To have or not to have a handbook: The legal effect of employee handbooks on law enforcement agencies

Journal of Criminal

Pergamon

Justice, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 205-213. 1994 Copyright 01994 Elsevicr Science Ltd Printed in U.S.A. All nghts reserved 0047.2352/94 $6.00 + .OO

0047-2352(94)E0003-T

TOHAVEORNOTTOHAVEAHANDBOOK: THE LEGAL EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

ERIC MOORE

and ROLANDO

V. DEL CARMEN

College of Criminal Justice Sam Houston State University Huntsville. Texas 7734 1

ABSTRACT This urticle analyzes recent stute and federal court decisions on the effect of police department employee handbooks. Specljicully, the questions of whether and when such manuals create an employment contract enforceable by the employee are discussed. The legal stutus of at-will employment doctrines in states and their interrelation with certain federal civil rights actions are examined. The situations in which police employee manuals have been used as buses for such actions are explored, along with fhctors considered by courts when deciding such suits. Trends in this area qf law are identified, and steps the police executive can take to avoid adverse outcomes when drafting such manuals are suggested.

The law governing an employer’s right to terminate employees in the absence of a specific employment contract is undergoing rapid evolution in many American jurisdictions (33 ALR 4th 120). Concurrently, police agencies of all sizes are being encouraged to standardize their personnel policies as part of the nationwide movement toward accreditation. Even small law enforcement agencies are finding professional and financial advantages in reducing hitherto unwritten, informal, or

customary personnel policies to writing (Arthurs, 1990). Having an agency manual has proven to be a viable defense for supervisors in civil liability cases for negligent failure to direct. These two trends, however, may converge to create a trap for the unwary police executive when faced with the necessity of discharging an unsatisfactory employee. In many states written personnel policies and employee handbooks are now considered

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evidence of an employment contract and of the terms of that contract. This is most common in private employment but has also occurred in public and law enforcement settings. A discharged employee may bring suit against his or her department in some jurisdictions if the discharge was for reasons and under procedures other than those specified in the handbook or in departmental regulations, even if there was no formal employment contract. This result can occur even if the employing agency regards its employees as terminable at pleasure and even if the laws of the state do not recognize a general right to continued employment. This article will first summarize the various terms of employment ordinarily found in police departments. Next. the common law doctrine of employment-at-will. once strictly adhered to in most American jurisdictions. will be examined, When and why this doctrine has been specifically applied or not applied to public employers and police agencies will then be explained. with a review of pertinent case law involving discharge of police and public employees in violation of agency handbook or regulation provisions. Trends and principles will be derived from this review so that police administrators will realize how the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine may affect their termination policies and practices. This knowledge should help law enforcement executives avoid unintended. costly. and disruptive results from lawsuits as executives strive to further professionalize their departments.

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE Many police officers hold their jobs by virtue of one of the following: ( I) collective bargaining agreements, (2) civil service statutes, or (3) provisions of law. Studies show that about 70 percent of police departments with 100 or more officers nationwide engage in collective bargaining (Reaves, 1992). In these departments the grounds and procedure

V. ,)t,. CARMEN

for discharge are governed by the appropriate collective bargaining agreement. civil service statute, or law. When none of these apply, however, a police officer may be an enployee-at-will, The employment-at-will doctrine is a common law principle of long standing. In essence it holds that if an employment contract is not for a definite term, and if there is no contractual or statutory restriction. an cnplayer may discharge an employee at any time for good cause, no cause, or bad cause which is not illegal (53 Am Jur 2d. Master and Servant. 4#27, 33). The rule remains in force in many states. and employers often rely on it when terminating an unsatisfactory employee. The doctrine is a general law in the absence of specific statutes or ordinances to the contrary and hence is most commonly applied to private employment. Even in the absence of ;I collective bargaining agreement or civil service statute. many discharges are unprotected by the atwill doctrine. The courts will not permit the termination of an a-will employee which is motivated by reasons which violate public policy. This encompasses such instances as discharge for reporting tar jury or military duty. union membership, purposes of pension fraud. or “whistlc-blowing” by a public employee (Smith. 1991). The list of these public policy exceptions will vary somewhat from state to state and is usually derived from specific state statutes. In a few instances the courts will declare a particular type of discharge to bc unlawful because it is without statutory authorization. For example. the Texas Supreme Court has prohibited the discharge of an employee if the sole ground for the discharge is refusal to perform an illegal act.’ Specific municipal ordinances or state law may also specifically prohibit certain grounds for discharge. such as age. disability, contraction of AIDS. or sexual orientation. Federal law also places significant restrictions on an employer’s right to fire. Federal statutes prohibit discharge for reasons of sexual or racial discrimination’ and may prevent discharge for disability’ or age.’ Nor may an

Legal Effect of Employee

Handbooks

at-will public employee be terminated in violation of important constitutional rights such as the First Amendment freedoms of association, speech, or religion.” In cases in which none of the aforementioned restrictions apply, the problem for executives is that even when the at-will doctrine applies to their employees, courts in many states are modifying the doctrine to give employees an actionable right against discharge without cause if their employer has promulgated internal policies detailing the procedures or grounds for termination and then fails to follow them. Under law a contract need not always be a signed nor a formal bilateral document so labeled. A contract can be a legally enforceable agreement although not signed or bilateral. Moreover, evidence of it may be inferred from a variety of sources. The risk is likely to arise when executives issue an employee manual containing provisions for notice prior to termination and an enumeration of causes for cancellation of employment. Thirty-six state supreme courts have held that employee handbooks may give rise to or be evidence of an implied contract of employment (McWhirter, 1993). In these states an employee terminated in violation of the handbook provisions may sue the employer for breach of contract and offer the manual into evidence as proof of the existence of a contract of employment. The handbook or manual need not be particularly elaborate or comprehensive for courts to consider it as evidence of a contract. In some cases even a small document detailing disciplinary procedures alone can serve as such evidence. In most departments with collective bargaining agreements, grounds for discharge are specified in the collective bargaining agreement and often incorporate the personnel manual by reference. In these situations, violations of the manual provisions on discharge procedures are also violations of the collective bargaining agreement and can serve as a basis of employer liability (Aitchison, 1992). Although the issue of wrongful discharge revolves around state law, suit in such cases

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is sometimes brought by the discharged employee in federal court under Title 42 of the United States Code, $1983, alleging a civil rights violation. This is because although the employee’s property interest in employment, if any, is created and limited by state law, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, $1). Where such a deprivation of due process is alleged, the federal court will seek to determine whether, under state law, the discharged employee had a legitimate claim or entitlement in the property interest, rather than a mere need, desire, or abstract hope for it.6 If such an entitlement exists, the employer must also have met certain federal procedural requirements prior to discharging the employee. These requirements apply only to cases brought under Title 42 and will be discussed in the final section of this article. In making this preliminary determination, the courts will assume the facts to be as alleged by the plaintiff and will not rule on any controverted issues of fact because this would require a full trial on the facts before it has been determined whether any legal right of the discharged employee was actually violated. Whether the lawsuit is brought in a state or a federal forum, courts have arrived at three broad categories of results when ruling on plaintiffs’ claims. First, some courts have flatly held that employment manuals or standard employment procedures do not, in and of themselves, indicate an enforceable employment contract; hence the employer may discharge the employee at pleasure. Second, in some states the courts have held that a manual can be offered into evidence as proof of an employment contract but does not in itself establish the existence of a property right to continued employment. The question whether an employment contract exists is left to the trier of fact, usually a jury. Third, in a few states the delivery or existence of an employment manual may be viewed as strong presumptive evidence of the existence

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and ROLAND0

of an employment contract. These three outcomes are examined in the case review which follows. FIRST CATEGORY: EMPLOYMENT MANUAL CREATES NO CONTRACT RIGHTS; THEREFORE EMPLOYEE REMAINS TERMINABLE AT-WILL In states adhering strictly to the at-will employment doctrine, even an employer’s issuance of a handbook specifying the grounds for discharge and instituting a gradual disciplinary procedure prior to discharge does not create an employee right to such procedures or to be discharged only for the enumerated grounds. This was the holding reached in Shav v. S.S. Kresge Co. (Indiana, 197.5), in which the court held that absent a specific promise on the part of the employer to continue employment for a determinable period of time, the elaborate procedures had no contractual force and the employer could violate them with impunity in discharging the employee. Police employment, as a category of public employment, is often affected by specific state constitutional or statutory provisions and local ordinances which may supersede the general contract doctrine of the state. This can result in a complex multifactorial legal analysis, as is illustrated by a pair of Colorado cases. In Juckson v. Johns ( 1989), the federal court noted that Colorado statute specifically provided that deputy sheriffs were employed at the pleasure of the sheriff. holding that this provision superseded any local procedures or arrangements. The sheriff, even if he so desired, was powerless to enter into an employment contract with the deputy if the contract was at variance with the statute. The court held that because of state law, a deputy could never be other than an at-will employee. This was an exceptional outcome because, as noted earlier. at-will status is usually residual rather than statutory. The statutory provision relied on in Jucksm. however, did not apply to enumerated “home rule” counties, which were free to abrogate or modify the employment at will of

V. I)~I. CARMEN

sheriff’s deputies by adopting career service ordinances. Thus, in Goodwin v. Debekker (1989). the deputy alleged that his discharge was in violation of rights created by an employment manual, but the record was silent on whether the county of his employment was a home rule county. The court held the matter in abeyance, refusing to rule on whether the manual created a protected property interest in employment until the parties submitted evidence on the home county issue.

SECOND CATEGORY: PERSONNEL MANUAL MAY BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS If state law holds that an employment contract may be implied from the particular facts and circumstances of a given case even though the employer has not made a definite commitment to employment for a determinable period, the determination of whether such a contract exists will often be a matter for the finder of fact to determine, hence precluding a summary judgment for either party. This scenario is likely to arise in cases in which the evidence of a contract, such as an employment manual, is ambiguous and subject to different reasonable interpretations. For example, in Whicfield v. Firm (1984), a discharged police officer brought suit in Alabama, basing his claim on a departmental personnel notice specifying probationary policies for new hires which was violated in his dismissal. Although the court noted that Alabama (at that time) adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine, “A question thus remains as to whether the parties understood the notice and attached regulations to constitute all or [only] a part of their employment agreement. It is true that the notice is not a model of clarity” (1508). In Whiffield the court looked to the deposition testimony of the mayor of the jurisdiction to resolve the issue. The mayor testified that it was the general custom of the town not to discharge police officers except for good

Legal Effect of Employee

Handbooks

cause. According to the court, this evidence and the employment notice were enough to raise a reasonable question as to whether an employment contract for discharge only on good cause existed; therefore summary judgment for the township was denied. The court specifically declined to hold that an employee handbook could not, as a matter of law, establish a property interest in public employment. Similarly, in Palmer v. City of Monticello (1990), a police officer in an at-will state was discharged in violation of the procedures contained in the departmental employment manual. Specifically, Officer Palmer alleged that under the terms of the employment manual, he was entitled to a pretermination hearing at which all the charges constituting grounds for discharge would be presented. The officer was discharged for falsifying a traffic ticket and for disclosing confidential information to unauthorized persons. The latter charge was not, however, presented at the hearing, The court first concluded that the Utah civil service statute exempted police officers from coverage and thus the state employment-atwill doctrine applied to them, as it would to private employees. However, police, like other employees, were free to bargain for different conditions of employment. The federal court noted that “Utah law recognized the possibility of an implied employment contract based on the terms and conditions of an employment manual, which could rebut the at will presumption . whether or not the City’s Personnel Manual created an implied employment contract may be a question of fact for a jury to decide” ( 1507). The court ruled that if indeed the manual created such a contract, and if the facts were as Palmer alleged, the failure to notify Palmer of the second charge against him prior to termination amounted to wrongful discharge. The court denied the city’s motion for summary judgment; hence the city’s failure to follow the very procedures it had prescribed for itself ensured that the case would result in a costly civil trial.

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THIRD CATEGORY: MANUAL CREATES STRONG BASIS FOR INFERRING THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT The most extreme inroad into the common law at-will employment doctrine has occurred in Michigan and Alabama. The Michigan Supreme Court held in the landmark case of Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan (1980) that policy manual statements may create enforceable rights in the employee. In Toussaint, the discharged Blue Cross employee had worked for the company for five years, having completed his probationary term long before his termination. At the time of his hiring, Toussaint asked about job security. He testified that he was told he would be with the company “as long as I did my job” (884). At the same time he received this assurance he was handed a copy of the personnel manual, which set forth the disciplinary procedures which applied to Blue Cross employees. The manual stated that it was the policy of the company to discharge for just cause only. The Michigan Supreme Court noted that Blue Cross could have easily established a company policy of drawing the attention of potential employees to their at-will status or requiring them to acknowledge such status. The fact that Toussaint negotiated for job security was itself some indication of the existence of an employment contract. However, his testimony was not necessary to establish a cause of action for wrongful discharge given the content of the personnel manual. The court said that an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The right to continued employment absent cause for termination may, thus, because ofstated employer policies and established procedures, be enforceable in contract, just as are rights so derived to bonuses, pensions, and other forms of compensation as previously held by Michigan Courts [emphasis added]. (892-894). While

2 IO

ERIC MOORI! and ROLAND0

The Court in Toussair~t further held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have actually read the manual for it to be enforceable against the employer. mere delivery of the manual was enough to hold the employer to its contents. The Michigan Court of Appeals extended this holding to public employees in RN.W/I v. Cit! oj’Eu.st Jordm ( IW5), ruling that a municipal employee discharged without cause had a reasonable expectation that the city’s policy and benefits manual provided an inplied contract of continued employment with discharge for cause only. The Court of Appeals noted that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the elements of the implied contract under %xrs.wtittt but that the Policy tr17tl Hrt7qfi’t.s Mtrt7urrl was itself such proof. This made the plaintiff’s burden easy to meet. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted in Schurtz v. Miclii~qi7i SlrgcltCo. ( I98 I ). however. that an employee’s sukjective expectations of continued employment based only on his or her own loyalty to the corn pany and the company’s supportive work atmosphere arc not adequate grounds from which to infer a contract of employment. Absent specific rules or regulations promulgated by the employer regarding discharge. the employee remains terminable at-will. In Scl7\\urtz the court upheld the termination ot the plaintiff. Further drift of case law away from the strict at-will employment doctrine is well illustrated by the Alabama Supreme Court’s about face in HoJinclwLcl Roc,he v. C~lrtlphcll ( 1987). in which the court held that an employee handbook would bc considered a contract in the absence of an express statement to the contrary by the employer. Alabama has long been in the forefront of jurisdictions adhering to the common law doctrine (see. e.g., Wllitc v. C~C~.WII It7d7lstrics, Itic.. 1983). In fact. Alabama is one of the few jurisdictions which continues to flatly deny any public policy exceptions to the doctrine (such as discharge for jury duty or for refusal to commit a criminal act: Hofttmtt~-Lo RocV7c at 72X). In Ho~intrt~-Ltr Rnche, the defendant conpany’s employee handbook provided certain medical benefits. such as sick leave. and

V. 111 I CARMEN

specified four grounds of termination: retirement, resignation, performance discharge, and disciplinary discharge. The discharged employee, Campbell, testified that he was fired because of an aggravated medical condition which adversely impacted his job performance, but only after his supervisor told him not to take advantage of the sick leave provisions in the handbook. Instead. he was instructcd to keep working to the extent possible. Campbell argued at trial that his termination did not fall into any of the four enumerated categories and that in actuality he was fired so that Hoffman-La Roche. Inc. could avoid paying him the medical benefits promised in the handbook. Hoffman-La Roche argued that the handbook did not create a contract and thus Campbell, as an at-will enployee. was powerless to enforce it and could be discharged at any time for any reason under Alabama law. Considering these facts in light of legal trends both in Alabama and in other states. the court ruled that 1W]c see no reason why a policy contained in an employee

manual

issued to an en-

ployee cannot become a binding promise once it i\ accepted continuing

by the employee

to work

IO do 50. Such a perf’ortnance vidcs any consideration tract.

The

means,

is simply

his

clearly

pro-

necessary to the con-

fact that the promise

nicutcd to the employee of a handbook.

through

when he is not required

ia comnlu-

through the medium

rather than by ~rne of no consequence.

other

(733-

734) Although no reported cases under this third category deal specifically with police employees. the warning for police executives with at-will employees is nevertheless obvious: The vitality of the at-will employment doctrine should not bc taken for granted in any jurisdiction.

THE TREND IN THE CASE LAW IS TOWARD JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE As the Alabama example indicates, the modern trend is toward judicial reevaluation

Legal Effect of Employee

Handbooks

and legislative modification of the at-will concept. Moreover, in jurisdictions wherein such modification has occurred, no courts have returned to the strict common law doctrine (33 ALR 4th 120). Although most of the reported cases on the issue deal with private employees or nonpolice public employees, the distinction is not critical unless specific constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions apply to the employment rights of police employees. In disputes of this kind, the courts look into whether the parties (employer and employee) agreed to a contract. Thus the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of employee manuals and the content of the policies therein are important factors which will be considered by the court in determining whether the manual indicated a contract. Clear-cut trends in the law are difficult to ascertain with finality where each case necessarily presents different facts. The willingness of many courts, however, to inquire into these facts instead of granting summary judgment for the employer in itself signifies an erosion of the strict common law doctrine of employmentat-will.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES: WHAT POLICE EXECUTIVES CAN DO What steps can the police executive take to protect his or her discretion when making termination decisions? First the executive must know the basic employment law in his or her state. If located in an at-will state, the executive must next consider the applicability to the agency of any specific state statutes or local ordinances which may reinforce or supersede the rule. For example, the Colorado sheriff in Goodwin was unable to demonstrate to the court the extent of his statutory powers to create discharge procedures. Adequate knowledge might have enabled the sheriff to defeat the suit at one hearing. The police executive should also be familiar with general statutory and constitutional limitations on at-will discharges. If in doubt, the advice of a competent legal counsel must be sought.

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The next step is to take great care in drafting any employee manual or personnel policies. This is necessary because the issue of whether and when such manuals create enforceable contract rights is often determined by referring to their contents. For example, unless deemed ineffective by statute or case law, a disclaimer such as “This is not a contract of employment,” can be inserted prominently in the manual. This approach would retain executive discretion under the Alabama rule in Hoffmun-Lu Rochr noted earlier. The disclaimer should be coupled with a statement to the effect that “This manual is intended only as a guideline or a standard of conduct.” The manual should state clearly the agency’s obligations to the employee and disclaim those it does not wish to undertake. In some jurisdictions a disclaimer will nor protect the employer’s right to terminate an employee absent cause if the manual provides elsewhere that employees will be terminated only for good cause. Such a contradictory provision was struck down by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Morriss v. Coleman Co. Inc. (1984). The court held that the employer could not make promises in one part of its employee policy and disregard them in another. Thus it is important that any disclaimer be consistent with the other provisions of the manual. When a manual lists grounds for discharge or discipline, it is also advisable to insert a catchall phrase or general provision dealing with unbecoming conduct, such as, “The employee may also be dismissed based on such other grounds as considered by the department to impair the employee’s efficiency and effectiveness in the department.” If the courts hold that the manual constitutes a contract or evidence of a contract, then such a provision will give the police executive latitude in dealing with unanticipated forms of employee misbehavior. The pitfalls of omitting such a provision were illustrated in F14qua v. Cir) Council of Ozark (Alabama, 1990), in which the discharged employee’s undesirable conduct (rude comments to the police chief) was not among the highly detailed list of grounds given for dismissal in the city’s regulations.

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ERIC

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The court held that the termination was without cause because the detailed. comprehensive list of prohibited conduct implied that other forms of undesirable conduct were not grounds for discharge. The court might well conclude. and logically so. that whatever is not included is deemed excluded. It is imperative that law enforcement executives follow whatever disciplinary proccdures or courses of action are provided for in any agency employee manual. It is better not to have any procedures than to have prescribed procedures that are breached. Strict adherence to prescribed procedures is a must despite temporary cost in time and inconvenience and regardless of how obviously outrageous the employee’s conduct may stem at the time. This is particularly crucial if such procedures involve a hearing. In federal civil rights actions claiming violation of due process, the Supreme Court has held that due process entitles the discharged public employee who has a property right under state law in continued employment to pre- and posttermination notice and an opportunity to respond to the charges (Cle\~~lcrnrl Hotrr-d c?f Educotim v. Laud~~rn~ill. I%S). The requirements of a Lodrrmill hearing can be complex. and many of them arc beyond the scope of this article. Essentially, the employer must afford the employee a pretermination opportunity to respond to the grounds for discharge, but this hearing need not be a full cvidentiary hearing nor need it be befoie a neutral decisionmaker. The pretermination hearing is essentially an opportunity afforded the employee to clear up any misunderstandings.’ After the termination. the employee must be afforded a trial-like hearing at which he or she may present evidence, have an and examine witnesses. attorney present. The decisionmaker at this hearing must be fair and impartial. If the cmployec is afforded only one hearing. it must meet the strictrequirements er set of posttermination (McWhirter. 1993). Even if the employee has no right to continued employment under state law, if the manual provides such rights and they are afforded in fact to the employee prior to termination. the police executive has significantly reduced the legal risk faced by his or her department in a discharge situation.

V. 1)i.i. CARMEN

CONCLUSION The law is changing in the field of employment, particularly in employment termination. Although the common law at-will doctrine is still the rule in most jurisdictions, in some cases that doctrine has been eroded to create exceptions. Most states now hold that at least some of the provisions of an employee handbook or manual are enforceable by the employee against the employer. Some courts have held that agency manuals may be used as evidence of an employment contract in ambiguous situations; other jurisdictions hold that provisions in the manual may create a contract giving a property right in continued employment. Precautions can and should be taken to obviate the possible adverse effects of what may appear to be binding provisions in agency manuals. Unless considered otherwise by statute or case law. the issuance of a disclaimer that the manual does not constitute an employment contract but is instead a guideline or a standard for police conduct should weaken. if not negate. employee claims to enforceable rights. In the end. however, the advice of and review by a good legal counsel when drafting an agency manual is the best precaution police executives have against possible litigation arising from manual provisions.

NOTES

2. Civil .wy

3. #I201

Rights

Americans cl seq.

Act

01‘ 1964;

with Disabilities

1. Age Dwxlmination 2Y U.S.C. a621 <‘I wq.

42 U.S.C.

$2000e

L’/

Act ol’ 1990; 42 U.S.C.

in Employment

Act of 1067:

S. del Carmen. R. V (IYYI). Civil liabilities in american policing: A text t.or law enlorcement personnet. Engtcwood Ctil’f5. NJ: Prentice Hall. 6 Hrurr-cl o/ Rqqorr.\ 2701 (I971 1. 7. SW. c-g.. I IYXX).

fIw/ws/w

v. R,,th,

408 U.S.

v. U’il/itrrrr.\.

S64, 92 S.Ct.

X49 F.2d

1004

Legal Effect of Employee

Handbooks

Hoffmun-La Roche (Ala. 1987).

REFERENCES 53 Am. Jur. 2d $027, 43, Master and Servant. 33 ALR 4th 120. Employment at Will-Restraints on Discharge. Aitchison. W. (1992). The rights of /a~, enforcement officers. Portland, OR: Labor Relations Information System. Arthurs, R. E. (1990). Accreditation: A small department’s experience. FBI Law EnfBull 59: 1-2. del Carmen, R. V. (199I). Civil liuhilities in American policing: A text for law enforcement personnel. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. McWhirter, D. (1993). Your righrs at work. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Reaves, B. k. (1992). State and local police depart merits. 1990. Bure~~u Just Star Bull Februarv: 7. Smith, D. H. (1991). The employment at will-doctrine and Texas public employment. Texas Correcfions Assot J January/February: 12- 14.

CASES Board ofRegents (1971).

CITED

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92. S.Ct. 2701

Cleveland Board of Education 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). Duchrsne

v. Williams,

v. Loudermill,

849 F.2d

Duckett v. Corn. Dept. Cmwlth. 1990).

of Revenue.

Fuqua v. City Council Civl. Appl. 1990).

of Ozark,

Goodwin 1989).

v. Debekker,

on Law Enforcement

Jackson Morris

v. Johns,

213

Agencies

Inc.

v. Campbell,

714 F.Supp.

II26

512 So.2d

(D. Cola.

725

1989).

v. Coleman Co. Inc., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1984).

Palmer v. City of Monticello, Utah 1990).

731 F.Supp.

1503 (D.

141 Mich.App.

336, 367

Rasch v. City ofEast N.W.2d 856 (1985).

Jot&n,

Sabine Pilot Service. (Tex. 1985).

Inc. v. Hawk,

687 S.W.2d

733

Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Cornpay, (Mich.App. 1981).

308 N.W.2d

459

Shaw v. S. S. Kresge 775 (1975).

Co..

167 Ind.App.

Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield N. W. 880 (Mich. 1980). White v. Chelsea (1983).

Industries,

Whitfield

731 F.2d

v. Finn,

2nd.

1, 32X N.E.2d

of Michigan, 292

425 So. 2d.

1090

1506 (11th Cir) 1984.

470 U.S. STATUTES

1004 (6th Cir.

19X8).

Americans with $81201 et seq.

Disabilities

CITED Act of 1990; 42 U.S.C.

582 A.2d 419 (Pa. 567 So.2d

716 F.Supp.

Age Discrimination in Employment U.S.C. 98621 e/ seq.

Act of 1967; 29

Civil Rights seq.

$81983,

354 (Ala.

1363 (D. Cola.

Act of 1964; 42 U.S.C.

U.S. Constitution,

Amend.

XIV, $1,

2000 et