Traditional leadership, community participation and mining development in South Africa: The case of Fuleni, Saint Lucia, KwaZulu-Natal

Land Use Policy 86 (2019) 290–298

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Traditional leadership, community participation and mining development in South Africa: The case of Fuleni, Saint Lucia, KwaZulu-Natal

T

Llewellyn Leonard University of South Africa, Science Campus, College of Agriculture and Environment, Department of Environmental Sciences, Florida Campus, Cnr Christiaan de Wet & Pioneer Streets, Johannesburg, 1709, South Africa

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Traditional leadership Democracy Mining Civil society Government Fuleni

In South Africa, proposals for mining are becoming increasingly situated in rural areas, with communities impacted negatively by local resource extraction due to environmental and social impacts. Unfortunately, traditional leadership structures have largely posed a barrier towards inclusion of local community concerns/decisions over mining development, with collusion between traditional leaders and mining companies. Although there has been some information surrounding traditional leaders approving mining developments on communal lands and with no local community participation, there has been limited case studies and academic discourse to examine the micro politics of the interaction between leaders, the mining corporations, government and local communities, including external traditional leadership forces outside the community influencing mining developments. This paper will focus on the rural community of Fuleni, Northern KwaZulu-Natal, which is being targeted for mining development by Ibutho Coal mining. It will also examine the role of the traditional leadership in engaging local community concerns against mining development. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants (community and civil society organisations providing support to residents). Corruption between the local traditional leadership council and the mining company influenced the lack of inclusion of the local community concerns over mining development. Corruption was also found within the ward leadership council, the Ingonyama Trust Board and with the Zulu King, which therefore perpetuated local traditional leadership mining corruption. Additionally, whereas during apartheid the state used the traditional chiefs as ‘representative’ of the people to legitimise decisions made, the new democracy has seen a continuation of this practice, but with mining, conglomerates exercising more control over the government and traditional chiefs to ensure mining development

1. Introduction In post-apartheid South Africa, proposals for mining are becoming increasingly situated in rural areas and/or in pristine areas of natural beauty (Duda, 2017; Leonard and Lebogang, 2017; Leonard, 2016) with some of the most profitable South African mines situated today on land in the former homelands that is occupied by traditional communities and is governed in terms of customary law (Pickering and Nyapisi, 2017; Bench Marks Foundation, 2016). However, as during apartheid, communities continue to be impacted negatively by local resource extraction (Forrest and Loate, 2018; Matebesi and Marais, 2018; Leonard, 2017; Branson, 2016). Although the coming of the new democracy witnessed considerable efforts to involve local communities in mining development and decision making, traditional leadership structures have largely posed a barrier towards local community decisions over mining development (Kane-Berman, 2017; Buthelezi and Yeni, 2016;

Branson, 2016; Capps and Mnwana, 2015), with leaders entering into deals with the mining sector for personal profit and without local community consent (Branson, 2016; Jewett, 2016; Capps and Mnwana, 2015). Additionally, mining companies frequently claim excessive secrecy over the terms of agreements entered into with mining communities, often rejecting individual’s access to information except through their traditional leader (Pickering and Nyapisi, 2017; Loate, 2014). Hilson (2019) also notes that in sub-Saharan Africa, most countries have policies that are ‘biased’ in favour of large-scale extraction, with South African being no exception (discussed below under section 3). Many communities therefore find themselves without access to their ancestral land, whilst others are forcibly removed from their lands (Debrah et al., 2018; Duda, 2017; Bench Marks Foundation, 2016; Loate, 2014; Hendricks et al., 2013). According to the Human Science Research Council (2015) there have been legal cases won against traditional leaders on various fronts in the contest for democratization of

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.05.007 Received 7 June 2018; Received in revised form 2 April 2019; Accepted 3 May 2019 Available online 15 May 2019 0264-8377/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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leadership support for mining development has been and how such leaders have included the concerns of their constituencies into decisions made (and also in relation to customary law), or whether the problem is with only a few traditional leaders supporting mining development. The paper will first briefly examine the literature on traditional leadership, community participation and mining development in South Africa, before discussing legislation, power and traditional leaders. Participatory epistemology literature will then be examined, before discussing the methodology, followed by results and discussion and conclusions.

traditional communities. Although there has been some information surrounding traditional leaders influencing mining developments and local community participation, there has been limited case studies and academic discourse to examine the micro politics of the interaction between leaders, the mining corporations, government and local communities, including external traditional leadership forces outside the community influencing mining developments. There is thus potential to enrich the current debates with a scholarly contribution based on a case study (and an area that has not been academically researched). Within the above context, this paper will focus on the rural community of Fuleni, which is being targeted for mining development by the Ibutho Coal mining company, with the community opposing planned mining development in the area. It will examine the role of the local traditional leadership structure in supporting local community concerns against mining development, including how traditional leaders engage with local communities surrounding community representation, communication of information and decision making over mining development. The case also indirectly examines interaction between leaders, the mining corporations, government and the local community. Fuleni is a rural community located in Northern KwaZuluNatal, in the uMkhanyakude District Muncipality, near the Great St Lucia Wetland Park, which is a world heritage site. The community is composed of four villages namely, Ocilwane, Nthuthunga, Nthuthunga Two and Novunula. According to Carnie (2017) there are plans by the Ibutho Coal Mining Company to develop an anthracite open cast coal mine in the area, and which borders the important tourist HluhluweiMfolozi nature reserve - the oldest nature reserve in Africa. Local residents, with the support from external civil society, have been opposing the mining application due to environmental, social and local livelihood impacts (Hans, 2016). Youens (2016) notes that the proposed mine will directly affect more than 1 600 households and about 16 000 people. According to Hansen and Bandile (2015), ten kilometres away from the proposed Ibutho Coal mine in Fuleni lies the Tendele cast coal mine in Somkele, which has been operating since 2007. Like the Fuleni residents, a limited number of Somkele community residents have been opposing mining development, with the latter already experiencing social and environmental impacts from the existing mine (e.g. water shortages, environmental pollution such as coal dust, impacts on family health, loss of livestock and farming productivity) (Youens, 2016; Jolly, 2016). Fuleni residents have also witnessed the negative impacts of mining in Somkele and some therefore do not want mining in their community, with mining dust from Somkele also impacting on Fuleni residents (Hans, 2016). According to Hargreaves (2016) organising to oppose mining in both Somkhele and Fuleni has become unsafe with rising intimidation, threats and attacks on community members who oppose the mine. There is a concern that most traditional leaders have been supporting mining development on community lands. Some residents in both the Somekele and Fuleni communities, especially women, have taken their concerns about the mining impacts on water and lack of water to the traditional leaders. Unfortunately, traditional leaders have poorly responded, but have rather punished women with fines for subverting the ‘rule’ that women cannot bring matters directly to male traditional leaders. According to Jolly (2016) similar threats have been made by members of the Mpukunyoni Traditional Council towards some Somkele residents opposing mining in the area, with outspoken residents having been physically abused by other pro-mining residents. Despite these challenges, a number of local inhabitants (Fuleni and Somkele) demand the closure of existing mines and halting of any new mining developments (Hansen and Bandile, 2015). Speculation over progress of the Ibutho Coal mine has been widespread in the media, with further hearsay that a tribal leader may have already given Ibutho Coal the goahead (Jolly, 2015), with traditional leaders selling off land to Ibutho Coal to rather develop the community through mining (Hans, 2016). Since there has been non-academic reports of traditional leaders supporting mining in Fuleni, it is unclear how widespread traditional

2. Traditional leadership, community participation and mining development in South Africa Some traditional leaders have been accused of trading the rights of communities for personal benefits and/or shares in mining companies. Although social and labour mining plans are designed to benefit local communities, many South African communities have complained that they are denied the right to decide on mining development in their communities and that plans are agreed to without their participation by traditional leaders. Generally rural communities complain that they are kept in the dark about deals made between traditional leaders and/or politicians as to who benefits from mining (Kane-Berman, 2017) with Duda (2017) and Branson (2016) noting that only traditional leaders benefit when mining takes place on communal land, with communities exposed to polluted environments, loss of livelihoods, health problems or are forcibly removed. For example, according to Matlala (2014) members of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional community attempted to hold their traditional leader, Kgosi Nyal to account over access to and management of assets and revenue derived from mining operations in the area dating as far back as 2001. In June 2012 residents also embarked on a protest fuelled by the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Traditional Administration (BBKTA) involvement in a number of deals involving communal property with mining houses and public institutions in the platinum mining sector, whilst residents continued to experience high levels of poverty and unemployment. The traditional leader was also convicted of theft and corruption and continues to be unaccountable. The leader rather sought an interdict against villagers from holding public meetings to discuss community concerns surrounding mining and corruption. Similarly Capps and Mnwana (2015) refer to the Rustenburg chieftaincies, where the platinum boom has been accompanied by growing conflicts over chiefly corruption, representation concerns, tribal service-delivery and mine-related jobs. In another incident, Brandon (2016) and Timse (2016) reported on a community campaign against Indian mining giant Jindal to prospect for iron ore in Melmoth in Northern KwaZulu-Natal. This has witnessed traditional leaders intimidating community members acting against the mining development. Activists, who reject mining on what they consider their ancestral land have been forced into hiding by death threats and intimidation. One of the tribal council members was also employed by Jindal. Community members accused traditional leaders of giving Jindal permission to prospect on their land without community consulting. The view that traditional leaders held ultimate power and authority in African societies has been mistaken and has been the internalisation of late nineteenth century writings. This reading of all powerful chiefs was part of British colonial processes to indirectly rule African societies through gaining control of chiefs. This kind of control of chiefs greatly intensified under apartheid, leading to chiefs largely losing legitimacy in Bantustans as they became instruments of the apartheid government. Chiefs supported the apartheid policies and actions, with no downward accountability to rural constituencies (Buthelezi and Yeni, 2016). For example, the Mpondo revolts in the late 1950’s and early 1960s saw the Mpondo people rebel against chiefs who collaborated with the apartheid government to implement the Bantu authorities system, which empowered chiefs and reduced popular participation (Duda, 2017). 291

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3. Legislation, power and traditional leaders

Land Affairs with regards to aiding the community to convert the provisional CPA into a permanent one (Buthelezi and Yeni, 2016). Dudu (2017) notes that traditional chiefs do not hold ultimate power over land development in the new democracy, since there is a strong family based ownership rights that exist in terms of customary law. Most land is registered in the name of the government of South Africa and is subject to the underlying ownership rights of the families who have occupied and used the land for generations, not traditional leaders. Loate (2014) notes that historically traditional leaders never owned communal land and that the situation has not changed today. At present the state holds communal land in trust but the land rights still rest with household and communities. However, Matlala (2014) notes that government has not acted in favour of democracy and has distanced itself from the challengers faced by mining affected communities, with traditional leaders having undue protection from key figures in the judiciary and the ruling party. Leonard (2017) in studies surrounding governance processes in Dullstroom, Mpumulanga for mining development noted that a number of factors influencing mining governance such as the ruling party promoting mining for social and economic upliftment, collusion between government and industry, and the DMR domination of decision-making to promote mining development, which may explain why government has not acted in favour of democracy and to address community challengers. As Pickering and Nyapisi (2017) note there is also a push by government to advance distorted colonial versions of the power of chiefs to the exclusion of decision-making by the people living on the land, thereby undermining the real customary-law structures on the ground that promote participatory decision-making, inclusion and transparency. This suggests that the community face a double edge sword in fighting traditional leaders over mining development, including government and the mining industry working closely with traditional leaders. Very rarely have traditional leaders acted in the interest of local communities and have not served as government and mining industry instruments to support mining developments. For example, Kgosi Nyoko Motlhabane, the traditional leader of the Batlhaping Ba Ga Maidi Community, was unhappy with the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) awarding prospecting rights to Taung Giant Miners and not consulting with the local community as actually required by the Mineral Petroleum and Resources Development Act (MPRDA). Despite the High Court issuing an order on the 20 October 2008 directing compliance with the Act and supporting the claims of the community, a second application was made without community consultation, which was granted by the DMR. Due to the traditional leader fighting against mining, there were attempts to oust him as leader of his people and the setting up of a commission of inquiry to investigate him for corruption, which resulted in no actions (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). This indicates that despite having laws in place, enforcement is weak and does not favour community social interests or traditional leaders serving the interest of their constituencies. Unfortunately, the MPRDA has as one of its goals to remove the obstacles to investment posed by private mineral rights, through their effective nationalisation. The Act encourages those tribal authorities receiving mining royalties to convert them into direct equity stakes in local mining operations, in the names of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and ‘community participation’ (Capps and Mnwana, 2015). Capazorio (2017) also notes that the MRPDA has been a disadvantage to communities since traditional leaders are allowed to sign off on mining projects under the illusion of representing everyone. The MRPDA also allows for the ‘optimal exploitation’ of minerals in the country. Additionally, there have been previous calls by the National House of Traditional Leaders to have an independent body to take over the granting of prospecting and mining rights so as to eliminate conflicts and the biased approach of the national DMR, which promotes mining investment and is simultaneously responsible for vetting the social and environmental impacts of proposals (Dladla, 2017; Leonard, 2017)

There has been a push by government to propose regulations that strengthen the powers of traditional leaders at the expense of customary laws. In violation of customary law, traditional leaders often purport to be the only community representatives in negotiation processes with mining companies. Gapps (2016) points out that the reassertion by government of the proprietary powers of chiefs in the name of ‘custom’ is ‘about generating the circumstances under which land becomes indirectly transferred to investors and serves to authenticate the commoditisation and appropriation of land and to transfer use rights into undisputable rights. Pickering and Nyapisia (2017) note that the lack of transparency of mining in rural areas by traditional leaders is exacerbated by weaknesses in aspects of the regulatory framework towards ensuring consultation, consent, and downward accountability in mining communities. This leaves communities vulnerable to exploitation by traditional leaders and mining companies. Jewett (2016) notes that without a robust and nuanced conception of democratic imperatives within customary law, traditional governance and communal landholding structures can be abused at the expense of individual rights and well-being. For example, according to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2010) the evolution of South African land policies removed most power and functions traditional leaders had in terms of customary law and gave it to government. The Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill (TKLB) (2015), which will replace the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework (2003), gives National and Provincial government the authority to give powers to traditional leaders and councils, with the bill being silent on the issue of community participation and giving consent when it comes to matters that would compromise the security of tenure of people living under the leadership of traditional leaders. According to Huizenga (2017) the TKLB allows traditional leaders to enter into ‘partnerships’ with any person, body or institution. These partnerships are noted to be a disaster with an increase in ‘partnerships’ between traditional councils and mining companies, with traditional leaders receiving personal benefits from mining. Many traditional councils openly support mining. For example, Bakgatla Ba Kgafela traditional council advertises their territory as rich in mineral wealth and commits to development through reinvestment of mineral wealth. Additionally, the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Investment Holdings (BBKIH) was launched in 2006, and according to a dedicated personal website, the BBKIH was borne out of the need to manage the assets that the tribe had accumulated over the years (BBKIH, 2018). Considering that the community (as above) attempted to hold their traditional leader to account over mining corruption, it is surprising that some of the BBKH values include accountability, integrity, transparency and honesty. However, according to Beinart (2017) The Bill of Rights specifies in Section 25 (5) that the state must take reasonable measures ‘to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis’. The Bill allows for registration and private ownership by title of individual landholdings in the present communal areas - it favours a communalist direction, since the key grouping in making decisions about land is an unspecified ‘community’. In 2005 the community of Bakgatla successfully lodged a land restitution claim in accordance with the constitution. They opted for a Communal Property Association (CPA) Act of 1996. The CPA provides that land is held and returned to people who or whose forebears were dispossessed of their land. The community agreed that the CPA legal entity to hold their land and applied to have it registered. Unfortunately, the traditional council and traditional leader, Chief Nyalala Pilane, were unhappy about the decision to form a CPA, as they wanted the community to create a trust instead. One important feature of CPAs is that they function according to democratic values (i.e. inclusive decision-making). Traditional leaders view CPAs as entities that take power and control over land away from them, with traditional leaders perceiving that they ‘own’ the land. There has been no progress from the Department of Agriculture and 292

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4. Participatory epistemology

power rest with the council (and in this case the traditional authority). Nevertheless, citizen empowerment suggests that direct democracy (the participation of citizens in decision-making) needs to be established on a ‘partnership’ basis. It is useful to refer to micro politics and as a link to the participatory epistemology literature highlighted above. There have been various understandings of micro politics. According to Healey et al. (2003) micro politics is about the local level interactions that determine the success of community-based initiatives. For Smeed et al. (2009) micro politics is about the use and abuse of power and sheds light on the way power operates through everyday interactions among local people, and can be conflictual, cooperative, consensual or protective. For Molden et al. (2017) a micro political perspective emphasizes that the actors involved in rural development are heterogeneous and complex, requiring constant networking and alliance building to maintain legitimacy and effectiveness. Furthermore, micro politics is about shared development narratives, and achievement of demonstrable practical outcomes. However, micro politics can be influenced by larger structural constraints in the context of neoliberal governance. From the above it is concluded that micro politics is about local level interactions between people requiring consistency for alliance building. It is linked to participation of all people and for communities having control over decisions that affect them. Therefore centralised power (e.g. by traditional authorities over residents) and mining companies influencing local processes (e.g. by controlling local leaders) are hindrances for micro politics and shared values, emphasising the interface between micro politics and macro-politics for power over resources.

It is important to explore conceptions of participation since this becomes essential to assess the quality of participation of mining communities and for the case study explored here. There have been numerous definitions of what participation entails. Tembo (2003) takes a narrow definition of participation as generally understood to involve people in decisions that affect their lives. Similarly, Marissing (2005) notes, that participation is the involvement of residents in processes of cooperation that affect their community. Arnstein (1969) takes a more robust definition of participation to mean the redistribution of power to citizens and by which citizens can induce significant social reform (e.g. by determining how information is shared, development occurs, goals and policies are set, resources allocated). In essence, participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. This entails implementing principles of democracy. Empowerment of citizens according to Zimmerman and Peterson (2004) is an active, participatory process through which individuals, organizations, and communities gain greater control and efficacy over their lives. This suggests a need for any centralised power within traditional authorities to be shared with grassroots groups. For this paper, participation is not only the involvement of people at all levels of decision-making, but the treatment of citizens as equal partners in decision-making processes. The direct incorporation of citizens into new decision-making is part of an effort to empower individuals to become active participants, which will enhance the responsiveness of local leaders to citizens’ concerns, and also overcome problems associated with representative democracy (Wampler, 2007). However, democratic decentralisation may not enhance people’s participation (Ishii et al., 2007). According to Ishii et al., other conditions are required by citizens to achieve people’s participation in local decision-making (e.g. local leadership, accountability mechanisms for local leaders, access to information by locals for participation). Referring to information for participation, Tembo (2003) notes that information reduces uncertainty (i.e. mistrust) and widens options for decision-making. According to Ishii et al. (2007), without in-depth dissemination of information (i.e. by local leaders, government and industry) to citizens, participatory mechanisms may be useless (i.e. manipulation and therapy non-participation process). It is useful to consider Arnstein’s (1969) eight rungs on the ladder of citizen participation grouped into ‘non-participation’, ‘tokenism’, and ‘citizen power’ to assess the quality of participation by traditional leaders (and government and industry) towards communities. With ‘non-participation’ (i.e. manipulation and therapy) the objective is to substitute for genuine participation. The purpose is to ‘educate’ (i.e. manipulate) citizens or gain support for decisions already made. Citizens are also ‘cured’ (i.e. therapy) of their pathological ideas. With ‘tokenism’, (i.e. informing, consultation, placation) which allows citizens to hear and have a voice, ‘informing’ citizens only encourages one-way communication by providing superficial information, discouraging questions, or giving irrelevant answers. Inviting citizens opinions (i.e. consultation), like ‘informing’ offers no assurance that citizens’ concerns will be taken into account. Power-holders (i.e. traditional authorities, mining companies) simply achieve evidence that they have involved people. With ‘placation’, citizens advise, but power-holders retain the right to judge the legitimacy of the advice. With ‘citizen power’ (i.e. partnership, delegated power, citizen control) decision-making power for citizens are increased. With ‘partnerships’ power is shared between citizens and power-holders, but is most effective when local leaders are accountable to community members, and when the community has sufficient resources (i.e. human, technical, material) to influence outcomes. With ‘delegated power’ negotiations (i.e. between citizens and industry) can result in the local community achieving dominant decision-making authority over a development process. With ‘citizen control’, Arnstein notes that although citizens demand a degree of power, one cannot meet the criteria of citizen control since final approval

5. Methodology Fieldwork to explore the role of the local traditional leadership in supporting local community concerns against mining development was examined in June 2016 (Fuleni community) and July 2017 (Somkele community) as part of a larger study in South Africa. Some background on South African is that the country emerged in 1994 as a new democratic state from a history of racial and environmental oppression. The African National Congress (ANC) rise to power was the final step in the continent’s trajectory of emancipation from colonialism and white minority rule. At the same time, national liberation was achieved in an era when market forces and neo-liberal ideology, were globally dominant (Barchiesi, 2004). Neoliberalism has seen the new democratic state engage in macroeconomic policies that have failed to address social and environmental concerns of its citizens (Bond, 2005). This has witnessed the ANC’s ability to mobilize support from the poorest strata of the population come under pressure (McKinley and Veriava, 2004). South Africa is quite developed with a strong economy compared to other African nations. Although, the country has made remarkable strides toward building a prosperous democracy, levels of inequality remain high with a widening gap between the rich and the poor. High level of unemployment reached 25.1 percent of the workforce in 2015 and 27.7 percent in the third quarter of 2017 associated with slow job creation as economic growth slowed in recent years. Considering that poverty is consistently higher among South Africans living in rural areas than for those in urban areas, with 65.4 percent of the population living below the poverty line in 2015 (World Bank, 2018) it is fitting that this paper focuses on the chosen rural case sites. These specific study sites were also chosen due to a lack of academic research conducted on mining development in these areas. Whilst research has been conducted for larger scale mining sites and for mining sites such as in Marikana due to political upheaval and the killing of mining workers by state police (see for example Hill and Maroun, 2015) this paper focuses on the lesser well known and smaller mining sites that also deserve attention. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from key social actors in Fuleni (i.e. local community residents fighting mining and external civil society organisations providing support for the local 293

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Fuleni community opposing mining). A total of nine interviews were conducted as part of the Fuleni fieldwork, of which seven interviews are used for this article. Interviews were conducted based on purposive sampling and using a snowball technique. Unfortunately several attempts in 2016 to get interviews from key personnel such as the Secretariat Regional Mining Development and Environmental Committee (RMDEC) KwaZulu-Natal, Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife, Naledi Development Consulting (the Fuleni mining consultants) and the Chief Executive Officer from Hluhluwe-iMfolozi game reserve – was unsuccessful. The lack of response from especially the mining consultants and traditional affairs body questions their participatory and transparency practices since these are key players interfacing with local communities on mining developments. The author had initially secured interviews with a local traditional leader from Somkele, but the leader did not attend the scheduled interview. Additionally two local Somkele residents working in the local Tendele cast coal mine initially agreed to be interviewed but wanted financial compensation. The author noted that no compensation would be offered and that the interview was voluntary and for research purposes. The two residents then did not want to be interviewed due to no compensation on offer. All informants interviewed gave permission for their names to be used in any research paper/s emerging from the fieldwork, with two noting their right to freedom of expression. However, considering the sensitivity and national tensions over mining developments in communities, the author has decided to not include informant names in this paper. For the data analysis, grounded theory and open coding were employed to identify similar emerging themes across the interviews. This assisted in splitting the data into relevant groups. This article focuses on the themes of traditional leadership, mining support and bribery; and traditional leadership, community representation and participation and are discussed below. Contemporary organisational information, reports and legislation are also used to verify informant responses where possible and identify relationships or patterns with the interview content.

‘The chief himself is very old. He is 90 something and he has his traditional councils, and the chairperson for that council is his son, who is also meant to take over when he eventually dies. So his son and the board of [traditional] council [members] are for the mine to carry on.’ As informant C [personal interview, July 2016] a community activist fighting against mining in the Fuleni community further noted for the chief’s son support for mining, and the potential conflict between the chief and his successor over mining development in Fuleni: ‘…the chief now is starting to realise that we [local community] are trying to save our land, but his son…is only thinking about making money [and supports mining in the area]…So I think now he is realising that his son has something to do [with corruption]… the chief himself told us…he said we mustn’t trust his son because he could see that he is a snake. So after hearing that from the horse’s mouth it was clear to us that our chief is on our side but his son [as chairperson of the traditional council] wants to sell that place [Fuleni to mining companies]’ From the above it would seem that generally the traditional council members, excluding the chief, are in favour of mining development, questioning how decisions are made within the traditional council, which may not have the support of the chief. This further suggests that there is a lack of transparency on how decisions are made within the traditional council, and which decisions may not be for the benefit of the community at large. Therefore there was a total lack of partnership and sharing of decision making power by the traditional council, which operated on its own terms and conditions and without being accountable to local residents. The support for mining development within the council was noted by several informants as being due to corruption as the traditional leaders benefited from mining development. This influenced local community micro politics for shared development narratives and the alliance building required for micro political development. According to informant D (telephonic interview, July 2016) from Youens Attorneys, a legal firm specialising in environmental law and environmental justice and who is currently representing the Fuleni community to oppose the application made to the DMR for an open cast coal mine - noting for corruption between traditional leaders over mining development in both Fuleni (and Somkele) and, which corruption has impacted negatively on local community residents who have been displaced by mining:

6. Results 6.1. Traditional leadership, mining support and bribery Most traditional leaderships in Fuleni engaged in collusion with mining companies to get mining developments approved and therefor negatively influenced local community micro politics. Traditional leadership structures supported the mining due to benefits secured from the mining industries, although such leaders deceitfully did so in secret from the local community. Informant A [personal interview, 2016] leader of the Ubumbano Youth Organisation (UYO), which organisation aims to unite the youth of Fuleni as the future leaders of South Africa to acquire skills and utilize their talents to ensure Fuleni’s sustainable economic development, noted generally where the traditional leadership structures allegiance lied:

‘…The corruption that was then part of the Somkele community now operates with…some traditional leaders benefiting, with the majority of people particularly those who have lost their land to the mine being really tragically disadvantaged and much poorer than they had ever been before, with very little prospects of improving their lives because there must be lands… it happens in all of these places where the traditional leaders end up being bribed quite substantially by the mining companies. It’s quite cleverly done such that suddenly they are all driving new cars…so it’s not in the form of hard cash…they are benefiting to be on the side of the mine so the whole community is anti the mine…’

‘…there are people [traditional leaders] who are supporting the mine though they are not doing it openly…they [mining company] used to go to those individuals especially stakeholders [the traditional council]… who are connected to the mine…They [traditional council] are on the mine’s side…not on the side of the community…’

Unfortunately bribery and corruption at the local leadership level extended beyond the traditional leadership council. Three informants noted that the ward councillor leader supported mining development due to family benefits received. This resulted in the ward leader not supporting local community anti-mining members to organise community meetings against mining and for information sharing required for micro politics alliance building. Informant E [personal interview, July 2016], noted how the local ward councillor leader was supporting mining due to corruption:

However, two informants (i.e. B and C) noted that the traditional chief, as opposed to the traditional leadership council, which is normally responsible for development related matters and decisions in the area, did not support the mining in Fuleni and was more sympathetic to local community concerns over mining development. However, the traditional chief’s son was the next successor in line for the leadership and was noted to have been vigorously supporting mining development. Informant B (personal interview, July 2016) community activist against mining, noted that:

‘But the other issue we have is that our ward councillor is on the side of the mine. His son has already been taken [by the mine] and they trained him in a couple of courses. So already if the mine starts he is going to have a position in that company. So it was easy for him [ward councillor] to push for the mine to start because he will get something on his 294

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Ingonyama Trust Board there was also corruption because the majority of the people from the Ingonyama Trust Board in Pietermaritzburg were connected with them [mining companies]…the licenses and all went through some illegal and illicit channels and it was only when it had to become part of the public participation process…there was suddenly an awareness in civil society and…because of all the meetings that the consultants suddenly started having within the community. There was the knowledge that the planning and everything hadn’t been for roads at all but it was actually for a coal mine’

side…So we tried to say no guys you can’t do that we need to sit down. If someone says he wants to come develop the area, we must all get developed it can’t be just one of you…’ Unfortunately, traditional leadership support for mining due to potential corruption and bribery also extended beyond the local community to the Zulu King. This corruption also perpetuated the local traditional support for mining and corruption. Whilst the Zulu King was noted to have stated support for local community mining concerns and non-displacement of the local community, it was noted that the King was not honest since the traditional council leadership, which falls under the King’s regulation, was supporting mining. This either questioned the integrity of the King in genuinely engaging with, mediating and supporting the local community against mining development, or that there was fragmentation in ideology on mining development between the King and traditional council structures. The King may have exhibited an illusion of transparency in negotiations with the communities. Informant C [personal interview, July 2016] noted for the statements made by the King on community support against mining and, which views did not translate to traditional leadership council action against mining development in Fuleni:

Corruption over mining development within the Ingonyama Trust Board may be an issue since the Annual Report (2015/16) notes that the Board allows for land to be leased for ‘mining and prospecting operators’. The Board notes that Contractual Royalty revenue is recognised as income of the Trust (Ingonyama Trust Board - Annual Report, 2015/ 16). The leasing of land for mining development may therefore seem contradictory since even the Ingonyama Trust Act places emphasis on the property clause as per section 25 of the Constitution and gives a stronger mandate for the Board to protect the land and ensure the benefit of communities from the proceeds of the land (Ingonyama Trust Board, 2017). However, since mining development commenced in Somkele by Tendele Mine in 2007, it has not benefitted the community with residents complaining about excessive mining dust negatively impacting their health and livelihood, and blasting damaging their homes (Jolly, 2016). The above evidence suggests that there is unequal power between traditional leaders and local communities, with the latter having no say in how their lands may be used and impacting negatively on micro politics and alliance building.

‘Last year [2015] in Empangeni we had an Imbizo with the Zulu King himself. We raised our view that we are not protected because these companies they just come to do whatever they want to do, and you as our father you don’t come and support us and show us that you are here…So he said he was going to come and help us… he told us no one has a right to remove you [us] when you say you are not happy…[and that] we do have the right to say no. But…those guys (mining companies)…are still coming to take over [and] they have a go ahead from the traditional leaders…So how then is it…if he [King] said to us that these guys [traditional leaders] are under him and they [traditional council] tell us we can’t oppose them?…I was so confused? But…for him [King] to make his name sweet and nice he can say that no one can remove us, but when he is on the other side and there is money on the table he can just take it and go and pretend like nothing happened.’

6.2. Traditional leadership, community representation and communication Due to corruption between traditional leaders and the mining sector, this influenced how the traditional leaders engaged with local communities surrounding community representation and communication of information and decision making. The traditional council did not communicate with local residents over mining development in the area and to ascertain their approval over decisions made. Due to lack of communication from the traditional council to the local community in Fuleni, some local community activist against mining development challenged the traditional council decisions, resulting in some traditional leaders making threats to those residents resisting mining development. Informant A [personal interview, 2016] from the UYO noted for poor communication between the traditional council and local community due to potential corruption between the council and the mining company: ‘…traditional leaders and the councillors of the local community are not clearly communicating with the community so that is the reason why there is this conflict [between the traditional leaders and the local community]…maybe there are certain agreements which we don’t know of between them [traditional leaders] and the mining people…’ Informant C [personal interview, July 2016] further noted threats received from the traditional leadership towards local community members for resisting mining development:

However, according to a report by Buthelezi and Yeni (2016), the Ingonyama Trust Board organized an Imbizo, which brought together traditional leaders, government departments, mining companies and affected communities. The Ingonyama Trust was established in 1994 by the KwaZulu Government, and which Trust mandate is to hold land for ‘the benefit, material welfare and social well-being of the members of the tribes and communities’ living on the land (Ingonyama Trust Board, 2017). At the Imbizo, community members raised concerns about the lack of transparency, consultation and false promises by mining companies. Community members gave testimony to dying livestock, cracking houses due to mine blasting, unemployment, loss of livelihoods and traditional leaders benefiting financially from mining. It was King Zwelithini who noted that traditional leaders must drive mining initiatives to ensure that people benefit from them since mining is crucial for rural development despite all the concerns raised by local communities. The unequal underlying power over land use therefore seems to belong to the traditional leaders and the king holding supreme power (Buthelezi and Yeni, 2016). This suggests that the King misled local communities that they had a right to refuse mining in their communities. It was also noted that corruption was also a concern between mining companies and the Ingonyama Trust Board. One informant noted that the links between the Ingonyama Trust Board and mining companies. As informant F (personal interview, July 2016), from the iMfolozi Communities and Wilderness Alliance (ICWA) noted, which was formed in August 2015 to unify opposition to the Fuleni Coal Mine and to emphasize community involvement in the Save our iMfolozi Wilderness campaign:

‘…[our] traditional [council] leaders said these people [mining company] must prospect…They will want to dig a hole to get the coal so why didn’t they consult us as the community?…that’s where the problem started, then I got some threats from our traditional leaders to say who am I to ask those questions because they are the owners of the place …I said no you don’t own the place…wherever we build our houses we own it so you can’t tell us what to do…They [a traditional leader and some men] came to…a meeting [taking place] to discuss the [protest] march by the community…That was after threatening community members not to hold the meeting or else they would then come and beat up people. The members thought they were just threatening them and the next day when the meeting was on, those guys came in a taxi and the Induna [traditional chief] was there with those guys and he didn’t stop them as they were

‘…initially there was prospecting for many, many years and people were completely ignorant and they thought…that all of the prospecting was for road construction…because it is Tribal land so somewhere in the 295

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beating the community.’

‘They [traditional council] are the ones who are making it so difficult for us [local community] to fight this battle because the first time we met them they were already moving with the mining company…now we had to fight against them [traditional council] and the mining company… even though our traditional councillors are saying yes the mine must carry on, they are finding it difficult because the people on the ground are still saying no they don’t want it [mining] because we are so fortunate that we have got a good example…across the river is the Somkele mine, which is a typical example of what this place will end up looking like if we give these people [mining company] a permit to carry on with the mine…’

Due to the close relationship between the traditional leaders with the mining company, it was noted by three informants that the traditional council did not represent the community and was in fact biased. Only the main traditional chief (as above) was noted to have been empathetic towards local community concerns over mining development. According to informant G (personal interview, July 2016): ‘…our Inkosi, the chief, in fact he is the one who said no, if the Ibutho Coal Mine people want to mine here [in Fuleni] they must come and talk to the people who are actually living there because they are the ones who will be directly affected by that proposed mine.’ As informant F (personal interview, July 2016) noted for the biasness of the traditional leadership council and close relationship between the council and the mining company:

7. Discussion and conclusion The new democracy has continued to see traditional chiefs and councils being indirectly controlled by mining companies and government via bribery and corruption to allow mining developments in rural areas without community consultation. This goes against adherence to the constitution and its values of administrative justice, transparency and accountability. Generally, traditional leaders have lost legitimacy amongst their constituencies and have become instruments of mining companies (and government) to allow mining developments in rural areas. Results indicated that there was a lack of transparency on how decisions were made within the Fuleni traditional council, and which decisions have not been in the interest of the community at large. This did not result in local community alliance building and for micro politics to flourish. The support for mining development within the traditional council was due to corruption and benefits received from mining development. Interestingly, whereas during apartheid the state used the traditional chiefs as ‘representative’ of the people to legitimise decisions made to benefit apartheid ideology, the new democracy has seen a continuation of the state to use traditional leaders to promote mining develop on lands belonging to communities. However, in the new democracy mining conglomerates seem to exercise more control over government and traditional chiefs to ensure mining development, which has been accompanied by bribery and corruption. However, bribery and corruption extended beyond the traditional leadership council structure to the Fuleni ward council leader who supporting mining development due to family benefits received from mining development. This resulted in the ward leader not supporting local community anti-mining concerns, but referring community leaders fighting mining to the chair of the traditional council (i.e. the traditional chief’s son next in line for the leadership and chair of the traditional council). Thus, micro politics was influenced by larger structural constraints in the context of neoliberal governance and the corruption that was perpetuated and supported by mining companies. The above also suggests that in the new democracy mining companies are strategically infiltrating all aspects of leadership beyond the traditional leadership structures to ensure mining development goes ahead. However, the traditional leadership has not represented the community, but have acted for their personal interests. Mining development and its potential corruption has also impacted on the application of customary laws and the need for community wide consultation on land use development. Unfortunately, state legislation (i.e. MPRDA) which also requires community consultation has also not been applied by mining companies (and government), with traditional chiefs/ councils viewed as the ‘mouth-piece’ of the community. Unfortunately, local community leadership support for mining due to potential corruption and bribery also extended beyond the local Fuleni community to the Zulu King and the Ingonyama Trust Board, influencing the traditional council leadership’s positive support for mining. Whilst the Zulu King was noted to have stated support for local community mining concerns and non-displacement of the local community, the King was not truthful since the traditional council leadership, which falls under the King’s regulation, was supporting mining.

‘They [mining company] had met with the whole traditional council… there are a couple of consultants from the mine who are very familiar with the traditional leaders, far more so that the local residents…so the engagement has been with the traditional council…[Fuleni is] very fortunate to have a traditional [chief]…who listens to the voices of his people…But Ibutho Coal they are satisfied that they have the community on their side because the traditional [council] leadership is on their side…Unfortunately though, the traditional leadership does not represent the community most of the time because it’s subject to bias…’ Unfortunately, lack of communication and support for local community concerns also extend beyond the traditional leadership council in Fuleni. The local ward councillor leadership tried to indirectly stop local community meetings and decision-making/strategy on mining development in the community and for community alliance building. The ward councillor also engaged in tokenistic consultation over mining development with Fuleni residents by organising meetings over mining development on inconvenient days when local community members were unavailable. It was also noted that external leaderships within the South African Human Rights Commission, the government and the Ingonyama Trust Board were not assisting the local Fuleni community surrounding their mining concerns. Informant C (personal interview, July 2016) noted the difficulties in engaging with these leaderships: ‘To call a community meeting in Fuleni I can’t do that because our ward councillor has the key to the community hall. The ward councillor made it so difficult for us as activists to make sure we don’t get the community behind us…At one stage I went to ask for the key and he said I must call the chiefs son and I said the chief’s son has got nothing to do with the hall key because we are the community based here…so why must I go and ask him that?…and I said…I have the right to do whatever I want to do in my community…Our ward councillor he must stop calling meetings during the day because some of us will be doing other things and won’t be there so you need to organise for the weekends. So he was very angry because of that and asked who am I in this community to tell him on which day he must call the meeting. …He was so angry and he said that it seems like I am not scared of him so he will sort me out…[also] the human rights commission [is] not doing anything. It’s so difficult to see the government and its departments not acting, yet they are the ones feeding the community with that information that they have rights…and the other issue is with the Ingonyama Trust Board…we have been writing letters to them every day [but] they don’t reply…’ The frustration of the local community over how the traditional council has avoided supporting community anti-mining concerns was expressed by informants. However, all informants noted that if the mining goes ahead in Fuleni it will end up like the neighbouring community of Somkele. Informant B (personal interview, July 2016) noted the lack of community support from the traditional council and the concerns surrounding mining development if allowed in Fuleni: 296

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References

The King therefore did not genuinely support anti-mining concerns and showed no interest in mediating effectively between local community mining concerns and their traditional council’s stance on allowing mining. Due to the Zulu King and Ingonyama Trust Board support for mining this perpetuated the local traditional leadership support for mining and corruption, since the local traditional council was not held accountable. This therefore further resulted in unequal power and lack of communication from traditional leaders to local communities and impacting on micro politics, with the latter having no control over mining development on their lands. Some community residents against mining also received threats from the traditional leadership (and ward councillor) structures. The above suggests a wider problem of local and national (traditional) leadership representation over Fuleni community concerns. Democracy has not necessarily resulted in more effective engagement between traditional leaders and communities, with corporations still having undue influence on traditional leaderships in post-apartheid South Africa. This was also due to government proposed regulations (i.e. TKLB) that strengthen the powers of traditional leaders at the expense of customary laws. Government also did not enforce how mining development occurred and to ensure proper consultation with local communities by mining companies. The following recommendations are made to ensure that traditional leaders (and mining companies and the state) engage with community concerns to inform decisions made:

Arnstein, R.S., 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. J. Am. Inst. Plann. 35 (4), 216–224. Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Investment Holdings, 2018. Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Investment Holdings. Online:. http://www.bbkih.com/. Barchiesi, F., 2004. Classes, Multitudes and the Politics of Community Movements in PostApartheid South Africa. Centre for Civil Society Research Report No. 20, Durban, South Africa. Beinart, W., 2017. Comments on the Communal Land Tenure Bill, 2017. (Accessed August 2017). https://www.gga.org/communal-land-tenure-bill-2017/. Bench Marks Foundation, 2016. Life Before and During Mining: the Relocation and Struggles of the Magobading Community, Limpopo – Policy Gap 11. Online:. http:// www.bench-marks.org.za/. Bond, P., 2005. Fanon’s Warning: A civil society reader on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Centre for Civil Society, Research Report. Africa World Press, South Africa 2005. Branson, N., 2016. Land, Law and Traditional Leadership in South Africa. Africa Research Institute Briefing note 1604. Buthelezi, M., Yeni, S., 2016. Traditional Leadership in Democratic South Africa: Pitfalls and Prospects. [Accessed August 2017]. https://www.nelsonmandela.org/uploads/ files/Land__law_and_leadership_-_paper_1.pdf. Capazorio, B., 2017. Motlanthe Says Mining Legislation Leaves the Poor Disempowered. Times Live July 25. Capps, G., Mnwana, S., 2015. Claims from below: platinum and the politics of land in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional authority area. Rev. Afr. Polit. Econ. 42 (146), 606–624. Carnie, T., 2017. Mining Poses Threat to iMfolozi Wilderness Zone. Business Day March 9. Debrah, A., Mtegha, H., Cawood, F., 2018. Social licence to operate and the granting of mineral rights in sub-Saharan Africa: exploring tensions between communities, governments and multi-national mining companies. Resour. Policy 56, 95–103. Dladla, S., 2017. Traditional Leaders Call for Independent Mining Council. 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Alternative Information and Development Centre. http://aidc.org.za/women-defending-water-land-life-northernkwazulu-natal/. Healey, P., De Magalhaes, C., Madanipour, A., Pendlebury, J., 2003. Place, identity, and local politics. In: Hajer, M., Wagenaar, H. (Eds.), Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hendricks, F., Ntsebeza, L., Helliker, K., 2013. The Promise of Land. Jacana Media, Johannesburg. Hill, N., Maroun, W., 2015. Assessing the potential impact of the Marikana incident on South African mining companies. South Afr. J. Econ. Manag. Sci. 18 (4), 586–607. Hilson, G., 2019. Why is there a large-scale mining ‘bias’ in sub-Saharan Africa? Land Use Policy 81, 852–861. Huizenga, D., 2017. Partnership Trumps Consultation in Latest Proposal to Administer South Africa’s Traditional Communities. Accessed September 2017. www. customcontested.co.za. Human Science Research Council, 2015. Face-off: Traditional Leaders and the Contest for Democracy 13 (5 Accessed September 2017. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/ pageContent/6547/HSRC%20Review%20Nov%20to%20Dec%202015.pdf. Ingonyama Trust Board (2107). http://www.ingonyamatrust.org.za/legislative-andother-mandates/. (Accessed August 2017). Ingonyama Trust Board Annual Report, 2017. Ingonyama Trust Board Annual Report (2015/16). Accessed August. . http://www.ingonyamatrust.org.za/wp-content/ uploads/2017/03/INGONYAMA-TRUST-BOARD-ANNUAL-REPORT-201516.pdf. Ishii, R., Hossain, F., Rees, J.C., 2007. Participation in decentralized local governance: two contrasting cases from the Philippines. Public Organ. Rev. 7 (4), 359–373. Jewett, T., 2016. Mining, Land, and Community in Communal Areas, Part 1. 11 August. Accessed August 2017. Helen Suzman Foundation. http://hsf.org.za/resourcecentre/hsf-briefs/mining-land-and-community-in-communal-areas-i-what-could-beachieved-and-why-it-is-not. Jolly, T., 2015. Fuleni Mine Speculation. Zululand Observer May 8. Jolly, T., 2016. Fed-up With Living in Close Proximity to Somkhele Mine, Mpukunyoni Communities Seek Closure of the Mine. Zululand Observer July 1. Kane-Berman, J., 2017. Mining in SA: Then, Now, and Into the Future. Accessed September 2017. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/archive/mining-in-sa-then-nowand-into-the-future–irr. Leonard, L., 2016. Mining and/or tourism development for job creation and sustainability in Dullstroom, Mpumalanga. Local Econ. 31 (1-2), 249–263. Leonard, L., 2017. Governance, Participation and Mining Development. Politikonhttps:// doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2016.1245526.

• The Zulu King needs to immediately ensure that traditional councils

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are not operating separately from local communities they are accountable too. If the King is serious about not allowing mining on communal lands and supporting local community concerns he needs to have better control over traditional councils and the way they function and as under customary law, which facilitates collective community decision-making, alliance building and the flourishing of micro-politics. Such councils should not pose as barriers towards local community decision making over the use of communal lands. Government (and the Zulu King) needs to ensure that the Ingonyama Trust Board operates as it was originally intended for and which mandate is to hold land for ‘the benefit, material welfare and social well-being of the members of the tribes and communities’ living on the land. The board should therefore not have links with any mining companies. Members operating within the Board having links to mining companies must be removed. In the short-term it is proposed that local rural communities with support from external civil society (e.g. public legal institutions, non-profit organisations) hold traditional structures (including mining companies and the government) accountable, which may be the best action to root out corruption and ensure due legislative processes are followed (e.g. ensuring consultation with communities occur as under the MPRDA). Communities must engage in the constitutional framework discourse to claim their rights (e.g. everyone has the right to live in an environment not harmful to their health and well-being, including holding the state constitutionally accountable since the state must take reasonable measures to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis). It is proposed that government and civil society generally (in the medium to long-term) make amendments to the current legislation that is viewed as undemocratic by local communities and that does not involve local communities in consultations over how their lands are used. This will require a revisit of the TKLB, which currently gives more power to traditional leaders and councils and how they enter in partnerships with external forces (e.g. mining companies), with the bill being silent on the issue of community participation and giving consent to developments on communal lands.

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