When is collectivization reversible?

When

is Collectivization

In certain

situations,

low short-run Poland

agricultural

costs

reversed

partial

the early

and mid-1950s.

the same

process

1980s.

appeared

1980s

steps

success,

at least on

stew. nations

is not

so that

websof

costs of being

I wish

to

paper.

I am

out-of-step

1

During

2.

thank

an

1985),

Paul

pp.

“Spatial versity, S~JDIES

measures to make

faster

notable in large

situations, to return

an aquarium

to

it is easy out of fish

of the East

why various

when

railroads

other

Why

when

European

refer

keyboard

arrange-

gauges

all would

and

around

gained

short-run

ofothers, benefit

are better

by a given

of production costs

and to the imperfect

to the intentions

in&strialized

revolving

to the benefits

to the interrelatedness

are

industrial

mainly

to the high

economies

do many

do most

wider

questions,

These

although

a

I alone,

1964

seminar the

to

at

the

University

Institution

draft.

David,

and

project;

the

and

National

to Paul

however,

am

North

Vietnam

1974,

University

“Clio

and

same

author,

in the

Social

Technology

the

Economics

“Path

tech-

of breaking

information

ofthe

not daring

to bear

the

if all decided

together

to

responsible

for

experienced

A and

Model

with

an

the 533,

to

Workshop,

the

informal NY:

0003-22

$03.00

@

1991

VOL.

XXIV,

University

Past

No.

1, March

East

and

European

Susan

at on

the this

Studies

Woodward

for

of decollectivization 1989)].

2 (May,

No.

Institute

Economics,” 1988;

Standardization

1991,

type Sharpe,

in

November,

Department

of California

and

and

comments

Economic Review,

of

1987.

COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM,

Cruz

their

errors.

A mencan

Report

Application

Productivity

Wang,

(Armonk,

Putting

Santa for

for Soviet

Christine

ofQWERTY,”

Technical

California, Berkeley

Council

David,

Dependence:

Sciences,

of

of California,

Question in Norfh Vietnam, 1974-1979

Externalities:

paper,

IN

Union

any

taken

for instance,

typing?

to these

to the benefits;

at

for this

period

A.

in

Hoover

TheA,qrarian

Network

0039.3592/91/01

Soviet

have noted,

efforts

Why,

another;

with others

support

Studies

Unpublished

in their given

with regard

Seminar

to the

332-337;

Mathematical

been

participants

earlier

the

Fforde, See,

in

action.

grateful on

gauges

upon

financial

comments

in the late

historical

observers

for a moment

much

one

Communism

for providing

in and

can be blamed

in certain

on typewrit&s,

allow

in comparison

a particular

consider

keyboard

agents

The

to achieve

an outcome that

or standards.

technology;

economic

Comparative

decollectivized;

also be unsuccessful.

system

depends

such

any large-scale

use the same

interaction

individual

and

1950s

such as Mozambique

unable

the decollectivization

in context,

have

was

As some Soviet

and embeddedness.2

others

nologies,

[Adam

might

narrow

answers

externalities

when

and early

and Vietnam

nations

but impossible

that

the QWERTY

Several

network

*

so that

technologies

use relatively

safer?

take

1990s

this possibility

use

Laos,

relatively

Yugoslavia

must be noted.

but

possible

to failure.

the prospect

such as the Dvorak

nations

user

reversible

into inefficient

nations

1940s

essentially

African

Although

it is also

are doomed

raises

To place

ments

1980s.

failures,

in the early

locked

China

with

instance,

of the late

ofdecollectivization

fish stew out of an aquarium,

This

For

in Cambodia,

in some

decollectivization

by the late

farming

to make

failure

a partial

policy

collectivization individual

1980s

to be occurring also collapsed

one major

toward

measure

drives

the early

is reversible,

benefits.

as well.

Nevertheless, took

certainly

long-run

collectivization

During

1Collectivization

the late

collectivization

and considerable

their

Reversible?

3-24

Douglas of

Economics,

Railway

J.

for

Puffert, Gauge,”

Stanford

Uni-

4

STUIIIES

Considerable nations also

be locked

willing the

evidence

can be locked into

to defend

lack

lasted

institutions In some

cases

individual

certainty

that

collective

private

steps,

accruing

benefits

to society

reason

may

may

or state

autonomous

production

farms,

e.g.

purpose

economic, major

sociological,

thesis

situations:

is that where

and whcrc decades.

with

of this

greater

political

for that

of the

may

takt

calculations

who must

the

Third,

the

implement

and thus

the

have

good

land to those wishing inputs

farms

to thern.

organized and their

A change the workers

the same,

either

as

creation

as

of ownership or others

hold

is quite

a diffcrcnt

the most

important

ease. more

likely

technology

has been

specifically

making

is more

agriculture

the exarnplcs

roughly

that,

benefits

of

of the

means

action.

farms,

in which

remain

(so

others

in their

of the government.”

factors

of agricultural

that

agricultural

operated

the costs

the lack

to them)

the social

infertile

of large-scale

is to consider

collectivization

the level

collectivized In short,

much

discussion and

by assigning

into a corporation operations

First,

actions

certain

officials

far outweigh

overseeing

the power

or politically,

and withholding

independent

farming

reasons:

and complementary

into indiviciually

a conversion

and can occur

The

units

are

of

as well,

the specific

for instance,

will be available

but local

the break-up

officials

complementary

economically

for instance,

enterprises,

but the essential

matter

the costs,

rents,

as a whole

to take into account

take a similar

high

possihle

if they

aspects agricultural

agriculture

own decisions,

will lie below

even

off, either

1 mean

cooperatives

stock

of change for them

outweigh

them

By decollectivization

or

such

arc

such as

controversy.

or local

(so that,

inputs

yet

slave

if

they can

historians

such feudal

to the system their

and

surely

agriculture

and

for

to more

for several

Second,

the program,

charging

be said

to guide

reduced)

if others

end up worst

land,

of these

system.

dues;

farmers

then

of feudal

underlying

is open

actions

is inefficient;

few economic

aspects

of labor may

of agricultural

net benefits

to them

to sabotage

to lease

be

example,

of change

similar

will

agriculture and standards,

causes

to individual

it may be impossible

benelits program

same

the benefits

sources

of the entire

similar

The benefits

take

chairmen

expected

changing

initial

such calculations will

alternative

system

after

but

outweigh

farm

instance, their

costs,

others

For

of this institution

the long-term

who are making

collectivized

of certain

or the

to wane.

COMML’NISM

technologies

efficiency

centuries

short-run

to that

that

institutions.

movement many

the inefficiency

the overall farms

inefficient

appeared

although

suggests

into inefficient

the economic

of factor

feudalism

IN COLIP.AKATI\.E

decollectivization to be

in the country

the dominant

of successful

irreversible form

decollectivization

difficult. in two is relatively

ofproduction briefly

noted

The

types

of

high;

for many above

are

not random.

Economic

Factors

Dec~~llecti~~ization commensurate

is most

to the effort

appealing he would

to the hard-working be willing

to expend.

farmer From

whose

income

this simple

is not

idea we can

?. Included in my drtinition ofdccollecti~%~A~~ are cases where private farminS includes many diffvrrnr types ofgroup activities, e.g. when a rice lield is irrigated by a sin+ system maintained by a group, wjhilc the liclds are subdivided into a number ofstrips, each farmed by a different household. Decollerrivization can also occur without full markrtization. rsprcially of factor markets; and it can also take place without a drwloped sysrrm of contractrnforcemrnt (as in China), although it is likely that such a sys~crn would won cwlvr. I’ht~ creation of autonomous units and the breaking of the link with thr go~ernrnent nppcars tu bc the raiest part of thr problt~m: by the end of 1990 none of the East European nations had an qricultural pian fin ttx farrm to f~ollow and the crfatmn ~f~“t~*~,~,~,~s units seemed well on its was.

When is Collectivization predict

that those

option

in those

shirking

is easy

accounting

farmers

adopt

farms

where

and

work

unit

analyses

for China.”

system

that

moreover,

provide

such

a venture

semblance

Network

What

individual

exactly

do

in centrally

satisfying time.

reward

in

some

also requires,

in agriculture

a viable

farm

with

be consistent

with other

the

so that

(e.g.,

where

the

statistical

the creation

indi~,idualized

a certain

choice

if given

interesting

however,

to support

economic

quickly

performance

level

of

farming.

of economic

at a particular

level

of risk;

goals of the government

so that

of permanency.

A New Institutional

institutions

a commensurate

the household

must

the most

to monitor

confirmed

Decollectivization structure

such a program

it has some

given

5

farming

it is difficult

hypothesis

must

makes

household

is not

an

new institlltional

new

return

hard

is large},

by Lin

an entirely This

would

collective

Reversible?

the needs

in the Agricultural farmers

Nevertheless,

program

that

cannot

economies?

below

the short-run

a decollectivization

need

administered

discussed

Sector be

Most

are of a short-run

costs

provided

of the nature

and time-constraints

to be followed

the

existing

involved

and can

may

by a leader

by

problems

be solved

in over

be too high to permit

facing

considerable

internal

opposition. A Reliable and Accessible Source offnputs: centrally

planned

seeds,

fertilizers

storage,

have

such

based

small

contract

(a) Since outlets

they cannot

would

collective

have

farms

is followed,

the existing

provide such

power

many

farmers

being a parent

supply

services

(e.g.,

(e.g., repairs,

amount.

Collective

and state

elaborate

networks

the

agricultural

Stalinist

by large

problems

units

model

that were usually

are compounded

to maintain

networks,

for the

the existing

who

use the various

needed

inputs

“Small

A hundred

only railroad

network.

by

difficult

leasing

can’t

problems

cars full. The

systems As

easily

to

and of

Zhores

separate

would

smallest

press

commitments

themselves.

operators

opposition

In the Soviet

on their

land

strategy

of individual-

by the active

reneging

retail

by the members,

for the system

chairmen

Union,

provides.

incentives

special

of the original

If the latter

to be elected

may be compounded over

either

remnants

this function.

have

farm

to obtain

for the Soviet

are no sacks offertilizer,

strong

control

to farmers

to fulfill would

problems

from

such

or else the administrative

of collective

farm

farm

within

to developing

since

input

may have

network

unable

has noted

the network

Such

of the remnant

inputs

and

to the farms

to be maintained

comes

inputs

parts),

especially

the labor

director

instances

the proper

Medvedev There

farm

to fail, i.e.

whose

one finds

have

farms

equipment,

reasons:

afford

the leader

for collective

manpower

and services

to be developed

would

then

ized farming of those

for three

problem the proper

time and in the right

problems,

and far from the users. units

spare

considerable

the sales of such goods

urban

obtaining

and

at the right

devoted

supply

A chronic

has been

insecticides,

therefore

solving

featured

since

and

or transportation)

farms for

economies

come

normal

A. from

up daily.

tractor

is 150

horsepower.“” 4. SW, tional

Justin

Choice,”

iHousehold

Yifu

Lin,

“The

~rn~jc~n~o~~~a~

Responsibility

Household

in China’s

neile/uprnentandCulluraf Change, Vol. A+cultural 5. 42

11‘.

Cited

Productivity by Mark

Growth

Kramer,

Responsibility

ffj~~r~r~~f~rui

“Can

Economics,

Agricuitural 36,

No.

R~forrn:

3 (April,

in China,” Gorbachev

System Vol

UCLA Feed

1988),

69,

Reform NO.

in China:

2 (May,

A Theoretical Supplement,

Working

Paper

Russia.”

New

and pp.

No.

1987), Empirical

199-225;

576,

York ‘limes

A Peasant’s pp.

Los

Study,” “Rural

Angeles,

Magazrne,

Institu-

410-415;

April

“The Eronom~~

Reforms

and

1989. 9,

1989,

pp.

6

SIUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM It

should

economy,

be

noted

many

instance,

in China

of the

of these

virtually

80 to 90 per cent from

rural

and

local

industries

all hand

efforts

to

increase

required

inputs

have

been

near

those

who use their

have

often

been

by small-scale Although

this effort

continued

of output

from

time;g

rural

much

at roughly

enterprises

of this,

exceeded

however,

been

to local rapid

came

to

rural

industry

for manufacturing After

than

in the

the reforms,

rural

rural

the gross

value

output

for the

of agricultural

rather

of

which

in the countryside

and by 1986

value

to urban

so

features

degree

of Chinese

needs.

rate

lasted

20 horsepower, fertilizers

the

For many

population.h many

unique

located

a capacity

the gross

went

has

of the

enterprises

the same

rural

of nitrogen

“One

the successes

created

the

had high costs,

54 per cent

for responsiveness

to grow

by

problem.

producing

with less than

production

supplied

administered

input

industries

used

declare:

products.“8

and the potential

industry first

agricultural

of rural

machinery

and

Yusef

of a centrally agricultural

and many

and farm

and

overemphasized,

this

goods

failed

fertilizer,

Perkins

China’s

framework

consumer

tools

of phosphorus

the

to relieve

the formation

inputs

enterprises.7

countryside

within

encouraged

farm

many

that by 1980

even

are possible

Mao

necessary

Although

that

measures

producers

and

consumers. Such

local

responsive other

Marxist

exception. mittees

regimes

their

1950s

by creating

various

remains These

“agro-industrial

technologies.

lock-in

be added

serious

of problems

of interrelatedness

producing

Korea

rural

supplies,

effects.

districts,” that

is this supply

which

underlie

Such

conditions

but help to keep the system equipment

Hungary

the county-level

industries Vietnam

are examples

system,

small-scale

and by the mid-1960s

It must

the more types

for

In the mid-1980s

to be seen.

technology,

the supply

of rural

in North

to develop

supervision; factories.”

simplify especially

have a network

In the late

such

and

not only

demands,

were encouraged

under from

industries to local

which

about

(kun)

would

tools.“’

but

management

aid the collective

to move

whether non-labor

this

Few

the most notable

half of all consumer

also started

the more

and

being

goods

came

in this direction

experiment

inputs

comfarms

required

works by the

problem.

of the conditions the existence also explain

of “strong

of positive the lock-in

complementarity”

feedback

mechanisms

of certain

inefficient

l2

(b) Large-scale

mechanical

equipment

cannot

be divided

easily

among

the farmers

of

6. American Rural Small-Scale Industry Delegation, Rural Small-Scale Industry VI the People’s Republic ofChina Production in the (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Lee Travers, “Peasant Non-Agricultural China’r Economy Looks Tou~ard People’s Republic of China, ” in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, fhe Year 2000, Volume I, The FourModernizations (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1986), pp. 376-387. 7. Christine Wang, Maoism and Deuelopmen!: Rural Industrialization in the People’s Republic of Chzna (Sorthcoming). 8. Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusef, Rural Deuelopmenl in China (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 61. Rural Industrial Growth in the Post-Mao Period,” Modern China, Vol. 9. Christine Wong, “Interpreting 14, No. 1 Uanuary, 1988), pp. 3-30. c h ronicles an interesting Soviet schizophrenia: the economic authonticx 10. Stefan Hedlund (pp. 91-96) recognize the importance of such small-scale equipment, but they seem unable to produce such equipmrnt for the farmers in any volume commensurate with the need. [Priuale Agriculfure in the Sooiel IJnmn (New York: Routledge, 1989)] Another example is found in Poland, where the government paid considerable money to purchase a licence to produce giant Massey-Ferguson tractors suitable only for the large fields of the state farms. Ofcourse, most Polish land was farmed in smallholdings for which such tractors were quite unsuitable. 11. Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, The North Korean Economy (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 70. 12. David, op. cit., note2.

When is Collectivization a collective

farm

to competing possible worthy

for the farms individual

in Eastern

harvest

the crop.

consuming

and

particular Whether general clearly

especially

than

highly

the newly

small

dairy

operations.

could

as well as for the non-labor or hand

weeding,

of course, unless

than

of farm

by much

equipment

regression

more

13.

I>in (1987,

1988),

14.

Ifthe

is mechanized,

actually

farm

used.

of lack

In some

of spare

15.

Paul

coopt,ratives

to jointly and

harvesting

machinery.

He have

Technological

Victorian

Britain,”

Mrthutn,

1971), (1985)

rraping USA.

Alan Olmstead,

l’p.

601 I(%

“The

rather

than

where

services, machines,

proportions

represents,

situations

might

to begin

fall

production

agriculture,

for

to has

form

as certain

been

century tasks

equpment

cooperatives

for constraint

have

required

the

to

were such

time

the

farm

was

was inoperable

greater

difficult and

19th

post-harvest

would

Tenure

such

paper”

because

a problem. in the

such

a much

equipment have

whether “on

such

equipment

reaping, and

users

to form shelters,

mowing,

the

Corn

of

some

Landscape

of

or

the problems

to form

[“The

negotiate.

Mechanization

willing as corn

type

and

the

Harvest

in

in the

“The

ed.,

interpretation

that

in the mid

is controversial

newly 1800s.

to share Vol.

settled Given such

Mechanization

Agricultural

has

farms,

available.

ProductIon farm

Farm

Change

and

In China,

farm

- 1984.

some

where

cottrrtivc

in farm

farm

of

the

(but

Otmstead

not

relatively

reaping

and

1975),

the

short

equipment

Reaping

35, No. 2u me,

Mechanization

and

states

(1975)

devrlopcd growing

might

Mowing

pp. 327

season

be more in

-353;

Martin

and

sharing

in most

swcre

than

American

Philip

Science, No.

Controversy,”

and states),

of

of the in the

Agriculture,

L. Martin

227 (February

and 8,

Alan 1985),

-606. Wirrzbicki

~ottcctive

1983

is not

farmers

unwilling

of such

arrangements

Olmstead,

raising

also be easier

in such

account

why

harvesting

Land

1879,“JournulqfEconomicHisto~y,

183S I>

of making

L.

labor

in factor

the

farm-

to decollectivize

various

individual

into

equipment or

would

This

out

common

upon

of animal

be easier would

oftheequipment

context

McCtoskey,

and

208.1

a

Ersays on a Mature Economy: Bri:azn @er 1840 (London: T echnml Choice, Znnooakm, and Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge

N.

pointed

was

, problems

USSR

which

p

have

equipment

were that

Interrelatedness,

1975),

in

to decollectivize

types

l6 It is also possible

to take much

equipment

of use

pp. 212%214;

Press,

important of the

but

in Donald

be easier

for these

hand

to small-scale

different

conjectures

arrangement,

Machine:

Olmstead

division

priority

not just

on a particular

certain

production

effort.

as Romania,

in a quite

equipment,

would

01 compensation

University

the

change

out

4.

it is also

USC plowing

other

who

note such

so that

considers

threshrrs, deriding

up. al.,

using

This

be time-

carried

depends

would

(e.g.,

and farm

individual

appropriate

countries

parts

David

supplies

fertilize,

would

be

crop

Decollectivization

the newly

weed,

to be effective.‘”

would

his own labor

herbicides).

greater

SSR

Similarly,

as pigs or sheep,

substitute

input

rather

a technological

offset

SSR.

seed,

must

of major

Nevertheless,

services

period

is a problem

in Georgia

in Kazakh such

farmer

these

services

animals

mechanized private

to coordinate time

collectives

of household

mechanized,

the land,

short

farms

the system

highly

more

to prepare

is quite

large-scale

and it is note-

option.

these

growing

wheat

are much

on the type

little

is another

since

but

relatively

the last to adopt

of equipment

the equipment farmers

not be underestimated

and in a relatively division

of leasing

using

cooperatives

negotiation

of mechanization,

the grape

must

were

which

especially

sequence

the large

farms,

I4 The

or not this

level

to the individual

need to buy services

difficult,

time

farms

equipment

Europe,

would

solution

services

involved

mechanized

7

Chinese

type of agriculture

the difficulties

“r Creating

farmers

The

sell mechanical

labor-intensive

that the more in China.

dissolved.

which

although

farming

than

is being

for a highly

equipment,

and

that

groups,

Reversible?

interesting

the

farmers

increased

as we do now, in the

[Wang,

mechanization

as one

farmer

Community,

sales

op. cit., during

declined

note71 the

of technological

to

we would

Rural

machinery

and,

examples began

Some 1980s.

have

use

been

hand-methods noted

millionaires.”

” in Inrtylul after foreign

to the

the

of

following

farming

author,

“If

[Zbigniew and

sales

of the Chinese

rhe

because wr T.

had

of small

brrakup

tractors

countryside

of Polish

machinery worked

Wierzbicki,

FilorofiiandSoclofqeii(Warsaw,

reforms,

observers

regression

“The

1968), did have

was

as hard

the

Collective

pp. not

not

on

186 - 191.1

recover

reported

until

a decline

8 countries

STUIXES IN COMPARATIVE

such as Czechoslovakia

COMMUNISM

(or Zimbabwe)

have

been

doing.‘7

Again,

this

solution takes time and resources. (c) The problems of dividing the assets among the members of a collective farm or the workers on a state farm are more serious with farm infrastructure, much of which was constructed for large-scale production and not for individual farming. The barns are built to house large herds of dairy cattle (in East Germany, for instance, barns housing over 2000 cows are common); the material handling equipment is designed for massive amounts of supplies, the silos hold a large volume of crops. Again, sharing or leasing arrangements lottery.‘8

can be made; and in Bulgaria

The former arrangements

livestock have been distributed

take time and effort;

through a

and the intervening

can be disastrous for the newly established individualized farmers. Several aspects of the administration of the division of land, equipment,

period

and capital

deserve mention. Clearly in situations where the collectives are merely nominal, decollectivization can be carried out without much difficulty. Decollectivization is also easier to carry out where the ownership unit on the farm is the team,lg rather than the farm itself, and where the internal organization of labor on the farm is land-centered (a group of workers carry out all farm tasks on a given piece of land). In this case (exemplified by China), a small group can divide the land, which all know well, in a manner perceived as fair.*O The opposite case (exemplified by the USSR) where the ownership unit is the entire farm and where the internal organization is not landcentered (but rather structured around products and functions) gives rise to problems. The group is too large to make such decisions, the individual farm members are not well acquainted with specific pieces of land, and the farm manager must make the key decisions

about the division of land. This state of affairs both increases

the possibility

that decollectivization measures promulgated by the top can be resisted by the local cadre and also increases the likelihood of serious inequities, either inadvertent or deliberate. Both possibilities raise the risk to individual farmers. Another complicating factor in dividing the land and the assets is that in some ofthese countries, land claims by previous owners who have left the farm raise difficulties. In Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary, considerable controversy has raged over which post-war land reform is to be considered the “base line” for settling land disputes. prices of agriculturai P~ofi~a~~E Sale of&tputs: This refers not only to the “official” produce, whether determined by the market or by central government, but also to the 17. Goodman, Hughes, and Schroeder point out that in the USSR, both the 11 th Five Year Plan (1981-85) and the 1982 “Food Program” stressed the importance of increasing production of small-scale agricultural equipment. The major emphasis still lay, however, in the production of large-scale equipment. [Ann Goodman, Margaret Hughes, Gertrude Schroeder, “Raising the Efficiency of Soviet Farm Labor: Problems and Prospects,” in Gorbachev’s Economic Plans, Vol. 2, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1987), pp. 100- 126.1 Timofeev notes that even such farm tools as shovels and rakes are poorly designed and too heavy for easy use by children and older people. who generally work the personrtl plots. [Lev Timofeev, Soviet Peasants (New York: Telos Press, 1985), pp. 80 ff.] 18. Anon, “East European Farming: No Yeomen They.” ~~~~co~~~~~~, July 21, 1990, pp. 15-17. 19. By “ownership unit” I mean the group that has effective control over the land, equipment, and tools. In China, the farm could not transfer equipment from one team to another; in the USSR, it could. 20. This does not mean that division of the land was easy in China because the teams still had 20 to 40 households. In Laos and Vietnam the apparent ownership unit was the small farm (a subunit of a larger state farm) or team, usually with a land-centered labor organization. This eased the processes of decollectivization that occurred in each country. Such a division of land must also be constrained by certain guidelines about equality of division, which are set and enforced by the central government. Otherwise, the process may be halted by conflict between those households who brought (or whose forefathers brought) land into the collective and others who brought little or no land into the collective.

When is Collectivization structure tion

of agricultural

to occur

farmers,

procurement.

at the same

the farmers

time

may

state

procurement

offices.

Tome

attempted

to assign

state

farms

incentive tion

processed structure

the government

as decollectivization

have

no price

For

the cocoa

produced

was not favorable

farm

by these

marketiza-

prices

paid

to

to monopsonistic

the government

to individual

farmers

for the aims

crops

of 1988

lands

allows

the official

to sell their

in the summer

of its state

either

or raises

incentive

instance,

some

9

of S”ao Since

the

and paid very low prices,

the

of the reform

farmers.

and the decollectiviza-

failed.

Credit: Other financial rent

measures

instruments

farm

course,

assets.

Without

risk to farmers have

steps

or has taken

bank

without

function credit

very

many

local

credit

clear

seriously

little

incentive press

for individual

where

they

had nothing

they preferred

density,

it is difficult

a sizable

centers

were

to create

never (or

of rural

ing the rural density

to maintain

suppressed a varied

is high or where

or a nation

where

In sum,

latter

the population

groups

to spend

their

in a rural goods

of

Chinese special

and encouraged is known

(the

to farmers),

through

and,

credit

it

were

difficult,

has negative

and,

without

that is easily

population

both time and

bureaucratized

toward

servic-

the population

it is a task requiring

attitudes

it is

to a large

network

where

has

marketing

density,

accessible

of a retail

in a long-term

such

reachable

government

the older

market

especially

in the because

with a low population

Chinese

a high

goods

reported

dissolved

money

Moreover,

with

is an important

been

have

market

the development

supply

goods

have

sector the

outlets.

exist in embryo,

is in rare

cases

of contrast,

is not conceptually such markets

The

the whose

than

units

of consumer

consumer

although

1979

institutions

work

many

an agricultural

level)

industry

contract

and retail

completely

workers.

talents.

traders

in

of

bankruptcy

not taken

institution

at the local

Union

consumer

way

resuscitate)

population

commercial

By

hand (an

or

of credit,

orderly

creating

and

sell,

of agriculture.

on which

a varied

other

to rural

availability

22 Of course,

of people.

e.g.

the smaller

productivity

shops

where

of these

credit

In the Soviet

leisure.

the rise of rural

easier number

more

number

encouraged

ready

high

in the local

goods,

more

facilities

or to buy,

has either

Bank

the reorganization

farming.

hardworking,

the

sector

of supporting

during

Union

21 On

of credit credit

the availability

manner,

of the activities

supply

Supply of Consumer Goods: The

and

Agricultural

to the agricultural

that the problems

considered

Soviet formal

branches.

is that they

bank

by the difficulties

The

former

as the creation

to obtain

institutions

multiplied

Although

impression

financial

in a purely

the

such

farms

established.

them

resuscitated

cooperatives.

seems

such

not been

is to supply

general

also be taken individual

increases,

these

government

must

to allow

procedures

by

Unless

Reversible?

commerce

economy and trade.

Problems Facing the Individual Farmers The

return/risk

ticipate The system”

facing

in individual first for

step

individual agriculture.

toward

agricultural

farmers Some

decollectivization output,

but

must

be sufficient

of the major is usually many

farmers

problems

to induce arising

the development are

reluctant

farmers

to par-

are as follows. of a “contract to

accept

such

21. Kramer, op. cit., note 5. 22. Roy D. and Betty A. Laird, “The Zueno and Collective Contracts: The End of Soviet Collectivization?,” in Josef C. Brada and Karl-Eugene Wadekin, eds., Soczalist Agriculture in Transition. Orpnizational Response to Failins Performance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 34-44; Kramer, op. cit., note 5; Yu. Vorobyev, “Ob Arende-Otkrovenno,” Prauda, April 18, 1989, p. 2.

10

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

contracts.

For

indicated

that

system. only

instance, only

” A later

30 per cent

to take

resistance

at that time

up private

were

ofthe

concerned

enables

about

side that

policy

to become

investments

needed

current

leases

to take

it back

to increase

lack credibility or violate

property

production

because

their

stated

the contractual

after

beautiful

farmer

rural

ready

to do (which to be

in China,

“the

people

survey

party’s

periodically

fieldwork

could

population

are not believed a 1987

whether

because

expending

one

actually

rights

that

reported

to such activities

sweep

interviews

that farmers

the collective

also

“in

of the

to Bernstein, about

From

that

decollectivization

and rumors

and Hanstad

revealed

they

farm,

10 to 14 per cent

Arcording

is occurring.

Prosterman

fear

legal protection

still worried

the contract

source

and the [individual]

effective

rich will change’

recollectivization in China,

after

the

by Vorobyev

under

but

40 per cent

but only

reversals.

a contract,

individual

In surn,

years

reported a farm

the same

voiced an

providing

that 80 per cent

from

roughly

farming,

some

work

180 degrees

consideration).“”

Even

showed

people

families

such

turn

lack ofIaws

under

or stable.

households

could

specialists

up such

ii4any

on

‘Q* A 1990 poll showed

in taking

“strong”

chairmen

system.

resources

policies

so, in part because were

to the and

government

interested

be willing

farm

Linc~nditionally

would

energy

everything.

of Soviet

farm

considerable lose

poil would

poll of collective

considerable moment

a 1987

10 per cent

COMMUNISM

of 100

policy

that

the countrywith

81 farm

are not undertaking

of uncertainties

the

of tenure;

the

still owns the land and has the power

conditions

without

much

recourse

available

to

the farmers.2” Every

inconsistency

of government

government

leaders

government

to the farmers

increases

of individual

farming

in some

type

difficulties unrest,

facing inflation

about

the

a government

policy,

future

the risks

conflicting

Any

dissension)

broken

general

by different

promise

by

their

resources

face in investing

the possibility

or political

statement

every

farmers

arran~er~lent.

that raised

or shortages,

every

of agriculture,

political

or economic

of its replacement would,

of course,

the

(e.g.,

ethnic

aggravate

such

fears. On a deeper rights,

i.e.

level,

rights

the government. (but

In past

not all) of other

determined property many upward

the problem

which

rights. of these pressure

as Karl countries. on

centuries

Marxist

by the current

of confidence

can be enforced neither

regimes

policies Wittfogel 27 For

agricultural

lies in the creation

and which China

cannot

nor the Soviet

had objective

ofthe

government

described instance, cadres

laws,

rather

or ruler.

it, continued

of “strong”

be suddenly

The

away

nor

a number

Union property

tradition

through

property

taken

rights

the

USSR

Nove

notes

which

led

to the

“repeated

were

of “weak”

the Marxist

for

by

the

era

in

constant

dishonoring

of

When is Collectivization pledges

about

the size of the delivery

the removal

even

considerable

may

use such

annul

a particular

unit,

or to raise

The

governmental

units

farm

whose

to return

contract

is much

careers

farm

in the operations

more than

important

in China,

are no longer

grain’

of course,

tied

because

interest”)

to

of the contract

in the Soviet where

or

creates

with the government

or to intervene

chairman,

‘borrowed

This,

(or “overriding

interests”

problem

is the collective

11

for livestock.“28

with a lease

as “state

in the contract,

the rent.

the lessor

local

excuses

clause

or promises

and grain

risks for any household

the lessor

where

quota,

of seed grain

Reversible?

Union,

the lessors

to increases

are the

of agricultural

production. The

creation

of strong

a series

of measures

in 1983

of introducing

the

permanency

however,

become

property

more

1989

and 1990,

case

put

if a non-Marxist

party

these

point

out,

so that

rights

the

might

also

of the government,

Nicaragua,

rights

and

the step

is mentioned

farmers),

takes over leadership

can enforce

Lewis that

2g Property

Hungary,

took

and guaranteeing

and

by collective

limited.

East Germany,

and if the government

proclaiming landownership

to land still

quickly

government

Kolankiewicz

“private”

are

be accomplished

(which

and Poland

does not seem

in the

in Nicaragua).

taken

place,

uncertain

argued

tivized

to induce

A different than

such kind

share,

important 197991983;

and

Share

rents,

of the

such

most

a system many

of the forms

of course,

to act

more

are much

advanced

on the government

effectively.

form If the

28. Alec Univcrsitv

Now,

can

include farms

“Peasants

of California

G?brge

agreement

collective and

Press,

such a contract

Kolankicwm

and

Paul

Marx’s not

are

pp. G.

during

adopted

might

belief

only

a division indebted,

ln Jerzy

Karcz,

ed.,

share

guided

highly

since would

the

also

period

is a share

reasons.“O

the government place

some of the

the input

rents

suggest

were

there

for other

encourage

that

to have

introduced Laos

in China in the USSR

widely

which

from elements

for the household

appears

Officials,”

1967),

contracts

rather

contracts

in the 196Os,

Share

Moreover, as well,

system

reports

1980s.)

suppliers

represent

a less

policy.

of farm many

assets

but

individuals

also

may

farm be un-

Soviet and East European Agriculture (Berkeley:

57-73. Lewis,

Poland: Politics, EcunomzcsandSociely (London:

Pinter,

1988),

34. 30.

culture

Karen and

Brooks, Applied

“Agiculture Economics

and

Five

(University

Years

of Perestroika,”

of Minnesota,

1990).

Staff

a

of contract

fixed, with

akkord

less risky

Nevertheless,

of rental

Decollectivization liabilities.

of lease

specify

was Hungary

contracts

has not been

some of the risk of production.

risk of late inputs

late

had

household.

experimented

exception

decollec-

team

with the form

(Contradictory

in the

transitional

a contract

have

and often

to have in the

contracts

as the Romanian notable

on a large-scale.

such

in some

although

such

The

arises

most

has

will be too

are difficult

households

problem

regimes

of land

appears

to which

of countries

elements,

contracts

introduced in several

element, shares

and share

share

rights

decollectivization

piece

surveys

the various

Marxist

after

however,

“belonged”

a number

in the mid-1970s.

it also

land

Such

China,

apparently

In most

survey

in a particular

in the land.

violence.

which

although

fixed

used

to invest

of risk and property

rents,

in agriculture which

about

a cadastral

of the farmer

a survey,

by the farmer.

combining

that

the farmer

understanding

received

without

rights

by considerable

without

strong

that

the property

are accompanied

29.

As

the right

be

in Czechoslovakia,

It is sometimes

p.

may

cannot

the Polish

a paragraph

than

include

land

believable

occurred

rights

instance,

landholding. rather

rights

such

which

For

into the constitution

of individual

to which

property

be taken.

it is “individual,”

(individual uses

and stable

must

Paper

P90-12,

Department

ofAigri-

willing In

to engage

such

cases

incentives

in individual government

to make

the system

East

European

nations,

after

cooperative

farms

between

1970 and 1980

doubled

between

this debt.“’ to total that off,

farming

the

1980

To place

annual

it must

be noted

began

paying

short and

1984,

agricultural

last

even

economically insurance older

more

farmers

farming in scope

of such

debt

risk

wages.

such

Union

farm

write-off

In the

implies

as China,

in East

mentioned.

a

farmers

belong

of social

security,

for their

a certain

less so

were

written

number

the loss

of

the

to the social then

many

old age through

type of social

decoliecti~~ization

of

equal

Germany.:jt In

collective

where

farm,

is roughly debts

and

off some

was very much

the risks of providing

or collective

for instance,

to write

all farm

of

especially

five times,

indebtedness

indebtedness

be

regimes,

USSR,

increased began

occurred

also

sufficient

and a number

has soared,

indebtedness

such farm

of this farm debt.

to provide

indebtedness

in 1989-1990

must

to accept

In countries social

share

debt

the government

In China,

farming

may be unwilling by the cotnmune

while

Marxist

If leasehold

activities.

was offered

of

advanced

system.

minimum

In Bulgaria

a partial

type

their

off this

that farm

in perspective,

output.

1990,

personal

assume

to write

and long terrn farm

the figures

and in March,

have

work. 3i In the case of the Soviet

this was Iess of a problem.“”

One

if they must

may

resulted

insurance

in a reduction

benefits.

Consistency Problems Facing the Government In

carrying out a decollectivization

only

the problems

obtaining

products

for export,

but also of integrating

have

in particular

argued

or threshing)

that are difficult

to consumers. are

troublesome

higher

are

useful,

of subsidies reasons,

not

than

to obtain

which

manner.

out, very

therefore,

contract

to turn

such

not

and

a program

of

into

possible

agricultural

empirical for

to more

most

unless for food,

products

from

on by

to the farms.

As for

suggests

(sugar

economic relatively

will prohably

problems.

result

prices

government

the

farmers

that

is a major

low food In-ices

to continue

the

of scale

be carried

evidence crops

pressing

producer

economies

can

services

for the government

Nevertheless, prices

that

such

of the loss of agri-

of these

has maintained

then decollectivization

free-market

Some

considerable important

the government

It is, ofcourse,

food in the traditional ment

plowing

to contract

of scale

in the city for political prices

(e.g.,

or cooperatives

It seems

If by a system

in the short-run

in terms

activities

activities exception}.

decollectivization of scale.

enterprises

economies

against

due to a loss of economies

separate such

food

policies.

Marxists production

occur

sufficient

must take into account

with

its macro-economic cultural

the government

the nation

agricultural

Some

program,

of supplying

in higher

food

to subsidize

paid by the governwill

for two

find

it more

reasons:

it is

3 1. In the Soviet Unwn the Presidium ofthe Cnuncii ofhlinisters announced in Dccwnber, 1989, that f&m tlrbts would be cancellt:d in proportion 10 the degree to which such farms shifted ~CIa lrasr system. 32. Laird and Laird, op. cif , note22; Zhores A. Medvedcv, Swirl /I+~~/turr (New York: W. W. Norton. 19X7), p_ 349. 33. To encourage household leasing, the Soviet Union in December, 1989, offwcd to thy farms contrxting out a portion ofthc’ir assetsto households the opportunity to write off its drbts in the same proportion. (Rwoks, op. at, note 30) In Chime many collective farm debts were written off when they transferred the land to individual households. 34. The law stated that all debts arising from uneconomic tasks assigrwd to the farm by the Crntral :Authoritics would be ranrcfled. Ofcoursc, every farm will try to makr this claim SC)that t~nforccm~nt wiil he diffiwlt.

When ix Collectivization

Reversible?

13

dealing with so many more units; and it is also more difficult to prevent these individual farmers

from selling directly to urban consumers.

Some notion gained from a on the farmers’ prices in state

of the magnitude of this micro-economic disequilibrium problem can be few examples. In the late 1980s in the Soviet Union, the prices for food markets were often two to three times higher than the official consumer retail stores (a multiple found in many other Marxist regimes as well).

Food subsidies from the government budget to urban consumers amounted to roughly 6 to 8 per cent of the factor cost GDP.“” In China food subsidies were relatively low in the late 1970s. As the government, however, was unwilling to raise urban food prices as fast as procurement prices, food consumption subsidies soared and, by the early 198Os, subsidies amounted very roughly to 3 per cent of the GNP; agricultural and other subsidies contributed to the budget deficit which played an important causal role in the Chinese

price inflation

of the late 1980s.“”

In such situations, unless the government is witling either to let food prices rise or to continue to subsidize agriculture, decollectivization does not seem possible. Unfortunately, consumer agricultural prices are highly politicized in most Marxist regimes so that the political costs of the first alternative are high. Agricultural subsidies, however, represent

a considerable

strain on the budgets

of most Marxist

regimes

so that the

economic costs of the second alternative are also high, especially with the increasing difficulties of obtaining tax revenues which often accompanies economic reform.

Social

Factors

Sociological

evidence is delicate because the emphasis on norms and values is often too

easy an explanation to have any verifiable meaning. The methodological pitfalls should be readily apparent. In comparing disciplines many have pointed out that economists explain why individuals make certain choices, while sociologists explain why society sees to it that individuals

are not left with any choices to make.

Pensant Entrepreneurship

A common

argument

to explain the success of the Chinese

agricultural

reforms and the

failure of the Soviet changes is that the Chinese farmers are more entrepreneurial than Soviet farmers. The forrner have been fiercely individualistic for millennia, cooperating only with fellow clan members

or in projects

such as irrigation

in which individual

benefits were manifest. In contrast, since the feudalization ofRussia in the 16th century the Russian village has had strong communal elements, reinforced after the emancipation of the serfs in the 1860s by the designation of the rural community, not the individual peasant, as the primary legal subject of Tsarist law. Although the shoots of individualistic farming began to bloom for a few decades in the early part of the 20th century,

they were crushed by collectivization.

3.5. This estimate started with a Soviet claim that such subsidies amounted to 40 billion rubles in 1983 [Alec Now, 7FzrSwre~ ~co?~~~~~S~~J/~R, 3rd edition (London, 1986), p. 1151 and increased considerably in succeedinS years. [The 1985 GDP datum from USA, CIAIDIA, “Gorbachev’s Economic Program: Problems Emerge,” I!.S. Congress, .Joinr E conornic Commitree, 1989, pp. 3- 70.J 36. This rough estimate is based on reported data for food subsidy&r 1979- 1981 (combined) by Solinger [Dorothy ,J. Solinger, “The 1980 Inflation and the Politics of Price Control in the PRC,” in David M. Ianpton, ed., Policy Itn~lcmenlalion in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 81 - 1191 and GNP data from World Rank [World?hbles, 4th edition (Washington. D.C., 1988)].

Convincing provide, Although apply

evidence

especially such

to focus

regimes

on the

a conjecture

is,

and heterogeneous

factors

31 Marxist

attention

such

as large

macro-sociological

to the other

useful

to demonstrate

for countries

may

except

specific

well

be true,

they

in a superficial

social

impact

however,

as China are

fashion

of the

difficult

to

and the USSR.“’ also

difficult

and it seems

system

to

more

of collectivized

farming. Individual

farming

European

nations

Hungary,

and

activities

provide

and with

the

peasant

markets

centrally

USSR.

were

planned

Although

good entrepreneurial

also

widespread

agricultural

sectors

it seems

likely

training,

I have found

that

in

certain

such

such

as

legal

and

no systematic

East

Bulgaria, semi-legal

evidence

on

the matter.

Time

Factor

According

to a common

increasingly

irreversible

scale

economy.

market

active

peasants

neither

the

individual which

The

and

Collectivized

farming

farming

occupation

system

of collectivized and,

according

successfully

in such

lasted

more

memories Following lost

than

to this

argument,

existed

system

a system. 50

years

this approach love

successful,

individual

village

Fyodor

farms.

generation Soviet

For

and

rush?

looked-after disappearing.

The old pride livestock

but

of state

that attitudes

Union,

management skills

Full

the land

before

and the

In China,

the

the 1979 reforms

a generation

his

and

are less those

bureaucracies.:‘s

farming.

still lived

necessary

the system

began

take

plot production

toward

25 years

the

have

to

mentality.

attitudes

meant

who and

for

of collectivized

reforms,

which

functioning

so that

farming few

such

of farmers.

observers ability

instance,

claim

that

the rural

to act as responsible a well

known

population

farmers

Soviet

writer

had

operating

interested

in

has observed:

When was it known that able-bodied harvest

training,

to individual

Gorbachev

of the land

Abramov

this

workers

individual

in a full

transforms

farmers

a different

certain

carried

gradually

of the required

requires

In the Soviet

some

some

becomes

to operate

rural

The

only for roughly

and

before

in the current

its traditional life,

tasted

former

efforts.

to be hostile

farming

i.e.

manipulation

is also said to breed

agriculture

forget

independent

and many

of semi-legal

are said

as

provides

to this argument,

which

the

proletarians,

of their

markets

than

according

as farmers

of agriculture

to work

are very small-scale;

farming,

rcmcmbered

passive

desire

for the results

farming,

began

into the

is sold on the farmers’

of capitalist

of collectivized

of time

hyper-industI.ialization

nor

decisions

a system

the passage

farmers

initiative responsibility

investment scale

conjecture, with

is vanishing.

peasants

go away

in a well-ploughed I,ove

Is all this not the curse

for the land,

of absenteeism,

[to market]

at the time ofthe

field, in a well-sown for work, lateness,

crop,

in well-

even self-respect

is

drunkenness?“”

39. Cited by ker Nwx [Sguiel A,picuke: The Brezhnev Lepcy and Gorbacheai Cure (Santa Monica, CA: KANWUCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, LRS-OS, 1X@)] from Prauda, November 17, 1979.

When is Collectivization More

directly

leading

related

sociologist

to concerns

I have been to many kolkhozy

kinds

type of question ambiguous.

current

by the amount

overcome visited repair

before

chickens

selling

their

to discourage “Crude

behavior.

shouting

harvest right

himself

to make

Composition more

serious

force.

If the

age;

few farmers work.

the 1960s

moreover,

graphic

conditions,

that

this

would

to lower

and

to circumstances arises

be

a vicious

a long-term

is an artifact

has acted

methods

pests.

The

deprives

types

of

comments:

a reluctance

to think. make

official himself

the who

of the

of irresponsibility."*'

circle problem

of the present

for and

costs.*’ power

by certain

Stereotyped

weeds,

is raising

Germany

Chernichenko,

engendered

I

then

themselves

of political Yu.

methods.

farm

to

farm

would

in West

I

I visited:

collective

reorganizing

In

of 1990,

repairmen

is reinforced

author,

officials]

stereotyped

There

German

in order

which

one Soviet

others.

but rather

impact

sociological rural would

Moreover,

in the few years

During and,

for workers

the spring

market

may

conditions.

collective

the centralization

to act according

upon

are

of proper

farming

present

tractor

to tap a niche

of any kind,

of weather

one East

countries

are

a lack

in the farms

a Czechoslovak

rules four

the

the conclusions

in individual under during

their

in part because

reflect

underway

which

just do not

under

a system

of

system.

of the Rural Labor Force

labor

a system

victim

Hungary

facilities,

[to the farm

engendered

only

activity

is that

thinking

to believe

Much because

of time

of the right

farming,

all

For instance,

demands

It is difficult individual

in

of interest

and

Germans;

ecological

and directives

to think the helpless

deprives

simply

and benefits

of compensation

impact

independent

Reluctance

may

in its repair

farms

methods

alleged

bureaucratic

laziness

of entrepreneurial

to special and

at face value, as a result,

Germany,

the cars to East

according

Another

a

up of the

they

and,

to buy used cars in Hamburg,

“eco-chickens”; changing

to take

the lack

of its costs

underemployment

planned

and

system, East

in this [FP breaking

is unclear

the alleged

evaluation

Czechoslovakia,

was struck

Zaslavskaya,

and talked to many people and those

difficult

the investigation

specifically,

in the

a rational

Bulgaria,

of generalizations

framing

More

incentives reflect

Tatiana

who dream of working individually,

),4,1

I find these

decollectivization,

of’ any people who are interested

farm].

who would give me that chance, exist.

15

has noted:

I do not know collective

about

Reversible.?

evidence

population be willing

on the collective for them

and 197Os,

the Soviet

to be composed War

or state to engage rural

predominantly II*”

and

in the composition

decollectivization

or able to invest

remaining

of World

can be found

is aged,

a flight

is unlikely

the time and energy farm

they have

in individual

population of women, to urban

security

farming,

appeared

to succeed to make

of many

such

in their

old

they do not.

to be rapidly

a consequence areas

of the rural

aging

of the demoof the young

40. Cited by Hedlund, “I’rlvatr Plots as a System Stabilizer, ” in Gregory Grossman, Roy Laird and KarlIkgr~n Wadekin, rds., Farmins under Cummunrsm: New and Old A,bp roacheJ (London. Routledge, 1990). 41 Frcdrrk L. Pryor, Ecut European Bconomzc R+rms ?%e Rehzrth qf/heMarkel (Stanford: Hoover Institution and Stanlord University, 1990). 42. Cited by Now, op tit , note28, from Navy Mir, No. 11 (1965), p 182. 43 Goodman, Hughes and Schroeder, op. czl , note 17.

16

STUI)IES

people

in

rural

European the

areas.44

nations

countryside

income has

has

countries

where

planners

is most

evident,

youth

In some from

East

appear rural

areas,

despite

or Romania carried had

their

independence,

collectivization, their

independence

over,

as farm

between

farm

destinies.” more

In essence,

arduous

provided people,

farms,

work

status

the

the more

provided

the major

of CLbor

Havas

such

of former

land

workers

particular

aspects

to become

source

countries

suggest

the same

and

and

of farming such

their

urban

them

more

specialized

within

children,

but

off the farm

who

as a result,

4” Similar is occurring,

For e.g.

the

middle

the difficulty

widened

prestige free class

population

specialized

for young who have thesis primarily of

(see below)

in some

shards

in keeping

and

education

knowledge

or ability

to operate Union,

lost

over their

to a controversial

desire

seem

the Soviet

After More-

farm

lower The

a farm only

the

but they

work.46

and into city jobs

have little

mechanisms

with

rural

48 According have

workers,

lost control

workers.

has left behind

who has system,

but the peasants

employees,

entrepreneurs.

farming varied

increasingly

of the former

up in

and monotonous.

differences

collar

reasons

growing

such as the USSR

and urban

much

benefits

other

an anthropologist

blue

of mobility

as Czechoslovakia.“”

phenomenon

governments Bell,

social

still

people

still remained,

more

children

and who,

farmers.

their

status

“counter-selection”

independent

socialist

of rural

Peter

differences

became

than

capable

some by the

in part because

do receive workers,

that in the individual

and the peasants

by the state was the avenue especially

In

farming

has occurred

of young

by certain

became

farmers

to perform

Hungary.

individual

farmers

between

proceeded,

and workers

of differentials

and

to urban

movement.

their

work

East from

to considerable

emigration

has argued difference

consolidation officials

equal

attempts

status

and their

some

is due

against

collective

the urban

the urban-rural

migration

in

migration

and the narrowing

this migration

where

to stem such a population ofthe

found where

farming.4”

the (ineffectual)

were aware

such areas,

or the bias

roughly

to explain

be

as Czechoslovakia

bias

nations incomes

out field work in Hungary,

peasants

In part

countries

can

and Yugoslavia

and rural

for private

have

to be at work

population

as in Yugoslavia,

European and

rapid.

the urban

see no future

the state

rural

in Bulgaria

urban

in such

socialist fhrm

most

between

migration

aging

especially

been

differentials

reduced

This

as well,

COMMUNISM

IN COMPAKATIVE

other

of evidence specialists

on

44. Unfortunately, the Scniet q~vu-“ment has not released census data to prwidc dccailed rGdencc on this point. According tu data from Danilov and USSR Goskomstat, the awxage age of adults (those 20 or over) in the rural sector as a whole (including non-agriculturaljobs) increasedfrom40.6in 1926to43.3in 1959t047.4 m 1987 [V. 1’. Danilov, RuralRuc\2a L’nder~heNew Re@ne, translated by (Irlandr) Figes (Bloomington: Indzma Uniwrsity Press, 1988), p. 42; USSR, Goskomstat, Na&niye SSS’R 1987: Statidxherkii Sbornik (Moscow,: Finansy i Sratistika, 1988), pp. 50-51.1 In the latter year women constituted 56 per cent of the rural population, A rapid aging of the farm population has occurred in other East European nations as well; S&ma” has SOII~ intcrcsting comments on the process in Czechoslovakia [Zdrnek Salzrnan, 7hree Contribu/ionr to fhr Research Report 22 (Departmrnt uf Anthropology, University r11 Study: qf Socialid Czechoslovakia, blassachusetts, Amherst, 1983)]; and a number of observers havr commented on this fact in Hungary. 45. Branko Horvar. ?%e Yuyo~lav Economzc Sptem (White Plaina: Intel-national Arts and Sciences Press. 1976), pp. 78-79. 46. Peter D. Bell, Peamnts WI Socialist 7iansztion Life in a Cullectivized Hun,pnun Vzliqe(Berkrley: University ot California Press, 1984). 47 Marida Hellos and Bela C. Maday, eds., .~ew Huyarian Peasants An Eat Central Eurojmn Exf~~nence mth Colied~umztzun (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 18, Ivan Szelenyi, So&didEntwprmeur~ Embourpnen/ m Rural Hungary (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). 48 Szclenyi, zbid 49. Interview by the author. .iO. Zdcnek Salzman and Vladimir Scheufler, Komaro~~~A Czech Farmq VZlqe(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974).

When is Collectivization the farm

suggests

In China, where

until

massive

that

many

recently

migrations

as farmers). in order

nation,

to improve

because

youth

their

of the farm

is possible

sufficiently

that

over

the

urban

government

incomes

by entrepreneurial-minded if they

Several

taxes

peasants

in any than

sector,

preventing

also

areas

to increase

most

(not

of the

necessarily

production

of their

activities

on the

rural/non-industrialized

in urban/industrialized

of a given

would,

share

a lower

income

would might

Some

of farm

such

of running

may carry

out only a few tasks

deskilled.

whom

I interviewed

much

less severe

productive

are

nations

of an age cohort

this

of rural

than

and

to accept

Szelenyi state

farms

activities

food prices

again.52

or the higher

Furthermore,

workers,

such

since

the latter

higher

Finally,

so that

Of

differen-

concerned.

scale,

might

incomes.

“compensating

for those social

have

farms

backward a modern

made

the

such

additional

force

controversial.

farm

farm

a given

This

farm

problem

than

worker

individual

in an important

of collective

sector

takes

average

farms

has become,

a number

agricultural

that the industrializa-

the

is, on such

labor

out with

that it is quite

also argued

has

farm. 53 That

so that the rural

running

individual

considerably

about

in the

sector

created

resisted.

industrial

incomes

to the rural

up farming urban

rural

back

higher.

argument

and found where

higher

to have

down

as Ivan

in a relatively

sector

to take

worried

difficult

an independent

I tried

to increase

a migration

be strongly

status

not

much

on collective

incapable sense,

The

would

a moving

to be very

sociologists work

occur.

for the former is often

represent

have

rural

city,

social

economists

but the phenomenon

migration

measures

to take over the newly

a program

unpalatable

take

to the

however,

such

have

professional

tials;”

commuting

to finance

it politically

can

so as to encourage

ex-peasants

been

generally

course,

tion

had

problems

urban find

is slower

of absorption

and

in rural

in new economic

Moreover,

population

the possibilities

opportunity

and to engage

income.

regulations

of the youth

remained

left.51

of the farm

are smaller.

It

or,

any

new crops,

to enforce

most

have

have

for the aging

able

As a result,

17

farmers

evidence

were

and women

welcome

to plant

the aging

simply

men would

crops,

entrepreneurial

is little

authorities

to the cities.

These

traditional

there

political

entrepreneurial-minded

side

of the most

by way of contrast,

Reuersible?

directors

is, of course,

in a modern,

an enormous

number

highly

of different

skills.54 Finally, farm

it should

education

independent

be added

for the rural farm.

training

program

Farmers

of America

that

although

youth,

As far as can provided clubs,

be determined,

for farm which

most

such education youth

provide

Marxist

no Marxist

in the United monetary

regimes

provide

does not provide States

regime

has

by the 4-H

and prestige

vocational

the skills

awards

to run an

the

type

of

or the Future to farm

youth

51. Bill Keller quotes a Soviet collective farm chairman saying: “Here we have lost the tradition [of farming]. It’s gotten so bad that in school they warn children: “If you don’t study hard, you will stay on the collective farm to work.” [“Plight of Soviet Farming: A Collective Indifference,” New York Times, August 19, 1990, p. I.] In Poland the aging of the private farm population is attributable to a different mechanism. In the early 198Os, however, out-migration from the farm appears to have been markedly reduced. 52. Political meam such as discrimination in schools and housing can also be used either to keep people in the farming sector or to encourage them to leave the urban areas where they have moved. 53. Szelenyi, op. cd., note 47. 54. The account of a year in the life of an American farmer by Rhodes provides a superb account of the number of different skills that a given farmer must master. [Richard Rhodes, Farm: A Year in the Life ofan American Farmer (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.1 Ofcourse, in some countries the family farms are too autarkic so that many of the skills acquired by the farmers are really unnecessary to learn if the farmers took greater advantage of the opportunities for specialization offered by the market.

S-1~nrll.s IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

18 for

successful

efforts

in

stockraising

and

other

skills

necessary

for

independent

farming.‘.?

Risk, In

Social Inertia, and Individual Effort

recent

years

cooperative Romania,

social

Hungarian

collectivization

would

that many

a total

revision

Some the

opinion

Czechoslovak

advantages

spring

that

countryside..

toward

cooperative

to which

Some

versus

quarters

than

that

moreover, they

had

between no market

farmers

farming

level

roughly and

provided

can be traced

of the two systems agreed

Clearly

than

of de-

to the

undertake

For instance, polled

the

same

standard evidence

closely

tied

during

saw

more

percentage

of living that

to the

In East had

material

to evaluations of agriculture.

that the work of collective Germany

more

free

55 and 65 per cent stressed worries,

exhibit

members

of production rather

of all farmers

and

was

farms

older

farming.“7

this notion.

thirds

system

inertia

polled

farmers.

cooperative’

two

of

habitual.

supporting

the cultural

farm

not even

system

become

studies

Czechoslovakia,

of the

a positive

success

of the

belonged.“’

return

of the farmers

of individual

that

of social

economic

have

village

of the collective that

to traditional

anthropologist

collective

the person

of this problem

risk

three noted

the

one

out

China,

of the old system,

about

increased

in

a functioning

individual

Hungary,

disposition

disturb

1968,

than

collectivization 58 In

the members

a return

that

carried

also

in such claims

are available

of

but

a continuation

practices

data

to collective

believed

and

prefer

of farming

public

studies

want

sufficiently

have

Hungary

as illustrated farms

would

sociologists

in

In these

inertia,

collective

extent

and

particularly

and the USSR.5b

considerable the

anthropologists

farms,

or social

over time

of effort

In Slovakia farmers

half

of the 453

than

individual

that in comparison insecurity,

of the ratio

farmers

polled

farmers

to capitalist

or anxieties

about

was easier

over

and,

farmers, their

own

55. Ofcourse. as l‘imufeev points out, rural youth in the Soviet Union carry out a considrrablr amount ol larm work, but this is work for others, not themselves. He also rcpol-ts (p. 112) ofan instance whcrc prr-school childrrn were playing at straling milk from thr collective farm, which is a useful skill tu learn for w&list. bat not private. farming (up. cil., note 17). i(i. Many of thcsc have appeared in I:.nSlish. For Hungary recznt studies include: Kcll, up rzl , note 45, C:. M. Harm, ?hz/ar. A Village m Huqary (Carnbridg-e: Cambridge University Prrss, 1980); Hellos and Maday, up. cit., notr 46; Nigel Swain, CollectzueFarms Which Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Vasary, op. cil., notr 57. For Czechoslovakia: S&man and Schcuflcr-, op cit., note 50. For thr USSR: Caroline Humphrey, Karl Marx Collect&. Economy, Society and Rul~~ion in n Sibman C&rf~oe Farm (Cambridge: Cambridxc University Press, 1983); T‘arnara Dragadz?, Rural I;arr~zlze~zn Soai& Geqza (I,ondon. Routledge, 1988). For Romania: Andreas Argyres, Prarant Produ~~zon, St& Art~~ulatzun and Compr~q~ Ro/tuna/i/~e~: TheColle~t~urEconomy~fRuralRomania (Ph.D. dissertation, University ol’Califom~a, Davis, 1988). Katherine Maureen Verdery, Ethnic Stratij2ca2mn m /he European Pmphery 7‘hr liis/orical Sociolo,~y qf n 7fans_ylm ‘lian~yluanian Villa,~rrs ~~anmz Vtlla~r(Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, December, 1976);. sameauthor, (Hcrkelry: University ofCalifornia Press, 1983). For China: Anita Ghan, Richard Madyen, Jonathan Ungcr. Chen Vilhzqe. 7.hheRecent History oJa Peasant Community in Mao i China (Herkcley: University of California I’rrss, 1984); Shu-min Huang. ?‘he Sptral Road: Chaqw zn n Chinme Vzllqc 7hroqh /he EYPJ ofa Cornmunt~l Pnr!y I.uudv (Boulder:Westview Press, 1989). 57. Ildiko Vasary, Beyond the Plm Social Chan,Fe in o Hun,+an Vzliqe (Boulder: Wrstview Press, 1987), ,‘_ 129. 58 ,Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz, Public Opinion Polltq~n Czechoslouakra, 196&69(Ncw York: Praeger. 1972), p 310. The sample includes 16.5 farmers in Slovakia. Piekalkicwicz also includes answers of 886 non-farmel-s in Slovakia to the same questions and, with the exception of a question about thr rural arcas subsidlztng the urban areas, the two samples wcrc in rough agreement. “Ideology and Ilconomics: Cooperatlvc Orgamzation and Attitudes toward 59 Marida Hellos, Cr)llcctlvization in ‘1.~0 Hungarian Commumtics,” in Hellos and Maday, op al . note 47.

When is Collectivization Reversible? economic

existence.60

In Wungary

this sentiment

19

was stated more bluntly

to me in

individual conversations by several specialists: farmers on collective and state farms have too easy a life ever to want to return to individual farming.61 Of course, if subsidies to collective or state farms were removed, such ideas might change. Some of the social inertia must also be traced to the social benefits which have been given to collective farmers and the personal risks the farmers would face in an environment of individual one Byelorussian

farms where such benefits might not be available. Along these lines Let peasant is quoted as saying: “They drove us into collectivization.

them drive us into perestroika. “‘* Political

Factors

A number of political problems must be mentioned

in connection

with the economic

and

social factors discussed above. The problems discussed below, I must emphasize, are much more severe in countries with Marxist governments than in countries which have voted Marxist governments out of power. For those Marxist regimes where the Marxist parties are still in power, five factors deserve special emphasis.

For decollectivization a general

recognition

to occur, two types of recognition of a serious

must occur. First, there must be

crisis in agricultural

production.

In China,

for

instance, the low level of economic development (and the high labor/land ratio) meant that the constraints on the growth of the entire economy arising from the agricultural sector were taken much more seriously than in the USSR; and some observers have argued that in the 1960s and 1970s unfulfilled demand for agricultural products increased more than in the Soviet Union, which made the Chinese agricultural situation more severe.63 In the Soviet Union the per capita level of agricultural production was higher and, at least in terms of aggregate growth, per capita agricultural production was respectable during the 1960s and 197Os, even if that growth was accompanied by very high investment costs. As a result, the recognition of a crisis was less generalized and the political leaders were less likely to take radical steps. The extent to which an agricultural crisis is recognized varies in the different Marxist regimes. In some of these nations such as Albania, Cuba, and North Korea, agricultural growth has been quite respectable so that there is little popular pressure for decollectivization, despite such “secondary assortment problems.

problems”

as shortages of particular

foods and

Second, there must be a recognition that the agricultural problems arise not from exogenous forces (weather or machination by foreign enemies), not from simple mismanagement by the administrators and sloth by the workers, not from imperfect 60. Arthur W. McCardle and A. Rruce Boenau, Easl Gervtan~: A Nem German N&m under So&&m (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). 61. Regarding the problem of individual effort, Keller cites a Soviet joke: “Which is better, individual sex or group sex? Group sex, of COUTS~,because it leaves you time off to goof off.” (op. cit., note51.) 62. Cited by Ernest Gellner, “Ethnicity and Faith in Eastern Europe,” Daedah, Vol. 119, No. 1(Winter, 1990), p. 282. 63. Karl-Eugen Wadekin provides estimates of such excess agricultural demand. (“Agrarian Structures and Policies in the USSR, China and Hungary: A Comparative View,” in Brada and Wadekin, op. cit.. notr 22).

plan

indicators

itself.

and

misplaced

Understanding

agricultural cultural

of this

sector

must

institutions

mcnt

have

intellectual

road

supply

to travel

and

Marxist

from

in turn,

autonomy

need serious

from

the

the

of which

of agriculture

accepting

political

that

sector,

that

and that a different

must

be created.

be immeasurably

both

system

requires

restructuring, production

it would

problems,

rather

element,

in agricultural

of the various

in many

but

causal

greater

and policies

for decision-making

discussion

incentives, last

aided

environ-

This

by frank

characteristics.of

is a long and

debate

the agri-

public

are in short

regimes.“4

The Problem of Ideology The

ideals

of socialism

socialism

implies

are noble

agricultural

and to many

collectivization.

only an end of socialism,

but a means

program

a crisis

requires

either

ing of beliefs

so that

that

reversed

will

be

mechanized public with

can such

or if the party collectivized

in

future

be more

easily

continues

to stress

time

realized.

certain

according

and

into

reluctant

to invest

their

tivization

program

will not achieve

resources

or else a reorder-

of tactical

advantages

Indeed,

the

If such

ideological

(as in China,

program

the

will occur.

maneuver

of

more

large-scale

advanced

a justification

themes

which

to Bernstein),“”

individual

is not

A decollectivization

in terms

when

regimes,

collectivization

as well.“”

socialist

is rationalized

the

in the Marxist

specifically,

socialism

in the entire

recollectivization

agriculture

leaders

change

sometime

the sooner

More

to achieve

of faith

institutional

agriculture

economy,

political

farming

the

becomes

are associated farmers

and

will be

the decollec-

its goals.

The Problem of Political Will At a number

of points

government

to offset

this discussion a particular

economically

costly,

top political

leadership.

this high price then the risks

politically

goals that conflict

their

priorities,

as a brief

comparison

Xiaoping

did not gain

put a high between political

priority 1979

and

opponents

individual

to private

political

have

between

the

complete

control

on agricultural 1981. so that

In the latter he could

leading

farmer

rise.

be taken

of these

some

problems

so enabling toward

by the

are either for the

them

to pay

decollectivization,

If this political

leadership

is relatively

has

low on

also increase. quite

Union

over

different and

the party he was able

quickly

in the various

China

shows.

and state

and took a series

year

move

and this raises

policies

been

Soviet

reform

Most

or ifdecollectivization

farming

factors

that could

is not fully unified

with decollectivization

the risks

upper-level

or both,

a set of consistent

any would-be

other

These

painful,

measures

in decollectivization.

If the top leadership

and to follow facing

has mentioned

difficulty

apparatus

of small

to defeat

and effectively

countries,

Although

but consistent decisively

Deng

in 1979,

he

steps

his major

to decollectivize

agri-

64 Judy Bat provides a fascmating account of this type of Intellectual rvolution for the 1968 rrforrns in (:zcchoslovakia and HUIISJW~. Although she focuses primarily on reforms in the industrial WCtar, hrr grnt~al ~w~clusions are equally valid for agriculture. [Ecconornzc R@m and Poli&d Charye in Emlern Europe (I.ondon: Macrnillim, 1988).] 65. l‘he strength ofthe idea that land cannot be sold and must br used only by thusc whom the govrrnrnent dctcrmines are the most capable farmers dies slowly. Bill Keller quotes a Soviet local party official contrnding: “From the point of view of morality and ethics, selling land is blasphemy. The land should not be trcatcd as some prostitute who goes with the guy w,ho pays thr hisheat price” (C//J czl , nntc 51). 66. Hcrnstcin, o,b cif , note 26.

When is Collectivization culture

thereafter.

because

of a desire

an initial place

belief

that

the highest

reform farms,

only

specializing

and

in different

crops

cultural

always

sector,

Political

which

appropriate

increased

property

property.“s

The

governmental

relative

organs

to their

size.

and

the willingness

to establish

mechanisms

strength

of

at different

which

rules

levels

that

over

is a crucial

in

for

agricultural agri-

and other

a

system

administrative

determinant

he

the risks

more.

system

lacking

state

extent,

the individual

even

a court

of law

with

compromises

the socialist over

farming

are

pluralism

not only raised

resources

of individual

agricultural to encourage

to a certain

political

of

he did not

less radical

The

which

Either

or because

did he seem each,

the specter

of inputs

party.h7

or because

an institutional coexisting,

the risks

rights,

divided

costs of reform,

a much

inconsistencies,

priority

will also implies

enforce

farms

but also raised

receive

more

at no point

he envisioned

with many

decollectivization,

would

he pursued

individual

21

was required,

Furthermore,

rather,

farms,

a much

and political

tinkering

on agriculture,

led to a problem

a successful

policy

of power.

,decollectivization;

accepted

faced

the economic

minor

years

collective

sector

Gorbachev

priority

in his early

a general

to

Mikhail to minimize

Reversible?

means

of

weak

orders

of the risk

from

of private

farming.

The Problem of Cadre Resistance Decollectivization many

party

summed

up the

agriculture] These

ideas

a negation

but this raises redefine

production

in their

in a position

leaders

for

that its entire evaluation

district.

to enrich

options. and purge

heads

authority

of cadres

the recalcitrant

in the rural

so that

they

It can also buy off the resistance

themselves

mechanisms

in the decollectivized

[in

to do?

to enforce

sector

are

.

of cadres

state

its political

local officials, may crumble.

no longer

system,

of

Castro

of local (and higher)

and in order

crack

power

Fidel

left for the party

resistance

face several

top,

[economic]

be then

“TV The

and the direct

At the very “If

level:

would

can be expected;

of course,

the possibility criteria

the income, sector.

general what

of the party.

measures

political can,

most

everything,

to such

government

of positions,

in the agricultural

at the

to solve

involve

cadres

the number

cadres

problem

the top level

The can

state

were

and party will,

reduces

and

by placing

which

It

judged

by them

happened

in

China.“’ In China,

for instance,

of land for private position economic inputs. rural

to become activities Moreover,

cadres

were

farm

farming.

“specialized allowing because in a better

and party

” Further,

officials

party

households,” them

ofthe

high

which

incomes

importance

position

were able to gain favorable

and state cadres

to engage

allowed

and priority

oflocal

sources

in trade,

allotments

were in the most them access

to engage to credit

of agricultural

not just

of farm

favorable in certain and other

inputs, inputs

such

but also

67. Anders Aslund. Gorbachec’c .Stru,&fur E commuc Reform (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 68. Wittfogrl, op. (il., note 27. 69. Quoted by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “The Cuban Economy in the 1980s: The Return of Ideology,” in Scrgio G. Rota, cd., Socialzst Cuba: Past fnlerpretations and Future Challenges (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 86. 70. ,Jean C. Oi, “Peasant Grain Marketing and State Procurement,” China Quuarter(y, No. 106 CJunr, 1986), pp. 270-290; “Market Reforms and Corruption in Rural China,” Studies in Compara’tiue Communism, Vol. XXII, Nos. 213 (Summer/Autumn, 1989), pp. 221-233; StateandPeasanl in Contemporary China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 7 1. A rase Ftudy is provided by Chan, Madsen and Unger, op cit., note56.

STUDIES IN COMPARA’IWE COMMUNISh4

22

of consumer goods, than the average peasant. Finally, since the system was not completely marketized, the local governmental cadres could manipulate their ability to distribute certain types of permits and licenses for their economic advantage.

Decollectivization problems

such problems conceivable. In China, irrigation

is not necessarily

can arise that encourage are important

for instance,

being neglected;

the answer to all agricultural more government

and cannot

decollectivization deforestation

problems

intervention

be resolved,

even a recollectivization

has led to: communal

becoming

and certain

in the countryside.

a problem;7z

facilities

agricultural

If is

such as produc-

tivity growth beginning to level off again; in the late 198Os, no significant increase in grain production; a “hog cycle” (a 4-year cycle of hog production that is found in many market economies) since the reintroduction of the market;73 population growth in the countryside beginning to rise;74 income differentiation proceeding to the point where many rural families are unable to operate in the new environment and are alleged to have a standard of living far below the socially acceptable norm; and rural violence, although not a major problem, increasing, at least up to the middle 1980s.75 Although I believe that all of these can be resolved in the present decentralized system, other problems may arise that are not so tractable. may decollectivization.

Reflections

If collectivization

may be reversible,

so

on Decollectivization

The collectivization of agriculture has probably been the most radical institutional change in the economy undertaken by the various Marxist regimes. It has required considerable coercion and violence, great administrative efforts, and enormous personal dedication on the part of the political leaders, all in the name of a formal doctrine which did not offer much support for introducing

such changes,

particularly

at low levels of

economic development. Once the process was completed, however, it has not proven simple to reverse such changes. The discussion above suggests that it may be much easier to decollectivize in a relatively poor country where farming is not highly input intensive or mechanized, than in an economically

more advanced

nation.

Such a conclusion

is reinforced

by the

case of Hungary, a nation which was able to marketize its agricultural sector but which has lacked the desire, apparently both on the side of the government and the farmers, to decollectivize. This proposition is merely the reverse side of the approach toward collectivization of Nicolai Bukharin (of the USSR) in the 1920s or Edvard Kardelj (of Yugoslavia) in the early 1950s that successful collectivization can occur only when the 72. Lester Ross, “Obligatory Tree Planting: The Role of Campaigns in Policy Implementation in PostMao China,” in Lampton, op. cik, note 36, pp. 225-252. 73. Thomas B. Wiens, “Issues in the Structural Reform of Chinese Agriculture,“JournnE ~~Cu~~ur~t~~~ Economics, No. 11 (1987), pp. 372-384. 74. Blanche Tyrene White, “Implementing the ‘One-Child-Per-Couple’ Population Program in Rural China: National Goals and Local Politics, ” in Lampton, op. cit., note36, pp. 284-317. 75. Elizabeth J. Perry, “Rural Collective Violence: The Fruits of Recent Reforms,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political EconomyofRefom in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies and Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 175- 192.

When is ~o~~ecti~izati~~ ReuersibEe?

labor force in agriculture Most of the economic

is relatively difficulties

small and production arising

23 is relatively

from decollectivization-the

mechanized. creation

of a

reliable and accessible source of inputs, the provision for the profitable sale of outputs, the establishment of outlets for credit and consumer goods-fall into the category of network

externalities and thus have parallels with the factors locking nations into inefficient technologies or standards, in particular costs external to the farm itself (pecuniary externalities), rather than classic production externalities. Most of the sociological difficulties are rather different and reflect the long-term consequences of selfreinforcing

demographic

and social-structural

factors

of the system of collectivized

agriculture. Most of the political factors are the outcome of particular power conligurations that differ considerably from nation to nation, so that few generalizations can be made. Underlying this study of collectivization are several simple messages. Some major institutional changes may occur only with dif~culty, if at all, even if the institutions to be changed

are dysfunctional

or highly inefficient.

The costs of decollectivization

are

high, particularly in the short run. Further, as the Hungarian case has shown, most systems of collectivized agriculture can be improved considerably by measures short of decollectivization, the development

e.g. structural

improvements

of an effective infra-structure

within the farms,

marketization,

and

aiding agriculture.

This study has been carried on at too high a level of abstraction to be able to make detailed predictions about the course of decollectivization in particular nations. It seems likely, however, that most of the Third World Marxist regimes will not greatly increase the relative importance of their state and collective farms, given the administrative difficulties

which such farms are experiencing.

By the same token, in such nations as

Cuba and North Korea, where collectivized agriculture appears relatively successful and firmly entrenched, decollectivization also does not appear likely unless some unexpectedly dramatic political changes occur. In Eastern Europe, after the events of 1989, marketization reforms or changes in the incentives facing farmers appear considerably more likely than decollectivization; indeed, even though communist parties have been dethroned in many of these countries, the calls for decollectivization have not been sufficiently strong to receive attention in the Western press-the only country in 1989 where reporters noted that demonstrators made such demands was Mongolia. In 1990 public

opinion

pollsters

in East

Europe

made

surveys

among

the rural

population about intentions to take up private farming as a full-time occupation. In East Germany, less than 5 per cent of the current farmers intended to undertake such a step; in Czechoslovakia, less than 10 per cent; in Bulgaria and Hungary, which have a less mechanized farming system, less than 30 per cent.76 In some countries such as Bulgaria, where the communist party opposed a full-scale decollectivization, they received

a higher percentage

poll, or election

results,

of votes than in the urban areas.77 Of course,

must be interpreted

cautiously,

because

it is unclear

any such exactly

76. These results were cited to me in interviews with economists in the four countries. I was, unfortunately, unabir to see the actual poll results. It would be aesthetically pleasing if there were some symmetry between the processes of collectivization and decollectivization, e.g. the more coercion used in collectivization, the grs~ttr the degree of voluntary decollectivization. Such public opinion data suggest, however, that the degree nf decollectivization is roughly related to the capital intensiveness of agriculture. 77. Anon, op. cit., note 18.

24

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

what the respondents

were assuming

about

the future economic environment

so that the

support such data provide for my thesis is llmited.78 In brief, the system of collectivized agriculture introduced by Stalin in the USSR in the late 1920s and implanted by Marxist parties in other nations is difficult to reverse where the system

has been

in existence

for several

decades

and where the level of

agricultural technology used on the farms has become relatively high. Large-scale mechanized farming is far from a closed episode in the economic history of the world; and in Marxist regimes it may prove to be one of Stalin’s few lasting legacies, at least within the foreseeable

future.

78. These comparisons are made with regard to the entire agricultural population. If, however, the denominator were the number of farm families with a household head between 20 and 55 who would really be capable of taking over a family farm, then the relative number of applicants for such farms would appear more impressive and such numbers would be more useful in predicting future developments. One also hears stories that in certain parts of Hungary peasants were driving in stakes to mark out old land boundaries after the communists were voted out of power; but such anecdotal evidence has limitations.