The Dubiousness of Assessing Appropriateness: Empirical Evidence

THE DUBIOUSNESS OF ASSESSING APPROPRIATENESS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

J.

van Brake!

Delft University of Technology/University of Utrecht, Julianalaan 136, Delft, The Netherlands

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate by means of fifteen brief case studies the practical problems involved in assessing the appropriateness of production systems (be it before or after their introduction) and the institutional frameworks that are meant to aid Ln the construction of appropriate production systems. This constitutes the second and major part of the paper. In the first part a conceptual framework is presented, indicating some of the theoretical problems involved in assessing appropriateness. Keywords. Appropriate production systems; chemical industry; economics; terminology; philosophical aspects; case studies.

conceptual framework in the first part, which is meant to illustrate some of the theoretical or a priori reasons for finding some useful use for the term "appropriate". The intention is to support an opinion about case studies in general, so that many different cases or examples are given. Of necessity, they cannot, therefore, be described in much detail. Some of the cases have been described in more detail in an earlier publication (van Brakel, 1978).

INTRODUCTION Originally a paper was submitted for this Symposium that would deal with the conceptual and terminological framework involved in talking about the selection of products and production systems and the mechanisms of transfer, generation, and adaptation of production systems. Hmvever, the organizers of the conference requested that my contribution should not be (only) theoretical but would deal more with the description of practical cases. The reason for this was that the theoretical aspects were already dealt with in invited lectures. The policy of leaving the analysis of the fundamental concepts of a subject only to the establishment of invited speakers would lead itself for very interesting case studies. In particular, it might lead to interesting results for the subject of "appropriateness". However, I also agree that analytical discussions about the basic ideas is of little relevance if the results of such discussions, if any, are not confronted with that part of reality they allege to refer to.

CONCEPTUAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK This part consists of four sections, which correspond roughly to the four topics that have been selected for this Symposium. Appropriate production systems In the English language the meaning of the term "technology" is ambiguous. Because it does matter what terms one uses, in particular in economics and other social sciences, I prefer to speak about appropriate production systems instead of appropriate technology. A production system is already quite a complex entity. It may be described in terms of:

In this contribution my aim is to illustrate firstly, that it is extremely difficult to assess in a particular case whether a production system or institution is appropriate - even if one is in exact agreement on what is to be considered appropriate in principle. Because, at least to some extent, the difficulty of giving true descriptions and correct assessments is due to the complexity of the subject matter, before embarking on the case studies in the second part of the paper, I present a

(a) the product it should produce (fulfilling some need); (b) the raw materials, the mecllanical, physical, and/or chemical operations, and the machines and instruments used to process the raw materials into the final product;

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J. van Brakel

(c) the individuals and social structures inside, and the institutions outside the production system that are necessary for it to produce; (d) the interaction of the production system with the physical and social environment (including macro- and long-term effects). Technology includes all knowledge about production systems. Technology is the knowhow to use various production techniques in order to produce, plus the know-that and how a particular production system affects both the individuals taking part in it, and the environment. The technology that is developed (or emerges) at a particular time and place is subject, as a matter of course, to socio-cultural influences. A production system is technically possible if it can produce the product needed. It is technically efficient if there are no other production sygtems that produce more output using the same amount of production factors. A production system is economically efficient if - given the prices of the production factors - there is no other production system that can produce the same output at lower cost. It is economically feasible if it is economically efficient at some reasonable shadow prices. What is reasonable is subject to discussion. Because production systems are complicated entities, interacting with their environment in complex ways, it is a technocratic fallacy that the economic feasibility of alternative production systems - that all fulfill the same need, say energ~ can be evaluated by technical means only. A production system is appropriate, relative to a given set of "ultimate" value judgements (providing the choice of product and an evaluation of the effect any production system has on its environment), when the best production system is chosen and put into operation according to expectations - given a correct analysis of the boundary conditions and their possible change. That is to say: Given a number of boundary conditions and specified goals, that one should choose the right (= correct = appropriate = good = adapted = optimal) production system (to be developed) is not a very original idea. The question is: what are the boundary conditions - and can they be changed, which goals have to be chosen - and by whom , what then is the best production system, and how can it be put into operation. This being said it will not come as a surprise that I think that asking for 'ways to measure the "appropriateness" of technology' is rather simplistic. If one insists on measuring it, two ge neral commen ts can be made. Firstly, appropriateness is not a physical magnitude; it is a predicate of a social system. Therefore, when proposing a measurement scale, one should (i) carefully distinguish between operational and

conceptual precision of the measure chosen, and (ii) realise that all interesting concepts are, whenever measurable, only measurable on multidimensional scales (conjoint measurement structures). Secondly, the meaning of "appropriateness" is - at least for most people - closely related to that of "development", and one may take advantage of the literature on the measurement of "development", and in particular learn from the methodological problems involved in measuring such concepts. CriLeria .f01 tIle choice of product and production sysLems In discussions about the choice of production systems it is usually overlooked that one first chooses a product to make and only then a production system. This is not a trivial matter. It is mainly due to the publications of Stewart that the importance of the choice of products starts to be recogni zed by economists as a more fundamental choice than that of the techniques used to make that particular chosen product. Product development may take the form of changes in the quality of existing products and the development of new products. Both types of development in Western industry have tended to the situation that product properties are so finely specified that only one production system exists to make it. New or improved products are developed and then marketed by large industries, who more or less by definition then operate on a quasimonopolistic market. Their only proble~ is whether or not there is any demand on that market, hence advertising is needed. Because the end product is highly specialized, and produced - given factor prices in industrialized countries - by capital-intensive techniques, this affects all previous production stages and the availability of alternative production techniques. For example, if consumers demand drip dry, colour fast, synthetic shirts, instead of cotton shirts, firstly shirtmaking techniques are bound to be capital-intensive, and secondly the feasible range of production methods at the stage of spinning and weaving (and sometir.es even cotton growing) is severely limited. We should start a costbenefit analysis not by asking: what techniques are available to make bricks (meaning in fact "bricks of standard and homogeneous strength, size and appearence") or shoes (meaning "the type of things the person making the analysis has on his feet on Sundays"), but we should ask: what products and techniques are available to fulfill the need of shelter or footwear. We might discover then that bricks designed to support the Empire State Building are certainly excessively strong for a single storey accommodation, and that footwear includes sandals cut from discarded automobile tyres, leather sandals made from locally tanned hides, stamped rubber and canvas shoes made from imported materials

The Dubiousness of Assessing Appropriateness in partly mechanized small-scale workshops, as well as mass produced factory shoes. It may also draw our attention to alternative raw materials: mud or bamboo in stead of concrete and corrugated iron, the first two giving better shelter in terms of heat cor'fort in tropical areas. The second point is that, of course, the criteria of choice are different depending on the person or institution making the decision. For example, the situation is not the same for the choice of a production system by an entrepreneur having or seeing a market and the choice of production systems at the national level where macroeconomic, welfare, and other political considerations prevail. Assuming that we look at what is the appropriate choice from some distance (some Archimedic point) most of the criteria that have been mentioned in the literature can be classified as follows: I.

Production factors:

1. 2.

labour intensive; low capital cost: (a) per workplace, (b) per unit of output, (c) per machine; low energy costs; simplicity: (a) in manufacture, (b) in operation, (c) in maintenance and repair, (d) in organization; locally oriented with respect to (a) scale of market, (b) available skills and entrepreneurs, (c) use of raw materials, (d) use of energy resources;

3. 4. 5.

11. Process of change aspects:

6.

geographically dispersed, rural development; 7. ecologically sound; 8. commercially viable (short/long term, increasing GNP); 9. fulfilling basic needs (products for lowincome groups); 10. self-help, control over production factors; 11. "organic growth" of production systems.

The criteria or features under 11 imply and set boundary conditions to the criteria given under I. Most pairs of criteria can be mutually inconsistent. Some pairs usually are inconsistent. Operationalisation of the criteria under 11 often make it impossible to meet one or more of the criteria given under I. Apart from the internal inconsistencies, there are the problems per se in giving an operational meaning to the criteria mentioned under 11. I give one illustration of this. Although the term "basic needs" has recently been much in use, its meaning tends to be rather emotional and abstract. Because it will be rarely appropriate to produce all products that are necessary to fulfill the "basic needs" oneself, one needs money to buy those products. This argument applies over the whole range from family to state. Therefore, to some

47

extent, money is a basic need and hence any product that can be sold outside the economic system considered fulfills in some sense a basic need for that system. I think the conclusion should be that there are no criteria for the choice of appropriate systems. That this is so, is rather self-evident, and most people will agree with the type of problems indicated above. The problem with the word "appropriate" is that it tends to undermine this insight. In the same way as systems theory is sometimes advocated as a panacea for everything, because "it offers scholars, educators, engineers, and artists new and harmonious ways of looking at the world" (Klir, 1972), and "Systems theorists investigate dynamic, goal-oriented systems, with definite if flexible programs for coping with their environment and assuring their growth and development" (Laszlo, 1972), in this same way, some people seem to think problems of choice become easier by throwing with great eloqu(·nce the term "appropriate" into the discussion. (In fact development specialists have assessed that "What the A.T. [Appropriate Technology] movement and its affiliates should be seen to be is a step in the development of thinking that leads one to the adoption of a Ivider "systems approach" to the choice of technology in development projects." (Mclnerney, 1977).) Models for transfer, adaptation and generation of production systems The distinction between adaptation and generation is not a simple one. Generally adaptation refers more to production systems, and generation to working things out from first principles. Together, however, they have to be clearly distinguished from transfer, because they may well be in conflict when choosing a policy. If transfer is made very easy this inhibits local development of technology and production systems. If, at the other extreme, transfer is made impossible one could argue - using the experience in China as an example that local entrepreneurs are forced to be inventive. We should carefully distinguish between the transfer of technology (i.e. the transfer of knowledge) and the transfer of production systems. In the literature, where this distinction is not made, probably the best definition is: 'h'hen scientific or technological information generated for, and used in one context is re-evaluated and/or implemented in a different context, the process is called technology transfer.' (Bar-Zakay, 1974) In that case it includes the technology transfer proper that is from one production context to another, e.g. helicopter technology from air force to toy industry. It also includes the transfer of Volkswagen manufacturing and marketing from Germany to Brazil, what I call transfer of

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J. van Brakel

production systems. In order to place the examples of transfer and adaptation in the second part of the paper in a general framework, I present here two models for the phases through which a transfer or adaptation process passes. For the appropriate choice and transfer of production systems these phases are as follows: (a) selection of plausible product(s); "plausible" means that it is on sociopolitical grounds considered desirable to manufacture these products (locally) and that production systems exist to do that in an economically feasible way; (b) select adequate processes from the alternatives available (including obsolete techniques and ideas aborted at the R & D stage of a process); (c) define clearly the basic differences between the environments for which the process was developed and the given environment; (d) evaulate the adaptive potential of (b) given (c) and make a provisional choice of process and basic techniques to be used; (e) negotiate and transfer the base technology (if necessary, include adaptation proposal); (f) adapt and fill in base design (only at this stage the unit operations are specified) ; (g) negotiate and transfer apparatus or specify task of contractor; (h) construction. In the process of adaptation the following stages may be distinguished (adapted from Giral): (i) availability of different processes or parts of them, in terms of patent rights, licences, pirating possibilities; (ii) sensitivity to scale; (iii) possibility of batch or semicontinuous operations, i e basically simplifying and disintegrating the process; (iv) sensitivity to raw materials (of apparatus needed as well as product quality); (v) flexibility with respect to product specifications in view of market to be catered for; (vi) ecological variables, including the adjustment of the production system to climatic conditions; (vii) integration with other plants and analysis of alternative multiproduct packages; (viii) adaptations following from the given infrastructural environment, including the local availability of materials and services; (ix) adaptation to the different characteristics of the factor labour. Dissemination of information In considering the organization of public services for developing and implementing appropriate production systems, information exchange and dissemination is a prime factor. As a background for the case studies that

follow, I would like to make just one comment on the importance of distinguishing carefully between the various types of information that may be needed, for example, as follows: (a) which options are available to make this product; (b) what is the economic feasibility of these options (in t his environment); (c) where and how do I buy an apparatus/ factory meeting t hes e specifications; (d) what reliable knowledge is available on t his subject; (e) who is presently doing R & D on t his production system; (f) who can help to finance this project; (g) who can help me to find out about (a) -

(0. It goes without saying that one needs different institutional frameworks, depending on the type of information required and the "market" one is working for. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING "APPROPRIATENESS": SOME CASE STUDIES The case studies here presented or referred to should speak for themselves; in most cases no attempt is made to arrive at general conclusions on the basis of them. (O~e reason for not doing this is that I think it would spoil the effect of illustrating what type of problems there are, as distinct from bickering about what one may and may ·not conclude on the basis of these examples.) I have tried to select the case studies from as wide a spectrum as possible. Cases showing the effect of the fundamental influence of boundary conditions Illegal brewing of "buzaa" The small-scale production of alcoholic beverages from local agricultural products is an age-old tradition: palmwine, pulque (from agave), rum (from sugar or palmwine), etcetera. Nowadays family and small-scale production is usually illegal because of health hazards. These are in many c ases quite serious. It is, however, doubtful whether police raids are a better investment than attempts to improve the quality of family scale production by instruction and perhaps temporarily subsidize these marginal production systems, or not? Nelson (1973) studied in detail the socio-economic structures involved in the illegal brewing of "buzaa" (a kind of beer) by women in the Mathare Valley in Nairobi: 'for many women with few skills marketable in the formal sector, no husbands and no land, this self employment in brewing buzaa is a simple and practical means of subsistence . . . . By participating in this "crime without victim" it can be said without exaggeration that most of these women avoid being a drain on Kenya's resources; and many contribute to her progress either indirectly through educating their children or directly by

The Dubiousness of Assessing Appropriateness sending money to the rural areas or by building houses.' Should we consider the illegal brewing of "buzaa" an appropriate production system or not. Synthesis of ethamtiutor'inCKorea. In the present world there is no development without underdevelopment, i e there is a relation of dependence between LDCs (less developed countries) and ODCs (overdeveloped countries), which places the development of LDCs under the power of ODCs. It may be useful to quote one example illustrating this type of problem in the context of research and development: An R & D project in South Korea to synthesize ethambutol (a drug for the treatment of tuberculosis) was held up for two years because of patent disputes. When these were settled, foreign suppliers of raw materials were reluctant to provide necessary raw materials, and further R & D was necessary to bypass this problem (Yang, 1977). In the present situation, this project should be considered as extremely successful, that is to say, both the R & D or?anization and the production itself would seem to be appropriate. But how appropriate are the boundary conditions under which this development and implementation took place? The East African Inaustrial Reseatch Organization (EAIRO). The EAIRO was established at Nairobi (Kenya) in 1942 to 'assist with industrial research ... when it became apparent that East Africa would have to manufacture some essential goods to avert the shortages brought about by the difficulty of importing from overseas at that time due to war conditions'. Compare the success of the research carried out during the war (1942-1947) and after the war (1946-1976) as indicated in TABLES 1 and 2.

49

The information in the tables is based on EAIRO (1970), recent annual reports and personal communications. The tables do not include all research, but only chemical production systems. The indications 'exists' and 'in use' imply that the production systems existed or the machines were in use before the EAIRO started research on them. Apart from the products and raw materials concerned it is indicated whether (partly) as a result of the EAIRO research the stage of commercial production was reached. The difference between the two periods can be called significant. Of the 15 products that were "commercially" produced during the war only three production systems survived: vegetable oil refining and hardening, pyrethrum extraction, and soap - the latter only with difficulty and continuous support of the EAIRO. The others could not compete with imported products. This illustrates two things: Firstly, that many production systems (possibly appropriate) could be realised, but have never been so in the given economic context. Secondly, even those that are economically possible are not always realised. (That is to say, the three production systems that survived owe their existence to the war.) The three production systems that have been brought to the stage of commercial production after the war illustrate another point: all of them are operated by foreign firms. The most recent success of the EAIRO, a bean-sorting-machine which separates the one per cent or so "rotten" beans from the coffee - a major innovation, is now produced and licenced by a British firm.

TABLE 1 Research carried out at the EAIRO during 1942-1947

product

raw materials

aluminium su~phate caustic soda cement copper sulphate glass paint lead (for pencils) phosphatic fertilizers building board domestic pottery adhessive insecticides khaki dye totaquina (anti malerial drug) beer nicotine sulphate soaps driers (for paints) creosote acetic acid

clay lime and sodium carbonate pozzuolana clays malachite sand barium sulphate graphite (not using sulphuric acid) Groundnut shells, sisal, ... clay latex pyrethrum plant extraction barley tobacco waste shea butter and others vegetable oils wood molasses (fermentation)

commercial production yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

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J. van Brakel

TABLE 2 Research carried out at the EAIRO In the period 1946-1976

product

raw materials

barium carbonate blackboard chalk cement bleacher agents sodium silicate plaster lead (for pencils) S-based chemicals bricks, tiles adhesive hecogenin (steroid) other drugs papain (enzyme) essential oils edible oils other oils and waxes dyes resins (phenolic) beer citric acid alcohol (spirits) methane furfural paper particle board charcoal fibres milling machinery dryers bean sorting machine

barium sulphate and sodium carbonate soapstone pozzuolana lime earths diatomite gypsum graphite sulphur earth, gypsum tannin extract sisal sisal, aloe, ... paw paw 22 plants oil seeds advocado, bagasse, sisal, ... anatto, ... cashew shell liquid various molasses cashew apple, molasses, ... sisal waste, ... various wastes papyrus, ... various wastes bagasse, cassave stalks bananas cereal coffee, pyrethrum, groundnuts, ... coffee

TABLE 3

commercial production

yes

exists yes

exists

exists In use in use yes

Scale factors for a number of chemical plants

product sulphuric acid carbon black calcium carbide ammonia urea styrene oxygen

capacity ran ge (1000 tons/yr)

n

0.62 0.2 0.5 0.58 0.59 0.53 0.47

-

I

0.7 0.8 0.81 0.71 0.9 0.64

Economies of scale. Under this heading I do not want to present a case stud:· of one particular system, but a case study of the way general rules of thumb are upset when the boundary conditions are different from the ones that one is used to. The term "economies of scale" refers to the fact that the cost of production factors is usually a function of the scale of production. Traditionally it is assumed that this empirical fact is best fitted by a power fun c tion, i e C = bQn, in which C is capital, Q is capacity, b is a constant and n is called the scale factor. In TABLE 3 scale factors are given for a number of chemical

10 4 5 18 16 5 60

-

500 500 60 500 500 300 150

n for LDCs (?) l>1

0.7

plants. The data given have been compiled from those quoted by Moore (1959), Robertson (1965), UNIDO (1959, 1965), Gallagher (1970), Guthrie (1970), Ruskamo (1974, personal communication). Moore reports data published as early as 1952 by Chilton and Leontief and criticizes the reliability of the data, because they are often based on two or three observations, while factors su ch as the location of the plant and the product grade have not been taken into consideration. I am not aware of any recent study on this subject, or any study at all that gives a statistical analysis on the question as to whether the values of n reported differ significantly

The Dubiousness of Assessing Appropriateness from I. Pratten (1971) has made a detailed study of almost all industrial branches in Britain, with respect to economies of scale. He does not find the exponent n representative enough to use as the sole parameter for economies of scale. He always find economies of scale, but hjs study is biased so much in finding the 'optimum maximum' scale, relying on the opinions of the experts engaged in building new - hence larger plants, that the results are not vP~v useful in the present context. Gallagher (1970) provides data "from his own files" without giving further detaIls. Guthrie (1970) presents data for 54 chemical processes: ' ... not many comprehensive, consistentlyplotted sets of such charts can be found in the literature. To fill this gap, I have tried to pull together a great deal of operating- and capital-cost data from personal files as well as secondary sources ... ' Guthrie co rre c ts his data for time (inflation) and location. At Delft University of Technology in 1974, Mr Ruskamp collected data as reported in chemical engineering journals over the same period as Guthrie does, and in particular for plants installed in LDCs there seems to be no relation at all between capacity and investment. If one forces a power function on the data for LDCs more often than not n > I (cf TABLE 3). Compared with the problems in choosing the appropriate price adjustments to compare different times and places, and the strong influence of the site-location, the choice of process (for the same product) does not seem to be important. All in all it follows that there is very little or no empirical evidence for the fact that there are economies of scale for chemical plants built in developing countries. Now it certainly does not follow from that that such economies of scale in fact are not present. But, it is clear that it is not the kind of choice for which one can use simple rules of thumb. That the economically efficient scale is a function of the environment as given (or made) may be illustrated further by the recent development in the USA with respect to refineries. Since 1974 about 40 "pygmy plants" (100 - 30,000 bbl/day) have come into operation, whereas plans for about ten largescale plants were abandoned. It is expected that for the next eight years or so no largescale plants will come into operation. Reasons for this change include government prices and taxes regulations and environmental protection aspects. Cases showing difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of a production system before it is put into operation Of the cases I present here, this is the category that is most discussed in the literature. Therefore, I shall be brief in giving a few examples of cases where the market at the input or output side was judged incorrectly.

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Fertilizers. Although economies of scale seem to be straightforward for fertilizer production, ironically, despite a great demand for fertilizers in LDCs, fertilizer plants operate at only 50 to 60 % of total capacity (Eadie, 1976; UNIDO, 1977). Reasons for this paradoxical situation include: lack of raw materials, lack of demand (no incentive on the part of the farmer for whateve r reason), inadequate transport and storage facilities, inadequate maintenance and management. (Most of these factors would seem to be more manageable on a smaller scale.) Oils and fats mill Sri Lanka. 'An oils and fats mill was established in the public sector when the private oil-milling industry was already saddled with excess capacity. Hence the mill had to be operated at only one-third its capacity. Its fat-splitting, fatty acid distillation and glycerine concentration plants were never operated on account of the absence of markets for their products. In seeking to reduce losses (and to lower costs) the project agency mechanized the movement of raw materials and finished products within the provender plant by installing elevators and conveyors. This plant was originally designed to use labour for such operations' (Hewavitharana, 1971). Palm oil Nigeria. Attempts to mechanize palm oil extraction started in Nigeria in 1953, and again in 1962. During the years 19591965 a small-scale hydraulic handpress was specially designed for use in West-Africa by Gebr. Stork & Co's Apparatenfabriek, Amsterdam (The Netherlands). 'Owing to the very much higher pressures obtained in this press compared with the screw handpress widely used in West-Africa, the extraction rate may be as much as 40 per cent higher .. ' writes Cornelius in 1963 and Nwanze concludes in 1965: 'From these figures it is evident that even at low returns to the producer (i.e. less than half the world market pri ce) the pay-off time for the handpress is less than one yea r and the profit accruing from the kernels makes the proje c t economically profitable.' And in 1975 Howat states: 'In recent years there has been an increase in the number of palm oil plantations with fully me chanized oil mills as an integral part of the project. They do produce oil of a much better quality and many of them are well managed and profitable investments. The firm of Stork Gebr. Germany [sic~l usually supplies the equipment which is welladapted to West-African conditions'. Neverth~less, the fact is that in 1975 still more than 80% of the palm oil is produced on a family scale, while mechanized production systems are all (in) directly subsidized (Zeven, 1976; Reusse, 1976). Which is the appropriate production system? Gari processing. Gari is prepared in West Africa from cassave by peeling and grating the roots. The grated root is fermented under pressure for 24-48 hours, and then sieved and fried. Traditionally gari is made

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J. van Brakel

on the family scale with dangerous and highly inefficient grinding methods and fermentation in bags pressed down with stones. In the late 1950's research was started in Nigeria on the possibility of innovation in the processing of cas save to gari. A mechanized small-scale plant (10 tons a day) was developed and is now available under licence of a British firm (Newell Dunford). The first plant started operation in The Gambia in 1970. Operations had to be stopped in 1974 because of a number of problems: continuous supply of input could not be answered; the sophisticated equipment led to severe maintenance and servicing problems; although labour was abundantly available the three-shift basis operation caused unsurmountable social problems; the capital/labour and capital/ output ratio appeared to be too high to produce economically (Kaplinsky, 1974; Molenaar, 1976; personal communications). Several other plants have been sold by the British firm, but they all have problems with continuous supply of input (Newell Dunford Ltd, personal communication). Sugar cane processing. It is not exceptional that large-scale sugar factories operate for many years at 10% of their planned capacity. Cases have been described for Sri Lanka (Hewavitharana, 1970) and Ghana (van der Wel, 1973). Cases showing difficulties ~n assessing what the facts are with respect to a particular production system Oil refinery. How should the appropriateness of the many oil refineries (sometimes combined with other petrochemical plants) in developing countries be evaluated. Very little information is available to assess this. What to think of the following case. In 1954 Shell-BP secured the option and in 1960 the right to build a refinery near Port Harcourt. Operation started in 1965 by the Nigerian Petroleum Refining Co. Ltd. (NPRC). Turner (1977) reports that: (a) within 18 months of operation the plant was running at full capacity (so as to realize a faster return on investment and to continue selling imported products?); (b) the planning of the Kainji Dam was not taken into consideration, hence the proportion of fuel oil in the output was much too high; (c) the BP managing director was free to decide that no suitably trained and qualified Nigerians were available and as late as 1971 only 20% of the senior staff was Nigerian, although the refinery was run for a few months without expatriates during the civil war (Onyemelukwe, 1974); (d) during construction the London office kept the original invoices from suppliers and did not pass on discounts to NPRC; (e) charges levied by BP for shipping materials from the UK were well above those for commercial shipping agents; (f) very few local suppliers of materials and services were patronized by the BP

management; (g) no local R & D facilities were established the London office was called to solve the most elementary problems. For the macro-economic effects of petrochemical industries see the case study of Morawetz (1975) in Colombia. Cement factory. In 1966 Ramachandrau of the Tamilnad Cement Factory writes: 'A small cement plant producing clinker from the smallest shaft kiln in the world started production in India in August 1966 .... The high thermal efficiency and low cost of the plant have shattered the theory of bigsized plant economy.' This looks promising. Over the period 1972-1976 the Cement Research Institute of India developed a mini cement plant which started continuous operation in July, 1976: 'In a favourable situation a net return of over 16 per cent is anticipated on the capital.' (Visvesvaraya, 1977.) This also looks promising. However, in the latter publication it is also recorded, without further comment, that 'a sick mini plant attempted as a pioneering one by the Government of Tamil Nadu State in India ~n 1966 was gifted to CRI in June 1974 for R&Dstudies'. Grinding machine using pedal power. The price of motorized grinding machines for use on the village level is about £ 200. It has been suggested that an alternative for this would be simple grinding machines using pedal power. In the Bulletin of the Intermediate Technology Development Groupe (London) of July 1971 it is reported that at the "Zaria Intermediate Technology Workshop" (Nigeria) a pedal power grinder has been designed using local materials. It would cost in the order of £ 20. It is also mentioned three years later in the ITDG journal "Appropriate Technology" (Lee, 1974), but without indicating how many had been produced by then. I visited the Zaria workshop in 1976: Nothing was known about pedal power grinders. The equipment they made at that time was meant for rural hospitals. By way of digression it may be added that they had a need for more and better designs to work with, but typically they had no contact with the Ahmado Bello University in the same city, although this university is hauled as a representative of the new trend of institutions having 'a moral responsibility to involve themselves in work for the betterment, both cultural and material, of persons and communities in the surrounding neighbourhood '(IUC, 1976). Soap and detergents. (The case quoted here has also aspects which \vould bring it under the first section on the effect of boundary conditions). In Kenya small- and medium-scale indigenous soap production was well-developed, but is now in a process of decay or modernisation due to the competition of the multinationals: 'Advertising, then, has been crucial in generating local demand for sophisticated, well-packaged, mnc-type products - with their associated employment

The Dubiousness of Assessing Appropriateness and linkage weaknesses.' ~angdon, 1975). The advertising has hardly affected the total sales of soap, only product substitution, ~n particular for laundry soap,for which consumers pay more to get a machine-made product that is inferior in everything but appearance. It is the smart-looking packaging that requires mechanization. By world standards the capital requirements are small for these apparatuses. But for indigenous entrepreneurs who have no easy access to capital, let alone foreign exchange, this forced change is often unsurmountable. In the non-mechanized firms the most capitalintensive operation is the drying stage. As Pack (1976) notes indigenous firms have developed various "innovations" to reduce capital intensity in modern processes, e.g. using bin-drying in stead of spray drying of detergent-noodles. Choice in the production of sweetening agents. Even if the most detailed studies have been made it may be next to impossible to find out what in fact is the case. The lartestsingle research project on the choice of production systems for sugar has been carried out at the Livingstone Institute (Glasgow). There seems, however, to be some problem in interpreting the results. In an article in "World Development" in 1974 Pickett, Forsyth, and McBain write among other things: 'From the table it can be seen that the open-pan process [the labourintensive alternative for modern sugar production] would have been superior to the vacuum-pan process on each of the four criteria listed .... The open-pan process would not only have been more profitable than the Ghanaian factory. It would also have used less capital and provided more employment'. This article and this conclusion is neither referred to in the many papers by Pickett and other members of the institute at the 1977 Nairobi Sugar Seminar (UNEP, 1977) nor in a publication by Forsyth in 1977 in the same journal, where he concludes that 'Contrary to recent suggestions in the literature, capital-intensive technology is shown to be clearly superior at all but the smalles level of scale, and unit costs are found to fall sharply as output rises.' Furthermore, this 1977 paper of Forsyth is not referred to in any of the papers at the 1977 Nairobi-seminar. Cases showing difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of institutions that should promote, develop, or implement appropriate production systems. United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Organizations such as UNIDO put great emphasize on organizing expert, consultative, or similar group meetings. I cannot present a particular case study here, but I would like to stress that it is not at all clear how to assess whether such meetings are appropriate. In October 1976 UNIDO organized a meeting of "Selected Heads of Research Institutes" to report on the

53

development and transfer of technology. In the conclusions and recommendations the following bottlenecks are mentioned: technological capabilities of research institutes in developing countries, personal contacts (on which successful transfer of technology depends), lack of information on activities being taken elsewhere, funds. But nothing very concrete is said on what to do about it. Of course the part~c~pants advised UNIDO that this type of meeting was very useful and should be held regularly. I do not think these meetings are very useful. Usually the kind of people that are selected for such meetings are so busy attending this type of meetings that (i) they are only superficially aware of what is happening at their own institute, (ii) they have no time to prepare original contributions for such meetings, (iii) they have no time for detailed correspondence with similar institutes. Furthermore, their position and probably that of their institute is so vulnurable that it is much too dangerous to engage in a real exchange of experience. Also in 1977, there was a UNIDO expert group meeting on co-operation amoung universities, industrial research organizations and industries. The report of the meeting gives a useful inventory of constraints or hurdles that stand in the way of such co-operation, but no word is said on the sheltered and priviliged position of LDC-universities and most "western" LDC-industries, or on the question as to whether there is a need at all for R & D on the production systems producing known existing western goods for elite consumers in LDCs. Typically one of the "experts" suggested that 'the role of UNIDO should be to inform countries without experience and tradition in this respect about the advantages of scientific investigations and also to create an economically useful demand for such research in these countries' (Maj, 1976). Tanzania. The difficulties involved in assessing the appropriateness of government policies are well documented in the literature. Because Tanzania is sometimes quoted as one of the best examples of appropriate policy for development, I want to indicate that this evaluation is not so simple: 'Many villages are in a state of deadlock' (Macpherson, 1975, p. 225), 'extension officers are not in favour of low-cost tools' (Vail, 1974), and 'the terms of trade have declined severely against the rural sector . .. the average peasant has suffered greater losses in welfare than either the urban minimum wage earner or the middle-income civil servant.' (Amey, 1976, p. 47.) And Lele (1974) in a review of thirteen rural development programmes in Africa writes: ' •.. in many other programmes, such as the Ujamaa villages in Tanzania ... inadequate adaptive research appears to have been a major constraint on increasing productivity and incomes of low income farmers' , and he ascribes the lack of success in Tanzania to

J. van Brakel

54

'haphazard policies of collectivization and by the neglect of critical organizational questions' . Technology Consultancy Centte '(Kumasi, Ghana) Due to promotion activities of its founder, its directors, and above all ITDG-London, TCC-Kumasi is described, not only in the appropriate-technology-bandwagon-literature, but also in the establishment literature as giving a notable lead in appropriate technology (IUC, 1976; Crane, 1977; Clarke, 1977). However, nowhere, have I found mention of the following facts: (a) TCC-Kumasi employs about two people \vith academic degrees; interest of staff members of the University in the activities of the Centre are negligible (although some of them fill advisory or steering committees with weighty names); (b) Although established in 1972 the output of the centre in terms of created employment or turnover is still in no proportion to the input; (c) Until 1974/75 annual reviews hav2 been published. As far as I know, no later reviews exist. (d) There are rumours that the small-scale soap factories designed and procured by de centre are not working most of time. Neither during a visit of me to the centre in 1976, nor in later correspondence, have I been able to obtain information on the performance of the soap factories. Presumably something is happening, as a few months ago the University founded a special firm to deal with the soap factories. (e) The broad loo~ developed by the Centre appears to be not feasible in the given economic context. The Centre itself cannot provide data, but observers say that the large-scale textile producers are able to keep the price of cotton thread high - which has to be bought by the village users of the broad loom. (f) In 1978 the University established a Centre, or at least a committee, that has to deal with, inter alia, technology for rural applications. In the news items no reference is made for the relation of this new activity to the existing TCC. REFERENCES Amey, A. (1976). Urban-Rural Relations in Tanzania: Methodology, Issues and FteYiminary Results, ERB paper 76.12, Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau (1976). Bar-Zakay, S.N. (1974). Technology'trdnsfer in developing countries, in :Davidson (1974, pp. 511-535). Clarke, R. (1977). Extending tHe university for grass-roots development: IDS Bull. (Sussex), 8 (4) (1977) pp. 4()-51. Cornelius, J.A. (1963). A recent development in the small-scale extraction of palm oil: Tropical ScL, 5 (1963) p. 34. Crane, D. (1977). Technological innovation in developing countties: a review of the literature, Research Policy, 6 (1977)

PO" 374-395. Davidson, H.F. (1974). Cetron, M.J., Goldhar, J.D. (ed.), Technology Transfer, Leiden, Noordhof. Eadie, C., Ghatak, S., Pearce, D.,(1976) The supply of fertilizer technology and final product to less developed countries and their impact on environment, University of Leicester: Public Sector Economics Research Centre. EAIRO (1970), Research Catalogue 1942-1969 East African Community, E.A. Industrial Research Organization, Nairobi. EAIRO (1975), Annual Reports 1969-1975, 6 vols., Nairobi: E.A. Ind. Res. Organization. Forsyth, D.J.C., Appropriate technology in sugar manufacturing, World Development, 5 (3) (1977) pp. 189-202. Gallagher, J.T. (1970) Rapid estimation of plant costs, in Popper, pp. 3-10. Giral, B.J., (1974) Manual para Desarrollo, Transferencia y Adaptacion de Technologia Quimica Apropriada, mimeo Facultad de 0uimica, Mexico: UNAM. Guthrie, K.M., (1970) Capital cost estimating in: Popper, pp. 80-108. Hewavitharana, B. (1970). Choice of techniques in Ceylon, in: Economic Development in South Asia (E.A.G. Robinson and M. Kidron, Eds), London: Macmillan, pp. 431-452. Howat, G.R. (1975). Developments in the edible oils and fats industry in West Africa Seminar on Food Science in West Africa, Univ. of Ghana. IUC (1976) Rural Development Overseas: First thoughts on the co-operative role of BritISh universities & polytechnics, London: Inter University Council for Higher Education Overseas, pp. 35. Kaplinsky, R. (1974) Innovation in Gari Production: The Case for an Intermediate Technology, Discussion Paper no. 34 University of Sussex, Inst. of Development Studies. Langdon, S. (1975). Multinational corporations, taste transfer and underdevelopment: a case study from Kenya, Rev. African Polit. Econ. (2) pp. 12-35; also in French: Options Mediterraneennes, no. 27, pp. 67-79. Laszlo, E. (1972). Introduction in the Relevance of General Systems Theory, E. Laszlo (ed.), New York, Braziller. Lee, J. (1974) The cassave grinder, a design from the Zaria Workshop, Appropriate Technol., 1 (2), pp. 10 11. Lele, U., (1974) Designing rural development programmes: lessons from past experience in Africa, lDS-Discussion Paper No. 213, Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies. Mclnerney, J.P., (May/June 1977). "Appropriate" technology: no miracle panacea for economic development, Report (News of the World Bank Group), pp. 4-6. Macpherson, G.A. (1975). First Steps in Village Mechanisation, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. Maj, R. (1976) The application of science in polish industry, Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting on Co-operation among Universities, etc., Vienna: UNIDO, ID/HG. 238/17.

Th e Dubiousn e ss o f Assessin g Mo len aa r, K. ( 1976 ) . Appropriate Technology in th e Gambia: An in tr odu c torv no t e , mimeo. Moore , F.T. ( 1959) . Econom i cs of Scale : Some St a ti s ti ca l Evidence, Quart . J . Econ ., 73 pp . 232- 245 . Morowetz, D. ( 1975) . Imp o r~,Substituti o n , Empl oyment and Fo r e i gn E x ch~ n ge in Co lumbi a : ~o : he ers f or Petr oc hemi ca l s , in: The Cho i ce of Techno l ogy in Deve l oping Countries, Harva rd Studies in Intern at i onal Aff airs , Number 32 . Ne l son, H. (1973). Buzaa br e\"ing i n ~{a th are valley, Pap e r pre s ented at the Third Int . Contr ess of African ni s t s , Addis Ababa. Nwa n ze , S.C. (1965) . The hydraulic handpress , J. Nigerian Inst. Oi l Palm Res ., 4 , p . 290 . Onyemel ukwe, C.C. (1974). Eco nomic Underdev elopme nt: An inside view , Lond on : Longman. Pa ck , H. (1976). The substitution of labour for capital in Kenyan manufacturing , The Eco nomi c J ournal , 86 (March, 1976), pp . 45 - 58 . Pickett, J., Forsyth , D. J . C., and McBa in, N.S., (197 4). The choice of technology, economic efficien cy and employmen t in developing count r ies , World Development , 2 (3), pp . 47- 54 . Popp e r, H. ( 1970) . (ed.) , Modern Cost Engi nee rin g Techniques, New York : McGraw-Hill. Ramachandrau, N. (nay 1967) . Ho rld' s Smallest Cement Plant; Ro ck Products, pp. 74-7 6 . Reusse, E. (Sept . Oct . 1976) . Organ i sation apres Recolte dans la Petite Agriculture ; Questions d'E conomie et de Commercialisation , Bullet. Mensuel : Economi e et Statistiq~ 2 Agricules (FAO), 25 . Robertson, J.M. (1965). Problems of scalin g down a plant, Trabajo nGmero 43 ,1. Horld Convention of Chemica l Engineering , Mexico (1965). Stewart, F. ( 1974) . Cho i ce of t echni que in deve l op ing coun tri es , in: Science Technol ogy and Developmen t (C. Cooper and F. Cass, eds .) London, pp. 99-123 . Stewart, F. ( 19 77) Technolo gy and Unde rdeve l opmen t, London: Macmillan . Turner, T. (1977). T,,,o refineries: a comparative study of technology t r ansfer t o t he Nigerian r ef inin g industry , \-Iorld Development , 5 : pp . 235- 356 .

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Final Report of the Jo int UNEP/UN IDO Semi nar on the I mplicat i on o f Tech nolo gy Choice in the African Sugar Industry, Nairob i, April 1977 , ID/WG . 247/22, and papers present ed there by Behari, Al pine and Dugu id, Mac Gillivray and No ore, Patureau , Barclay , Ohi n go , Al mazan de l Olmo , and Picket t. UNIDO (1959) . Pr oblems of Size of Plant ~n Industry in Underdeveloped Coun tries , Industrial iz ation and Pr od uctivi t y , ( 2) , pp . 7- 25 . UNIDO ( 1965) . Plant Size and Ec onomics o f Scale, Ind. and Prod ., (8) pp . 53- 6 1. UNIDO (1977a) . Final Repo rt and Digests of Pape r s Ad-hoc Expert Group Meeting on Coope r atio n among Unive r s it ies , I ndu s trial Resea r ch Organizations and Industries and the Role of UNIDO in this Co- operation , Vienna : UNDIO , ID/HG . 238 / 25. UN IDO ( 1977b) . Rep ort of the First Consu ltation Meet ing on Fe r til i zer Industry , Vienna 17 2 1 Jan . 1977 , ID/HG . 242/8/Rev . I, Vi enna . UNIDO (1977c) . Unido in the Field of Te chno lo gy Transfer , mi meo DTTS/ref . I, Vienna . Vail , D.J ., (30 Oc t. - 2 Nov. 197 4 ) . The intercontine nt al transfe r o f intermediate technology desi gned for Ta nzania ' s Ujamaa vi l lages , paper 7th Ann . Heeting of the African Studi es Assoc. , Chi cago . Van Br akel, J. ( 1978) . Chemi c a l Technol ogy for Approp r iate Development, Delft University Press. Van der He l, P.P. ( 19 73) , 1.S.S. Occ a siona l Paper No . 26, The Hague: Institu t e of Social Studies . Visvesvaraya , H.C. (1977) . Improved packaging for cement and mini cement, ID/I-JG . 246/ 1, Vi enna: UNIDO . '!ang , J .H. (1977) . Pr oduction of ethambu t ol , in : Utilization of National Technological Instit utions in th e Developing Co untri es fo r Indu s tria lization , Vi enna : UN I DO , I D/I-JG . 246/ 6. Zeven , A. C. (1976) . The Semi - I, ild Pa l m Oil and Its Industry ~n Af ri ca . Thesis , Hageningen.