The effects of different magnitudes of threat upon interpersonal bargaining

JOURNAL

The

OF EXPERIMENTAL

Effects

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

of Different Interpersonal

1,

282-293

Magnitudes Bargaining’

(1965)

of Threat

upon

Threat is generally conccived of as the communication of an intention to do harm to another. The purpose of a threat is to establish, in the threatened party, the expectation that if he performs some undesired act, he will suffer some harm -4 successful threat is one which does not have to be executed. The experiments by Deut.sch and Krauss (1960, 1962) suggest a conception of the relation of t.hreat to bargaining that is contrary to the usual game theory interpretation of threat in terms of economic gains and costs. These experiments are based on the assumption that the use of t,hreat in bargaining alters the bargainers’ perceptions of their relationship via-ti-vis one another. It is not a gain-cost relation that determines the effect of threat but a complex relationship involving the players’ perceptions of their social stat,us, their expectation of appropriate behavior, and their loss of face in yielding to a threat. Similarly, Schelling’s (1960) notions run counter to most game theor> assumptions regarding the nature of t.hreat. His interpretation of the use of threat assumes that the players perception of the context within which bargaining is being carried out is changed if one of the player:: appears to have successfully committed himself to the use of threat. In Schelling’s analysis the success of threat, is not :I simple function of cost comparisons, but, instead, depends upon one player’s perception of the other’s commit.ment to carry out t,he threat. In contrast, the economic assumption is that :I threat, will be more successful, i.e., the threatened will perform in a may which the threatener desires, ~vhcn t,he threatened party expects that his net gain will be less ‘This article is based upon a dissertation submitted to Teachers College, Columbia University in partial fulfillment of the reyuircments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This study was partially supported by NSF grant GS-302, “Elements of Conflict Resolution.” The writer is indebted to Morton Deutsch, principal investigator of the grant and, also, chairman of the author’s dissertation committee. Grateful acknowledgment is also extended to thr other mcmhers of the committee, Kenneth F. Herrold and Matthew B. Miles. 282

EFFECTS

OF THREAT

I-PON

BARGAINING

283

or his net cost will be greater than if he refrains from the desired move (Milburn, 1961; Pruitt, 1962 ; Snyder, 1960). This view of threat is sometimes referred to as “deterrence.” It suggests that if threat potential (TP), i.e., the degree to which one can harm the other, were differentially distributed between bargainers, the use of threat would itself be encouraged or discouraged by the relative threat potential of the bargainers. This study assumes the validity of t,he deterrence view of threat. Namely, that A’s ability to deter B-a potential aggressor-depends upon the comparative loss each would suffer after an aggressive interaction as well as the “absolute” costliness of aggression. In other worda, A’s deterrent force is assumed to be a function of two factors: the relation of A’s TP to B’s TP and the magnitude of the loss A can inflict upon B. Thus, we hypothesize that if one bargainer’s TP is greater than the other’s the bargainer with the smaller TP will be less likely to (ai initiate threat, and (b) respond to threat with counter-threat. Further: it may be expected that low-TP bargainer t will yield to demands made by high-TP bargainers. Both the need and the opportunity for aggression are thus avoided. Hence, the affront-offense-punitive behavior sequence noted by Siegel and Fouraker (1960’) and Deutsch and IGauss (1960, 1962) is less likely to dcrelop when bargaincre have unequal rather than equal TP. In the equal TP conditions the initiation of threat and the readiness to respond to threat \Tith counter-threat will also reflect the magnitude of the threatener’s deterrent force. That is, under conditions of equal TP those pairs of bargainers with the greater absolute magnitude of TP will be less likely to (a) initiate threat, and (b) respond to threat with counter-threat. Consequently, in equal TP conditions we expect that the affront-offense-punitive behavior sequence is less likely to develop as the absolute magnitude of TP increases. Therefore, among pairs of bargainers with equal TP, those pairs with the greater absolute magnitude of TP will be less likely to follow threat with aggression. METHOD Each of the Ss was asked to imagine tha.t he was a realtor who was trying to come to some agreement with another realtor regarding the number of acres and the cost per acre to be used in the sale of a piece of land. The objective in arranging this sale was to accumulate as much profit for oneself as possible regardless of how much the other made. Thus, Ss had an individualistic rather than a cooperative or a competitive orientation. into separate booths. They were Pairs of SY were escorted, one at a time, seated on either side of a large screen which prevented them from seeing each other. Moreover, during the bargaining all communication was conducted through the use of standard message slips. Thus, the experimental conditions insured the anonymity of 6%.

284

HARVEY

A.

HORNSTEl&

Ofjers. There wrre IWO ways in which SY could offer terms for agreement. “Offer” slips could be used to r~ommunicate the terms of a particular offer to the other realtor. An offer could also be communicated by sending :l “notice” slip, but, in this case, the offer was m:~dc XP pzrt of :I tllrrat, l’hreat. Each of the realtors could reduce the other’s profits I,- a ctiortain per cc,nt. &fore he actually rrducc,d the other’s profits, howevc~r, he was rccluired to warn the othc,r of his intmtions. The notice slip constituted a threat which told its receiver that unh>ss 11~ ac~c~lltctt :I c,ert:tin offer, which was indicated thereon, the sender might rrduc~ I& profits. Aggression. If :L realtor sent a notice, he was permitted to send a “stock sale” slip on his following turn. (Each realtor could send no more than one stock sale per trial.) If a realtor received a stock sale slip his profits for that trial were’ reduced by a certain per cent. A realtor’s threat pot,entinl was drfined as the per cent by which he could reduce the other realtor’s profits. In this experiment, Ss were assigned threat potentials of 90%, 50%, 20%, and 10%. Thus, Ss were paired with each other iu one of six types of pairs: three equal types, 90-90, 50-50, and 10-10; and thrclc unequal types, 90-10, M-10, and 20-10. Each of the S’s had n profit table which indicat,ed to him the amount of profit, that he and his opponrnt would make for any of the twenty possible combinations of number of acres and cost. prr acre. For any combination of these factors there was a differenccx of 500 between the profits of each of the Ss, i.e., in onr-half thtl combinations one of the Ss had the 500 advantage, while in the other half the other one had it. Ss were also supplied with a table which indicated the value of profits that remained after he was aggressed against by the other realtor. Prior to the bargaining trials Ss were verbally briefed on the procedure and were then permitted to read a complete set of instructions. A practice trial was conducted by the E during which the Ss were able to make various combinations of moves and examine the ramifications of their actions. At this point, Ss answered a set of questions which dealt with critical aspects of the game. If their answers were incorrect, Ss were encouraged to reread the appropriate section of the instructions and correct their answer. Written questions from the Ss were answered aloud by the E. Ss were also told to keep a record of their profits and losses. For each of the six conditions there were eight pairs of male, college undergraduates who served as Ss. Each pair participated in eight bargaining trials. Each trial was terminated at the end of six minutes if no agreement had been reached. RESULTli:

In general, the results indicate that if one or both of the bargainers issue a threat at the start of negotiations or, if threat or aggression occur during the negotiations the likelihood that an agreement will be reached is reduced (Tables 1, 2, 3).? These findings are consistent with those of Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 1962) who found that the use of threat involves the bargainers in a threat, counter-t.hreat, aggression ‘In order to avoid confounding between-trial effects with within-trial effects. Tables 1, 2, and 3 are based on data from each of the 48 pairs on the first trial only.

EFFECTS

CHI-SQUARE

TEST

OF THREAT

FOR RELATION

UPON

TABLE 1 BETWEEN THE USE OF THREAT OF AGREEMENT Agreement

Notice (threat) is not first communication of either realtor Notice (threat) is first communication of either realtor x2 = 11.650, p < ,001

CHI-SQL-.IRE

TEST

No agreement 9

3

12

OF AGGRESSION

Agreement

C&II-SQUARE

TEST

and, consequently,

reduces

No agreement 9

1

12

Agreement

sequence, gaining.

AND THE

26

TABLE 3 FOR NEL~TION BETIVEEN THE THREAT-.k~~Ess10N THI? PRESENCE OF AGREEMENT

Neither of the realtors threatened or aggreased during their first trial One or both the realtors threatened, but neither aggressed during their first trial One or both the realtors threatened and aggressed during their first trial x2 = 24.151, p < .OOl

.~ND THE PRESENCE

24

TABLE 2 FOR REL~ITION BETWEEN THE USE PRESENCE OF AGREEMENT

Neither of the realtors aggressed dnring their first trial One or both the realtors aggressed dnring their first trial x* = li.081, p < ,001

285

BARGAINING

SEQUENCE

No agreement

15

0

11

9

1

12

the likelihood

BND

of successful

bar-

Threat. The degree to which a bargainer initiated threat was operationally defined as the number of times he sent a notice slip (threat) to begin a trial or in response to an offer. Analysis of the data3 for the unequal (Table 4) and equal (Table 5) TP conditions fails to support 3 Except when otherwise noted, all analyses were done by the use of standard analysis of variance techniques and, when significant F ratios were obtained, evaluation of the separate comparisons was done by the use of Dunn’s method.

the notion that a bargainer’s USC of threat was :I negative function of his opponent’s deterrent. force. Within unequal conditions, however. there was an indication that while stronger bargainers initiated more threat under conditions of high disparity in TP, weaker bargainer:: initiated more threat under conditions of low disparity in TP. This interact,ion effect was significant at the .05 level. TABLE MEAN

NUMBER

OF THREATS

Bargainer’s Stronger Weaker

position bargainer bargainer

NUMBER

Distribution

OF THREATS

of threat

UNEQUAL

BARGAINING

Distribution

of threat

CONDITIONS

potential

90-10

50-10

20-10

4,500 3.375

3.875 2.500

3.000 4.500

TABLE MEAN

4

INITI.ATED:

INITIATED:

5 EQUAL

potential

BARGAINING

Mean

CONDITIONS

initiation

90-90 5(r50 10-10

of threat

2.750 4.089 3.937

Counter-threat. In order to control for the number of threats received, counter-threat was calculated as the ratio of the number of times a notice slip was sent in response t.o a notice slip to the total number of possible times one could have been sent. TABLE MEAN

RATIO

FOR

USE

6

OF COUNTER-THREAT: BARQAINING

EQUAL

Unequal Distribution of threat. potential 90-10 50-10 20-10 90-90 50-50 lo-10

Equal conditions

.328 .638 .551

AND

UNEQUAL

CONDITIONS

conditions

Stronger bargainer

Weaker bargainer

.590 .691 .650

,460 ,513 ,657

EFFECTS

OF THREAT

UPON

287

BARGAINING

Table 6 presents the relevant data for the equal and unequal groups. An analysis of these data does not completely support the hypotheses. Among equal conditions the 90-90 group, as predicted, was less ready to counter-threaten than the 50-50 group (p < .05), but the 90-90 group is not significantly different from the lo-10 group. The ordering of the means, in this case, is the same as it is in the case of initiation of threat and aggression: 50-50 > lo-10 > 90-90. Among unequal bargaining conditions, there was a tendency for bargainers with nearly equal TP to have a greater readiness to counterthreaten than bargainers with highly disparate TP. Analysis of variance of the absolute values of this variable indicate t.hat this tendency is statistically significant (p < .05). Aggression. The degree of aggression was determined by computing a ratio of the number of stock sale slips sent to the total number of times they could have been sent. Theoretically, they could be sent, after any notice slip, (but only once per trial). Therefore, the closer the ratio is to one, the more readily did the bargainer follow threat with aggression. The means for each of the conditions based on this measure are presented in Table 7. TABLE

MEAN RATXO OF AGGRESSION: EQU.AL

7 AND

UNEQUAL BARGAINING CONWTIONS Unequal

Distribution of threat potential 90-10 50-10 20-10 90-90 50-50 10-10

Equal conditions

conditions

Stronger bargainer

Weaker bargainer

.195 .600 .599

.491 .423 .428

,426 .498 ,471

Analysis of these data does not support the hypothesis that equal TP bargainers are more likely to aggress than bargainers with unequal TP. Nor is there any support for the notion that, among equal TP groups, the higher the absolute magnitude of TP, the less likely it is that threat will be followed by aggression. Analysis of the absolute number of aggressionsindicates that 50-50 bargainers aggress more frequently than either the 90-90 or lo-10 bargainers (p < .05). Among unequal TP groups there is evidence that under conditions of low disparity in TP (20-10) the weaker bargainers aggress least, whereas

288

HARVEY

A. HORNSTEIN

under conditions of high disparity in TP (90-10) it is t.he stronger bargainers who aggress Icast ip < .025 t Norton, st.rongcr bargainers in the 90-10 conditions aggress lcsa than stronger I)argaincrs in c>ithcr the 50-10 or 20-10 conditions (p < .05). Yielding to threat. Underlying the aggression hypothesis is the assumption that bargainers whose opponent :: have high deterrent force are more likely to yield t.o threat than bargainers whose opponents have low deterrent force. Yielding to threat was operationally determined by dividing the number of times a S marked :I notice slip OK by the total number of times he could have done so, i.e.. it was divided by the number of notices that hc received. The relevant data appear in Table 8. Analysis of these data does not, support, the expectation that xv-eaker TP bargainers yield to threat more often than stronger oncr. TABLE MEAN

RATIO

8

OF YIELDING

TO THREAT: EQUAL RARG.~INING CONDITIONS

AND

Unequal Distribution of threat potential 90-10 50-10 20-10 90-90 50-50 10-10

Equal conditions

UNEQUAL

conditions ___~--

Stronger bargainer

Weaker bargainer

.301 .190 . OS0

240 .2 17 .Lll

.220 .205 ,163

There is a tendency (.05 < p < .lO), however, for the rate of yielding to increase as the difference between bargainers’ TP increases. This finding is statistically significant (p < .05) when the absolute values of this variable are analyzed. There are no statistically significant differences between bargainers with equal TP. Agreement. In this experiment the terms of an agreement could be communicated as part of a threat, on notice slips, or they could be sent as simple offers, on offer slips. Above, we defined yielding as agreeing to offers made as parts of threats. Here, we will simply be concerned with the number of times a bargainer agrees to terms which have been offered by the other bargainer. Table 9 contains the relevant data. Analysis indicates that the number of agreements, for pairs of bargainers, increases as the difference in TP increases (p < .Ol). Moreover,

EFFECTS

MEAN

NUMBER

OF THREAT

OF AGRCEMENTS:

EQIJAL

UPON

289

BARGAINIXG

ANI) IJNEQI~.IL

BARG.~INING

Ivnequal Distribution of threat potential

Eyllal r.onditions

90-10 50-10 20-10 90-N) 50-50 10-10

CONDITIONS

ronditions

Stronger bargainer

Weaker bargainer

3.000 2.000 2.000

4.000 3.000 1.500

3.5UO 2.310 2.150

under conditions of high disparity in TP (90-10) the weaker bargainer agrees most often, whereas under conditions of low disparity (20-10) it is the stronger bargainer who tends to agree more (p < .05). There is also a general tendency (.05 < p < .lO) for weaker bargainers to agree more often than stronger ones. Profit. In the final analysis one’s success in bargaining can be measured in terms of the profit that he makes. Analysis of the relevant data (Table 10) for the equal TP conditions does not yield any statistically significant differences.

SUN

PROFIT-~:

TABLE 10 EQUAL BARGAINING

Distribution of threat potential

Before reduction for aggression

go-90 50-50 lo-10

3293.75 2768.75 3131.25

CONDITIONS After reduction for aggression 3100.00 2568 75 3081.88

Among unequal TP conditions (Table ll), however, there is evidence (p < .05) that pairs of bargainers who have highly disparate TP make more profit than bargainers whose TPs are nearly equal. Although differences between the profits of stronger and weaker TP bargainers are not significant, one notes that before reductions for aggression, stronger bargainers made more profit in 13 pairs, weaker bargainers in 7 pairs, and in 4 pairs the Ss had equal profit; and, after reductions for aggression, stronger bargainers led in 17 pairs, weaker bargainers in 6 pairs, and in one pair profits were even. This suggests

290

HARVEY

A.

HORNSTEIK

TABLE MEAN

PROFITS:

UNEQUAL

11 BARGAINING

Distribution

CONMTIONS

of threat potentisl _I_~ 50-10 20-I 0

Bargainer’s position

90-10

Before reductions for aggression Stronger bargainer Weaker bargainer

3625.00 3062.50

3312.50 2562.50

2937.50 2025.00

After reductions for aggression Stronger bargainer Weaker bargainer

3567.50 2591.25

3226.25 2481.25

1948.75 1905.00

that while there are no statistically significant differences in the profits of stronger and weaker bargainers, t,hc likelihood that the stronger bargainer will best the weaker one is fairly high. In general, the data fail to support the assumptions regarding the effects of deterrent force. A bargainer’s use of threat or counter-threat was not determined by his opponent’s deterrent force. In turn, the rate of aggression was not greater under equal than under unequal conditions. Some results, however, reflect differences owing to the disparit’y of threat potential in the unequal conditions and to the absolute magnitude of threat potential in the equal conditions. Namely, these data reflect the fact that the number of agreements and the profit is greatest in those conditions where t.hreat, counter-threat, and aggression is least. DISCUSSION

The view that deterrence is determined by the relative power to inflict harm is not supported by the data gathered for this study. However, the general similarity within pairs of bargainers in their use of threat, counter-threat, and aggression might be explained by the fact that profit was not real and/or 8s were aware that their (the Xs’) opponents were students like themselves. Although aggressive acts are said to be deterred when the cost for the act exceeds the possible gains, this is true only to the extent that a loss is actually perceived. It may be that Xs did not perceive the fictional reduction of points as a real loss. As a result, they were not differentially deterred from threatening or aggressing. If they had perceived the reduction of points as a loss we might have expected Ss in the unequal TP conditions to perceive differences between their own and their opponent’s status. In this regard, one notes that in responding to a post-experimental questionnaire, 5s did not indicate differences in perceived superiority or inferiority. Hence,

EFFECTS

OF THREAT

UPON

BARGAINING

291

it is possible that the referent for evaluating their status was not TP, but. rather their perceptions of each other as student-subjects. Bargainers who perceive their opponents to be of equal or lower status are less likely to show them deferrence than are bargainers who perceive their opponents to have higher status. Given that bargainers perceived each other as atudcnt-subjects, it is possible that, they resisted yielding to the other who was perceived as an equal. This interpretation is pretlicateci on the assumption that economic costs were perceived as relatively less important to the SY than the Aatus costs of yielding to an equal. This qualifying assumption i s necessary since one can easily imagine a situation where the parties pcrccivc each other as equals, but where the threat potential of one party is so high that the costs he can inflict on the other for not yielding cscccd any loss the lat.ter would suffer as a result of deferring to an equal (e.g., where one is thrcatencd by a perceived equal or subordinate who has a gun). Among unequal threat potential conditions, both the number of agreements concluded (Table 9) and the bargainers’ profits (Table 11) increased as the disparity in threat potential increased. Earlier, we noted that threat and aggression tended to lessen the iikclihood of agreements (Tables 1, 2, 3). This observation is consistent. with the findings conccrning profit and agreements in unequal conditions inasmuch as threat and aggression tended to be greater as the bargainers’ threat potentials became more nearly equal. Similarly, under equal threat potential conditions, the same tendency was noted. That is, bargainers in the 90-90 condition tended to make more profit than bargainers in the lo-10 condition, who, in turn, tended to make more profit than bargnincrs in the 50-50 condition (Tables 10 and 11‘1. Correspondingly, t#he occurrence of threat and aggression V:\H found to be distributed in the following manner: 50-50 > lo-10 > 90-90 (Tables 4, 5, 6, 7). Thus, certain distributions of thrfxt potential dtcrcnsctl the ncccl for threat :tncl aggrcesion and increased the likelihood of agreement and profit. \\-e suggest that the bargainers’ threat potentials acted as cues that facilitated or hindered them in their efforts to conic to an agreement. This view is rcminisccnt of Schclling’s (1960 1 assumption that certain aspects of the structure of a situation create a rationale within which some solutions become more salient than others. Thus, the cues provide a structure around which bargainers can coordinate their expectations. When threat potentials arc highly disparate the cues regarding who should agree (Table 9) and who sl~oulcl receive what share of the profits (Table 11) are clear. As the threat potentials became more nearly equal the meaning of the cues became more ambiguous. The ambiguity regarding n-ho should acquiesce and who should receive what, share of t.he

292

HARVEY

A.

HORXSTEIIV

profits interfered with the negotiations and rcaultetl in fewer agrcxcmcnts as well as less profits. In the equal threat potential condit,ions the magnitude of threat potentials may have created a structure which provided a rationale that enabled the bargainers to avoid the use of threat and aggression. In this case, the 90-90 bargainers’ threat potential was too powerful to risk its employment. In the lo-10 condition the threat potential was too insignificant to suppose that it could have bec,n used successfully. In contrast, bargainers in the 50-50 condition were in an ambiguous position inasmuch as their threat potential were not SO powerful that both players recognized them as effect’ire dctcrrents, nor were they HO minute that both players perceived them as insignificant. This group could not avoid provocations nor could they let them go unnoticed. Along these lines, post-experimental questionnaire data supports the notion t,hat bargainers in the high, equal Dhreat-potential conditions (90-90) were more discouraged from aggressing because of their opponent’s t,hreat potential than were bargainers in the 50-50 condition (p < .05). In addition, these data also show that bargainers in the 50-50 condition were more likely to aggress out of anger than bargainers in the 90-90 condition (p < .05). One might infer that affronts, under certain conditions, did not arouse a bargainer’s ire and could pass unavenged. This may have occurred because both realized t’he possible costs for saving face wcrc’ too great or that they both obviously lacked power which was sufficient to harm the affronter. It is proposed that bargainers in the 50-50 condition could not afford to overlook provocations (e.g., threats and rcjections of offers) by rationalizing that the other realized that no one had enough threat potential to avenge an affront. Nor could they believe that the other recognized that their t,hreat potentials were so overwhelming as to make aggressive action obviously imprudent. In other conditions (particularly the 90-90)) the threat potentials provided the Ss with a tacitly accepted rationale for not having to threaten, counterthreaten, or aggress. Thus, although there was no indication that a bargainer’s threat, potential had deterrent effects, there was evidence supporting the notion that certain distributions of threat potential provide a structure which increases t,he likelihood that an agreement will be reached. We suggested that a wide disparity in threat potential provides a structure within which certain distributions of profit are legitimatized. The cues within the structure did not, however, crcat,e conditions within which one bargainer was willing to accept the coercive power of the other. This general tendency to resist showing deferent behavior may have resulted

EFFECTS

OF THREAT

UPON

BrlRCiAINING

from Ss perceiving each other as equals (i.e., other student-subjects) well as from the fact that losses were fictional.

293 as

WMMARY

The rationale underlying this study was that the successof threat is a positive function of the threatener’s deterrent force. Deterrent force was said to increase as the absolute magnitude of threat potential increases, and as the discrepancy between one’s own and one’s opponent’s threat potential increases. However, the data do not support, this view of deterrence. They do suggest that certain distributions of threat potential increase the likelihood of agreement. Also, the data support the notion that threat and aggression tend to lessenthe probability of agreement. It was suggested that Ss’ perception of each other as equals or the fact that profits were fictional may have caused Ss to resist showing deferent behavior. REFERENCES BORAH, L. A. The effects of threat in bargaining: critical and experimental analysis. J. abnorm. sot. Psychol., 1963, 66, 37-44. DEUTSCH, M., AND KRAUSS, R. M. The effects of threat on interpersonal bargaining. J. abnorm. sot. Psychol., 1960, 61, 223-230. DEUTSCH, M., AND KRAUSS, R. M. Studies in interpersonal bargaining. J. confEict Resol., 1962, 6, 52-76. MILBURN, T. W. The concept of detcrrenc~c~. J. sot. ISSWS.. 1961, 3, 3-11. PRUITT, D. G. An antllyyi< of rcq>onsiveners hrtwccn nations. J. conflict Resol., 1962, 6, 5-18. SCHELLING, T. C. The .sll,rrlcgy of coj~flict. Camhridgc, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. SIEGEL, S., AND FOURAIWI, L. E. Bnrgccirli/Lg crt~d grolcp decisio,L wz&i)Lg. New York: McGraw Hill, 1960. SNYDER, G. Deterrence :md pow~. J. couflict Resol.. 1960, 4, 163-178. (Received

January 5, 1965)