The impacts of photovoltaic electricity self-consumption on value transfers between private and public stakeholders in France

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

The impacts of photovoltaic electricity self-consumption on value transfers between private and public stakeholders in France

T

⁎

Jonathan Roulota,b, , Ricardo Raineria a b

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Libertador Bernardo O′Higgins 340, Santiago de Chile, Región Metropolitana, Chile Ecole Centrale de Nantes, 1 Rue de la Noë, 44300 Nantes, France

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Photovoltaic electricity Self-consumption Value transfers France Renewable energy policy Energy decentralization

Between 2016 and 2017, the French Government made significant advances in shaping the new legislative structure in order to support photovoltaic electricity self-consumption, which is a growing challenge for many countries developing renewables close to the grid parity. By analyzing all the main financial flows linked to the electric bill, the sales of electricity and the investment in photovoltaic systems, this study aims to identify the stakeholders that benefit or suffer the most from value transfers caused by photovoltaic electricity self-consumption compared to full injection. The results suggest a shortfall of revenue for the distribution system operator. An increase in the electric bill of other grid customers will undoubtedly offset this shortfall. Simultaneously, the French State would make savings for individual self-consumption projects below 100 kWp. The new policy also incentivizes the self-consumption for big consumers for whom it is more profitable and competitive. Self-consumption projects tend to be economically more attractive than projects in full injection when the photovoltaic system is not oversized for the electric demand. The policy may consequently imply risks for the equalization of electric grid charges among consumers, the sustainability of the current business strategy of utilities and the security of supply.

1. Introduction 1.1. Electric self-consumption as a universal revolution A growing number of countries partly rely on photovoltaic installations to fulfill the requirements of greenhouse gas mitigation, to reduce their fossil fuels imports, and to decentralize their energy industry. Since the beginning of photovoltaic deployment in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the cost of photovoltaic systems has been tremendously reduced. Even though the economic context and the electric system are different in each country, the powerful reduction of costs already led countries to review their photovoltaic support policy. Of course, the photovoltaic installations did not already reach the grid parity everywhere and the pace to reach it will be different according to the country. Nevertheless, when the grid parity is reached or about to be reached, governments should consider the development of electric self-consumption. Consuming and also producing electricity is characteristic of a new class of consumers, which are called “prosumers” (Green and Staffell, 2017; IEA PVPS, 2016b). The growing number of producer – consumers is at the origin of this study. Several countries

⁎

have already built an economic and legal structure for it (IEA PVPS, 2016a; 2016b). Different self-consumption business models are implemented and they rely on one of the five main schemes: Pure SelfConsumption with Constraints, Pure Self-Consumption with a Feed-inTariff for the excess electricity, Net-metering, Net-billing, and Pure SelfConsumption with a premium. This policy diversity depending on the national context does not necessarily mean different challenges among countries, but a policy shift may have probably different impacts among private and public stakeholders. Therefore, this shift from a policy supporting full injection towards a policy supporting self-consumption may raise questions. Who benefits and who loses from the reorganization of value transfers? It is important to answer such question because, depending on the magnitude of changes and on the stakeholders concerned, this self-consumption policy would consequently lead to a structural change for some stakeholders. Basically, prosumers’ photovoltaic self-consumption may be viewed according to two different perspectives. First, it may provide electricity access to populations in remote areas. Secondly, it may contribute to the decarbonization and decentralization of an electric system already developed through a grid system. This second perspective is the context

Corresponding author at: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins 340, Santiago de Chile, Región Metropolitana, Chile E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J. Roulot), [email protected] (R. Raineri).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.07.035 Received 22 October 2017; Received in revised form 10 June 2018; Accepted 16 July 2018 0301-4215/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 1. Breakdown of tariff types (fixed rate and variable rate) in 2015. Source: European Commission (2016).

1.2. The electricity tariff structure: a common context between France and other countries

in which this assessment has been set up. It aims to produce results able to provide some elements about the different consumers’ electricity demand in a context of renewable electricity self-consumption. Changes in the electric load do not necessarily imply a modification of the transmission and distribution system since the peak load sizes the infrastructure, but certainly, imply changes in the pricing of the wholesale electricity along the day. When the dispatch is made through a merit-order model, with must-run status for intermittent renewable power systems, the utility may reconsider the way it invests and also the economic profitability of some power plants. Furthermore, the structure of the electric bill may also be questioned by the consequences of the self-consumption policy. These questions are at the heart of concerns in many countries facing the challenge of developing more and more photovoltaic capacities that reach the grid parity in a context of decentralization. This paper uses the on-going policy transition in France but, even though each country has its own specificities, the conclusions of this impact assessment will provide reflection elements for the self-consumption policy design and implementation in some countries. In fact, photovoltaic installations may be economically attractive for big electric consumers or for high-income consumers, and their electricity self-consumption may also affect the financial contributions that the different consumers made within their electricity bill to support the electric grid. After several years of self-consumption deployment, marginal impacts for utilities may become crippling effects for a given business strategy as previously mentioned. In fact, electric self-consumption may be viewed as a step toward a deep reorganization of the way an electric system produces, transports and consumes electricity. Different policies adapt to different contexts but often target a similar goal. For some elements, they may consequently lead to the same results. Self-consumption policy often aims to provide an economically attractive photovoltaic installation, with public policy support to an easy household access at a lower cost, implying fewer payments for the grid. Nevertheless, a policy that only focuses on the self-consumption may neglect for instance security of supply or the fair distribution of grid charges. By working on the French case, this paper highlights on possible implications of a new self-consumption policy, and also raises questions on the long-term implications for the financial viability and development of the national electric system.

One of the main policy implications discussed at the end of this study is the suitability of the self-consumption policy with the structure of the electric bill. Therefore, it seems interesting to have a quick look at some European countries that might share some similar features as the French model. First of all, one characteristic to keep in the mind is the relative high share of the variable tariff in the overall electric bill (Fig. 1). In 2015, this share was 46% in France, but other countries were in a similar situation like for example Finland, Denmark, Slovenia, the Netherlands or the Czech Republic. It is interesting to look the Spanish case because the State decided, between 2010 and 2015, to drop the variable tariff from 48% to 21% of the bill (European Commission, 2016; IEA, 2015). Additionally, the other characteristics to consider are the grid charges which are embedded in the consumer's electric bill. In the second semester of 2014, it reached almost 0.06€ in France, and it was around the same value in many other countries as illustrated in Fig. 2. Consequently, it seems that other countries are also in a situation where PV self-consumers have the possibility to make savings on the volumetric grid charges. The EU observed this overdependence in volumetric grid tariffs (European Commission, 2015), and noticed the growing interest in increasing the share of the grid tariffs based on the capacity component of the bill. Given such tariff structure, the changes that have been brought by the self-consumption require a reform of the electricity tariffs as advocated by Yu (2017) and mentioned by Green and Staffell (2017).1 This exposure to the consequences of self-consumption could be solved by an overall reform of the electricity tariff or by including measures in the self-consumption policy. Nevertheless, many countries such as Finland or Denmark did not include charges to finance the transmission and distribution system on the self-consumers (IEA PVPS, 2016b), whereas Belgium (Flanders) and Italy respectively implemented a capacity based fee and charges for systems above 20 kW in self-

1 Green and Staffell (2017) judiciously mentioned the example of US utilities that increase fixed charges for PV users to avoid the “utility death spiral” while also reducing the volumetric charges.

460

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 2. Breakdown of electricity prices to household consumers (2nd semester 2014). Source: European Commission (2016) from Eurostat.

consumption. Spain implemented a “grid backup toll” in order to charge each kW self-consumed for systems above 10 kW (IEA PVPS, 2016b). Consequently, countries having the same overall tariff structure as France and not taking measures to balance the distribution of grid charges while developing self-consumption would probably face similar problems in terms of the revenue shortfall for the distribution system operators. This would be offset by grid financing inequalities as mentioned by Schittekatte et al. (2018) and the results of this study are expected to demonstrate that a self-consumption policy may lead to such externality.

on Feed-In-Tariff for small installations and on requests for proposals for installations with a peak power above 100kWp (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016a, 2017a). Undoubtedly, the support for more decentralized production is costly, and the development of centralized photovoltaic production, through solar plants, is based on a support policy less expensive than the former. Nowadays, in a context of energy transition, which aims to decentralize even more the electricity production, the electricity self-consumption is at the heart of concerns. Other elements may explain this new tendency. The lever based on society behavior has been identified by the French utility EDF (Electricité de France or Electricity of France in English) as a structural movement toward the self-production. People want to take part in the energy transition autonomously; it also gives a positive image and brings an added value on houses or buildings. But, for a substantial proportion of users, the financial interest seems to be priority before environmental convictions. Indeed, the increase of electricity prices suggests that it will be economically better to depend on its own electricity production, with a fixed cost that is determined by its own investment, rather than to mainly depend on the electricity from the national grid. On the other hand, the decrease in photovoltaic systems cost will convince users to invest for a better profitability. Before, the French support policy stimulated more the development of in-roof and half-in-roof systems (respectively IAB and ISB). As a result, a superimposed system was not attractive even though its LCOE was lower than the LCOE of IAB and ISB systems (ADEME, 2015). According to the pricing decree on the 9th May 2017, the differences in the support policy between superimposed systems and IAB/ISB systems will disappear by 2018 (French Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and Energy MEDDE, 2017a). This would facilitate investment for photovoltaic systems and decrease the cost of the support policy. Additionally, the decrease in the mandatory purchase tariffs of photovoltaic electricity, which is continue (Photovoltaïque.info, 2017), would lower the interest in selling surplus electricity and increase the profitability of consuming the self-produced electricity. The gain would be higher. At the moment, storage is not economically attractive, (Bost

1.3. The self-consumption context in France With a nuclear electricity share of 76% (Transmission Network of Electricity [RTE], 2016), the COP21 host has not reached, or is just beginning to reach, the grid parity for photovoltaic electricity because of the relatively low prices of its grid electricity (ADEME French Environment and Energy Management Agency, 2015). Nevertheless, the grid parity is about to be reached in the south of France for superimposed systems that have a lower Levelized Cost Of Energy (LCOE) than in-roof systems. The low prices of retail electricity is one of the reasons which might explain why France is lagging behind some countries, like for example Germany, in terms of support and development of electric self-consumption, and more precisely photovoltaic self-consumption, which is the focus of this study (ADEME, 2015). At the end of 2016, photovoltaic installations represented 6 772 MW in France and produced 8.3 TWh during the last twelve months, which represents 1.7% of the national electric consumption during the same period (RTE, 2016). The photovoltaic electricity production is highly centralized. Installations with a peak power above 250kWp represent 50% of the cumulative installed power while the small installations of less than 9kWp represents 17% in March 2017 (French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy MEDDE, 2017b). Moreover, this development has been allowed by a support policy based 461

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

aggregated data from the distribution system operator, Enedis (2016).3 There are four average profiles calculated between October 2015 and September 2016, which are representative of all French consumers: household, commerce, small and medium business (SMB, or PME for its French acronym), and industry. A forecast of electric consumption for each consumer's segment, made by Enedis, adapts the average consumptions for 2017 (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016b). The model uses an interval of one hour to represent typical weekdays and weekend days for winter (December, January, February), summer (June, July, August), and mid-season.

et al., 2011) but its development would increase the interest for selfconsumption. As studied by Green and Staffell (2017), a prosumer relying on storage facilities to increase his/her self-sufficiency introduces a new concept: the “prosumage”. Nevertheless, individual storage for a prosumer is not yet commercially worthwhile, and it would face challenges. As a matter of fact, this study does not consider the storage of electricity for a photovoltaic system. Many levers are oriented toward the development of electricity selfconsumption, but an important lever is the legislative and administrative one. The operation of self-consumption initially appeared in the law with the Law for Energy Transition and Green Growth (LTECV), but a legislative base was concretely created on the 27th of July 2016 with the order no. 2016–1019 (French Government, 2016) for the electric self-production and self-consumption.2 On the 24th of February 2017, deputies and senators approved the law that provides a legal framework for the development of electric self-consumption. This law was a prerequisite and it removes some impediments and uncertainties (French Government, 2017b). Several levers explain the development of photovoltaic industry toward electricity self-consumption, and the French government has begun to structure a legislative framework to develop this decentralized electricity production. But some questions appear. Which stakeholder would receive or give the biggest transferred value? Does the shift from electric full injection to self-consumption enable the support policy to be more efficient and less costly for the French State? How could the policy support reduce the disparity in the transferred values? Does the new policy allow the profitability and competitiveness of self-consumption? The main objective of this study is to calculate the different value transfers among stakeholders for a projected economical valuation scheme. With that appraisal, it is possible to assess which type of scheme might allow a minimum gap of transferred values. This study also analyses the profitability and competitiveness of average projects for average customers’ profile. The conclusions of this case study aim to provide food for thought regarding risks inherent to the development of a self-consumption policy. It is important to note that the French specificities do not preclude from using those conclusions in order to consider risks for other national electric systems. On the contrary, the concerns that have been raised by this assessment are common among countries that move from a photovoltaic full injection support policy to a photovoltaic self-consumption support policy. As it was previously explained, it depends a lot on the electricity tariff structure of the country.

• The profile household profile corresponds to residential users such • • •

as individual house or apartment with a power subscribed below 36 kVA. The profile commerce corresponds to professional users such as shop, school, and offices with a power subscribed below 36 kVA. The profile small and medium business corresponds to professional users that have small or medium company. It could be a small industry or a medium company with high electric needs. Its power subscribed is between 36 kVA and 250 kVA. The profile industry corresponds to professional users that have big industries, with a power subscribed higher than 250 kVA (Enedis, 2016).

Then, the profile of photovoltaic electricity production is structured for the city of Marseille, in the south of France, in the region ProvenceAlpes-Côte d′Azur (PACA).4 The model uses data from the Photovoltaic Geographical Information System (PVGIS) of the European Commission that provides daily radiation for each specific place. In order to do a simulation, it is chosen an inclination of 35° for panels and an orientation of 0° to the South, which is the optimal orientation for installations. Then, the performance ratio, the energy efficiency of panels and the necessary area for a peak watt are applied to calculate the electric power divided by peak watt (We/Wp) for each hour of the day.

Is × PR × η × AWp =

We Wp

With:

Is : the solar irradiation (Ws / m2) PR: the Performance Ratio (%) η: the energy efficiency of panels (%) AWp : the area for a peak watt (m2 / Wp) We : electric power (We ) Wp : peak watt (Wp)

2. Model and methodology

According to the peak power of the installed system (kWp), it is simple to calculate the energy produced during each hour. Finally, an adjusting factor is used to be closer to the reality of a simulation by month. This factor, called λ, is elaborated with a data extracted from another simulation on the PVGIS of the European Commission, which one gives the yield of the average day of each month.

The methodology to develop the model is illustrated in a simplifying flowchart (Fig. 3) that aims to summarize the process and explain the main logic of the following subsections. On the left, the vertical boxes illustrate the main subsections, in which the model could be divided as it is described in the paragraphs hereinbelow. On the right, the flowchart is composed of more details but still simplified to remain intuitive.

λ=

2.1. Load profile and profile of photovoltaic electricity production

Average Day Energy Yield (PVGIS ) Day Energy Yield (Model)

As a result, the electricity generated by step of one hour (kWh) is the

In order to model the average consumption habits of users, it is used

3 In 2016, ERDF (Electricité Réseau Distribution France, or Electricity Distribution Network of France in English) changed its acronym name to a new name without any specific signification: Enedis, which is now the regulated Distribution System Operator in France. 4 The region PACA has the highest solar irradiation in France. Indeed its average solar load factor is the highest in 2016 with 16,8% (RTE, 2016). On the 31th December 2016, this region had 945 MW of photovoltaic system installed, which ranked it as the third region in France (French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), 2017b).

2 As it was presented by Gossement (2016), the order on self-consumption was a first stage toward the development of individual and collective selfconsumption it defined and authorized, but there was a need for other regulatory and legislative texts to define an operational and simpler setting. In that sense, the French Energy Regulatory Commission (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016a, 2017a) published two requests for proposals that made the photovoltaic electricity self-consumption more concrete.

462

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 3. Simplifying flowchart of the calculative steps of the model.

463

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

following.

2.2. The electric bill

We × kWp × λ = kWe = kWh Wp

Each component of the electric bill is calculated for the two situations defined previously.

The Report for Renewable Electricity Self-Consumption and SelfProduction, elaborated in 2014 by the French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), defined the self-consumption has the act for a user to consume all or part of the energy that he produced himself. The model uses the self-consumption rate defined by the following formula.

Self − Consumption Rate =

• The Tariffs for using public electricity grids (TURPE) • The Tariffs for the supplied electricity • The Contribution to Public Electric Services (CSPE) • Municipal and Departmental Taxes on Electricity Final Consumption (TCCFE and TDCFE) • The Tariff Contribution for Transmission (CTA) • The Value Added Tax (VAT)

Self − Consumed Photovoltaic Electricity Total Photovoltaic Electricty Production

The value and calculation of the TURPE are based on the decision of the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) from the 17th November 2016 on the TURPE 5 HTA-BT beginning on the 1st August 2017 for a period of 4 years. For this study, it is only considered the TURPE HTA-BT and not the TURPE HTB.7 The TURPE HTA-BT is responsible for 95% of the income of Enedis (Enedis, 2018). In this study, only the components of management, count, injection, and extraction are used. It was taken the hypothesis that the other components are negligible for this study. The annual component of management is established for each connection point and for each access contract. It covers the management cost of customers’ file; it includes the physical and phone reception, the elaboration of contract, the invoicing and the recovery. It is established by the main point of connection and its value depends on the power range. For a self-producer that has, for a same connection point, a contract for injection and another for extraction, or a contract for both, the annual component of management is the sum of an annual component of management for a grid access contract established by the user and half of the annual component of management for a grid access contract established by a supplier. The annual component of count covers the cost of the count, control, meter-reading, data transmission, and if it is the case, rent and maintenance. It is established according to the customer property regime for the counting system. It depends on the power range subscribed and the maximal injected power for a producer. The user of the grid that injects electricity on the public grid pays the annual component of injection. It is established for each connection point, according to the active energy injected on the public grid and the power range subscribed. A user of a photovoltaic system connected on the distribution grid doesn’t have to pay it (French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), 2016b). For a connection point, the annual component of extraction is calculated according to the power subscribed by period and the energy consumed. With seasonality hours, the customer chooses for each connection point a subscribed power by temporal range and a tariff option. The model takes in consideration this granularity for the energy consumption, which is illustrated in Fig. 5. In this study, it is made the hypothesis that a unique tariff is taken for the TURPE 5 HTA-BT. It is assumed that the consumption has a defined and known profile. For the power range BT ≤ 36 kVA, which corresponds to household and commerce profiles, the model uses “the 2

Logically, the physical electric flows are defined as following in the model.

• The • •

self-consumed electricity of an hour results from the consumption of all the electricity produced when it is lower than the energy demand during the considered hour, or from the consumption of a quantity equal to the energy demand when the electricity produced during this hour is above the energy demand. The electricity surplus is the difference between the electricity production and the energy demand during an hour. This surplus, in the case of individual self-consumption, would be injected on the public grid. The extracted electricity is the difference between the energy demand and the electricity production self-consumed, which is the lack of production for the considered demand of electricity.

The model is developed to size automatically the photovoltaic system according to the load profile, the annual electric demand, the profile of photovoltaic electricity production and the self-consumption rate, which is also an input. An iterative calculation gives the peak power of the system that has to be installed in order to reach the selfconsumption rate selected for the model. The average load and photovoltaic production profiles are provided in the Fig. 4. A table of CAPEX (Capital Expenditure) and OPEX (Operational Expenditure) for photovoltaic systems in full injection and in self-consumption, from I Care & Consult, is submitted to the model in 2017. The model selects the right value according to the peak power of the simulated system and the chosen year of simulation. It is also chosen a lifespan of 25 years for the photovoltaic system (ADEME, 2015), a discount rate of 4%, and an annual increase of 2% for the whole electric bill. In order to assess the value transfers between stakeholders, the model takes in consideration two situations: “With PV Full Injection” and “With PV Self-Consumption”. The model calculates the transferred values according to the unit €/MWh_selfconsumed. The objective is to visualize the transferred values in the case of self-consumption compared to full injection, thus, to calculate these transferred values for each megawatt hours self-consumed.5 What is sizing for the transmission grid is the power called during the peak load (ADEME, 2015), this is why the following hypothesis is taken for this study: photovoltaic electricity self-consumption would bring negligible additional savings and costs to the system operators. In a context of photovoltaic development, which is decentralized, it could be inferred that self-consumption brings negligible costs or benefits for the electric grid, in comparison with the same development of decentralized photovoltaic that is based on full injection.6

(footnote continued) consumption and in full injection. Naturally, this is an important effect that should be considered if the decentralization provided by the PV generation were compared to a centralized generation. In fact, decentralization may bring substantial savings regarding this issue. Nevertheless, this study focus on a specific evolution of the decentralization process by comparing it with a baseline scenario relying also on decentralization, which reduces joule losses as well. 7 The TURPE HTA-BT deals with distribution made by Enedis and the TURPE HTB deals with the transmission made by the Transmission System Operator RTE (Réseau de Transport d′Electricité or Transmission Network of Electricity in English).

5

It should be noted that the self-consumption studied does not include storage facilities. 6 Regarding the reduction of joule losses provided by a development of PV generation close to the electric demand, this study makes the assumption that such reduction is similar between a development of PV generation in self464

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 4. Average load and photovoltaic production profiles in Marseille (France). Source: Own calculation - Enedis and EU PVGIS Data.

465

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 5. Period of seasonality hours.

reachable by municipalities and departments. The TCCFE value is 6.375 €/MWh for customers with an electric connection below 36 kVA, 2.125 €/MWh between 36 and 250 kVA, and 0 €/MWh above 250 kVA. The TDCFE value is 3.185 €/MWh for customers with an electric connection below 36 kVA, 1.0625 €/MWh between 36 and 250 kVA, and 0 €/MWh above 250 kVA.10 The Tariff Contribution for Transmission (CTA) is a tax paid in the electric, but also gas, bill. It aims to finance the retirement pension of workers in the electric and gas industry. Its value is calculated on a percentage (27.04%) of the fixed TURPE (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2017b). The value-added tax (VAT or TVA for its French acronym) is applied to all the components of the electric bill. For households, its percentage is 5.5% on the fixed part of the electricity, which is the subscription. And it is 20% on the variable cost of the energy consumption and others taxes. The customer with a professional status can avoid paying the VAT.11 The model takes into consideration all of these components of the electric bill, and it adjusts them to the profile of the customer. The following Fig. 6 provides the structure of the annual electric bill for average consumers’ profiles without photovoltaic systems. With data from Enedis (2016), the calculated the annual electric consumptions used in this study are:

periods and average use tariff”. For the power range BT > 36 kVA, which corresponds to small and medium business profile, the model uses “the 4 periods with long use tariff”. For the power range HTA, which corresponds to the industry profile, the model uses “the 5 periods with fixed peak and long use tariff “ (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016b). The price of electricity supply covers all the costs necessary to the production of electricity or its purchase, and the markup of the utility. A fixed price is the cost of subscription, and it depends on the power subscribed and the consumption profile chosen by the customer. The variable price covers the energy cost, and it depends on the power subscribed and on the quantity of electricity consumed by the user. The model uses “the Blue Tariff for Households” and “the Blue Tariff for No Households” for customers in the power range BT ≤ 36 kVA, “the Yellow Tariff” (not available anymore) for customers in the power range BT > 36 kVA, and “the Green Tariff” (not available anymore)8 for customers in the power range HTA (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2017b). When the TURPE is deducted from these tariffs, the model gives the price of electricity supply. These tariffs of electricity supply are the tariffs published in August 2016 by the CRE for the period 2016–2017. The model calculates also the markup applied by the utility on the sold electricity. It was taken an average markup of 4% on the supplied electricity price. The Contribution to Public Electric Services (CSPE) aims to finance several services.9 The main service is to cover charges of the electric public services assumed by historic suppliers like Electricity of France (EDF), Electricity of Mayotte (EDM) and local companies of distribution (ELD). Support policies such as the mandatory purchase tariff for photovoltaic electricity injected on the public grid force the French State to refund the difference between the mandatory purchase tariff that historic suppliers, such as EDF, pays for the photovoltaic electricity it must buy and the avoided cost that purchasing this electricity brings to EDF, which is appraised at 44.74 €/MWh by Poizat and François (2015). This refunding is allowed by the CSPE. Another policy covered by the CSPE is the tariff equalization. For instance, tariffs are the same on the interconnected mainland and on islands like Corsica and DOMTOM (Overseas Department and Territories) where the cost of electric production is higher, but the CSPE equalizes the electricity tariffs. Each consumer and self-producer must pay for the CSPE according to the kWh consumed on the grid. The cost for the consumer is 22.5 €/MWh in 2016 and this value will be fixed in the future. According to the law on the self-consumption, a user with a photovoltaic installation based on self-consumption will be exonerated from the CSPE on the kilowatt-hours self-consumed. The Tax on Electric Final Consumption (TCFE) is the sum of a local (municipal) and a departmental tax. It depends on the quantity of electricity consumed and the power range. The municipal tax is the TCCFE (Municipal Tax on Electric Final Consumption), and the departmental tax is the TDCFE (Departmental Tax on Electric Final Consumption). The values were chosen equal to the maximum values

• 4,688 kWh/year for an average household profile • 10,688 kWh/year for an average commerce profile • 119,851 kWh/year for an average SMB profile • 1,267,514 kWh/year for an average industry profile It should be noted that the hatched part is the fixed share of the electric bill without considering the VAT. 2.3. The economic valuation scheme The model aims to assess the cash flow coming from the sales of photovoltaic electricity and other premiums. Therefore, the economic valuation scheme that is used in the model is flexible in order to face changes in the regulatory pattern. The French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy MEDDE (2014) elaborated this scheme in its Report for Renewable Electricity Self-Consumption and Self-Production, and it was also operationally defined in two requests for proposals of the Energy Regulatory Commission (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016a, 2017a). By mixing the theory and its first practical applications the valuation scheme is the following. Eselfconsum × (Electricity Price on theBill + A) + Einject × (Wholesale market Price + B ) − C × Eprod × ⎜⎛ ⎝

PMAXinject Pinstal

⎞+D×P instal ⎠

⎟

With:

Eselfconsum : the quantity of self-produced electricity that is self-consumed by the user (kWh)

8

Now, the Yellow and the Green Tariffs are replaced by not regulated tariffs, which are negotiated between the customer and the utility and it is assumed that prices of not regulated tariffs will be similar to the former regulated tariffs. 9 According to the French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy MEDDE (2016) and a reform linked to the French budget, the revenue generated by the collected CSPE will be allocated to the budget of the French State, just as the Interior Tax on the Consumption of Energy Products (TICPE) with which one the CSPE is henceforth fused. This tax pool, allocated to the French budget, is expected to assume the future development of renewable energies.

10 These values has been selected by a review of the taxes applied by local governments according to the regulatory framework, and were presented by the Fournisseurs Electricité (2016) and Opera Energie (2016) on their website in 2016. 11 This information is commonly mentioned in the website of electricity suppliers or informative professional websites like Fournisseurs Electricité (2016).

466

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 6. Analysis of annual electric bills for average profiles.

“Electricity Price on the Bill”: the cost that the user used to pay for the electricity extracted from the public grid, it is the retail market price (€/kWh) “A”: a premium for the additional valuation of self-consumed electricity (€/kWh) Einject : the quantity of self-produced electricity that is injected on the public grid (kWh) “Wholesale market Price”: the price SPOT (€/kWh) “B”: a premium for the valuation of the injected self-produced electricity (€/kWh) “C”: a premium to limit the peak of power injected on the public grid (€/kWh). Eprod : the total of self-produced electricity (kWh) PMAXinject : the maximum power injected on the public grid by step of one hour (kW) Pinstal : the peak power of the installed system (kWp) “D”: a premium of subsidy for investment (€/kWp)

Fig. 7. Several types of economic valuation allowed by the standardized economic valuation scheme.

provided in the following table that allows calculating the premium B, which is equivalent to the purchase tariff, when it is added to the price SPOT equal to 0.0423 €/kWh. This price SPOT was calculated in 2017 with data published by the French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE (2017b) in the report on the French electric market. According to the same pricing decree, the premium D for investment would subsidy photovoltaic installations with a peak power in the range [0–100 kWp]. The following Table 1 summarizes the previous mandatory purchase tariffs and the new pricing decree published on the 9th May 2017.

It has to be noted that the premium “C” is chosen equal to zero in this study because it is regarded as a secondary parameter to reach the conclusions of the study. The benefit of this standardized scheme is that it is possible to approach several valuation schemes as it is presented by the Fig. 7.14 In 2017, according to the current mandatory purchase tariff and the pricing decree presented on the 9th May by the French MEDDE, the premium A is equal to zero. Moreover, the data from the decree are

2.4. Treatment of the cash flow The model does an aggregation of each cash flow, in order to calculate the annual transferred value for a lifespan of 25 years when the investment is made in 2017. It also calculates the profitability of the projects in self-consumption and full injection. To do so, it calculates the cash flow during 25 years taking in consideration the CAPEX, the

12 It should be noted that the Net-Billing and the Net-Metering developed by this model are defined by a step of one hour.

467

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Table 1 Table of mandatory purchase tariffs and premium for investment. Source: French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (2017a); Photovoltaïque.info (2017). Installed peak power

[0–3 kWp]

[3–9 kWp]

[9–36 kWp] [36–100 kWp] [Sup à 100 kWp]

Roof Integration

IAB (In-Roof) ISB (Half In-Roof) Superimposed IAB (In-Roof) ISB (Half In-Roof) Superimposed ISB (Half In-Roof) Superimposed ISB (Half In-Roof) Superimposed All

Purchase Tariff T1 2017 (€/kWh)

0.2357 0.1230 0.0536 0.2357 0.1230 0.0536 0.1230 0.0536 0.1177 0.0536 0.0536

Purchase Tariff 2017 – Pricing Decree (€/kWh) without IAB Premium

Premium D for investment (€/kWp)

Full Injection

Self-Consumption + Surplus Injection

0.187

0.10

400

0.159

300

0.12075

0.06

200

0.115

100

Table 2 Main inputs for the average simulation.

Annual Consumption (kWh) Power of connection (kVA) Integration Mode of a system in Full Injection or in Self-Consumption Average Self-Consumption Rate Photovoltaic System Sized (kWp)

Household

Commerce

Small and Medium Business

Industry

4,688 6 Superimposed 50% 2.7

10,688 24 Superimposed 50% 6.7

119,851 100 Superimposed 70% 56.2

1,267,514 384 Superimposed 90% 191.9

Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy MEDDE, 2017a; French Government, 2017a). The main inputs of selfconsumers’ profile for the average simulations are gathered in the following Table 2. According to the following charts (Fig. 8) that represent average value transfers from a situation in full injection to self-consumption, the first result shows that Enedis, which is the distribution system operator, would suffer from a loss of revenue. Indeed, a self-consumer would consume less electricity from the grid than a consumer in full injection. This implies a lower TURPE to pay because it is more dependent on the quantity of electricity consumed than on the consumer's peak load.14 Undoubtedly, this shortfall will be offset by an increase in some services tariffs for other customers. Concretely, the public grid users will assume the loss of revenue through a price increase on their electric bill. On the other hand, the French State would benefit from these transferred values for three average profiles that have photovoltaic systems with a peak power below 100 kWp: household, commerce, and SMB. It is possible to explain this tendency because the savings made on the CSPE spent to cover the cost of the mandatory purchase tariff is higher than the sum of the premiums spent for the development of selfconsumption and the shortfall of CSPE collected. This result demonstrates the interest for a State to switch from a policy in favour of full injection to a policy in favour of self-consumption when LCOE is approaching the grid parity. Moreover, it could be a tool to support an energetic transition that aims to decentralize the production sites at a lower policy cost. Nevertheless, these savings do not appear to be directed to benefit the consumers because the value of CSPE is fixed on their electric bill in the future (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016b). In the case of a self-consumption project for the industry profile, the result is a shortfall for the State. It is possible to explain this result by looking at the low mandatory purchase tariff for electricity coming from a system above 100 kWp. In fact, when this mandatory purchase

OPEX, the subsidy for investment, the sales of photovoltaic electricity and the savings on the electric bill compared to a situation without any photovoltaic installations. Then, the actualization of the cash flow is made with the discount rate.13 Concretely, the formula of the Net Present Value is the following and was used to assess the profitability and the competitiveness of projects: 25

NPV = −I +

∑ n=1

Qn (1 + r )n

With: Qn: the cash flow for each period n I: the initial investment r: the discount rate Concerning the value transfers that are annual value transfers, the values were calculated on the lifespan of the project, actualized and annualized. The model has also an automated abacus that analyses, independently, the impact of the premium B on transferred values. Each simulation is made for a different value of this economic parameter and registered in the abacus that allows viewing value transfers for a range of premium B values. 3. Results and discussion For 2017, the aggregated data from Enedis (2016) give an average annual consumption for each profile. The average power of connection to the public grid is also provided (French Energy Regulatory Commission CRE, 2016b). The photovoltaic system installed are not inroof but are superimposed systems. This hypothesis is taken because the new policy, presented on the 9th May 2017 in the pricing decree, aims to stop its support to in-roof systems, which are more expensive (French

14 It is also possible to refer back to the Fig. 6 that illustrates the fixed TURPE depending on the consumer's peak load, and the variable TURPE depending on the volumetric consumption of electricity.

13

For the reference case, the discount rate has been chosen equal to 4% as previously presented. 468

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Fig. 8. Annual value transfers for each simulation.

469

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Table 3 Mandatory purchase tariffs for surplus of self-consumption that minimize the difference between the lowest and highest value transfer by stakeholder.

Minimizing Mandatory Purchase Tariff for surplus (€/kWh) Retail Market Price on 25 years (€/kWh)

Household

Commerce

Small and Medium Business

0.19 0.21

0.18 0.19

0.12 0.15

support high self-consumption rate rather than big photovoltaic installations that are oversized for the user's electric demand. In this study, it is also questioned how a mandatory purchase tariff for self-consumption, given a mandatory purchase tariff for full injection, could allow a minimum delta between the highest value transfer received by a stakeholder and the highest value transfer lost by another. The results suggest that this minimum would be reached by a NetBilling if the focus were on the lifespan of projects beginning in 2017,15 that is to say, if the mandatory purchase tariff is between zero and the retail market price. This result is summarized in Table 3.16 If this minimum were reached with an adequate mandatory purchase tariff, it would be also possible to have a self-consumption project more economically attractive than a full injection project. Such adequate mandatory purchase tariff is not a necessary condition for the competitiveness of self-consumption, but it is not opposed to the possibility of competitiveness of self-consumption over full injection. Finally, the economic return is calculated with two NPV, one for a full injection project and the other for a self-consumption project. The calculation of these NPV takes in consideration the possible bill savings compared to a situation without any photovoltaic installation; and the model sizes a smaller photovoltaic system when the self-consumption rate is increased, given an electric load. On average, self-consumption is profitable for all profiles excepted for households given an average self-consumption rate (Table 4). Moreover, bigger the installation and electric demand are, more profitable the self-consumption project is, like for instance with a project adapted to suit an industrial profile. On average, the competitiveness of self-consumption over full injection exists for industrial projects. Furthermore, the profitability of self-consumption and full injection is almost the same for small or medium businesses. The relative competitiveness of a self-consumption project over a full injection project is explained by the mandatory purchase tariffs previously presented in the pricing decree (Table 1). These results show that the support policy aims to stimulate a selfconsumption with a high self-consumption rate rather than investments in photovoltaic injections that would be oversized for the user's electric demand. Indeed, when the self-consumption rate is increased while the system size decreases, self-consumption becomes competitive. One more time, it has to be noted that the model sizes a smaller photovoltaic system when the self-consumption rate is increased. The following tables (Tables 5–7) present the NPV resulting from the analysis of sensitivity made previously. A lower lifespan negatively impacts the profitability and competitiveness of self-consumption projects, even though big projects are less sensitive. The same negative impacts result from a higher discount rate. Concerning the electric bill, a higher annual increase implies a higher profitability and better competitiveness of self-consumption projects.

tariff, which is the reference of the simulation for that industry profile, is initially low for a full injection (this is not necessarily the case if the project comes from a request for proposal), it is even more difficult to offset the sum of premiums spent and shortfall of the CSPE collected by savings in the CSPE spent. Indeed, the possibility of savings is very low. It has to be noted that the results should be analysed according to the relative tendencies and orders of magnitude, not to the absolute value of the transferred values. When an analysis of sensitivity is made for the self-consumption rate, with an addition and subtraction of 20%, the tendencies for Enedis and for the French State remain the same. When the self-consumption rate decreases (respectively increase), there is a positive (respectively negative) increase of value transfer for Enedis and the State. Those fluctuations are opposite for the PV user. When an analysis of sensitivity is made for the lifespan of PV systems, with a lifespan of 20 years, and also 15 years, instead of 25 years, the absolute values of the annual value transfers for Enedis, the State, and PV user are slightly less important, but the overall tendencies of reference remain the same. When an analysis of sensitivity is made for the discount rate, with a rate of 8%, and also 12%, instead of 4%, the absolute values of the annual value transfers for the State and the PV user are less important, but the overall tendencies of reference remain the same. These reductions are slightly more significant than for the analysis of sensitivity on the lifespan. When an analysis of sensitivity is made for the annual increase of the electricity bill, with an increase of 1%, and respectively 3%, instead of 2%, there is a negative (respectively positive) increase of value transfers for PV users. There is also a positive (respectively negative) increase for Enedis, municipalities, and departments. The value transfers for the State resulted from a negative increase (respectively positive increase). Finally, the overall tendencies did not change at all except for the SMB profile that suffers from a small negative value transfer when the annual increase is 1%. To add conclusion about this analysis of sensitivity, the average tendencies are quite robust but more sensitive to the self-consumption rate and the annual increase of the electric bill. It seems interesting to evaluate these transferred values if the mandatory purchase tariff for the injection of the surplus is equal to the mandatory purchase tariff in the case of full injection. For each project, Enedis would suffer from the same shortfall of revenue. In the case of the household, the State would continue to make savings but lower than for the realistic simulation, and the user would reduce the negative value transfers and may have some benefits. For commerce profile, the same tendencies result from this last analysis. And for small and medium business, it is similar: the user would benefit even more from value transfers and the State would save less, compared to the tariffs stated in the pricing decree on the 9th May 2017. Coming back to the savings that could be made by the State for the profiles of household, commerce, SMB, another analysis shows that it is possible to do savings whether the mandatory purchase tariff for selfconsumption is lower, equal, or higher than for full injection. It depends on the self-consumption rate and the user's electricity demand. Results show logically that a higher self-consumption rate means that the State has more opportunities to put a mandatory purchase tariff for selfconsumption higher than for full injection while still earning from the value transfers. This tendency is in favour of a policy that aims to

4. Conclusions and policy implications Findings of the current study support, for France, the development 15 This minimum would have been reached by a Feed-in-Tariff if the focus were only made on the first year since 2017. 16 This result applies to the profiles household, commerce and SMB, but is not possible to reach this minimum for the industry profile.

470

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

Table 4 NPV for a lifespan of 25 years (€). Household Self-Consumption Rate Peak Power (kWp) NPV (in € and for Full Injection) NPV (in € and for Self-Consumption)

30% 4.9 3,065 854

Commerce

50% 2.7 − 136 − 953

70% 1.7 − 355 84

30% 12.4 6,393 − 5,544

50% 6.7 7,431 1,440

70% 4.3 4,480 1,837

Small or Medium Business

Industry

50% 87.9 35,583 6,258

70% 551.1 − 234,334 191,258

70% 56.2 17,508 20,722

90% 35.8 5,812 22,615

90% 355.9 − 156,661 230,781

100% 191.9 − 117,951 115,428

20

25

− 176,771 116,234

− 156,661 230,781

8%

12%

− 222,887 15,583

− 262,560 − 105,363

Table 5 NPV analysis of sensitivity on PV Systems Lifespan. Household PV systems Lifespan (years) Self-Consumption Rate Peak Power (kWp) NPV (in € and for Full Injection) NPV (in € and for Self-Consumption)

15 50% 2.7 − 1,318 − 2,718

Commerce 20

25

− 14 − 1,668

− 136 − 953

15 50% 6.7 3,971 − 2,700

20

25

7,207 − 194

7,431 1,440

Small or Medium Business

Industry

15 70% 56.2 1,440 − 12,786

15 90% 355.9 − 216,512 − 7,563

20

25

17,378 5,199

17,508 20,722

Table 6 NPV analysis of sensitivity on Discount Rate. Household Discount Rate Self-Consumption Rate Peak Power (kWp) NPV (in € and for Full Injection) NPV (in € and for Self-Consumption)

4% 50% 2.7 − 136 − 953

Commerce

8%

12%

− 1,875 − 2,664

− 2,994 − 3,650

4% 50% 6.7 7,431 1,440

8%

12%

2,850 − 2,664

− 35 − 5,049

Small or Medium Business

Industry

4% 70% 56.2 17,508 20,722

4% 90% 355.9 − 156,661 230,781

8%

12%

− 4,877 − 10,219

− 19,095 − 27,750

Table 7 NPV analysis of sensitivity on Electric Bill Annual Increase. Household Electric Bill Annual Increase Self-Consumption Rate Peak Power (kWp) NPV (in € and for Full Injection) NPV (in € and for Self-Consumption)

1%

Commerce 2%

3%

1%

50% 2.7 − 64

− 136

− 219

50% 6.7 7,511

− 1,530

− 953

− 285

328

2%

Small or Medium Business 3%

1%

7,431

7,363

70% 56.2 19,609

1,440

2,724

9,921

2%

Industry 3%

1%

2%

3%

17,508

15,082

90% 355.9 − 155,151

− 156,661

− 158,403

20,722

33,192

147,250

230,781

327,232

this kind of unbalance results from a self-consumption policy support, it raises the question of the feasibility of the electric bill structure for this new policy. In that sense, a weak or inappropriate change in the electric bill structure for a policy that introduced a new usage of the electric and grid system may create unbalances in the revenues and the grid financing contributions. Nevertheless, such adjustment could be more necessary when the number of self-consumption installations will become significant. During the first years of the policy, this revenue compensation and adjustment in the grid charges allocation may not be necessarily compulsory, and other customers may not see the effects at first. Even though the French CRE preferred to wait, the electric bill should be restructured in the coming years in order to counterbalance this deficit and prevent unbalances. Increasing the share of the bill depending on the subscribed power or asking the PV user to pay for the grid services regardless of his consumption of electricity withdrawn from the grid are an example of pricing reforms able to reduce such externality. It is also interesting to note that French municipalities, French department, and utilities would suffer from a deficit of revenues too. The French State would make savings for several projects, especially for projects below 100 kWp. The total benefit for the French State will naturally depend on the respective development of the dimensional

of large photovoltaic electricity self-consumption facilities, as being more profitable than smaller ones, that is to say for industries and small or medium businesses (SMB). On the contrary, projects around 36 kWp or below have not been easily profitable in 2017. Furthermore, it seems to be easier to reach profitability by having a high self-consumption rate rather than by oversizing the photovoltaic installation. Apparently, the new energy policy for photovoltaic electricity self-consumption favors the development of installations well sized according to the electric demand and user's profile. This study suggests consequently that an oversized system for self-consumption is less profitable and not competitive compared to the same oversized system in full injection. These results also suggest that exist opportunities for the development of storage capacities, which is an increasingly strategic sector for utilities. Results also showed that the stakeholders which are most affected by the direct transferred values are the distribution system operator (Enedis), the French State and the PV user. Concerning the distribution system operator, a deficit of revenues will take place for all the projects with self-consumption. This shortfall would affect the electric bill of other public grid customers through a price increase, while photovoltaic prosumers would get economic benefits by paying less. When 471

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

been elaborated. We would also like to show our gratitude to Valentin Vermeulen, Julien Paulou, Guillaume Neveux and Ali Hajjar from I Care & Consult for their enlightening insights. Finally, we wanted to express our gratefulness to the three reviewers for their highly contributing insights.

types of photovoltaic installations in France. Moreover, the transferred values would benefit or impact the user because of one main tendency: the difference between the deficit of revenues from the electricity sales and the savings on the electric bill. The premiums might help favorably the user, but with a more moderate impact. Other results suggest, if the focus is logically made on the lifespan of the photovoltaic system, that the minimum delta between the biggest and lowest transferred value by stakeholder, for household, commerce and SMB profiles, could be reached with a mandatory purchase tariff for the electricity surplus slightly lower than the retail market price, given the mandatory purchase tariff for full injected electricity. According to this study, the new policy supports the development of photovoltaic systems with high self-consumption rate rather than pushing prosumers to invest in oversized photovoltaic systems and inject more electricity on the grid. Undoubtedly, it could be in favour of a more efficient policy when the grid parity is about to be reached, but the national value transfers for the State would depend on the distribution between the development of big installations for industrial profiles and smaller installations for household and commerce profiles, which do not have the same economic return. In fact, the big consumers are more incentivized to become prosumer and so to reduce their dependence on utilities. The deficit of revenues from the markup because of fewer sales is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, fewer big customers and lower demand on the grid will be added to the reduction of the wholesale electricity price generated by the high penetration of renewable generation associated with a must-run status. It would decrease the profitability of fossil fuels plants, and increase the retail price of electricity, leading to more prosumers. As it is more difficult to cover the cost of big power plants, utilities may question the profitability of their investments. They may reduce their electricity generation and trading activities in order to focus more on other activities related to renewables integration and demand-side management services. This utility death spiral with more and more prosumers will probably force utilities to a structural revolution of their business. Nevertheless, the security of supply of electricity should be safeguarded, and a particular attention should be given to the impact of intermittent renewables on the grid and its operation. As a result, the self-consumption policy calls for another one, like for instance storage and capacity payments that focuses on the security of supply by creating incentives to have reserved and secure available capacity. Some thoughts on the grid infrastructure financing, and as with local and decentralized generation, grid investments are expected to decrease, just as its maintenance cost, whereas the reorganization of the electric industry may limit this reduction. Moreover, fewer investments maybe impossible if the security of supply and management of intermittency are considered. The introduction of prosumers who reduce their contribution to finance the grid raises new challenges, on the long term, in order to secure enough revenues to finance the needed investments and operational costs that ensure the security of supply. As presented in the introduction, several countries may face similar issues linked to grid financing, because of their electric tariffs structure and the lack of measures to secure the needed revenues to finance the grid, but also to enable a fair allocation of grid charges. In this context, different policies and tariff structure can be used to compare the situation in different countries. Nevertheless, this calls for additional research to assess value transfers on international bases and to analyze the recurrent main consequences of the implementation of self-consumption policies.

Data statement I, Jonathan Roulot, confirm that all the data, excepted CAPEX and OPEX, used for this study are relevant data from well known sources and available in free access. Concerning the data of CAPEX and OPEX used for this study, these are relevant data, which are confidential data from the consulting company I Care and Consult. But similar data of CAPEX and OPEX could be easily found in free access from relevant sources. References ADEME, 2015. Filière Photovoltaïque Française: Bilan, Perspectives et Stratégie (French Photovoltaic Industry: Assessment, Prospects and Strategy). France. Bost, M., Bernd, H., Aretz, A., 2011. Effects of Self-Consumption and Grid Parity of Photovoltaic Systems. The IÖW, Germany. Enedis, 2016. OpenData, Website. Retrieved from 〈http://www.enedis.fr/opendata〉 (Accessed 30 October 2016). Enedis, 2018. Notre financement: le tarif d′acheminement (Our financing: the transmission tariff). Retrieved from 〈http://www.enedis.fr/tarif-acheminement〉 (Accessed 31 May 2018). European Commission, 2015. Commission Staff Working Document – Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-Consumption. Brussels, Belgium. European Commission, 2016. Second Consumer Market Study on the Functioning of the Retail Electricity Markets for Consumers in the EU – Final Report. Brussels. Fournisseurs Electricité, 2016. Taxe communale sur la consummation finale d′électricité (TCCFE) (Municipal Tax on Electricity Final Consumption), France. Retrieved from 〈https://www.fournisseurs-electricite.com/tcfe/tccfe〉 (Accessed 24 September 2017). French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), 2016a. Cahier des charges de l′appel d′offres portant sur la réalisation et l′exploitation d′installations de production d′électricité à partir d′énergies renouvelables en autoconsommation (Specifications of the call for tenders on the development and exploitations of installations for electricity generation based on renewable energies in self-consumption). France. French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), 2016b. Délibération de la Commission de régulation de l′énergie du 17 novembre 2016 portant décision sur les tarifs d′utilisation des réseaux publics d′électricité dans les domaines de tension HTA et BT (Decision of the French Energy Regulatory Commission from the 17th November 2016 on the tariffs of utilisation of the electricity public grid in the tension range of HTA and BT). France. French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), 2017a. Appels d′offres (Call for tenders). France. Retrieved from: 〈www.cre.fr/documents/appels-d-offres〉 (Accessed 24 September 2017). French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), 2017b. Marché de l′électricité (Electricity Market). France. Retrieved from 〈www.cre.fr/marches/marche-de-detail/marche-del-electricite〉 (Accessed 24 September 2017). French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), 2014. Rapport sur l’autoconsommationl′autoconsommation et l′autoproduction de l′électricité renouvelable (Report on self-consumption and self-generation of renewable electricity). France. French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), 2016. Panorama energies-climat (Energies-Climate Panorama). No. 34 La FiscalitéEnergie, France. French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), 2017a. Arrêté du 9 mai 2017 fixant les conditions d′achat de l′électricité produite par les installations implantées sur batiment utilisant l′énergie solaire photovoltaicque, d′une puissance crête installée inférieure ou égale à 100kW tells que vises au 3° de l′article D. 314-15 du code de l′énergie et situées en métropole continentale (Decree from the 9th May 2017 setting the purchasing conditions for electricity produced by installations established in buildings using photovoltaic energy, with an installed peak power below or equal to 100 kW as targeted in the 3° of the article D. 314-15 of the energy code, and located on the mainland). France. Retrieved from: 〈https:// www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/arrete/2017/5/9/DEVR1712972A/jo/texte〉 (Accessed 18 September 2017). French Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE), 2017b. Tableau de bord: solaire photovoltaïque, Premier Trimestre 2017 (Overview: Photovoltaic Solar, First Semester 2017). SOeS (MEDDE). France. French Government, 2016. Ordonnance n° 2016–1019 du 27 juillet 2016 relative à l′autoconsommation d′électricité (Order no. 2016–1019 from the 27th July 2016 on the electricity self-consumption). France. French Government, 2017a. Energy Code (Energy Code). France. French Government, 2017b. Loi no. 2017-227 du 24 février 2017 ratifiant les ordonnances no. 2016–1019 du 27 juillet 2016 relative à l′autoconsommation d′électricité et no. 2016–1059 du 3 août 2016 relative à la production d′électricité à partir

Acknowledgement We thank our colleagues from Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and Ecole Centrale de Nantes, France, who provided insight and expertise that contributed to the research, even though they may not agree with all the conclusions of this paper. We also thank I Care & Consult, France, for its helpful insight into the way this research has 472

Energy Policy 122 (2018) 459–473

J. Roulot, R. Raineri

IEA PVPS, 2016b. Review and Analysis of PV Self-Consumption Policies. France. Opera Energie, 2016. Les taxes de l′éléctricité en 2016 (Taxes on electricity in 2016). France. Available from 〈https://opera-energie.com/les-taxes-en-electricite/〉 (Accessed 24 September 2017). Photovoltaïque.info, 2017. Tarif d′achat (Purchase Tariff). France. Available from 〈http://www.photovoltaique.info/-Tarif-d-achat-.html〉 (Accessed 24 September 2017). Poizat, F., François, P., 2015. Obligation d′achat, prix administré: l′opacité du marché de l′électricité (Purchase Obligation, Price Managed: the Opacity of Electricity Market). Foundation IFRAP, France. RTE, 2016. Panorama de l′électricité renouvelable 2016 (Renewable Electricity Panorama 2016). France. Schittekatte, T., Momber, I., Meeus, L., 2018. Future-proof tariff design: recovering sunk grid costs in a world where consumers are pushing back. Energy Econ. 484–498. Yu, H.J.J., 2017. A prospective economic assessment of residential PV self-consumption with batteries and its systemic effects, and the implications for public policies: the French case in 2030. Chair European Electricity Markets, Working Paper no. 27.

d′énergies renouvelalbles et visant à adapter certaines dispositions relatives aux réseaux d′électricité et de gaz et aux energies renouvelables (Law no. 2017-227 from the 24th February 2017 ratifying the order no. 2016–1019 from the 27th July 2016 on the electricity self-consumption and no. 2016–1059 from the 3rd August 2016 on the electricity generation based on renewable energies and aiming at adapting some measures on the electric and gas networks, and renewable energies). France. Retrieved from: 〈https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/2/24/2017-227/jo/ texte〉 (Accessed 3 March 2017). Gossement, A., 2016. Que dit l′ordonnance autoconsommation? (What does the order on self-consumption say?) GreenUnivers, Cabinet Gossement Avocate, France. Green, R., Staffell, I., 2017. “Prosumage” and the British electricity market. Econ. Energy Environ. Policy 6 (1) (IAEE). IEA, 2015. Electricity tariff structure – Spanish experience (PowerPoint Slides). Retrieved from 〈https://www.iea.org/media/workshops/2015/esapworkshopiv/Laveron.pdf〉 (Accessed 29 May 2018). IEA PVPS, 2016a. A Methodology for the Analysis of PV Self-Consumption Policies. France.

473