/‘er.wn.
individ.
Pergamon
Vol.
Copyright
0191-8869(94)
TYPE
018
A BEHAVIOR
E0052-S
BEN-ZUR
0
3. pp. 323-334.
1994 Elsevier
Science
1994 Ltd
Printedin GreatBritain.All rightsreserved 0191-8X69/94 $7.00 + 0.00
PATTERN AND DECISION STRATEGIES
HASIDA
17. No.
MAKING
AND NAOMI WARDI
The Ray D. Wolfe Centre for Study of Psychological Stress, University Haifa 3 1999, Israel
of Haifa,
Mount Carmel,
(Received 16 December 1993) Summary-The present study investigated patterns of decision making strategies among Type A and Type B individuals. Seventy students were presented with decision problems representing typical dilemmas from their everyday life. Each problem contained three alternatives that differed from each other on several relevant dimensions, and was constructed specifically for the individual subject by using his/her own estimated dimension weights obtained prior to the decision making task. The decision problems were presented with instructions requiring either fast performance, high-quality performance, both fast and high-quality performance, or none (i.e. control). It was found that Type A and Type B subjects exhibited similar dimension weights and did not differ in their ability to differentiate between the various dimensions, or in their intolerance of ambiguity level. Type As performed faster than Type Bs on the decision problems, but most important, Type As used a more non-compensatory strategy, choosing the alternative which was highest in its value on the most important dimension. It was concluded that when confronted with a decision problem, Type As filter the most important information and choose accordingly, thereby avoiding gross errors. The results suggested that a cognitive component be added to the action-emotion complex that describes the Type A Behavior Pattern.
INTRODUCTION
Type A Behavior Pattern (TABP) was first described as: “an action-emotion complex that can be observed in any person who is aggressively involved in a chronic, incessant struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time, and if required to do so, against the opposing effects of other things or persons” (Friedman & Rosenman, 1974, p. 67), and for many years was considered a major risk factor for coronary heart disease [CHD(e.g., Glass, 1977; Rosenman, 1993; Wright, 1988)]. By contrast, the Type B Behavior Pattern was associated with the opposite behavioral style, and found to be less related to CHD. Following the discovery of the association between TABP and CHD, several models were offered to explain its significance as a psychological construct (e.g., Glass, 1977; Matthews, 1982; Price, 1982), and in recent years it was also delineated in terms of an interaction between a unique personality and compatible environmental conditions (Smith & Anderson, 1986; Smith & Rhodewalt, 1986). According to this approach, Type A individuals are not only highly stimulated by demanding, that is, challenging or threatening environments (e.g. Humphries, Carver & Neumann, 1983), but they also tend to see situations as more challenging or threatening to their control and self-esteem than Type Bs, sometimes actively searching for such demands, and thereby subjecting themselves more often to aversive stimuli. Such propensity is accompanied, on the one hand, by active and task-oriented coping strategies (Carver, Schaier & Weintraub, 1989; Hart, 1988), and on the other, by an extensive use of suppression or denial which protect self-esteem in the face of failure (Ben-Zur, Breznitz & Hashmonay, 1993; Pittner & Houston, 1980; Strube, 1988). This enhanced ability to disregard threatening information suggests that Type As may differ from Type Bs in certain cognitive functions. The present research integrates two approaches: (a) a personality approach which originated in a behavioral-emotional complex that was claimed to be at the basis of cardiovascular problems, and which evolved to include specific attentional mechanisms of the persons characterized by this complex; and (b) a cognitive-situational approach that focused on the effects of stressful environments on information processing and decision making. Thus, the study explores the cognitive performance of people characterized by the TABP, investigating the relationship between TABP and decision making strategies under different types of environmental demand. 323
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HASIDA BEN-ZUR and NAOMIWARDI
Type A, cognitive
performance
and demand
Most of the studies which investigated the cognitive features of the Type A persons relied on their presumed ability to concentrate better than Type Bs. Thus, Weidner and Matthews (1978), and Offutt and Lacroix (1988) showed that Type As reported on less fatigue and fewer symptoms during task performance than Type Bs. The explanation for this tendency was in terms of attentional processes: Type As are struggling to excel, and therefore devote full attention to the task at hand; if external and internal stimuli compete for their attention, Type As will focus their attention more on environmental cues that help in enhancing task performance, and less on bodily cues that can hinder the attainment of goals they aim to accomplish. Furthermore, Type As may be able to allocate more attention to specific task or environment attributes. For example, Type As were found to perform better than Type Bs on the Stroop task especially under the distracting condition of background noise (Matthews & Brunson, 1979) and they succeeded in ignoring extraneous noise when working on vigilance tasks (Zelson & Simons, 1986). Although such findings were not always replicated (see Bermudez, Perez-Garcia & Sanchez-Elvira, 1990; Lawler & Schmied, 1988), they suggest that Type As utilize an active inhibition or suppression of attention to peripheral events under an external distractor (Blaney, 1991; Matthews & Brunson, 1979). However, working under noise or other stressful conditions may also be interpreted as more demanding by the Type A persons, leading to increased effort on their part to excel and therefore to high-quality accomplishments. In spite of the claim that TABP characterizes people who make decisions such as managers (Streufert, Streufert & Gorson, 1981), or individuals at higher levels of the occupational hierarchy (see Glass, 1977) very little research was devoted to the cognitive processes involved in decision making among Type As. However, past research that dealt with the effects of certain environmental stressors on decision making processes may enhance our understanding of the type of decision making strategies most likely to characterize Type As’ performance. Decision
making
strategies
and time pressure
Current decision making research is concerned with the kind of strategies people utilize when faced with decision problems consisting of multiple alternatives that differ along several dimensions (e.g. Bettman, Johnson & Payne, 1990; Klayman, 1983; Montgomery, 1983; Payne, 1982). One of the frequently used classifications of decision strategies is in terms of compensatory and non-compensatory rules. The typical compensatory strategy is exemplified by the “linear-compensatory” or additive model: each dimension is characterized by its weight (which is assumed to be the same over alternatives) and by its specific values (which are assumed to differ among alternatives). Each alternative then acquires an overall value, arrived at by summing over all weighted values (Hogarth, 1980). The alternative having the highest overall value should be selected if we assume that choices are optimal. Using compensatory rules means that the decision maker is weighting and combining all or most of the information contained in each alternative. However, when time and resources are limited, people may turn to non-compensatory strategies: the relatively simple decision rules that usually lead decision makers to process information along specific dimensions only rather than assessing whole alternatives. For example, according to the Lexicographic Choice rule (Tversky, 1969) one estimates dimension weights and then compares the alternatives on the most important dimension, choosing the one with the highest value on this dimension. Many task and environmental aspects can affect decision making strategies and processes (e.g. Hogarth, 1980; Montgomery, 1983; Payne, 1982). One of the environmental demands that has its parallel in the TABP is time pressure, since TABP includes a time urgency component: Type As are described as persons who are impatient, work under deadlines, and do several tasks simultaneously (e.g. Friedman & Rosenman, 1974; Rosenman, 1993) and who tend to overestimate the passage of time, arrive early for appointments, and complete questionnaires quickly (see Bingham & Hailey, 1989; Glass, 1977). The effect of time pressure on decision making was empirically tested in gambling situations (e.g. Ben-Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988). In these experiments Ss exhibited a filtering type of processing, focusing on only part of the information before making a choice.
Type A and decision making
325
Moreover, using decision problems that consisted of several alternatives such as stoves to be purchased, Zakay and Wooler (1984) found that under time pressure less Ss chose according to the ideal, compensatory rule, and Zakay (1985) showed that time pressure led to choosing the alternative which was highest on the most important dimension rather than the compensatory one. Such a strategy can lead to the selection of the most important data for consideration, at the same time preventing large-scale errors; and it may terminate with decisions not necessarily less efficient than decisions made by utilizing compensatory strategies (Paquette & Kida, 1988). Type A, decision
making,
and cognitive
differentiation
Few research efforts were directed towards the question of how Type A persons deal with decision problems. Streufert (1986) suggested that Type As, who are described as constantly operating under time pressure, may tend to more risk-taking in decision making, especially when challenged to compete, and such a tendency could lead to more errors in judgement. While Streufert and Swezey (1986) found Type As to be more risky on a visual-motor task containing components of decision making, Streufert, Streufert and Denson (1985), using the same task, did not succeed in showing differences between Type As and Type Bs on risk taking, strategy use, or errors. It should also be remembered that Type As are characterized by a hard-driving component, i.e. they are not only trying to achieve a lot, but they are also trying to do everything perfectly (Price, 1982). Indeed, it has been claimed that Type As will try to achieve goals rapidly, but the desire to achieve in itself may lead the Type A individual to take care to avoid errors (Innes, 1980). Thus, Type As, who presumably function under constant pressure, but also value quality, may make decisions based on partial information and simpler strategies; the adoption of a non-compensatory, albeit systematic, strategy, will lead them to process the most relevant dimensions and at the same time gross mistakes will be avoided, resulting in fast decisions, but of a relatively high-quality level. The possibility that Type As will filter information because they tend to use simple cognitive operations should not be overlooked. According to Ortega and Weinstein (1988), cognitive simplicity is expressed by emphasizing few dimensions in decision making (unidimensionality), making gross distinctions between positions on a stimulus dimension (lower discriminative ability), and placing greater value on order and viewing ambiguity as a source of stress. Streufert er al. (1985) have not observed differences between Type As and Type Bs in an interview designed to measure complexity by assessing unidimensionality, differentiation and integration of responses. In the Ortega and Weinstein research (1988) Type As and Type Bs performed similarly on tests measuring gross discriminations and intolerance of ambiguity. When making desirability judgements about people based on descriptor lists, Type As emphasized the attribute of competence over criticalness and congeniality while Type Bs showed similar emphasis for all three attributes, but this could reflect either the Type As’ tendency towards filtering information in decision making, or their assigning more weight to competence over other attributes. Thus, it seems that no consistent evidence was found to indicate cognitive simplicity among the Type A persons. Moreover, very little research exists in relation to TABP and decision making, and the way Type As make decisions under environmental demands has not yet been investigated. Research
aims and hypotheses
The main purpose of the present research is to investigate differences between Type As and Type Bs in decision making patterns. The main hypothesis is that Type As will be using a unidimensional strategy rather than the compensatory one, focusing on the most important dimension in the decision problem at hand and choosing accordingly, thereby avoiding gross errors that can emanate from superficial or random processing. In addition, Type As’ performance will be assessed under different demands that are in accord with the Type A’s main characteristics of time urgency and high performance standards. Thus, Ss will perform under time pressure, quality pressure, combination of time and quality pressure, and a control (no demand) condition. If Type As differ from Type Bs in being under chronic pressure, and if this chronic pressure causes Type As to use effort-saving strategies in order to protect the quality of their performance, they will show a preference of unidimensional choices across all experimental conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that Type As are differentially stressed by external demands,
HASIDA BEN-ZUR and NAOMI WARDI
326
and cope with them in specific versatile ways. Accordingly, they will use the unidimensional strategy to save time under time pressure, but under quality pressure they will engage in a thorough and deep processing which may conclude with more compensatory choices. Since the combination of the two conditions is a sort of conflict which demands maximal effort, it may therefore cause extreme stress in Type As and result in a higher frequency of both unidimensional and unsound choices. The study also aims to demonstrate that decision-making among Type As is not based on the tendency to use simpler cognitive operations when evaluating decision-relevant information. Thus, Type As and Type Bs are not expected to differ in either their differentiation ability in regard to the assessment of the dimensions underlying the decision problems used in the present research, or in their intolerance of ambiguity level.
PART
1:
DIMENSION
WEIGHTS
AND
TABP
The main purpose of conducting the first part of the experiment was twofold: (a) to provide personal weights for the dimensions on which the alternatives included in the decision problems were based, so that these alternatives could be specifically constructed for each subject, and (b) to investigate whether Type As are comparable to Type Bs in their differentiation ability when assessing the importance of those attributes.
Method Subjects Seventy paid students from various departments of Haifa University and the Technion in this study, 34 men and 36 women, with mean age of 25.1 yr (SD = 3.32, range 21-39). native speakers of Hebrew.
took part All were
Instruments The following instruments were used. (u) Ruting tusks. Five decision making topics from student lives were selected: renting an apartment (‘apartment’ problem), choosing a job during study period (‘job’ problem), choosing institute for higher education (‘institute’ problem), buying a refrigerator (‘refrigerator’ problem), and choosing a course for study (‘course’ problem). To construct the decision problems for each of the topics, 10 psychology students produced various dimensions which are highly relevant to each of the topics, and judged their relative importance and independence of each other. On the basis of these judgements, for each topic five frequent, important and independent dimensions were selected (see Appendix I), each dimension having five possible values (e.g. for the ‘job’ topic, the scale of salary size was 1 = very low, 2 = fairly low, 3 = medium, 4 = fairly high, 5 = very high). Three types of rating scales were prepared: (a) simple rating scale-a seven-point scale (1 = not important at all, 7 = highly important), with each dimension independently rated, (b) simple ranking scale-a five-point scale (5 = the least important dimension, 1 = the most important dimension), with each dimension receiving a unique rank, and (c) a combined rating and ranking scale-a seven-point scale as in (a), but each dimension receiving a unique score as in (b). (6) TABP assessment. The TABP was assessed by the Jenkins Activity Survey [JAS(Jenkins, Zyzanski & Rosenman, 1979)], adapted by Glass (1977) for students. The student version (SJAS) yields a 2 1-item scale for assessing TABP (A-B Scale) and shows moderate internal reliability and moderate to high test-retest reliability values (Yarnold, Mueser, Grau & Grimm, 1986). The Hebrew translation was validated by Ben-Zur, Weinstein and Hashmonay (1990). The A-B Scale mean was 7.50 (SD = 3.48. range O-14), with a median of seven (2 = 0.71). These data are similar to those reported by Glass ( 1977). (c) Intolerance ofambiguity. The Hebrew version of the Budner (1962) Intolerance of Ambiguity (IOA) inventory was used. It consists of 16 statements which the S agrees or disagrees with on a l-7 point scale (with no middle grade 4). The IOA mean and median were 52.3 and 53, respectively
327
Type A and decision making
(SD = 9.98, range 32-80, CI= 0.49).
CI= 0.63), the reliability
being higher than that reported by Budner (1962;
Procedure Subjects were tested in small-group sessions. For the rating tasks Ss were first given general background, being told that in everyday decisions, choice alternatives are usually compared on a number of dimensions. The decision problem situations were described, and then they were presented with the five decision topics and their relevant dimensions, first to be rated according to the simple rating task, followed by the simple ranking task, and finally the combined rating/ranking task. Then Ss filled-in the SJAS and the IOA and were released. Results and Discussion The median was used to divide Ss into Type As (33 higher than the median) and Type Bs (37 equal or lower than the median). Since five dimensions were rated for each of the five topics, 25 ratings were available for the simple rating, simple ranking, and combined rating/ranking task. Comparing Type As and Type Bs on each set of the 25 ratings using a Multiple Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) procedure yielded non-significant results. The individual t-tests yielded significant effects (P < 0.05) for only three out of the 75 possible tests. Hence, it can be concluded that Type A and Type B Ss did not differ in their weights of the various dimensions. Thus, differences in their decision making patterns are not likely to be the result of differential weights assigned to the dimensions used in the present decision problems. To test Ss’ differentiation ability, the seven-point simple rating scale was used. On this scale Ss were free to give each of the dimensions the same value and therefore the variance of the ratings for each of the five topics could be used as a measure of how much they discriminated between the various dimensions. To control for content effects, the mean variance score was used (averaging over the five variances of the five topics). No significant differences were found between Type A and Type B Ss on mean variance (the means were 2.61 and 2.40, respectively, t < 1). By contrast, when Ss were divided into 38 low-intolerance and 32 high-intolerance Ss (according to the IOA median), IOA showed a significant effect, with high-intolerance Ss being lower on level of variance than the low-intolerance ones [the means were 2.16 and 2.78, respectively, t(68) = 2.36, P < 0.051. Finally, TABP was not correlated with IOA (r = - 0.11). These results suggest that Type A Ss do not differ from Type Bs on the differentiation and complexity measures used in the present research. The correlations between the three sets of the ratings were also computed. The range was between 0.35 and 0.88 (P < O.Ol), indicating a satisfactory level of inter-rating consistency. For the decision making task the weights obtained with the ranking scale (range l-5; the scores were reversed so that a high rank represented a large weight and vice versa) were chosen because they represented unique ranks for each dimension with an identical summation over the five rankings for each topic.
PART
II.
DECISION
MAKING
AND
TABP
For the second part, decision problems consisting of three alternatives, each representing a specific strategy, were prepared. The ‘compensatory’ alternative represented the best choice according to a linear-additive model while the ‘unidimensional’ alternative represented the best choice in terms of being highest on the most important dimension (see Zakay, 1985). The third alternative constituted an unsound choice: it was lower than the other two alternatives on both its overall value and the value it acquired on the most important dimension. Thus, Type As alleged tendency to err in judgement (Streufert, 1986) could be assessed. Each S made his/her decisions under four types of demand: control, time pressure, quality pressure and a combination of time and quality pressure. To let Ss, fully express their cognitive tendencies without external limitations, the demands were explicitly stated, but their actual levels left to be determined by the S. This procedure is based on Matthews’ suggestion (1982) that ambiguous standards will provoke Type As to exhibit their behavioral tendencies, and on the observation that Type Bs behave like Type As when deadlines are specifically defined (Glass, 1977).
328
HASIDA BEN-ZUR and NAOMI WARM
Method Subjects The same Ss that participated
in Part I.
Instruments Sixteen decision problems were prepared for each S, with four different variations for each of the following four topics: ‘apartment’, ‘job’, ‘institute’, and ‘refrigerator’ (the ‘course’ topic was only used for demonstration). Each decision problem contained three alternatives, whose overall value was determined by multiplying the specific value assigned to each dimension by its respective weight (as predetermined by each S in Part I), and summing over the resulting weighted values (Hogarth, 1980), that is: Value of alternative
= sum of (relative
weight X scale value) of all dimensions.
Each of the three alternatives included in a decision problem represented a specific type of choice or strategy. Thus, the ‘compensatory’ alternative represented the best choice according to a linear-additive model, i.e. after summing up over the weighted values it had the highest overall value among the three. The ‘unidimensional’ alternative was lower than the ‘compensatory’ one in its total value, but the value of the most important dimension was higher than the value assigned to the same dimension in the ‘compensatory’ alternative. Most or all of the other dimension values on the ‘unidimensional’ alternative were lower than the respective values in the ‘compensatory’ one (though for certain cases one dimension value was identical in the two alternatives). The third alternative was a ‘bad choice’ alternative: it was much lower than the other two possibilities both in its total value, and in its value on the most important dimension, and therefore choosing it can be conceived to be an error in judgement. Four different basic configurations were used to create the four problem variations for each topic. The dimension values assigned to each alternative in each configuration were randomly produced, and each alternative total value was determined by summing up the weighted dimension values. The resulting three-alternative problems were subjected to two constraints: (a) each decision problem included the three types of alternatives described above, that is, ‘compensatory’, ‘unidimensional’ and ‘bad choice’, and (b) approximately equal intervals between the three alternatives overall values were attained, with the ‘compensatory’ alternative having the highest value, and the ‘bad choice’ the lowest. The same four configurations were used for all topics and Ss, but Ss’ personal weights (i.e. unique ranks; see Part I) were used to determine the final form of the specific problems. The three alternatives in each problem, as well as the five dimensions in each alternative, appeared in different counterbalanced sequences in the different problem variations. In addition, for each S the 16 problems appeared in four sets, each set including one problem of each topic in the following order: ‘apartment’, ‘job’, ‘institute’, and ‘refrigerator’. The order of the four problem variations belonging to each topic was counterbalanced across the 16 problems, and the order of the four sets of problems was counterbalanced across subjects and the Type A-B classification. Procedure Part II was held about l-2 weeks after Part I, with Ss performing individually on the decision making task. They were instructed about the decision topics and the general structure of the problems, and were also reminded about their ratings of the dimensions in the previous meeting. Then they made a practice choice on a decision problem taken from the ‘course’ topic, which was presented together with two information pages: a list of the relevant dimensions for this topic and their respective values (both descriptive and numeral), and the predetermined personal weights assessed in the previous meeting. Following the ‘course’ example Ss were presented with the two types of information pages for all topics, and these were available to them throughout the experiment (one S who reported on changes in dimensions weights during the previous l-2 weeks was replaced). Now Ss were presented with the 16 decision problems, in four sets of four problems each, with each problem printed on a separate page. Each set of four problems appeared under one of the following experimental conditions.
Type A and decision making
329
(a) Control. The problems were presented with no additional requirements, or no demand of any kind. The experimenter measured performance time (in set) for each problem using a stopwatch. The measurement was done covertly to avoid undue pressure. (b) Time pressure. The problems were presented together with both written and verbal instructions to decide as fast as possible, and the experimenter stressed the fact that Ss should not be concerned with quality, and that she was going to measure the time needed to reach each decision. In this condition performance time for each problem was measured and written down by the experimenter openly. (c) Quality pressure. The problems were presented together with both written and verbal instructions to work thoroughly and make decisions of a high-quality level, without being concerned with the time it takes to reach each decision. As in (a) the experimenter measured performance time covertly. (d) Time and quality pressure. The problems were presented together with both written and verbal instructions to decide both as fast as possible and on a high-quality level. In fact, this condition included ‘conflicting’ instructions, since it suggested to Ss that they should try to work fast but also thoroughly at the same time. As in (b) performance time for each problem was measured and written down by the experimenter openly. The experiment started for each S with condition (a), so that decision making behavior could be assessed without being affected by the specific pressures. Furthermore, to avoid training and carry-over effects as much as possible, Ss performed on distractor tasks, not relevant to the decision making task, before and after each experimental condition (a variant of a word association test and a variant of an F-scale). The additional three conditions followed the control condition in a counterbalanced order across Ss. The six possible sequences of the three conditions were equally represented among Type A and Type B Ss. In addition, the four sets of problems appeared the same number of times in each condition, and across the Type A-B classification. Results and Discussion For each of the 16 decision problems two measures were obtained for each S: time to reach the decision, and the type of decision made. Table 1 presents means and SDS of time to decision under the four experimental conditions and the two levels of TABP. The time scores of each problem were log-transformed and averaged over the four-problem sets presented in each condition, and a two-way, 2 X 4, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) compared Type As with Type Bs on the four conditions. A marginally significant effect was found for TABP [F(l,68) = 3.41, P < 0.071, with Type As performing faster than Type Bs (the overall means were 39.84 and 43.91, respectively). The requirement manipulation was found to be highly significant [F(3,204) = 210.86, P < O.OOOl], and the interaction effect was also significant [F(3,204) = 3.18, P < 0.051. Table 1 shows that Type As did not differ from Type Bs in their decision time under the control condition (t < 1). By contrast, a two-way, 2 X 3 ANOVA applied to the three requirements produced a significant effect for TABP [F(l,68) = 5.69, P < 0.051, with Type As performing faster than Type Bs (the overall means were 32.19 and 38.37, respectively). The requirement manipulation was found to be highly significant [F(2,136) = 155.98, P < O.OOOl], with no significant interaction (F< 1). Thus, the Quality Pressure condition led all Ss to perform in a relatively slow rate, the Time Pressure condition led them to a fast performance, while performance time under the Time and Quality Pressure was found to be between these two extremes (see Table 1). The decision measures used were the proportions of ‘compensatory’ and ‘unidimensional’ choices out of the four-problem set of each condition. The sum of these two proportions represents ‘correct’ choices, and its counterpart is the proportion of cases in which Ss preferred the ‘bad choice’ alternative. Table 2 depicts the average proportions of each type of decision taken by Type As and Type Bs under the four conditions. It clearly shows that the proportion of ‘correct’ choices overall was generally high, ranging between 0.89-0.97. Thus, even under the time pressure condition Ss chose consistently, making less than 8% of ‘bad choices’. Neither the TABP nor the demand manipulation, nor their interaction, produced significant effects for the proportion of ‘bad choices’ (F < 1.45). By contrast, two-way ANOVAs applied to the proportion of compensatory or unidimensional choices showed
330
HASIDA BEN-ZL’R and NAOMI WARD] Table 1. Conditions’ means and SDS for Type A and Type B persons on time to decision (in set)
Control
Time pressure
62.80 (32,SO)
20.54 (11.43)
47.77 (35.98)
28.26 (i2.06f
60.53 (25.84)
24.55 (9.46)
56.08 134.10)
34.46 (12.75)
TABP
Time & quality pressure
Type A in = 33)
Type B (n = 37)
significant TABP effects [F( 1,68) = 6.30, P = 0.01, and F( 1,68) = 4.94. P < 0.05, respectively], over the various conditions. As can be seen in Table 2, Type A Ss made more unidimensional choices and less compensatory choices than Type Bs. Neither the requirement condition, nor the double interactions, were found to be significant (F < 1.10 in each case). It should be noted that a similar pattern of results was obtained for both time and decision measures when we tested the performance of extreme Type As and Type Bs using the A-B scale scores from the first and forth quartiles only. In addition, the differences between Type As and Type Bs for either the compensatory or the unidimensional measure remained significant in an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) using the time measure as a covariate (P< 0.05). Although no effect was found for the demand conditions on choices, Type Bs seemed somewhat more sensitive to these manipulations than Type As, making more compensatory choices under the Quality than under the Time Pressure condition [the means were 0.55 and 0.64, respectively, F(1,36) = 3.88, P < 0.0571, while Type As did not (F < I). This is a somewhat weak indication that time pressure led to more unidimensional choices than quality pressure. IUA and decision
making
Two-way ANOVAs. IOA X Condition, were applied to the compensatory and unidimensional choices. No effects were found for the IOA characteristic or the IOA X Condition interaction. Thus, it seems that TABP differs from IOA on both decision making patterns as well as differentiation (see Part I). Correlations
between
peyformance
indices
Since the experimental conditions did not differ in decision making patterns, Ss scores were averaged over the four conditions. Correlations were computed between the rating variance measure, time to reach a decision, and the proportion of compensatory choices (compensatory choices were
Table 2. Conditions’ means and SDS for Type A and Type B persons on proportions of ‘compensatory’ and ‘untdimensional’ choices Experimental condition
Type of choice Type A (n = 33) Compensatory Unidimensional Total ‘correct’ Type B (n = 37) Compensatory Unidimenaional Total ‘correct’
Time pressure
Quality pressure
Time L quality plWSUR
0.51 (0.25) 0.42 (0.28) 0.93 (0.13)
0.46 (0.26) 0.47 (0.24) 0.93 (0.14)
0.49 (0.23) 0.45 (0.24) 0.93 (0.14)
0.49 (0.25) 0.4 I (0.23) 0.89 (0.15)
0.55 (0.27) 0.35 (0.25) 0.90 (0.18)
0.55 (0.26) 0.39 (0.23) 0.94 (0.1 I)
0.64 (0.2 1) 0.33 (0.23) 0.97 (0.09)
0.60 (0.25) 0.35 (0.25) 0.95 (0.10)
Control
Type A and decision making
331
highly correlated with the unidimensional choices and therefore only the former was used). Average time to decision was marginally correlated with the proportion of compensatory choices (r = 0.22, P = 0.06), suggesting that Ss who took more time to reach a decision, made more compensatory choices than Ss who took less time. A positive correlation between the rating variance measure and time to reach a decision was found (r = 0.34, P -=c0.01). Thus, Ss who were more differentiating also spent more time to reach a decision than Ss who were less differentiating. It should be noted that no correlation was observed between the proportion of the compensatory and the rating variance measure (r = - 0.04), and a similar result was observed when the correlation was based on the data of the control condition alone (r = 0.00) which was run without pressure and hence under very similar conditions as the rating task. It is also of some interest that the relationship between time to make a decision and compensatory choices was significant when computed separately for the two conditions that included a time component (r = 0.24 and r = 0.23 for the Time Pressure and Time and Quality Pressure, respectively, P = 0.05). In sum, the results show that TABP is characterized by using more the unidimensional strategy over the compensatory one, but the use of this strategy is not related to differentiation ability measures. This type of strategy is not affected by the demand conditions presumably because the various pressures as used here were not very strong in terms of external limitations. The observed small effects of time pressure on decision making were in the direction predicted by previous research (e.g. Zakay, 1985): longer processing times accompanied higher proportions of compensatory decisions, and for the Type Bs Ss only, time pressure led to less compensatory choices than the quality pressure.
GENERAL
TABP and decision
DISCUSSION
making
The purpose of the present research was to investigate patterns of decision making strategies among Type A and Type B individuals under different types of demand. The main hypothesis was confirmed. namely, Type As made less use of the compensatory decision rule than Type Bs, thereby choosing the alternative with the highest value on the most important dimension. This pattern of choices was accompanied by a faster rate of processing, although further analyses indicated that choice time did not account for all of the effects observed on the decision making measures used. An additional important finding was the observation that Type As did not differ from their Type B counterparts in the proportion of ‘bad choices’ they made under the various requirement conditions. These findings suggest that Type As possess an ability to focus on the important dimensions of a decision problem, and choose accordingly, a quality that enables them to perform faster than Type Bs but also avoid errors which can emanate from rash judgements. Their fast performance is in line with other research results (e.g. Glass, 1977) and their tendency to choose unidimensionally conforms well with the findings that Type As are better able to focus their attention on the main task and avoid external distractions such as noise (e.g. Blaney, 1991; Matthews & Brunson, 1979; Zelson & Simons, 1986). The present results are also in accord with Innes’ (1980) suggestion that Type As will try to achieve goals rapidly but at the same time avoid errors. Our findings are also compatible with the suggestions that a filtering mechanism is used under time pressure to process important decision-relevant data (e.g. Ben-Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Payne et al., 1988), or with the preference found for unidimensional choices under this condition (e.g. Zakay, 1985). Thus, Type As exhibit the type of information processing that characterizes performance under objective time constraints, supporting the claim that indeed time urgency is a basic component of the TABP. The decision making patterns of Type As observed in the present study are not in accordance with Streufert’s (1986) implication that Type As will make more errors in judgement because they are always pressed for time. Their behavior in the present study suggests that they take decisions rapidly but also wisely, so that their final choices represent good decisions in terms of the value they possess on the important dimensions which underlie them. These results carry implications for models which conceive of the TABP as a coping strategy aimed at protecting self-worth or self-evaluation. For example, Price (1982) advanced a social learning model which centered on personal beliefs of Type As that are related to self-worth, justice, and paucity of PAID 17-3-C
HASIDA BEN-ZUR and NAOMIWARDI
3.12
resources. This model sees the specific behaviors of Type A such as competition and aggression as representing efforts to cope with anxieties associated with these beliefs. Matthews’s (1982) approach is mostly relevant here since it is based on Type As possessing “a combination of a strong value in productivity and ambiguous standards for evaluating that productivity” (p. 3 1 l), and it is argued that this combination will lead to the cognition that time is not sufficient for accomplishing one’s goals. Similarly, Martin, Kuiper and Westra (1989) proposed a self-worth contingency model according to which Type As use unrealistic standards that make positive self-evaluations difficult to achieve. This approach maintains that TABP represents cognitive and behavioral coping strategies in an attempt to achieve positive appraisal of the self. If indeed Type As’ behavior is aimed at achieving a positive view of the self, and if they realize that time is not sufficient to fulfill their personal aims, then a ‘unidimensional’ choice strategy that is accomplished by filtering the most important information is an asset since it allows the rapid attainment of good-enough decisions. In this way Type As accomplish two important aims, namely, achieving a lot in a short time and still keeping a positive self-worth by avoiding negative criticism upon the occurrence of gross errors. Type As and environmental
demands
Type As’ performance was not affected by the various demands used in the present research. The ‘unidimensional’ choice strategy was used more by Type As than by Type Bs under all conditions, even when demand was absent, though the differences under the neutral requirement tended to be somewhat smaller. In addition, Type As performed faster than Type Bs under all requirement conditions, but not under the control condition. These results could be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that Type As’ chronic pressure leads them to unidimensional choices under all conditions. However. it should be remembered that the present research used flexible performance criteria, and this procedure may account for the weak effects of the demands on decision making strategies. Additional studies are needed to replicate Type As’ uniform decision pattern under more effective demands. Type As cmd cognitive
differentiution
Type As differed from Type Bs in their decision making patterns, but not in their sensitivity to the specific content of the dimensions judged, or in their ability to differentiate between these dimensions as measured by their assessments of their importance. In addition, TABP was not related to the intolerance of ambiguity attribute, and no relationship was observed between differentiation and decision making measures. If we accept the assumption that differentiation is associated with cognitive simplicity, then these results imply that Type As’ decision performance is not dependent on this aspect of cognitive ability. It might have been claimed that the dimension rating tasks were performed under no pressure, in contrast to the three demand conditions used in the decision making task. However, the lack of association between decision making and differentiation scores was found under the control condition as well. This is not intended to mean that decision making processes are not based to some degree on being able to differentiate between dimensions in analytical sets as used in the present research. However, it is being advanced here that decision making activity contains additional operations such as filtering information and integrating several informational items which go beyond the differentiation level. In sum This study investigated the combined effects of personality and situation on information processing, concentrating on the decision making patterns of TABP under different environmental demands. While Type As were not found to be different from Type Bs in cognitive simplicity, they differed in their decision making strategies. It is proposed that TABP is an emotion-cognition-action complex involving the aggressive and impatient style of the rapid, high-achiever individual, who is, in addition, characterized by a specific cognitive structure. This cognitive component leads to focused and unidimensional processing of information in both attention and thought domains. Further studies that will emphasize the cognitive in relation to the emotional and action components could map the causal relationships between these three aspects of the TABP.
Type A and decision
making
333
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APPENDIX
Topic
Dinwmim
Job
( 1) Salary (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apartment
Location-proximity Rent Existing furniture Location-proximity
to shopping
and recreation
support through scholarships and similar benetits Length of study period Suitability of studies to your field of interest Standard of living to be attainable in the acquired profession Distance between place of studies and family residence
period Price-relative to similar-size refrigerators Brand name-product quality Quality of service Fitness of inner design to your needs
( I ) Level of interest (2) (3) (4) (5)
centers
to university
(I) Guarantee (2) (3) (4) (13)
Course
Flexible working hours Contribution to studies or future profession Job satisfaction Distance of working place from home
(I) Financial (2) (3) (4) (5)
Refrigerator
drscriptim
( I ) State of repair (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institute
I
Expectancy Number of Agreement Excellence
of a high grade requirements with overall timetable of teacher
27, 273-284.
A blink
reflex
analysis.