Strategic diversity in labor PAC contribution patterns

Strategic Diversity in Labor PAC Contribution Patterns

RICHARD HURD* Cornell University JEFFREY SOHL University of New Hampshire

This article explores variations in labor PAC contribution patterns. The conclusions drawn are based on interviews with union political operatives, and on a principal component and cluster analysis of labor PAC expenditures in 1984 House elections. The principal component analysis confirms that unions typically pursue an electoral strategy. The analysis also reveals important ideological cross currents, including conflicting practices of support for conservatives versus support for ideological allies. The principal component analysis is extended with the aid of clustering techniques, which are used to lend precision to the diversity in labor PAC contribution patterns. Five clusters of unions are identified, each displaying a distinct allocation strategy.

The involvement of unions in campaign financing has expanded considerably over the past two decades. This activity, combined with the availability of Federal Election Commission data on political action committee (PAC) expenditures, has attracted the attention of academic researschers who have promulgated a fairly substantial body of literature on the subject. With few exceptions the research on labor PAC allocations has focused on candidates and whether or not they are supported by labor PACs as a group, with comparatively little attention devoted to the factors which influence individual union campaign financing decisions. The research reported here was designed to identify distinct contribution patterns within the labor movement, and to group labor unions according to these

*Direct all correspondence Cornell University, Ithaca,

to: Richard Hurd, New York State School of Industrial New York 14851-0952. Telephone: (607) 255-2765.

The Social Science Journal, Volume 29, Number 1, pages 6546. Copyright @ 1992 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0362-3319.

and Labor

Relations,

66

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29iNo.

l/l 992

contribution strategies. As explained below, the research methodology was inspired by the institutionalist school of economic analysis. We began by conducting interviews with representatives of the labor movement on PAC allocation decisions. We determined that we would let our interviews drive the research. This inductive approach contrasts with the more typical format of proposing a model of PAC allocation decisions, developing hypotheses based on the model, and subjecting the hypotheses to empirical testing. Consistent with our inductive mode we adopted an exploratory multivariate approach. Based on the interviews, we identified several dimensions along which we could track labor PAC allocations. We then used principal component analysis to interpret the data on labor PAC expenditures in the 1984 elections for the House of Representatives. In the most important part of our research we employed clustering techniques based on the principal component results to separate the PACs into five distinct clusters, each of which pursued an identifiable allocation strategy. It is clear from the results that unions are systematically diverse in their PAC allocation patterns. Following a discussion of our methodological and theoretical framework and a brief review of the literature most directly relevant to our research, we will report the interview results and explain more thoroughly the principal component and cluster analysis we performed.

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL

FRAMEWORK

This research has been substantially influenced by institutional economics. In contrast to the static equilibrium analysis of market processes promulgated by mainstream neoclassical economists, institutionalists include concern for economic, political and social institutions and the evolving power structure. Methodologically, institutionalists avoid the a priori reasoning and deductive analysis of orthodox economists, and instead adopt an indeterminate, exploratory approach best described as critical inquiry.’ After positioning our research within institutional economics, we will describe how our statistical methodology also flows from this school of thought. The object of our inquiry is firmly rooted within institutional economics. As Warren Samuels has noted “institutional economists go deeper [than neoclassicalsl to . the processes in which interested groups compete for the use of government.. .“2 More specifically, Stephen Woodbury has observed that “to try to discuss how the labor movement has used its political power... [is] the natural domain of the Although union political action has received little attention from institutionalist.“’ institutionalists in recent years. it was a primary concern of John R. Commons who is generally regarded as one of the three most influential early institutionalists (along with Thorsten Veblen and Wesley Claire Mitchell).J In Commons’ view, economic science should focus its attention on collective action, in particular corporations, unions and political parties which are in essence organized “pressure groups.“’ As Mancur Olson interprets Commons, the union as a political pressure group is among the most essential institutions in society, and even the “lifeblood of democracy.“’

67

Strategic Diversity

Without subscribing to all of Commons’ views, we agree that economists have much to learn from a better understanding of social institutions in general and trade unions in particular. We also agree that to thoroughly comprehend the role of unions, we must carefully study their political activities. Furthermore, we are convinced that it is inappropriate to group all unions together, and in this regard we also follow in the footsteps of Commons. As Allan Gruchy noted in a summary of Commons’ economics, “laborers are divided into many different groups, each of which has a distinct property interest to protect. “’ Institutionalist economist John Dunlop embellished this observation in a 1970 book co-authored with Derek Bok, offering a descriptive account of political “diversity and division within the labor movement.“8 The quantitative research on labor PACs published in the 1980s (summarized in the following section) did not directly address this diversity. Our curiosity regarding the dimensions of the political diversity led us to the research reported here. Our methodology follows naturally from our institutionalist leanings. To quote Edwin Witte, “Institutional economists have generally relied on induction rather than deduction.“’ The just first step of our inductive research involved interviews, and in this aspect we once again followed the lead of John R. Commons.” Our reliance on statistical analysis, however, is more in the tradition of another great institutionalist Wesley Claire Miller. Although he dealt primarily with business cycles and other macroeconomic topics, whereas we are concerned here with a microeconomic subject, we share with Mitchell a conviction that there is much to be learned from careful review of factual information with the aid of statistical analysis.” We should point out that the ultimate goal of institutional economists is to develop policy recommendations. In this regard the research reported here is not an end in itself, but part of an ongoing program to better understand what motivates labor political action. Our eventual intention is to use the acknowledge we gain through inductive statistical research to develop recommendations for unions regarding how to improve their political effectiveness.

LITERATURE

REVIEW

Those researchers who have studied the strategic aspects of PAC operations have identified two primary options. In one, the PAC chooses to be pragmatic and contributes money to likely winners, particularly those who are members of committees which have jurisdiction over issues important to the PAC. These pragmatic contributions are designed to increase the probability that the eventual winner will support the PACs position on some key issues. This option has been referred to by several authors as the “access strategy.“‘* Alternatively, the PAC may decide to follow a more ideological approach, contributing to candidates whose political views are similar to those of the PAC. PACs which follow this ideological pattern typically target their contributions to politically friendly incumbents involved in potentially close elections, to promising challengers of incumbents who actively oppose the PACs interests, and to ideologically congenial candidates for open seats. This option has been labeled the “electoral strategy.“13

68

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29/No. l/1992

Ian Maitland notes that PACs with very narrow interests will tend to follow an access strategy, particularly if it is possible to convince key members of Congress that voting for the interest group will not create problems with the legislators’ normal constituency. On the other hand, PACs that are concerned with a broad range of programmatic issues will be more likely to support ideological allies and thus pursue an electoral strategy.14 Most researchers who have studied labor PACs portray them as following a middle road, adopting a combined electoral and access strategy.r5 There is general agreement, however, that labor PACs emphasize electoral aspects of their strategy somewhat more than access.” Marrick Masters and Asghar Zardkoohi, who have completed the most detailed analyses of labor PAC contribution patterns, go even further and conclude that, “the electoral strategy is evidently pervasive in the labor movement. . . [indicating] that labor PACs are relatively homogeneous in their preferences.“i7 The perception of substantial homogeneity among labor PACs pervades the literature. As Masters and John Delaney note in their review article, we are left with the predictable conclusion that unions allocate PAC funds to liberals and Democrats.18 Although their research deals only peripherally with labor PACs, Theodore Eismeier and Philip Pollock decry the tendency to assume homogeneity of interests and strategy within types of PACS.‘~ The research reported here was inspired in part by a similar concern. We entered the project with suspicions that labor is less monolithic in its PAC contribution patterns than the literature implies. Summary of Interviews with Union Political Directors AFL-CIO

Influence

on PAC Allocations

Efforts by the AFL-CIO to influence the campaign activities of member unions were described to us by Marta David of the Committee on Political Education (COPE) national office, and by Madeline Matchko, COPE director for New England. The election related political activity of the AFL-CIO is coordinated by the COPE Operating Committee, made up of all the political directors of the national unions belonging to the AFL-CIO. Campaign activity related to races for the U.S House of Representatives is influenced substantially by the COPE House Marginal Committee, essentially a subcommittee of the COPE Operating Committee. Throughout the 1980’s the membership on the House Marginal Committee was relatively stable with little turnover in the thirty or so unions represented. In 1988 there were officials from thirty-one unions on the committee, including the fourteen largest AFL-CIO unions and a reasonable cross section of XI other unions. The primary function of the House Marginal Committee is to identify those House races which are most likely to benefit from the active support of organized labor. COPE endorsed candidates involved in potentially close races are considered for a possible spot on the House Marginal List. The committee meets monthly beginning in February of each election year, with more frequent meetings after Labor Day. Starting with incumbents the committee develops and revises the list

Strategic Diversity

69

at each meeting, and discusses the status of the campaigns of those already on the list. The House Marginal List is distributed to all AFL-CIO unions, and to allied political organizations including the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the National Council of Senior Citizens.” A candidate’s endorsement at the state level, usually at some type of COPE convention organized by the state AFL-CIO, is a prerequisite for consideration for inclusion on the House Marginal List. Endorsement of incumbents is based primarily on their record on key legislative votes specified by COPE; the percent right is usually referred to as the representative’s “COPE score.” A questionnaire developed by the AFL-CIO Legislative Department covering key legislation likely to be considered in the next Congress is distributed to all candidates, with responses especially helpful in making endorsement decisions for challengers and candidates for open seats.22 To earn a spot on the marginal list, incumbents must convince the marginal committee that they face a closely contested campaign, and challengers must demonstrate that they are in a position to oust the incumbent. Endorsed candidates vying for open seats are always reviewed for possible inclusion on the marginal list. The potential closeness of a race is determined by the voting history of the district, with the vote in the most recent election given primary consideration where an incumbent is involved. Polls are also considered, but care is exercised to assure that they are “credible” (i.e., that reasonably rigorous polling techniques have been followed). In addition to demonstrating that the election is likely to be close, to gain a spot on the marginal list the endorsed candidate must prove that he/she has the ability to raise sufficient funds from non-labor sources to wage a competitive 23 campaign. National Union /‘AC Contributions In order to gain a better understanding of which factors actually influence the contributions of individual labor PACs, telephone interviews were conducted with twenty-four national union political directors or assistant political directors. Every effort was made to gain input from a reasonably representative sample of unions. Of those interviewed, twenty were from AFL-CIO unions (including fourteen represented on the House Marginal Committee), while four were from large independent unions. In terms of economic sector, the membership base of the unions was distributed as follows: mining and manufacturing 6, transportation 5, public sector 5, services and trade 4, and construction 4. The following discussion summarizes the interview results. Keep in mind that all questions were posed in the context of PAC allocation decisions.24 As would be expected, unions judge incumbents based on their voting records. Most unions (even the independents) consider the COPE score, but also compile their own ratings. The individual union rating systems tend to focus on legislation of special interest to the union’s members. In addition to voting record, many unions also consider the committee assignment of incumbents. Although committee membership is a secondary concern for most unions, the federal employee and transportation unions view it as “significant” or “very, very important.”

70

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29iNo.

111992

The evaluation of challengers and candidates for open seats is somewhat more complicated. Many unions actually interview candidates, or at least carefully evaluate their position on key issues. As an alternative or supplement to the interviews, many unions rely on their locals in the candidate’s district for an evaluation. Nearly half of those interviewed indicated that the first thing they look at in evaluating a challenger is the voting record of the incumbent. Nearly all of the unions are influenced by the potential closeness of an election in their contribution decisions. Voting history in the district and opinion polls are evaluated in deciding whether an election is likely to be close. One fourth of the respondents indicated that their primary source of information on this score is the House Marginal List. Most of those interviewed agreed that the House Marginal List played some role in their PAC allocation decisions. Some voiced strong support for marginal list candidates, but most indicated that the list was only one piece of information considered. For example, one union finds the marginal list particularly useful where they do not have members in the district, another uses it to identify friendly incumbents who are having problems, and (as noted above) several use it to determine which races are likely to be close. Even the independent unions are familiar with the marginal list and make use of the information it provides. Three quarters of those interviewed identified fund-raising ability as an important criteria. Most expressed the opinion that there is no sense contributing to a candidate who cannot raise money on his/ her own. A few displayed a somewhat different attitude, noting that they do not contribute to campaigns that already have substantial funds, or even that they prefer to give to candidates who get less from other sources. In most national unions, PAC contribution decisions are centralized in the national office. Although local input is sought regarding endorsements (some unions have a carefully developed formal structure to assure rank and file involvement in the endorsement process), most campaign funding decisions are made by the political director of the national union. The construction unions appear to be different, however, with more control granted to locals which often set up their own PACs. Even here, however, the national union keeps in close touch with the locals in an effort to coordinate PAC allocations. Although there are exceptions, most unions adopt a national strategy and contributions are only slightly influenced by the level of membership in a district. MULTIVARIATE

MODEL

For our analysis, we treat the labor PAC as the unit of measurement and adopt a multivariate framework to elucidate the underlying allocation strategies. Specifically, we examine labor PAC contributions to candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives for the 1984 election. We include alllabor PACs that contributed money to a House candidate involved in the general election. We incorporate all 1984 House candidates who received a money contribution from at least one labor PAC and either won the election or received the largest percentage of the vote among losers. All labor PAC contributions were combined according to the parent

Strategic

Diversity

71

union. As a result of these criteria, this study includes 263 labor PACs, representing 81 labor organizations, and 559 candidates in 433 elections. As a means of identifying the underlying allocation strategy of these 81 PACs and forming groups of PACs that exhibit similar contribution patterns we adopt a two-stage multivariate approach.25 In the first stage principal component analysis, a data reduction technique, is used to identify distinct sources of variation by reducing the dimensionality of a data set which consists of a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much as possible of the variation present in the data.26 In our research principal component analysis identifies the distinct sources of variation within our profile of labor PAC contributions. In the second stage the multivariate statistical procedure of cluster analysis is used to create a classification by empirically forming clusters or groups of similar entities. In general, a clustering method is a multivariate statistical procedure that analyzes information on the unit of study and attempts to organize these units into relatively homogeneous groups.27 Utilizing the principal component scores, cluster analysis groups labor PACs on the basis of similarities in their contribution patterns. These resulting clusters offer a refinement in the identification of the underlying allocation strategy of labor unions’ political activity. In sum, principal component analysis identifies the general underlying allocation patterns, cluster analysis forms groups of labor PACs that exhibit similar patterns, and a descriptive analysis of the resulting clusters is then undertaken to further elucidate the labor PAC allocation strategies for the 1984 election. We have chosen to classify labor contributions according to the seven dimensions discussed below. Based on the interviews we identified five dimensions which promised to be useful in our effort to detect strategic patterns in labor PAC allocations. To these we added two ideological categories to assist in the sorting process. Each dimension or category is represented by the percentage of a specified labor PACs 1984 House contributions going to candidates with the specified attribute. Table 1 outlines the operational definitions and data sources. 1. MARGINAL. This dimension measures the percentage of each labor PACs House contributions going to candidates who appear on the AFL-CIO 1984 House Marginal List. 2. COPE. This dimension measures the percentage of each labor PACs House contributions going to incumbents with high COPE ratings, or to challengers of incumbents with low COPE ratings. Use of an incumbent’s COPE score as a measure of support for issues important to labor is consistent with prior research.28 A minimum of 16 correct votes out of 31 votes tracked by COPE in 1983-84 is chosen as an indicator or labor support. A score of 16 is the minimum for those incumbents who appear on the House Marginal List. For challengers, interviews with union political directors indicated that the COPE score of the incumbent opponent is utilized in determining union PAC allocations. For this purpose, a COPE score of 8 or less is adopted as evidence that the incumbent is a political opponent of labor. 3. VULNERABLE. This dimension measures the percentage of each labor PACs House contributions going to candidates involved in closely contested races.

THE

72

Table 1.

Variables

SOCIAL

Used in the Principal

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Component

Sample*

Standard*

Variable

Mean

Deviation

COPE

0.855

0.131

Analysis

Source

The People’s Lobby: AFL-

incumbents with 2 16 correct COPE votes;

Cl0

challengers of incumbents with I

Congress

8 torrect

Vol. 29/No. l/l 992

Report on the 98th

COPE votes’ MARGINAL c-andidateson the AFL-CIO

0.482

0.200

0.820

0.137

AFL-CIO

House

marginal list RECEIPT

FEC Reports on Financial

candidates with 2 40% of total campaign

Activity 198X-84;

receipts in their specific House district as of

Report No. 7

Interim

the third quarter (June 30, 1984) VULNERABLE

0.413

0.170

1982 FEC tape

0.163

0.133

1983.84

candidates in races where the incumbent’s 1982 vote was I

55% of the total

COMMITrEE incumbents on one or more of six key

Congressional

Directory

labor committees; challengers of incumbents on one or more key labor committees with 5 4 correct COPE votes’ CONSERVATIVE

0.05 1

0.073

1984 FEC tape

0.867

0.1 05

1984 FEC tape

candidates who received contributions from

dt

least one of eleven well-known

conservative PACs’ LIBERAL candidate5 who received contributions from at least one of twelve well-known Ilberal PACsJ

Strategic Diversity

73

Consistent with prior research29 and the interviews, the tightness of a race is determined by the actual vote in the district in the previous (1982) election, with a winning share of 55% or less selected as the cutoff based on the interviews. 4. RECEIPT. This dimension measures the percentage of each labor PACs House contribution going to candidates with 40% or more of total receipts in the congressional district as of the last reporting date before the election. This attribute reflects a candidate’s ability to raise money and thus demonstrate that his/ her campaign represents a good investment of PAC funds. Reliance on the third quarter report and the demarcation point of 40% of total race receipts were specifically suggested in the interview with Marta David of the AFL-CI0.30 5. COMMITTEE. This dimension measures the percentage of each labor PAC’s House contributions going to incumbents serving on key committees, or to challengers of incumbents who are on key committees but who consistently oppose labor’s interests as indicated by a COPE score of 4 or less. Based on the interviews, we determined that nearly every House committee is important to one union or another. For simplicity we chose a generic approach, and selected those House committees important to all unions as reported to us by Michael Gildea of the AFL-CIO Legislative Department.3’ 6. CONSERVATIVE, and 7. LIBERAL. These dimensions measure the percentages of each labor PAC’s House contributions going to candidates whose ideology is defined as conservative or liberal, respectively. We adopted definitions of ideology which could be easily applied to incumbents and challengers alike. We categorized as CONSERVATIVE any candidates receiving money from at least one of eleven ideological PACs widely recognized as LLconservative.“32 We categorized as LIBERAL any candidate receiving money from at least one of twelve ideological PACs widely recognized as “liberal.“No candidate included in our study received funds from both liberal and conservative committees.

MODEL RESULTS Given our multivariate labor PAC profile, a principal component analysis on the covariance matrix was performed to uncover the meaningful relationships among the seven dimensions. Table 2 summarizes the results of the principal component analysis. The first three principal components are included in the table, but the remaining four are excluded since the contribution of each to total variation was minimal. A principal component is interpreted by the weight and sign of each variable. Principal component coefficients are reported only when the magnitude is sufficient to confirm a meaningful impact on allocation decisions.” Principal Component 1 accounts for 49.3 percent of the variation within the profile of labor PAC allocations, and MARGINAL is an important dimension as indicated by the magnitude of its principal component coefficient. Taken together with the only other important dimension, VULNERABLE, it appears that labor PACs as a group tend to follow an electoral strategy. We label this component “Pure Electoral Strategy.” Principal Component 2, which explains 19.5 percent of the variation, indicates that after allocating funds to marginal list candidates labor PACs split into two

74

THE

Table 2.

Principal

Component Principal

Component PC1

PC2 ideological

Strategy

Allies vs. Conservatives

,304

,598

-.291

COMMITTEE

,347

,570

-.312

LIBERAL

Eigenwlue

Strategy

.737

CONSERVATIVE

Percentages ol Variation Explained

PC3 Access

,616 ,697

RECEIPT VULNERABLE

Vol. 29/No. l/l 992

Coefficients

Pure

COPE MARGINAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Analysis on Labor PAC Allocations

Electoral Variable

SOCIAL

,427 49.3 0.068

19.5 0.027

17.7 0.025

distinct camps. One tendency (as indicated by the positive principal component coefficients) is to contribute to campaigns of candidates with good COPE ratings who are LIBERAL. These candidates are especially likely to benefit from labor contributions if they serve on a key COMMITTEE and appear on the MARGINAL list. This approach is followed by unions with positive scores on this component, and reflects an electoral strategy with some concern for access. The countervailing tendency revealed by Principal Component 2 (as indicated by negative principal component coefficients) is to contribute to campaigns of CONSERVATIVE candidates who are VULNERABLE. Those labor PACs with a negative score on this component display a surprising allocation pattern which seems to reflect an electoral strategy that is at odds with the bulk of the labor movement. This practice will be explored in more detail below when we examine clusters of labor PACs. We label Principal Component 2 as “Ideological Allies vs. Conservatives.” Principal Component 3, which explains 17.7 percent of the variation in the multidimensional labor PAC profile, further refines our understanding of the discretionary nature of labor PAC spending. The principal component coefficients indicate that after accounting for those tendencies revealed in Principal Components 1 and 2. allocations are also influenced by the ability of candidates to raise funds (RECEIPT), in conjunction with membership on key labor COMMITTEES. Both of these factors are related to access, RECEIPT because it reflects fund raising ability and thereby potential to be elected, and COMMITTEE because it reflects influence on legislation important to labor.34 Labor PACs with positive scores on this component display some commitment to an “Access Strategy,” which we adopt as the component’s label.

Strategic

75

Diversity

Tab/e 3. Cluster 1 IMAW LIUNA NALC NEA NFFE OCAW OPCM PPF RLCA SEIU TWU UAW UMW uwu

ACTWU AFGE AFSCME AFT APWU ATU BAC BBF BRC CIA HFIA IBFO ILGWU ILWU

Labor PAC’ Clusters

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

Cluster 4

Cluster

AFL-CIO AIW ANA BSOIW CWA GCIU IAM IBEW IUE OPEIU PAT RWAW SMW UFCW UPIU URW USA USATCO

AFM BCTD BMWE BRAC BRS CUTW HERE IAFF IUD IUOE NAPFE NAPS NTE PGW RWDSU UTU

ALPA BLE IBT ILA ITU MEBA NAATS NMU RLEA SIU

ABGW BCTW CPPAW ICW UFWA

5

Cluster Dmcriptionx

Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Notr:

1 2 3 4 5

-

Balanced Approach Marginal List Advocacy Support for Friends of Labor Transportation Access Marginal List Allegiance

’ SeeAppendix

A for the names associated with the union abbreviations, and for the total contributions of each PAC

to 1984 House races.

Clusters of labor PACs In total, Principal Components l-3 explain 86.5% of the variation in labor PAC allocations. The second, and most important, stage of our multivariate analysis is to group labor PACs on the basis of the similarities in their principal component scores, which are calculated by applying the coefficients for the three principal components to actual contribution percentages. A cluster analysis for the 8 1 labor PACs was performed employing the agglomerative hierarchical clustering procedure of average linkage. Agglomerative hierarchical methods proceed by a series of successive mergers that begins with the individual items. Thus there are initially as many clusters as items. The most similar objects are first grouped, and these initial groups are merged according to their similarities. The average linkage method, which essentially computes an average of the similarity of a case under consideration with all cases in an existing cluster, is suitable for clustering variables such as the principal component scores utilized in this research.j5 This analysis produced five clusters of labor PACs, with the PACs within each cluster exhibiting similar contribution patterns. Only four labor PACs could not be clustered, all of them very small in terms of contribution amounts. A descriptive analysis of the resulting clusters was undertaken to further identify and refine the

76

THE SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29iNo.

111992

0.6 15

List Influence

0.50.4_

0.3-

$

0.2-

S

Ol-

8E

0.0

g ..: 6

MoreMargmalf

12

I

-0. 1 - More support for Conservatwes -0.2.

I More support for ldeologlcal Allies

.4

m3

-0.3-o-4-0.5-

List hfluence -0.6

1 1

Less MargInal

-0.6

I -0.5

I -0.4

1 -0.3

I -0.2

c -0.1

t -0.0

I 0.1

I 0.2

I 0.3

/ 0.4

I 0.5

c316

Principal Component 2 Figure 7.

Strategic Mapping of Labor PAC Clusters

Mean Scores for Principal Component 1 vs. Principal Component 2

labor PAC allocation strategies for the 1984 election. Table 3 lists the members of each cluster. The mean principal component scores for the five clusters and the three components are shown in Table 4. The descriptive statistics for these clusters are presented in Table 5. The titles given to the clusters were selected after evaluation of the principal components scores and descriptive data for each cluster. Clusters 1,2, and 5 pursue an electoral strategy, allocating funds to candidates whose positions on the issues are similar to those of organized labor, with the goal of helping them get elected. Cluster 3 follows a mixed electoral and access strategy, while cluster 4 pursues a somewhat unique access strategy as described below. The strategic diversity of the five clusters is depicted in Figures 1, 2, and 3 which graph each cluster’s average scores on the three pairs of principle components (1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, and 2 vs. 3). Cluster 2 includes the AFL-CIO, and reflects the federation’s desire to allocate funds to those candidates who are ideological allies of labor and will benefit most from the contributions. From Table 4 and Figure 1 we see that cluster 2 PACs earn a relatively large positive score on Principal Component I, indicative of a marginal list influenced electoral strategy. The positive score on Principal Component 2, though small, provides further evidence of electoral support for ideological allies. The modest negative score on Principal Component 3 denotes divergence from an

77

Strategic Diversity

0.6 More Marginal List Influence

0.5-

z

o.o-

x

-O.l--

2 ‘C a

_()2-

I 1

More Access Oriented

Less Access Oriented

B

-0.3-0.4-0.5-0.6

4

Less Marginal

-0.6

I -0.5

I -0.4

List Influence ,I I I -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 Principal

I -0.0 0.1 Component

0.2 3

0.3

0.4

Figure 2. Strategic Mapping of Labor PAC Clusters Mean Scores for Principal Component 1 vs. Principal Component

/ 0.5

( 6

3

access strategy. Confirmation of the essence of the approach of cluster 2 unions is available in Table 5. There we can see that cluster 2 PACs contribute an average of 62.0% of their funds to marginal list candidates compared to 48.3% for all labor PACs, and 50% to candidates in races where the incumbent is vulnerable compared to 41% for all labor PACs. Based on the available evidence, we label Cluster 2, “Marginal List Advocacy.” A similar pattern is evident for cluster 5. The most notable feature for this cluster in Table 4 and Figure 1 is the very large positive score for Principal Component I, which points to strong reliance on the marginal list. This is supported by Table 5 which shows that cluster 5 PACs donate 87.9% of their funds to marginal list candidates, and that 77.9% of their funds go to races where the incumbent is vulnerable. These are easily the highest proportions for any cluster on both dimensions. Note that the PACs in Cluster 5 are quite small, averaging about $30,000 in contributions to House races compared to $230,000 for all labor PACs. All five of the unions in this cluster belong to the AFL-CIO, and apparently allocate their limited funds based on advice from the federation with little deviation from the marginal list. Thus, we label Cluster 5, “Marginal List Allegiance.” The political strategy of the U.S. labor movement has long been described by the dictum “support your friends, oppose your enemies.” Cluster 3 unions appear

78

THE SOCIAL

0.6 ,

-O.l-0.2~

1il992

I

0.4-

‘U .E c

Vol. 29iNo.

More Support for Ideologiw! Allles

0.5

$

SCIENCE JOURNAL

I

Less Access Oriented

I

-0.3-

More Access Oriented

4

-0.4-

-0.6

1

More Support for

-0.5t -0.6

I -0.5

Conservatives

-0.4

I 1 -0.2 -0.1 Principal

-0.3

t

I 0.2 3

-0.0 0.1 Component

I 0.3

/ 0.4

Figure 3. Strategic Mapping of Labor PAC Clusters Mean Scores for Principal Component 2 vs. Principal Component

Table 4. Cluster Number

Mean Principal

I of unions

2

28

18

Component

, 0.5

C 6

3

Scores*

3

4

5

16

10

5

First Component

,009

.188

-.251

-.273

Second Component

,022

,027

,054

-.279

,033

-.025

-.073

,053

,072

,015

Third Component ,Q01e

* Mean principal component wxe

to follow

,552

for all labor unpins 15II for each tomponent.

this pattern in their PAC allocations. Information included in Table 4 is inconclusive. The relatively large negative score for cluster 3 PACs on Principal component 1 affirms that they do not follow an electoral strategy based on the marginal list. On the other hand, the modest positive score on Principal Component 2 is consistent with electoral support for political allies. At the same time, the modest positive score on Principal Component 3 is consistent with the pursuit of an access strategy. Table 5 helps explain the cluster 3 contribution pattern. Cluster 3 PACs contribute an average of 90.3yc of their funds to candidates with good COPE ratings (or opponents of candidates with poor COPE ratings), the highest of any cluster. Furthermore, this cluster contributes more than the others to candidates on key

Strategic

Dfversity

79

Table 5. Cluster Number of Unions

Cluster Characteristics

I

2

3

4

5

28

18

16

10

5

81

281.878

129,152

348,760

30,393

230,232

TOtd

Mean Total Contribution to House Races ($i

280.894

Median Percentage Allocation to Candidate Categories: COPE

.880

.853

.903

,740

.874

,875

MARGINAL

,496

,620

,336

,255

,879

,483

RECEIPT

.822

.729

,917

,938

,751

,830

VULNERABLE

.409

,501

,275

,322

,779

.410

COMMWEE

.140

,083

,242

,165

,043

,148

CONSERVATIVE

.034

,018

.050

,211

,000

,028

LIBERAL

.876

,918

,840

,669

1.000

.877

committees, and contributes the smallest percentage of any cluster to races where the incumbent is vulnerable. These factors point to a strategy which is influenced more by past deeds than by current financial needs. Thus, we label Cluster 3, “Support for Friends of Labor.” Cluster I unions appear to follow a pattern which lies somewhere between the marginal list driven strategies of Clusters 2 and 5 and the reward your friends strategy of Cluster 3. The mean scores for cluster 1 PACs reported in Table 4 are small in magnitude for all three components. The small positive values for Principal Components 1 and 2 do point to an electoral strategy while the small negative value for Principal Component 3 suggests that cluster 1 PACs reject an access strategy. This pattern is further clarified in Table 5, where we can see that Cluster 1 contribution shares are very close to the median for all clusters for every dimension, and in Figure 1 which places Cluster 1 almost at the origin. Thus, we label Cluster 1, “Balanced Approach.” Cluster 4 is in the one group which clearly breaks from the ideological pattern followed by the other labor PACs, as is highlighted by its position in Figure 1. From Table 4 we can see that the scores of cluster 4 PACs are very similar to those of cluster 3 for Principal Components 1 and 3. Thus, cluster 4 does not follow an electoral strategy based on the marginal list, and does place some emphasis on access. However, the negative score on Principal Component 2 reveals that cluster 4 PACs diverge from other labor PACs by throwing electoral support to conservatives, who are generally thought to be the political enemies of organized labor. Table 5 confirms this pattern. Cluster 4 PACs contribute the lowest share of any cluster to marginal list candidates, to candidates with positive COPE ratings, and to liberal candidates. Cluster 4 PAC’s contribute the highest share of any cluster to conservative candidates and candidates with substantial donations from other

80

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29iNo.

1il992

sources. In order to understand what motivates this pattern, we have explored in detail the contributions of each PAC in Cluster 4 and have discovered an interesting common thread. The conservatives who receive substantial donations from cluster 4 PACs are all incumbent members of one or more of the following House committees: Appropriations, Rules, Budget, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Public Works and Transportation. The first three of these committees are generally considered to be among the most influential committees in the House, and the last two are the key committees for transportation legislation. Note that nine of the ten unions in cluster 4 have their primary membership base in the transportation sector. Apparently the unions in cluster 4 are willing to financially support candidates who are not generally friendly to labor, in hopes of gaining access to them in an effort to influence legislation of special interest to their members employed in the transportation industries. Thus we label cluster 4, “Transportation Access.”

Analysis of Union Distribution

Across Clusters

An examination of the makeup of the clusters reveals a few tendencies which should be noted. Most large public sector union PACs appear in Cluster 1. The electoral strategy of this cluster is consistent with the heightened importance of political action for unions whose members are so directly affected by the legislative and budgetary process. The balanced approach of Cluster 1 is also appropriate, since public sector unions must be concerned with maintaining good relations with friendly legislators as well as attempting to influence the balance of power in the House. It will be a surprise to some that construction unions and manufacturing unions display similar PAC allocation patterns. The large unions from both sectors are concentrated in Cluster 1 and 2 with a roughly even split between the two. At least on the surface this seems to contradict Maitland’s conclusion that “vestigial differences apparently remain between old AFL and CIO unions.“36 To investigate this issue further, the thirty-two unions which were members of the CIO at the time of the 1955 merger were traced to their 1984 successor organizations. The CIO descendants are somewhat more concentrated in the electoral strategy clusters (1, 2 and 5) than the entire population of labor PACs (76’% compared to 66%). Among the CIO unions appearing in the other clusters are the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union in cluster 3, and both the Marine Engineers and the National Maritime Union in cluster 4.” The unique role of COPE within the AFL-CIO is highlighted by the presence of two other AFL-CIO departments in Cluster 3: the Industrial Union Department (IUD) and the Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD). COPE’s primary responsibility is to coordinate election related activity, thus following the marginal list based electoral strategy of cluster 2. The IUD and BCTD, on the other hand, pay special attention to the specific legislative concerns of their member unions and therefore support influential legislators who are ideological allies. Independent unions do not appear to differ noticeably from AFL-CIO unions in their allocation strategies. The major independents are scattered, with the

81

strategicDiversity

National Education Association, the Rural Letter Carriers and the United Mine Workers in cluster 1, the American Nurses Association in cluster 2, the National Treasury Employees in cluster 3, and the Teamsters and Locomotive Engineers in cluster 4. The electoral and legislative interests of the independents transcend questions of affiliation in the formulation of PAC allocation strategies. Our conclusions regarding the political strategy of the transportation unions represented in cluster 4 are consistent with other research. Two papers have singled out one cluster 4 union, the Marine Engineers, for its willingness to contribute to conservative candidates.38 At least one author has also noted that maritime unions (four of which appear in cluster 4) give to incumbents with ports in their districts regardless of political affiliation.39 In their research on levels of labor PAC donations, Masters and Delaney have revealed that transportation unions are more politically active than unions from other sectors as measured by both total and per member contribution.40 Our results augment these studies by uncovering a clear pattern in the PAC allocations of nine labor organizations based in the transportation sector. The pragmatic nature of this strategy is related to the important role of federal regulation in transportation. As Gregory Saltzman has noted, “PAC money can easily influence votes on little publicized regulatory issues. rr4’This is consistent with Maitland’s assessment that PACs will tend to follow an access strategy if their legislative concerns are “so narrow that accommodation does not arouse much opposition from other interests.“42

CONCLUSIONS The research reported in this article has relied on interviews and descriptive statistical methods to explore variations in labor PAC allocation strategies. The interviews were helpful in identifying key variables which influence campaign contribution decisions, and in interpreting the analytical results. Although most of the factors studied had been included in prior research, our interviews proved to be useful in specifying the variables; for example our decision to use the COPE score of the incumbent as a measure of the ideology of the challenger. In addition, we were able to include an element which had not been explicitly investigated, the COPE House Marginal List. The principal component analysis has allowed us to detect distinct patterns in the data which help elucidate the strategies of labor PACs. Our results corroborate that the predominant tendency is to pursue an electoral strategy. On the other hand, we have demonstrated clearly that labor PACs are not monolithic in their allocation patterns. There are important ideological cross currents beneath the surface, as revealed by Principal Component 2 which highlights the conflicting strategies of support for conservatives versus support for ideological allies. It was by extending the principal component analysis with the aid of clustering techniques that we realized our original objective. The interviews indicated considerable variability in the details of union political directors’ explanations of their allotment of PAC funds. By clustering labor PAC we are able to lend some precision to this variability. The five clusters represent distinct allocation patterns. Three of the clusters (1, 2 and 5) consist of labor PACs which pursue electoral

82

THE SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29/No.

l/l 992

strategies, but the three clusters are heterogeneous regarding the weights attached to various dimensions as described above. The other two clusters consist of labor PACs which pursue alternative strategies. Cluster 3 unions follow the traditional philosophy of supporting the proven friends of labor. Only cluster 4 PACs break from the ideological uniformity displayed by the labor movement, opting instead for an access strategy apparently aimed at achieving narrow legislative objectives related to transportation policy. We believe that our research has uncovered some intriguing heterogeneity in the allocation strategies of labor PACs. This contribution was built upon the information we garnered from our interviews with union officials, and enhanced by our reliance on descriptive statistical methods well suited to the task of unveiling hidden patterns present in the raw data. We hope that both our results and our research methodology prove to be provocative to scholars who study the political activities of unions and other interest groups in our society.

APPENDIX A Total Contributions

Cluster 1

($1

153,590

ACTWU

Clothing

AFGE

Government

and Textile Workers Employees

AFSCME

State, County

and Municipal

AFT

Teachers

246,088

APWU

Post Workers

418,145

ATU

Transit Union

232,850

BAC

Bricklayers

BBF

Boilermakers

283,435 Employees

631,740

41,425 135,873 51,550

BRC

Railway Carmen

CIA HFIA

Carpenters Asbestos Workers

IBFO

Firemen and Oilers

ILGWU

Ladies Garment

537,249

ILWU

Longshoremen

IMAW

Molders

LIUNA

Laborers

44,299 8,865 382,41 5

Workers

50,840

and Warehousemen

7,550

and Allied Workers

2 14,950

NALC

Letter Carriers

1,004,691

NEA

Education

i ,382,554

NFFE

Federal Employees

OCAW

Oil, Chemical

OPCM

Plasterers and Cement

PPF

Plumbing

36,905

and Atomic

49,802

Workers

8,900

Masons

and Pipe Fitting

126,195

RLCA

Rural Letter Carriers

239,767

SEIU

Service Employees

150,132

TWU

Transport

UAW

Automobile,

UMW

Mine Workers

uwu

Utility Workers

61,325

Workers Aerospace

Workers

1,182,818 176,940 4,150

icontinued

Strategic Diversity

83

Appendix kontinued) Total Contributions

Cluster 2 AFL-CIO

American

Federation

AIW

Industrial

Workers

ANA

Nurses

of Labor-Congress

of Industrial

Organizations

($)

441,275 19,550 197,689 150,123

BSOIW

Iron Workers

CWA

Communications

CCIU

Graphic

IAM

Machinists

IBEW

Electrical Workers

IUE

Electronic,

OPEIU

Office

PAT

Painters

RWAW

Roofers, Waterproofers

SMW

Sheet Metal Workers

UFCW

Food and Commercial

UPIU

Paperworkers

URW

Rubber Workers

USA

Steelworkers

USATCO

Air Traffic Controllers

532,260

Workers

46,265

Communications

1,017,872 570,158 79,869

Electrical

and Professional

20,750

Employees

42,730 and Allied Workers

20,260 438.586 950,369

Workers

29,270 81,025 434,360 1,400

Cluster 3 39,000

AFM

Musicians

BCTD

Building

BMWE

Maintenance

BRAC

Railway, Airline

BRS

Railroad Signalmen

CUTW

Connecticut

HERE

Hotel Employees

IAFF

Fire Fighters

IUD

Industrial

1UOE

Operating

NAPFE

Postal and Federal Employees

NAPS

Postal Supervisors

NTE

Treasury

PCW

Plant Guard Workers

RWDSU

Retail, Wholesale

UTU

Transportation

and Construction

93,708

Trades

87,475

of Way Employees and Steamship

Clerks

319,554 37,200

Union

of Telephone

5,624

Workers

101,454 30,730

Union

20,350

Department

659,927

Engineers

7,050 42,175 120,600

Employees and Department

Union

2,896 Store Union

16,250 482,431

Cluster 4 ALPA

Air Line Pilots

BLE

Locomotive

IBT

Teamsters

356,700

Engineers

168,015 668,674 340,098

ILA

Longshoremen

ITU

Typographical

MEBA

Marine

NAATS

Air Traffic Specialists

NMU

Maritime

5,035

Union

Engineers Union

RLEA

Railway Labor Executives

SIU

Seafarers

904,338 9,670 19,795 3,500 1,011,779 (continued)

84

THE SOCIAL

Appendix

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29/No.

l/1992

(continued) Totdl

Cluster5

Contributions

ABGW

Aluminum,

BCTW

Bdkrry, Confectionery

Brick and Class Workers

GPPAW

Glass, Pottery, Plastics dnd Allied Workers

ICW

Chemical

Workers

UFWA

furniture

Workw

AACSE

Classified School

AFGM

Grain Millers

NSO

National

UFW

Farm Workers

and Tobacco

($I

2,800 Workers

121,650 4,695 20,830 1.990

Employees

1,200 920

Staii Organization

500 1,333

Acknowledgment: The authors would like to thank Marvin Karson and Allen Kaufman, who introduced us to PAC research, the helpful comments of the two anonymous referees, and the union officials who participated in this study.

NOTES I.

For an excellent overview of institutional Economics: Philosophy, Methodology

economics, see Edythe Miller, “Institutional and Theory,” Social Science Journal, 15, 1

( 1978): 13-25. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Il.

Warren Samuels, Institutional Gonomics, Vol. I, (England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), p. 3. Stephen Woodbury, “Power in the Labor Market: lnstitutionalist Approaches to Labor Problems,” Journal oj’Eu~nomic Issues, XXI, 4 (1987): 1796. Lewis Hill, “Institutional Economics: The Quest for Relevance in the Economic Science,” Social Science Journal, 15, I ( 1978): 3-4. John R. Commons. The Gonomics of Collec,tive Action, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 33-34. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic, of’ Collec.tive Ac?ion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 116. Allan Gruchy. Modern Eknomk Thought, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1947), p, 171. Derek Bok and John Dunlop. Luhor and The American Community, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970). pp. 393-405. Edwin Witte. “Institutional Economics as Seen by an Institutional Economist,” in hzstitutionol G~onomiu, edited by Samuels, p. 32. For a description of the importance of interviews in Commons’ research, see Selig Perlman. “John Rogers Commons 1862-1945,” in Eu)nomics qf Collective Ac,tion, edited by Commons, p. 5. For a review of the quantitative economics of Mitchell, see Gruchy, Modern Eumomic. Thought, pp. 247-336.

StrategicDiversity 12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28.

85

Gregory M. Saltzman, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40, 2 (1987): 174; Marick F. Masters and Asghar Zardkoohi, “The Determinants of Labor PAC Allocations to Legislators,” Industrial Relations, 25, 3 (1986): 330; and “Labor Unions and the U.S. Congress: PAC Allocations and Legislative Voting,” in Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, edited by David Lewin, David Lipsky, and Donna Sockell, (Greenwich, “Access, Record, and Competition CT: JAI Press, 1987), p. 88; James F. Herndon, as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional Campaigns,” Journal of Politics, 44, 4 (1982): 998. Ian Maitland, “Interest Groups and Economic Growth Rates,” Journal of Politics, 47, 1 (1985): 49 offers an excellent description of this approach, but uses the term “pragmatic” rather than “access.” Masters and Zardkoohi, “Labor Unions and the U.S. Congress,” p. 88; and “The Determinants of Labor PAC Allocations,” p. 330. Once again Maitland, “Interest Groups,” pp. 49-50, offers an excellent description of this approach, but uses the term “ideological” rather than “electoral.” Maitland, “Interest Groups,” pp. 49-50. Henry W. Chappell, Jr., “Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 64, 1 (1982): 79. “Access, Record, and Competition,” pp. 1006-1007; Saltzman, Herndon, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues,” p. 174. Masters and Zardkoohi, “Labor Unions and the U.S. Congress,” p. 96. Marick F. Masters and John Thomas Delaney, “Union Political Activities: A Review of the Empirical Literature,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40, 3 (1987): 336353. Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, “Political Action Committee: Varieties of Organization and Strategies, ” in Money and Politics in the United States, edited by Michael J. Malbin (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1984) p. 128. Marta David, Chair, COPE House Marginal Committee, Washington, DC. Interview, July 12, 1988. Ibid. Madeline Matchko, COPE Director, AFL-CIO Region VIII, West Hartford, Connecticut. Interview, June 9, 1988. David, Interview, July 12, 1988. A copy of the interview schedule and a complete list of those interviewed with the dates of the interviews are available from the authors on request. Allen Kaufman, Marvin Karson, and Jeffrey Sohl, “Corporate Factionalism and Corporate Solidarity in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 15 (1987): 17 I - 186, and “Corporate Political Action Committees’ Strategies in the 1980 Congressional Elections,” The Social Science Journal, 25, 3 (1988): 289-307. LT. Jolliffe, Principle Component Analysis, (New York: Springer-Verlag, Inc., 1986). Douglas M. Hawkins, M.W. Muller, and T.A. ten Krooden, “Cluster Analysis,” in Topics in Applied Multivariate Analvsis, 2nd ed., edited by Douglas M. Hawkins (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1982) pp. 303-356. See, for example Saltzman, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues,” p. 169; and Allen Wilhite and John Theilmann, “Unions, Corporations, and Political Campaign Contributions: The 1982 House Elections,” Journal of’ Labor Research, 7, 2 (1986): 181.

86

29.

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCE JOURNAL

Vol. 29/No. l/1992

See for example Kevin B. Grier and Michael C. Munger, “The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions,” Journal of Labor Research, VII, 4 (1986): 358; and Saltzman, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues,” p. 173. 30. David, Interview, July 12, 1988. 3 1. Michael Gildea, Assistant to the Director, AFL-CIO Legislative Department, Washington, D.C. Interview, July 12, 1988. 32. Using contribution patterns of liberal and conservative organizations to indicate ideologies of labor PAC contribution recipients allowed us to derive ideological measures for both incumbents and challengers. More direct measures, such as ADA scores, are available only for incumbents. As a check on the validity of our measures we correlated LIBERAL minus CONSERVATIVE with ADA ratings for incumbents; the correlation coefficient of .45 is significant at the .OOOllevel. 33. Jolliffe, Principle Component Analysis. 34. The argument that both RECEIPT and COMMITTEE are closely related to similar access strategies is given some confirmation by the high correlation between the two; the correlation coefficient is .44 which is significant at the .OOOllevel. 35. Richard A. Johnson and Dean W. Wichern, Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1988). 36. Maitland, “Interest Groups,” p. 55. 37. Congress of Industrial Organizations, Cl0 1935-1955: Industrial Democracy in Action, (Washington, DC: Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1955) pp. 131-146; Courtney D. Gifford, Directory of U.S. Labor Organizations, 1984-1985 Edition, (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs, 1984) pp. 51-55. 38. Saltzman, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues,” p. 173; Maitland, “Interest Groups,” p. 55. 39. Chappell, “Campaign Contributions,” p. 82. 40. Marick F. Masters and John Thomas Delaney, “The Causes of Union Political Involvement: A Longitudinal Analysis,” Journal of Labor Research, 6, 4 (1985): 356; and “Interunion Variation in Congressional Campaign Support,“Industrial Relations, 23, 3 (1984): 414. 41. Saltzman, “Congressional Voting on Labor Issues,” p. 166. 42. Maitland, “Interest Groups,” p. 49; we should point out that four other transportation union PACs are part of cluster 3 which follows a mixed electoral and access strategy.