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Some observations on the interaction of technology and society
Futures Essay
A section of the journal in which ideas and topics that indicate potential considerations for futures research are discussed.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTERACTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY Roy Amara I: will begin my observations of the interaction of technology and society by defining terms. For our purposes, technology can be viewed as comprised of two major components: ~~y~cu~ art$%cts such as laser, computers, refineries, bridges-the hardware of technology; and soti& ~~ty~~n~ that include methods, procedures, knowhow, regulations, laws-the software of technology. Similarly, society may be assumed to be comprised of: in& uiduals whose perceptions influence attitudes, goals, and values; and ins& tutions that embody processes which determine how we organise, relate, and make social choices. Society makes choices-explicitly and implicitly-of particular technologies in accordance with the dictates of its values and institutional structures. From the application of such technologies, in turn, derive important consequences that make impact on these values and structures.. The nature of this interaction has been characterised by a wide range of views which basically revolve around the pessimistic (or Malthusian) and the optimistic standpoints. At one level, the technoIogical pessimist maintains: Roy Amara is President of the Institute for the Future, Menlo Park, California. His observations are extracted f&n remarks made at the opening session of the 1975 International Conference on Cybernetics and Society, September 23-25, San Francisco, California.
FUTURES
December IS75
We Sive in a world of finite resources in which technology can provide a temporary respite in the race with population growth. Technology provides this respite by increasing productivity and decreasing the death rate, while Ieaving birth rates essentially unaffected. Eventually, population growth overtakes productivity improvements, and equilibrium is again estabEs&d at high birth rates and high death rates.
In contrast, the technolo~cal maintains :
optimist
There are no real limits to resources since technology can always come to the rescue to reduce, if not eliminate, scarcity. Thus, technology not only operates to increase productivity and decrease death rates, but it also decreases birth rates in the long run. The result is the establishment of an improved standard of living (and quality of life) at a new equilibrium between low birth rates and low death rates.
The history of the last two or three decades in the USA illustrates how we have moved along this continuum, but at a different level. The 1950s may be characterised as the decade of the ascendency of physical technology with dramatic developments in space exploration, nuclear energy, computers, communications, and the like. Similarly, the 1960s were clearly years of the ascendency of social technology in which no social problem (welfare, health, education, etc) was viewed as too complex to yield to analysis and solution (eg, “Great Society”‘). By way of contrast, the decade of the 1970s may be characterised as one of “pause and reappraisal”, where we are not ready to revert to a simplistic technological
5 16
Futures Essay
pessimism, but neither are we prepared to return to the unbounded technological optimism of the prior two decades. Our views for the 1980s on the role of technology in society will largely be shaped by the outcome of the present reappraisal which poses some basic questions about the role of technology in society : l l l l
What can technology do ? What else will it do? How much do we need ? What risks do we incur?
As such questions are raised, a number of critical issues are surfacing that need to be confronted. Four that I consider particularly significant are : Alienation. Technology operates to open up the range of personal choices available to the individual, creates greater uncertainty about values and goals, and confronts each of us with unprecedented rates of change. For large segments of society-at one time or another-these effects create stresses which exceed the individual’s ability to cope adequately with his social environment. These stresses often engender strong feelings of “not belonging”, with the result that a “dropping-out” or “severing of the social contract” takes place. Diminishing of person-to-person contact. It is indeed somewhat surprising to recognise how often technology operates to isolate us as individuals rather than to foster personal interaction. The automobile, the television, and even the telephone act to decrease considerably the opportunities for face-to-face exchanges. The inevitable result is a loss of any sense of community with our neighbours and a more general loss of human dimensions in personal relations. Concentration of wealth. Technology almost always concentrates wealth among (and within) nations because of the effects of economies of scale, the division of labour, and the growth of cartels. One result is a further widening
of the gap between developed and developing countries, with the prospect between of “wars of redistribution” “haves” and “have-nots” a growing spectre on the international front. Concentration of power. Technology increases the size and role of government because “big government” is needed to regulate “big industry”, to meet the demands for increased public goals, and to deal with the expanded national scale that considerations of population, mobility, national defence, and economic planning dictate. At the same technology operates to raise time, considerably the level of complexity of the issues that society must confront. This observation is equally as true whether one is a technological optimist or a technological pessimist. One of the inevitable prices of increased technology is increased complexity. Herein lies one of the major dilemmas of modern society. Big government is least able to deal with complexity, for a complex society cries out for local control, citizen participation, democratic government. Our level of understanding of major social issues is far below that necessary to regulate and control at a national level, although clearly national policies are required which provide general guidance for local initiative and implementation. Thus, technology concentrates power at a time when the increased complexity it brings requires less-not moreconcentration. In managing technology in the next decade and beyond, we face two principal hazards. The first is that we will revert to a neo-Malthusian view and seek to throttle technology unnecessarily or-worse yet-to abandon it altogether. The second is that we will become neo-technological optimists, believing that we know enough to forecast and control completely the social consequences of technology. To avoid either of these extremes, we need to develop a strategy for the next
FUTURES
December 1975
decade that following :
permits
us
to
do
the
o to place the greatest emphasis on moniioring technology as it develops and in situ ; achieving this objective requires a broad programme of experimentation, assessment, and indicator design. a to increase greatly the level of public participation and involvement in technology assessment;
From Prophecy to Prediction
the major issues are political and social, not technological, and thus the interplay of values and preferences is paramount for effective social choice. 0 to approach the understanding of technology and society with both undertak“nerve” and humility, ing a wise exploration of technological alternatives with a keen sense of the limits of the tools of forecasting, planning, and analysis.
seriahsed survey ot the movement of ideas, developments in predictive fiction, and first attempts to forecast the future scientificall<
A
9. Ideal worlds and ideal wars:
1870-1914
I. F. Clarke IF THE futurologists of the world ever unite-and there is an expectation of this in some recent science fiction stories-then they will no doubt look about them for a badge, seal, or heraldic shield to manifest their corporate identity. And if the futurologists follow in the worthy tradition established in 1439 by the Drapers’ Company in the City of London, then their blazon will probably read: Azure three mushroom clouds issuing from three sunbursts gules and beneath the words, If we had only ktiown ! This is a way of suggesting that futurologists should look backward before they begin to look forward, so that they may learn how all too easy it is to follow the graphs of hopes and fears to their apparent conclusions on the delights or disasters of the future.
1. F. Clarke is Chairman of the Department of English Studies, University of Strathclyde. He received the Pilgrim Award for 1974 from the Science Fiction Research Association ofAmerica in recognition of his contributians to the field.
FUTURES
December IS75
For this reason the articIes in this series have examined those developments in the past that have had a major effect upon the emergent practice of forecasting; and the authors have, in particular, looked into the frame of reference that gave bearings and directions to the prophecies and predictions of the last hundred years. In their different ways three expert writers1 have shown how the dominant imagesideas, beliefs, aspirations, and anxieties --of past periods have been decisive in projecting their own characteristic perspectives into the desert regions of time-to-come. This is to say that the frame of reference-the mass of assumptions in any period-is a subtle instrument for the deception of mankind. For we live rather like the prisoners in Plato’s cave, ever observing the activities of our times as they are projected upon the blank screen of the future and ever uncertain that these shadows of coming things will become the realities of tomorrow’s world.
A section of the journal in which ideas and topics that indicate potential considerations for futures research are discussed.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTERACTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY Roy Amara I: will begin my observations of the interaction of technology and society by defining terms. For our purposes, technology can be viewed as comprised of two major components: ~~y~cu~ art$%cts such as laser, computers, refineries, bridges-the hardware of technology; and soti& ~~ty~~n~ that include methods, procedures, knowhow, regulations, laws-the software of technology. Similarly, society may be assumed to be comprised of: in& uiduals whose perceptions influence attitudes, goals, and values; and ins& tutions that embody processes which determine how we organise, relate, and make social choices. Society makes choices-explicitly and implicitly-of particular technologies in accordance with the dictates of its values and institutional structures. From the application of such technologies, in turn, derive important consequences that make impact on these values and structures.. The nature of this interaction has been characterised by a wide range of views which basically revolve around the pessimistic (or Malthusian) and the optimistic standpoints. At one level, the technoIogical pessimist maintains: Roy Amara is President of the Institute for the Future, Menlo Park, California. His observations are extracted f&n remarks made at the opening session of the 1975 International Conference on Cybernetics and Society, September 23-25, San Francisco, California.
FUTURES
December IS75
We Sive in a world of finite resources in which technology can provide a temporary respite in the race with population growth. Technology provides this respite by increasing productivity and decreasing the death rate, while Ieaving birth rates essentially unaffected. Eventually, population growth overtakes productivity improvements, and equilibrium is again estabEs&d at high birth rates and high death rates.
In contrast, the technolo~cal maintains :
optimist
There are no real limits to resources since technology can always come to the rescue to reduce, if not eliminate, scarcity. Thus, technology not only operates to increase productivity and decrease death rates, but it also decreases birth rates in the long run. The result is the establishment of an improved standard of living (and quality of life) at a new equilibrium between low birth rates and low death rates.
The history of the last two or three decades in the USA illustrates how we have moved along this continuum, but at a different level. The 1950s may be characterised as the decade of the ascendency of physical technology with dramatic developments in space exploration, nuclear energy, computers, communications, and the like. Similarly, the 1960s were clearly years of the ascendency of social technology in which no social problem (welfare, health, education, etc) was viewed as too complex to yield to analysis and solution (eg, “Great Society”‘). By way of contrast, the decade of the 1970s may be characterised as one of “pause and reappraisal”, where we are not ready to revert to a simplistic technological
5 16
Futures Essay
pessimism, but neither are we prepared to return to the unbounded technological optimism of the prior two decades. Our views for the 1980s on the role of technology in society will largely be shaped by the outcome of the present reappraisal which poses some basic questions about the role of technology in society : l l l l
What can technology do ? What else will it do? How much do we need ? What risks do we incur?
As such questions are raised, a number of critical issues are surfacing that need to be confronted. Four that I consider particularly significant are : Alienation. Technology operates to open up the range of personal choices available to the individual, creates greater uncertainty about values and goals, and confronts each of us with unprecedented rates of change. For large segments of society-at one time or another-these effects create stresses which exceed the individual’s ability to cope adequately with his social environment. These stresses often engender strong feelings of “not belonging”, with the result that a “dropping-out” or “severing of the social contract” takes place. Diminishing of person-to-person contact. It is indeed somewhat surprising to recognise how often technology operates to isolate us as individuals rather than to foster personal interaction. The automobile, the television, and even the telephone act to decrease considerably the opportunities for face-to-face exchanges. The inevitable result is a loss of any sense of community with our neighbours and a more general loss of human dimensions in personal relations. Concentration of wealth. Technology almost always concentrates wealth among (and within) nations because of the effects of economies of scale, the division of labour, and the growth of cartels. One result is a further widening
of the gap between developed and developing countries, with the prospect between of “wars of redistribution” “haves” and “have-nots” a growing spectre on the international front. Concentration of power. Technology increases the size and role of government because “big government” is needed to regulate “big industry”, to meet the demands for increased public goals, and to deal with the expanded national scale that considerations of population, mobility, national defence, and economic planning dictate. At the same technology operates to raise time, considerably the level of complexity of the issues that society must confront. This observation is equally as true whether one is a technological optimist or a technological pessimist. One of the inevitable prices of increased technology is increased complexity. Herein lies one of the major dilemmas of modern society. Big government is least able to deal with complexity, for a complex society cries out for local control, citizen participation, democratic government. Our level of understanding of major social issues is far below that necessary to regulate and control at a national level, although clearly national policies are required which provide general guidance for local initiative and implementation. Thus, technology concentrates power at a time when the increased complexity it brings requires less-not moreconcentration. In managing technology in the next decade and beyond, we face two principal hazards. The first is that we will revert to a neo-Malthusian view and seek to throttle technology unnecessarily or-worse yet-to abandon it altogether. The second is that we will become neo-technological optimists, believing that we know enough to forecast and control completely the social consequences of technology. To avoid either of these extremes, we need to develop a strategy for the next
FUTURES
December 1975
decade that following :
permits
us
to
do
the
o to place the greatest emphasis on moniioring technology as it develops and in situ ; achieving this objective requires a broad programme of experimentation, assessment, and indicator design. a to increase greatly the level of public participation and involvement in technology assessment;
From Prophecy to Prediction
the major issues are political and social, not technological, and thus the interplay of values and preferences is paramount for effective social choice. 0 to approach the understanding of technology and society with both undertak“nerve” and humility, ing a wise exploration of technological alternatives with a keen sense of the limits of the tools of forecasting, planning, and analysis.
seriahsed survey ot the movement of ideas, developments in predictive fiction, and first attempts to forecast the future scientificall<
A
9. Ideal worlds and ideal wars:
1870-1914
I. F. Clarke IF THE futurologists of the world ever unite-and there is an expectation of this in some recent science fiction stories-then they will no doubt look about them for a badge, seal, or heraldic shield to manifest their corporate identity. And if the futurologists follow in the worthy tradition established in 1439 by the Drapers’ Company in the City of London, then their blazon will probably read: Azure three mushroom clouds issuing from three sunbursts gules and beneath the words, If we had only ktiown ! This is a way of suggesting that futurologists should look backward before they begin to look forward, so that they may learn how all too easy it is to follow the graphs of hopes and fears to their apparent conclusions on the delights or disasters of the future.
1. F. Clarke is Chairman of the Department of English Studies, University of Strathclyde. He received the Pilgrim Award for 1974 from the Science Fiction Research Association ofAmerica in recognition of his contributians to the field.
FUTURES
December IS75
For this reason the articIes in this series have examined those developments in the past that have had a major effect upon the emergent practice of forecasting; and the authors have, in particular, looked into the frame of reference that gave bearings and directions to the prophecies and predictions of the last hundred years. In their different ways three expert writers1 have shown how the dominant imagesideas, beliefs, aspirations, and anxieties --of past periods have been decisive in projecting their own characteristic perspectives into the desert regions of time-to-come. This is to say that the frame of reference-the mass of assumptions in any period-is a subtle instrument for the deception of mankind. For we live rather like the prisoners in Plato’s cave, ever observing the activities of our times as they are projected upon the blank screen of the future and ever uncertain that these shadows of coming things will become the realities of tomorrow’s world.