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Thomas aquinas on the justification of revolution
Hirrory Pnnted
of European Ideas, m Great Bntain
Vol.
16,
No.
4-6.
pp.
501-506,
1993
0191-6599193 $6.OO+O.Oil 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd
THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF REVOLUTION THOMASA. FAY*
The question of rebellion against civil authority was one to which Thomas Aquinas turned his attention repeatedly in his writings-from his very first writing, the Commentary on the Sentences, written about 1254-1256, to his very last in the second part of the Summa Theoiogiae, 1271-1272, the DeRegno, 1266, and the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 1272-1273.’ As one studies these writings one notes a change, perhaps quite considerable, in Thomas’s postion. In the earliest writings in the Commentary on the Sentences the right of rebelling against unjust civil authority is conceded quite readily, or so it seems, while in the later writings, for example in the De Regno, Thomas seems to turn a much bleaker gaze on rebellion. What I should like to do in this paper is to examine genetically the development, if such there is, in Thomas’s thought on the obligation of obedience to civil authority.
I. EARLIEST
WRITING
In the Commentary on the Sentences in Book II, distinction 44, question 2, article 2,’ Thomas treats, for the first time, the question of obedience to tyrannical authority. In the solutio of the article in a rather Neoplatonic way, he argues that all civil authority (v&us coactiva) descends from God, and hence we are bound, in general, to obey it as an expression of God’s divine order. However, he is perfectly well aware that not all civil authority is of this sort and the pages of history coruscate more with the figures of cruel tyrants than with the few faint glimmers of saintly King Louis IXs. He goes on to argue that the civil power may not be of divine ordinance in two ways: one, the way in which it is acquired (quantum ad modum acquirendi), and two, as to the way the power is exercised (quantum ad usum). In terms of the first, the mode of acquisition, this can happen in two ways. First if there is a defect in the person (defectum personae), for example if he is unworthy, or second, if the power is gained by violence, simony, usurpation, etc. If the defect is because of the unworthiness of the person holding office, Thomas asserts that we are obliged to obedience.3 If the second type of defect in the way power is acquired takes place, that is, power is seized through violence, no obedience is owed to it4 because violent usurpation does not, according to Aquinas, confer the jus praelationis, and therefore if one has the ability one may legitimately rebel against it.j The second way in which civil power may fail to command our obedience is by abusing it (quantum ad usum). Power may be abused in two ways. If civil *Department of Philosophy, St Johns Univesity, Grand Central and Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, NY 11439, U.S.A. 501
Thomas A. Fay
502
authority should command something which is against God’s law, it obviously does not command our obedience. This is clear since it derives whatever coactive power it has from divine law, so that if it commands whatever is contrary to this it ipsofacto loses its compelling force. Should this happen subjects are not only free to disobey such commands, but indeed are obliged to disobey them. The second way in which power may be abused is if the civil authority commands something beyond its competence ,6 for example if a tribute or tax is exacted to which the ruler is not entitled. In this case the subject is not bound to disobey, nor is he bound to obey. He is free to do what he wishes. One final point needs to be made here and that concerns tyrannicide. Would Thomas ever allow aggrieved subjects not only the right to depose a tyrant but, if need be, even to kill him. The answer seems to be in the affirmative. Thus he says in the answer to the fifth objection: Tullius is speaking about the case where someone has seized power for himself by violence, the subjects being unwilling, or where their consent has been forced, and where there is no recourse to a superior who can render judgment on the usurper. For then whoever kills the tyrant to free his country receives praise and reward.’
To sum up this section, then, we can say that at this period in his writings St Thomas argued first that since all earthly authority descends from God it commands our obedience. However, it does not take much knowledge of history to know that not all authority does in fact descend from God. If a tyrant seizes power by violence, he does not by that fact acquire the right to rule, the jus praelationis. At this stage, at least, in Thomas’s thought we do not owe such a ruler obedience. And if there is no other way of removing him Thomas would allow killing him. If the authority is legitimately constituted but commands what is against God’s law, not only are we not obliged to obey, we are obliged to disobey his sinful commands. And finally if a legitimate authority acts ultra virer, that is, issues commands which exceed his legal competence we are also not obliged to obey or to disobey. We are free to do what seems best to us. One final point for this section. Here in the Commentary on the Sentences Thomas doesn’t seem to place any restrictions at all on those who are unjustly governed. He doesn’t say anything about the necessity incumbent on those resisting authority of avoiding scandal or other dangers which insurrection might let loose. Nor does he speak at all about the spiritual value of patiently suffering injustice, as he will do in his later writings, to which we will now turn our attention.
II. LATER
WRITINGS
By the time of the writing of the second part of the second of the Summa about 1271-1272,8 Thomas seems a bit more reluctant to justify disobedience to civil authority. In the Summa Theologiae, II-II,q, 42, a.2 concerning sedition, Thomas still holds, as he did in his earlier writing, that the multitude of the citizens have the moral right to resist a tyrannical despot. And thus he states in his reply to the third objection: Theofogiae,
The JustiJi:cation of Revolution
503
. . a tyrannical regime is not just because it is not ordered to the common good but to the private good of the ruler.. . And therefore struggling against such a regime is not essentially sedition..
.’
But now there is a notable difference. Whereas in the Commentary on the Sentences this right of rebellion vacultas rebellandi)1° is unqualified, even up to tyrannicide. provided it meets the stipulated conditions, now in the Summa qualifications and limitations begin to creep in. Thus he immediately adds in this same reply to the third objection that we just quoted: . . unless perhaps when it disturbs the regime of the tyrant so inordinately that the subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than they suffered from the tyrant’s rule.” So a qualification is immediately placed on the right of resisting authority. The principle of proportion is invoked which indeed seems fairly close to a utilitarian principle-that is, the consequences must be measured in terms of the totality of harm being done and the good hoped for, If there is no proportion between the harm which the subjects are currently suffering, the insurrection cannot be justified. Moving now to question 104, article six, again in the second part of the second of the Summa, Aquinas takes up the same question that he had treated, and which we have examined in the Commentary on the Sentences, ‘Whether Christians are Bound to Obey Secular Powers’. Again the same objections are urged against obedience to secular princes -because we have been set free by Baptism we are no longer bound by secular power. In the Commentary on the Sentences Thomas had answered this argument by stating that while Baptism had freed us spiritually, we are still subject, while in the flesh, to secular authority because Baptism does not remove the defects of the body in its fallen condition. In the early writing his argument is similar, though not identical, to the Patristic and Augustinian concept of the origin of the state-that is, the state is propter peccatum, a punishment for man’s sin. This is not exactly the position of Aquinas in the Sentences but his position is not totally different either. In the Sentences servitude to secular power is part of the punishment of siqpoenapeccati. Thus he states in answer to the second objection:
. . and thus it does not necessarily follow that someone who is baptised is immediately freed from the condition of servitude, although this is the punishment of sin.12 As we shall see, as Thomas’s thought develops, particularly toward the end of his life, after his deep study of Aristotle which is manifested by the fact that he did commentaries on all of Aristotle’s major works, his view of the role of the state will also change and become much more Aristotelian. This change is already manifesting itself in the text that we are considering, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 104, a. 6. His argument here for obedience to legitimate authority is now quite different, more Aristotelian, than that of the Sentences. Now he argues: The order of justice requires that inferiors obey superiors: otherwise a stable order of human life could not be conserved. And therefore the faithful are not excused from obedience to secular princes.‘3
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Thomas A. Fay
This is obviously a quite different line of argument from the Sentences. The answer to the third objection is also of interest. Here the argument by which he justifies obedience to civil authority is very close to that of the Sentences. Man is bound to obey secular princes insofar as the order of justice requires this. And therefore if the civil power is not just but usurpation or if unjust things are commanded, the subjects are not bound to obey them.. .I4
Thus the argument here is quite similar to the one of the Sentences. If there is a defect in the mode of acquiring power, for example if it is seized by violence against the will of the people, or if the power is abused by commanding sinful things, or things beyond its competence, subjects are not obliged to obey it. But now a cautionary note creeps in which was not present in the Sentences, but is similar to what we have already seen in the question on sedition. Subjects might be obliged to obey even unjust commands, not to be sure as though these intrinsically commanded obedience, but perhaps per accidens, ‘in order to avoid scandal or danger’.15 St Thomas seems to be growing much more cautious about giving carte blanche to wild-eyed revolutionaries. And now we will move into the final work which we shall consider, the De Regno, On Kingship, or as it is also called, the DeRegimine Principum, completed probably about the year 1267,16 that is seven years before Thomas’s death. In De Regno, St Thomas walks on tippytoes around the question of rebellion. First of all given the fact that rule by one is the best,” and also that rule by one can so easily degenerate into tyranny, we should make very careful provisions to prevent this from happening. ‘* This means that his power should be very closely circumscribed. But suppose that with all of our diligent care somehow a tyrannous regime comes about. What then? Now St Thomas’s position is very different from that of the Sentences. Well, he says, in effect, if it isn’t too bad its probably better to tolerate it. Thus he remarks: Indeed, rf there be not an excess of tyranny it is more expedient to tolerate the milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved in many perils more grevious than the tyranny itself.19
Again, the same principle of proportion appears. One must weigh the consequence of insurrection. He seems to be saying in this section of the De Regno that if history teaches us anything, it is that when some would-be savior rises up to save us from a regent tyrant, we are very likely to replace one tyrant with another one who is worse than the first. Here there is a very considerable change from the position of Aquinas in the Sentences. How is this change to be accounted for? It may be that as Thomas’s Aristotelianism deepened, ‘O he became much more empirical, much more experiential, much less abstract. As a young theologian in the Sentences, his method shows a marked contrast to the one which we see operating here. In the Senfences, as a theologian, his method is abstract and speculative. Here in the De Regno it is very much different. It is concrete, experiential, and highly practical. He seems to be saying about rebellion, even against tyrants, what he had hinted at in the question on sedition where he referred to proportion. What has history
The Justification
of Revolution
505
shown us? Most of the time these would-be saviors who are going to deliver us from tyranny wind up worse than their predecessors and produce a tyranny that is worse than the one that preceded it. And on this point Aquinas has a strong historical argument in his favor. While there were, no doubt, many injustices in the monarchy which preceded the French Revolution, was Robespierre and the Reign of Terror which followed all that much better than Louis XVI, and was the blood bath that was the aftermath of the Revolution that much of an improvement on the previous state of affairs? Certainly, conditions under the czars in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were a great deal less than utopian. But was Russia after the Revolution under Stalin really an improvement? One certainly can deplore the corruption of the Battista regime which preceded Castro, but again has that revolution, on balance, really improved the lot of the Cuban people that much? St Thomas’s position here seems to be very wise and prudent. Examine the credentials of would-be revolutionary messiahs very carefully-and then say, “we don’t think we will be able to use your services”. Finally, even in the De Regno the subjects are not left without any redress from tyranny, but it must be the majority of the citizens who decide this. St Thomas’s position here seems to be an adumbration of that of Locke in Locke’s justification of rebellion. Since, Thomas says, it belongs to the people to make a king they can also unmake him.*’ There exists a covenant (pacturn)‘* between them he says. Hence if through tyrannous actions the king breaks that covenant, the people are no longer bound by it, for it is the king himself who has broken it and they may depose him and establish another.
CONCLUSION In conclusion we can see that there is a considerable development in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, as he moves from an abstract, speculative position in his youthful writing to a much more concrete, practical, empirical, that is Aristotelian, approach in his most mature writings. He does not totally rule out the possibility of rebellion against tyranny in his later writing, but he would make the justification of it as difficult as possible. Thomas St John’s University,
A. Fay
New York
NOTES 1. Following the chronology given by Raymundus Verardo In the Marietti edition of the Opuscula Theologica, 1954. 2. Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, ed. Peter Fiaccadori (Parma, 1856). 3. Ibid., ‘Ideo talibus praelatis, quamvis indignis, obedire tenentur subditi’. 4. Ibid., ‘. qui per violentiam praelationem accipiunt, non sunt veri praelati; unde net eis obedire tenentur subditi . . .‘. 5. Ibid., ‘. . . cum facultas adest potest aliquis tale dominium repellere’. 6. Ibid., ‘. . . cogunt ad hoc ad quod ordo praelationis non se extendit.. ,‘.
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7. All translations are my own. Ibid., ‘Ad quintum dicendum, quod Tullius loquitur in casu illo quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit, nolentibus subditis, vel etiam and consensum coactis, et quando non est recursus ad superiorem, per quem judicmm de invasore possit fieri: tune enim qm ad liberationem patriae tyrannum accidit, laudatur et praemium accipit’. 8. Marietti, op. cir. 9. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3: ‘. regimen tyrannicum non est justum: quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis.. . Et ideo perturbatio huius regiminis non habet rationem seditionis.. .‘. 10. In ZZ Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, obj. 4. Il. Sum. Theo/. II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3: ‘. . . nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyranni regimen quod multitude subiecta maius detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione consequenti quam ex tyranni regimine’. 12. 1n II Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: ‘. . . et sic non oportet ut ahquis statim baptizatus a servili conditione liberetur quamvis illa sit poena peccati’. 13. Sum. TheoI., II-II, q. 104, a. 6: ‘. . . ordo autem justittae requirit ut inferiores suis superioribus obediant: aliter enim non posset humanarum rerum status conservari. Et ideo per tidem Christi non excusantur fideles quin principibus saecularibus obedire teneantur’. 14. Sum. Theol., II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3: ‘.. . principibus saecularibus intantum homo obedire tenetur, inquantum ordo justitiae requirit. Et ideo si non habeant justum principatum sed usurpatum, vel si iniusta praecipiant, non tenentur eis subditi obedire . .‘. 15. 1bbid., &.. . propter vnandum scandalurn vel penculum’. 16. On problems concerning the dating and authenticity of the De Regno see for example James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Lrfe. Thoughtand Works (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 189. 17. De Regimine Principum, I, 6: ‘. . . unius regimen praeeligendum est, quod est optimum. . .‘. 18. Ibrd. 19. Ibid., ‘Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyranmdem tolerare ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo muhis implicari pericuhs quae sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide’. 20. On St Thomas’s increasing Aristoteliamsm see especially Thomas Gilby, The Polrtical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Chicago University Press, 1958), pp. 94, 98, 239. 21. De Regimine Principum, I, 6: ‘. . . si ad jus multitudimsalicuius pertmeat sibi providere de rege, non mluste ab eadem rex institutus potest destrui vel refrenari eius potestas. si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur’. 22. Zbrd.
of European Ideas, m Great Bntain
Vol.
16,
No.
4-6.
pp.
501-506,
1993
0191-6599193 $6.OO+O.Oil 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd
THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF REVOLUTION THOMASA. FAY*
The question of rebellion against civil authority was one to which Thomas Aquinas turned his attention repeatedly in his writings-from his very first writing, the Commentary on the Sentences, written about 1254-1256, to his very last in the second part of the Summa Theoiogiae, 1271-1272, the DeRegno, 1266, and the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 1272-1273.’ As one studies these writings one notes a change, perhaps quite considerable, in Thomas’s postion. In the earliest writings in the Commentary on the Sentences the right of rebelling against unjust civil authority is conceded quite readily, or so it seems, while in the later writings, for example in the De Regno, Thomas seems to turn a much bleaker gaze on rebellion. What I should like to do in this paper is to examine genetically the development, if such there is, in Thomas’s thought on the obligation of obedience to civil authority.
I. EARLIEST
WRITING
In the Commentary on the Sentences in Book II, distinction 44, question 2, article 2,’ Thomas treats, for the first time, the question of obedience to tyrannical authority. In the solutio of the article in a rather Neoplatonic way, he argues that all civil authority (v&us coactiva) descends from God, and hence we are bound, in general, to obey it as an expression of God’s divine order. However, he is perfectly well aware that not all civil authority is of this sort and the pages of history coruscate more with the figures of cruel tyrants than with the few faint glimmers of saintly King Louis IXs. He goes on to argue that the civil power may not be of divine ordinance in two ways: one, the way in which it is acquired (quantum ad modum acquirendi), and two, as to the way the power is exercised (quantum ad usum). In terms of the first, the mode of acquisition, this can happen in two ways. First if there is a defect in the person (defectum personae), for example if he is unworthy, or second, if the power is gained by violence, simony, usurpation, etc. If the defect is because of the unworthiness of the person holding office, Thomas asserts that we are obliged to obedience.3 If the second type of defect in the way power is acquired takes place, that is, power is seized through violence, no obedience is owed to it4 because violent usurpation does not, according to Aquinas, confer the jus praelationis, and therefore if one has the ability one may legitimately rebel against it.j The second way in which civil power may fail to command our obedience is by abusing it (quantum ad usum). Power may be abused in two ways. If civil *Department of Philosophy, St Johns Univesity, Grand Central and Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, NY 11439, U.S.A. 501
Thomas A. Fay
502
authority should command something which is against God’s law, it obviously does not command our obedience. This is clear since it derives whatever coactive power it has from divine law, so that if it commands whatever is contrary to this it ipsofacto loses its compelling force. Should this happen subjects are not only free to disobey such commands, but indeed are obliged to disobey them. The second way in which power may be abused is if the civil authority commands something beyond its competence ,6 for example if a tribute or tax is exacted to which the ruler is not entitled. In this case the subject is not bound to disobey, nor is he bound to obey. He is free to do what he wishes. One final point needs to be made here and that concerns tyrannicide. Would Thomas ever allow aggrieved subjects not only the right to depose a tyrant but, if need be, even to kill him. The answer seems to be in the affirmative. Thus he says in the answer to the fifth objection: Tullius is speaking about the case where someone has seized power for himself by violence, the subjects being unwilling, or where their consent has been forced, and where there is no recourse to a superior who can render judgment on the usurper. For then whoever kills the tyrant to free his country receives praise and reward.’
To sum up this section, then, we can say that at this period in his writings St Thomas argued first that since all earthly authority descends from God it commands our obedience. However, it does not take much knowledge of history to know that not all authority does in fact descend from God. If a tyrant seizes power by violence, he does not by that fact acquire the right to rule, the jus praelationis. At this stage, at least, in Thomas’s thought we do not owe such a ruler obedience. And if there is no other way of removing him Thomas would allow killing him. If the authority is legitimately constituted but commands what is against God’s law, not only are we not obliged to obey, we are obliged to disobey his sinful commands. And finally if a legitimate authority acts ultra virer, that is, issues commands which exceed his legal competence we are also not obliged to obey or to disobey. We are free to do what seems best to us. One final point for this section. Here in the Commentary on the Sentences Thomas doesn’t seem to place any restrictions at all on those who are unjustly governed. He doesn’t say anything about the necessity incumbent on those resisting authority of avoiding scandal or other dangers which insurrection might let loose. Nor does he speak at all about the spiritual value of patiently suffering injustice, as he will do in his later writings, to which we will now turn our attention.
II. LATER
WRITINGS
By the time of the writing of the second part of the second of the Summa about 1271-1272,8 Thomas seems a bit more reluctant to justify disobedience to civil authority. In the Summa Theologiae, II-II,q, 42, a.2 concerning sedition, Thomas still holds, as he did in his earlier writing, that the multitude of the citizens have the moral right to resist a tyrannical despot. And thus he states in his reply to the third objection: Theofogiae,
The JustiJi:cation of Revolution
503
. . a tyrannical regime is not just because it is not ordered to the common good but to the private good of the ruler.. . And therefore struggling against such a regime is not essentially sedition..
.’
But now there is a notable difference. Whereas in the Commentary on the Sentences this right of rebellion vacultas rebellandi)1° is unqualified, even up to tyrannicide. provided it meets the stipulated conditions, now in the Summa qualifications and limitations begin to creep in. Thus he immediately adds in this same reply to the third objection that we just quoted: . . unless perhaps when it disturbs the regime of the tyrant so inordinately that the subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than they suffered from the tyrant’s rule.” So a qualification is immediately placed on the right of resisting authority. The principle of proportion is invoked which indeed seems fairly close to a utilitarian principle-that is, the consequences must be measured in terms of the totality of harm being done and the good hoped for, If there is no proportion between the harm which the subjects are currently suffering, the insurrection cannot be justified. Moving now to question 104, article six, again in the second part of the second of the Summa, Aquinas takes up the same question that he had treated, and which we have examined in the Commentary on the Sentences, ‘Whether Christians are Bound to Obey Secular Powers’. Again the same objections are urged against obedience to secular princes -because we have been set free by Baptism we are no longer bound by secular power. In the Commentary on the Sentences Thomas had answered this argument by stating that while Baptism had freed us spiritually, we are still subject, while in the flesh, to secular authority because Baptism does not remove the defects of the body in its fallen condition. In the early writing his argument is similar, though not identical, to the Patristic and Augustinian concept of the origin of the state-that is, the state is propter peccatum, a punishment for man’s sin. This is not exactly the position of Aquinas in the Sentences but his position is not totally different either. In the Sentences servitude to secular power is part of the punishment of siqpoenapeccati. Thus he states in answer to the second objection:
. . and thus it does not necessarily follow that someone who is baptised is immediately freed from the condition of servitude, although this is the punishment of sin.12 As we shall see, as Thomas’s thought develops, particularly toward the end of his life, after his deep study of Aristotle which is manifested by the fact that he did commentaries on all of Aristotle’s major works, his view of the role of the state will also change and become much more Aristotelian. This change is already manifesting itself in the text that we are considering, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 104, a. 6. His argument here for obedience to legitimate authority is now quite different, more Aristotelian, than that of the Sentences. Now he argues: The order of justice requires that inferiors obey superiors: otherwise a stable order of human life could not be conserved. And therefore the faithful are not excused from obedience to secular princes.‘3
504
Thomas A. Fay
This is obviously a quite different line of argument from the Sentences. The answer to the third objection is also of interest. Here the argument by which he justifies obedience to civil authority is very close to that of the Sentences. Man is bound to obey secular princes insofar as the order of justice requires this. And therefore if the civil power is not just but usurpation or if unjust things are commanded, the subjects are not bound to obey them.. .I4
Thus the argument here is quite similar to the one of the Sentences. If there is a defect in the mode of acquiring power, for example if it is seized by violence against the will of the people, or if the power is abused by commanding sinful things, or things beyond its competence, subjects are not obliged to obey it. But now a cautionary note creeps in which was not present in the Sentences, but is similar to what we have already seen in the question on sedition. Subjects might be obliged to obey even unjust commands, not to be sure as though these intrinsically commanded obedience, but perhaps per accidens, ‘in order to avoid scandal or danger’.15 St Thomas seems to be growing much more cautious about giving carte blanche to wild-eyed revolutionaries. And now we will move into the final work which we shall consider, the De Regno, On Kingship, or as it is also called, the DeRegimine Principum, completed probably about the year 1267,16 that is seven years before Thomas’s death. In De Regno, St Thomas walks on tippytoes around the question of rebellion. First of all given the fact that rule by one is the best,” and also that rule by one can so easily degenerate into tyranny, we should make very careful provisions to prevent this from happening. ‘* This means that his power should be very closely circumscribed. But suppose that with all of our diligent care somehow a tyrannous regime comes about. What then? Now St Thomas’s position is very different from that of the Sentences. Well, he says, in effect, if it isn’t too bad its probably better to tolerate it. Thus he remarks: Indeed, rf there be not an excess of tyranny it is more expedient to tolerate the milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved in many perils more grevious than the tyranny itself.19
Again, the same principle of proportion appears. One must weigh the consequence of insurrection. He seems to be saying in this section of the De Regno that if history teaches us anything, it is that when some would-be savior rises up to save us from a regent tyrant, we are very likely to replace one tyrant with another one who is worse than the first. Here there is a very considerable change from the position of Aquinas in the Sentences. How is this change to be accounted for? It may be that as Thomas’s Aristotelianism deepened, ‘O he became much more empirical, much more experiential, much less abstract. As a young theologian in the Sentences, his method shows a marked contrast to the one which we see operating here. In the Senfences, as a theologian, his method is abstract and speculative. Here in the De Regno it is very much different. It is concrete, experiential, and highly practical. He seems to be saying about rebellion, even against tyrants, what he had hinted at in the question on sedition where he referred to proportion. What has history
The Justification
of Revolution
505
shown us? Most of the time these would-be saviors who are going to deliver us from tyranny wind up worse than their predecessors and produce a tyranny that is worse than the one that preceded it. And on this point Aquinas has a strong historical argument in his favor. While there were, no doubt, many injustices in the monarchy which preceded the French Revolution, was Robespierre and the Reign of Terror which followed all that much better than Louis XVI, and was the blood bath that was the aftermath of the Revolution that much of an improvement on the previous state of affairs? Certainly, conditions under the czars in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were a great deal less than utopian. But was Russia after the Revolution under Stalin really an improvement? One certainly can deplore the corruption of the Battista regime which preceded Castro, but again has that revolution, on balance, really improved the lot of the Cuban people that much? St Thomas’s position here seems to be very wise and prudent. Examine the credentials of would-be revolutionary messiahs very carefully-and then say, “we don’t think we will be able to use your services”. Finally, even in the De Regno the subjects are not left without any redress from tyranny, but it must be the majority of the citizens who decide this. St Thomas’s position here seems to be an adumbration of that of Locke in Locke’s justification of rebellion. Since, Thomas says, it belongs to the people to make a king they can also unmake him.*’ There exists a covenant (pacturn)‘* between them he says. Hence if through tyrannous actions the king breaks that covenant, the people are no longer bound by it, for it is the king himself who has broken it and they may depose him and establish another.
CONCLUSION In conclusion we can see that there is a considerable development in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, as he moves from an abstract, speculative position in his youthful writing to a much more concrete, practical, empirical, that is Aristotelian, approach in his most mature writings. He does not totally rule out the possibility of rebellion against tyranny in his later writing, but he would make the justification of it as difficult as possible. Thomas St John’s University,
A. Fay
New York
NOTES 1. Following the chronology given by Raymundus Verardo In the Marietti edition of the Opuscula Theologica, 1954. 2. Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, ed. Peter Fiaccadori (Parma, 1856). 3. Ibid., ‘Ideo talibus praelatis, quamvis indignis, obedire tenentur subditi’. 4. Ibid., ‘. qui per violentiam praelationem accipiunt, non sunt veri praelati; unde net eis obedire tenentur subditi . . .‘. 5. Ibid., ‘. . . cum facultas adest potest aliquis tale dominium repellere’. 6. Ibid., ‘. . . cogunt ad hoc ad quod ordo praelationis non se extendit.. ,‘.
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7. All translations are my own. Ibid., ‘Ad quintum dicendum, quod Tullius loquitur in casu illo quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit, nolentibus subditis, vel etiam and consensum coactis, et quando non est recursus ad superiorem, per quem judicmm de invasore possit fieri: tune enim qm ad liberationem patriae tyrannum accidit, laudatur et praemium accipit’. 8. Marietti, op. cir. 9. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3: ‘. regimen tyrannicum non est justum: quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis.. . Et ideo perturbatio huius regiminis non habet rationem seditionis.. .‘. 10. In ZZ Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, obj. 4. Il. Sum. Theo/. II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3: ‘. . . nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyranni regimen quod multitude subiecta maius detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione consequenti quam ex tyranni regimine’. 12. 1n II Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: ‘. . . et sic non oportet ut ahquis statim baptizatus a servili conditione liberetur quamvis illa sit poena peccati’. 13. Sum. TheoI., II-II, q. 104, a. 6: ‘. . . ordo autem justittae requirit ut inferiores suis superioribus obediant: aliter enim non posset humanarum rerum status conservari. Et ideo per tidem Christi non excusantur fideles quin principibus saecularibus obedire teneantur’. 14. Sum. Theol., II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3: ‘.. . principibus saecularibus intantum homo obedire tenetur, inquantum ordo justitiae requirit. Et ideo si non habeant justum principatum sed usurpatum, vel si iniusta praecipiant, non tenentur eis subditi obedire . .‘. 15. 1bbid., &.. . propter vnandum scandalurn vel penculum’. 16. On problems concerning the dating and authenticity of the De Regno see for example James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Lrfe. Thoughtand Works (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 189. 17. De Regimine Principum, I, 6: ‘. . . unius regimen praeeligendum est, quod est optimum. . .‘. 18. Ibrd. 19. Ibid., ‘Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyranmdem tolerare ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo muhis implicari pericuhs quae sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide’. 20. On St Thomas’s increasing Aristoteliamsm see especially Thomas Gilby, The Polrtical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Chicago University Press, 1958), pp. 94, 98, 239. 21. De Regimine Principum, I, 6: ‘. . . si ad jus multitudimsalicuius pertmeat sibi providere de rege, non mluste ab eadem rex institutus potest destrui vel refrenari eius potestas. si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur’. 22. Zbrd.