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The irony and the exclusivity of Atlantic bluefin tuna management
Marine Policy 35 (2011) 249–251
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Short Communication
The irony and the exclusivity of Atlantic bluefin tuna management D.G. Webster n Environmental Studies Program, Dartmouth College, 6182 Steele Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, USA
a r t i c l e in fo
abstract
Article history: Received 9 July 2010 Received in revised form 9 August 2010 Accepted 18 August 2010
The eastern stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna (thunnus thynnus) was recently nominated for protection under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES). That nomination failed, which leaves management of the heavily overfished stock in the hands of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). This paper reviews the history of ICCAT management of Atlantic bluefin tuna to show that (1) early elimination of competitive forces prevented agreement on management in keeping with scientific advice, resulting in the steep decline of the stock, (2) even just the threat of a CITES listing can provide temporary impetus for marked improvement in ICCAT management, and (3) long-term sustainable management by ICCAT will require continued economic and political pressure. & 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: International fisheries management Atlantic bluefin tuna Highly migratory species Endangered species Vulnerability response
1. Introduction Like many valuable marine species, Atlantic bluefin tuna (thunnus thynnus) has been extensively overfished. Biomass estimates for the eastern stock of the species are now so low that it was recently nominated for protection under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES). Those who opposed the CITES listing, including Japan, Canada, Tunisia, and others, pointed out that there is already an international organization charged with the protection of bluefin tuna, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). In spite of its failure to halt the decline of the stock, these countries believe that ICCAT is still the appropriate forum for Atlantic bluefin management [1,2]. Here, we draw insights from the history of ICCAT regulation to explain why bluefin is so heavily overexploited and provide measured expectations for the future of the species.
Sub-Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) consistently recommended that they should do so. Thus the legal catch level matched scientific recommendations, but the actual catch level fluctuated and then began to rise unchecked (see Fig. 1). In the mid-1990s this pattern changed but management remained ineffective. At that time, ICCAT established countryspecific quotas for eastern bluefin tuna and also applied strong international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to both stocks in the Atlantic.1 Since then, the Commission has consistently set legal catch levels that were higher than those recommended by the SCRS but quite close to estimated total harvest.2 Although SCRS advice became more optimistic later that decade, the gap between legal catches and scientific advice remained quite large. The resultant stock decline was compounded by both illegal harvests and exceptionally high catches of juvenile bluefin in the Mediterranean. The ‘‘small fish’’ problem was consistently mentioned by the SCRS and consistently received only ineffectual attention from the Commission.3
2. Historical management of eastern bluefin tuna The simplest explanation for the current state of eastern bluefin tuna is that ICCAT consistently ignored the advice of their scientists regarding this species. At first, the Commission chose to adopt regulations without enforcing them. In 1974, ICCAT passed a binding recommendation to limit harvests to ‘‘current levels’’ as per scientific advice [3,4]. They renewed this measure annually for almost two decades but never actually implemented it, even though their n
Tel.: + 1 602 646 0213. E-mail address: [email protected]
0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2010.08.004
1 Monitoring measures include a catch certification scheme that allows countries to track the origin of imported bluefin tuna through official documents and both positive and negative lists of vessels that are respectively allowed to target the stock and those observed harvesting illegally. Enforcement mechanisms largely consisted of sanctions on exports of bluefin tuna from countries whose fleets were found to be fishing in contravention of ICCAT management. 2 Based on SCRS estimates using data from trade certificates as well as reported catch. It should be noted that the SCRS believes the data to be grossly underestimated from the peak in 1996 onward because of illegal fishing not identified via existing monitoring mechanisms. 3 In response to SCRS advice, ICCAT established minimum size limits and time area closures to protect small bluefin but has yet to effectively enforce these regulations.
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D.G. Webster / Marine Policy 35 (2011) 249–251
Fig. 1. History of regulation and harvests of Eastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna by ICCAT. Total catch is estimated by the SCRS using landings reported by countries and import records from ICCAT’s catch documentation scheme (1969–2007 [11]; 2008, [8]). SCRS recommended levels were collected from the SCRS stock assessment in the year reported [6]. Based on ICCAT regulations were derived from (1) a search of all bluefin-related recommendations in ICCAT’s database and (2) ICCAT’s annual reports detailing bluefin-related discussions in plenary and sub-committees dealing with bluefin tuna [6]. (In 1974, ICCAT passed a recommendation requesting that contracting parties hold their catch to current levels for the next year. Every year thereafter, ICCAT ‘‘rolled’’ the recommendation over and the SCRS recommended that it should be implemented fully until 1996. Therefore, the legal catch was set to the 1974 reported yield over the entire period. In 1994, a 4 year catch reduction plan was implemented that required contracting parties to hold their 1995 catches to either 1993 or 1994 levels, whichever was higher, and then reduce those catches by 25% from 1996 to 1998. The figure shows the total catch that could be expected based on this rule in 1995 and then assumed a constant decline of 25% over the next 3 years. All other legal catch levels reflect ‘‘total allowable catch’’ limits established by ICCAT.)
3. Comparison against more successful ICCAT management It would be easy to dismiss this dismal result as just another tragedy of the commons. However, a broader view shows that ICCAT has actually implemented regulations in accordance with SCRS advice for other stocks under its jurisdiction. Although both northern swordfish (xiphias gladius) and bigeye tuna (thunnus obesus) were overfished in the Atlantic, the Commission eventually responded by effectively limiting fishing effort to the levels recommended by the SCRS. They enforced these limits using the same mechanisms that were implemented for bluefin tuna. Both stocks quickly rebounded once these regulations were put into place. Measures were also taken to protect juvenile swordfish caught incidentally in the fishery for bigeye tuna and the catch limit for bigeye tuna was reduced in order to compensate for large harvests of juveniles in another fishery [5,6]. This variation is not just an interesting anomaly in an otherwise typical example of institutional failure; it is an excellent natural experiment that provides insight into the role of incentives in international resource management [7]. In the bigeye and swordfish fisheries, historically dominant fleets from countries like the US, Japan, and members of the EU are economically vulnerable to competition from large-scale fleets that face lower operating costs from countries like Taiwan, China, and those that harbor the infamous illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fleet [6]. They need international regulation, which excludes or limits these competitors, in order to protect their domestic fleets. However, to attain agreement on management measures in a multilateral forum like ICCAT, these members must (1) agree amongst themselves and (2) be willing to make sidepayments, mainly to the many coastal developing countries who also claim access rights to these stocks. Without economic pressures from the encroachment of larger fleets, historically dominant fishing countries would not be willing to
make the smaller sacrifices that are necessary in such negotiations [5,6].4
4. The role of competition in driving exclusion through management The management of Atlantic bluefin tuna shows that the absence of competitive pressures undermines effective regulation even without demands from coastal developing countries. By the time ICCAT was founded in 1969, there was already tough competition over the remaining biomass of Atlantic bluefin [4].5 Because of this pressure, members of the Commission with fleets targeting bluefin negotiated measures that would exclude outsiders and codify historically and geographically determined access rights before a real threat of entry ever manifested. It was at this time, in the 1970s, that ICCAT established the eastern and western stocks for management purposes. A catch limit and quota sharing was set up for the smaller western stock and the eastern stock was managed as described above. Since that time, both stocks have been driven to near collapse by overfishing [5,6]. Many people do not know or have forgotten that CITES considered listing bluefin tuna as an endangered species almost twenty years ago. In 1991, Sweden nominated the western stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna, just as Monaco nominated the eastern stock in 2009. At the time, the listing met ferocious resistance 4 Small countries have been important harbors for what is now known as the IUU fleet, which is highly capitalized, extremely mobile, and can operate at very low cost. 5 By far the largest harvests of Atlantic bluefin occurred in the 1960 s, when it was caught as bycatch in the fishery targeting other tunas [11]. At the time there was no way to transport bluefin back to Japan for sale as sashimi and so most was sold at very cheap prices to be used in animal feed.
D.G. Webster / Marine Policy 35 (2011) 249–251
from Japan as well as the US, France, Spain, and other countries with important fleets targeting the species. These countries objected to the nomination, claiming that, in spite of the fact that it had failed to prevent such a decline, ICCAT was still the appropriate forum for management. They made it abundantly clear that CITES interference was unwelcome and quashed the proposed listing early on [5,6]. Although the 1991 CITES nomination failed, there were short run benefits. ICCAT responded to the threat of a listing by agreeing to ‘‘scientific quotas’’ for western bluefin tuna that matched SCRS recommendations. The Commission also created new mechanisms to monitor and enforce these quotas, particularly by tracking trade in the species to identify the origins of IUU catches and by sanctioning the countries found to harbor large IUU fleets. The long-term effect of the 1991 CITES nomination is less straight forward. By 1994, the scientific quota for western bluefin was reset to pre-1991 levels and, since then, the stock has fluctuated around about half the biomass that would support maximum sustainable yield, or between 18 and 27% of the 1975 level [8].6 On the other hand, ICCAT continues to utilize the catch documentation schemes, vessel listing procedures, and tradebased enforcement mechanisms that were originally developed to protect western bluefin. In fact, the application of these mechanisms to other stocks catalyzed the fundamental shift in policy regarding eastern bluefin tuna shown in Fig. 1 and also enabled the Commission to enforce its later agreements regarding northern swordfish and bigeye tuna [5,6].
251
them with incentives to make concessions and sidepayments for better management. Indeed, this is one likely reason for the EU’s conditional acceptance of a CITES listing—they proposed that the stock should only be listed if ICCAT failed to maintain the stringent regulations that were adopted in 2009 [10]. On the negative side, noncompliance remains a huge problem for successful management of eastern bluefin tuna and many other marine species. High prices still drive substantial illegal harvesting, the eastern management area is much larger than the west, and there are many countries bordering the Mediterranean that lack monitoring or enforcement capacity. Furthermore, as long as a majority of CITES members maintain that ICCAT is the appropriate management forum, a CITES listing is not a viable option. Given the resounding defeat of the nomination at Doha, it may be years, even decades before this card can be played again. ICCAT is therefore the only international body that can protect bluefin tuna and, unless public outcry reaches the volume initiated by dolphins, elephants, or whales, the future of the species rests in their sometimes-capable hands.
Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Oran R. Young, Gail Osherenko, J. Samuel Barkin, and Ronald Mitchell for their comments on a draft of this paper. She would also like to thank the USC Wrigley Institute for Environmental Studies for funding her early work on this topic. References
5. Explaining ICCATs failure and considering the future of Atlantic bluefin tuna management The recent nomination of eastern bluefin tuna galvanized a similar short run response from ICCAT. With the threat of a CITES listing looming in 2009, the Commission adopted catch limits that would quickly reduce legal harvests below the scientifically recommended levels (see Fig. 1).7 The Commission also instituted a new penalty mechanism for members who go over quota, stepped up efforts to reduce capacity in the fishery, reorganized its committee dealing with compliance, and started a compliance task force to improve monitoring and enforcement of all regulations related to bluefin tuna. This litany of measures was cited at the 2010 CITES meeting in Doha as evidence that ICCAT is committed to conserving bluefin tuna now and in the future [2,9]. If history is our guide, we should expect that catch limits will rise again in a few years, new enforcement mechanisms will proliferate, perhaps improving management of other stocks, and eastern bluefin will neither collapse, nor be rebuilt very much. However, there are some important differences between the cases. On the plus side, the recent nomination attracted more publicity and is supported by a wider base of nongovernmental organizations than the 1991 attempt.8 If these groups can keep up pressure, then recent improvements may continue. In addition, new technologies have allowed fleets from developing coastal countries to increase harvests in the Mediterranean. While their catches contribute to the decline of the species they also put economic pressure on fishers in the European Union, providing 6 There is evidence that mixing between the eastern and western stocks has also allowed overfishing in the east to undermine rebuilding plans in the west [12]. 7 There was already a four year management plan in place to gradually reduce eastern bluefin catches to 18,500 m by 2011. That is 5000 m higher than the current total allowable catch for 2010 [9]. 8 For instance, an article about Atlantic bluefin recently made the cover of the New York Times Magazine [13].
[1] Summary record of the eighth session of committee I, fifteenth meeting of the conference of the parties, Doha, Quatar, 13–25 March, 2010 (Cop15 Com.9Rec. 8, 2010, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Geneva, Switzerland, /http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/ sum/index.shtmlS). [2] Stokstad E. Trade trumps science for marine species at international meeting. Science 2010;328:26–7. [3] Recommendation: bluefin size limit and fishing mortality (ICCAT 74-1, 1974, International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Madrid, Spain, /http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C1974-01-e. pdfS). [4] See Carter LJ. Law of the sea: fisheries plight poses dilemma for United States. Science 1974;185:336–9. [5] Webster DG. Adaptive governance: the dynamics of Atlantic fisheries management Cambridge. MA: MIT Press; 2009. [6] ICCAT management measures can be found at /http://www.iccat.int/en/ RecsRegs.aspS and both Commission and SCRS reports for all years can be obtained at /http://www.iccat.int/en/pubs_biennial.htmS. [7] Worm B, et al. Rebuilding global fisheries. Science 2009;325:578–85. [8] Report for biennial period, 2008–09, Part II, vol. 2, english version (SCRS 09-II, 2009, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Madrid, Spain, /http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_08-09_II_2.pdf), p. 122. [9] ICCAT statement bluefin tuna in CITES CoP15, Doha, 18 March 2010 (CoP 15 Inf. 63, 2010, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Geneva, Switzerland, /http://www.cites.org/common/ cop/15/inf/C15i-63.pdfS). [10] EU position on listing proposal 19 to include Atlantic bluefin tuna in Appendix I (CoP 15 Inf. 57, 2010, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Geneva, Switzerland, /http://www.cites.org/ common/cop/15/inf/E15i-57.pdfS). [11] ICCAT Task 1 Data, Excell Format (2010, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Madrid, Spain, /http://www.iccat.int/en/ accesingdb.htmS). [12] Block BA, et al. Migratory movements, depth preferences, and thermal biology of atlantic bluefin tuna. Science 2001;293(17):1310–4. [13] Greenberg, P Tuna’s end. The New York times magazine 2010 June 27; 28–37:44–48.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Marine Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Short Communication
The irony and the exclusivity of Atlantic bluefin tuna management D.G. Webster n Environmental Studies Program, Dartmouth College, 6182 Steele Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, USA
a r t i c l e in fo
abstract
Article history: Received 9 July 2010 Received in revised form 9 August 2010 Accepted 18 August 2010
The eastern stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna (thunnus thynnus) was recently nominated for protection under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES). That nomination failed, which leaves management of the heavily overfished stock in the hands of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). This paper reviews the history of ICCAT management of Atlantic bluefin tuna to show that (1) early elimination of competitive forces prevented agreement on management in keeping with scientific advice, resulting in the steep decline of the stock, (2) even just the threat of a CITES listing can provide temporary impetus for marked improvement in ICCAT management, and (3) long-term sustainable management by ICCAT will require continued economic and political pressure. & 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: International fisheries management Atlantic bluefin tuna Highly migratory species Endangered species Vulnerability response
1. Introduction Like many valuable marine species, Atlantic bluefin tuna (thunnus thynnus) has been extensively overfished. Biomass estimates for the eastern stock of the species are now so low that it was recently nominated for protection under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES). Those who opposed the CITES listing, including Japan, Canada, Tunisia, and others, pointed out that there is already an international organization charged with the protection of bluefin tuna, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). In spite of its failure to halt the decline of the stock, these countries believe that ICCAT is still the appropriate forum for Atlantic bluefin management [1,2]. Here, we draw insights from the history of ICCAT regulation to explain why bluefin is so heavily overexploited and provide measured expectations for the future of the species.
Sub-Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) consistently recommended that they should do so. Thus the legal catch level matched scientific recommendations, but the actual catch level fluctuated and then began to rise unchecked (see Fig. 1). In the mid-1990s this pattern changed but management remained ineffective. At that time, ICCAT established countryspecific quotas for eastern bluefin tuna and also applied strong international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to both stocks in the Atlantic.1 Since then, the Commission has consistently set legal catch levels that were higher than those recommended by the SCRS but quite close to estimated total harvest.2 Although SCRS advice became more optimistic later that decade, the gap between legal catches and scientific advice remained quite large. The resultant stock decline was compounded by both illegal harvests and exceptionally high catches of juvenile bluefin in the Mediterranean. The ‘‘small fish’’ problem was consistently mentioned by the SCRS and consistently received only ineffectual attention from the Commission.3
2. Historical management of eastern bluefin tuna The simplest explanation for the current state of eastern bluefin tuna is that ICCAT consistently ignored the advice of their scientists regarding this species. At first, the Commission chose to adopt regulations without enforcing them. In 1974, ICCAT passed a binding recommendation to limit harvests to ‘‘current levels’’ as per scientific advice [3,4]. They renewed this measure annually for almost two decades but never actually implemented it, even though their n
Tel.: + 1 602 646 0213. E-mail address: [email protected]
0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2010.08.004
1 Monitoring measures include a catch certification scheme that allows countries to track the origin of imported bluefin tuna through official documents and both positive and negative lists of vessels that are respectively allowed to target the stock and those observed harvesting illegally. Enforcement mechanisms largely consisted of sanctions on exports of bluefin tuna from countries whose fleets were found to be fishing in contravention of ICCAT management. 2 Based on SCRS estimates using data from trade certificates as well as reported catch. It should be noted that the SCRS believes the data to be grossly underestimated from the peak in 1996 onward because of illegal fishing not identified via existing monitoring mechanisms. 3 In response to SCRS advice, ICCAT established minimum size limits and time area closures to protect small bluefin but has yet to effectively enforce these regulations.
250
D.G. Webster / Marine Policy 35 (2011) 249–251
Fig. 1. History of regulation and harvests of Eastern and Mediterranean bluefin tuna by ICCAT. Total catch is estimated by the SCRS using landings reported by countries and import records from ICCAT’s catch documentation scheme (1969–2007 [11]; 2008, [8]). SCRS recommended levels were collected from the SCRS stock assessment in the year reported [6]. Based on ICCAT regulations were derived from (1) a search of all bluefin-related recommendations in ICCAT’s database and (2) ICCAT’s annual reports detailing bluefin-related discussions in plenary and sub-committees dealing with bluefin tuna [6]. (In 1974, ICCAT passed a recommendation requesting that contracting parties hold their catch to current levels for the next year. Every year thereafter, ICCAT ‘‘rolled’’ the recommendation over and the SCRS recommended that it should be implemented fully until 1996. Therefore, the legal catch was set to the 1974 reported yield over the entire period. In 1994, a 4 year catch reduction plan was implemented that required contracting parties to hold their 1995 catches to either 1993 or 1994 levels, whichever was higher, and then reduce those catches by 25% from 1996 to 1998. The figure shows the total catch that could be expected based on this rule in 1995 and then assumed a constant decline of 25% over the next 3 years. All other legal catch levels reflect ‘‘total allowable catch’’ limits established by ICCAT.)
3. Comparison against more successful ICCAT management It would be easy to dismiss this dismal result as just another tragedy of the commons. However, a broader view shows that ICCAT has actually implemented regulations in accordance with SCRS advice for other stocks under its jurisdiction. Although both northern swordfish (xiphias gladius) and bigeye tuna (thunnus obesus) were overfished in the Atlantic, the Commission eventually responded by effectively limiting fishing effort to the levels recommended by the SCRS. They enforced these limits using the same mechanisms that were implemented for bluefin tuna. Both stocks quickly rebounded once these regulations were put into place. Measures were also taken to protect juvenile swordfish caught incidentally in the fishery for bigeye tuna and the catch limit for bigeye tuna was reduced in order to compensate for large harvests of juveniles in another fishery [5,6]. This variation is not just an interesting anomaly in an otherwise typical example of institutional failure; it is an excellent natural experiment that provides insight into the role of incentives in international resource management [7]. In the bigeye and swordfish fisheries, historically dominant fleets from countries like the US, Japan, and members of the EU are economically vulnerable to competition from large-scale fleets that face lower operating costs from countries like Taiwan, China, and those that harbor the infamous illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fleet [6]. They need international regulation, which excludes or limits these competitors, in order to protect their domestic fleets. However, to attain agreement on management measures in a multilateral forum like ICCAT, these members must (1) agree amongst themselves and (2) be willing to make sidepayments, mainly to the many coastal developing countries who also claim access rights to these stocks. Without economic pressures from the encroachment of larger fleets, historically dominant fishing countries would not be willing to
make the smaller sacrifices that are necessary in such negotiations [5,6].4
4. The role of competition in driving exclusion through management The management of Atlantic bluefin tuna shows that the absence of competitive pressures undermines effective regulation even without demands from coastal developing countries. By the time ICCAT was founded in 1969, there was already tough competition over the remaining biomass of Atlantic bluefin [4].5 Because of this pressure, members of the Commission with fleets targeting bluefin negotiated measures that would exclude outsiders and codify historically and geographically determined access rights before a real threat of entry ever manifested. It was at this time, in the 1970s, that ICCAT established the eastern and western stocks for management purposes. A catch limit and quota sharing was set up for the smaller western stock and the eastern stock was managed as described above. Since that time, both stocks have been driven to near collapse by overfishing [5,6]. Many people do not know or have forgotten that CITES considered listing bluefin tuna as an endangered species almost twenty years ago. In 1991, Sweden nominated the western stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna, just as Monaco nominated the eastern stock in 2009. At the time, the listing met ferocious resistance 4 Small countries have been important harbors for what is now known as the IUU fleet, which is highly capitalized, extremely mobile, and can operate at very low cost. 5 By far the largest harvests of Atlantic bluefin occurred in the 1960 s, when it was caught as bycatch in the fishery targeting other tunas [11]. At the time there was no way to transport bluefin back to Japan for sale as sashimi and so most was sold at very cheap prices to be used in animal feed.
D.G. Webster / Marine Policy 35 (2011) 249–251
from Japan as well as the US, France, Spain, and other countries with important fleets targeting the species. These countries objected to the nomination, claiming that, in spite of the fact that it had failed to prevent such a decline, ICCAT was still the appropriate forum for management. They made it abundantly clear that CITES interference was unwelcome and quashed the proposed listing early on [5,6]. Although the 1991 CITES nomination failed, there were short run benefits. ICCAT responded to the threat of a listing by agreeing to ‘‘scientific quotas’’ for western bluefin tuna that matched SCRS recommendations. The Commission also created new mechanisms to monitor and enforce these quotas, particularly by tracking trade in the species to identify the origins of IUU catches and by sanctioning the countries found to harbor large IUU fleets. The long-term effect of the 1991 CITES nomination is less straight forward. By 1994, the scientific quota for western bluefin was reset to pre-1991 levels and, since then, the stock has fluctuated around about half the biomass that would support maximum sustainable yield, or between 18 and 27% of the 1975 level [8].6 On the other hand, ICCAT continues to utilize the catch documentation schemes, vessel listing procedures, and tradebased enforcement mechanisms that were originally developed to protect western bluefin. In fact, the application of these mechanisms to other stocks catalyzed the fundamental shift in policy regarding eastern bluefin tuna shown in Fig. 1 and also enabled the Commission to enforce its later agreements regarding northern swordfish and bigeye tuna [5,6].
251
them with incentives to make concessions and sidepayments for better management. Indeed, this is one likely reason for the EU’s conditional acceptance of a CITES listing—they proposed that the stock should only be listed if ICCAT failed to maintain the stringent regulations that were adopted in 2009 [10]. On the negative side, noncompliance remains a huge problem for successful management of eastern bluefin tuna and many other marine species. High prices still drive substantial illegal harvesting, the eastern management area is much larger than the west, and there are many countries bordering the Mediterranean that lack monitoring or enforcement capacity. Furthermore, as long as a majority of CITES members maintain that ICCAT is the appropriate management forum, a CITES listing is not a viable option. Given the resounding defeat of the nomination at Doha, it may be years, even decades before this card can be played again. ICCAT is therefore the only international body that can protect bluefin tuna and, unless public outcry reaches the volume initiated by dolphins, elephants, or whales, the future of the species rests in their sometimes-capable hands.
Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Oran R. Young, Gail Osherenko, J. Samuel Barkin, and Ronald Mitchell for their comments on a draft of this paper. She would also like to thank the USC Wrigley Institute for Environmental Studies for funding her early work on this topic. References
5. Explaining ICCATs failure and considering the future of Atlantic bluefin tuna management The recent nomination of eastern bluefin tuna galvanized a similar short run response from ICCAT. With the threat of a CITES listing looming in 2009, the Commission adopted catch limits that would quickly reduce legal harvests below the scientifically recommended levels (see Fig. 1).7 The Commission also instituted a new penalty mechanism for members who go over quota, stepped up efforts to reduce capacity in the fishery, reorganized its committee dealing with compliance, and started a compliance task force to improve monitoring and enforcement of all regulations related to bluefin tuna. This litany of measures was cited at the 2010 CITES meeting in Doha as evidence that ICCAT is committed to conserving bluefin tuna now and in the future [2,9]. If history is our guide, we should expect that catch limits will rise again in a few years, new enforcement mechanisms will proliferate, perhaps improving management of other stocks, and eastern bluefin will neither collapse, nor be rebuilt very much. However, there are some important differences between the cases. On the plus side, the recent nomination attracted more publicity and is supported by a wider base of nongovernmental organizations than the 1991 attempt.8 If these groups can keep up pressure, then recent improvements may continue. In addition, new technologies have allowed fleets from developing coastal countries to increase harvests in the Mediterranean. While their catches contribute to the decline of the species they also put economic pressure on fishers in the European Union, providing 6 There is evidence that mixing between the eastern and western stocks has also allowed overfishing in the east to undermine rebuilding plans in the west [12]. 7 There was already a four year management plan in place to gradually reduce eastern bluefin catches to 18,500 m by 2011. That is 5000 m higher than the current total allowable catch for 2010 [9]. 8 For instance, an article about Atlantic bluefin recently made the cover of the New York Times Magazine [13].
[1] Summary record of the eighth session of committee I, fifteenth meeting of the conference of the parties, Doha, Quatar, 13–25 March, 2010 (Cop15 Com.9Rec. 8, 2010, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Geneva, Switzerland, /http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/ sum/index.shtmlS). [2] Stokstad E. Trade trumps science for marine species at international meeting. Science 2010;328:26–7. [3] Recommendation: bluefin size limit and fishing mortality (ICCAT 74-1, 1974, International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Madrid, Spain, /http://www.iccat.int/Documents%5CRecs%5Ccompendiopdf-e%5C1974-01-e. pdfS). [4] See Carter LJ. Law of the sea: fisheries plight poses dilemma for United States. Science 1974;185:336–9. [5] Webster DG. Adaptive governance: the dynamics of Atlantic fisheries management Cambridge. MA: MIT Press; 2009. [6] ICCAT management measures can be found at /http://www.iccat.int/en/ RecsRegs.aspS and both Commission and SCRS reports for all years can be obtained at /http://www.iccat.int/en/pubs_biennial.htmS. [7] Worm B, et al. Rebuilding global fisheries. Science 2009;325:578–85. [8] Report for biennial period, 2008–09, Part II, vol. 2, english version (SCRS 09-II, 2009, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Madrid, Spain, /http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_08-09_II_2.pdf), p. 122. [9] ICCAT statement bluefin tuna in CITES CoP15, Doha, 18 March 2010 (CoP 15 Inf. 63, 2010, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Geneva, Switzerland, /http://www.cites.org/common/ cop/15/inf/C15i-63.pdfS). [10] EU position on listing proposal 19 to include Atlantic bluefin tuna in Appendix I (CoP 15 Inf. 57, 2010, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Geneva, Switzerland, /http://www.cites.org/ common/cop/15/inf/E15i-57.pdfS). [11] ICCAT Task 1 Data, Excell Format (2010, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Madrid, Spain, /http://www.iccat.int/en/ accesingdb.htmS). [12] Block BA, et al. Migratory movements, depth preferences, and thermal biology of atlantic bluefin tuna. Science 2001;293(17):1310–4. [13] Greenberg, P Tuna’s end. The New York times magazine 2010 June 27; 28–37:44–48.