The politics of indigenous land rights in Brazil

Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 461}478

The politics of indigenous land rights in Brazil Georgia O. Carvalho* Woods Hole Research Center, Woods Hole, MA 02543, USA

Abstract Brazilian indigenous rights policy has been exclusionary. As a result indigenous people and their supporters have mobilised and politicised indigenous issues. Politicisation led to inclusion of indigenous rights in the 1988 Constitution. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that this process led to a retrenchment of interests opposed to indigenous rights. This analysis compares the asymmetric access to the policy-formation process granted to political and economic interests and indigenous people. The argument is that democratisation has yet to open the policymaking process to disenfranchised groups such as indigenous people. To illustrate the argument evidence of setbacks to indigenous land rights is examined.  2000 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Indigenous land rights; Indigenous policy; Brazil; Policy formation

1. Introduction The rights of indigenous peoples to their lands in Brazil has always been contentious despite its importance as a human rights issue. In addition, the demarcation of indigenous lands is also of environmental relevance since indigenous areas cover approximately 20 per cent of Amazonia are virtually the only areas e!ectively protected from frontier expansion pressures (Schwartzman, Nepstad & Moreira, 2000). Brazil's failure to establish indigenous land rights stems partly from the long held integrationism that has guided indigenous policies in Brazil and partly from ingrained political and economic interests that run contrary to those of indigenous

* Corresponding author.  Field research for this project was partly funded by the Institute for the Study of World Politics. I would like to thank Steven Mumme, Kathryn Hochstetler and Maria Guadalupe Rodrigues for their comments on previous versions, and the Woods Hole Research Center for making the time available to complete this project. 0261-3050/00/$20.00  2000 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 3 0 5 0 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 3 2 - 2

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peoples (Ribeiro, 1975, 1977; Vidal, 1986; Carneiro da Cunha, 1992; Davis, 1977; Ramos, 1998). Consequently, the political and policy environments in Brazil have by and large excluded indigenous peoples and their interests from participating in the policy process (Vidal, 1986; Ferraz & Ladeira, 1991). The resulting indigenous policy has been discriminatory and exclusionist and as such has led to resistance on the part of indigenous people and their supporters and to politicisation of the land rights issues since the end of the authoritarian regime. Some progress on indigenous land rights was made when the 1988 Constitution came into e!ect. One of its innovations was the inclusion of several articles on indigenous rights. The constitutional text, in principle, gave new direction to indigenous policy. For the "rst time, the integrationism of previous policies, and the asymmetrical basis of the relationship between indigenous people and the state were removed from the text of the law. Brazil was not alone in changing its legal treatment of indigenous people. Given the democratisation processes in the region, many Latin American countries experienced simultaneously a rebirth of political activism (including for the recognition of indigenous rights) and a wave of constitution (re)writing during the 1980s. It has been suggested in the literature that the coincidence of these processes resulted in many cases in a renegotiation of relations between indigenous peoples and the state (Van Cott, 1998, p. 3; Stavenhagen, 1992; Yashar, 1996). However, unlike other Latin American countries, in Brazil, the inclusion of indigenous rights in the 1988 Constitution resulted in neither political inclusion of indigenous groups, nor in improved access for indigenous people to the policy process. Rather, what can be observed is that, especially in regard to the demarcation of indigenous lands, Brazilian policy has failed to reach the standards set in the 1988 Constitution. Instead, there has been a recrudescence of interests that run contrary to those of indigenous peoples, and a backlash against gains made in the Constitution. The process of indigenous policy formation in Brazil remains, in practice, similar to what it was like during less democratic times. One emblematic example of this political backlash su!ered by indigenous peoples was the enactment of decree 1775 in early 1996, which opened up for revision and legal challenge the limits of previously recognised and demarcated indigenous areas and changed the demarcation method. The reasons why indigenous land rights have remained mostly on paper in Brazil are quite complex as the result of multifarious interactions between several historical, political and institutional variables. This analysis seeks to further explore the e!ects of the unequal access to the insulated policy process on indigenous land rights policy formation enjoyed by speci"c political and economic actors that have had clientelistic ties to the state. The argument developed here is that in spite of the democratic opening, social sectors traditionally excluded from policy making, such as indigenous  Among the Latin American countries that have rewritten or approved constitutional reforms since 1984 are Argentina, Bolivia Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.  For a summary of the decree and its immediate e!ects see http://linux.soc.uu.se/&jorge/fakta/ brazil.htm.

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people, have made very modest political advances. To illustrate the argument, the article presents evidence that many of the gains made by indigenous people in the 1988 Constitution were included in the political and policy agenda mainly because a coalition of indigenous rights activists politicised the issue, but such a politicisation has led to controversy and setbacks.

2. An overview of the policy process in Brazil The policy process in Brazil during the authoritarian period could be characterised as a closed process largely controlled by the state and allied sectors of civil society with access to state bureaucracy (Schmitter, 1971; Evans, 1979). This closed process was often a series of stages varying from inclusion of the issue in the agenda to drafting of legislation (mainly) by state agencies, to enactment of decrees. Barring the relatively small variations depending upon the substantive character of the issues and the institutional actors participating in the process, there was little else to the policy process during the military regime. Such a bureaucratic process often limited access points and precluded participation from social sectors traditionally excluded from the policy process. The same policy process gave disproportionate access to sectors that were closely allied to or had clientelistic ties to the state, including sectors of national economic elite and international economic interests. Given that the democratic transition in Brazil was gradual and did not lead to abrupt changes in the nature of institutional actors, one of the main characteristics of that post-transition period has been the remarkable continuity found in the policy process both in terms of formation and implementation (Hagopian, 1996, 1990; Graham, 1993). That, in many cases, has meant that for disenfranchised groups to participate in the policy process, it is often necessary to intensely politicise the issues at stake by stirring public debate and polarising public opinion. This strategy of politicisation through public opinion polarisation and temporary mobilisation usually grants access to new actors into a formerly closed policy subsystem. Nevertheless, due to the traditionally insulated and bureaucratic character of the policy process in Brazil * and the lack of demand for accountability still enjoyed by the state apparatus * the inclusion of the politicised issues on the national agenda may be only temporary for two reasons. First, once the question is out of the public eye, it is relatively easy for institutional or politically strong actors to revert to previous policy patterns. And it is very di$cult to keep one issue permanently on the public arena given the cyclical nature of public attention (Downs,  Politicisation here refers to the process whereby actors excluded from the policy process, or with limited access to the policy making, try to increase their ability to shape the policy process by bringing the closed access policy pattern to the public arena * by stirring public debate and/or by polarising public opinion and mobilising related constituencies in favour of a certain position on the issue * rather than by trying to gain access to the normal channels of the bureaucratic policy process or by building alliances or clientelistic ties with traditional participants in the policy process.  By clientelism I mean a relationship of patronage where there is an exchange of favours for political support between public authorities and members (or sectors) of society.

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1972; Kingdon, 1984). Second, such an approach may create an adversarial relationship between its proponents and the institutional actors historically involved in policy making, thus generating a backlash that may lead to a reversal of gains made in previous stages (Graham, 1993; Carvalho, 1998). These considerations make the strategy of `politicise and increase awarenessa of questionable long-term e!ectiveness in many cases. On the other hand, the closed nature of the policy process in Brazil allows few, if any, alternatives for social sectors seeking to in#uence policy formation (Lemos, 1998; Guimara es, 1991). Policy formation in regard to indigenous land rights closely mirrors the pattern above described. While the policy process a!ords little access to the coalition representing indigenous interests, the coalitions of actors that are opposed to the expansion of indigenous land rights enjoy disproportionate access to the policy process. For instance the military, conservative nationalists, landed elite and mining interests are much better represented in Congress and have made their views heard during the policy formation stage (Ferraz & Ladeira, 1991; Albert, 1992; Ribeiro, 1977; Van Cott, 1995; Maybury-Lewis, 1996). One of the prominent actors shaping indigenous rights policy outcomes has been a coalition of anti-indigenous land rights headed by entrenched economic, security and economic interests. The interests of this coalition have been brokered by the state, since many of the actors have strong historical ties with the state. In spite of the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights to their traditional lands in the 1988 Constitution, what has ensued in terms of policy formation is an asymmetrical struggle between economic, landed and nationalist interests on the one hand, and the less powerful pro-indigenous rights interests on the other.

3. Historic roots of indigenous policy in Brazil Brazil's historical treatment of its indigenous population, contrasting with other Latin American countries, has been discriminatory and marginalising. For instance, until the 1988 Constitution Brazilian law treated indigenous people as minors. Moreover, the Brazilian state has historically failed to guarantee and enforce the rights of indigenous peoples as they exist on paper. This is partly due to the belief long held by many involved in the processes of formulation and implementation of indigenous policy that `Indians would become civilised, Christian and Brazilian,a like everyone else, and would be `integrated slowly and harmoniouslya to the remainder of the nation (Vidal, 1986, p. 223; Ramos, 1998; Carneiro da Cunha, 1992; Ribeiro, 1975) and partly because politically strong economic and security interests that compete with indigenous peoples for land rights have been able to dominate this policy arena. The discrimination against indigenous people began in colonial times and has permeated the historical relationship between the state and indigenous people in Brazil. For instance, the creation of the Indian Protection Service (SPI, Servic7 o de  For a discussion of the legal treatment of indigenous people in other Latin American countries see Ribeiro (1975), Stavenhagen (1990), Drzewieniecki (1996), and Van Cott (1995, 1998).

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Protec7 a o ao ID ndio), in 1910 was prompted by a series of international allegations of genocide of the Brazilian indigenous peoples (Mendes Junior, 1912). Between 1910 and 1967, the SPI carried out indigenous policy in Brazil, but it su!ered from such corruption that it met its demise and was replaced by the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI, Fundac7 a o Nacional do ID ndio) (Vidal, 1991; Branford & Glock, 1985). FUNAI was created in 1967, at the height of the authoritarian regime, and emerged as a centralised agency placed under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry and the National Security Council and sta!ed primarily by military personnel and appointed executives with no previous anthropological experience (Carneiro da Cunha, 1987; Vidal, 1991). As an agency linked to the Interior Ministry and the National Security Council the policy direction openly pursued accelerated integration and `emancipationa of the indigenous communities into the national fabric, and the integration of their lands into the expanding national economic frontier. Besides its integrationism, FUNAI's treatment of indigenous issues re#ected many of the clientelistic interests associated with the state. Throughout the authoritarian period the formation of indigenous policy in Brazil re#ected a predominance of strategic, security and economic interests (Albert, 1992; Treece, 1990; Allen, 1992; Ramos, 1998). For instance, by placing FUNAI under the control of the National Security Council, the state signalled that security concerns were the priority in indigenous policy. The security preoccupation stemmed from the fact that the military and other nationalist sectors viewed the Amazon as a demographic vacuum, an area vulnerable to foreign interests * that needed to be integrated, socially and economically into the country (ESG, 1989; Cavalcanti, 1999). This position was re#ected in the Calha Norte Program, although this project headed by the army was implemented in the post-authoritarian period, it sought to combine security and indigenous policy (Allen, 1992; Hecht & Cockburn, 1989). Besides the security aspect, indigenous legislation of the military period also re#ected the ability of land-owning elites and the mining sector to shape indigenous policy. Acquiescing to both landed and security interests law 6001/1973 (also known as the Statute of the Indian) added several steps to the process of indigenous land demarcation and consequently slowed down the process. Later, decree 88/118 of 11 February 1983 set even more stringent criteria for demarcation and allowed other state agencies to review the boundaries, and if necessary revise them according to their convenience. This law also required exclusion of the presence of white settlers, towns and farms from the demarcation, thus legitimising the previously illegal practice of indigenous land grabbing. The result was that implementation became such an  In that regard see FUNAI's own website at http://www.funai.gov.br/periodo}1.html.  Because demarcation of indigenous areas is an issue associated with land reform and that takes on a redistributive aspect, it has historically met with opposition from land-owning elite in Brazil, especially in Amazonia.  According to the statute and its companion law (decree 76/999, regulating the procedure), the demarcation process would go from FUNAI to the Presidency where it would be `validateda (approved), and then registered with the Federal Patrimonial Service (Servic7 o de Patrimo( nio da Unia o, SPU) and the Real Estate Registry (CartoH rio de Registro ImobiliaH rio, CRI) of the municipality in which the indigenous area was located.

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arduous process that by 1985 only 14 per cent of lands were demarcated (Ramos, 1998; Alonso, 1994; Vidal, 1986). Sectors of the mining industry played a strong role in de"ning the content of decree 88.988 of 1983 which e!ectively opened indigenous lands to mining companies, both state and private (Comissa o ProH -ID ndio, 1985). Although this decision ran against the Statute of the Indian, the state justi"ed its actions by saying that `there were not enough reasons to justify non-exploration of the rich mineral reserves, fundamental to the national security and development process, just because they were located inside indigenous areasa (MinisteH rio do Interior/MinisteH rio das Minas e Energias, 1983). Nevertheless, the Brazilian Geological Society manifested its opposition in a press release, stating `the mineral reserves in indigenous lands are neither essential to the country nor large enough in volume to justify the decree2mining in indigenous lands can only be explained by greed2allowing mining in indigenous areas is irresponsible and threatens the survival of these nationsa. 4. Mobilisation of an indigenous rights coalition and the 1988 Constitutional advances The biased policy pattern that predominated during the authoritarian period led to resistance by indigenous people. Beginning the late 1970s, indigenous people had slowly started to organise and articulate their perspective. In 1979, the Union of Indigenous Nations (UNI) was created as an organisation to articulate their perspective. At the same time, several national organisations embraced the indigenous cause, among them the Brazilian Anthropological Association (ABA), the Brazilian Society for Scienti"c Progress (SBPC), the Human Rights Committee of the OAB (Brazil's lawyers' association), the Pro-Indian Commission (CPI), the Indigenous Working Group (CTI) and the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI) which is linked to the Catholic Church. These organisations began defending indigenous rights (Vidal, 1986). In addition, a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political actors, especially leftist politicians sympathetic to human rights participated in a proindigenous coalition. Around the same time, several international NGOs became involved in the indigenous cause. Among them were the Natural Resources Defence Council, Environmental Defence Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Policy Institute, Survival International and Oxfam (Rodrigues, 1996; Posey, 1989; Carneiro da Cunha, 1989).  Examples of domestic companies that bene"ted from this measure are AcaramH , a subsidiary of Paranapanema, Petromisa, and Minerac7 a o Monte Negro. International mining interests also bene"ted, for example US Steel, Alcan Aluminum and Bethlehem Steel, Anglo American and British Petroleum were granted mining rights (Davis, 1977).  CONAGE/CEDI (1984), Nota conjunta da coordenac7 a o nacional dos geoloH gos e da Sociedade Brasileira de Geologia, cited in Comissa o ProH -ID ndio (1985).  JoseH Lutzenberger, Betty Mindlin, Darcy Ribeiro and Fernando Gabeira were among those who lent support.  Some of the key "gures in this coalition were Bruce Rich of the Natural Resources Defence Council, Steve Schwartzman of the Environmental Defence Fund, Barbara Bramble from the National Wildlife Federation, and Brent Blackwelder from the Environmental Policy Institute, according to Rodrigues (1996).

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The support from these well-known national and international groups, as well as the international environmental campaign that ensued had the e!ect of bringing international attention to the plight of indigenous people in Brazil (especially in the Amazon) and along with it international pressure, placing the issue on the policy agenda. But this also had the e!ect of politicising the issue of indigenous rights and led to a nationalist backlash. At "rst, the coalition of pro-indigenous e!orts reinforced the strength of the indigenous movement. Feeling strengthened by the attention directed at the indigenous cause by this coalition, some indigenous groups, tired of waiting for a change in indigenous policy and for government to solve their urgent problems, with land grabbers, gold prospectors and miners invading their lands, took action in protest (Carneiro da Cunha, 1989; Posey, 1989). Over time the coalition with environmentalists and international organisations became a `domestic liabilitya for indigenous peoples as this alliance fuelled a counter-mobilisation among the actors who had historically dominated indigenous policy formation and who had already bene"ted, or expected to bene"t, from limiting indigenous rights (Conklin & Graham, 1995; Carneiro da Cunha, 1992). A number of powerful anti-indigenous lobbies with access to Congress and the federal government sought to keep control of the indigenous policy formation process. Among the actors in this counter coalition were the landed elite, mining sector, and conservative nationalists, including the military (Conklin & Graham, 1995; Kolk, 1996; Albert, 1992). The position taken by these actors was that `indigenous people were being told by international interests and the Catholic Church to request larger and richer areasa in order to undermine the national interest (SaH Correa, 1993, pp. 76}88). These groups de"ned as their goal the end of abuse of their rights by indigenous people. The activities of the anti-indigenous interests escalated into a defamation campaign led by some conservative news organisations "rst in 1987 and again in 1991 (CEDI/Museu Nacional, 1988; CIMI, 1991). Both times the campaigns ended up as unsubstantiated accusations, founded on rather thin evidence. Not by coincidence, the "rst series of articles was published in August and September 1987, as the discussion of the constitutional articles on indigenous land rights was taking place. The attempt by security based, nationalist and economic interests to in#uence the constitutional process on indigenous land rights can be divided into two main policy advocacy coalitions. First, representing the interests of the domestic and international mining sector, was a politically strong lobby led by the Association of Amazon Entrepreneurs (AEA), the Brazilian Mining Institute (IBRAM). This lobby's main  Among the organised lobbies in this alliance were the powerful Legal Amazonia Gold-Miners Trade Union (Unia o Sindical dos Garimpeiros da Amazo( nia Legal), the Timber Importers and Exporters Association (Associac7 a o dos Importadores e Exportadores de Madeira), the Maranha o Cattle Ranchers Association (Associac7 a o dos Criadores de Gado do Maranha o), the Association of Amazon Entrepreneurs (Associac7 a o dos EmpresaH rios da Amazo( nia * AEA), the Democratic Ruralist Union (Unia o DemocraH tica Ruralista * UDR).  See the document signed by M. Nogueira, printed in O Estado de SaJ o Paulo in 1987 which was written by an employee of the Paranapanema mining company (Nogueira, 1987).  Among the mining conglomerates represented by IBRAM were Paranapanema and British Petroleum/Brascan and Anglo-American/Bozano Simonsen (Kolk, 1996, pp. 97}98).

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interest was in opening indigenous lands to mining (Kolk, 1996). Second, there were the nationalist interests associated with the indigenous defamation campaigns. Representing the interests of the traditional oligarchy, the Ruralist Democratic Union (UDR) was in favour of restricting indigenous rights, especially land rights, but given their nationalist inclinations they preferred to limit economic exploration rights in indigenous lands to national companies (Kolk, 1996, pp. 99}106). Also supporting this coalition of forces opposing expansion of indigenous rights was the military. The dominant perception among the armed forces in Brazil is that indigenous people have `too much land, which they do not needa and, moreover, the land remains unproductive thus not contributing to national development. Not only was this the prevailing attitude of the armed forces during the military regime, but it has persisted under civilian rule as well. Opposed to these economic and nationalist/security coalitions, a third current involved in the de"nition of indigenous land rights in the constitutional process was an indigenous rights advocacy coalition called Indigenous Rights in the Constitutional Assembly (Direitos IndmH genas na Constituinte). Important actors in this coalition were the above-mentioned indigenous people's associations UNI, CAPOIB and COIAB, professional and scienti"c associations, and human and indigenous rights organisations (including CIMI, CPI, CTI, Oxfam and Cultural Survival) which drafted several of the proposed articles. Besides, a broad movement in defence of citizenship rights entitled Action for Citizenship (Ac7 a o Pela Cidadania), embraced the indigenous rights cause as well, especially senator Severo Gomes, who became a vocal defender of the cause. The main goal of this coalition was to include the protection of indigenous rights in the constitution (land and cultural protection, as well as protection of indigenous people as minorities with recognised rights). The strategy adopted by the coalition was to politicise the issue and gain the support of civil society. Although the nationalist reaction was strong and well articulated, the campaign split the centre-right block (known as CentraJ o). This was partly because outside the more conservative, nationalist block and those with ties to regional oligarchies in the Amazon (or with ties to the mining/timber industry), the moderate centre and centre-left sectors of Congress supported the indigenous coalition and ensured the inclusion of indigenous rights in the constitution (Viola & Nickel, 1994; Kolk, 1996). The 1988 Constitution thus gave indigenous people substantial rights as compared to the previously existing legislation. Articles 231 and 232 of the constitution recognised indigenous people's rights to their own social and cultural organisation and more importantly, recognised the right to demarcation of `traditionally indigenous landsa.  Documents show the continuing suspicion of indigenous people held by the military establishment. The `Estrutura do Poder Nacional para o Ano 2001a, a background paper for presidential candidates in 1989, classi"ed indigenous lands as enclaves and considered them `obstacles to the permanent national interests in Amazo( niaa (ESG, 1989).  The "rst paragraph of article 231 de"nes as indigenous lands those `traditionally occupied by indigenous people in permanent fashion, those utilised for productive activities, those necessary to the preservation of natural resources on which they depend, and those necessary to their well}being, and physical and cultural reproduction, according to their habits and traditiona (Brasil, 1988, p. 150). Also articles 20, 22, 67, 109, 129, 176 and 210 make reference to rights of indigenous peoples.

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The Constitution also stipulated a period of "ve years for the demarcation of all indigenous lands. The pro-indigenous rights coalition's apparent victory was due to the fact that the issue was politicised and brought into the public arena with support from domestic and international advocacy groups. Both the character of the policy process in Brazil (closed to disenfranchised groups) and the character of indigenous rights issue itself contributed to this politicisation. Politicisation was probably the only viable option for the pro-indigenous interests to bring the issues to light given their lack of access to conventional bureaucratic politics in Brazil. However, these e!orts led to further complications insofar as they tapped into historical associations with security concerns, land tenure patterns and resource control issues, thus leading to continued opposition by sectors of the military, landed elite and mining and timber sectors in the period that followed.

5. Indigenous land rights policy formation since 1988 Politicisation of indigenous rights and its debate in a public arena had the side e!ect of creating a polemic around the issue and eventually provoked a political backlash. As a result, the process of policy formation became a veritable political tug of war between economic, landed and nationalist/security interests on one side and a waning pro-indigenous rights coalition on the other. The battle has taken place mainly in Congress, and more recently through the executive branch, and has sought to reverse the rights conquered by indigenous people in the 1988 Constitution. This section traces the main actors involved in the attempts to reshape indigenous land rights policy. The main sources of the backlash against indigenous land rights are the same as before. The conservative nationalist sectors and the armed forces base their argument on a perceived threat to national security. Their continued e!orts to reformulate the main tenets of indigenous land rights policy by these sectors were present in the 1990}1991 campaign denouncing indigenous people and their allies as agents of `imperialisma. Similar to the campaign launched in 1987 during the constitutional discussion on indigenous rights, it reached the national press at the height of the international publicity about the Yanomami, and purported to defend national interests from an alleged alliance between indigenous people and international corporations interested in mineral resources in Amazonia (US Congress, 1993; Kolk, 1996). This e!ort was led primarily by local and national conservative politicians and the military who charged that President Collor's attempt to demarcate the Yanomami area in the state of Roraima was an international plot to keep Brazilian tin from  Brazilian Constitution, Transitional Dispositions, Article 67 (Brasil, 1988).  The international pressure came as the news of the Yanomami genocide reached the world press in 1990, mobilising a transnational network which focused its e!orts on the plight of the Yanomami after the news of the genocide. Many of the actors in the network were the same as in previous indigenous rights campaigns: Steve Schwartzman, David Treece, Bruce Rich and Darrell Posey.

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reaching the international market. The demarcation of the Yanomami area went ahead and eventually the campaign died down, but the nationalist e!orts denouncing foreign meddling in internal a!airs and the negative attitude towards indigenous issues among these sectors of society persisted. Related to that campaign, these sectors started a strong (and on-going) lobby for the annulment of the demarcation of the Yanomami area and for the revision of the criteria for indigenous land demarcation in Brazil. Besides the lobbying e!orts, sectors opposing indigenous land rights have presented their arguments in Congress through several bills aimed at rede"ning the rights of indigenous communities to land, especially land near national borders (Mestrinho, 1999; Cavalcanti, 1999). Strong opposition to indigenous land rights as established by the constitution continued to come from landed elite (represented in congress chie#y by the `Bancada Ruralistaa and the `Bancada Amazonicaa * Rural and Amazon Blocks). The interests of landed elite have been well represented in Congress, and national politics in general, and since it counts with the support of politically powerful groups such as the Democratic Ruralist Union (UDR), these interests have in#uenced the indigenous policy formation process since 1988. These actors presented several proposals for the rede"nition of indigenous land rights in the Constitutional reform e!ort of 1993 and 1994. Overall, approximately 70 reform bills have been introduced by this sector proposing rede"nition of indigenous land rights, limiting the size of indigenous areas and revising the criteria for demarcation. Alongside land-owning elite, the mining sector actively participated in the recent attempts to reshape indigenous land policy in Brazil. The main policy goal of this  Among those involved in this nationalist campaign were former president JoseH Sarney (currently a senator representing the state of AmapaH ), the then governor of Roraima, Brigadier Ottomar Pinto, senators Romero JucaH and Mozarildo Cavalcanti and the local chapter of the UDR, as well as several local mining entrepreneurs. See CIMI (1991), Damasceno (1994), and Kolk (1996).  This lobby was led by members of the armed forces, including the Secretary of Strategic A!airs of the Presidency (Mario Cesar Flores), a former Supreme Court Justice (Clovis Ramalhete), the former governor of the state of Amazonas (Gilberto Mestrinho) among others. The campaign claimed that the Yanomami were `givena an area `larger than Portugal, where there are 12 million Portuguese2while in the indigenous areas there are an estimated 3,460 Indians'; that the Yanomami would `sooner or later develop a sense of nationhood and along with the 11,000 Yanomami living in Venezuela will declare independence and live in their area, larger than Holland;a that `it is not fair to impede mining in rich areas in a country where there is need for economic growth;a and "nally that `even without knowledge of Portuguese and without money, the Yanomami have become the largest landowners in the countrya (Mestrinho, 1993; Ramalhete, 1993; Flores, 1993; Bolsonaro, 1996). As a result of the campaign, Jair Bolsonaro introduced a bill in Congress proposing that the demarcation of the Yanomami area be annulled (Projeto de Decreto Legislativo 365/1993). After being archived for several years, the project was reactivated on 3 March 1999.  For a summary of all the bills on indigenous issues in Brazil see http://www.cimi.org.br/congresso.htm and http://www.funai.gov.br/projetos}em}tramitacao.html.  Among those introduced by landed interests are the bills by Marluce Pinto (PTB-Roraima) and Mozarildo Cavalcanti (PFL-Roraima) suggesting that indigenous lands should not necessarily be contiguous in order to accommodate existing farms; by Adelaide Neri (PMDB-Acre), AD tila Lins (PMDBAmazonas) and Elton Rohnelt (PFL-Roraima), proposing that indigenous lands be proportional to the size of their population within the municipality, and that they should not exceed 20 per cent of a state's area; by Ruben Bento (PFL-Roraima) and by Mendes Ribeiro (PMDB-Rio Grande do Sul) suggesting that land occupied by non-Indians for 25 years or not e!ectively occupied by indigenous populations should be exempt from demarcation (CIMI, 1998; Damasceno, 1995; Guimara es, 1993).

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sector is to open indigenous lands to mining and timber extraction. To that end, mining interests represented by the Brazilian Mining Institute (IBRAM), in an alliance with several politicians, introduced a variety of bills to open indigenous lands to mining and to transfer the power to grant mining licences in indigenous areas (currently restricted to the legislature) directly to the Mines and Energy Ministry, a closed bureaucracy with little sensitivity to indigenous or environmental issues. This coalition of mining interests also introduced 14 absolutely identical bills proposing to amend articles 176 (paragraph one) and 231 (paragraph three) of the constitution in an attempt to prohibit small-scale mining by indigenous people, and to exclude indigenous people from sharing pro"ts of mining activities on their lands during the Constitutional revision e!ort in 1994 (Guimara es, 1993; Ricardo & Gonc7 alves, 1999). Of a total of 230 proposals related to rewriting the Constitution's chapter on indigenous rights in 1994, fewer than 10 suggested preserving the articles on indigenous rights as they had been written into the Constitution and very few representatives actively defended indigenous rights. During the same period, the pro-indigenous coalition, as it had existed during the constitutional e!ort, had become rather demobilised for two main reasons. First, the original goal of inclusion of indigenous rights in the Constitution had been achieved, therefore the issue lost its urgency and many of the actors involved in the coalition redirected their e!orts in new directions. Second, given the relative scarcity of resources faced by actors in the coalition it was practically impossible to remain mobilised and/or lobby congress for a prolonged time period even for the most committed indigenous rights activists. A reaction against the attempts to reverse indigenous land rights came only during the more intense 1994 debate on constitutional reform. Under the leadership of Ailton Krenak, several organisations representing indigenous peoples * foremost among them, Co-ordination of Indigenous People of Brazilian Amazonia (COIAB) and Council of the Associations and Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (CAPOIB) * along with national advocacy groups, domestic and international

 Including senators CeH sar Dias (PMDB-Roraima), Coutinho Jorge (PMDB-ParaH ), AD tila Lins (PMDBAmazonas), Gilberto Mestrinho (PMDB-Amazonas), Marluce Pinto (PMDB-Roraima), Mozarildo Cavalcanti (PFL-Roraima), Romero JucaH (PSDB-Roraima) and congressmen Giovanni QueiroH z (PDT-ParaH ), NmH cias Ribeiro (PMDB-ParaH ), Mario Chermont (PP-ParaH ), Rubem Bento (PFL-Roraima) and Del"m Neto (PPR-Sa o Paulo).  Defenders of indigenous rights included Wilson Martins (PMDB-Mato Grosso do Sul), Zaire Rezende (PMDB-Minas Gerais), Rita Camata (PMDB-Esparto Santo), Marco Pinafore (PSDB-Sear), Tuga Angerami (PSDB-Sa o Paulo), Sidney de Miguel (PV-Rio De Janeiro), Regina Gordilho (Prona-Rio De Janeiro), Beth Azize (PDT-Amazonas). These representatives were predominantly from leftist parties and from the Central-southern states (Damasceno, 1995).  For example the former Indigenous Rights Nucleus (NuH cleo de Direitos IndmH genas, NDI) and CEDI (Centro Ecume( nico de Documentac7 a o e Informac7 a o, CEDI), which merged into one larger organization, the Social-Environmental Institute (Instituto SoH cio-Ambiental, ISA), the Pro-Indian Commission (Comissa o ProH -Indio, CPI), the Indigenist Work Centre (Centro de Trabalho Indigenista, CTI), the Institute for Socio-Economic Studies (Instituto de Estudos SoH cio-Econo( micos, INESC) and the Amazon Work Group (Grupo de Trabalho Amazo( nico, GTA). Other organisations involved were the Brazilian Anthropological Association (Associac7 a o Brasileira de Antropologia, ABA), the Brazilian Lawyers Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, OAB), and di!erent chapters of the Society for Protection of Human Rights in Brazil (SDDH).

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NGOs initiated a counter-e!ort to lobby for indigenous rights protection and to disseminate information about the anti-indigenous initiatives in the national media and other channels. Once again, given the lack of access to the conventional channels of the Brazilian policy process, indigenous right activists chose to politicise the issue. Due to the competing nature of the coalitions attempting to reform or maintain indigenous rights in the Constitution, the co-ordinator of the constitutional revision, congressman Nelson Jobim (PTB-ParanaH ), suggested that a compromise be reached between indigenous, nationalist, landed elite and economic interests. Representative FaH bio Feldman (PSDB-Sa o Paulo) was named the sub-co-ordinator of the Congressional committee for consumer rights, environment and minority issues and his recommendation was that the existing text be maintained. In spite of strong pressure from the mining sector and landed interests to limit indigenous land rights, eventually the position recommended by Feldman prevailed in plenary voting. According to many indigenous rights advocates, this outcome was thanks to the leftist and centreleft representatives who were sympathetic to the indigenous cause and in the end supported Feldman's recommendation, although very few members of Congress actively defended indigenous rights (Ferraz, 1996; Silva, 1998). In the period between 1988 and 1994 the strategy adopted by the pro-indigenous coalition was based on politicising the issue and mobilising against opposing interests in a crucial moment to achieve an speci"c goal (maintenance of the indigenous rights as de"ned in the Constitution) and then demobilising once the goal was achieved. And again the defeat did not stop anti-indigenous rights interests from continuing their attempts to reshape the law on indigenous rights once the issue was out of the public eye. In reality, as soon as the indigenous rights advocacy coalition demobilised, several of the bills were redrafted and reintroduced. As early as December 1994, the Brazilian Senate passed a bill (4420/94), introduced by Senator Marluce Pinto limiting indigenous rights in border areas. The House version of the bill was abandoned later in 1995, when it became clear that the executive branch itself would propose a revision of indigenous rights (Damasceno, 1995). Having found it a long process to revise indigenous land rights in Congress, the politically powerful mining sector and landed interests shifted their e!orts by building support for their position within the executive branch, and more speci"cally within the Ministry of Justice which co-ordinates indigenous policy. Soon after former congressman Nelson Jobim became the Justice Minister in 1995 he enacted indigenous policy reforms that had been long awaited by these sectors. Jobim reawakened a discussion of the right of contradito& rio (legal right to contradict or challenge indigenous land demarcations) in the high echelons of the Cardoso administration (Damasceno, 1995, p. 3). And in January 1996 Jobim enacted executive decree 1775/96, which revised the process of establishing indigenous land  Among them were international NGOs the Environmental Defence Fund, the Amazon Coalition, the Amanak'a Network and Survival International.  There are currently 21 bills circulating in the Brazilian Congress that suggest altering indigenous rights as they were de"ned in the 1988 Constitution.

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rights. These decrees established the contradito& rio rights and changed the procedure for demarcation ultimately placing the decision of whether or not an area belongs to indigenous people in the hands of the executive branch (the Justice Minister). The executive branch also gained the right to review demarcations and to establish the "nal limits for indigenous areas, as well as the right to establish the value of any reparations to be paid in case of expropriation. Decree 1775/96 also established a window of 90 days for any interested parts to "le suit with the Justice Ministry contesting indigenous areas already demarcated. This led to 1066 requests for revision in 70 indigenous areas, of which 419 processes in 34 di!erent areas were considered pertinent and analysed by the Ministry and the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI). In July, 90 days after the closing of the revision period, the Justice Ministry announced that of these 34 areas challenged, eight areas needed to be rede"ned (FUNAI, 1996). The decree met with strong and immediate resistance (and mobilisation) from indigenous leaderships, national organisations and international NGOs. Indigenous organisations such as COIAB and CAPOIB were quick to organise protests. National organisations such as the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI) and the Social-Environmental Institute (ISA) started a campaign shortly after the decree, publishing long articles in newspapers of major circulation, harshly criticising the government for enacting the decree. International outcry over decree 1775 was also strong. The government's response was defensive but mild in comparison to the reaction to such criticism during previous administrations. Jobim himself travelled to Europe approximately a month after the enactment of the decree, to address the concerns from the European Parliament and the sources funding the G-7 Pilot Programme to conserve the Brazilian Rainforest (PPG-7) project. The Foreign Relations Ministry  Jobim was the co-ordinator of the constitutional revision in 1993/1994, and is currently a Supreme Court justice. As a congressman, he was the author of a report that served as the basis for the lawsuit "led by the state of ParaH claiming the unconstitutionality of decree 22/91 (revoked by decree 1775/96). Previously, while working as a lawyer, Jobim represented a timber group from ParaH . In this lawsuit he argued what decree 1775/96 made into law: the incorporation of the contradito& rio into the administrative process of demarcation, instead of protesting demarcations through the regular court venues (Folha de Sa o Paulo, 30 Jan. 1996; Carneiro da Cunha, 1996).  See editorials in Folha de SaJ o Paulo, 16 January 1996; 0 Estado de SaJ o Paulo, 14 January 1996; 0 Globo, 30 January 1996.  Less than a week after the enactment of the decree Survival International and Oxfam sent letters to European governments requesting that all the resources related indigenous matters within the scope of the Rainforest Trust Fund project be suspended (approximately 20 million dollars). Survival International released reports on the decree to the European media. The Amanak'a Network sent a letter to the president expressing its opposition to the decree. Amnesty International released a note rejecting the decree, and together with OXFAM and Survival International organised a protest visit to the Brazilian ambassador in London. The concerted pressure from several European NGOs, led the European parliament to pass a resolution condemning the actions of the Brazilian government, and recommending the suspension of any "nancing to development projects in Brazil until the decree was revoked (Anonymous, 1996).  The PPG-7 is a US$300 million program funded by the G-7 countries which aims at de"ning strategies for Amazon Conservation. One of the elements of the program is the Indian Lands Project (PPTAL) and it had funded the demarcation of 39 indigenous areas and helped identify another 23 areas for a total of US$6.3 million. This can be viewed as a sign of commitment by donors to support of indigenous rights in Brazil.

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distributed a document to the international press in which it argued the need to open the process to challenges in order to legitimise it (MRE, 1996). Since within six months the challenges had been reviewed and only eight of the claims in already demarcated areas were accepted, the international pressure died down quickly. Much of the internal mobilisation over the issue also ended although, as a result of the decree, the process of demarcation of indigenous areas has been permanently altered to accommodate interests opposing those of indigenous people. The e!orts to limit indigenous land rights continued in Congress as well. Since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution was an open-ended process, indigenous policy still required the formulation of ordinary laws regulating and implementing constitutional principles. A revision of the outdated 1973 Indian Statute (Estatuto do I! ndio) is necessary for that. In the early 1990s, FUNAI, CIMI and the NDI submitted a proposal for such new legislation to the Brazilian Congress. In 1993, an interministerial working group comprised of senators, representatives, indigenous leaderships and indigenous rights advocacy groups discussed a new proposal for legislation. In July 1994, after several months of discussion, the committee, under the coordination of Representative Luciano Pizzatto, reached consensus on a "nal version (Projeto de Lei 2057/91) and it was approved in the Chamber of Deputies. However, instead of being circulated and voted on in the Senate, the new statute was returned to the lower house in December of 1994 per a recourse signed by 56 representatives and senators who opposed it. The recourse asked that the bill be re-debated on the #oor of the house before going to the senate. This e!ort, spearheaded by Congressman Arthur da TaH vola (PSDB-Rio de Janeiro), was started in response to a personal request from Justice Minister Nelson Jobim and, some argue, from President Cardoso himself, both of whom were very critical of the bill (Pizzatto, 1996). This bill remains paralysed and its reintroduction depends on the will of the present administration to include it in the congressional agenda. This is unlikely to happen in the near future. The Cardoso administration has been openly critical of the proposed new statute, claiming that by recognising indigenous nations as independent legal entities they would gain rights similar to those of municipalities. The armed forces are also adamantly opposed to the new text because `it does not make integration of indigenous people its explicit goala and because it `does not su$ciently guard the national security on frontier zonesa (Damasceno, 1996, p. 10). Many ministries and state agencies oppose the text on di!erent grounds. The expectation of activists is that the new Statute will remain stalled in the foreseeable future. Overall, since the 1994 revision e!ort over 30 bills have been introduced in Congress proposing to revise indigenous land rights and/or open indigenous lands to mining. Of these, 12 are still in circulation (http://www.cimi.org.br/congresso). The  Another plausible interpretation is that the request was part of a larger strategy of political bargaining to mobilise support of conservative sectors for the constitutional amendment allowing for a second presidential term (Rodrigues & Lemos, 1997, p. 15).  On 24 March 1999 the Congressional committee for consumer rights, environment and minorities "led a motion for the reintroduction of the bill, however, but failed to obtain enough votes to reject the 1994 recourse.

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debate over indigenous rights is alive and well, as are the security-based concerns of the military and conservative nationalists that indigenous rights are a ploy by international economic interests to weaken Brazil's control over the Amazon (Cavalcanti, 1999, 2000; Mestrinho, 1999).

6. Conclusions This article has examined the policy formation pattern of indigenous land rights in Brazil. Brazil's policy process remains of di$cult access to indigenous people, a historically disenfranchised social sector. In spite of a democratic transition process in the 1980s, the policy process in this arena is still asymmetrical granting disproportionate access to politically and economically powerful sectors that historically have had clientelistic ties to the state's legislative and executive branches. The capacity of historically excluded social actors to place their issues on the political and policy agendas and to shape policy formation remains limited. Indigenous policy is a telling example of this policy pattern. Indigenous peoples and their supporters in post-authoritarian Brazil have not managed to gain full access to the policy process through the conventional channels of bureaucratic politics. Thus, confronted with a closed-access policy-making process, indigenous rights advocates have been left with no alternative but to politicise the issue, by mobilising public support and the support of international non-governmental organisations, in order to exert pressure on the Brazilian government and Congress. The strategy of politicising indigenous rights was not without side e!ects and has further complicated the policy-making process. For instance, public debate of indigenous rights and mobilisation of domestic and international support for the indigenous cause has stirred security concerns among the military and conservative nationalist groups (Cavalcanti, 1999, 2000; Mestrinho, 1999). The politicisation of the issue also threatened interests traditionally granted access to the policy process by the state, especially the landed elite and the mining sector. Opposition from these politically powerful sectors has impacted on indigenous policy formation in Congress where representatives associated with these sectors have actively sought to reform indigenous rights as de"ned in the constitution, and in the executive branch where there have been attempts to redirect indigenous policy by allowing economic interests to directly intervene in the demarcation process. Nevertheless, politicisation of the issue was necessary given the lack of access points for interests not traditionally aligned with the state. The political debate on indigenous rights is not likely to be resolved soon. In November 1999, under the leadership of senators Mestrinho (PSDB-Amazonas), Cavalcanti (PFL-Roraima) and Sarney (PFL-AmapaH ), a series of public hearings on

 The process has been similar for other minorities as well. For instance, see the political "ght over the legalisation of the land rights for the quilombos (communities descending from runaway slaves who established themselves in the interior of the country) (Baptista & Fernandes, 1999).

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the security threats posed by the existence of indigenous areas along the border, as well as by the activities of environmental and indigenous rights NGOs in Amazonia, took place once again in Congress. This on-going political struggle over indigenous land rights has led to a protracted policy formation process e!ectively leaving Brazil without a clear direction in regard to indigenous land rights. Unde"ned indigenous land rights have been an important contributor to the shortcomings associated with indigenous policy at the implementation stage and the poor track record for demarcation and protection of indigenous lands. For instance, by February 2000, only 279 of the 594 indigenous areas o$cially recognised in Brazil were demarcated and regularised, in spite of the constitutional provision calling for all indigenous lands to be demarcated by 1993.

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