tonga to combat such increasing health group, so do the exposure and aspirations to problems. As populations grow, Western values, lifestyles and goods. Problems of providing education and employment for young people increase, accompanied by increasing social dislocation, frustration, ‘stolen dreams’ and suicide among young people.15

On smallness

and beauty

There are numerous problems and constraints of smallness and isolation for the Pacific islands, and few opportunities. Human and many physical resources (excluding some primary products) are limited, social and physical environments are sensitive to change. Productive capacities and markets are small. Infrastructure and services, goods and spare parts are expensive to procure, install and maintain. Industrial processes and equipment are often no longer available to ‘fit’ such a diminutive scale-what is now small by world standards is large in the islands. Aid donors prefer larger projects, as they are less expensive to administer, although they may be neither needed nor appropriate. High levels of aid bring problems of assimilation as well as dependence. Supposed opportunities or ‘comparative advantages’ of the Pacific islands include tourism, remittances, access to donor-funded concessionary produce and manufactures-export schemes, a strategic geopolitical position and aid. Indeed, because aid is so prevalent in the region, it has been suggested that aid should be considered as a factor of production, rather than an externality. I6 From their dependence on migration, remittances, and aid-supported bureaucracy and government, Pacific islands have been identified as ‘MIRAB”’ or ‘MfRAGE’18 economies-the latter reflecting what Brookfield sees as an illusion of development in the region.7g Tourism may be seen to have short-term gain, but longer-term cost in terms of forgone opportunities of more sustainable development. Islanders are right to be fearful of the impacts of tourism, and treat it as a ‘last resort’.20

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Small is beautiful?

The problems of smallness and isolation in the islands have exercised the minds of many outside experts-the South Pacific is a development planner’s paradise (in the South Pacific, development planning is essentially synonymous with economic development, and nearly all planners are economists). The islands have been seen as laboratories for alternative development strategies,21 and various development models-‘cures for underdevelopment’22have been applied throughout the region in a ‘passing parade of paradigms’.23 Most island states now have national development plans. These are essentially wish-lists or shopping-lists prepared for aid donors at their behest, often written by expatriate planners provided by the donors. Within the five-year horizon of most plans there is generally little futures thinking, partly because of the timescale of the plans, the microeconomic project orientation of most plans and the fact that the future for such small countries is so uncertain. Most plans exhibit a naive view of the future as a uniform and straight-line reflection of trends elsewhere (and the vision of more than one leader seems to be of Hawaii-stlye ‘concrete’ development and tourism). Most island leaders and politicians are so busy with the present that few engage in systematic thought about the future, although sea-level rise, nuclear testing, toxic waste disposal and the impact of tourism all illustrate considerable concern with the physical and social island environment of the future. Industrialization and industry-led development in the islands is problematic-to UNCTAD, ‘in a small country with no free trade, industrial however, with free trade, a small country may growth may be inefficient; experience no growth at all, and may in fact deindustrialise’.24 Despite difficulties with micro-industrialization, the desire for open markets and the agricultural potential of many Pacific islands, other observers have recommended that ‘the expansion of manufacturing capacity should be of encouraged . . . the guide should probably be the successful experience East Asian countries which had adopted outward-looking, export-oriented rather than import-substitution industrialisation’.25 Industrialization has been encouraged in the islands as a ‘good thing’, supporting small industry for import substitution, and larger industry for export promotion. The failure of many aid projects (although donors usually speak publicly of ‘limited success’, never failure) indicates that aid agencies have yet to ‘adjust their thoroughly to Pacific realities. Various island constraints have minds’ prompted some outsiders, particularly economists, to observe that Pacific islands are not ‘feasible’ (despite their evident history), and that certain island populations would be best relocated overseas.26 More realistically, others conclude that considerations of island problems ‘have overturned the classical theories of economic development’.*’ Technology

in Pacific

history

exploration and exploitation of the South Pacific The European ‘discovery’, was facilitated by the technology of the industrial revolution, fuelled by a spirit of Victorian scientific inquiry, endeavour, the growth of capitalism and The whalers, sandalwooders, traders and desire for colonial expansion. missionaries were responsible for the initial exposure of islanders to Western technology and the first technology transfer to the region in the

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form of hatchets, knives, nails and guns. Technological gifts, trade and aid were designed to gain the hearts, minds, souls and salvation of the islanders, and valued island resources. Islanders appreciated the usefulness and superiority of Western technology and developed a continuing technophilia. Preference for early trade goods changed-market knowledge was a vital ‘trade secret’ for successful trading captains.28 Melanesian cargo cults developed because Europeans were rarely observed to work-so that Europeans could not be credited with the production of the technology they possessed. Cult followers deduced that Europeans had misappropriated the technology from humanity. Cargo cults are properly understood as a reflection of islander beliefs, desires and attempts to correct the situation and begin acquisition of the technology dispossessed by the Europeans, rather than as bizarre, ‘primitive’ behaviour.29

Technology

and development

In the image

in the South Pacific

(of the West)

There is some vagueness and incoherence regarding the term ‘technology’ in the islands (as elsewhere). This is partly because of the invisible pervasiveness of technology-the technological frame is beyond normal and partly because technology is often narrowly conscious scrutiny,30 includes viewed as high technology, and as a ‘black box’.31 Technology hardware goods and artefacts and software processes and knowledge. Encompassing the technology hardware and software is a system of technological support-a technological infrastructure. The whole web of technology can be viewed as a ‘technological system’32 of interlocking technological artefacts, institutions and people. Technology is socially constructed rather than an assemblage of given artefacts. Most modern technology is socially constructed in the West -technology is context-bound to Western societies. Technology shapes and frames Western societies, and is in turn shaped and enframed by those societies.33 When technology is transferred to other societies, it shapes and frames those societies, without being shaped or framed by them-there is little or no feedback. One result is that developing countries acquire Western technological artefacts without acquiring or developing a compatible technological infrastructure. Their technological infrastructure remains limited, while traditional knowledge systems and technology are eroded. A developed technological infrastructure is one way in which development is defined. When technology is transferred from the West to developing countries, problems of ‘transport rejection’ are encountered-technology becomes a ‘Pandora’s black box’.

Technology

transfer-craving

the image

In the South Pacific, technology is often taken to refer to hardware, particularly high technology such as desk-top computers. This is unfortunate-such a conception obscures a wider understanding of technology, and can lead islanders to disregard traditional technology in favour of imported technology of higher perceived status, further dislocating the past

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Small

is beautiful?

from the present and future. Technology imports and aid to the South Pacific are mainly transferred as unpackaged black boxes of visible hardware, not as a total package of hardware goods and software knowledge. Problems that often arise relate to the fact that necessary support from the limited technological infrastructure is unavailable, so that when software and hardware inputs are required-for adaptation, training, maintenance or repair-long delays in getting the technology to work properly occur frequently, leading to the permanent breakdown of the technology. Technology transfer to the South Pacific consists of technological imports and aid. Technology imports mainly include plant and machinery, fuels and transport equipment. Technology imports represent about 70% of total technology transfer, with aid technology representing around about 30%. Around half the total imports to the region are technological goods.3* Technological imports are the single most important group of imports and therefore most responsible for the increasing balance of trade deficits in the region. Table 3 presents an analysis of technological imports by SITC category for Pacific island countries from 1980 to 1986. The two main and interrelated factors affecting the choice of technology for transfer to the South Pacific relate to size and cost. Two size factors affect technology transfers-technology products and processes may be too and large items of technological big for island capacities and needs, hardware are difficult to transport to the islands. Technology is often chosen on the grounds of lowest capital cost, although this may be a false as the technology may not perform adequately, and operating economy, Although the two size factors might be expected to costs are high. encourage ‘small is beautiful’ technology, this is not usually the case in the islands. Cost considerations generally predominate, and ‘big is beautiful’ thinking. Larger development projects are generally designed, funded and with little technical input from local governments. managed by donors, There is also little or no attention paid to, or real scope for effective technology choice, for example between different small computers or cars, apart from a choice between brand names. The availability of various similar brands is itself a problem, given the limited technological infrastructure and support services. Non-technoeconomic factors also enter the technology choice and transfer equation. These include wants (as opposed to needs) and the fashionable desirability for otherwise) of certain technologies-on the part of islanders and expatriate advisers. Overseas suppliers may sell (dump) unwanted technology for various reasons of age or uncompetitiveness (such technology may not, however, be inappropriate in island conditions). Various projects appear to have been established for the primary purpose of getting rid of worn-out or outdated technology and making an overseas loss for metropolitan tax purposes. Small items of technological hardware such as computers readily enter the islands in aid packages, whereas larger technology products and procesfrom the islands (the problem ses remain progressively more ‘hidden’ addressed by the cargo cults). Desk-top computers, highly popular with aid donors and recipients, encounter particular problems of performance in the tropical island Pacific, and are often underutilized or may not even be needed-personal computers represent a microcosm of the problems of

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technology and development in the South Pacific. Reconditioned cars are imported into many Pacific islands, but maintenance costs are high. Roadmaking costs are also high-in one country, more money was spent on the meetings of the Roads Committee (and allowances for Committee members) than on the roads, although in other countries there is increased interest in labour-based construction techniques.

Catch-22s of technology

and development

As a result of the limited technological infrastructure in developing countries, a Catch-22 of technology and development arises that is particularly severe and the major background reason for many failed development in projects in the South Pacific. Because small island states are deficient technologists and technological knowledge, they need outside technical advice and advisers; advisers may be insensitive to local conditions and customs, and recommend inappropriate technology. Island states therefore require technologists and technological knowledge to appraise outside technical advice, in which they are deficient. To make matters worse, this Catch-22 also occurs within many aid donor agencies. Outside experts and consultants are used by donors (or their client-states, at the behest of the donors), because technological expertise is not available in the donor agency (often due to the predominance of economists and ‘content-free’ administrators), Donor evaluations of technical advice are therefore necessary, but often not undertaken because of the paucity of technical expertise within the donor agency.

Technology

by sector

All Pacific islands are ‘dual economies’, consisting of modern/urban and traditional/rural spheres. The modern sphere mainly comprises the economic sectors commonly used in most development plans in the region. The traditional sphere comprises non-economic and rural sectors. There is considerable overlap between the two spheres, and much economic activity takes place in the traditional sector. The modern sphere consists of the private and public sectors. Larger companies are mainly foreign-owned~ medium-size companies are often jointly owned, with local partners; and smaller companies are generally local. The public sector is responsible for many services and industries that may not otherwise be available. In the larger modern sphere, ‘the foreign sector is the economy’.35 Larger industry tends to be export-oriented, whereas smaller industry is mainly import-substituting. Much of the larger technology in the region is used in primary production. Larger overseas companies dominate naturalresource exploitation-mining, fisheries and forestry-in joint ventures or under licensing agreements. ‘Enclave’ technology is used, with little potential for technology transfer into local sectors. There are similar divisions and little linkage between modern transport, energy and communications technology and the traditional sphere. The medium and smalIer private sector receives support from government and donors through various grants and loans, with the aim of

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382

Smalf is beautiful?

Mineralfuels LSiTC3I hMu&g PNG: tatal value 96 total imports Excluding PNG: total value % total imports

296 675 18.0

398 501 22.0

385670 21.6

402 033 20.6

367 042 17.8

407 179 17.2

295 694 11.5

142808

193304 22.7

190879 24.2

178861 20.8

+t62 367 16.0

184291 16.7

149688 13.0

‘ill

19.0

91302

5.6

675 6.2

105637 5.9

f44975 7.4

147540 7.3

43 790 5.8

53387 6.3

53212 6.8

5~5576 6.9

64 687 7.2

66096 6.0

79548 6.9

Machinery and transport equipment (SITCT) including PNG: total value % total imports

429053 26.1

467171 25.6

442486 24.7

471693 24.2

454641 22.6

561457 23.7

714685 27.9

Exciuding PNG: total vague X tOta imports

161092 21.4

387746 22.1

t35295 57.2

161229 18.7

162366 16.9

181640 16-5

233436 20.2

816030 49.8

977547 54.0

933792 f 018601 52.2 52.3

959123 i 129594 I217379 47,7 47.7 47.5

347466 46.2

434437 51.1

379385 48.2

379422 42.0

Excluding PNG: total value % total imports

Total t~~~~~~ imports (SfTC 3 f 5 f 71 including PNG: total value % total imports Excluding PNG: total value total imports

399665 46.4

Source: Most data are drawn from various editions of South Summary (Noumea, South Pacific Commission, various years). Note: ‘Tec~~~iog~cat imports’ gories:

have been defined

genera&

P&k

as jncludi~~

432027 39.2

Economies:

462 67 40.1 Statistical

the f~lt~wi~g StTC cate-

* SfTC Category 3-‘Mnerai Fuels, Lubricants and Retated ~a~ar~ats’~ * SIX Gate9ory 5--‘Chemicals’, * SITC Category 7--‘Machinery and Transport E~u~pme~t~~

promoting industry, infrastructure and human resource development. Attractions to encourage overseas investment and the transfer of technology and skills include fiscal incentives such as five-year tax holidays and regional or overseas schemes supposedly favouring the islands-such as the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement (SPARTECA), the Pacific Island lndustr~a~ Development Scheme (PllDS), introduced by New Zealand to help hew Zealand companies establish in the region in a process of fmport Finance Facility ‘abetting, not aiding’,36 the similar Development (DIFF) of Australia, and STABEX, the EC scheme for commodity purchase fat

Small is beautiful?

383

premium rates) and price stabilization. Although certain industries may be by invitation’,37 limited preferred through a process of ‘industrialization overseas interest, similar strategies and competition between island nations has led to a largely open-door atmosphere, where few economically ‘sound’ proposals are declined. It is debatable how much genuine viable and sustainable small industrial and associated economic development such policies have achieved in the region. The few technologically oriented smaller industries that have been introduced have encountered a whole range of constraints and problems relating to technical (operation and mait~tenance), social (skills training and high labour turnover, economic (high capital and unant;cipated operating costs and consequent cash-flow shortfalls), marketing and environmental factors. Problems of technology in the provision of services abound-relating to problems of smallness, isolation, tropical island conditions and limited technological infrastructure. It is difficult to maintain complex technology (such as an x-ray machine), and easier to obtain new equipment on aid. The traditional/rural sphere is becoming increasingly marginalized, despite the recognized need for rural development activities in the face of increasing urban drift and sociocultural dislocation. The traditional/rural sphere is responsible for much of the technology transfer to the region in the form of consumer and small producer ‘durables’ (sic). islander technophilics unknowingly face considerable technological adversity-given the cost and brief lifespan of much technology transferred to the islands.

Technology-country

outlines

Because the Pacific islands and their peoples are distinct in many ways, it is useful to take a brief look at three individual Pacific islands, Kiribati (the old Gilbert Islands), an atoll and one of the smaller low-lying island countries of the region, has 70000 people, 33 islands and atolls of 690km* in three area or Exclusive Economic Zone of groups spread over an oceanic 5 million km*---larger than continental Europe. Kiribati, part of ‘Micronesia’, faces particular problems of small size, national and international isolation. Kiribati has limited physical and human reApart from marine resoures, are extremety sources, although, perhaps because of this, the I-Kiribati resourceful. Despite the abundance of marine resources (including seabed minerals of possible future value such as manganese nodules), Kiribati lacks the ability effectively to harvest these resources. Being small, Kiribati is among the highest per capita aid recipients in the South Pacific. The local market is small, and there are few artisans and limited industrial development. Apart from fish and marine products such as b&he-de-mer, there is almost no scope for export. The main income of the country was phosphate now mined-out, but still yielding investment in(Banaba/Ocean Island, come). Remittances from I-Kiribati merchant sailors, trained at the local Marine Training School, are significant. Other national income has derived from fisheries licences (with the USSR, among other countries). Tonga, part of ‘Polynesia’, is a medium-sized Pacific island country (95000 people, half on Tongatapu) with a slightly better physical and human

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Small is bea~~if~~?

resource base than Kiribati. Over 20000 Tongans live overseas, in New Zealand, Australia and the USA fiongans are the main export), and remittances equal the domestic budget (around A$30 million). A particular dilemma faced by Tonga (and similar countries) is the technical ‘brain drain’-many migrants acquire a skill to help them qualify as a migrant. While this is quite understandable, it presents a significant problem for technical and industrial development. The local market is larger than Kiribati, with some scope for industrialization. The Tonga Small Industries Centre is regarded as a model of its kind in the region, although most of the technologically based industries have encountered the problems noted above-leading some observers to question the emphasis and returns from small/medium industries promotion and the associated de-emphasis on the agricultural base of the country. Papua New Guinea, part of ‘Melanesia’, by far the largest Pacific island state (3.5 million people in nearly 500000 km2 of lowlands, mountainous highlands and islands), is isolated at national level by land as much as sea-many remote highlanders would have seen and travelled in an aeroplane before a car. Most income derives from gold and copper exports and aid-A$500 million/year (A$145/capita). Although the overall market is large, size and isolation means that PNG is best considered as a series of larger and smaller communities-PNG has 19 provincial governments and over 700 Because of the largely resource-extractive economy, separate languages. small indust~ development has been seriously neglected, although problems at Bougainville have prompted an increased interest in small business and industrial development. PNG is also the first country in the region to begin formulating a science and technology policy (in 1990).

Technology,

economic

development

and the future

Theoretical interest in the role of technology in economic development has grown since the late 197Os, reflecting increasing concern regarding deficiencies of the Keynesian model of demand/management in stimulating economic growth and coping with imbalances in the global economy. Two areas of interest have arisen from the influential perspective of supply-side economics-neo-Schumpeterian analysis of economic growth, and politically influential monetarism, with an ideological focus on reducing the role of the state to the prevailing forces of the free market. Despite constraints of size, a need for services that only island governments can properly provide, and problems in translating Western free-market models to the tiny island Pacific, such ideologies have penetrated the Pacific through various aid agencies, some development workers, academics and island politicians. Neo-Schumpeterian economists regard technology as the central and revolutionary engine of economic growth, and are mainly concerned with restructuring the role of the state to facilitate technological change and economic growth. Neo-Schumpeterians formulated the concept of historic technological discontinuities and the importance of radically innovatory heartland technologies, generating Kondratiev long waves of economic development. Microelectronics is identified as a major current heartland technology.38

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Small

is beautiful?

385

Changes in heartland technologies occasion changes in technology or wider industrial technoecoparadigms, techn~~conom~c paradigms,39 and associated changes in ‘technological trajecnomic metaparad~gms,40 tories‘-technological development within the paradigm,41 indicated by changes in modes of production and division of labour. Perceptions of who believes that present changes are part of change vary from Dote, underlying, unidirectional but accelerating long-run trends and the ‘steady accumulation of scientific knowledge and technical know-how’,42 to Kaplinsky, who is ‘convinced that we are indeed witnessing a major transition in the industrial~sat~~n era’.43 Kapfinsky notes historic changes from handicraft ‘machinofacture’ and ‘systemofacture’. Although production to manufacture, perceptions of change vary, outcomes are similar. Most observers agree that the change in the technological paradigm not only refers to particular products or processes, but also to changes in the organization and structure of firms and industries-the ‘cultural revolution’ in the firm.@ Changes in technology paradigm occur unevenly across sectors and reduce sectoral differences (between primary production, industrial manuServices are becoming industrialized-in facturing and tertiary services). telecommunications, banking, transport and health services, and industries ‘servicized’ or ‘tertiarized’-by software, producer services are becoming and value-added manufacturing. Radical innovation creates new needs for new skills, information and the use of ‘intelligent’ capital that itself embodies and is used to take advantage of new knowledge.45 Few observers have reflected on the consequences of change in technology paradigms on developing countries. Change in technology paradigms leads to change in the structure and culture of countries as wet1 The change in technology paradigm is particularly uneven as companies. between developed and developing countries, and between different sectors in developing countriesespecially between modern and traditional sectors. The impact of changing past and present technoparadigms is of particular importance for developing countries. The significance of new technology for less developed countries is ambivalent.46 The increased productivity of new technology could negate the advantage of low labour costs in favour of high technology and have the effect of relocating formerly labour-intensive industries back to the West, increasing the technology gap between developed and developing countries (assuming that developing countries could not take advantage of such technology,47 returning the Ricardian ‘comparative advantage‘ to developed countries. At the same time, however, technologjcal discont~nuities could allow developing countries the possible advantage of plugging into the latest technology in a process of ‘technological leap-frogging’ (assuming that developing countries could take advantage of such technology). Kaplinsky also argues that changes in ‘embodied technology’, ‘social technology’ and the modes of production, and divisions of labour occasioned by new technology may create certain advantages for developing countries.48 Most observers agree on the increasing scientific content of technology. Generally, these considerations mainly act to the disadvantage of developing countries. Crucial factors are the location and ability of developing countries to acquire and assimilate new technology into production processes -depending essentially on their technological infrastructures.

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Small is beautiful?

Technology

transfer

differentials

in the South

Pacific

Technology transferred to the South Pacific is an unrepresentative and distorted reflection of general technological development in the industrialized West. Technology transfer to the islands is not uniform, it is different in different sectors-there are gaps and lags, and differential ‘fronts’ or ‘technology transfer differentials’. These differentials are technology transfer analogues to the ‘reverse salients’ identified by Hughes in the frontier growth of large technological systems in industrialized countries,4q and illustrate the unevenness of change in technology paradigm between countries, most divisive between developed and developing countries. The ‘crisis of structural adjustment’ in coming to terms with the new technology paradigm in developed countries will increase the technology transfer differentials between the West and the developing countries of the South Pacific.

Technofutures

and the Pacific Islands

Technology is regarded by many development planners (economists) in the region (either Western economists or those trained in the Western tradition) as another input or factor of production-an aspect of capital, alongside labour and land/raw materials. This is a technological ‘blind spot’ of neo-classical development economics. This legacy relegates non-quantitative technological factors such as technology policy, planning, choice (what constitutes an appropriate technology in the island Pacific?) and decision making, and neglects wider issues of technological change and dependence. Non-economic aspects of technology are still treated by many economists in the South Pacific as non-problemmatic-this is part of the problem of development in the region, rather than part of the solution. Technology futures in the Pacific islands reflect (through a distorted mirror) past and present innovation and trends in the ‘heartland’ countries of the main donors and suppliers of technology. There is a time-lag between what will happen and is happening in the islands, and what is happening and has happened overseas. Various external and internal factors impinge on consideration of Pacific island technofutures. Islands are however able to exert some influence and structure their internal response to external change and technology transfer differentials-on how these trends will transfer and translate to the South Pacific, in a quasi neo-Schumpeterian structural accommodation to external technological change. Factors that affect island response to external technological change and transfer differentials primarily relate to local technological infrastructures and policy regarding technology management and transfer. The increasing science base to technology in the West creates transfer problems for small developing nations, particularly in the process and service industries (modern cars and computers, for example, need sophisticated maintenance facilities). The industrialization of services (health, telecommunications, transport and banking), and ‘tertiarization’ of industries (software and product services) will have serious ramifications in small island states, where it is difficult not to ‘go with the flow’ of donor neighbours. Although flexible manufacture does not require scale, a certain

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387

size and refativefy high level of technologicaf infrastructure is required, which the island nations do not have. The increasing productiv~~ of new technology acting to decrease the advantage of low labour costs largely by-passes small-scale realities of the South Pacific. These considerations, however, have negative implications for strategies of export promotion and import substitution in the region, especially for export promotion-the products of many island industries could generally become less competitive with overseas products in the overseas and home markets, requiring further internal and external pratective measures, or a rethink of policies regarding small industry promotion, especially for export.

For better or for worse? The consequences of new technology in the West and changes in the old energy- and materials-intensive technoeconomic paradigm to a new information-intensive paradigm are less ambivalent for the island states of the South Pacific than for larger developing countries. The Pacific islands are particularly disadvantaged regarding technology futures-apart from being small and isolated, they do not have particularly low labour costs (relative to productivity), have limited technological infrastructures and capabilities and significant technology transfer differentials. The Pacific islands could not take advantage of technological reap-froggi~g. It is therefore likely that the technology-gap and comparative technofogicat disadvantage of the islands will increase. There are severaf implications of the above observations for island policy makers regarding technology, industry and development. An overall implication is that the dominant development model promoting industry and the private sector (based on either economic or ideological arguments) has serious drawbacks in the South Pacific. There is little opportunity for industry-led economic development or a rollback of government to make way for private sector development, and the likelihood, as UNCTAD comments, that open markets will cause deindustrialization in the islands. Already, where there are forces to privatize government services such as Government Stores ~mainly supplying technical goods for government departments and public sale), the fact that the private sector cannot properly fill the gap is readily apparent. The most important ways in which the internal response to external technology change and transfer could be improved include reinforcing the technological infrastructure and local technology policy, planning and management, to ensure that the islands have a better ‘fit’so or ‘mesh’ to overseas technological chang@----so that the islands become more proactive rather than reactive to external change. This will mean a reduced emphasis on value-added export promotion industries, an increased selectivity regarding import substitution industries, identifying and maximizing real national benefits of concessionary schemes such as PIIDS, DIFF and STABEX, and a focus on adding value through the increased processing and export of agricultural products. As Lipton has cautioned, ‘if you wish for industriafisation, prepare to develop agriculture’? There is a generaf need for the improved identifications innovation and

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388

5matl

is beautiful?

adaptation of appropriate technology at national and regional levels. This technology should ideally consist of incremental improvements on traditional technology, materials, skills and knowledge, rather than radical innovation. This is not to rule out radical innovation-there is undoubtedly a place for personal computers and video TV in education and community development in the islands. The task is to ‘modernize the traditional, and traditionalize the modern’. The reinforcement of technological infrastructures in the islands is also urgent, along with the development of technology management skills among aid donors, or ‘partners in development’. There is a particular need for the development of national and regional south Pacific capability for technology management in the areas of technology policy making, planning, technology choice, adaptation and operation. One way of achieving this would be a wider recognition of the problem, and the training of personne! to act as technolog}/ advisers in development planning offices, development banks and other relevant agencies. There is also a need for more local technology and local technologists at all levels. This is essential for viable and sustained development. The problem remains that trained technical specialists may migrate. This can only be countered by encouraging people to stay, or hoping that they return soon, by improving local pay and conditions, and/or by constraining the migration of skilled islanders to migrate through such measures as a period of bonding following government-sponsored education {other devetoping countries do this) and developing technical qualifjcations that are not internatjona~ly recognized. While the latter measure has obvious shortcomings, the training of ‘barefoot technicians’ should be encouraged, One way of tackiing the technological b~jnd-spot of many planners and economists in the region is for technology and development specialists to enter the lion’s den and educate (planner-econotnists are often tribal and disdainful of outsiders). UNESCO has organized a technology and development initiative in the region, and presented the South Pacific Regional Technology and Development Workshop, held in Tonga in 1988. The workshop was aimed at people and organizations involved with technology and development activities in the region, and drew together islanders from development planning offices and development banks around the region. A manuat for technology and development in the South Pacific came out of the workshop-T~~nkjng Te~~~~i~~~.~3 Further workshops are being planned for Papua New Guinea and small islands and atolls. Tertiary education in aff disciplines should aiso include increased reference to technology and development issues. If the above issues are not recognized and included in development strategies, development in the region will become increasingly uneven or skewed, leading to increased technological and overall dependence. The prospect could then be of most Pacific island states becoming increasingly marginatized and dependent, increasingly the military range and dump, fish tank and tourist playground of the Western world. As Ward concludes, Perhaps a hundred years hence . . . almost all of the descendents of today’s Polynesian or Micronesian islanders will live in Auckland, Sydney, San Francisco and Salt Lake City. Pacific islands.

Occasionally they may Even more occasionally

recatf that their ancestors they may visit the resorts

cmce lived on tiny which, catering for

FUTURES May 1991

Smalf is beautiful?

scuba divers, academic researchers or gamblers may provide the human activities on lonely Pacific islands, set in an empty ocean.s4

only

389

permanent

Notes and references estimate was given by E. Nijpels, Dutch Ambassador to the UN Environment Pro1. This gramme; Melbourne? Age, 16 October 1990. 1990; it has also recently been reported that Japan has since 2. islands Business, September stopped drift-net fishing in the region, and Taiwan has agreed to reduce the number of drift-net vessels; Melbourne Age, 18 October 1990. revolution ’ in the South Pacific refers to the huge impact of Western 3. ‘The technological technology on the region. This revolution is disjointed because only elements of Western with various degrees of lag. Western technology have been transferred to the region, technology, or ‘technoeconomic paradigm (see reference 39), has also undergone significant change before and during this period. ‘Science and technology policy and the small island states of the South 4. T. Marjoram, Pacific’, paper presented at the 59th ANZAAS Congress, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 14-16 Februarv 1990 (available from ANZAAS, Congress Proceedings not published). (Sydney, Pluto?ress, 1988). 5. S. Hill, The T’iagedy of Technology ‘Fiji: client state of Australia?‘, Sydney Transnational Corporations Research 6. E. Utrecht, Proiect, University of Sydney, 1984. The Pacific Islands in a Pacific century’, Geographica/ 7. R. 6. Ward, ‘Earth’s empty’quarter? /ourna/, 7.5.5(2), July 1989, pages 235-246. ‘Subsistence affluence and development policy’, Regional Development Dia8. E. K. Fisk, logue, 1982, pages T-12. op cir, reference 19. 9. F. Sevele, quoted by K. D. Bedford, quoted by Conneli, to Revie%v the Aus~raijan Overseas Aid Program (the jackson IO. Report of the Committee Report) (Canberra, Australian Government Pubiishin~ Service, 1984). Samoa 25 years after: celebrating what?‘, Pacific islands Mon~~l,~, 58, Il. A. Wendt, ‘Western June 1987, page 15. quoted by Connell, op tit, reference 19. 12. P. Shankman, 13. Ward, op N’t, reference 7. ‘The MIRAB economy in South Pacific microstates’, Pacific 14. I. C. Bertram and R. F. Watters, Viewpoint, 26, 1985, page 499. ‘Stolen dreams: some consequences of dependency for Western Samoan 15. C. Macpherson, in John Connell (editor), Migration and Development in the South Pacific (Canyouth’, berra, 1990), pages ‘107-119. by K. Makin, economist at Central Planning Department, Tonga, 16. Personal communication 1986. op tit, reference 14. 17. Bertram and Watters, quoted in Bertram and Watters, op cif, reference 14, page 497. 18. H. C. Brookfield, keynote address to Commonwealth Geographic Conference on Small island 19. John Connell, Development, Valletta, Malta, 24-29 March 1990. in Papua New Guinea: the last resort’, in J. M. ]ennings and G. 1. R. Linge 20. D. Lea, ‘Tourism (editors), Of Time and Place (Canberra, Australian National University, 1980)‘ pages 211-231. ‘Paradise lost? The past performance and future prospects of small island 21. A. 1. Dolman, developing countries’, in E. Dommen and P. Hein (editors), States, Microstates and lsfands (London, Croom Helm, 1985), page 58. ‘Traditional agriculture and urbanisation: policy and practice’, in E. K. Fisk 22. E. K. Fisk, (editor), The Adaptation of Traditional Agriculture: Socioeconomic Problems of Urbanisation, Monograph 11 (Canberra, Development Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1978), page 371. ‘Why poor people stay poor’, Journal of Modern African 23. R. Baker, review of M. Lipton, Studies, 13, 1979, page 167; (see below, reference 52); quoted by Connell, op tit, reference 19. Least Developed Counfries Report (New York, UNCTAD, 1985), page 25. 24. UNCTAD, 25. E. V. Charle, ‘Foreign trade patterns and economic development in the South Pacific‘, Journal of Pacific Studies, 12, 1986, page 26. International Development Assistance Bureau, AIDAB, has observed that ‘for 26. The Australian those countries with very poor prospects for self-sustaining development and poor standards of living, opening up of migration policy may be an essential adjunct to aid’, ADIBAB, Austrak’s Relations with the South Pacific (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987).

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Small is beaufifut?

27. Connell, op tit, reference 19. They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of the Sandaiwood Trade in the 28. D. Shineberg, South-West Pacific, 1830-1865 (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1967). 29. P. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of Cargo ‘Cults’ in Melanesia (London, MacCibbon and Kee, 1957). 5. 30. Hill, op tit, reference ‘Black boxism and the sociology of science: a discussion of the major 31. R. D. Whitley, developments in the field’, in P. Halmos (editor), The Sociology of Science (Keele, University of Keele Press, 1972), pages 62-92; referring to the pioneering work of Whitley, Bijker and Pinch reflect that the economic study of technological innovation is reminiscent of the early days in the sociology of science, ‘when scientific knowledge was treated like a “black box” and, for the purpose of such studies, might have well produced meat pies’: W. E. Biiker and T. Pinch, ‘The social construction of facts and artefacts; or how the sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other’, in W. E. Biiker. T. P. Hughes and T. Pinch (editors), The Social Construction of Techno/o~ica/ S,&fe,s (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 19891, page 21. including systems analysts, and, later, social scientists 32. It is not surprising that technologists, have viewed technology itself as a ‘system‘ and applied a systems approach to the analysis of technology as a whole; see T. P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Eiectrification in Western Society, 7880-7930 (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). Hughes notes that one of the first historians to use the systems approach to the history of technology was Gille (see B. Cille, I-listoire des techniques (Paris, Gallimard, 1978)). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays translated by 33. See M. Heidegger, W. Lovitt (New York, Harper and Row, 1977); and Hill, op tit, reference 5. ‘Taming technology: technology and development in the small island 34. See T. Marjoram, states of the South Pacific’, paper presented at the Commonwealth Geographic Conference on Small Island Development, Valletta, Malta, 24-29 March, 1990 (to appear in Contemporary Economic issues in island Development, University of Keele Monograph, forthcoming). the dominant activity of and P. Hein, ‘Foreign trade in goods and services: 35. E. Dommen small island economies’, in Dommen and Hein (editors), op cif, reference 20. 1982. ‘Abetting, not aiding’, fsfands Business, 8, November 36. I. Richardson, of the Caribbean development strategy, import substitution and 37. ‘The two kev elements industrialisation by invitation, have both failed to develop th< economy of the region’; T. Barrv. B. Wood and D. Preusch, The Other Side of Paradise: Fore&n Control in the Caribbean (New York, Grove Press, 1984), page 73. and R. Kaplinsky (editors), ‘Technology and development in the third 38. See C. Cooper industrial revolution’, European journal of Development Research, I(l), June 1989, pages l-3. Kondratiev noticed long waves of economic development in the 1920s; see N. D. Kondratiev, ‘The long wave in economic life’, Review of Economic Statistics, 77, November 1935, pages 105-115. These long waves were associated with phases of technological development by Schumpeter-_l. A, Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistica/ Analysis of the Capitalist Process (New York, McGraw Hill, 1939). use the term ‘technoeconomic paradigm’ because the process of 39. Perez (and Freeman) technological change involves complex technological, economic and other factors; C. Perez, ‘Structural change and the assimilation of new technologies in the economic and social system’, Futures, i?(4), October 1983, pages 357-375; C. Perez, ‘Micro-electronics, long waves and world structural change: new perspectives of developing countries’, World and developDevefopment 73(3), 1985, pages 441-463; and C. Perez, ‘New technologies ment’, in C. Freeman and B.-A. Lundvall (editors), Small Countries Facing the Technological Revolution (London, Pinter, 1988), pages 85-97. Research and catching up’, European journal of Development 40. C. Freeman, ‘New technology 1(l), June 1989, pages 85-99. paradigms and technology trajectories’, Research Policy, 77(3), 1982, 41. G. Dosi, ‘Technology pages 147-162, Dosi likened the change in technological paradigm to Kuhn’s work on change in scientific paradigms; T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolufions (Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press, 1962). For a discussion of culture, changing technology trajectories and Australia, see S. Hill, ‘Changing the technological trajectory’, Futures, 22(31, April 1990, pages 272-297. European Jaurnai of Development Research, 7(l), )une ‘Latecomers’ problems’, 42. R. Dore, 1989, pages 100-107. and the international division of labour in “‘Technological revolution“ 43. R. Kaplinsky, European journal of Development Research, manufacturing: a place for the Third World?‘, I(l), June 1989, pages 5-37.

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44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53.

54.

beautiful? 397

Freeman, op tit, reference 40, refers to the ‘cultural revolution’ occuring within General Motors and the ‘factory of the future’. C. V. Vaitsos, ‘Radical technological changes and the new “order” in the world economy’, European journal of Development Research, 7(l), June 1989, pages 60-84. Cooper and Kaplinsky, op tit, reference 38. First noted by M. Posner, ‘International trade and technical change’, Oxford Economic Papers, 78, 196’1, pages 323-341. Kaplinsky, op tit, reference 39. Hughes, op tit, reference 31. The Solomon Island pijin word ‘fitim’-to be eminently suitable-is a better fit in this context. This is analogous at the training edge to the economic success of the leading edge companies (and countries) best able to mesh with and take advantage of change in the best-practice technoeconomic paradigm (see Perez, op tit, reference 36; and Hill, op tit, reference 41). M. Lipton, why Poor People Stay Poor (London, Temple Smith, 19771, page 24. T. Marjoram, Thinking Technology: Manual for Technology and Development in the South Pacific (Melbourne, Development Technologies Unit (for UNESCO), University of Melbourne, 1989). Ward, op tit, reference 7.

FUTURES

May 1991