The Baltic transformed: complexity theory and European security

The Baltic transformed: complexity theory and European security

Book reviews / Political Geography 22 (2003) 585–598 591 fication. While that might be sufficient for travel writing, it is insufficient for scholar...

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Book reviews / Political Geography 22 (2003) 585–598

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fication. While that might be sufficient for travel writing, it is insufficient for scholarly writing. J. Hickman Berry College, Department of Government and International Studies Rome, GA 30149, USA doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00043-4

The Baltic transformed: complexity theory and European security Walter C. Clemens Jr; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001 This book applies complexity theory to the Baltic region. It is written by a senior scholar of international affairs—Clemens is a Professor of Political Science at Boston University and an Associate at Harvard University—and features a foreword by Jack Matlock, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1987–91. The central concern of the book lies with fitness—defined as “the ability to cope effectively with complex challenges at home and abroad” (p. xxii). Seeking to explain why the Balts (sic.) have been able to survive and thrive despite their small size, Clemens charts the ‘progress’ and ‘regress’ of Baltic fitness since the Viking era. His key proposition is that the Baltic case supports complexity theory’s central thesis: “that a capacity for self-organisation is a weighty factor in survival and prosperity” (p. 227). The first chapter introduces the reader to complexity theory, the second chapter reviews Baltic history, the subsequent nine chapters explore contemporary Baltic politics and economy, and the concluding chapter assesses the contribution of complexity theory to our understanding of Baltic and European security. Clemens’ narrative is accessible and assured, punctuated by statistics and journalistic accounts of his personal encounters with Balts. Despite the author’s enthusiasm for complexity theory and the Balts, the book is plagued by theoretical and empirical incoherence. In theoretical terms, two problems stand out. First, Clemens does not clearly explain what are the key assumptions and claims of complexity theory, how it relates to other approaches in security studies, and what it adds to our understanding of Baltic or European security. Ambitious claims are posited but not substantiated. For example, Clemens states that complexity theorists seek “a general theory able to explain many different types of phenomena” (p. 13), yet explains each of the theory’s key elements—fitness, coevolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organised criticality, punctuated equilibrium and fitness landscapes—in a paragraph or two. Regarding the Baltic region, he suggests that: “our understanding of Baltic, European, and world security can gain from linking complexity theory to insights gained from Immanuel Kant’s prognosis for liberal peace, from the model of complex interdependence, and from mutual gain theory” (p. 227), but does not explicate any of these insights or links. Most notably, Clemens’ analysis both exemplifies and obscures his debt to social Darwinism. He starts out

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by stating that complexity theory “modifies Darwin’s emphasis on natural selection as the key to evolution” (p. 13). He then makes a passing attempt to distinguish complexity theory from social Darwinism by maintaining that survival is determined “not just by luck (the correspondence between genetic mutations and environmental conditions), but by a capacity for self-organisation and mutual aid” (p. 13). Without further elaborating on this disclaimer, he subsequently provides a survival of the fittest account of the Baltic region. Oddly, given the initial praise for complexity theory, the concluding chapter is devoted mostly to concessions as to what complexity theory cannot explain. The reader is left with the blanket conclusions that Baltic fitness and security in 2000–2025 “may plateau or regress” (p. 242), and the policy implications of complexity theory are “extremely general” (p. 232). Given that Clemens recognizes numerous weaknesses in complexity theory, it is unclear why he does not consider the lessons that complexity theorists could learn from the Baltic case. The second theoretical problem lies in Clemens’ conception of culture as the cornerstone of his argument. Fitness is explained in terms of self-organisation, which is explained in terms of culture, which is not explained. Clemens posits that Baltic fitness stems largely from the Baltic states’ proximity to the West and acceptance of “Western values of individual dignity, self-reliance, and freedom” (p. 229), but he does not explain how exactly the Balts exemplify these values and how exactly do such values contribute to Baltic fitness. Nation, state, geography, ethnicity, and culture are all treated as given unitary facts. It remains unclear who or what exactly are the Balts—the three states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), their citizenry, residents, titular nations, or something else entirely? Even though Clemens’ argument hinges on the causal link between culture and fitness, his account of this link is contradictory. He first says that cultural diversity “may hold some inherent advantage akin to biodiversity or genetic diversity in humans”, but then states, drawing from the US example, that “if a growing percentage of US residents regard English as their second language, US fitness will probably suffer” (both on p. 237). How, then, do cultural diversity and hybridity fit into fitness? Empirically, the book does not develop a coherent line of argument but rather offers an eclectic series of episodes. Clemens touches on a wide array of issues, including the domestic and foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the foreign policies of Russia, and the fitness of the Asian Tigers. The significance of many of these issues for Baltic or European security remains obscure, however. For example, why does it matter when the Finno-Ugric, Baltic or Slavic tribes arrived on the Baltic coast, what exactly should the Baltic states learn from the Asian Tigers, or why is it significant that the Baltic states ‘excelled’ at the Sydney Olympics? This incoherence is exemplified by the index. Major issues in regional security such as soft or societal security, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Northern Europe Initiative or the Northern Dimension are not cited (although the Northern Dimension is mentioned under the European Union), but ‘size of states’ gets four entries, ‘losers’ get two entries, and Tina Turner gets one. This book thus offers scant insight into European or Baltic security. It does, however, present a thought-provoking example of complexity theory.

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Merje Kuus Department of Geography, The University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00045-8

The European culture area: a systematic geography Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov and Bella Bychkova Jordan. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002, xviii and 437 pp. maps, photos, diagrams, index. $59.00 cloth (ISBN 0-7425-1628-8) The fourth edition of The European Culture Area represents more than the continuation of a popular regional geography textbook, it provides an initial breadth of readings for understanding Europe. Perhaps contemporary scholars conflate Europe’s power in the world-system with its unification process under the European Union at the expense of cultural diversity and territorial fragmentation that still impress common identities. Jordan-Bychkov and Bychkova Jordan present Europe in its complexity through twelve chapters organized systematically, and they incorporate ample maps and other figures that illustrate various diffusions, regions, and landscapes. For those already familiar with previous editions, except for the addition of a coauthor, the fourth edition remains very similar. In addition to the prerequisite updates, the most notable change from the third edition consists of chapter reorganization, for example, the authors eliminate the rural landscape chapter, which becomes part of the agriculture chapter, reorder a few chapters, and rename the ecology chapter into habitat. Chapter One remains an engaging introduction on defining Europe that clearly identifies Europe as a cultural entity. The second chapter takes on a background quality as they describe the physical geography of Europe, yet the authors also use this chapter to introduce anthropogenic changes to the environment, which becomes one of the subtle themes of the textbook. The next three chapters (3-5) return to the main argument that Europe is a cultural entity with each chapter describing a particular part of European self-identity: religion, language, and genes/race. The authors are careful not to declare these as absolute traits especially the later, but more in an ethnographic fashion of what Europeans express about themselves. Geodemography, geopolitics, and cities are the titles of the next three chapters; each focusing a distinct sub-field of geography onto contemporary Europe. The political geography chapter deserves a little more elaboration for this audience. The authors present fragmentation as the key political trait of Europe using the number of states, autonomous regions as well as the continued presence of separatist movements as evidence for fragmentation. After a discussion of states and boundaries, they present ten different case studies that highlight various political geographic principals. The chapter ends with some discussion of supranational entities specifically the European Union and NATO. The remaining systematic chapters include two chapters on the economy (organized around industries) and one on the agriculture of Europe; as a