The theory and practice of socialist democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of elite accountability

Wn.H~,M M. LEOGRANDE

The Theory and Practice of Socialist Democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of Elite Accountability

On October 10, 1976, the Cuban people went to the polls to elect representatives to the Organs of People's Power in the first nationwide election of government officials since the triumph of the Revolution in 1959. The creation of these assemblies at the municipal, provincial, and national levels marks the culmination of the "new phase" in Cuba's political development. Begun in 1970, the "new phase" has involved a sweeping reorganization of the entire political system, a keyaspect of which has been a fundamental shift in the Cuban concept of democracy and its practical application. The Revolutionary Government, which came to power on January 2, 1959, after the flight of Fulgencio Batista, was a loose political coalition held together only by common opposition to the former dictatorship. Faced with the question of how to use its newly won political power to mold the future of the nation, the anti-Batista coalition began to disintegrate almost immediately. One of the earliest issues to divide members of the new government was whether to hold elections. The Right, unhappy with the rapid pace at which social reform measures were being promulgated, argued for restoring the pre-Batista electoral system embodied in the Constitution of 1940. By restoring the old political parties and deflecting the focus of political activity back to the electoral arena, the Right hoped to halt STUDmS IN COI~ARAT[VE COMMUNISM

VOL. XII, NO. 1, SIRING 1979, 3 9 - 6 2

40

STUDIES 1N COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

the leftward drift of the Revolution and slow the momentum of ongoing reforms. To the Right's demand for the restoration of electoral democracy, the Left replied that elections would serve only to revive the defunct and discredited political parties of the pre-Batista era and to divide the people at a time when national unity (in the face of U.S. hostility) was essential for the Revolution's survival. Elections were unnecessary to legitimize the new regime because, the Left argued, the Revolutionary Government clearly had the overwhelming support of the people and they demonstrated that support whenever the government called upon them to do so. 2 In fact, the fraudulence and corruption of virtually every Cuban election since the founding of the Republic had so discredited the electoral process among the general populace that elections might well have served to damage rather than to enhance the legitimacy of the new regime. One of the only occasions on which Fidel Castro has been booed by a crowd took place in Las Villas Province in 1959 when he suggested elected assemblies as one method by which the people might exercise control over the government)

Direct Democracy The Cuban concept of "direct democracy," predominant throughout the decade of the 1960s, emerged from the Left's position in this early argument over elections, though it was not fully articulated until 1961 when the Left consolidated its political control and proclaimed the Revolution's socialist course. The characterization of the Revolution as a "direct democracy" rested upon several distinct propositions: (1) that the essence of democracy is the pursuit of policies that serve the interests of the people; (2) that democracy requires the active support of the people through their direct participation in the implementation of public policy; and (3) that a direct, noninstitutional relationship between the people and their leaders is sufficient to ensure governmental responsiveness to popular needs and demands. The first of the propositions constituted the theoretical cornerstone 1. Maurice Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 38-42. 2. Between January 1959 and mid-1962, four opinion polls were taken (two in 1959 by the magazine Bohemia before its nationalization and two by U.S. social scientists in 1960 and 1962). Support for the revolutionary regime varied from 91 percent to 70 percent of the population. 3. Jean Paul Sartre, Sartre on Cuba (New York: Ballantine, 1961), p. 85.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

41

of direct democracy and was, from 1961 onward, explicitly related to the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state. Both Marx and Lenin attributed primary importance to the class character of the state--i.e., to whose interests were served by substantive policy decisions--rather than to the state's procedural or institutional forms. For them, a state that serves the interests of the proletariat and peasantry--i.e., the vast majority of the populace--is democratic; a state that serves the interests of the bourgeoisie is not, irrespective of the particular institutional framework through which state power is exercised. Consequently a socialist government, whatever its form, is regarded as more democratic than a bourgeois government because a socialist government, by abolishing capitalism, acts in the interests of the working class. Upon this basis, the Cuban Revolutionary Government staked its claim to being democratic despite the absence of elected institutions: For the oligarchic and bourgeois parties, elections were auctions for the highest bidder among those who had the most money for propaganda and vote buying. Since its historical inception, the state has been an instrument of domination of certain classes over other classes. The state does not lose that character in the transition from capitalism to communism. It stops being the instrument of the exploiters against the exploited. [The socialist state] is more democratic than the bourgeois state because it serves the interests of the exploited majority. 4

The social and economic policies adopted by the Revolutionary Government in its early years actually did improve the material well-being of the vast majority of Cubans. This is evidenced both by the measurable effects of these policies and also by the perceptions of the population itself, s Even during the periods of severe austerity (1962-1963, 1967-1971) when the standard of living declined, it nevertheless remained above the prerevolufionary level for most of the people. Consequently, it must be said that the socio-eeonomic policies of the Revolutionary Government during the 1960s were consistent with the concept of the socialist democracy that was being advanced. 4. Fidel Castro, Speech on the 3rd anniversary of the triumph of the Revolution, January 2, 1962, R#volucitn, January 3, 1962, pp. 2-3, 8. 5. Concerning the redistribution of income, see Archibald R. M. Ritter, The Economic Development of Revohaionary Cuba: Strategy and Performance (New York: Praeger, 1974), passim; concerning popular perceptions, s ~ Lloyd Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the Castro Regime (np: Institute for International Social Research, 1960).

42

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

The second aspect of direct democracy--mass participation in the implementation of public policy--has been particularly important in Cuba. One of the earliest manifestations of such participation was the formation of the militia (500,000 strong at its peak) as a political and military counterweight to the armed forces, and, of course, as a defense force against invasion from the United States. In 1960 and 1961, the nationwide literacy campaign mobilized virtually the entire adult population--either as teachers or as students--in a highly successful attempt to eradicate illiteracy. During those early years, the mass organizations (the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Confederation of Cuban Workers, the Federation of Cuban Women, and the National Association of Small Farmers) were created. They served throughout the 1960s as the institutional apparatus for mass popular mobilizations. A tremendously wide variety of tasks were performed by these organizations, and they grew steadily in membership through the decade. By 1970, the vast majority of the adult population belonged to one or another of the mass organizations, which constituted an extremely important infrastructure for the mobilization of mass support and political participation. It is clear, however, that the function of these institutions was almost exclusively instrumental; they served primarily as a mechanism for mass participation in the implementation of policy rather than as a mechanism for providing popular input to decisionmaking.6 These first two aspects of Cuban direct democracy--i.e., that policy serve the interests of the majority, and that the masses participate in policy implementation--were consistent with the Leninist conception of socialist democracy. However, the third aspect of Cuban direct democracy--the denial of any need for institutionalized mechanisms to assure elite accountability--was not consistent with Lenin, who emphasized the need for elected, representative state bodies. "Without representative institutions," wrote Lenin, "it is not possible to conceive of democracy, not even proletarian democracy.' '7 The idea that such institutions were not essential was, therefore, the distinguishing characteristic of socialist democracy in Cuba, and it was closely related both to the charismatic nature of Fidel Castro's leadership and to the fluid, uninstitutionalized nature of the Cuban political system during the 1960s. There is no doubt that Fidel Castro was, throughout the 1960s, a 6. Richard Fagen, The Tranxformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Sumford University Press, 1969). 7. V.l. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), Vol. XXV, p. 424.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

43

highly charismatic leader, s Thus the noninstitutional form of masselite relations which comprised the third aspect of direct democracy was epitomized in Fidel Castro's charismatic relationship with the people. As with all charismatic relationships between leaders and supporters, direct democracy entailed, on the one hand, Castro's ability to discern the needs and interests of the people without formal channels for the gathering of such information, and, on the other hand, an abiding confidence among the people that Castro's policies would correspond to those needs and interests. Chd Guevam's description of this aspect of direct democracy is one of the best: • . . in the case of the initiatives arising from the top levels of government, we are using an almost intuitive method of listening to the general reactions in the face of the problems posed. Fidel is a master at this, and his particular mode of integration with the people can only be appreciated by seeing him in action. At the great mass meetings, one can observe something like the dialogue of two forks whose vibrations summon forth new vibrations each in the o t h e r . . . For one who has not lived the revolutionary experience, it is difficult to understand the close dialectical unity that exists between the individual and the mass, in which both are interrelated, and the mass, as a whole composed of individuals, is in turn related with the leader. 9

Castro's direct relationship with the Cuban people was built upon two mechanisms: his major speeches; and his frequent visits to factories, farms, and villages throughout the island. The speeches, disseminated by mass media, constituted the regime's foremost method of informing the people of policy initiatives and the reasons behind them; they also served to mobilize people to support the policy actively, i.e., to do whatever was required to make the policy a success. The political institutions that did develop during the 1960s acted largely as instruments for organizing supportive activity, but, during the early years especially, the ability of these structures to mobilize people of their own accord was limited. The frequent mass rallies where so many of Castro's most important speeches have been delivered served an additional purpose beyond informing the people. They were also presented as a demonstration of 8. See, for example, Richard Fagen, "'Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro,'" Western Poliacal Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1965), pp. 275-284; and Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Caslro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1974). 9. Ernesto Guevara, Ch~: Selected Works o f Ernesto Guevara, (Cambridge, Mass.: M1T Px~..ss, 1969), p. 157.

44

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

popular support for the regime--an "instantaneous plebiscite." It was not uncommon during such rallies for Castro to submit specific policy proposals to the crowd for ratification. The major examples are the two Declarations of Havana (1960 and 1962) which constituted the foremost statements of overall policy and goals during the early years of the Revolution. Despite the ratification of some decisions at the mass rallies, there is no doubt that they never constituted a means by which the people could exercise substantive influence over policy formation or decisionmaking; they were never intended as such. On the contrary, they were, and to some extent remain, affirmations of the people's basic trust in Castro--a physical manifestation of the confidence that he will ensure policy decisions in accord with the people's best interests. Castro's trips through the countryside provided the principal opportunity for the Cuban people to communicate with their leaders and thereby exert some influence over policy. Frequent, usually unannounced, and always informal, these visits were an integral aspect of direct democracy. " N o one could accuse him," wrote Hugh T h o m a s , " a s Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth did so many leaders of new states, of retiring to the palace and never visiting the country. On the contrary, Castro seemed never to be in the capital, always traveling by helicopter, or jeep, or Oldsmobile, always looking at some new project, always speaking, encouraging, threatening, denouncing, never indifferent." m If the mass rallies were a manifestation of the close identification between the people and their l[der mdximo, then the small meetings between Castro and ordinary citizens on his trips around the island were the places in which that identification was forged. In his travels, Castro also gave ordinary Cubans direct personal access to the center of governmental power--himself. "This is democracy," reads Granma's account of one such tour, "the people talking things over directly with their leaders--in this case, the commander-in-chief. ''H Castro would often spend hours with small groups of people discussing local problems in the greatest detail and conclude by ordering government action to solve the problem, or explaining specifically why a solution was not possible. Not infrequently he would take the side of the citizenry against abuses of power or inefficiency on the part of public officials. Thus Castro personally came to be regarded as a more reliable bulwark against 10. Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 1345. I1. "This is Democracy," Granma Weekly Review, April 21, 1968, p. 1.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

45

governmental irregularity than any set of structural safeguards. Gonzalez writes: As the personal link between the rulers and r u l e d . . . Castro also supplied an element of regime responsiveness to popular pressures. Constantly making personal inspection tours throughout the length and breadth of the island, he functioned, in effect, as an ombudsman for the populace. Only he possessed the singular ability to redress local grievances in a political system that had yet to develop truly responsive (as opposed to command) institutions. By the same token, he served as the regime's intuitive barometer of popular sentiment, sounding out public opinion and eliciting criticisms from among the rank and file regarding the performance of local party and government officials in the management of state enterprises. 12

Many other Cuban government officials also adopted this style of administration by on-site inspection, thus becoming "ambulatory bureaucrats" whowere "constantly on the move attempting to locate problems and to solve them on the spot. ''13 Since direct democracy placed such emphasis upon direct, personal mass-leader relationships, institutional mechanisms to insure elite accountability were virtually nonexistent. All governmental officials, and most Party and mass organization leaders, were appointed. Thus virtually all the members of the political elite above the grass-roots level were formally accountable only to their superiors. In practice, even this accountability was not systematic; problems of administrative organization made supervision by superiors only marginally effective. In the absence of proper control mechanisms making officials accountable either to their superiors or their constituency, there developed a general unresponsiveness of political institutions both to popular demands from below and to policy directions from above. This problem became a primary focus of domestic political action in the late 1960s with the "struggles against bureaucratism." For the most part, however, the antibureaucratism campaigns were aimed at streamlining the existing political institutions in order to increase central control capability; little was done to increase popular control over officials. The one exception was the short-lived "Local Power" program--the f'LrSt real attempt to create mechanisms that would make political leaders accountable to the general populace. 12. Gonzalez, Cuba Under Costro, p. 184. 13. ]ames F. Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr., Cultivating Revolution: The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 342.

46

STUDIESIN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

Local Power, 1966-1968 The impact of bureaucratism, overcentralization, and governmental unresponsiveness during the early years of revolutionary government was nowhere more graphically demonstrated than in the region of Mayabeque. Despite the openness of terrain and high population density in the region, antigovernment guerrillas operated there with impunity for more than a year, obviously receiving assistance from the local population. After the capture of the guerrillas in 1962, an experiment in municipal government was launched in Mayabeque in hopes of making the local administration more responsive to the needs of the people. Whereas previously the central government had exercised extensive control over even the smallest details of public administration in the region, the new plan gave the regional and municipal governments complete authority over public services and local industry (i.e., industry without significant economic linkages outside the region). Moreover, special delegates were elected in popular assemblies to serve as the people's link with the administration, advising administrators of the people's needs and demands, and reporting back to the people on the government's performance. The results of this experiment were encouraging, and in late 1965 preparations were begun for extending the program throughout the island, replacing the Boards of Coordination, Execution, and Inspection (JUCEI) that had been created in 1961 in an effort to overcome the administrative confusion ("guerrilla administration") of the Revolution's early years. In January 1966, popular assemblies were held in work places and in the rural areas to elect 10,887 "delegates to local government" to serve as the members of the local governments' Work Commisions. Much more was involved than simply the first direct election of government officials in socialist Cuba. Instead of becoming bureaucrats, these delegates retained their regular jobs, receiving no salaries for their work in local government. The intent of this arrangement was to keep the delegates among the general populace, for their primary task was not public administration but rather upward political communication. They were "responsible for maintaining contact between the people and the local government administration." The representativesto local governmentexpress the feelingsof the people and communicatethe people's needs, detect shortcomings a n d - - w h a t is evenmore important--mobilizeand organizethe masses through their organizations.., for activitiesnecessaryto social improvement. The people must direct their problems to the repre-

THEORY AND PRACTICEOF SOCIALISTDEMOCRACY IN CUBA

47

sentatives elected to local government so that they may be passed on to the appropriate o r g a n i s m . . . Their job is to solve problems presented by the masses, or if they cannot be solved, explain why. 14

It was the duty of these delegates to do more than merely make themselves available for popular input; "the delegates should also go out on their own initiative to determine the problems of our communities," said Party Organizational Secretary Armando Hart. ~5 Delegates were elected for two-year terms, but "Report to the People" municipal assemblies were scheduled every six months. At these assemblies, both delegates and local government officials reported on the administration's work; the people assembled then had an opportunity to ask questions, lodge complaints, offer suggestions, and so on. The assemblies, according to Hart, "aimed at verifying the efficiency of Local Government during the past six months and giving the people an opportunity to state before the Local Government any concrete problem dealing with the municipality. ' ' ~ The assemblies were also intended to stimulate a new attitude on the part of local administrators--that of placing greater emphasis on popular input into decisionmaking. Local government assemblies must not just be formal meetings on specific days when everybody gets together, raises problems and answers questions. Every day, in each locality, on every comer, we must have a small cheek-up meeting, answering questions, analyzing problems with the people. The most important aspect of local government is direct contact, being aware of what the people think and want. 17

The new system of local government was widely heralded in Cuba as a major step toward institutionalizing what heretofore had been informal relations between the leaders and the people. This was, in fact, often cited as a principal aim of the project and especially of the "Report to the People" assemblies. ~s While the institutionalization of popular input embodied in the local government program was wholly restricted to the municipal level, its promulgation sparked discussion of institutionalizing such participation on a wider scale. 14. "What is Local Government?"Granma Weekly Review, September 10, 1967, p. 4. 15. "On the Work of the Check-up Assemblies," Granma Weekly Review, October l, 1967, p. 2. 16. "Enthusiastic Participationof the People in Local GovernmentAssembfies,"Granma Weekly Review, July 24, 1966, p. 6. 17. "On the Work of the Check-up Assemblies." 18. ArmandoHart, "Local Government," Granma WeeldyReview, July 17, 1966, p. 3.

48

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

During the second round of delegate elections, an editorial in Granma dealt with this subject at great length. The jobs of local g o v e r n m e n t . . , are very closely linked to the nation's problems of organization and administrative struc.tg~s, to greater direct popular participation in the work of the state, and above all to our ideas about how to build socialism and C o m m u n i s m . . . In the first years of the Revolution, the participation of the masses was effected fundamentally through total enthusiastic support of the Revolution's actions and its leaders. We recall, for example, how our people gave their direct support to the two Declarations of Havana in massive rallies in the Plaza de la Revoluei6n. But it has become necessary to specify exactly what the role of the people is in fulfilling revolutionary t a s k s . . . The time has arrived for officially widening the scope of mass activity19

Very little such widening occurred though. The first delegate elections were held in January 1966, and the first "Report to the People" assemblies were convened on schedule the following July. Instead of the second round of assemblies, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) held municipal meetings in early 1967 to select additional delegates who were, specifically, delegates to the local government from the CDR. In September 1967, the second and final round of delegates' elections was held. After these elections, "Report to the People" assemblies were conducted for what also proved to be the last time. When the appointed time for assemblies arrived once again in early 1968, they were postponed indefinitely on the grounds that the time and manpower needed to hold them could not be spared from agricultural work. In the following year, the Work Commissions and delegates to local government were formally absorbed by the CDR until finally, late in the year, local power was brought to an end by the cancellation of the scheduled delegate elections. It is extremely difficult to isolate the decisive factor in the demise of "local power." We know, on the one hand, that the national leadership of the Communist Party was disappointed at the failure of the program to develop effective channels of upward political communications between the people and the local government administrations, and at the lack of effective coordination between local government and the mass organizations. On the other hand, Edward 19. "Local Government:A Frontof ExtraordinaryImportance," Granma WeeklyReview, September 17, 1967, p. 4.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

49

Gonzalez reports that a local govemment official told him that popular discontent during 1968-1969 was so intense that the national leadership feared allowing it such an open forum. 20 Finally, the simple explanation that the priorities of resource allocation were in other areas should not be dismissed out of hand. The last two years of the decade were marked by almost constant mobilization building toward the production of 10 million tons of sugar in 1970. The commandism that dominated the political system during this period was, in fact, fundamentally antithetical to the systematic popular review of governmental performance and popular input to decisionmaking represented by the "local power" project at the level of municipal politics. Thus, we can plausibly conclude that a new institutional arrangement, which was not functioning as well as had been hoped, was discarded when its continued operation came into conflict with the political requirements of the 10 million ton zafra. Except for the brief interlude of "local power," the basic theory and practice of Cuban direct democracy remained unchanged through the first decade of revolutionary government. The socialist course of the regime and the participation of the masses in policy implementation were regarded as sufficient to ensure the regime's democratic character. In the 1970s, this conception was altered radically.

"Democratization" and the "'New Phase," 1970-Present On May 19, 1970, Fidel Castro announced to the Cuban people that the most massive and intense effort ever organized by the Revolution would end in failure; the goal upon which he had staked his personal prestige and the prestige of the Revolution--the production of 10 million tons of sugar in 1970--could not be achieved. Even though a record 8.5 million tons were eventually produced by the 1970 zafra, the defeat was a bitter one and it was made more bitter still by the damage done to the rest of the economy. During the harvest, the sugar sector had been given absolute priority in resource allocation. The mobilization of experienced workers from other sectors to cut cane caused declines in both productivity and product quality, and the diversion of transport disrupted the flow of raw materials to the nonsugar economy. The result was massive dislocation in virtually every other economic sector. Nor was the damage solely economic; production declines meant still greater austerity for a population that had already been pushed beyond its tolerance and the popular response was not favorable. "Our enemies say we have 20. Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro, p. 158.

50

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

problems," admitted Castro on July 26; "they say there is discont e n t . . , they say there is irritation, and in reality, our enemies are right."21 The immediate task facing the revolutionary leadership was to begin economic recovery, and priority was given to the consumer goods industry so as to ease the shortages that had been worsening since 1966. The real problem revealed by the failure of the 10 million ton zafra was political, however, and it is to the credit of the revolutionary leadership that they were able to recognize and willing to admit that the root of their difficulties was in the political structure that they had created over the previous decade. Shortly after the announcement that 10 million tons of sugar could not be produced, the Cuban press advanced a new slogan; "Turn the Setback into a Victory." The failure of the 1970zafra to reach its goal was without doubt the greatest defeat the Revolution had suffered but, so it was argued, if this setback became the occasion for a reassessment, a forthright examination of the Revolution's errors and weaknesses, it could become a victory nonetheless. This, then, was the task to which the revolutionary leadership dedicated itself during 1970. The result was the beginning of a "new phase" in the Revolution in which "democratization" and "institutionalization" became the hallmarks of a far-reaching reorganization affecting literally the entire political system. The central feature of this reorganization, the unifying element that made the changes in all the various political institutions a unified program, was the creation of multiple channels for the upward communication of political information on the attitudes and opinions of the Cuban masses (i.e., the introduction of popular opinion into the decisionmaking process). One key aspect of expanding mass input to decisionmaking was to make leaders in the Party, the government, and the mass organizations more accountable to their constituents. In the Party and mass organizations, this involved a democratization of existing electoral procedures; in the government, where no electoral mechanism had existed previously, one was created. While an individual's admission to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) was contingent upon a nomination by a majority of his/her co-workers, during the 1960s PCC officials were almost exclusively appointed to their posts by higher Party bodies. In 1974, as part of a concerted effort to strengthen the PCC, elections of officials were 21. Fidel Castro, Speech on the 17th anniversary of the attack on Moncada Barracks, July 26, 1970, Granma WeeklyReview, August 2, 1970, pp. 2-6.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

51

conducted at the provincial, regional, municipal, and nuclei (base organization) levels. At each organizational level above the base (with the exception of the national level), the PCC has two leadership bodies: the Party committee, and the committee's executive bureau. The election of Party leaders began with the convening of Party evaluation meetings (roughly analogous to a Party congress at the national level) attended by elected delegates from lower Party bodies. At each level, the existing Party committee proposed (to its respective evaluation meeting) the slate of candidates for a new committee (the slate always including more candidates than positions). The delegates to the evaluation meetings then elected a new committee by direct, secret ballot; the new committees, in turn, elected new executive committees. In December 1975, the PCC held its First Congress, at which a new Central Committee, Secretariat, and Political Bureau were elected (the original national bodies were appointed in 1965). Nominees to the new Central Committee were made by the subnational Party organizations during preparatory meetings for the congress, and the delegates to the congress elected the new Central Committee from among those nominees. It should be noted, however, that the nominees were almost all incumbent Central Committee members, which suggests that the nomination procedure may have been guided by the central Party apparatus. The new Central Committee then elected a Secretariat and Political Bureau from candidate slates prepared by the incumbent Secretariat. While these procedures keep the selection of candidate slates under the control of the existing Party leadership, they also represent a change from the past practice of appointment. Prior to these new procedures, selection of officials at every level was controlled by higher levels; now, selection is controlled primarily by the Party organization at the same level for which leaders are being selected, with input from Party members at lower levels (i.e., delegates to the evaluation meetings). One would thus expect a corresponding increase in the-accountability of Party officials to these levels of the Party organization--i.e., to their Party constituency,--rather than to their Party superiors. Another change has been the requirement that candidate slates include more candidates than available positions. Since 1971, new leadership elections have been held in all mass organizations, but the trade union elections were by far the most significant. In the late 1960s the trade unions had been supplanted by the Advance Workers Movement--a cadre organization of the most productive workers in a work center. One conclusion to come out of

52

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

Honnecker, is contained in Document 4.) One of the claimed results of the law has been that, among those gainfully employed in the DDR, the percentage of persons with little or no training went down from 70 percent in 1955 and 47 percent in 1964 to 39 percent in 1970. The percentage of skilled workers rose from 25.6 percent in 1955 and 45.6 percent in 1964 to 48.5 percent in 1970, with a corresponding increase in the number of personnel trained on higher levels, x3 It is also claimed that the percentage of Schulabg~inger (school leavers) beginning training for a specific vocation, 90 percent in 1960, rose to 99 percent in 1970.14 So far as expenditures for education are concerned, the DDR claimed, even at the time the law was passed in 1965, to be one of the top nations in the world, in terms both of the relationship between expenditures for education and national income, and of percapita expenses for education. Dramatic increases since then have been claimed, not only for current expenditures, but also for investments in new schools and classrooms and in facilities for extracurricular youth activities. 1~ It is useful to compare these developments with those in West Germany. While education in the DDR has been completely centralized, with the fifteen Bezirke (districts) lacking legislative authority, West Germany, despite currently growing federal interest in education, still adheres to the principle that education is the responsibility of the eleven states. While the DDR has abolished private schools and is vigorously enforcing the separation of church and state, private schools continue to operate in West Germany. Moreover, although they are decreasing in number, there are still denominationally oriented, publicly financed schools and teacher-training institutions in the Federal Republic. While the DDR has been rapidly moving toward the tenyear school as the only fully comprehensive and compulsory form of education, the most frequent type of school organization in the Federal Republic is still the four-year Grundschule (ages six to ten), followed by three alternative schools types: the five-year ,Hauptschule (upper elementary school), the six-year Realschule (middle school), and the nine-year Gymnasium leading to the Abitur. (It is true that West Berlin, for instance, has shifted to a six-year basic school, and that in several states Gesamtschulen (comprehensive schools) are being created which combine in grades five through ten of the same building 13. Arnold Knauer and Paul Eberle, Berufsbildung fiir das Jahr 2000 (Berlin: Redaktion aus Erster Hand, 1971), p. 15. 14. Ibid., p. 29. 15. Karl:Heinz Guenther and Gottfried Uhlig, Geschichte der Schule in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1945-1968 (Berlin: Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, 1969), pp. 188-189.

EDUCATION IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY

53

what had traditionally been three parallel school types. In fact, in some schools there has been complete integration of all students into one program, instead of three curricula under one roof. But these patterns are still only evidences of a trend--not parts of an established form of organization. Finally, while the DDR has imitated both the political orientation and many actual forms of Soviet education, West German school systems, although they have given consideration to ideas from some foreign models (e.g., the Swedish comprehensive school) and have shown interest in experimentation abroad (e.g., in America's team teaching and flexible scheduling), have not actually imported foreign school types or practices. In recent years, the so-called "theory of convergence," according to which Western school systems will gradually eliminate their dualistic systems of education (parallel streams of upper elementary and true secondary schools) and adopt the common school, while socialist countries will give up the totally uniform curriculum of their common school in favor of differentiation of instruction, has frequently been spoken of in the West but harshly criticized by DDR educators, le

Schools in the D D R and in West G e r m a n y - - S o m e Comparisons

Under the 1968 constitution of the DDR (parts of the new constitution are included in Document 2), laws on education as on other matters must be passed by a parliament which includes 434 members. Interestingly, only 110 of the members belong to the dominant Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Unified Socialist Party of Germany) or SED, while 220 belong to the four other political parties, all of them socialist also. Since the remaining parliamentary seats belong to mass organizations, such as the central trade union, the youth organization, and the cultural organizations, members of which often belong to the SED, educational legislation is made by a parliament with an overwhelming and never-changing majority of the dominant party. 1~ On the other hand, whatever agreements on education are reached among all West German states occur in parliament or through such agencies as the Conference of Ministers of Education, the Bil16. Akademie der P~dagogischen Wissenschaften der DDR, Einheitlichkeit und Differenzierung im Bildungswesen ~Be~lin: Volk und Wissen, 1971), pp. 95-98. 17. Bernhard Vogel et al., Wahlen in Deutschland (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971), pp. 281-282.

54

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

o f building elected, representative governmental institutions in socialist Cuba. T h e Organs o f People's Power reflect, in practice, the changes that the Cuban conception o f socialist democracy has undergone since 1970. Rattl Castro described the need for representative institutions o f government in terms o f the need to involve the masses not only in policy implementation, but in policymaking as well: Due to the circumstances prevailing in the fLrStdecade of our Revolut i o n . . , these institutions have not existed in our state and as Fidel has pointed out, they must be set u p . . . They must promote participation by the masses in state and administrative affairs, so the people will be part of the state in a direct and institutionalized manner and feel more identified with it, and so it will increasingly be a state of workers, a real people's revolutionary democracy. We are convinced that to the extent the masses participate in state affairs, the struggle against all forms of bureaucratlsm will be more effective, the needs of the population and the community will be better met and the revolutionary state will be stronger, more democratic and solid. ~ This theme was the primary explanation offered by the revolutionary leadership for the creation o f Organs o f People's Power. These new state organs were to constitute t h e " institutionalization o f proletarian d e m o c r a c y " by giving the masses the opportunity to "participate regularly and in an integral manner in the work o f g o v e r n m e n t . " The people must be given the opportunity to decide the persons to whom they delegate their power and, moreover, the channels should be e.stabllshed through which every member of society may, to the greatest possible extent, participate directly in the governing of that society, in the administration of that society.~7 T h e Organs o f People's Power were to be representative institutions, not only by virtue o f the fact that the delegates were elected but also because they were required to represent the interests o f their constituents; " ' . . . during their entire term they must be representatives in the apparatus o f the state power o f the interests, concerns, and suggestions o f the e l e c t o r s . . . " 2 8 T h e Matanzas experiment ran over two years, and in 1976 Organs 2&/bide 27. "The Role of Regesent~ive Institutionsin the SocialistState Apparatus," Granma Wee.MyRev/ew, October20, 1974, p. 10.. 28. EmiqueMesa,' "I'nisis Democracy:TheZapataSwampandthe Electionof Delegatesto the Organs of People's Power," Oranma WeeklyReview, June 23, 1974, p. 4.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

55

of People's Power were established nationwide. The delegates to the municipal assemblies are directly elected by the general populace; they, in turn, elect the delegates to the provincial and national assemblies. The electoral process for municipal delegates is rather complex. 29 Municipalities are divided into electoral zones called "circumscriptions," each of which sends one delegate to the municipal assembly. Each circumscription is divided into neighborhoods. and it is at this level that candidates are nominated. A mass meeting of all eligible voters (' 'electors") is called in each neighborhood for the purpose of nominating a candidate who will then run in the delegate election against candidates from other neighborhoods in the circumscription. These neighborhood meetings are chaired by a local resident who was himself elected to that position at a prior meeting. Nominations of candidates are made from the floor, and any number of people may be nominated, so long as there are at least two nominees. The Communist Party is explicitly prohibited from offering or endorsing nominees, although Party members acting as individuals can make nominations. The nominees are then discussed and voted upon by a show of hands. The nominee receiving a simple majority becomes the neighborhood's candidate for the general election. During the nominating process for the 1976 election, 76.7 percent of the eligible voters attended these nominating assemblies. 30 Since each circumscription encompasses several neighborhoods, each "delegate seat is contested by several candidates, in some cases by as many as five or six. Once a full slate of candidates has been nominated, an election commission compiles a biography of each candidate; these are then publicly posted and copies are delivered to all electors in the circumscription. No other form of campaigning is permitted. The first nationwide election of delegates to the municipal assemblies was conducted on October 10, 1976, with nearly 30,000 candidates contending for 10,725 seats. Voting was by secret ballot in closed voting booths. Although voting was voluntary (it had been compulsory before 1959), the voter turnout was 95.2 percent, the highest in Cuban history. In many circumscriptions, all eligible voters had cast their ballots before noon)! To be elected, a candidate 29. The following description of the electond procedure is based upon the Const/tut/on ofthe

Organs of People's Power (New York: Center for Cuban Studies, 1975"). 30. Fidel Castro, Speech on the 16th anniversary oftheCDR, September28,19"/6,Granma

WeeklyReview, October 10, 1976, pp. 2-5. 3 I. "A Victory for Socialist Democracy,"GranmaWeeklyReview, October17,1976, p. I.

56

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

must receive a majority of the votes cast in his/her circumscription. Given the multiplicity of candidates for some seats, runoff elections had to be held to fill nearly a quarter of the delegate posts. Turnout in the runoff elections was 94.9 percent. 32 Shortly after the election of municipal delegates, the municipal assemblies convened to elect their executive committees and to elect delegates to the provincial assemblies, and to the National Assembly of People's Power. Candidates in all these elections were proposed by special election commissions composed of representatives from the Party, the Union of Young Communists, and the mass organizations. Slates proposed by the commissions included at least 25 percent more candidates than posts and the delegate assemblies could alter the slates either in part or in whole. Voting was by direct secret ballot. One effect of the indirect election of people's Power delegates above the municipal level is that mass input to decisionmaking and elite accountability is greatest at the local level but tends to decline in importance as one moves upward in the political system. While the decisions of higher bodies are compulsory for the lower ones, the higher bodies of People's Power are explicitly not empowered to remove either delegates or executive committee members in the lower bodies. 33They can mandate a recall election, but only the constituency that elected the person to his/her position is empowered to remove him/her. The power of annulment--i.e., the power of higher bodies to overturn decisions made at lower levels--is to be employed only in "exceptional circumstances" after exhausting every effort to resolve the differences through consultations. It is supposed to be the exception to the general rule of operational autonomy between various levels of People's Power.

People's Power: Popular Input to Policymaking and Elite Accountability The People's Power elections did not in themselves serve an interest articulation function, nor were they intended to; the prohibi32. "94.9% of Electors Vote in Second Round of Elections," Granma Weekly Review, October 31, 1976, p. 6. 33. On the relationships between thethree levels of People's Power, and between People's Power and other political institutions, see: Constitution of the Organs of People's Power (New York: Center for Cuban Studies, !975); Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, printed as a supplement toGranma WeeklyReview, March 7, 1976;Rat~lCastro, Speech to the Delegates to People's Power, August 22, 1974,Granma WeeklyRevie)v, September 8, 1974pp. 2-5. These three sources and "Resolution on the Organs:of People' s Power," from the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, December 1975, reprinted in Centerfor Cuban Studies Newsletter, Vol. 3, Nos. 2-3, pp. 6-13; e0nstitute the primary documents for this article.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

57

tion on campaigning precluded such a function'. Thus the People's Power elections do not provide a forum for the articulation of alternative policy proposals or issue agendas. Nor can they be used as 'a vehicle for the emergence of a counterelite, even at the local level. Rather, the Organs of People'.~ Power appear intended to improve mass-elite political communication without challenging the political hegemony of the Party. The election procedures were designed to select out people highly respected by the masses, and these delegates were then responsible for ascertaining the interests of their constituents and introducing those interests into the decisionmaking process in an ongoing fashion. Consequently, one aspect of the earlier Local Power program that was not only retained but expanded under the People's Power program was the variety of mechanisms for keeping the delegates in close contact with their constituents so that they could act as receptors for people's complaints, suggestions, and opinions. The delegates' mission was to act a s " the true vehicle of communication between their electorate and the Organs of People's Power. ''a4 Consequently, as was the case with Local Power representatives, the People's Power delegates do not become professional politicians of public administrators; they retain their regular jobs, receiving no compensation for their delegate work, and they continue to live in the community from which they were elected. The Cubans have come to regard elite accountability as essential to socialist democracy: One of the traits that guarantees the broad democratic nature of the Socialist State is the obligation which all institutions and elected persons have to be accountable for all their activities to the electorate. 35

Thus more formal mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of delegates to theirconstituentshave also been instituted.Delegates are mandated to meet regularly with theirconstituentsto report on governmental operations and on theirpersonal performance, and to listen to the people's opinions. The primary forum for such meetings is the "Assemblies for Rendering Accounts." Like the !'Report to the People" meetings held by the Local Power representativesin 1966 and 1967, these assemblies arc mass public meetings of the delegates' entire constituency. While the Local Power "Reports" were scheduled only once every six months and were actually held less fie, quenfly than that, the "Assemblies for Rendering Accounts" arc 34. Constitution of the Organs of People's Power, p. 22. 35. Ibid., p. 9.

58

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

being held every four months. The delegates' responsibilities in these meetings are clearly spelled out: to report on the activities of the Municipal Assembly of People's Power; to report on their personal performance in the assembly; and to solicit the people's complaints and suggestions. All complaints and suggestions are to be recorded; all proposals must be submitted to a vote of those present; and the results of these deliberations must be submitted by the delegate to the municipal assembly, even if the delegate personally disagrees with the comments or proposals made. "The delegate doesn't represent himself, but the mass of electors who have elected him," Ratll Castro explained, "and his duty is to act in the interests of the opinions expressed and the problems of the masses, not his personal opinions and problems."3e Finally, the delegate must report back to the people in the next public meeting on the action taken by People's Power regarding all the issues raised in the previous meeting. The people earl, if they so choose, see the disposition of such proposals for themselves, since all People's Power assemblies are open to the public and all are scheduled after working hours. Because the municipal Organs of People's Power deal exclusively with local issues, the criticisms and suggestions generated at the "Assemblies for Rendering Accounts" tend to be "concrete" criticisms aimed at problems in the locality itself. The assemblies are certainly not forums for criticizing, or even discussing, major national policy initiatives, since such matters are beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal Organ of People's Power. The' 'Assemblies for Rendering Accounts" are not the only structural device for keeping the delegates accountable to their constituents. Delegates are also required to meet once every three months with each CDR (Committee for the Defense of the Revolution) base committee in their circumscription to report on the activities of People's Power and to receive input from the members of these organizations. Finally, the delegates are supposed to set aside several hours each week ("consulting hours") so that members of the community earl meet with them on an individual basis. The citizenry also has the right to recall delegates who "are not adequately fulfilling their tasks in a responsible manner"--a right that is now described as "an essential part of a true democracy. ''37 Only the constituency that elected a delegate can remove him or her, but a recall proposal may be initiated by the Municipal People's 36. Ratll Castro, Speech on the 15th anniversary of the triumphof the Revolution. 37. Constitution of the Organs of People'sPower, p. 10.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

59

Power Assembly in which the delegate serves, the municipal Party Committee, the municipal leadership of any of the mass organizations, or by 20 percent of the circumscription's electors. 3s Since People's Power has only recently been instituted nationwide, it is still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of its mechanisms for assuring elite accountability. Results of the two-year Matanzas pilot project, however, offer preliminary indications that these mechanisms are functioning fairly well. The meetings for "Rendering Accounts" were held regularly and were attended by between 50 and 70 percent of the electorate, and people did visit delegates during their "consulting hours." By December 1975, when the Matanzas experiment was slightly over a year old, thirty-two of the 1,014 delegates had been recalled (3.2 percent). 39 Perhaps the most significant change brought about through the Organs of People's Power has been an increase in governmental responsiveness at the local level. The structures created provide people with easy access to their local delegate, and this appears to have eliminated much of the bureaucratic red tape that formerly characterized governmental responses to local problems. The creation of People's Power is unquestionably the most significantly political development in Cuba since the formation of the new Communist Party. The provisional governmental structure that existed during the 1960s is finally being replaced by the "final institutionalization of the socialist state." These new institutions of goveminent have built into them multiple channels for communicating popular opinions to decisionmakers and thus represent a vast expansion of popular input to policymaking. Prior to People's Power, the masses had no mechanism through which they could exert any direct influence on decisions being made in the state apparatus. Now, the citizenry not only nominates and elects the delegates who will be making decisions, they are assured ongoing access to those delegates as well. The delegates, who are required to represent the interests of their constituents, continue to live and work in the community which elected them, and they must meet every four months with all their electors in the "Assemblies for Rendering Accounts" and in the meetings with the CDR branches. If the delegates do not perform adequately, their electors can replace them at any time. Taken together, these mechanisms give the Cuban people a greater degree of 38. Ibid., p. 23. 39. Carolee Bengelsdorpf, " A Large School of Government," Cuba Review, VI, 3 (September 1976), pp. 3-18; Lourdes Casal, "On Popular Power. The Organization of the Cuban State During the Period of Transition," Latin American Perspectives, IT, 4 (1975), pp. 78-88.

60

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

access to the government apparatus than they have enjoyed over any other political institution created since the Revolution. The major limitation on popular input to decisionmaking seems to be the limitations of the Organs of People's Power in the decisionmaking process. These bodies are by no means autonomous; they are constrained from above by the decisions of higher People's Power organs and by the policy-initiating function of the Party. They are constrained in their own jurisdiction by the administrative discretion allowed to the managers of enterprises formally under the control of People's Power. Whether People's Power represents primarily a decentralization of decisionmaking or a decentralization of administrative supervision is difficult to assess at this point. It may well be that the answer to that question will vary considerably from one locality to another, depending upon the initiative of the People's Power organs themselves. Conclusion All these changes in the structure of Cuban political institutions since 1971 represent the implementation of a concept of democracy which differs substantially from the pre-1970 concept. No longer is the direct noninstitutionalized relationship between the people and the revolutionary leadership (primarily Fidel Castro) regarded as sufficient to ensure policy that accords with the demands and serves the interests of the general populace. Now, formal institutional mechanisms to ensure elite accountability--both through elections and through expanded popular input to decisionmaking--are perceived as being essential to proletarian democracy. This new concept of socialist democracy in Cuba is certainly much closer to the Leninist conception than was the Cuban direct democracy of the 1960s, and it has emerged at a time when the structure of the Cuban political system is coming to resemble, much more closely than ever before, the model of a "Communist political system" familiar to observers of Soviet and Eastern European politics. Yet the Cuban version seems, at this early juncture, to be making these formal structures operate just as they are purported to. Thus the Cubans seem intent on making the formal mechanisms of elite accountability (ever-present in the Soviet Union, for example, but often as little more than mere formality) a real, functioning part of the political system. In particular, if the Organs of People's Power actually operate as designed, they will give the general population considerable input to and control Over municipal government affairs. The Cuban leadership's seriousness in creating mechanisms of

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

61

elite accountability and popular input may well stem from the serious economic problems engendered in the late 1960s by the leadership's isolation from the attitudes of the general populace. Whatever the reason, Cuba, whose revolution (despite its manifest hardships) has had an easier time than the Bolshevik Revolution, appears to be avoiding the distortions of socialist democracy that have plagued so many other Communist political systems. Whether Cuba can succeed in translating theory into practice on a sustained, long-term basis, only the future will tell. There should be no illusion, however, that the Cuban political system is evolving toward a Western-style democracy. Cuba is explicitly a proletarian dictatorship, and democracy in Cuba must be understood within that context. None of the political changes instituted since 1970 reflects a diminished leadership role for the Party; on the contrary, one aspect of "institutionalizing" the revolution has been the strengthening of the Party. Nor do these changes include opportunities for opponents of the regime to organize or articulate alternative policies. Legitimate political participation is still channelled exclusively through regime-sanctioned institutions. Nevertheless, Cuba's current concept of democracy does mandate greater mass participation in politics and greater popular input to decisionmaking. For those Cubans who support the revolution and its basic policy orientations, the changes of the past few years have indeed constituted a "democratization" of the revolution.

Pos~cr~t The second nationwide election of People's Power delegates was held in April 1979, once again with voter turnout topping 90 percent for both the general election and the run-off election. Levels of participation in both the nominating process and the "Assemblies for Rendering Accounts" remain at about 70 percent. Between 1976 and 1978, these Assemblies produced over 330,000 proposals for consideration by the Municipal Organs of People's Power.

62

STUDIES 1N COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

While there is still some confusion regarding the working relationship between People's Power and the administrative apparatus of the government, the elected assemblies have been increasingly active in supervising public administration. It appears that People's Power represents not merely a decentralization of administration but, more significantly, a decentralization of political control over administrators as a new mechanism for holding bureaucrats accountable.