- Email: [email protected]
The Jura-problem is not resolved: Political and psychological aspects of Switzerland's ethnic conflict
Hzsrory of European I&m, Printed in Great Britain
0191~6599/92 ts.c4 c 0.00 e 1992 Peigamon Pras Lid
Vat. IS, No. t-3, pp. LOS-I 1 I. 1992
THE JURA-PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED: POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SWITZERLAND’S ETHNIC CONFLICT KURT R. SPILLMANNAND Kerr SPILLMANN*
Switzerland is situated in the heart of Europe, stretching from North to South across the Alps, and from Lake Geneva to Lake Constance and the Vorarlberg. In its long process of formation over centuries it came to include the most diverse elements and comprises-in spite of its smailness-a great variety of distinctly diverse elements, among them four linguistic regions: a French speaking part in Western Switzerland (approximately 23% of the population), a German speaking part in Central and Northern Switzerland (approx. 72% of the population), an Italian speaking part in the South (approx. 4.5% of the population), and several pockets of Romansh speaking communities in the mountainous valleys of Graubtinden, the Easternmost of the actual 24 cantons. In spite of its multilingual structure and composition of several ethnic groups Switzerland did not know ethnic unrest and ethnic conflict until very recently, when the Jura conflict has become notorious and expresses itself through various acts of violence and a constant battle of words between speakers of the Jurassian separatist movement (Rassemblement Jurassian, RJ) and the Bernese cantonal government. It was only after World War II, in 1947, that the separatist movement surfaced, when the Bernese state legislature gravely offended Jurassian self-esteem. In the so-called ‘Affaire Moeckli’, a well-established Jurassian member of the Bernese executive counsei was denied the post of head of the cantonal department of public works and railroads, on the grounds that this department was too important to be headed by a Francophone counsellor. As Moeckli was sufficiently bilingual, this decision provaked an outcry by the Francophone Jurassians. It became the symbol of the minority status of all Francophones in the canton of Bern and led to feelings and reactions that culminated, after years of escalating turmoii, in the creation of a 23rd canton on 1 January 1979; a canton comprised on the northern districts of the former Bishopric. In 1948 the ‘Affaire Moeckli’ brought about the founding of the ‘Comite de Moutier’, the first body that brought politicians and representatives of all areas of cultural activity together in a committee to defend the rights of the Jura. The committee demanded partial autonomy for the Jura within the framework of the canton of Bern, the closing of the German schools in the Jura and the return of the bishop’s archives to Porrentruy. *Center for Security Ziirich, Switzerland.
Studies and Conflict
Research,
ETH Ziirich,
CH 8092, 1OS
106
Kurt R. Spillmann and Kati Spillmann
A parallel movement was founded at about the same time, the ‘Rassemblement Jurassian’ (RJ) that demanded the formation of a completely independent canton of Jura. But the Bernese looked at the members of the RJ as radicals and their goal-separation from Bern-seemed like an obscenity to Bern. After much discussion and even some agitation in 1950 the canton of Bern accepted a constitutional amendment recognising ‘the people of the Jura’ in the Bernese constitution. In 1952 the ‘Union de Patriotes Jurassians’ (UPJ), a grouping of antiseparatist Jurassians (mostly from the southern districts, who wanted to stay with Bern), was formed. In 1963 for the first time the sign FLJ (Front de liberation jurassian) was seen on roadmarkers and the Front began its terrorist activities (based on the contemporary model practised in the Algerian war). In 1965 Jurassians commemorated the 150th anniversary of the Congress of Vienna by flying the Jura flag (which has been recognised officially since 1948) at half-mast. In 1967 the government of Bern formed a committee of 24 to study the Jura question. The federal council (the highest executive organ of the Swiss confederation) suggested to the cantonal government of Bern that they also form a ‘commission of good offices’ under the presidency of the former federal councillor Max Petitpierre. The commission of 24delivered its report in 1968, the commission of good offices in 1969. Both reports suggested a two stage solution with part-autonomy as a first step and an alternative to separation. In 1970 the Bernese constitution was amended to allow the districts of the Jura to decide whether they wanted to form an independent canton or stay with Bern. In 1974, in the first Jurassian plebiscite-taken in the then entire Jura, north and south-a majority of 36,802 votes (against 34,057 votes) decided in favor of separation from Bern and in favor of the creation of a new canton. Yet the dividing line along the old religious creeds was already visible in the results from the various districts. And in the second round of the plebiscite in 1975 the three southern districts of the Jura (Courtelary, Moutier and La Neuveville) voted for separation from the new canton of Jura and for remaining with Bern. In September of the same year, eight communities changed their allegiance from one side to the other. In September the district of Laufen also decided to remain with Bern retaining the right to change to a different canton later, if they wished. The sequence of plebiscites was carefully (and skillfully) devised to put the responsibility of breaking the Jura apart exclusively and entirely on the shoulders of the Jurassians themselves. (The popular vote is the ultimate authority embodied in Switzerland’s constitutional right.) In 1976 a Jurassian constitutional assembly began to work on a new constitution and in 1977 the constitution was adopted by the population of the new canton with 27,061 for and 5,749 against. In the same month the legislature of the canton of Bern (without the Jurassian representatives) decided to remove the name of the Jurassian people from the Bernese constitution. Strong protests in Moutier followed and part of the district expressed itself in favor of the unity and freedom of ‘the entire Jura’ (eventually in violent form). In September 1978, 82% of the Swiss population accepted a constitutional amendment creating the new canton of Jura, which went into effect by January
The aura-Problem is not Resolved
107
1979, thus creating a new and 23rd canton within the framework of the Swiss confederation. But this was not the solution to the Jura problem, as many experts had long warned. Almost immediately after the creation of the new canton new actions of protest began in the southern districts of the Jura, demanding the unification of the Jura, i.e. demanding that the southern districts should join the new canton of Jura. Why has the separatist’s claim remained virulent up to this day, bewildering the Swiss population and annoying the Bernese cantonal parliament? We have to look at the developments since 1947 on two levels: The level of collective ~~i~~~c~~action, and the levef of ind~vidua~p~~~ti~a~ leadership. We then reahse, that in the Jura there existed a very strong, articulate and clear-minded leader in the person of expand B~~el~n, who was able to put the rather vague notion of Jurassian identity forcefully into firm values and beliefs. By doing so he was able to create a Jurassian perception of the social reality that made deviant behavior and opposition against Bernese suppression for the purpose of achieving recognition legitimate. Through the strength of his personality Roland Btguelin has been able to strongly influence the perception of the problem and to define, therefore, political reality for the Jurassians. On the level of collective political action the Jurassians fought by constantly expressing the conflict, articulating it and arguing, while the Bernese, seemingly unconscious of the gulf that separated them from their Jurassian constituency, fought with a very different tactic, which we may call n~nrec~g~it~#~ of the conflict or collective convict avoidance. Thus, the conflict was prone to escalate. Let us look how this escalatory process developed. The Moeckli Affair created the first outcry, on the Jurassian side, of discrimination by first-class (Bernese) citizens against second-class (Jurassian) citizens. This also provoked the formation of the ‘Comitt de Moutier’, which in April 1948 put the demands of the Jura in a 22-point document that was officially submitted to the Bernese government. Among the demands were -constitutional recognition of the existence of a Jurassian ethnic group -establishing French as a second official language in the canton of Bern --creation of a Jurassian flag --constitutional guarantee of two seats (out of nine) in the Bernese cantonal government In 1950 the Bernese people accepted a constitutional amendment, granting the above mentioned points to the Jurassian people. They were convinced that with their magnanimous concessions the excitement and the heat of the conflict would subside. But far from resolving the conflict, the vote of 1950 complicated conditions in the Jura even further, because the Jurassians split among themselves. On one hand, a group declared itself satisfied and wanted to remain loyal to Bern (Union des Patriots Jurassiens). On the other a radical group (Rassemblement Jurassien, RJ) under the leadership of Roland B&guelin wanted to separate. There was little or no understanding for the separatist position among the Bernese. The Bernese perception of their own role and identity was rooted in the
108
Kurt R. Sp~~~rnannand Kati Spi~~mann
conviction of themselves as a bridgebuilding canton between the German and French speaking regions of Switzerland. Therefore, any reproach from the Jurassians of being ‘germanised’, isolated and treated as second class-citizens seemed ridiculous to the Bernese. The stated goal of the radical group (RJ), to separate from Bern and to form an independent canton of Jura (even if still within the framework of the Swiss confederation), seemed almost blasphemous, at least it had the smell of obscenity in politics. It was dismissed as the product of some hot-headed and wayward radicals. The Bernese parliament treated the Jura problem accordingly. One of the foremost experts on the Jura conflict and himself a member of the Bernese parliament writes that the Bernese parliament felt very uncomfortable with the topic of Jurassian separatism, shying away from dealing with it, as if it had a touch of ‘polit-pornography’ (Schwander, 1977, p. 63ff). Not to know or not to perceive a Jura conflict became a sign of loyalty to Bern, while indicating concern or even understanding for the Jurassians was equated with unreliability (Schwander, 1977, p. 63ff). The level of awareness of the issues involved was thus very low: not a sound basis for decision-making on how to deal with the Jura problem (Mandel, 1979, p. 15ff). Parallel to the repression of the Jura problem in the Bernese parliament hardly any information on the topic of a possible Jura secession could be found in the regional papers and in the media in general. For many years not even the Bernese population knew what the conflict was really about. Enemy images and negative stereotyping of the Jurassian separatists prevailed. This denial of conflict and the suppression of awareness of the conflict are surprising. From 1948 onwards the separatist movement has been relentlessly active, working for its goals in a very articulate way through statements, articles and books. The non-recognition of the conflict by Bern indicates a neurotic reaction. It points toward what Morton Deutsch calls conflict avoidance, a pathological form of dealing with conflict (Deutsch, 1987, p. 38). Conflict avoidance, like premature conflict resolution, excessive involvement in conflict, and position hardening, prevents conflicts from being constructively resolved. It has, in addition, escalatory consequences. Although repressed, the conflict does not disappear, it continues beneath the surface and leads to misperceptions and emotional reactions that escape conscious control. Two main factors strike us as being at the root of conflict avoidance: (1) perception of political power-distribution, and (2) the psychological threat to identity. The political assessment was that the Jura had no power and the Bernese government-after centuries of having been a leading regional power-could easily suppress Jurassian separatism. The psychological basis of denial, on the other hand, was the underlying threat posed to Bernese identity by the Jurassian separatists. The Jurassian striving for separation represented a fundamental challenge to the Bernese self-image of a disinterested bridgebuilder between German and French speaking ethnic groups. Erikson has shown that threats to one’s own self-image can lead to traumatic identity confusion, which disrupts the sense of integrity and continuity of an individual or group (Erikson 1966, ~204). Such threats are therefore met with the defence mechanisms of denial and repression (Anna Freud, 1980, pp. 234).
The Jura-Problem
is not Resolved
109
The strategy of ‘ignoring’ implied that there was never a real understanding of the conflict and that the Bernese never conceived the separatists as a group to be seriously reckoned with, let alone to be accepted as an interlocutor. This low level of awareness of the real issues and the imbalance of power between the parties in conflict had two consequences: (1) Escalation of the conflict: the Jurassians tried to produce a level of escalation which would create a situation where the Bernese would have to recognise them and where it would no longer be possible to ignore them. Therefore, we find a separatist movement that is relentlessly provoking, confronting and challenging the Bernese government by intensifying their fighting methods, from words to deeds, arson, using explosives, and by internationalising the issue of a suppressed ethnic group. The Bernese remained unyielding, and thus the conflict escalated step by step. (2) Mediation failed, because there was no awareness and understanding of the conflict. Both parties were uncompromising in their view that their particular way of looking at the conflict was the only valid description of reality. Although the Bernese government appointed a commission of experts to analyse the conflict and to make recommendations it did not provide the commission with adequate authority for a real mediating position, as in the case of former federal councillor Max Petitpierre. Or, it dismissed recommendations by profound experts of Bernese and Jurassian history, such as Professor Herbert Ltithy, who early on had recommended the creation of a separate canton of Jura, containing two half-cantons, one for the North and one for the South, as the only means to avoid the splitting of the historical unit of the Jura (Ltithy, 1972). We conclude our interpretation of the Jura conflict with a few observations on Roland Btguelin and the importance of the leader in conflicts. In general, conflicts between groups tend to express themselves through their leaders. Under escalation the pressure for a ‘unite de doctrine’, a unified ideology, mounts. Different interpretations of the conflict are less and less tolerated, and the cohesion within the group increases. With this the leader becomes the central figure. He communicates the goals of the group to the outside world. He is making the decisions and implementing the group’s policies. The rising importance of a leader in an escalating conflict is due partly to the defense mechanism of projection and identification, whereby-as Freud has demonstrated (Freud, 1921)-the members of the group project their positive and admired qualities onto their leader, identifying themselves with him. For the opposing party the leader becomes the incarnation of evil, and all negative and despicable qualities are projected onto him. Yet there is no way of resolving a conflict without this influential leader. He cannot be bypassed. Roland BCguelin meets the criteria of this specific leader personality (described under the heading of ‘Senator’ by Glasl, 1990, p. 164ff). There is a unanimous opinion among friend and foe-shared even by Btguelin himself-that the separatist movement, its success and perseverance is unthinkable without him.
110
Kurt R. ~p~i~~?~~ln and Kati S~i~~rna~~n
While his opponents consider him a pathological fanatic, a traitor, an evil demon hating Switzerland, in the Jura he is seen as reserved rather than aggressive, more of a vain seducer than a tough leader, but of a Cartesian straightness and endurance, uncompromising in regard to his mission. When the Moeckli-Affaire occurred, Beguelin, a talented writer and poet, who had studied economics, was already involved in politics, fighting for the preservation of the French language and against the spread of German in the Jura. The Moeckli-Affaire was a narcissistic blow to the Jurassians, indicating blunt neglect and devaluation by the Bernese of the status, concerns and pride of the Jurassian population. It seems that Beguelin experienced that loss of status in an extremely personal way and lost any hope of a fair treatment by the Bernese government. Yet he did not react with depression and resignation. He reacted as he had done in his ~hiIdhood, when his father, a Jurassian watchmaker, had lost his job and young Roland felt despised by the dominant German speaking group; he resorted to an elevated notion of France and the superior French culture. In ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ Freud points out that the loss of an abstract object relationship like status, role, etc. has a similar impact on the individual as the loss of a valued person (Freud, 1916, S.429). Individual reactions, however, to such a loss vary greatly. They can run from apathy, withdrawal and resignation to an exhilirating sense of liberation and omnipotent fantasies of unlimited accomplishment. From the point of view of object relations theory, increased autonomy and a sense of liberation after such an object loss can only occur if some valued person or ideal, such as religious, political, or ethnic ideals, has been internalised beforehand and which the individual can then turn to and draw from, thus compensating for the loss. From the Affaire Moeckli onward Beguelin never ceased to fight for an independent and French speaking canton of Jura, which was to encompass all former territories of the Bishopric, and not just the northern parts. The combination of individual and collective offense, the rather slow and clumsy reactions of the Bernese cantonal government, the lack of leadership by the federal government, all combined to prolong and intensify the Jura conflict. The solution which was found, the creation of an independent canton of Jura, seemed generous on the surface. But looking behind the scenes and into the history of the conflict, we realise that the splitting of the northern and southern parts of the Jura is no solution and therefore an end of the conflict is not yet in sight. The Jurassians themselves-all Jurassians, from the north as well as from the South-have to define their needs, their wishes, their goals and to define solutions that are acceptable to all of them. It might well be that the proposal of Professor Herbert Luthy might still come closest to such a solution. But it will need some farsighted leadership at the highest level, to get real discussions started. In the past the Jurassians have not accepted commissions appointed by the Bernese government. They want to discuss on equal footing with the Bernese. Unless the federal government takes the initiative for new talks there is no chance for progress towards overcoming the mutual bitterness and tensions. Otherwise southern Jura will develop more and more atong the lines of Ireland. Switzerland has its own laboratory for conflict research, but so far neither the Bernese nor the federal government have been able to seize the opportunity to do some active work in conflict research and conflict mediation, or they are not willing to face up
to the real problems. But here as etsewhere ethnic conflicts are either recognised as very serious conflicts of identity (and not merely conflicts of borders) and actively tackled, or they escalate and their management becomes increasingly difficult. If the federal government actively assumes its role as the third party and brings the different parties together, only then can we expect first signs of reconciliation. Kurt R. Spillmann Kati Spillmann Cept&r for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich
BIBLIOGRAPHY B&guelin, B&e reponse &vos questions, unprinted letter to the author (15 June, 19&S). Alain Charpilloz, Le Jura irlandise, ed. Bertil Galland (Vevey, 1976). Heinz DPpp, Die Spaltung des Juras hat die Jurafrage nicht gel&t, in: Basler Zeirung, Roland
No. 286 (6 August 1986). Morton Deutsch, A theoretical perspective on conflict and conflict resolution, in: Sandofe/Sandole-Srarasofte (1987), pp. 38-49. Erik H, Erikson, Identitgt und Lebenszyklus, 3 Aufs&ze, Buchklub Ex Libris (Ziirich 19661, p. 204. Anna Freud, Das Ich und die Abwehrmec~anismen~ in: Die ~~~~~~g~~der Anna Fread 1922-1936, Band I ~M~nch~n: Kindler Veriag, 19801, p. 234. Sigmund Freud, Trauer und Melancholic (1916), in: Gesammefre Werke, Band 10 (London 1940), pp. 428-446. Sigmund Freud, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (192I), in: ~esa~~e~~e Werke, Band 13 (London 1940), pp. 73-161. Friedrich Glasl, Konfliktmanagement, 2, vollstgndig iiberarbeitete Aufl. (Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt/Stuttgart: Freies Geistesleben, 1990). Hans Peter Henecka, Die j~rassisc~e~ Separatisten, Eine Studie zur Soziologie des e&W&err ~on~~krs md deer soziaien Bervegung (Meisenheim am Gian: Verlag Anton Hain, 1972). Herbert Liithy, Ein Vorschlagfiirden Jura, 1.5Thesen zurjurassischen Selbstbestimmung (Bern: Verfag Herbert Lang, 1972). Robert Mandef, Pe~c~~r~~~, f)e;‘cisioprMakiqg and Cmflict ~Universjry of America Press, Washington, DC, 1979). Kenneth D. McRae, Con&%x and Compromise in ~~u~t~IinguufSocieties (Switzerland: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983). Dennis J.D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste teds), Conflict ~a~a~e~e~f and Prabiem Solving: Interpersonal to ZnternarionaLApplications (London: Frances Pinter, 1987). Marcel Schwander, Jura-Konfliktstoff fiir Jahrzehnte (Ziirich: Benziger Verlag, 1977).
0191~6599/92 ts.c4 c 0.00 e 1992 Peigamon Pras Lid
Vat. IS, No. t-3, pp. LOS-I 1 I. 1992
THE JURA-PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED: POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SWITZERLAND’S ETHNIC CONFLICT KURT R. SPILLMANNAND Kerr SPILLMANN*
Switzerland is situated in the heart of Europe, stretching from North to South across the Alps, and from Lake Geneva to Lake Constance and the Vorarlberg. In its long process of formation over centuries it came to include the most diverse elements and comprises-in spite of its smailness-a great variety of distinctly diverse elements, among them four linguistic regions: a French speaking part in Western Switzerland (approximately 23% of the population), a German speaking part in Central and Northern Switzerland (approx. 72% of the population), an Italian speaking part in the South (approx. 4.5% of the population), and several pockets of Romansh speaking communities in the mountainous valleys of Graubtinden, the Easternmost of the actual 24 cantons. In spite of its multilingual structure and composition of several ethnic groups Switzerland did not know ethnic unrest and ethnic conflict until very recently, when the Jura conflict has become notorious and expresses itself through various acts of violence and a constant battle of words between speakers of the Jurassian separatist movement (Rassemblement Jurassian, RJ) and the Bernese cantonal government. It was only after World War II, in 1947, that the separatist movement surfaced, when the Bernese state legislature gravely offended Jurassian self-esteem. In the so-called ‘Affaire Moeckli’, a well-established Jurassian member of the Bernese executive counsei was denied the post of head of the cantonal department of public works and railroads, on the grounds that this department was too important to be headed by a Francophone counsellor. As Moeckli was sufficiently bilingual, this decision provaked an outcry by the Francophone Jurassians. It became the symbol of the minority status of all Francophones in the canton of Bern and led to feelings and reactions that culminated, after years of escalating turmoii, in the creation of a 23rd canton on 1 January 1979; a canton comprised on the northern districts of the former Bishopric. In 1948 the ‘Affaire Moeckli’ brought about the founding of the ‘Comite de Moutier’, the first body that brought politicians and representatives of all areas of cultural activity together in a committee to defend the rights of the Jura. The committee demanded partial autonomy for the Jura within the framework of the canton of Bern, the closing of the German schools in the Jura and the return of the bishop’s archives to Porrentruy. *Center for Security Ziirich, Switzerland.
Studies and Conflict
Research,
ETH Ziirich,
CH 8092, 1OS
106
Kurt R. Spillmann and Kati Spillmann
A parallel movement was founded at about the same time, the ‘Rassemblement Jurassian’ (RJ) that demanded the formation of a completely independent canton of Jura. But the Bernese looked at the members of the RJ as radicals and their goal-separation from Bern-seemed like an obscenity to Bern. After much discussion and even some agitation in 1950 the canton of Bern accepted a constitutional amendment recognising ‘the people of the Jura’ in the Bernese constitution. In 1952 the ‘Union de Patriotes Jurassians’ (UPJ), a grouping of antiseparatist Jurassians (mostly from the southern districts, who wanted to stay with Bern), was formed. In 1963 for the first time the sign FLJ (Front de liberation jurassian) was seen on roadmarkers and the Front began its terrorist activities (based on the contemporary model practised in the Algerian war). In 1965 Jurassians commemorated the 150th anniversary of the Congress of Vienna by flying the Jura flag (which has been recognised officially since 1948) at half-mast. In 1967 the government of Bern formed a committee of 24 to study the Jura question. The federal council (the highest executive organ of the Swiss confederation) suggested to the cantonal government of Bern that they also form a ‘commission of good offices’ under the presidency of the former federal councillor Max Petitpierre. The commission of 24delivered its report in 1968, the commission of good offices in 1969. Both reports suggested a two stage solution with part-autonomy as a first step and an alternative to separation. In 1970 the Bernese constitution was amended to allow the districts of the Jura to decide whether they wanted to form an independent canton or stay with Bern. In 1974, in the first Jurassian plebiscite-taken in the then entire Jura, north and south-a majority of 36,802 votes (against 34,057 votes) decided in favor of separation from Bern and in favor of the creation of a new canton. Yet the dividing line along the old religious creeds was already visible in the results from the various districts. And in the second round of the plebiscite in 1975 the three southern districts of the Jura (Courtelary, Moutier and La Neuveville) voted for separation from the new canton of Jura and for remaining with Bern. In September of the same year, eight communities changed their allegiance from one side to the other. In September the district of Laufen also decided to remain with Bern retaining the right to change to a different canton later, if they wished. The sequence of plebiscites was carefully (and skillfully) devised to put the responsibility of breaking the Jura apart exclusively and entirely on the shoulders of the Jurassians themselves. (The popular vote is the ultimate authority embodied in Switzerland’s constitutional right.) In 1976 a Jurassian constitutional assembly began to work on a new constitution and in 1977 the constitution was adopted by the population of the new canton with 27,061 for and 5,749 against. In the same month the legislature of the canton of Bern (without the Jurassian representatives) decided to remove the name of the Jurassian people from the Bernese constitution. Strong protests in Moutier followed and part of the district expressed itself in favor of the unity and freedom of ‘the entire Jura’ (eventually in violent form). In September 1978, 82% of the Swiss population accepted a constitutional amendment creating the new canton of Jura, which went into effect by January
The aura-Problem is not Resolved
107
1979, thus creating a new and 23rd canton within the framework of the Swiss confederation. But this was not the solution to the Jura problem, as many experts had long warned. Almost immediately after the creation of the new canton new actions of protest began in the southern districts of the Jura, demanding the unification of the Jura, i.e. demanding that the southern districts should join the new canton of Jura. Why has the separatist’s claim remained virulent up to this day, bewildering the Swiss population and annoying the Bernese cantonal parliament? We have to look at the developments since 1947 on two levels: The level of collective ~~i~~~c~~action, and the levef of ind~vidua~p~~~ti~a~ leadership. We then reahse, that in the Jura there existed a very strong, articulate and clear-minded leader in the person of expand B~~el~n, who was able to put the rather vague notion of Jurassian identity forcefully into firm values and beliefs. By doing so he was able to create a Jurassian perception of the social reality that made deviant behavior and opposition against Bernese suppression for the purpose of achieving recognition legitimate. Through the strength of his personality Roland Btguelin has been able to strongly influence the perception of the problem and to define, therefore, political reality for the Jurassians. On the level of collective political action the Jurassians fought by constantly expressing the conflict, articulating it and arguing, while the Bernese, seemingly unconscious of the gulf that separated them from their Jurassian constituency, fought with a very different tactic, which we may call n~nrec~g~it~#~ of the conflict or collective convict avoidance. Thus, the conflict was prone to escalate. Let us look how this escalatory process developed. The Moeckli Affair created the first outcry, on the Jurassian side, of discrimination by first-class (Bernese) citizens against second-class (Jurassian) citizens. This also provoked the formation of the ‘Comitt de Moutier’, which in April 1948 put the demands of the Jura in a 22-point document that was officially submitted to the Bernese government. Among the demands were -constitutional recognition of the existence of a Jurassian ethnic group -establishing French as a second official language in the canton of Bern --creation of a Jurassian flag --constitutional guarantee of two seats (out of nine) in the Bernese cantonal government In 1950 the Bernese people accepted a constitutional amendment, granting the above mentioned points to the Jurassian people. They were convinced that with their magnanimous concessions the excitement and the heat of the conflict would subside. But far from resolving the conflict, the vote of 1950 complicated conditions in the Jura even further, because the Jurassians split among themselves. On one hand, a group declared itself satisfied and wanted to remain loyal to Bern (Union des Patriots Jurassiens). On the other a radical group (Rassemblement Jurassien, RJ) under the leadership of Roland B&guelin wanted to separate. There was little or no understanding for the separatist position among the Bernese. The Bernese perception of their own role and identity was rooted in the
108
Kurt R. Sp~~~rnannand Kati Spi~~mann
conviction of themselves as a bridgebuilding canton between the German and French speaking regions of Switzerland. Therefore, any reproach from the Jurassians of being ‘germanised’, isolated and treated as second class-citizens seemed ridiculous to the Bernese. The stated goal of the radical group (RJ), to separate from Bern and to form an independent canton of Jura (even if still within the framework of the Swiss confederation), seemed almost blasphemous, at least it had the smell of obscenity in politics. It was dismissed as the product of some hot-headed and wayward radicals. The Bernese parliament treated the Jura problem accordingly. One of the foremost experts on the Jura conflict and himself a member of the Bernese parliament writes that the Bernese parliament felt very uncomfortable with the topic of Jurassian separatism, shying away from dealing with it, as if it had a touch of ‘polit-pornography’ (Schwander, 1977, p. 63ff). Not to know or not to perceive a Jura conflict became a sign of loyalty to Bern, while indicating concern or even understanding for the Jurassians was equated with unreliability (Schwander, 1977, p. 63ff). The level of awareness of the issues involved was thus very low: not a sound basis for decision-making on how to deal with the Jura problem (Mandel, 1979, p. 15ff). Parallel to the repression of the Jura problem in the Bernese parliament hardly any information on the topic of a possible Jura secession could be found in the regional papers and in the media in general. For many years not even the Bernese population knew what the conflict was really about. Enemy images and negative stereotyping of the Jurassian separatists prevailed. This denial of conflict and the suppression of awareness of the conflict are surprising. From 1948 onwards the separatist movement has been relentlessly active, working for its goals in a very articulate way through statements, articles and books. The non-recognition of the conflict by Bern indicates a neurotic reaction. It points toward what Morton Deutsch calls conflict avoidance, a pathological form of dealing with conflict (Deutsch, 1987, p. 38). Conflict avoidance, like premature conflict resolution, excessive involvement in conflict, and position hardening, prevents conflicts from being constructively resolved. It has, in addition, escalatory consequences. Although repressed, the conflict does not disappear, it continues beneath the surface and leads to misperceptions and emotional reactions that escape conscious control. Two main factors strike us as being at the root of conflict avoidance: (1) perception of political power-distribution, and (2) the psychological threat to identity. The political assessment was that the Jura had no power and the Bernese government-after centuries of having been a leading regional power-could easily suppress Jurassian separatism. The psychological basis of denial, on the other hand, was the underlying threat posed to Bernese identity by the Jurassian separatists. The Jurassian striving for separation represented a fundamental challenge to the Bernese self-image of a disinterested bridgebuilder between German and French speaking ethnic groups. Erikson has shown that threats to one’s own self-image can lead to traumatic identity confusion, which disrupts the sense of integrity and continuity of an individual or group (Erikson 1966, ~204). Such threats are therefore met with the defence mechanisms of denial and repression (Anna Freud, 1980, pp. 234).
The Jura-Problem
is not Resolved
109
The strategy of ‘ignoring’ implied that there was never a real understanding of the conflict and that the Bernese never conceived the separatists as a group to be seriously reckoned with, let alone to be accepted as an interlocutor. This low level of awareness of the real issues and the imbalance of power between the parties in conflict had two consequences: (1) Escalation of the conflict: the Jurassians tried to produce a level of escalation which would create a situation where the Bernese would have to recognise them and where it would no longer be possible to ignore them. Therefore, we find a separatist movement that is relentlessly provoking, confronting and challenging the Bernese government by intensifying their fighting methods, from words to deeds, arson, using explosives, and by internationalising the issue of a suppressed ethnic group. The Bernese remained unyielding, and thus the conflict escalated step by step. (2) Mediation failed, because there was no awareness and understanding of the conflict. Both parties were uncompromising in their view that their particular way of looking at the conflict was the only valid description of reality. Although the Bernese government appointed a commission of experts to analyse the conflict and to make recommendations it did not provide the commission with adequate authority for a real mediating position, as in the case of former federal councillor Max Petitpierre. Or, it dismissed recommendations by profound experts of Bernese and Jurassian history, such as Professor Herbert Ltithy, who early on had recommended the creation of a separate canton of Jura, containing two half-cantons, one for the North and one for the South, as the only means to avoid the splitting of the historical unit of the Jura (Ltithy, 1972). We conclude our interpretation of the Jura conflict with a few observations on Roland Btguelin and the importance of the leader in conflicts. In general, conflicts between groups tend to express themselves through their leaders. Under escalation the pressure for a ‘unite de doctrine’, a unified ideology, mounts. Different interpretations of the conflict are less and less tolerated, and the cohesion within the group increases. With this the leader becomes the central figure. He communicates the goals of the group to the outside world. He is making the decisions and implementing the group’s policies. The rising importance of a leader in an escalating conflict is due partly to the defense mechanism of projection and identification, whereby-as Freud has demonstrated (Freud, 1921)-the members of the group project their positive and admired qualities onto their leader, identifying themselves with him. For the opposing party the leader becomes the incarnation of evil, and all negative and despicable qualities are projected onto him. Yet there is no way of resolving a conflict without this influential leader. He cannot be bypassed. Roland BCguelin meets the criteria of this specific leader personality (described under the heading of ‘Senator’ by Glasl, 1990, p. 164ff). There is a unanimous opinion among friend and foe-shared even by Btguelin himself-that the separatist movement, its success and perseverance is unthinkable without him.
110
Kurt R. ~p~i~~?~~ln and Kati S~i~~rna~~n
While his opponents consider him a pathological fanatic, a traitor, an evil demon hating Switzerland, in the Jura he is seen as reserved rather than aggressive, more of a vain seducer than a tough leader, but of a Cartesian straightness and endurance, uncompromising in regard to his mission. When the Moeckli-Affaire occurred, Beguelin, a talented writer and poet, who had studied economics, was already involved in politics, fighting for the preservation of the French language and against the spread of German in the Jura. The Moeckli-Affaire was a narcissistic blow to the Jurassians, indicating blunt neglect and devaluation by the Bernese of the status, concerns and pride of the Jurassian population. It seems that Beguelin experienced that loss of status in an extremely personal way and lost any hope of a fair treatment by the Bernese government. Yet he did not react with depression and resignation. He reacted as he had done in his ~hiIdhood, when his father, a Jurassian watchmaker, had lost his job and young Roland felt despised by the dominant German speaking group; he resorted to an elevated notion of France and the superior French culture. In ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ Freud points out that the loss of an abstract object relationship like status, role, etc. has a similar impact on the individual as the loss of a valued person (Freud, 1916, S.429). Individual reactions, however, to such a loss vary greatly. They can run from apathy, withdrawal and resignation to an exhilirating sense of liberation and omnipotent fantasies of unlimited accomplishment. From the point of view of object relations theory, increased autonomy and a sense of liberation after such an object loss can only occur if some valued person or ideal, such as religious, political, or ethnic ideals, has been internalised beforehand and which the individual can then turn to and draw from, thus compensating for the loss. From the Affaire Moeckli onward Beguelin never ceased to fight for an independent and French speaking canton of Jura, which was to encompass all former territories of the Bishopric, and not just the northern parts. The combination of individual and collective offense, the rather slow and clumsy reactions of the Bernese cantonal government, the lack of leadership by the federal government, all combined to prolong and intensify the Jura conflict. The solution which was found, the creation of an independent canton of Jura, seemed generous on the surface. But looking behind the scenes and into the history of the conflict, we realise that the splitting of the northern and southern parts of the Jura is no solution and therefore an end of the conflict is not yet in sight. The Jurassians themselves-all Jurassians, from the north as well as from the South-have to define their needs, their wishes, their goals and to define solutions that are acceptable to all of them. It might well be that the proposal of Professor Herbert Luthy might still come closest to such a solution. But it will need some farsighted leadership at the highest level, to get real discussions started. In the past the Jurassians have not accepted commissions appointed by the Bernese government. They want to discuss on equal footing with the Bernese. Unless the federal government takes the initiative for new talks there is no chance for progress towards overcoming the mutual bitterness and tensions. Otherwise southern Jura will develop more and more atong the lines of Ireland. Switzerland has its own laboratory for conflict research, but so far neither the Bernese nor the federal government have been able to seize the opportunity to do some active work in conflict research and conflict mediation, or they are not willing to face up
to the real problems. But here as etsewhere ethnic conflicts are either recognised as very serious conflicts of identity (and not merely conflicts of borders) and actively tackled, or they escalate and their management becomes increasingly difficult. If the federal government actively assumes its role as the third party and brings the different parties together, only then can we expect first signs of reconciliation. Kurt R. Spillmann Kati Spillmann Cept&r for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich
BIBLIOGRAPHY B&guelin, B&e reponse &vos questions, unprinted letter to the author (15 June, 19&S). Alain Charpilloz, Le Jura irlandise, ed. Bertil Galland (Vevey, 1976). Heinz DPpp, Die Spaltung des Juras hat die Jurafrage nicht gel&t, in: Basler Zeirung, Roland
No. 286 (6 August 1986). Morton Deutsch, A theoretical perspective on conflict and conflict resolution, in: Sandofe/Sandole-Srarasofte (1987), pp. 38-49. Erik H, Erikson, Identitgt und Lebenszyklus, 3 Aufs&ze, Buchklub Ex Libris (Ziirich 19661, p. 204. Anna Freud, Das Ich und die Abwehrmec~anismen~ in: Die ~~~~~~g~~der Anna Fread 1922-1936, Band I ~M~nch~n: Kindler Veriag, 19801, p. 234. Sigmund Freud, Trauer und Melancholic (1916), in: Gesammefre Werke, Band 10 (London 1940), pp. 428-446. Sigmund Freud, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (192I), in: ~esa~~e~~e Werke, Band 13 (London 1940), pp. 73-161. Friedrich Glasl, Konfliktmanagement, 2, vollstgndig iiberarbeitete Aufl. (Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt/Stuttgart: Freies Geistesleben, 1990). Hans Peter Henecka, Die j~rassisc~e~ Separatisten, Eine Studie zur Soziologie des e&W&err ~on~~krs md deer soziaien Bervegung (Meisenheim am Gian: Verlag Anton Hain, 1972). Herbert Liithy, Ein Vorschlagfiirden Jura, 1.5Thesen zurjurassischen Selbstbestimmung (Bern: Verfag Herbert Lang, 1972). Robert Mandef, Pe~c~~r~~~, f)e;‘cisioprMakiqg and Cmflict ~Universjry of America Press, Washington, DC, 1979). Kenneth D. McRae, Con&%x and Compromise in ~~u~t~IinguufSocieties (Switzerland: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983). Dennis J.D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste teds), Conflict ~a~a~e~e~f and Prabiem Solving: Interpersonal to ZnternarionaLApplications (London: Frances Pinter, 1987). Marcel Schwander, Jura-Konfliktstoff fiir Jahrzehnte (Ziirich: Benziger Verlag, 1977).