- Email: [email protected]
The management of an animal population: Changing attitudes towards the wild rabbit in Britain
Journal of Environmental Management (1991) 33, 189-203
The Management of an Animal Population: Changing Attitudes Towards the Wild Rabbit in Britain John Sheail ]nstitute of Terrestrial Ecology (Natural Environment Research Council), Monks Wood Experimental Station, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire PE17 2LS, U.K. Received 30 July 1990
Drawing mainly on the documentation of the Ministry of Agriculture, the paper traces the changing perception of the rabbit as a pest species, from the 1920s until the late 1950s, when the death of almost every rabbit as a result of the spread of myxomatosis made it both easier and more urgent to introduce large-scale clearance programmes. Among the more significant constraints on the management of the species in the United Kingdom was the lack of an effective, yet humane, means of control, and ignorance as to the actual extent of damage inflicted on rabbit-infested farm and woodland.
Keywords: rabbit control, pests, game, myxomatosis.
1. Introduction The Annual Report of the United K i n g d o m Institute of Animal Health for 1988 drew attention to a new form of rabbit disease, affecting commercial rabbit farms, capable of destroying 95% of the animals affected (Institute of Animal Health, 1988). Whilst it is far too soon to forecast what, if any, impact it might have on the United Kingdom, it m a y nevertheless be topical to review the different ways in which the wild rabbit population was perceived in the decades leading up to the outbreak of myxomatosis in 1953-1954, and the estimated loss of 99% of the population. It was a time when the twin issues of damage caused to crops and plantations, and the cruelty inflicted by trapping, aroused so much passion that governments and Parliament became directly involved in "the rabbit question". This paper is based on contemporary files of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the official body responsible for nature conservation in the United Kingdom, the Nature Conservancy. The rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) is an alien species which, over the course of some 800 years, had spread and become abundant over the greater part of the country. Its meat and fur, and the sport of chasing and shooting the animal, were so highly prized that landowners set aside areas of land explicitly for its conservation in what was otherwise a hostile environment (Sheail, 1978; Bailey, 1988). Even after the warrens were abandoned in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it became possible for feral colonies to survive, the history of the animal continued to be closely bound up with wider trends in land use and management (Sheail, 1971, 1984).
189 0301-4797/91/060189+ 15 S03.00/0
9 1991 Academic Press Limited
190
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
2. T h e i n t e r - w a r y e a r s
Whilst few commentators denied the right of landowners and occupiers to use their land howsoever they pleased, there was increasing opposition to "rabbit farming" from two quarters. There was resentment at the extent to which all farm and woodland was affected by the marauding rabbit. Despite claims made in the Journal of the Board of Agriculture and elsewhere that rabbits could be encouraged with little risk to crops if a system of management was "intelligently conceived and properly executed" (Sharpe, 1918), it was rarely possible to achiev~ a balance between such farming and other forms of crop and animal husbandry. It was also strongly argued that the method of trapping, using mass-produced, 4-inch steel traps, called the gin or spring trap, involved an unacceptable level of cruelty. By the late 1920s, it was estimated that 30 to 40 million rabbits were caught each year in gin traps. The sight and sound of the animals struggling to free one or more limbs from the jaws of the trap caused many people, particularly in towns, to support the campaign directed by the University of London Animal Welfare Society (ULAWS), which was founded by Major C. W. Hume in 1926 (Hume, 1958). At the instigation of the Society, a Private Member's Bill was introduced into the House of Lords in May 1935, seeking to abolish the use of the gin trap. No one disputed the cruelty inflicted, but the Bill was defeated on its second reading by 46 to 42 votes. Opponents of the Bill succeeded in stressing the importance of the sales of wild-rabbit meat and fur, and the fact that there was no alternative method of control (HL, 1), ULAWS contended that there was an alternative, and possibly much more effective, form of rabbit controk namely cyanide gassing. A research chemist from the manufacturers, Imperial Chemicals Industry, took part in tests initiated by ULAWS on a farm in Pembrokeshire, using two types of cyanide dust. Not only were the methods comparatively cheap and effective in clearing the burrows of animals, but they appeared to inflict comparatively little suffering (Buckley, 1935). The only criticisms came from the rabbit trade, which complained of the waste of carcases left underground. There were also fears that the housewife might stop buying any rabbit-meat, lest it had been "tainted" by gas (Hume, 1962). In urging the abolition of the gin trap, ULAWS consciously developed the arguments being put forward by those explicitly concerned with the cost of rabbit damage. In December 1935, supporters of ULAWS tabled a motion in the House of Lords, supported by the County Councils Association, calling for an enquiry into methods of protecting agriculture from rabbit damage (HL, 2), The motion was passed, and a report was published in 1937. This report recounted how there had been 10 abortive attempts to pass legislation for protecting farmers from their neighbours' rabbits. Each had failed, largely because of opposition to proposals that the Minister of Agriculture, or local authorities, should be given powers to enter private land and destroy the rabbits. In their report, the House of Lords' Select Committee adopted a compromise put forward by the County Councils Association, which limited the local authorities to issuing orders requiring the destruction of rabbits wherever excessive damage was being caused to adjoining properties. The authorities would be able to instigate legal proceedings against those who failed to comply with an order (House of Lords, 1936-37). The Lords' Select Committee also adopted a compromise solution in respect of the use of the gin trap. Whilst the use of the trap in the open should be banned, the Committee believed it ought to be still available for catching rabbits in the mouth of the burrows. Although disappointed, ULAWS and the other animal-welfare bodies realized
J. Sheail
191
that a Private Member's Bill incorporating the Committee's findings provided the only opportunity of imposing even these modest curbs on the use of the gin trap. For its part, the Ministry of Agriculture saw a Private Member's Bill, which appealed to both the agricultural and humanitarian interests, as the best chance o f securing a place for a Bill in the congested parliamentary timetable. In a Cabinet Paper o f January 1938, the Minister described how the State was becoming directly involved in the search for adequate controls over rabbit infestation, following the introduction of grants for improving grasslands as part of the Government's Fertility Campaign. As one correspondent to the Ministry observed, it was "useless ploughing and re-seeding run out, rabbit ruined and unproductive grassland, just to feed more rabbits" [Public Record Office (PRO) 1; Hume, 1958]. The Prevention of Damage by Rabbits Bill received the Royal Assent in July 1939 (HL, 3). In the event, the powers conferred on the local authorities under the Act were never implemented. The outbreak of war in September 1939 soon led to the more direct intervention of the State in rabbit control. Farmland became so valuable a commodity that not only the trespassing rabbit, but all rabbits, had to be greatly reduced in number, wherever they occurred. Under similar circumstances in 1917, the Board (and later the Ministry) of Agriculture had set the precedent of empowering its agents, the County War Agricultural Executive Committees, to issue orders requiring owners and occupiers of land to take steps to prevent damage by rabbits (Sheail, 1976). The Order remained in force until 1921, when it was repealed as part of a much wider reaction to wartime emergency legislation. Soon after the outbreak of war in 1939, the Ministry of Agriculture obtained new Rabbit Orders, authorizing the Committees to order those persons legally entitled to kill or take rabbits to carry out such operations. In default of their doing so, the Committees could undertake the work, and recoup the costs (PRO, 2). The powers were put on a peacetime footing under the Agriculture Act of 1947 and a similar measure for Scotland a year later.
3. Techniques of rabbit control Although the rabbit was recognized as a serious pest, there had been no systematic study of the comparative efficiency of the different methods of rabbit control. It was the controversy arising from the gin trap that provided the first opportunity to remedy the situation. In its report of 1937, the Lords' Select Committee recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture "should at once make technical enquiries in order to find a less cruel type of trap". When found, a ban should be imposed on all other designs. The Ministry's initial response was to argue that cruelty was traditionally a matter for another government department, namely the Home Office. The latter refused to become involved, asserting that the Ministry had both the responsibility and facilities to carry out trials. The Ministry used the opportunity to secure the Treasury's approval for the expenditure of s on a year-long study, designed to discover methods of control that were "efficacious, humane and of reasonable cost". Trials were carried out in 1937-1938 on 17 types of trap or snare, two methods of netting and seven forms of gassing. No single method proved to be entirely satisfactory. Of 4001 rabbits trapped, 2903 had fractured limbs and, of these, 74% were immature animals. Because the bones of young animals were so soft, it was better, from a humane point of view, to use gassing rather than trapping in spring when a large proportion of the population consisted of young. Gassing was, however, useless on light, sandy soils, where the runs failed to hold the gas. Here, there was no alternative to trapping. The Ministry emphasized that cruelty could be reduced substantially if "only well made and
192
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
correctly designed traps" were used, care was taken in setting them, and frequent visits were made to inspect them (PRO, 3; Anon., 1939). Meanwhile, ULAWS pressed for "a technical investigation, made by trained ecologists" of the longer-term effects of the various forms of rabbit control on the population (Hume, 1939). Most of the research on wild mammals and game-birds during the late 1930s was being carried out by the Bureau of Animal Population in the University of Oxford. On the initiative of the Bureau's Director, Charles S. Elton, an agreement was reached, whereby ULAWS contributed to the cost of a survey and trials conducted by H. N. Southern on the feeding habits, reproduction and predator-prey relationships of the rabbit, and their implications for controlling the species (Southern, 1940). With the outbreak of war in 1939, the Bureau of Animal Population quickly turned all its attention to biological methods of controlling the rabbit, brown and black rat, and house mouse populations. Largely financed by the Agricultural Research Council, the aim was to find the most effective and economical methods of pest control, and to act as an information bureau generally (PRO, 4; Elton, 1954). There appeared in 1942 a booklet, The Control and Extermination of Wild Rabbits, written by a member of the Bureau, A. D. Middleton. This described how numbers could be reduced drastically using a combination of existing methods of control, provided every occupier of land cooperated (Middleton, 1942). With the end of the war, there was considerable concern lest the number of rabbits should return to pre-war levels. The Universities Federation of Animal Welfare (as it was now called) financed a studentship in the Department of Animal Health at Aberystwyth to study the impact of commercial trapping in Pembrokeshire, where an estimated 2 million rabbit carcases were exported by rail each year. A close study made by Winifred Phillips of two farms, between 1946 and 1949, confirmed that trappers generally removed only 30 to 40% of the population (Phillips et al., 1952; Phillips, 1955a). In collaboration with the Pembrokeshire Agricultural Executive Committee and the Ministry's Infestation Control Division, the opportunity was taken to investigate the most effective forms of control on another rabbit-infested farm. A year-long trial in 1947-1948 confirmed that the key to a successful control programme was the persistent application of a variety of methods (Phillips, 1955b). Drawing on this experience, an even more ambitious clearance trial was carried out over 2690 acres of coastland in the Mathry district of north Pembrokeshire between 1948 and 1950. It was directed by H. V. Thompson of the Infestation Control Division, with a further student from University College, Aberystwyth, Marie Stephens, as scientific observer. It provided outstanding opportunities for the biologist to record such phenomena as body weights, sex ratios, reproduction, coprophagy and the incidence of diseases and parasites among a large rabbit population (Stephens, 1952). 4. The extermination of the rabbit
Although rabbits might be eliminated locally, there was at first little conscious thought given to their extermination throughout the country. During the Committee Stage of the Agriculture (Scotland) Bill of 1948, the Secretary of the State for Scotland spoke of how the "vital need for rabbits as food" made it difficult to control the pest effectively. They were "vermin which we like to eat occasionally" (HC, 1). The first major challenge to this ambivalent attitude came from an unexpected
J. Sheail
193
quarter. In December 1947, a Cabinet Committee on Industrial Productivity was appointed. As intended, the main work was done by a number of Panels, including one on Imports Substitution, chaired by Professor Solly Zuckerman (PRO, 5). In consultation with government departments, research bodies and trade associations, the Panel was expected to examine the question "from a scientific point of view", and "to persuade the appropriate bodies to adapt their organisation and policies" so as to make greater use of alternatives and waste materials (PRO, 6). The Panel soon discovered that the main problems were not so much a lack of scientific or technical insights, but rather a shortage o f manpower, resources and political will to put the initiatives into effect. Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the case of proposals for exterminating the rabbit. Arising from discussions with Professor Zuckerman and other members of the Panel, a senior official of the Lord President's office, E. Max Nicholson, circulated a paper in July 1948 on Rabbits and the Balance of Payments. On the premise that rabbits consumed as much food as the equivalent of the entire wheat crop, or one-and-a-half times that eaten by the sheep population, Nicholson argued the case for eradicating the rabbit in order to reduce the amount of foreign exchange needed to import meat and dairy produce, grain and timber. Nicholson identified three priorities. The first was to educate public opinion as to the actual cost of harbouring rabbits. The second was for the Ministry o f Agriculture, in collaboration with the Forestry Commission and Department of Agriculture for Scotland, to appoint a panel to prepare an operational plan for the period 1948-1952, with the peak of the campaign timed for 1950-1951. Third, and in the longer term, Nicholson argued that it should be made an offence to have wild rabbits on any land scheduled for clearance, unless the most stringent steps had been taken to control numbers or prevent their infesting other areas (PRO, 7). Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture were very sceptical as to whether such an eradication campaign was "a practicable proposition". Professor J. A. Scott-Watson pointed out that "a mass attack over the whole country, aiming at complete eradication, was beyond the capacity of any force of people who could be made available". Even if such problems could be overcome, Nicholson's memorandum took insufficient account of the "enormous amount of inertia and even prejudice in favour of the rabbit among countrymen". There were many farmers who liked "to carry a stock of wild rabbits for pot and profit". An educational campaign might succeed in persuading people of the great savings to be derived from foreign exchange and food subsidies if the rabbit were eliminated, but few rural people would believe they overrode "the personal considerations of wild (and free) rabbits for the table" (PRO, 8). The misgivings over an eradication programme were not confined to the Ministry of Agriculture. Nicholson was a distinguished ornithologist and, in that capacity and later as an official of the Lord President's office, he played a major part in the establishment in 1949 of an official nature-conservation body, the Nature Conservancy (Sheail, 1984). He turned to the Director-General of the Conservancy, Cyril Diver, for advice on the extermination of the rabbit. Diver was far from encouraging. He pointed out how the rat had survived the most extensive and expensive attempt to eradicate it--despite its being regarded as an unmitigated pest. Even if the rabbit could be exterminated, the chances of recouping the investment would depend on how far the obvious gains for agriculture and forestry were swallowed up by the costs of mitigating the secondary effects of the rabbit's disappearance. There was still a great deal "to be learnt about the ecology and habits" of the rabbit [Nature Conservancy Council (NCC, 1)]. In discussions with the Panel on Imports Substitution, Ministry officials agreed to
194
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
the proposal that the Minister and Secretary of State for Scotland should appoint a working party under the chairmanship of the Ministry's Director of Pest Infestation, W. McAuley Gracie (PRO, 9). Although "extermination was probably impracticable", there was a strong case for working towards that goal on arable and the better grazing land, and for seeking a drastic reduction elsewhere. In a submission to the Cabinet's Production Committee in October 1949, the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland supported a recommendation of the Working Party that legislation should be introduced, declaring the rabbit to be a pest wherever it occurred, and imposing controls over the activities of the commercial trapper. The Ministers' case was, however, fatally weakened by serious doubts as to whether there was sufficient public support for an extermination campaign to succeed. The Cabinet Committee expected there to be "strong opposition and resentment" against such drastic action in rural areas. The immediate needs of the situation could be met by powers already conferred on the Agricultural Executive Committees for destroying rabbits in those areas where damage was most severe (PRO, 10). Recognizing that ministers were not prepared to risk what they regarded as unnecessary unpopularity in the months leading up to a general election, Ministry officials decided to disband the Working Party and wait "until a more favourable moment, e.g. after the General Election". No public statement was required. Very few people outside the relevant Cabinet Committee and government departments knew of the discussions. 5. Voluntary clearance schemes
The initiatives for rabbit control, taken in the full glare of publicity, met with no greater success--after what seemed a promising start. At the instigation of the National Farmers Union, and following a similar and successful meeting in Scotland, the Ministry of Agriculture convened a conference in July 1950 "to consider ways and means of securing a rapid and progressive reduction in the rabbit population by voluntary cooperation of interested parties within the limits of present legal powers" (PRO, 11). From the chair, a Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture emphasized how farmers could not expect others to pay for getting rid of their pests. They would enjoy the profits from better crops. If they co-operated with one another, the unit costs of rabbit control would be reduced. For the Ministry, the outcome of the conference was highly satisfactory. The need for a drastic reduction in the rabbit population was endorsed. Supported by the Country Landowners Association, the National Farmers Union undertook to encourage its branches to initiate area-clearance schemes. The Agricultural Executive Committees were far less sanguine. Many doubted whether any real progress would be made until "some inducement or financial assistance was offered". By early 1951, only nine counties would report any significant moves to control the rabbit (PRO, 12). Meanwhile, a succession of mild winters had contributed to the rise in population to unprecedented levels. The Agricultural Executive Committee for West Suffolk described the position as "literally appalling despite the Committee's efforts to persuade and indeed direct owners and occupiers to take adequate control measures". By the summer of 1953, the Committees were again urged to "give a strong lead in organizing control measures" (PRO, 13). In October 1953, the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee accepted the contention of the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland that individual effort was not enough to keep numbers down, let alone exterminate, them. Powers were needed to force every owner and occupier to co-operate in destroying all the
J. Sheail
195
rabbits living or resorting on the land where infestation was so serious as to require a clearance scheme (PRO, 14). The Cabinet Committee was far less happy about the Minister's insistence that legislation should include powers enabling him to prohibit the use of the gin trap at some future date. While the Minister claimed such enabling powers would ensure support among the humanitarian organizations for the concept of statutory clearance areas, the Committee feared that the inclusion of "so thorny a topic" as the abolition of the gin trap would complicate an otherwise uncontroversial Bill. The Minister was asked to investigate whether the powers could be made the subject of a Private Member's Bill (PRO, 15). The outcome was further delay.
6. The gin trap Controversy over the humanitarian aspects of the gin trap had grown considerably during the post-war period. Under wartime regulations, open trapping had been permitted at the discretion of the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland. An average of 1500 permits was issued each year between 1941 and 1945 in England and Wales. Opposition to the granting of these permits became so strong that the clause to include the discretionary powers in the Agriculture Bill of 1947 was defeated at the Commons' Committee Stage by 29 to 4 votes (HC, 2). The opposition remained so strong that the Secretary of State for Scotland tabled an amendment to the Agriculture (Scotland) Bill of 1948, which had the effect of abolishing the use of the gin trap altogether (HC, 3). This in turn gave rise to so much concern among the farming industry that a further amendment was introduced and passed in the House of Lords, which allowed any type of trap approved by the Secretary of State to be used without restriction. Non-approved traps could only be used under permit, which would be withdrawn once adequate supplies of humane traps became available (HL, 4). Soon afterwards, the whole subject of trapping was reviewed by a Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals, appointed by the Home Secretary in response to a motion signed by 200 members of parliament. In a wide-ranging report of 1951, the Committee supported a policy of exterminating the rabbit by means of compulsory clearance orders. Although the gin trap was "a diabolical instrument which caused an incalculable amount of suffering", there seemed to be no alternative to open trapping as a means of eliminating rabbits in some types of terrain. The Committee therefore recommended that open trapping should be permitted under licence, provided the Government announced its intention of banning the use of all non-approved traps "within a short pe~'iod" (PRO, 16; Home Office, 1951). Both the Home Secretary and Minister of Agriculture regarded the contentious issues raised by the Committee as "political dynamite", particularly in view of the Labour Government's slender majority in parliament. There was room, in any case, for only one Ministry Bill in the congested legislative timetable, and preference had to be given to the introduction of greater safeguards for operatives in the use of toxic sprays on farmland. It was not until August 1952 that the Minister of Agriculture sought and obtained the consent of the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee of a new Conservative Government for an announcement to the effect that the sale and use of "non-approved" traps would be prohibited from a date still to be decided. Still the prospects for actual legislation seemed bleak, particularly after the Minister himself (Sir Thomas Dugdale) wrote a minute to his officials, highly critical of the new
196
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
Imbra humane trap, which had been a complete failure on Sir Thomas' property. No further initiatives could be taken until substantial supplies of the new trap were available for assessment by officers of the Ministry in all parts of the country (PRO, 17).
7. Myxomatosis The impasse that had developed in respect of introducing powers to designate statutory clearance areas, and to take steps to abolish the use of the gin trap, was not broken until late 1953, by which time an entirely new dimension had appeared in discussions on rabbit control, namely the outbreak of myxomatosis. Over the years, there had been many trials designed to find ways of introducing an epizootic disease into wild-rabbit populations, including two successful trials with the virus Myxomatosis cuniculi, in a compound erected at the Institute of Animal Pathology in Cambridge (Chick, 1956). A larger-scale trial on the rabbit-infested island of Skokholm, off the Pembrokeshire coast, in 1936-1938, had failed (Lockley, 1940). In an appraisal of December 1949, Grade advised against the conducting of further trials in Britain. Even if the disease spread over extensive areas of unenclosed land or small islands, "it would be unsuited to the physical conditions of land tenure in this country, and further would offend the public conscience as well as produce resistance from those more directly concerned in rabbit areas" (PRO, 18). The Ministry continued to counsel caution, even after the disease had been introduced, by inoculation, into the wild-rabbit population near Paris in June 1952, and had spread to nearly every French department a year later. It was far from certain whether there were suitable vectors for transmitting myxomatosis to all parts of Britain. There was, however, nothing "to prevent some enterprising but irresponsible person from getting hold of a supply of the virus", and experimenting for himself. If the disease became established, the domestic rabbit-industry would be threatened, and the unpleasant symptoms of myxomatosis "would doubtless provoke some public out-cry". Regional Pest Officers were asked "to keep their ears close to the ground for any whispers" (PRO, 19). In order to help the Ministry forecast what might happen in the event of an outbreak in Britain, a member of the Infestation Control Division, J. W. Evans, made a 3-day tour of France in late September 1953. Over 95% of the rabbits had died in some parts. Dr Armand Delille (who had originally introduced myxomatosis to France) told Evans that he had received many requests for supplies of the virus from persons in Britain. French experience indicated that there was no means of eradicating myxomatosis, once it became established (PRO, 20; NCC, 2). The first outbreak in Britain was reported from Edenbridge in Kent during October 1953, up to 3 weeks after dead and dying rabbits had been first noticed in the area. Local gossip, the time of year and the localized nature of the outbreak suggested that the disease had been introduced deliberately. The Ministry's veterinary officers discounted the idea of its being introduced by insect vectors or on the wheels of vehicles (PRO, 21; Armour and Thompson, 1955). At first, every effort was made to minimize the amount of publicity given to the outbreak. However, newspaper reports soon appeared and it became clear that public concern would only be allayed by indications that the Government had "all aspects of the matter in mind and in hand". A press statement was issued, describing the steps taken to contain the outbreak. The disease was not likely to spread until the warmer weather of spring. On the day the outbreak was confirmed, the Minister had approved
J. Sheail
197
the enclosure of the 200 acres of affected farmland with wire netting, and the eradication of the rabbits by personnel working under the Ministry's supervision. The occupiers of the land had given their consent, and 5000 yards of fencing were erected within 5 days. Water-bodies were sprayed with a larvacide in order to minimize the risk of the disease being spread by mosquitoes. From the first day of the outbreak, arrangements were set in motion for the appointment of a Myxomatosis Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, a Joint Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture. Intended to advise on what action should be taken in the event of further outbreaks, the Committee included the chairman of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Lord Merthyr) and the chairman of the earlier Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals (J. Scott Henderson). Before the Committee met, a further outbreak had been reported at Robertsbridge in East Sussex, about 25 miles from Edenbridge. Lord Carrington decided it was "just defensible" to try to stop this outbreak from spreading in view of the apparent success at Edenbridge and the need to give the Advisory Committee more time to consider a longer-term policy towards the disease (PRO, 22). Over the next 3 months, eight further occurrences were reported in an arc from Southwold in Suffolk to Lewes in Sussex. By mid-December 1953, the Advisory Committee had concluded that further attempts to contain the disease would be futile. By the following spring, it was clear that the virus could survive an English winter. In a report of March 1954, the Committee urged the farming industry to take every advantage of "this unique opportunity" to eliminate the rabbit pest (Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis, 1954). The implications of the disease for legislation were considerable. By the end of the summer, only five Scottish counties, and the Isle of Ely in England, remained free of the virus. The anticipated disappearance of 99% of the rabbits in Britain made irrelevant demands that compensation should be paid to those who suffered pecuniary losses as a result of the imposition of rabbit clearance orders. Likewise, the public's reluctance to eat any rabbits, lest they had been in contact with myxomatous animals, had virtually eliminated commercial trapping and the widespread use of the gin. 8. The Pests Act, 1954
Paradoxically, the destruction of so large a proportion of the rabbit population made statutory clearance areas even more necessary. Unless farmers made every effort "to back up the efforts of the virus by an energetic mopping-up campaign", the opportunity to eliminate the pest would be lost. The survival of even a very small number of rabbits would ensure that recovery and recolonization took place (HC, 4; Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis, 1955). A Pests Bill was introduced to parliament in January 1954, which enabled the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland to designate rabbit clearance areas, where occupiers could be required to take reasonable steps to kill or remove all rabbits living on or resorting to their land. There was unanimous support for the measure. Members spoke of the need to enforce "effective action where co-operation is not otherwise obtainable". The statutory clearance orders would have the effect of reassuring the majority of farmers that the job of rabbit clearance was being borne fairly by all. As expected, most attention focused on the issue of the gin trap. Government spokesmen emphasized that "we are all agreed that the gin-trap is cruel and we all want
198
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
to abolish it; all that divides us is a matter o f timing". Because of the absence of "an adequate, efficient and humane alternative to the gin trap" being found, Ministers argued that they could go no further than to announce their intention of banning at some date after July 1958 the use of any spring trap not approved by them in consultation with interested parties. The postponement was vigorously attacked during the Bill's second reading in the House of Lords. Critics argued that the Government's "compromise" gave colour to the fallacious idea that trapping was an effective way of controlling rabbits, whereas it was only the commercial trapper who found the traps indispensible (HL, 5). During the Lords' Committee Stage of the Bill, Lord Elton moved an amendment, requiring Ministers to ban the sale and use of unapproved traps before July 1958. By laying down a deadline, Lord Elton believed industry would soon devise an adequate humane trap. Government spokesmen denied this. By the most optimistic forecast, it would take at least two seasons to develop and produce traps of a new design, and a further period to manufacture and test them. In the words of the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, "we cannot just look at it from the rabbit's point of view, however strongly we feel about the humane aspect; we must look at it from the farmers' point of view, too". These were the people who would have to carry out the statutory rabbit clearance orders (PRO, 23; HL, 6). Although Lord Elton's amendment was defeated by 42 to 22 votes, the Minister announced later in May 1954 that he had revised his own position. The use of spring traps would in effect be banned in England and Wales after July 1958, except where their design had been approved (HC, 5). The promotion of the Pests Bill was timely in another sense. It offered an obvious means o f making the wilful introduction of myxomatous rabbits illegal. The Myxomatosis Advisory Committee had condemned such a practice, but had warned of how it would be extremely difficult to prove that any person had knowingly taken steps to introduce the virus. The Committee argued that it was in no one's interests to make laws that could not be enforced (HC, 6). The advice was rejected by many of the speakers at the second reading of the Pests Bill. During the Committee Stage, Dr Horace King moved an amendment, whereby any person who knew, used, or permitted "'the use of a rabbit infected with myxomatosis to spread the disease among uninfected rabbits" would be guilty of an offence. Whilst the rabbit population should be controlled, a Geneva Convention was needed, making "bacteriological warfare" against the rabbit illegal (HC, 7). That morning, the Minister of Agriculture (Derek Heathcoat Amory) had sought the guidance of the Cabinet as to how he should respond to the amendment. With the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in the chair, ministers agreed that public opinion throughout the country was strongly opposed to the deliberate spreading of the disease, and that the clause "was likely to command a substantial body of support on both sides of the House" (PRO, 24). Some intimation of Churchill's attitude was conveyed in earlier correspondence, when he had protested to the Home Secretary and Minister of Agriculture that not enough attention was being given to the cruelty aspect. The Prime Minister was considering whether to send a subscription to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, earmarked for use in preventing the deliberate spread of myxomatosis (PRO, 25). It was also clear that the Secretary of State for Scotland had similarly "strong humanitarian sympathies". When his officials drafted a "neutral" response to a letter urging him to ban the deliberate spreading of myxomatosis in September 1954, he had added in manuscript a postscript, making it clear that he found the practice repulsive and would resist it strongly (PRO, 26).
J. Sheail
199
With the approval of the Cabinet, Heathcoat Amory informed the Commons' Committee that the Government accepted the amendment. The announcement led to the resignation of two members of the Myxomatosis Advisory Committee. One was the secretary of the National Farmers Union, Harold Woolley, who complained that the concession would be interpreted by the general public as an admission that farmers had been largely responsible for spreading the disease--a contention which the Union strongly repudiated. The other member, the Earl of Dundee, protested at the way the Government had completely disregarded "the carefully considered and unanimous advice" given by those "most qualified to advise the Government". In an exchange of letters, the Minister for his part stressed how, "where issues of major policy" were not involved, the Government must sometimes bow to the wishes of Parliament. Although farmers were not generally responsible for spreading the disease, there could be little doubt that some had done so--they had admitted as much to the press (PRO, 27). The protests were renewed when the time came for the House of Lords to consider the Commons' amendments. In a maiden speech, the Earl of Dundee described how farmers would be puzzled by the illogicality of a situation where they were encouraged to use poisons against the rat, but were "forbidden to spread a natural disease" that promised to rid the country of rabbits. Scientific evidence indicated that the myxomatous rabbit suffered less pain than that inflicted by any other method of control, except gassing. The animal continued, for example, to feed normally, although its eyes and cheeks were swollen by the disease. Support for the Earl of Dundee came from the wartime Minister of Agriculture, Viscount Hudson, who called upon the leaders of the Government, and especially those professing to be farmers, to cast aside sentimentality, and to explain to the British public the benefits of extending the epidemic (HL, 7). Another member of the Myxomatosis Advisory Committee, Lord Merthyr, also opposed the amendment, but warned the House that any rejection of the Commons' amendment would jeopardize the entire Bill. As the Joint Parliamentary Secretary reminded members, the House of Commons had "truly reflected a strong feeling in the country". Whatever the merits of rejecting the amendment, the Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords (Lord Salisbury) doubted whether they justified the taking of "a big step towards provoking a dispute between the two Houses". The motion to support the Commons' amendment was affirmed without division. The Pests Bill gained the Royal Assent in November 1954. 9. The impact of the rabbit
The lack of quantitative data on the extent of rabbit damage was highlighted during the early years of the Second World War. The only information available were the answers given by farmers to the "non-statistical and common-sense questions" put to them by the Ministry's 300 crop-reporters (PRO, 28). There was disagreement, even within the agricultural departments and their expert advisory bodies, as to how far crop losses might be attributed to the rabbit as opposed to the weather, poor seed or husbandry, or the depradations of insect and other types of pest (PRO, 29). Some impression of the scale of depradations emerged from field-plot trials and more extensive surveys made in north Hertfordshire and parts of East Anglia by officers of the National Agricultural Advisory Service. It was estimated that over s worth of winter corn were destroyed by rabbits during the season, 1949 1950 (PRO, 30; Gough and Dunnett, 1950). Meanwhile, a small informal committee had been formed to devise ways of identifying and assessing rabbit damage on a national scale. It was made up of
200
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
representatives of the Infestation Control Division, Plant Pathology Laboratory, the Ministry's Advisory Entomologists and the statistical department of the Rothamsted Experimental Station. A preliminary survey of damage to spring wheat in 1950 was based on a comparison of protected and unprotected plots on farms, selected at random. A year later, a much more extensive survey was made of damage to winter wheat in southern England and Wales, where 85 % of the crop was grown (PRO, 31). On the basis of data collected by the District Advisory Officers of the National Agricultural Advisory Service, the committee estimated that 6% of the total yield, representing the produce of 25 000 acres, was lost (PRO, 32; Church et al., 1953; Thompson and Worden, 1946). With its responsibilities for managing National Nature Reserves and advising on the conservation of wildlife generally, the Nature Conservancy was similarly keen to discover more about the impact of the rabbit on the countryside. A grant was awarded to Ronald Lockley to carry out detailed field surveys and to embark on "certain very simple experiments", as a prerequisite to tackling "the more complex questions" later. His first task was to make an extensive tour of France in December 1953, and then to visit those National Nature Reserves in Sussex, which were the first to be affected by myxomatosis (NCC, 3). A member of the Nature Conservancy committee, Professor F. W. Rogers-Brambell of the Department of Zoology at Bangor, wrote of how the "catastrophe" of myxomatosis would present "an extraordinary opportunity for fundamental ecological studies", as well as posing new and urgent problems for reserve-management. A meeting was held in June 1954 of representatives of the Conservancy and the Infestation Control Division. It was agreed that the Ministry of Agriculture should focus on the biological aspects of the disease and the behavioural response of the rabbit. The Nature Conservancy would concentrate on the botanical aspects, and provide grant aid for studies of the hare and buzzard (the predator most severely affected by the loss of rabbits) (Moore, 1957). The closely-cropped vegetation of several National Nature Reserves would be ideal for monitoring the effects of reduced rabbit-grazing. As early as February 1954, Dr A. S. Thomas, who was already engaged on a grassland survey for the Conservancy, was instructed to devote his full time to the vegetation of the chalk areas, as a means of assessing "the ecological role of the rabbit" (NCC, 4). In a report to the Cabinet's Natural Resources (Technical) Committee in July 1955, Thomas recounted how the changes consequent on the disappearance of the rabbit were being recorded by means of almost 11 000 point quadrats or transects at various sites, mainly on the chalk. A comparison of the records made in the spring and early summer of 1954 and 1955 indicated that the turf was up to 2 inches higher in sheltered hollows. There was a slight increase in species numbers and a better cover of the ground. Some of the more palatable grasses were found in places where they had not been recorded in 1954. Not only had there been more grass-growth during the summer of 1955, but Thomas expected a comparison of the autumn records to reveal even greater changes. Whereas the Lullington Down National Nature Reserve had been purple with a mass of closely-grazed heather 2 years previously, it was now dull brown. Fruiting grasses obscured the flowering heather (NCC, 5; Thomas, 1960). It took time for the full implications of these floristic changes to be appreciated. An article published in the N e w Statesman for June 1954 was one of many to take a rather simplistic view of what was happening. The author looked forward to the day when the only surviving rabbits would be confined behind wired bars in a zoo. The article drew a response from Dr J. F. Hope-Simpson, a grassland botanist at Bristol University, who argued that a great deal of urgent thought and planning was required if the loss of the
J. Sheail
201
rabbit was to prove entirely beneficial to farming. Hope-Simpson wrote of how a lot of rabbit-grazing occurred on grasslands where, because of steepness and other factors, the chief use of the land was likely to remain rough grazing. Unless more sheep or cattle were depastured, the ground would become dominated by coarse grass, scrub or bracken. It was impossible to dispense with herbivores and keep the pasture. Once established, scrub was difficult to remove, especially from steep slopes, and it was impossible to eradicate tor g r a s s - - " a n aggressive pest of downland". If the spread of "downland of scrubby aspect and negligible value" was to be avoided, an agricultural policy was required, which would promote a return to "the traditional regularity of hill grazing" (NCC, 6; Harvey, 1954; Hope-Simpson, 1954).
10. The species network
Ecologists have always emphasized the interdependence of living organisms. Each species formed part of a food chain or cycle; each affected the living space of the other. The term "species network" was coined to describe the interlocking system. It was, however, not until myxomatosis virtually destroyed the rabbit population that the full impact of the species on the farming and semi-natural environments was appreciated. It was a salutary lesson on the need for closer surveillance and understanding of what was happening, if farm and woodland, and nature reserves, were to be managed costeffectively. The history of the rabbit also highlights how little control owners and occupiers may have over their holdings. The distinctions commonly drawn between wild and domestic animals, or between beneficial and pest species, can be extremely misleading. It was rarely possible to manage rabbits solely for their meat and fur, or for sport. Some rabbits would always leave the warren or game-covert, and damage crops. Conversely, no rabbit-control programme could overlook the importance of the rabbit as a source of food and income--often to those charged with its eradication. The confused and ambivalent attitude towards the species was illustrated by debates over gassing and the implementation of campaigns to exterminate the animal. As the outcry over cruelty and the artificial spreading of myxomatosis demonstrated, the fate of the rabbit was not something to be decided solely by those working on the land. The history of pest control, and the handling of such issues as cruelty, may provide relevant insights into the more general development of concepts in environmental management during the present century. The choice of options in wildlife management has always been severely circumscribed by a lack of understanding of intra- and interspecies relationships and habitat requirements, and, perhaps at least as significantly, by the constraints imposed by prevailing social and cultural attitudes towards the stewardship of land and natural resources. Within the archival material on the management of individual species and semi-natural plant and animal communities, an abundance of material will be found on the relative importance of these two types of constraint, and their complex interplay in determining the course of action taken by decision-makers.
Dr H. V. Thompson kindly commented on an early draft of this paper. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the fac~hties extended to me by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and by the Nature Conservancy Council, and the assistance given by the Cambridge University Library and Public Record Office.
202
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
References
Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis (1954). Myxomatosis. London: HMSO. Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis (1955). Second Report on Myxomatosis. London: HMSO. Anonymous (1939). The control of rabbits. Journal of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 46, 588-592. Armour, C. J. and Thompson, H. V. (1955). Spread of myxomatosis in the first outbreak in Great Britain. Annals of Applied Biology 43, 511-518. Bailey, M. (1988). The rabbit and the medieval East Anglian economy. Agrtcultural History Review 36, 1-20. Buckley, W. H. (1935). Report on a solution of the rabbit problem: cyanide gassing. Veterinary Journal 91, 210~15. Chick, H. (1956). Charles James Martin 1866-1955. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 2, 173~08. Church, B. M., Jacob, F. H. and Thompson, H. V. (1953). Surveys of rabbit damage to wheat in England and Wales, 1950-1952. Plant Pathology 2, 107 112. Elton, C. (1954). Research on rodent control by the Bureau of Animal Population. In Control of Rats andMice (D. Chitty and H. N. Southern, eds) pp. 1-24. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gough, H. C. and Dunnett, F. W. (1950). Rabbit damage to winter corn. Agriculture 57, 374-378. HC Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons: 1. Standing Committee, 1947-1948, vol. 1. 2. Standing Committee, 1947-1948, vol. 1. 3. Vol. 450, columns 485-90 and 501. 4. Vol. 531, columns 1502-1509. 5. Vol. 528, columns 39-40 and 531, columns 1502 1558 and 1265-1303. 6. Vol. 531, columns 1502-1508. 7. Vol. 532, columns 1308-1317. HL Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords: I. Vol. 97, columns 8 4 8 . 2. Vol. 100, columns 1061 1066. 3. Vol. 111, columns 319-345. 4. Vol. 156, columns 722 732 and 969-973. 5. Vol. 185, columns 414-435 and 444-473. 6. Vol. 185, columns 113%1192. 7. Vol. 189, columns 1749-1787. Harvey, N. (1954). Killing rabbits. New Statesman 4% 723. Home Office (1951). Report of the Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals. Parliamentary Papers, 195(~1951, VIII, Cmd 8266. Hope-Simpson, J. F. (1954). Myxomatosls. New Statesman 47, 788. House of Lords (19367). Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Agriculture (Damage by Rabbits). Sessional Papers, IV. London: HMSO. Hume, C. W. (1939). Instructions for dealing with rabbits. UFA W Monograph and Report, 4E. Hume, C. W. (1958). The gin trap: UFAW's long battle. The UFAW Courier 15, 1-10. Hume, C. W. (1962). Man and Beast. London: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare. Institute of Animal Health (1989) Annual Report. Compton, Newbury: Institute of Animal Health (Agricultural and Food Research Council). Lockley, R. M. (1940). Some experiments in rabbit control. Nature (London) 145, 767 769. Middleton, A. D. (1942). The Control and Extermination of Wild Rabbits. Oxford: Bureau of Animal Population. Moore, N. W. (1957). The past and present status of the buzzard in the British Isles. British Birds 50, 173 197. Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) archives: 1. S1, vol. 1. 2. SI/I, vol. 1. 3. F 210 & Sl, vol. 1. 4. S1/1, vol. 2. 5. S1/1, vol. 2. 6. S1/1, vol. 2. Phillips, W. M. (1955a). The effect of commercial trapping on rabbit populations. Annals of Applied Biology 43, 247 257. Phillips, W. M. (1955b). An experiment in rabbit control. Annals of Applied Biology 43, 258~64. Phillips. W. M., Stephens, M. N. and Worden, A. N. (1952). Observations on the rabbit in west Wales. Nature (London) 169, 869-70. Public Record Office (PRO): 1. M A F 44, 19. 2. MAF 44, 20 and 21. 3. MAF 44, 18. 4. M A F 44, 32.
J. Sheail
203
5. CAB 124, 1094. 6. CAB 124, 1096. 7. MAF 131, 2 and 39. 8. MAF 130, 80 and 131, 2. 9. MAF 132, 39. 10. CAB 134, 640, 11. MAF 131, 5. 12. MAF 131, 5. 13. MAF 130, 80 and 131, 2, 5 and 19. 14. CAB 134, 914. 15. CAB 134, 912. 16. MAF 131, 3. 17. MAF 130, 67. 18. MAF 13l, 2. 19. MAF 131, 2 and 19. 20. MAF 191, 145. 21. MAF 131, 12. 22. MAF 131, 13. 23. MAF 131, 28. 24. CAB 128, 27/2. 25. PREM 11,585. 26. MAF 131, 22. 27. MAF 131, 14. 28. MAF 44, 33. 29. MAF 191, 143. 30. MAF 191, 144. 31. MAF 191,48. 32. MAF 131, 19. Sharpe, R. (1918). The taking of wild rabbits. Journal of the Board of Agriculture 25, 281-298 and 435-444. Sheail, J. (1971). Rabbits and their History. Newton Abbot: David and Charles. Sheil, J, (1976). Land improvement and reclamation: the experiences of the First World War m England and Wales. Agricultural History Review 24, 110-125. Sheail, J. (1978). Rabbits and agriculture in post-medieval England. Journal of Historical Geography 4, 343-55. Sheail, J. (1984). Nature reserves, national parks, and post-war reconstruction m Britain Environmental Conservation 11, 29-34. Southern, H. N. (I 940). The ecology and population dynamics of the wild rabbit. Annals of Applied Biology 27, 509-526. Stephens, M. N. (1952). Seasonal observations on the wild rabbits in west Wales. Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London 122. 417-344. Thomas, A. S. (1960). Changes in the vegetation since the advent of myxomatosls. Journal of Ecology 48, 287 306. Thompson, H. V. and Worden, A. N. (1956). The Rabbit. London: Collins.
The Management of an Animal Population: Changing Attitudes Towards the Wild Rabbit in Britain John Sheail ]nstitute of Terrestrial Ecology (Natural Environment Research Council), Monks Wood Experimental Station, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire PE17 2LS, U.K. Received 30 July 1990
Drawing mainly on the documentation of the Ministry of Agriculture, the paper traces the changing perception of the rabbit as a pest species, from the 1920s until the late 1950s, when the death of almost every rabbit as a result of the spread of myxomatosis made it both easier and more urgent to introduce large-scale clearance programmes. Among the more significant constraints on the management of the species in the United Kingdom was the lack of an effective, yet humane, means of control, and ignorance as to the actual extent of damage inflicted on rabbit-infested farm and woodland.
Keywords: rabbit control, pests, game, myxomatosis.
1. Introduction The Annual Report of the United K i n g d o m Institute of Animal Health for 1988 drew attention to a new form of rabbit disease, affecting commercial rabbit farms, capable of destroying 95% of the animals affected (Institute of Animal Health, 1988). Whilst it is far too soon to forecast what, if any, impact it might have on the United Kingdom, it m a y nevertheless be topical to review the different ways in which the wild rabbit population was perceived in the decades leading up to the outbreak of myxomatosis in 1953-1954, and the estimated loss of 99% of the population. It was a time when the twin issues of damage caused to crops and plantations, and the cruelty inflicted by trapping, aroused so much passion that governments and Parliament became directly involved in "the rabbit question". This paper is based on contemporary files of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the official body responsible for nature conservation in the United Kingdom, the Nature Conservancy. The rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) is an alien species which, over the course of some 800 years, had spread and become abundant over the greater part of the country. Its meat and fur, and the sport of chasing and shooting the animal, were so highly prized that landowners set aside areas of land explicitly for its conservation in what was otherwise a hostile environment (Sheail, 1978; Bailey, 1988). Even after the warrens were abandoned in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it became possible for feral colonies to survive, the history of the animal continued to be closely bound up with wider trends in land use and management (Sheail, 1971, 1984).
189 0301-4797/91/060189+ 15 S03.00/0
9 1991 Academic Press Limited
190
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
2. T h e i n t e r - w a r y e a r s
Whilst few commentators denied the right of landowners and occupiers to use their land howsoever they pleased, there was increasing opposition to "rabbit farming" from two quarters. There was resentment at the extent to which all farm and woodland was affected by the marauding rabbit. Despite claims made in the Journal of the Board of Agriculture and elsewhere that rabbits could be encouraged with little risk to crops if a system of management was "intelligently conceived and properly executed" (Sharpe, 1918), it was rarely possible to achiev~ a balance between such farming and other forms of crop and animal husbandry. It was also strongly argued that the method of trapping, using mass-produced, 4-inch steel traps, called the gin or spring trap, involved an unacceptable level of cruelty. By the late 1920s, it was estimated that 30 to 40 million rabbits were caught each year in gin traps. The sight and sound of the animals struggling to free one or more limbs from the jaws of the trap caused many people, particularly in towns, to support the campaign directed by the University of London Animal Welfare Society (ULAWS), which was founded by Major C. W. Hume in 1926 (Hume, 1958). At the instigation of the Society, a Private Member's Bill was introduced into the House of Lords in May 1935, seeking to abolish the use of the gin trap. No one disputed the cruelty inflicted, but the Bill was defeated on its second reading by 46 to 42 votes. Opponents of the Bill succeeded in stressing the importance of the sales of wild-rabbit meat and fur, and the fact that there was no alternative method of control (HL, 1), ULAWS contended that there was an alternative, and possibly much more effective, form of rabbit controk namely cyanide gassing. A research chemist from the manufacturers, Imperial Chemicals Industry, took part in tests initiated by ULAWS on a farm in Pembrokeshire, using two types of cyanide dust. Not only were the methods comparatively cheap and effective in clearing the burrows of animals, but they appeared to inflict comparatively little suffering (Buckley, 1935). The only criticisms came from the rabbit trade, which complained of the waste of carcases left underground. There were also fears that the housewife might stop buying any rabbit-meat, lest it had been "tainted" by gas (Hume, 1962). In urging the abolition of the gin trap, ULAWS consciously developed the arguments being put forward by those explicitly concerned with the cost of rabbit damage. In December 1935, supporters of ULAWS tabled a motion in the House of Lords, supported by the County Councils Association, calling for an enquiry into methods of protecting agriculture from rabbit damage (HL, 2), The motion was passed, and a report was published in 1937. This report recounted how there had been 10 abortive attempts to pass legislation for protecting farmers from their neighbours' rabbits. Each had failed, largely because of opposition to proposals that the Minister of Agriculture, or local authorities, should be given powers to enter private land and destroy the rabbits. In their report, the House of Lords' Select Committee adopted a compromise put forward by the County Councils Association, which limited the local authorities to issuing orders requiring the destruction of rabbits wherever excessive damage was being caused to adjoining properties. The authorities would be able to instigate legal proceedings against those who failed to comply with an order (House of Lords, 1936-37). The Lords' Select Committee also adopted a compromise solution in respect of the use of the gin trap. Whilst the use of the trap in the open should be banned, the Committee believed it ought to be still available for catching rabbits in the mouth of the burrows. Although disappointed, ULAWS and the other animal-welfare bodies realized
J. Sheail
191
that a Private Member's Bill incorporating the Committee's findings provided the only opportunity of imposing even these modest curbs on the use of the gin trap. For its part, the Ministry of Agriculture saw a Private Member's Bill, which appealed to both the agricultural and humanitarian interests, as the best chance o f securing a place for a Bill in the congested parliamentary timetable. In a Cabinet Paper o f January 1938, the Minister described how the State was becoming directly involved in the search for adequate controls over rabbit infestation, following the introduction of grants for improving grasslands as part of the Government's Fertility Campaign. As one correspondent to the Ministry observed, it was "useless ploughing and re-seeding run out, rabbit ruined and unproductive grassland, just to feed more rabbits" [Public Record Office (PRO) 1; Hume, 1958]. The Prevention of Damage by Rabbits Bill received the Royal Assent in July 1939 (HL, 3). In the event, the powers conferred on the local authorities under the Act were never implemented. The outbreak of war in September 1939 soon led to the more direct intervention of the State in rabbit control. Farmland became so valuable a commodity that not only the trespassing rabbit, but all rabbits, had to be greatly reduced in number, wherever they occurred. Under similar circumstances in 1917, the Board (and later the Ministry) of Agriculture had set the precedent of empowering its agents, the County War Agricultural Executive Committees, to issue orders requiring owners and occupiers of land to take steps to prevent damage by rabbits (Sheail, 1976). The Order remained in force until 1921, when it was repealed as part of a much wider reaction to wartime emergency legislation. Soon after the outbreak of war in 1939, the Ministry of Agriculture obtained new Rabbit Orders, authorizing the Committees to order those persons legally entitled to kill or take rabbits to carry out such operations. In default of their doing so, the Committees could undertake the work, and recoup the costs (PRO, 2). The powers were put on a peacetime footing under the Agriculture Act of 1947 and a similar measure for Scotland a year later.
3. Techniques of rabbit control Although the rabbit was recognized as a serious pest, there had been no systematic study of the comparative efficiency of the different methods of rabbit control. It was the controversy arising from the gin trap that provided the first opportunity to remedy the situation. In its report of 1937, the Lords' Select Committee recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture "should at once make technical enquiries in order to find a less cruel type of trap". When found, a ban should be imposed on all other designs. The Ministry's initial response was to argue that cruelty was traditionally a matter for another government department, namely the Home Office. The latter refused to become involved, asserting that the Ministry had both the responsibility and facilities to carry out trials. The Ministry used the opportunity to secure the Treasury's approval for the expenditure of s on a year-long study, designed to discover methods of control that were "efficacious, humane and of reasonable cost". Trials were carried out in 1937-1938 on 17 types of trap or snare, two methods of netting and seven forms of gassing. No single method proved to be entirely satisfactory. Of 4001 rabbits trapped, 2903 had fractured limbs and, of these, 74% were immature animals. Because the bones of young animals were so soft, it was better, from a humane point of view, to use gassing rather than trapping in spring when a large proportion of the population consisted of young. Gassing was, however, useless on light, sandy soils, where the runs failed to hold the gas. Here, there was no alternative to trapping. The Ministry emphasized that cruelty could be reduced substantially if "only well made and
192
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
correctly designed traps" were used, care was taken in setting them, and frequent visits were made to inspect them (PRO, 3; Anon., 1939). Meanwhile, ULAWS pressed for "a technical investigation, made by trained ecologists" of the longer-term effects of the various forms of rabbit control on the population (Hume, 1939). Most of the research on wild mammals and game-birds during the late 1930s was being carried out by the Bureau of Animal Population in the University of Oxford. On the initiative of the Bureau's Director, Charles S. Elton, an agreement was reached, whereby ULAWS contributed to the cost of a survey and trials conducted by H. N. Southern on the feeding habits, reproduction and predator-prey relationships of the rabbit, and their implications for controlling the species (Southern, 1940). With the outbreak of war in 1939, the Bureau of Animal Population quickly turned all its attention to biological methods of controlling the rabbit, brown and black rat, and house mouse populations. Largely financed by the Agricultural Research Council, the aim was to find the most effective and economical methods of pest control, and to act as an information bureau generally (PRO, 4; Elton, 1954). There appeared in 1942 a booklet, The Control and Extermination of Wild Rabbits, written by a member of the Bureau, A. D. Middleton. This described how numbers could be reduced drastically using a combination of existing methods of control, provided every occupier of land cooperated (Middleton, 1942). With the end of the war, there was considerable concern lest the number of rabbits should return to pre-war levels. The Universities Federation of Animal Welfare (as it was now called) financed a studentship in the Department of Animal Health at Aberystwyth to study the impact of commercial trapping in Pembrokeshire, where an estimated 2 million rabbit carcases were exported by rail each year. A close study made by Winifred Phillips of two farms, between 1946 and 1949, confirmed that trappers generally removed only 30 to 40% of the population (Phillips et al., 1952; Phillips, 1955a). In collaboration with the Pembrokeshire Agricultural Executive Committee and the Ministry's Infestation Control Division, the opportunity was taken to investigate the most effective forms of control on another rabbit-infested farm. A year-long trial in 1947-1948 confirmed that the key to a successful control programme was the persistent application of a variety of methods (Phillips, 1955b). Drawing on this experience, an even more ambitious clearance trial was carried out over 2690 acres of coastland in the Mathry district of north Pembrokeshire between 1948 and 1950. It was directed by H. V. Thompson of the Infestation Control Division, with a further student from University College, Aberystwyth, Marie Stephens, as scientific observer. It provided outstanding opportunities for the biologist to record such phenomena as body weights, sex ratios, reproduction, coprophagy and the incidence of diseases and parasites among a large rabbit population (Stephens, 1952). 4. The extermination of the rabbit
Although rabbits might be eliminated locally, there was at first little conscious thought given to their extermination throughout the country. During the Committee Stage of the Agriculture (Scotland) Bill of 1948, the Secretary of the State for Scotland spoke of how the "vital need for rabbits as food" made it difficult to control the pest effectively. They were "vermin which we like to eat occasionally" (HC, 1). The first major challenge to this ambivalent attitude came from an unexpected
J. Sheail
193
quarter. In December 1947, a Cabinet Committee on Industrial Productivity was appointed. As intended, the main work was done by a number of Panels, including one on Imports Substitution, chaired by Professor Solly Zuckerman (PRO, 5). In consultation with government departments, research bodies and trade associations, the Panel was expected to examine the question "from a scientific point of view", and "to persuade the appropriate bodies to adapt their organisation and policies" so as to make greater use of alternatives and waste materials (PRO, 6). The Panel soon discovered that the main problems were not so much a lack of scientific or technical insights, but rather a shortage o f manpower, resources and political will to put the initiatives into effect. Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the case of proposals for exterminating the rabbit. Arising from discussions with Professor Zuckerman and other members of the Panel, a senior official of the Lord President's office, E. Max Nicholson, circulated a paper in July 1948 on Rabbits and the Balance of Payments. On the premise that rabbits consumed as much food as the equivalent of the entire wheat crop, or one-and-a-half times that eaten by the sheep population, Nicholson argued the case for eradicating the rabbit in order to reduce the amount of foreign exchange needed to import meat and dairy produce, grain and timber. Nicholson identified three priorities. The first was to educate public opinion as to the actual cost of harbouring rabbits. The second was for the Ministry o f Agriculture, in collaboration with the Forestry Commission and Department of Agriculture for Scotland, to appoint a panel to prepare an operational plan for the period 1948-1952, with the peak of the campaign timed for 1950-1951. Third, and in the longer term, Nicholson argued that it should be made an offence to have wild rabbits on any land scheduled for clearance, unless the most stringent steps had been taken to control numbers or prevent their infesting other areas (PRO, 7). Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture were very sceptical as to whether such an eradication campaign was "a practicable proposition". Professor J. A. Scott-Watson pointed out that "a mass attack over the whole country, aiming at complete eradication, was beyond the capacity of any force of people who could be made available". Even if such problems could be overcome, Nicholson's memorandum took insufficient account of the "enormous amount of inertia and even prejudice in favour of the rabbit among countrymen". There were many farmers who liked "to carry a stock of wild rabbits for pot and profit". An educational campaign might succeed in persuading people of the great savings to be derived from foreign exchange and food subsidies if the rabbit were eliminated, but few rural people would believe they overrode "the personal considerations of wild (and free) rabbits for the table" (PRO, 8). The misgivings over an eradication programme were not confined to the Ministry of Agriculture. Nicholson was a distinguished ornithologist and, in that capacity and later as an official of the Lord President's office, he played a major part in the establishment in 1949 of an official nature-conservation body, the Nature Conservancy (Sheail, 1984). He turned to the Director-General of the Conservancy, Cyril Diver, for advice on the extermination of the rabbit. Diver was far from encouraging. He pointed out how the rat had survived the most extensive and expensive attempt to eradicate it--despite its being regarded as an unmitigated pest. Even if the rabbit could be exterminated, the chances of recouping the investment would depend on how far the obvious gains for agriculture and forestry were swallowed up by the costs of mitigating the secondary effects of the rabbit's disappearance. There was still a great deal "to be learnt about the ecology and habits" of the rabbit [Nature Conservancy Council (NCC, 1)]. In discussions with the Panel on Imports Substitution, Ministry officials agreed to
194
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
the proposal that the Minister and Secretary of State for Scotland should appoint a working party under the chairmanship of the Ministry's Director of Pest Infestation, W. McAuley Gracie (PRO, 9). Although "extermination was probably impracticable", there was a strong case for working towards that goal on arable and the better grazing land, and for seeking a drastic reduction elsewhere. In a submission to the Cabinet's Production Committee in October 1949, the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland supported a recommendation of the Working Party that legislation should be introduced, declaring the rabbit to be a pest wherever it occurred, and imposing controls over the activities of the commercial trapper. The Ministers' case was, however, fatally weakened by serious doubts as to whether there was sufficient public support for an extermination campaign to succeed. The Cabinet Committee expected there to be "strong opposition and resentment" against such drastic action in rural areas. The immediate needs of the situation could be met by powers already conferred on the Agricultural Executive Committees for destroying rabbits in those areas where damage was most severe (PRO, 10). Recognizing that ministers were not prepared to risk what they regarded as unnecessary unpopularity in the months leading up to a general election, Ministry officials decided to disband the Working Party and wait "until a more favourable moment, e.g. after the General Election". No public statement was required. Very few people outside the relevant Cabinet Committee and government departments knew of the discussions. 5. Voluntary clearance schemes
The initiatives for rabbit control, taken in the full glare of publicity, met with no greater success--after what seemed a promising start. At the instigation of the National Farmers Union, and following a similar and successful meeting in Scotland, the Ministry of Agriculture convened a conference in July 1950 "to consider ways and means of securing a rapid and progressive reduction in the rabbit population by voluntary cooperation of interested parties within the limits of present legal powers" (PRO, 11). From the chair, a Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture emphasized how farmers could not expect others to pay for getting rid of their pests. They would enjoy the profits from better crops. If they co-operated with one another, the unit costs of rabbit control would be reduced. For the Ministry, the outcome of the conference was highly satisfactory. The need for a drastic reduction in the rabbit population was endorsed. Supported by the Country Landowners Association, the National Farmers Union undertook to encourage its branches to initiate area-clearance schemes. The Agricultural Executive Committees were far less sanguine. Many doubted whether any real progress would be made until "some inducement or financial assistance was offered". By early 1951, only nine counties would report any significant moves to control the rabbit (PRO, 12). Meanwhile, a succession of mild winters had contributed to the rise in population to unprecedented levels. The Agricultural Executive Committee for West Suffolk described the position as "literally appalling despite the Committee's efforts to persuade and indeed direct owners and occupiers to take adequate control measures". By the summer of 1953, the Committees were again urged to "give a strong lead in organizing control measures" (PRO, 13). In October 1953, the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee accepted the contention of the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland that individual effort was not enough to keep numbers down, let alone exterminate, them. Powers were needed to force every owner and occupier to co-operate in destroying all the
J. Sheail
195
rabbits living or resorting on the land where infestation was so serious as to require a clearance scheme (PRO, 14). The Cabinet Committee was far less happy about the Minister's insistence that legislation should include powers enabling him to prohibit the use of the gin trap at some future date. While the Minister claimed such enabling powers would ensure support among the humanitarian organizations for the concept of statutory clearance areas, the Committee feared that the inclusion of "so thorny a topic" as the abolition of the gin trap would complicate an otherwise uncontroversial Bill. The Minister was asked to investigate whether the powers could be made the subject of a Private Member's Bill (PRO, 15). The outcome was further delay.
6. The gin trap Controversy over the humanitarian aspects of the gin trap had grown considerably during the post-war period. Under wartime regulations, open trapping had been permitted at the discretion of the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland. An average of 1500 permits was issued each year between 1941 and 1945 in England and Wales. Opposition to the granting of these permits became so strong that the clause to include the discretionary powers in the Agriculture Bill of 1947 was defeated at the Commons' Committee Stage by 29 to 4 votes (HC, 2). The opposition remained so strong that the Secretary of State for Scotland tabled an amendment to the Agriculture (Scotland) Bill of 1948, which had the effect of abolishing the use of the gin trap altogether (HC, 3). This in turn gave rise to so much concern among the farming industry that a further amendment was introduced and passed in the House of Lords, which allowed any type of trap approved by the Secretary of State to be used without restriction. Non-approved traps could only be used under permit, which would be withdrawn once adequate supplies of humane traps became available (HL, 4). Soon afterwards, the whole subject of trapping was reviewed by a Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals, appointed by the Home Secretary in response to a motion signed by 200 members of parliament. In a wide-ranging report of 1951, the Committee supported a policy of exterminating the rabbit by means of compulsory clearance orders. Although the gin trap was "a diabolical instrument which caused an incalculable amount of suffering", there seemed to be no alternative to open trapping as a means of eliminating rabbits in some types of terrain. The Committee therefore recommended that open trapping should be permitted under licence, provided the Government announced its intention of banning the use of all non-approved traps "within a short pe~'iod" (PRO, 16; Home Office, 1951). Both the Home Secretary and Minister of Agriculture regarded the contentious issues raised by the Committee as "political dynamite", particularly in view of the Labour Government's slender majority in parliament. There was room, in any case, for only one Ministry Bill in the congested legislative timetable, and preference had to be given to the introduction of greater safeguards for operatives in the use of toxic sprays on farmland. It was not until August 1952 that the Minister of Agriculture sought and obtained the consent of the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee of a new Conservative Government for an announcement to the effect that the sale and use of "non-approved" traps would be prohibited from a date still to be decided. Still the prospects for actual legislation seemed bleak, particularly after the Minister himself (Sir Thomas Dugdale) wrote a minute to his officials, highly critical of the new
196
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
Imbra humane trap, which had been a complete failure on Sir Thomas' property. No further initiatives could be taken until substantial supplies of the new trap were available for assessment by officers of the Ministry in all parts of the country (PRO, 17).
7. Myxomatosis The impasse that had developed in respect of introducing powers to designate statutory clearance areas, and to take steps to abolish the use of the gin trap, was not broken until late 1953, by which time an entirely new dimension had appeared in discussions on rabbit control, namely the outbreak of myxomatosis. Over the years, there had been many trials designed to find ways of introducing an epizootic disease into wild-rabbit populations, including two successful trials with the virus Myxomatosis cuniculi, in a compound erected at the Institute of Animal Pathology in Cambridge (Chick, 1956). A larger-scale trial on the rabbit-infested island of Skokholm, off the Pembrokeshire coast, in 1936-1938, had failed (Lockley, 1940). In an appraisal of December 1949, Grade advised against the conducting of further trials in Britain. Even if the disease spread over extensive areas of unenclosed land or small islands, "it would be unsuited to the physical conditions of land tenure in this country, and further would offend the public conscience as well as produce resistance from those more directly concerned in rabbit areas" (PRO, 18). The Ministry continued to counsel caution, even after the disease had been introduced, by inoculation, into the wild-rabbit population near Paris in June 1952, and had spread to nearly every French department a year later. It was far from certain whether there were suitable vectors for transmitting myxomatosis to all parts of Britain. There was, however, nothing "to prevent some enterprising but irresponsible person from getting hold of a supply of the virus", and experimenting for himself. If the disease became established, the domestic rabbit-industry would be threatened, and the unpleasant symptoms of myxomatosis "would doubtless provoke some public out-cry". Regional Pest Officers were asked "to keep their ears close to the ground for any whispers" (PRO, 19). In order to help the Ministry forecast what might happen in the event of an outbreak in Britain, a member of the Infestation Control Division, J. W. Evans, made a 3-day tour of France in late September 1953. Over 95% of the rabbits had died in some parts. Dr Armand Delille (who had originally introduced myxomatosis to France) told Evans that he had received many requests for supplies of the virus from persons in Britain. French experience indicated that there was no means of eradicating myxomatosis, once it became established (PRO, 20; NCC, 2). The first outbreak in Britain was reported from Edenbridge in Kent during October 1953, up to 3 weeks after dead and dying rabbits had been first noticed in the area. Local gossip, the time of year and the localized nature of the outbreak suggested that the disease had been introduced deliberately. The Ministry's veterinary officers discounted the idea of its being introduced by insect vectors or on the wheels of vehicles (PRO, 21; Armour and Thompson, 1955). At first, every effort was made to minimize the amount of publicity given to the outbreak. However, newspaper reports soon appeared and it became clear that public concern would only be allayed by indications that the Government had "all aspects of the matter in mind and in hand". A press statement was issued, describing the steps taken to contain the outbreak. The disease was not likely to spread until the warmer weather of spring. On the day the outbreak was confirmed, the Minister had approved
J. Sheail
197
the enclosure of the 200 acres of affected farmland with wire netting, and the eradication of the rabbits by personnel working under the Ministry's supervision. The occupiers of the land had given their consent, and 5000 yards of fencing were erected within 5 days. Water-bodies were sprayed with a larvacide in order to minimize the risk of the disease being spread by mosquitoes. From the first day of the outbreak, arrangements were set in motion for the appointment of a Myxomatosis Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, a Joint Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture. Intended to advise on what action should be taken in the event of further outbreaks, the Committee included the chairman of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Lord Merthyr) and the chairman of the earlier Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals (J. Scott Henderson). Before the Committee met, a further outbreak had been reported at Robertsbridge in East Sussex, about 25 miles from Edenbridge. Lord Carrington decided it was "just defensible" to try to stop this outbreak from spreading in view of the apparent success at Edenbridge and the need to give the Advisory Committee more time to consider a longer-term policy towards the disease (PRO, 22). Over the next 3 months, eight further occurrences were reported in an arc from Southwold in Suffolk to Lewes in Sussex. By mid-December 1953, the Advisory Committee had concluded that further attempts to contain the disease would be futile. By the following spring, it was clear that the virus could survive an English winter. In a report of March 1954, the Committee urged the farming industry to take every advantage of "this unique opportunity" to eliminate the rabbit pest (Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis, 1954). The implications of the disease for legislation were considerable. By the end of the summer, only five Scottish counties, and the Isle of Ely in England, remained free of the virus. The anticipated disappearance of 99% of the rabbits in Britain made irrelevant demands that compensation should be paid to those who suffered pecuniary losses as a result of the imposition of rabbit clearance orders. Likewise, the public's reluctance to eat any rabbits, lest they had been in contact with myxomatous animals, had virtually eliminated commercial trapping and the widespread use of the gin. 8. The Pests Act, 1954
Paradoxically, the destruction of so large a proportion of the rabbit population made statutory clearance areas even more necessary. Unless farmers made every effort "to back up the efforts of the virus by an energetic mopping-up campaign", the opportunity to eliminate the pest would be lost. The survival of even a very small number of rabbits would ensure that recovery and recolonization took place (HC, 4; Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis, 1955). A Pests Bill was introduced to parliament in January 1954, which enabled the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State for Scotland to designate rabbit clearance areas, where occupiers could be required to take reasonable steps to kill or remove all rabbits living on or resorting to their land. There was unanimous support for the measure. Members spoke of the need to enforce "effective action where co-operation is not otherwise obtainable". The statutory clearance orders would have the effect of reassuring the majority of farmers that the job of rabbit clearance was being borne fairly by all. As expected, most attention focused on the issue of the gin trap. Government spokesmen emphasized that "we are all agreed that the gin-trap is cruel and we all want
198
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
to abolish it; all that divides us is a matter o f timing". Because of the absence of "an adequate, efficient and humane alternative to the gin trap" being found, Ministers argued that they could go no further than to announce their intention of banning at some date after July 1958 the use of any spring trap not approved by them in consultation with interested parties. The postponement was vigorously attacked during the Bill's second reading in the House of Lords. Critics argued that the Government's "compromise" gave colour to the fallacious idea that trapping was an effective way of controlling rabbits, whereas it was only the commercial trapper who found the traps indispensible (HL, 5). During the Lords' Committee Stage of the Bill, Lord Elton moved an amendment, requiring Ministers to ban the sale and use of unapproved traps before July 1958. By laying down a deadline, Lord Elton believed industry would soon devise an adequate humane trap. Government spokesmen denied this. By the most optimistic forecast, it would take at least two seasons to develop and produce traps of a new design, and a further period to manufacture and test them. In the words of the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, "we cannot just look at it from the rabbit's point of view, however strongly we feel about the humane aspect; we must look at it from the farmers' point of view, too". These were the people who would have to carry out the statutory rabbit clearance orders (PRO, 23; HL, 6). Although Lord Elton's amendment was defeated by 42 to 22 votes, the Minister announced later in May 1954 that he had revised his own position. The use of spring traps would in effect be banned in England and Wales after July 1958, except where their design had been approved (HC, 5). The promotion of the Pests Bill was timely in another sense. It offered an obvious means o f making the wilful introduction of myxomatous rabbits illegal. The Myxomatosis Advisory Committee had condemned such a practice, but had warned of how it would be extremely difficult to prove that any person had knowingly taken steps to introduce the virus. The Committee argued that it was in no one's interests to make laws that could not be enforced (HC, 6). The advice was rejected by many of the speakers at the second reading of the Pests Bill. During the Committee Stage, Dr Horace King moved an amendment, whereby any person who knew, used, or permitted "'the use of a rabbit infected with myxomatosis to spread the disease among uninfected rabbits" would be guilty of an offence. Whilst the rabbit population should be controlled, a Geneva Convention was needed, making "bacteriological warfare" against the rabbit illegal (HC, 7). That morning, the Minister of Agriculture (Derek Heathcoat Amory) had sought the guidance of the Cabinet as to how he should respond to the amendment. With the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in the chair, ministers agreed that public opinion throughout the country was strongly opposed to the deliberate spreading of the disease, and that the clause "was likely to command a substantial body of support on both sides of the House" (PRO, 24). Some intimation of Churchill's attitude was conveyed in earlier correspondence, when he had protested to the Home Secretary and Minister of Agriculture that not enough attention was being given to the cruelty aspect. The Prime Minister was considering whether to send a subscription to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, earmarked for use in preventing the deliberate spread of myxomatosis (PRO, 25). It was also clear that the Secretary of State for Scotland had similarly "strong humanitarian sympathies". When his officials drafted a "neutral" response to a letter urging him to ban the deliberate spreading of myxomatosis in September 1954, he had added in manuscript a postscript, making it clear that he found the practice repulsive and would resist it strongly (PRO, 26).
J. Sheail
199
With the approval of the Cabinet, Heathcoat Amory informed the Commons' Committee that the Government accepted the amendment. The announcement led to the resignation of two members of the Myxomatosis Advisory Committee. One was the secretary of the National Farmers Union, Harold Woolley, who complained that the concession would be interpreted by the general public as an admission that farmers had been largely responsible for spreading the disease--a contention which the Union strongly repudiated. The other member, the Earl of Dundee, protested at the way the Government had completely disregarded "the carefully considered and unanimous advice" given by those "most qualified to advise the Government". In an exchange of letters, the Minister for his part stressed how, "where issues of major policy" were not involved, the Government must sometimes bow to the wishes of Parliament. Although farmers were not generally responsible for spreading the disease, there could be little doubt that some had done so--they had admitted as much to the press (PRO, 27). The protests were renewed when the time came for the House of Lords to consider the Commons' amendments. In a maiden speech, the Earl of Dundee described how farmers would be puzzled by the illogicality of a situation where they were encouraged to use poisons against the rat, but were "forbidden to spread a natural disease" that promised to rid the country of rabbits. Scientific evidence indicated that the myxomatous rabbit suffered less pain than that inflicted by any other method of control, except gassing. The animal continued, for example, to feed normally, although its eyes and cheeks were swollen by the disease. Support for the Earl of Dundee came from the wartime Minister of Agriculture, Viscount Hudson, who called upon the leaders of the Government, and especially those professing to be farmers, to cast aside sentimentality, and to explain to the British public the benefits of extending the epidemic (HL, 7). Another member of the Myxomatosis Advisory Committee, Lord Merthyr, also opposed the amendment, but warned the House that any rejection of the Commons' amendment would jeopardize the entire Bill. As the Joint Parliamentary Secretary reminded members, the House of Commons had "truly reflected a strong feeling in the country". Whatever the merits of rejecting the amendment, the Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords (Lord Salisbury) doubted whether they justified the taking of "a big step towards provoking a dispute between the two Houses". The motion to support the Commons' amendment was affirmed without division. The Pests Bill gained the Royal Assent in November 1954. 9. The impact of the rabbit
The lack of quantitative data on the extent of rabbit damage was highlighted during the early years of the Second World War. The only information available were the answers given by farmers to the "non-statistical and common-sense questions" put to them by the Ministry's 300 crop-reporters (PRO, 28). There was disagreement, even within the agricultural departments and their expert advisory bodies, as to how far crop losses might be attributed to the rabbit as opposed to the weather, poor seed or husbandry, or the depradations of insect and other types of pest (PRO, 29). Some impression of the scale of depradations emerged from field-plot trials and more extensive surveys made in north Hertfordshire and parts of East Anglia by officers of the National Agricultural Advisory Service. It was estimated that over s worth of winter corn were destroyed by rabbits during the season, 1949 1950 (PRO, 30; Gough and Dunnett, 1950). Meanwhile, a small informal committee had been formed to devise ways of identifying and assessing rabbit damage on a national scale. It was made up of
200
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
representatives of the Infestation Control Division, Plant Pathology Laboratory, the Ministry's Advisory Entomologists and the statistical department of the Rothamsted Experimental Station. A preliminary survey of damage to spring wheat in 1950 was based on a comparison of protected and unprotected plots on farms, selected at random. A year later, a much more extensive survey was made of damage to winter wheat in southern England and Wales, where 85 % of the crop was grown (PRO, 31). On the basis of data collected by the District Advisory Officers of the National Agricultural Advisory Service, the committee estimated that 6% of the total yield, representing the produce of 25 000 acres, was lost (PRO, 32; Church et al., 1953; Thompson and Worden, 1946). With its responsibilities for managing National Nature Reserves and advising on the conservation of wildlife generally, the Nature Conservancy was similarly keen to discover more about the impact of the rabbit on the countryside. A grant was awarded to Ronald Lockley to carry out detailed field surveys and to embark on "certain very simple experiments", as a prerequisite to tackling "the more complex questions" later. His first task was to make an extensive tour of France in December 1953, and then to visit those National Nature Reserves in Sussex, which were the first to be affected by myxomatosis (NCC, 3). A member of the Nature Conservancy committee, Professor F. W. Rogers-Brambell of the Department of Zoology at Bangor, wrote of how the "catastrophe" of myxomatosis would present "an extraordinary opportunity for fundamental ecological studies", as well as posing new and urgent problems for reserve-management. A meeting was held in June 1954 of representatives of the Conservancy and the Infestation Control Division. It was agreed that the Ministry of Agriculture should focus on the biological aspects of the disease and the behavioural response of the rabbit. The Nature Conservancy would concentrate on the botanical aspects, and provide grant aid for studies of the hare and buzzard (the predator most severely affected by the loss of rabbits) (Moore, 1957). The closely-cropped vegetation of several National Nature Reserves would be ideal for monitoring the effects of reduced rabbit-grazing. As early as February 1954, Dr A. S. Thomas, who was already engaged on a grassland survey for the Conservancy, was instructed to devote his full time to the vegetation of the chalk areas, as a means of assessing "the ecological role of the rabbit" (NCC, 4). In a report to the Cabinet's Natural Resources (Technical) Committee in July 1955, Thomas recounted how the changes consequent on the disappearance of the rabbit were being recorded by means of almost 11 000 point quadrats or transects at various sites, mainly on the chalk. A comparison of the records made in the spring and early summer of 1954 and 1955 indicated that the turf was up to 2 inches higher in sheltered hollows. There was a slight increase in species numbers and a better cover of the ground. Some of the more palatable grasses were found in places where they had not been recorded in 1954. Not only had there been more grass-growth during the summer of 1955, but Thomas expected a comparison of the autumn records to reveal even greater changes. Whereas the Lullington Down National Nature Reserve had been purple with a mass of closely-grazed heather 2 years previously, it was now dull brown. Fruiting grasses obscured the flowering heather (NCC, 5; Thomas, 1960). It took time for the full implications of these floristic changes to be appreciated. An article published in the N e w Statesman for June 1954 was one of many to take a rather simplistic view of what was happening. The author looked forward to the day when the only surviving rabbits would be confined behind wired bars in a zoo. The article drew a response from Dr J. F. Hope-Simpson, a grassland botanist at Bristol University, who argued that a great deal of urgent thought and planning was required if the loss of the
J. Sheail
201
rabbit was to prove entirely beneficial to farming. Hope-Simpson wrote of how a lot of rabbit-grazing occurred on grasslands where, because of steepness and other factors, the chief use of the land was likely to remain rough grazing. Unless more sheep or cattle were depastured, the ground would become dominated by coarse grass, scrub or bracken. It was impossible to dispense with herbivores and keep the pasture. Once established, scrub was difficult to remove, especially from steep slopes, and it was impossible to eradicate tor g r a s s - - " a n aggressive pest of downland". If the spread of "downland of scrubby aspect and negligible value" was to be avoided, an agricultural policy was required, which would promote a return to "the traditional regularity of hill grazing" (NCC, 6; Harvey, 1954; Hope-Simpson, 1954).
10. The species network
Ecologists have always emphasized the interdependence of living organisms. Each species formed part of a food chain or cycle; each affected the living space of the other. The term "species network" was coined to describe the interlocking system. It was, however, not until myxomatosis virtually destroyed the rabbit population that the full impact of the species on the farming and semi-natural environments was appreciated. It was a salutary lesson on the need for closer surveillance and understanding of what was happening, if farm and woodland, and nature reserves, were to be managed costeffectively. The history of the rabbit also highlights how little control owners and occupiers may have over their holdings. The distinctions commonly drawn between wild and domestic animals, or between beneficial and pest species, can be extremely misleading. It was rarely possible to manage rabbits solely for their meat and fur, or for sport. Some rabbits would always leave the warren or game-covert, and damage crops. Conversely, no rabbit-control programme could overlook the importance of the rabbit as a source of food and income--often to those charged with its eradication. The confused and ambivalent attitude towards the species was illustrated by debates over gassing and the implementation of campaigns to exterminate the animal. As the outcry over cruelty and the artificial spreading of myxomatosis demonstrated, the fate of the rabbit was not something to be decided solely by those working on the land. The history of pest control, and the handling of such issues as cruelty, may provide relevant insights into the more general development of concepts in environmental management during the present century. The choice of options in wildlife management has always been severely circumscribed by a lack of understanding of intra- and interspecies relationships and habitat requirements, and, perhaps at least as significantly, by the constraints imposed by prevailing social and cultural attitudes towards the stewardship of land and natural resources. Within the archival material on the management of individual species and semi-natural plant and animal communities, an abundance of material will be found on the relative importance of these two types of constraint, and their complex interplay in determining the course of action taken by decision-makers.
Dr H. V. Thompson kindly commented on an early draft of this paper. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the fac~hties extended to me by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and by the Nature Conservancy Council, and the assistance given by the Cambridge University Library and Public Record Office.
202
Changing attitudes to wild rabbits in Britain
References
Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis (1954). Myxomatosis. London: HMSO. Advisory Committee on Myxomatosis (1955). Second Report on Myxomatosis. London: HMSO. Anonymous (1939). The control of rabbits. Journal of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 46, 588-592. Armour, C. J. and Thompson, H. V. (1955). Spread of myxomatosis in the first outbreak in Great Britain. Annals of Applied Biology 43, 511-518. Bailey, M. (1988). The rabbit and the medieval East Anglian economy. Agrtcultural History Review 36, 1-20. Buckley, W. H. (1935). Report on a solution of the rabbit problem: cyanide gassing. Veterinary Journal 91, 210~15. Chick, H. (1956). Charles James Martin 1866-1955. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 2, 173~08. Church, B. M., Jacob, F. H. and Thompson, H. V. (1953). Surveys of rabbit damage to wheat in England and Wales, 1950-1952. Plant Pathology 2, 107 112. Elton, C. (1954). Research on rodent control by the Bureau of Animal Population. In Control of Rats andMice (D. Chitty and H. N. Southern, eds) pp. 1-24. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gough, H. C. and Dunnett, F. W. (1950). Rabbit damage to winter corn. Agriculture 57, 374-378. HC Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons: 1. Standing Committee, 1947-1948, vol. 1. 2. Standing Committee, 1947-1948, vol. 1. 3. Vol. 450, columns 485-90 and 501. 4. Vol. 531, columns 1502-1509. 5. Vol. 528, columns 39-40 and 531, columns 1502 1558 and 1265-1303. 6. Vol. 531, columns 1502-1508. 7. Vol. 532, columns 1308-1317. HL Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords: I. Vol. 97, columns 8 4 8 . 2. Vol. 100, columns 1061 1066. 3. Vol. 111, columns 319-345. 4. Vol. 156, columns 722 732 and 969-973. 5. Vol. 185, columns 414-435 and 444-473. 6. Vol. 185, columns 113%1192. 7. Vol. 189, columns 1749-1787. Harvey, N. (1954). Killing rabbits. New Statesman 4% 723. Home Office (1951). Report of the Committee on Cruelty to Wild Animals. Parliamentary Papers, 195(~1951, VIII, Cmd 8266. Hope-Simpson, J. F. (1954). Myxomatosls. New Statesman 47, 788. House of Lords (19367). Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Agriculture (Damage by Rabbits). Sessional Papers, IV. London: HMSO. Hume, C. W. (1939). Instructions for dealing with rabbits. UFA W Monograph and Report, 4E. Hume, C. W. (1958). The gin trap: UFAW's long battle. The UFAW Courier 15, 1-10. Hume, C. W. (1962). Man and Beast. London: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare. Institute of Animal Health (1989) Annual Report. Compton, Newbury: Institute of Animal Health (Agricultural and Food Research Council). Lockley, R. M. (1940). Some experiments in rabbit control. Nature (London) 145, 767 769. Middleton, A. D. (1942). The Control and Extermination of Wild Rabbits. Oxford: Bureau of Animal Population. Moore, N. W. (1957). The past and present status of the buzzard in the British Isles. British Birds 50, 173 197. Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) archives: 1. S1, vol. 1. 2. SI/I, vol. 1. 3. F 210 & Sl, vol. 1. 4. S1/1, vol. 2. 5. S1/1, vol. 2. 6. S1/1, vol. 2. Phillips, W. M. (1955a). The effect of commercial trapping on rabbit populations. Annals of Applied Biology 43, 247 257. Phillips, W. M. (1955b). An experiment in rabbit control. Annals of Applied Biology 43, 258~64. Phillips. W. M., Stephens, M. N. and Worden, A. N. (1952). Observations on the rabbit in west Wales. Nature (London) 169, 869-70. Public Record Office (PRO): 1. M A F 44, 19. 2. MAF 44, 20 and 21. 3. MAF 44, 18. 4. M A F 44, 32.
J. Sheail
203
5. CAB 124, 1094. 6. CAB 124, 1096. 7. MAF 131, 2 and 39. 8. MAF 130, 80 and 131, 2. 9. MAF 132, 39. 10. CAB 134, 640, 11. MAF 131, 5. 12. MAF 131, 5. 13. MAF 130, 80 and 131, 2, 5 and 19. 14. CAB 134, 914. 15. CAB 134, 912. 16. MAF 131, 3. 17. MAF 130, 67. 18. MAF 13l, 2. 19. MAF 131, 2 and 19. 20. MAF 191, 145. 21. MAF 131, 12. 22. MAF 131, 13. 23. MAF 131, 28. 24. CAB 128, 27/2. 25. PREM 11,585. 26. MAF 131, 22. 27. MAF 131, 14. 28. MAF 44, 33. 29. MAF 191, 143. 30. MAF 191, 144. 31. MAF 191,48. 32. MAF 131, 19. Sharpe, R. (1918). The taking of wild rabbits. Journal of the Board of Agriculture 25, 281-298 and 435-444. Sheail, J. (1971). Rabbits and their History. Newton Abbot: David and Charles. Sheil, J, (1976). Land improvement and reclamation: the experiences of the First World War m England and Wales. Agricultural History Review 24, 110-125. Sheail, J. (1978). Rabbits and agriculture in post-medieval England. Journal of Historical Geography 4, 343-55. Sheail, J. (1984). Nature reserves, national parks, and post-war reconstruction m Britain Environmental Conservation 11, 29-34. Southern, H. N. (I 940). The ecology and population dynamics of the wild rabbit. Annals of Applied Biology 27, 509-526. Stephens, M. N. (1952). Seasonal observations on the wild rabbits in west Wales. Proceedings of the Zoological Society of London 122. 417-344. Thomas, A. S. (1960). Changes in the vegetation since the advent of myxomatosls. Journal of Ecology 48, 287 306. Thompson, H. V. and Worden, A. N. (1956). The Rabbit. London: Collins.