- Email: [email protected]
The social contagion of incremental and entity trait beliefs
Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
The social contagion of incremental and entity trait beliefs Edward Burkley a,⁎, Jessica Curtis b, Thomas Hatvany a a b
Oklahoma State University, United States Arkansas State University, United States
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 30 July 2016 Received in revised form 28 November 2016 Accepted 29 November 2016 Available online xxxx Keywords: Implicit theories Incremental beliefs Entity beliefs Social contagion Role models
a b s t r a c t This study examined if people's own beliefs regarding the malleability of traits is influenced by the beliefs of surrounding others. Consistent with the idea of social contagion, people who read a vignette of someone espousing an incremental view (i.e., perceive traits as malleable) were more likely to endorse an incremental view themselves than those who read a vignette of someone with an entity view (i.e., perceive traits as fixed). Results indicated this contagion effect is not domain specific and can spread from one skill domain (e.g., athletics) to another (e.g., mathematics). Furthermore, others who espoused an incremental view were perceived to be more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as positive role models than those who espoused an entity view. Overall, these results provide a bridge between the largely disparate literature areas of implicit trait beliefs, social contagion, and role models and indicate one potential source for the origination of these trait beliefs. © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction Imagine you are reading an interview with a highly successful athlete. When asked what his skills were like as a child, he states that he had a natural aptitude for sports and that he thinks athletic skills are something you have to be born with. Now instead imagine reading the same article but the interviewee states that as a child, he was not very skilled at sports, that he had to work hard to improve his abilities, and that he thinks you can change and improve your athletic skills over time. How would reading these articles impact your own beliefs about whether traits are fixed or malleable? How inspired would you feel after reading one article versus the other? These examples demonstrate the difference between entity and incremental trait beliefs (Dweck, 1999). The former represents an entity perspective – the belief that traits are fixed at birth and do not change much over time. Conversely, the latter represents an incremental perspective – the belief that traits are malleable and improvable over the lifetime. A wealth of research has examined the consequences of these beliefs, finding they have a strong impact on motivation (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). However, less is known regarding the causes or origins of these beliefs. The present work examines a unique potential source of people's trait beliefs: the views of others. Consistent with social contagion theory (Le Bon, 1903; Levy & Nail, 1993), we examined if trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they may spread from one person to another. Thus, we tested if exposure to a person who purports a particular belief leads ⁎ Corresponding author at: 116 North Murray, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74048, United States. E-mail address: [email protected] (E. Burkley).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.11.063 0191-8869/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
people to adopt this belief for themselves. We also sought to examine the boundaries of this effect by examining if the contagion process is domain specific. That is, does exposure to a person who purports a belief in one domain (e.g., athletics) impact a person's own beliefs in a different domain (e.g., mathematics)? Lastly, we sought to bridge the trait belief and role model literature by examining whether people who espouse a particular belief are more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as a role model. Prior research indicates that successful others are more likely to serve as role models if people view their success as attainable (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Because an incremental perspective frames the success as more attainable than an entity perspective, we examined if people would be more inspired when exposed to a person espousing an incremental belief. 1.1. Incremental versus entity trait beliefs According to Dweck's (1999) implicit personality theories model, people differ in their lay beliefs about the malleability of personal attributes. Entity people believe they are either born with abilities or not and that no amount of work will enable them to improve. Instead, incremental people believe their abilities are developed through education and practice and that they can always improve. Differences in these trait beliefs are important because they have been shown to strongly influence behavior (for reviews, see Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Because entity individuals believe their traits are unchanging, they view failure as an indication of low ability. This attribution produces negative emotions and leads to task avoidance, as well as reduced expectations, effort, persistence, and performance. Conversely, incremental individuals view failure as an indication of lack of effort. This attribution produces feelings of optimism, leads to attempts at self-
46
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
improvement, and results in sustained or enhanced expectations, effort, persistence and performance. For these reasons, people who hold an incremental perspective are typically more successful than people who hold an entity perspective (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For example, Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (2007) found that junior high students who believed intelligence was malleable showed an upward trajectory in math grades over two years, whereas those who believed intelligence was fixed showed a flat trajectory. Given the many benefits of an incremental perspective, researchers tried to examine ways to systematically alter these implicit beliefs. Such inductions of trait beliefs not only allow researchers to examine causal relationships, they also give clues as to the potential origins of such beliefs. The earliest study that attempted to alter trait beliefs did so via feedback in the form of praise (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Results indicated that children who were praised in an entity way (e.g., “You must be smart at these problems”) were more likely to adopt an entity perspective of intelligence, whereas those who were praised in an incremental way (e.g., “You must have worked hard at these problems”) were more likely to adopt an incremental perspective. However, the most common technique used to alter trait beliefs in the literature is through the explicit presentation of scientific data that supposedly demonstrates how traits are either fixed or malleable (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Burkley et al., 2014; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Heslin, Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). For example, Levy et al. (1998) presented participants with a fictitious scientific article that reported on case studies, intervention programs and longitudinal data that suggested personality was either fixed (titled “Personality, Like Plaster, Is Pretty Stable Over Time”) or malleable (titled “Personality is Changeable and Can Be Developed”). Results indicated that people who read the fixed article adopted an entity perspective whereas those who read the malleable article adopted an incremental perspective. A similar approach has been used to alter beliefs about intelligence (Aronson et al., 2002), personality traits (Chiu et al., 1997), general abilities (Heslin et al., 2005), math abilities (Burns & Isbell, 2007), and natural beauty (Burkley et al., 2014). Although praise and scientific data may reflect two factors that influence people's trait beliefs, we believe another possible source—one that is more indirect but just as influential—is the perspective of others. Specifically, we assert that trait beliefs are likely to spread from one person to another, such that exposure to another's beliefs can influence your own. This assertion is consistent with the notion of social contagion. 1.2. Social contagion Social contagion refers to the spreading of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors from one person (“initiator”) to another (“recipient”; Levy & Nail, 1993). Unlike other forms of social influence that involve a clear intention on the part of the initiator to impact the recipient (e.g., persuasion, obedience), social contagion is thought to occur in a more indirect manner (Levy & Nail, 1993). Historically, social contagion was examined primarily in terms of behaviors (e.g., aggression; Bandura, 1973; Le Bon, 1903; Wheeler & Caggiula, 1966) and emotions (Le Bon, 1903; Sullins, 1991). More recently, researchers have examined how thoughts also have a tendency to spread from person to person (Lynch, 1996). The contagious nature of thoughts (sometimes referred to as memes; Dawkins, 1976) has been demonstrated for a wide range of cognitive processes, including beliefs, motivations, memories, and goals (e.g., Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Lynch, 1996; Radel, Sarrazin, Legrain, & Wild, 2010; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Wild & Enzle, 2002). For example, Radel et al. (2010) examined how intrinsic motivation can spread from teacher to student. In their study, students learned that their teacher was either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated to demonstrate a learning activity. After listening to the lecture, those students (“first-generation learners”) then served as teachers for another student (“second-generation learners”) regarding the information
they had learned in the activity. The results indicated a chain of social contagion. First-generation learners who thought their teacher was intrinsically motivated demonstrated greater intrinsic motivation themselves. Furthermore, the second-generation learners who were taught by first-generation learners who thought their teacher was intrinsically motivated also demonstrated greater intrinsic motivation. To date, no studies have examined if trait beliefs spread from person to the person in a similar manner. We sought to address this gap in the literature by examining if people exposed to a person who purports having a particular belief are more likely to adopt this belief for themselves. 1.3. Role models Because we believed that people who attributed their success to incremental reasons would encourage others to adopt this incremental belief, we also expected such people would be more likely to be viewed as a role model compared to those who attributed their success to entity reasons. This prediction was based on the role models literature that demonstrates how successful people have the ability to be both inspiring and deflating (e.g., Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Mussweiler, 2003; Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). According to Lockwood and Kunda (1997), the primary factor that determines which outcome will occur is the perceived attainability of the upward comparison's success. In support of this assertion, research demonstrates that factors which promote the belief that one could obtain the same outcome as the successful other tend to increase the likelihood that the successful other will serve as an inspiring role models (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Suls et al., 2002). One factor known to impact perceived attainability is having enough time to achieve the success. For example, Lockwood and Kunda (1997) found that first-year college students were inspired by a successful graduating senior, whereas fourth-year students were deflated. This pattern presumably occurred because the first-year students perceived the other's success as attainable because they still had enough time to achieve it whereas the fourth-year students did not. More relevant to the current discussion, a second factor that impacts perceived attainability is the participant's trait beliefs. People with an incremental view of intelligence are more inspired by a successful other than those with an entity view (Hoyt, Burnette, & Innella, 2012; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). In addition to the participant's trait beliefs, we assert that another factor that may convey attainability is the successful other's trait beliefs. When successful others espouse an incremental belief, they encourage the perception that others can also attain their same level of success if they work hard enough. As such, we predicted that successful others who espouse an incremental belief would be more inspiring role models than those who espouse an entity belief. 1.4. Present study The goal of the present study was twofold. First, we sought to examine if trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they spread from one person to another. Based on prior evidence of social contagion for other types of thought, we predicted that people exposed to a person who espouses an incremental belief would be more likely to adopt this belief for themselves than people exposed to a person who espouses an entity belief. Second, we sought to test the boundaries of this effect by examining whether the contagion is domain specific. Specifically, we examined if exposure to a person who purports a belief in one domain (e.g., athletics) would impact a person's own beliefs in a different domain (e.g., mathematics). Because social contagion effects tend to be indirect and far reaching (Wild & Enzle, 2002), we predicted trait beliefs would spread from one domain to another. However, there is reason to believe this may not happen. Prior work indicates that people's own beliefs tend to be domain-specific, such that the same person may hold an entity belief about one domain and an incremental belief about another
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Because there is theoretical support both for and against the idea of domain spreading, our study serves as a “critical test” of these two competing possibilities. To test this first prediction, we chose to focus specifically on participants' trait beliefs regarding mathematics (Burkley, Parker, Stermer, & Burkley, 2010; Burns & Isbell, 2007; Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012; Shively & Ryan, 2013). Focusing on a domain-specific trait belief (rather than a general belief) allowed us to determine if trait beliefs in this particular domain would be equally influenced by a successful other's trait beliefs regarding the same domain (mathematics) or a different domain (athletics). Furthermore, research has shown that trait beliefs regarding math have important real-world implications (Burkley et al., 2010; Burns & Isbell, 2007; Luo, Lee, Ng, & Ong, 2014; Rattan et al., 2012). For instance, Burkley et al. (2010) found that women who held an entity belief about math were more likely to disengage from the math domain following failure whereas those with an incremental belief were not. Thus, seeking out new ways to encourage women to adopt an incremental math belief may be helpful in reducing the gender gap commonly seen in the STEM sciences. A second goal of the present work was to bridge the trait belief and role model literatures by examining if people who espouse a particular trait belief are more inspiring. Prior research indicates that successful others are more likely to serve as role models if observers view their success as attainable (Hoyt et al., 2012; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Because an incremental perspective frames the success as more attainable than an entity perspective, we predicted that people would be more inspired when exposed to a person espousing an incremental belief. To date, this prediction has not been tested directly. However a study by Buunk (2006) within the relationship domain found that couples exposed to a successful married couple who attributed their success to hard work experienced more positive affect than those exposed to a couple who did not attribute their success to hard work. This suggests that when successful people emphasize their effort in achieving their successes (i.e., espouse an incremental belief), they are more likely to serve as positive role models for others. Our study was designed to directly test this prediction. 2. Method 2.1. Participants and design One hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students (120 women; 75% White, mean age = 18.99, SD = 1.50) from a large Southwestern university participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The study utilized a 2 (domain: athletic vs. mathematic) × 3 (target's belief: control vs. entity vs. incremental) factorial design.
47
successful in this domain, espousing that his skills were something he improved upon with effort and practice.
2.2.2. Manipulation check of target's trait beliefs about math After reading the interview, participants indicated the extent they thought the target in the interview held an entity or incremental view of math. Recall that our prediction was that trait beliefs espoused by the target in one domain would spread to a new domain; however, an alternative explanation is that our manipulation of the target's espousal may unintentionally communicate that the target believes all traits are entity- or incremental-based. To ensure this was not the case, we included these manipulation check items. Specifically, participants answered two questions about the target's beliefs about math (i.e., To what extent does Mr. Baron believe that math skills can be improved upon?; To what extent does Mr. Baron believe that math skills can change over time?). Ratings were made on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) scale. The two items (r = 0.76) were then averaged together to create a composite, with higher scores indicating a more incremental view.
2.2.3. Participants' trait beliefs about math After some filler items, participants completed a three-item measure of their own trait beliefs regarding the math domain (Burkley et al., 2010; e.g., You can learn new things, but you can't really change your basic math ability). Ratings were made on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. However, to make comparisons to the target's belief measure easier, the items were reverse scored such that agreement implied a more incremental view of math. These items (α = .77) were averaged to form a composite score.
2.2.4. Perceived inspiration Participants also completed a three-item assessment of the extent that they found the target inspiring (e.g., To what extent did you feel inspired by the article?; Would you like to someday be like Mr. Baron?). Ratings were made on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) scale. The items (α = .81) were averaged to create a composite, with higher scores indicating greater inspiration.
3. Results All data were analyzed using a 2 (domain: athletic vs. mathematic) × 3 (target's belief: control vs. entity vs. incremental) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA).
2.2. Procedure and measures 3.1. Manipulation check of target's trait beliefs about math 2.2.1. Target's trait beliefs manipulation All participants read an excerpt of a magazine article that supposedly depicted an interview with a successful target named Malcolm Baron. Based on random assignment, participants in the athletic condition read an article supposedly featured in a sports magazine that featured an interview with a “successful and highly respected American soccer player.” Participants in the mathematic condition read an article supposedly featured in a money magazine that featured an interview with a “successful and highly respected American real estate developer.” Participants in the control condition read an interview in which the target only mentioned his career accomplishments. Additionally, participants in the entity condition read an interview in which the target mentioned his career accomplishments and indicated he had always been successful in this domain, espousing that his skills were not something that could be changed. Instead, participants in the incremental condition read an interview in which the target mentioned his career accomplishments and indicated he had not always been
There was a significant main effect of domain, F(1, 155) = 13.61, p b .001, η2p = 0.08, and a main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 35.36, p b .001, η2p = 0.31. However, as expected, this was qualified by a significant interaction, F(2, 155) = 19.98, p b .001, η2p = 0.21. In the athletic domain, there were no significant differences in perceived trait beliefs across the control, entity and incremental conditions, F(2, 155) = 1.43, p = .24. Conversely, in the mathematics domain, there were significant differences, F(2, 155) = 45.28, p b .001. Participants in the incremental condition perceived the target held a greater incremental view (M = 6.60, SD = 0.74) than those in the control condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.54), p b .001, d = 3.08, who in turn perceived the target held a greater incremental view than those in the entity condition (M = 2.12, SD = 1.44), p = .05, d = 0.51. The fact that there were no differences in the athletic conditions confirms that our manipulation specifically altered the target's beliefs about math, rather than unintentionally communicating the target's beliefs about all traits.
48
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
3.2. Participant's trait beliefs about math As expected, the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 3.39, p = .04, η2p = 0.04. Planned contrasts revealed that regardless of the domain, participants in the incremental condition held a more incremental view (M = 6.61, SD = 1.30) than those in the entity condition (M = 5.65, SD = 1.99), t(158) = 2.55, p = .01, d = 0.57 (Figure 1). Furthermore, participants in the incremental condition held a marginally more incremental view than those in the control condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.89), t(158) = 1.81, p = .07, d = 0.39. However, participants in the entity condition did not significantly differ from those in the control condition, t(158) = 0.94, p = .39. This pattern demonstrates evidence of a social contagion effect and the fact that it emerged in both athletic and mathematic domains (i.e., only a main effect of target's belief) indicates that, as expected, this contagion effect is not domain-specific. 3.3. Perceived inspiration Only the two main effects were significant. First, there was a significant main effect of domain, F(1, 155) = 10.75, p b .001, η2p = 0.07, such that participants in the math domain were more inspired by the successful target (M = 3.74, SD = 1.60) than those in the athletic domain (M = 3.20, SD = 1.49). This may have occurred because our college student sample likely perceives math successes as more attainable than professional athletic successes. Second, there was a significant main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 29.24, p b .001, η2p = 0.27. Planned contrasts revealed that regardless of the domain, participants were more inspired in the incremental condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.32) than the entity condition (M = 2.42, SD = 1.37), t(158) = 2.32, p = .02, d = 1.44 (Figure 2). Participants in the incremental condition were also more inspired than those in the control condition (M = 3.73, SD = 1.39), t(158) = 6.80, p b .001, d = 0.46, who in turn were more inspired that those in the entity espousing condition, t(158) = 5.18, p b .001, d = 0.95. Thus, participants were more inspired by a successful other who espoused an incremental view than an entity view.
Fig. 2. Perceived inspiration of the target as a function of the target's espoused view and success domain. Higher scores represent greater inspiration. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
incremental view were more likely to endorse an incremental view themselves compared to those who read a vignette of someone espousing an entity view. Furthermore, our results indicated this contagion effect does not appear to be domain specific and can spread from one domain to another. Thus, reading about an athlete espousing an entity view of athletic skills led people to adopt an entity view regarding their own math skills. This contagious spreading of trait beliefs helps explain why these beliefs are often shared within groups or cultures (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). We also found that people who espouse an incremental view are more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as positive role models than people who espouse an entity view. This pattern is consistent with research indicating that the more attainable another's successes are perceived to be, the more likely they are to serve as positive role models (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). 4.1. Implications, limitations and future directions
4. Discussion Consistent with the concept of social contagion (Levy & Nail, 1993), we found that trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they spread from one person to another. People who read a vignette of someone espousing an
Fig. 1. Participants' trait beliefs about math as a function of the target's espoused view. Higher scores represent a more incremental view. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Although a great deal of research has examined the consequences of entity versus incremental beliefs, only a few studies have examined potential sources or causes of these beliefs (e.g., praise, scientific information). Importantly, the present study adds to this work by suggesting that people in our social environment can have an important impact on our own beliefs. In everyday life, we are constantly bombarded with statements regarding others' trait beliefs: Beyoncé espoused an entity perspective of her beauty when she sang, “I woke up like this;” Michael Jordon espoused an incremental perspective of his athletic skills when in a Nike commercial he stated, “Maybe I led you to believe that basketball was a God-given gift and not something I worked for every single day of my life;” Regardless of which perspective is expressed and in what domain, what is clear from the present work is that these statements have sway on our own beliefs. Although the impact of others is more indirect than the factors shown to impact trait beliefs in prior research, our work suggests they are just as influential. And when it comes to real world interactions, people's own trait beliefs are probably more likely to come from indirect, social sources than from the direct presentation of scientific data that has typically been studied in the literature. Thus, people who want to serve as positive role models and inspire others, whether they be teachers, coaches, managers or parents, should emphasize an incremental perspective when communicating to their audience. Although the present work provides an important bridge between the largely disparate literature areas of implicit trait beliefs, social contagion, and role models, several questions remain. First, this study's sample was composed predominantly of women. Future research should
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
examine if the gender of the participant has an impact on these responses. Second, this study only examined the contagion effects that occur when observing a successful other's comments. It may be that people are less likely to adopt another's beliefs if the initiators are instead espousing a reason for their failure. Future research should explore this potential boundary to the contagion effect. Third, it is likely that certain variables may moderate the likelihood that trait beliefs will spread from one person to another. For example, prior work on other forms of contagion indicates that people are more likely to adopt another's perspective if they feel a sense of connection with the initiator. Factors known to increase this sense of connection include shared similarities, an overlap between the self and other, and actively taking the other person's perspective (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). Future research should explore if these and other factors increase or decrease the likelihood that trait beliefs will spread from person to person. Finally, it is possible that there are other unexplored potential consequences that occur from this contagion effect. For instance, it may be that reading about someone with an incremental perspective not only inspires people but actually facilitates them to perform better on a relevant task. Future research should explore this and other potential implications from the present work. References Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 23–37. Aronson, J., Fried, C. B., & Good, C. (2002). Reducing the effects of stereotype threat on African American college students by shaping theories of intelligence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 113–125. Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an intervention. Child Development, 78, 246–263. Burkley, M., Burkley, E., Stermer, P. S., Andrade, A., Bell, A. C., & Curtis, J. (2014). The ugly duckling effect: Examining fixed versus malleable beliefs about beauty. Social Cognition, 32, 466–483. Burkley, M., Parker, J., Stermer, P. S., & Burkley, E. (2010). Trait beliefs that make women vulnerable to math disengagement. Personality and Individual Differences, 48, 234–238. Burns, K. C., & Isbell, L. M. (2007). Promoting malleability is not one size fits all: Priming implicit theories of intelligence as a function of self-theories. Self and Identity, 6, 51–63. Buunk, A. (2006). Responses to a happily married other: The role of relationship satisfaction and social comparison orientation. Personal Relationships, 13, 397–409. Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 19–30. Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 47–63. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality and development. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. (1988). A social cognitive approach to motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256–273. Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and reactions: A world from two perspectives. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 267–285. Dweck, C. S., Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (1993). Implicit theories: Individual differences in the likelihood and meaning of dispositional inference [Special issue: On inferring personal dispositions from behavior]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 644–656. Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 708–724. Goldstein, N. J., & Cialdini, R. B. (2007). The spyglass self: A model of vicarious self-perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 402–417. Heslin, P. A., Latham, G. P., & VandeWalle, D. M. (2005). The effect of implicit person theory on performance appraisals. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 842–856. Hoyt, C. L., Burnette, J. L., & Innella, A. N. (2012). I can do that: The impact of implicit theories on leadership role model effectiveness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 257–268. Le Bon, G. (1903). The crowd: A study of the popular mind (4th imprinting). London: T. Fisher Unwin (Originally published: Psychologie des foules, 1895). Levy, D. A., & Nail, P. R. (1993). Contagion: A theoretical and empirical review and reconceptualization. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 119, 233–284. Levy, S., Stroessner, S., & Dweck, C. (1998). Stereotype formation and endorsement: The role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1421–1436. Lockwood, P., & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars and me: Predicting the impact of role models on the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 91–103. Luo, W., Lee, K., Ng, P. T., & Ong, J. X. W. (2014). Incremental beliefs of ability, achievement emotions and learning of Singapore students. Educational Psychology, 34, 619–634. Lynch, A. (1996). Thought contagion: How belief spreads through society. New York: Basic Books. Mueller, C. M., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Intelligence praise can undermine motivation and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 33–52. Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and consequences. Psychological Review, 110, 472–489. Radel, R., Sarrazin, P., Legrain, P., & Wild, T. C. (2010). Social contagion of motivation between teacher and student: Analyzing underlying processes. Journal of Educational Psychology, 102, 577–587. Rattan, A., Good, C., & Dweck, C. S. (2012). “It's ok—Not everyone can be good at math”: Instructors with an entity theory comfort (and demotivate) students. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 731–737. Roediger, H. L., Meade, M. L., & Bergman, E. T. (2001). Social contagion of memory. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 8, 365–371. Shively, R. L., & Ryan, C. S. (2013). Longitudinal changes in college math students' implicit theories of intelligence. Social Psychology of Education, 16, 241–256. Sullins, E. S. (1991). Emotional contagion revisited: Effects of social comparison and expressive style on mood convergence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 166–174. Suls, J., Martin, R., & Wheeler, L. (2002). Social comparison: Why, with whom, and with what effect? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 159–163. Wheeler, L., & Caggiula, A. R. (1966). The contagion of aggression. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 1–10. Wild, T. C., & Enzle, M. E. (2002). Social contagion of motivational orientations. In E. L. Deci, & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of self-determination research (pp. 141–157). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
The social contagion of incremental and entity trait beliefs Edward Burkley a,⁎, Jessica Curtis b, Thomas Hatvany a a b
Oklahoma State University, United States Arkansas State University, United States
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 30 July 2016 Received in revised form 28 November 2016 Accepted 29 November 2016 Available online xxxx Keywords: Implicit theories Incremental beliefs Entity beliefs Social contagion Role models
a b s t r a c t This study examined if people's own beliefs regarding the malleability of traits is influenced by the beliefs of surrounding others. Consistent with the idea of social contagion, people who read a vignette of someone espousing an incremental view (i.e., perceive traits as malleable) were more likely to endorse an incremental view themselves than those who read a vignette of someone with an entity view (i.e., perceive traits as fixed). Results indicated this contagion effect is not domain specific and can spread from one skill domain (e.g., athletics) to another (e.g., mathematics). Furthermore, others who espoused an incremental view were perceived to be more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as positive role models than those who espoused an entity view. Overall, these results provide a bridge between the largely disparate literature areas of implicit trait beliefs, social contagion, and role models and indicate one potential source for the origination of these trait beliefs. © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction Imagine you are reading an interview with a highly successful athlete. When asked what his skills were like as a child, he states that he had a natural aptitude for sports and that he thinks athletic skills are something you have to be born with. Now instead imagine reading the same article but the interviewee states that as a child, he was not very skilled at sports, that he had to work hard to improve his abilities, and that he thinks you can change and improve your athletic skills over time. How would reading these articles impact your own beliefs about whether traits are fixed or malleable? How inspired would you feel after reading one article versus the other? These examples demonstrate the difference between entity and incremental trait beliefs (Dweck, 1999). The former represents an entity perspective – the belief that traits are fixed at birth and do not change much over time. Conversely, the latter represents an incremental perspective – the belief that traits are malleable and improvable over the lifetime. A wealth of research has examined the consequences of these beliefs, finding they have a strong impact on motivation (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). However, less is known regarding the causes or origins of these beliefs. The present work examines a unique potential source of people's trait beliefs: the views of others. Consistent with social contagion theory (Le Bon, 1903; Levy & Nail, 1993), we examined if trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they may spread from one person to another. Thus, we tested if exposure to a person who purports a particular belief leads ⁎ Corresponding author at: 116 North Murray, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74048, United States. E-mail address: [email protected] (E. Burkley).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.11.063 0191-8869/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
people to adopt this belief for themselves. We also sought to examine the boundaries of this effect by examining if the contagion process is domain specific. That is, does exposure to a person who purports a belief in one domain (e.g., athletics) impact a person's own beliefs in a different domain (e.g., mathematics)? Lastly, we sought to bridge the trait belief and role model literature by examining whether people who espouse a particular belief are more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as a role model. Prior research indicates that successful others are more likely to serve as role models if people view their success as attainable (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Because an incremental perspective frames the success as more attainable than an entity perspective, we examined if people would be more inspired when exposed to a person espousing an incremental belief. 1.1. Incremental versus entity trait beliefs According to Dweck's (1999) implicit personality theories model, people differ in their lay beliefs about the malleability of personal attributes. Entity people believe they are either born with abilities or not and that no amount of work will enable them to improve. Instead, incremental people believe their abilities are developed through education and practice and that they can always improve. Differences in these trait beliefs are important because they have been shown to strongly influence behavior (for reviews, see Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Because entity individuals believe their traits are unchanging, they view failure as an indication of low ability. This attribution produces negative emotions and leads to task avoidance, as well as reduced expectations, effort, persistence, and performance. Conversely, incremental individuals view failure as an indication of lack of effort. This attribution produces feelings of optimism, leads to attempts at self-
46
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
improvement, and results in sustained or enhanced expectations, effort, persistence and performance. For these reasons, people who hold an incremental perspective are typically more successful than people who hold an entity perspective (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For example, Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (2007) found that junior high students who believed intelligence was malleable showed an upward trajectory in math grades over two years, whereas those who believed intelligence was fixed showed a flat trajectory. Given the many benefits of an incremental perspective, researchers tried to examine ways to systematically alter these implicit beliefs. Such inductions of trait beliefs not only allow researchers to examine causal relationships, they also give clues as to the potential origins of such beliefs. The earliest study that attempted to alter trait beliefs did so via feedback in the form of praise (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Results indicated that children who were praised in an entity way (e.g., “You must be smart at these problems”) were more likely to adopt an entity perspective of intelligence, whereas those who were praised in an incremental way (e.g., “You must have worked hard at these problems”) were more likely to adopt an incremental perspective. However, the most common technique used to alter trait beliefs in the literature is through the explicit presentation of scientific data that supposedly demonstrates how traits are either fixed or malleable (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Burkley et al., 2014; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Heslin, Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). For example, Levy et al. (1998) presented participants with a fictitious scientific article that reported on case studies, intervention programs and longitudinal data that suggested personality was either fixed (titled “Personality, Like Plaster, Is Pretty Stable Over Time”) or malleable (titled “Personality is Changeable and Can Be Developed”). Results indicated that people who read the fixed article adopted an entity perspective whereas those who read the malleable article adopted an incremental perspective. A similar approach has been used to alter beliefs about intelligence (Aronson et al., 2002), personality traits (Chiu et al., 1997), general abilities (Heslin et al., 2005), math abilities (Burns & Isbell, 2007), and natural beauty (Burkley et al., 2014). Although praise and scientific data may reflect two factors that influence people's trait beliefs, we believe another possible source—one that is more indirect but just as influential—is the perspective of others. Specifically, we assert that trait beliefs are likely to spread from one person to another, such that exposure to another's beliefs can influence your own. This assertion is consistent with the notion of social contagion. 1.2. Social contagion Social contagion refers to the spreading of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors from one person (“initiator”) to another (“recipient”; Levy & Nail, 1993). Unlike other forms of social influence that involve a clear intention on the part of the initiator to impact the recipient (e.g., persuasion, obedience), social contagion is thought to occur in a more indirect manner (Levy & Nail, 1993). Historically, social contagion was examined primarily in terms of behaviors (e.g., aggression; Bandura, 1973; Le Bon, 1903; Wheeler & Caggiula, 1966) and emotions (Le Bon, 1903; Sullins, 1991). More recently, researchers have examined how thoughts also have a tendency to spread from person to person (Lynch, 1996). The contagious nature of thoughts (sometimes referred to as memes; Dawkins, 1976) has been demonstrated for a wide range of cognitive processes, including beliefs, motivations, memories, and goals (e.g., Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Lynch, 1996; Radel, Sarrazin, Legrain, & Wild, 2010; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Wild & Enzle, 2002). For example, Radel et al. (2010) examined how intrinsic motivation can spread from teacher to student. In their study, students learned that their teacher was either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated to demonstrate a learning activity. After listening to the lecture, those students (“first-generation learners”) then served as teachers for another student (“second-generation learners”) regarding the information
they had learned in the activity. The results indicated a chain of social contagion. First-generation learners who thought their teacher was intrinsically motivated demonstrated greater intrinsic motivation themselves. Furthermore, the second-generation learners who were taught by first-generation learners who thought their teacher was intrinsically motivated also demonstrated greater intrinsic motivation. To date, no studies have examined if trait beliefs spread from person to the person in a similar manner. We sought to address this gap in the literature by examining if people exposed to a person who purports having a particular belief are more likely to adopt this belief for themselves. 1.3. Role models Because we believed that people who attributed their success to incremental reasons would encourage others to adopt this incremental belief, we also expected such people would be more likely to be viewed as a role model compared to those who attributed their success to entity reasons. This prediction was based on the role models literature that demonstrates how successful people have the ability to be both inspiring and deflating (e.g., Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Mussweiler, 2003; Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). According to Lockwood and Kunda (1997), the primary factor that determines which outcome will occur is the perceived attainability of the upward comparison's success. In support of this assertion, research demonstrates that factors which promote the belief that one could obtain the same outcome as the successful other tend to increase the likelihood that the successful other will serve as an inspiring role models (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Suls et al., 2002). One factor known to impact perceived attainability is having enough time to achieve the success. For example, Lockwood and Kunda (1997) found that first-year college students were inspired by a successful graduating senior, whereas fourth-year students were deflated. This pattern presumably occurred because the first-year students perceived the other's success as attainable because they still had enough time to achieve it whereas the fourth-year students did not. More relevant to the current discussion, a second factor that impacts perceived attainability is the participant's trait beliefs. People with an incremental view of intelligence are more inspired by a successful other than those with an entity view (Hoyt, Burnette, & Innella, 2012; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). In addition to the participant's trait beliefs, we assert that another factor that may convey attainability is the successful other's trait beliefs. When successful others espouse an incremental belief, they encourage the perception that others can also attain their same level of success if they work hard enough. As such, we predicted that successful others who espouse an incremental belief would be more inspiring role models than those who espouse an entity belief. 1.4. Present study The goal of the present study was twofold. First, we sought to examine if trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they spread from one person to another. Based on prior evidence of social contagion for other types of thought, we predicted that people exposed to a person who espouses an incremental belief would be more likely to adopt this belief for themselves than people exposed to a person who espouses an entity belief. Second, we sought to test the boundaries of this effect by examining whether the contagion is domain specific. Specifically, we examined if exposure to a person who purports a belief in one domain (e.g., athletics) would impact a person's own beliefs in a different domain (e.g., mathematics). Because social contagion effects tend to be indirect and far reaching (Wild & Enzle, 2002), we predicted trait beliefs would spread from one domain to another. However, there is reason to believe this may not happen. Prior work indicates that people's own beliefs tend to be domain-specific, such that the same person may hold an entity belief about one domain and an incremental belief about another
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Because there is theoretical support both for and against the idea of domain spreading, our study serves as a “critical test” of these two competing possibilities. To test this first prediction, we chose to focus specifically on participants' trait beliefs regarding mathematics (Burkley, Parker, Stermer, & Burkley, 2010; Burns & Isbell, 2007; Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012; Shively & Ryan, 2013). Focusing on a domain-specific trait belief (rather than a general belief) allowed us to determine if trait beliefs in this particular domain would be equally influenced by a successful other's trait beliefs regarding the same domain (mathematics) or a different domain (athletics). Furthermore, research has shown that trait beliefs regarding math have important real-world implications (Burkley et al., 2010; Burns & Isbell, 2007; Luo, Lee, Ng, & Ong, 2014; Rattan et al., 2012). For instance, Burkley et al. (2010) found that women who held an entity belief about math were more likely to disengage from the math domain following failure whereas those with an incremental belief were not. Thus, seeking out new ways to encourage women to adopt an incremental math belief may be helpful in reducing the gender gap commonly seen in the STEM sciences. A second goal of the present work was to bridge the trait belief and role model literatures by examining if people who espouse a particular trait belief are more inspiring. Prior research indicates that successful others are more likely to serve as role models if observers view their success as attainable (Hoyt et al., 2012; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). Because an incremental perspective frames the success as more attainable than an entity perspective, we predicted that people would be more inspired when exposed to a person espousing an incremental belief. To date, this prediction has not been tested directly. However a study by Buunk (2006) within the relationship domain found that couples exposed to a successful married couple who attributed their success to hard work experienced more positive affect than those exposed to a couple who did not attribute their success to hard work. This suggests that when successful people emphasize their effort in achieving their successes (i.e., espouse an incremental belief), they are more likely to serve as positive role models for others. Our study was designed to directly test this prediction. 2. Method 2.1. Participants and design One hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students (120 women; 75% White, mean age = 18.99, SD = 1.50) from a large Southwestern university participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The study utilized a 2 (domain: athletic vs. mathematic) × 3 (target's belief: control vs. entity vs. incremental) factorial design.
47
successful in this domain, espousing that his skills were something he improved upon with effort and practice.
2.2.2. Manipulation check of target's trait beliefs about math After reading the interview, participants indicated the extent they thought the target in the interview held an entity or incremental view of math. Recall that our prediction was that trait beliefs espoused by the target in one domain would spread to a new domain; however, an alternative explanation is that our manipulation of the target's espousal may unintentionally communicate that the target believes all traits are entity- or incremental-based. To ensure this was not the case, we included these manipulation check items. Specifically, participants answered two questions about the target's beliefs about math (i.e., To what extent does Mr. Baron believe that math skills can be improved upon?; To what extent does Mr. Baron believe that math skills can change over time?). Ratings were made on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) scale. The two items (r = 0.76) were then averaged together to create a composite, with higher scores indicating a more incremental view.
2.2.3. Participants' trait beliefs about math After some filler items, participants completed a three-item measure of their own trait beliefs regarding the math domain (Burkley et al., 2010; e.g., You can learn new things, but you can't really change your basic math ability). Ratings were made on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. However, to make comparisons to the target's belief measure easier, the items were reverse scored such that agreement implied a more incremental view of math. These items (α = .77) were averaged to form a composite score.
2.2.4. Perceived inspiration Participants also completed a three-item assessment of the extent that they found the target inspiring (e.g., To what extent did you feel inspired by the article?; Would you like to someday be like Mr. Baron?). Ratings were made on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) scale. The items (α = .81) were averaged to create a composite, with higher scores indicating greater inspiration.
3. Results All data were analyzed using a 2 (domain: athletic vs. mathematic) × 3 (target's belief: control vs. entity vs. incremental) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA).
2.2. Procedure and measures 3.1. Manipulation check of target's trait beliefs about math 2.2.1. Target's trait beliefs manipulation All participants read an excerpt of a magazine article that supposedly depicted an interview with a successful target named Malcolm Baron. Based on random assignment, participants in the athletic condition read an article supposedly featured in a sports magazine that featured an interview with a “successful and highly respected American soccer player.” Participants in the mathematic condition read an article supposedly featured in a money magazine that featured an interview with a “successful and highly respected American real estate developer.” Participants in the control condition read an interview in which the target only mentioned his career accomplishments. Additionally, participants in the entity condition read an interview in which the target mentioned his career accomplishments and indicated he had always been successful in this domain, espousing that his skills were not something that could be changed. Instead, participants in the incremental condition read an interview in which the target mentioned his career accomplishments and indicated he had not always been
There was a significant main effect of domain, F(1, 155) = 13.61, p b .001, η2p = 0.08, and a main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 35.36, p b .001, η2p = 0.31. However, as expected, this was qualified by a significant interaction, F(2, 155) = 19.98, p b .001, η2p = 0.21. In the athletic domain, there were no significant differences in perceived trait beliefs across the control, entity and incremental conditions, F(2, 155) = 1.43, p = .24. Conversely, in the mathematics domain, there were significant differences, F(2, 155) = 45.28, p b .001. Participants in the incremental condition perceived the target held a greater incremental view (M = 6.60, SD = 0.74) than those in the control condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.54), p b .001, d = 3.08, who in turn perceived the target held a greater incremental view than those in the entity condition (M = 2.12, SD = 1.44), p = .05, d = 0.51. The fact that there were no differences in the athletic conditions confirms that our manipulation specifically altered the target's beliefs about math, rather than unintentionally communicating the target's beliefs about all traits.
48
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
3.2. Participant's trait beliefs about math As expected, the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 3.39, p = .04, η2p = 0.04. Planned contrasts revealed that regardless of the domain, participants in the incremental condition held a more incremental view (M = 6.61, SD = 1.30) than those in the entity condition (M = 5.65, SD = 1.99), t(158) = 2.55, p = .01, d = 0.57 (Figure 1). Furthermore, participants in the incremental condition held a marginally more incremental view than those in the control condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.89), t(158) = 1.81, p = .07, d = 0.39. However, participants in the entity condition did not significantly differ from those in the control condition, t(158) = 0.94, p = .39. This pattern demonstrates evidence of a social contagion effect and the fact that it emerged in both athletic and mathematic domains (i.e., only a main effect of target's belief) indicates that, as expected, this contagion effect is not domain-specific. 3.3. Perceived inspiration Only the two main effects were significant. First, there was a significant main effect of domain, F(1, 155) = 10.75, p b .001, η2p = 0.07, such that participants in the math domain were more inspired by the successful target (M = 3.74, SD = 1.60) than those in the athletic domain (M = 3.20, SD = 1.49). This may have occurred because our college student sample likely perceives math successes as more attainable than professional athletic successes. Second, there was a significant main effect of target's belief, F(2, 155) = 29.24, p b .001, η2p = 0.27. Planned contrasts revealed that regardless of the domain, participants were more inspired in the incremental condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.32) than the entity condition (M = 2.42, SD = 1.37), t(158) = 2.32, p = .02, d = 1.44 (Figure 2). Participants in the incremental condition were also more inspired than those in the control condition (M = 3.73, SD = 1.39), t(158) = 6.80, p b .001, d = 0.46, who in turn were more inspired that those in the entity espousing condition, t(158) = 5.18, p b .001, d = 0.95. Thus, participants were more inspired by a successful other who espoused an incremental view than an entity view.
Fig. 2. Perceived inspiration of the target as a function of the target's espoused view and success domain. Higher scores represent greater inspiration. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
incremental view were more likely to endorse an incremental view themselves compared to those who read a vignette of someone espousing an entity view. Furthermore, our results indicated this contagion effect does not appear to be domain specific and can spread from one domain to another. Thus, reading about an athlete espousing an entity view of athletic skills led people to adopt an entity view regarding their own math skills. This contagious spreading of trait beliefs helps explain why these beliefs are often shared within groups or cultures (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). We also found that people who espouse an incremental view are more inspiring and therefore more likely to serve as positive role models than people who espouse an entity view. This pattern is consistent with research indicating that the more attainable another's successes are perceived to be, the more likely they are to serve as positive role models (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). 4.1. Implications, limitations and future directions
4. Discussion Consistent with the concept of social contagion (Levy & Nail, 1993), we found that trait beliefs are “contagious” in that they spread from one person to another. People who read a vignette of someone espousing an
Fig. 1. Participants' trait beliefs about math as a function of the target's espoused view. Higher scores represent a more incremental view. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Although a great deal of research has examined the consequences of entity versus incremental beliefs, only a few studies have examined potential sources or causes of these beliefs (e.g., praise, scientific information). Importantly, the present study adds to this work by suggesting that people in our social environment can have an important impact on our own beliefs. In everyday life, we are constantly bombarded with statements regarding others' trait beliefs: Beyoncé espoused an entity perspective of her beauty when she sang, “I woke up like this;” Michael Jordon espoused an incremental perspective of his athletic skills when in a Nike commercial he stated, “Maybe I led you to believe that basketball was a God-given gift and not something I worked for every single day of my life;” Regardless of which perspective is expressed and in what domain, what is clear from the present work is that these statements have sway on our own beliefs. Although the impact of others is more indirect than the factors shown to impact trait beliefs in prior research, our work suggests they are just as influential. And when it comes to real world interactions, people's own trait beliefs are probably more likely to come from indirect, social sources than from the direct presentation of scientific data that has typically been studied in the literature. Thus, people who want to serve as positive role models and inspire others, whether they be teachers, coaches, managers or parents, should emphasize an incremental perspective when communicating to their audience. Although the present work provides an important bridge between the largely disparate literature areas of implicit trait beliefs, social contagion, and role models, several questions remain. First, this study's sample was composed predominantly of women. Future research should
E. Burkley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 108 (2017) 45–49
examine if the gender of the participant has an impact on these responses. Second, this study only examined the contagion effects that occur when observing a successful other's comments. It may be that people are less likely to adopt another's beliefs if the initiators are instead espousing a reason for their failure. Future research should explore this potential boundary to the contagion effect. Third, it is likely that certain variables may moderate the likelihood that trait beliefs will spread from one person to another. For example, prior work on other forms of contagion indicates that people are more likely to adopt another's perspective if they feel a sense of connection with the initiator. Factors known to increase this sense of connection include shared similarities, an overlap between the self and other, and actively taking the other person's perspective (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). Future research should explore if these and other factors increase or decrease the likelihood that trait beliefs will spread from person to person. Finally, it is possible that there are other unexplored potential consequences that occur from this contagion effect. For instance, it may be that reading about someone with an incremental perspective not only inspires people but actually facilitates them to perform better on a relevant task. Future research should explore this and other potential implications from the present work. References Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 23–37. Aronson, J., Fried, C. B., & Good, C. (2002). Reducing the effects of stereotype threat on African American college students by shaping theories of intelligence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 113–125. Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an intervention. Child Development, 78, 246–263. Burkley, M., Burkley, E., Stermer, P. S., Andrade, A., Bell, A. C., & Curtis, J. (2014). The ugly duckling effect: Examining fixed versus malleable beliefs about beauty. Social Cognition, 32, 466–483. Burkley, M., Parker, J., Stermer, P. S., & Burkley, E. (2010). Trait beliefs that make women vulnerable to math disengagement. Personality and Individual Differences, 48, 234–238. Burns, K. C., & Isbell, L. M. (2007). Promoting malleability is not one size fits all: Priming implicit theories of intelligence as a function of self-theories. Self and Identity, 6, 51–63. Buunk, A. (2006). Responses to a happily married other: The role of relationship satisfaction and social comparison orientation. Personal Relationships, 13, 397–409. Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 19–30. Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 47–63. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality and development. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. (1988). A social cognitive approach to motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256–273. Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and reactions: A world from two perspectives. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 267–285. Dweck, C. S., Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (1993). Implicit theories: Individual differences in the likelihood and meaning of dispositional inference [Special issue: On inferring personal dispositions from behavior]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 644–656. Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 708–724. Goldstein, N. J., & Cialdini, R. B. (2007). The spyglass self: A model of vicarious self-perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 402–417. Heslin, P. A., Latham, G. P., & VandeWalle, D. M. (2005). The effect of implicit person theory on performance appraisals. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 842–856. Hoyt, C. L., Burnette, J. L., & Innella, A. N. (2012). I can do that: The impact of implicit theories on leadership role model effectiveness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 257–268. Le Bon, G. (1903). The crowd: A study of the popular mind (4th imprinting). London: T. Fisher Unwin (Originally published: Psychologie des foules, 1895). Levy, D. A., & Nail, P. R. (1993). Contagion: A theoretical and empirical review and reconceptualization. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 119, 233–284. Levy, S., Stroessner, S., & Dweck, C. (1998). Stereotype formation and endorsement: The role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1421–1436. Lockwood, P., & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars and me: Predicting the impact of role models on the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 91–103. Luo, W., Lee, K., Ng, P. T., & Ong, J. X. W. (2014). Incremental beliefs of ability, achievement emotions and learning of Singapore students. Educational Psychology, 34, 619–634. Lynch, A. (1996). Thought contagion: How belief spreads through society. New York: Basic Books. Mueller, C. M., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Intelligence praise can undermine motivation and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 33–52. Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and consequences. Psychological Review, 110, 472–489. Radel, R., Sarrazin, P., Legrain, P., & Wild, T. C. (2010). Social contagion of motivation between teacher and student: Analyzing underlying processes. Journal of Educational Psychology, 102, 577–587. Rattan, A., Good, C., & Dweck, C. S. (2012). “It's ok—Not everyone can be good at math”: Instructors with an entity theory comfort (and demotivate) students. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 731–737. Roediger, H. L., Meade, M. L., & Bergman, E. T. (2001). Social contagion of memory. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 8, 365–371. Shively, R. L., & Ryan, C. S. (2013). Longitudinal changes in college math students' implicit theories of intelligence. Social Psychology of Education, 16, 241–256. Sullins, E. S. (1991). Emotional contagion revisited: Effects of social comparison and expressive style on mood convergence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 166–174. Suls, J., Martin, R., & Wheeler, L. (2002). Social comparison: Why, with whom, and with what effect? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 159–163. Wheeler, L., & Caggiula, A. R. (1966). The contagion of aggression. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 1–10. Wild, T. C., & Enzle, M. E. (2002). Social contagion of motivational orientations. In E. L. Deci, & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of self-determination research (pp. 141–157). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.