A 3% RISE IN MILITARY SPENDING

1231

World Resources A

3% RISE

IN MILITARY SPENDING*

SABRE rattling is again the mark of international relations. Rapidly rising military budgets, demands for more and better chemical weapons in NATO, the modernisation of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe, the continuing Soviet deployment of SS-20 medium range ballistic missiles and Backfire bombers, the NATO decision to deploy new types of tactical nuclear weapons, and plans to pre-position NATO military equipment in Denmark and Norway to speed troop reinforcements of NATO’s northern flank-these are some of the symptoms of a new phase in East-West relations which has been aptly described as hot peace. Let us look at the most basic of these symptoms, the coming increases in military spending. These increases will undoubtedly start a new and even more dangerous round in the EastWest arms race and will accelerate the militarisation of the whole planet. In the United

States, the Carter Administration has recently

five-year defence plan for the fiscal years 1981 to 1985, inclusive. Steady rises in annual military spending are planned so that in 1985 the American military will spend announced

a

about$250 000 million-more than double this year’s military budget of about$110000 million. The Pentagon’s shopping list for the next five years is formidable. The plan is to buy nearly 100 new ships, some 2000 fixed-wing aircraft, about 1000 helicopters, 4000 or so tanks, and about 4000 armoured personnel carriers. By contrast we know very little about Soviet military spending. The Soviet Union simply puts a single item in its official budget for the military. This figure is 17 200 million roubles -an obvious understatement; there must be some military funds hidden in other parts of the Soviet budget. Because the Soviet official figure is not credible many Western observers have come to rely on the American Central Intelligence Agency’s estimates of the Soviet military budget. What the C.I.A. does is to estimate how much it would cost the U.S.A. in dollars to operate itself the Soviet military machine. By this method the C.I.A. reckons that Soviet military spending is now about$165 000 million a year-well ahead of the American

military budget. The C.I.A. figure clearly does not represent the actual money spent by the U.S.S.R. on military activities. For one thing the Soviets have about 4 million men under arms. These soldiers are paid very little-by Western standards next to nothing. But the C.I.A. in its estimates of Soviet military spending gives each Russian soldier an American rate of pay. Also, Russian weapons are costed according to estimates of the costs of their manufacture in the U.S.A. The upshot is that the C.I.A. estimate is not a meaningful indication of actual Soviet military spending. It is a very exaggerated figure. Even so, this highly dubious C.I.A. figure is bandied about in the West to justify demands for increases in NATO military spending. The C.I.A. figure is used as if it were actual Soviet military expenditure, which it is not. It is used to argue, incorrectly, that the Soviet Union is spending a very high percentage of its gross national product on the militaryof up to 20% are cited. And the C.I.A. estimates are show that Soviet military spending is increasing each year much faster than it probably really is. The Soviets have

figures used

to

*Based

on a

talk

on

Danish Radio.

only themselves to blame for this state of affairs-it is possible only because of their obsession with secrecy. If they would only give realistic figures for their military spending, Western authorities would not be able to propagate misleading ones. If we don’t know the amount of military money spent by the U.S.S.R. we do know that its arsenal is, for all intents and purposes, of similar military potential to that of the U.S.A. This is not to deny that there are many differences between the arsenals. The U.S.S.R. has a vast conscript army, paid very little, whereas the U.S.A. has highly paid all-volunteer armed forces of only half the size. The Soviets can, therefore, afford to use relatively large numbers of men for military tasks. Thus, whereas the U.S.A. uses about 75 000 men to man its strategic nuclear deterrent, the Soviet Union is thought to use roughly five times

as

many

men to

handle about the

same

number of

strategic missiles, submarines, and bombers. Another difference between the American and Soviet forces is the sophistication of their weapons. By and large, American weaponry includes much more advanced technology than its Soviet counterpart. Moreover, American technology is generally superior to Soviet technology. For example, the U.S.S.R. has about 1400 intercontinental ballistic missiles whereas the U.S.A. has about 1000 such missiles. But the American missiles are so much more reliable than the Russian ones that the American intercontinental ballistic missile force is probably superior to the Soviet one.

Despite all the differences, it is reasonable to assume that the American and Soviet forces are in general about equal, in the sense that in a war there is no saying which side would gain an advantage. Moreover, there is so much military power on each side that quite large differences are meaningless in military terms. There is therefore little, if any, sense in arguments for increases in NATO military spending, at least from a military point of view. The U.S. defence budget for fiscal year 1981, for example, proposes outlays that are 3-3% higher in real terms, after inflation, than in fiscal 1980. This meets the NATO goal of a 3% real increase in annual defence spending but will require the diversion of nearly 6% of the American gross national product to military activities. At a time of high inflation and increasing unemployment this is not a sensible use of a nation’s resources, particularly since it will give no military advantage over the potential adversary. There is even less sense in Britain increasing its military spending by 3% per year in real terms, as it plans to do, when it is in such dire economic straits that the social services have to be savagely cut. Such absurdity is hard to understand. Chancellor Schmidt’s government, under pressure from his opposition opponent Strauss, does plan to meet the NATO target of 3% by, among other things, increasing defence aid to Turkey; West Germany is better able than most to afford extra military costs. Belgium and Denmark are going to fall short of a 3% real increase in military spending in 1980. What are, in fact, the most serious threats to the West’s democratic way of life? In my opinion, the coming economic crisis brought on by a shortage of energy supplies is at least as great a threat as the Warsaw Pact, and probably a much bigger threat. This is particularly so because the Eastern European countries, including the U.S.S.R., will be as preoccupied with energy problems as we will be in the West. For the next twenty to thirty years there will be such shortage of energy that there is unlikely to be much economic growth in the industrialised countries. The

‘

1232

typical Western European country needs, so it is said, an economic growth rate of between 3% and 4% a year to maintain more or less full employment, to fund the social welfare benefits to which we have become accustomed, and to prevent an erosion of our living standards. I have heard no politically realistic way of achieving 3 or 4% economic growth over the next ten or twenty years, given predicted energy supplies. Some people, in desperation, put their faith in nuclear power to fill the energy gap. But it would be simply impossible to build nuclear-power reactors fast enough to help the energy problem significantly, at least for the rest of this century. Other people argue for massive schemes of energy conservation encouraged by new life styles. But it seems to me politically unrealistic to expect large numbers of people suddenly and dramatically to change the pattern of their lives. The most likely outcome of the energy crisis is, therefore, that economic growth will be very low, perhaps zero or even negative. This will mean much unemployment and probably high inflation. The unemployment is likely to hit the youngest the worst. Youths coming out of schools and universities will be extremely hardpressed to find work. The microchip revolution will, of course, make matters worse, as automation in factories and offices reduces the need for labour without signifi-

cantly increasing productivity. Unemployment and inflation at the forseeable levels will probably provoke a great deal of political and social turmoil. And this turmoil may well be the greatest threat to our political systems. Perhaps far greater than the threat of a military attack by the Warsaw Pact on NATO, or vice versa. In these circumstances, increasingly high levels of military spending do more harm than good. For example, they themselves contribute substantially to unemployment and inflation. And they have a cumulative effect, so that military spending in one year affects economic growth for many subsequent years. The actual magnitude of the effects of military spending is not calculable. Particularly difficult is any assessment of the consequences for the economy of diverting massive resources to military research and development. It is a sobering fact that, of the world’s research physicists and engineering scientists, more than half are working only for the military. Spectacular results could follow if this enormous fund of talent was devoted to peaceful pursuits. In addition, provided that cuts in military spending were offset by an increase in government spending in other areas or by a tax reduction then the number of jobs would increase. To sum up, increases in military spending will not increase the security of NATO countries, whereas a decrease in military budgets would, by increasing employment and reducing inflation, offset to some extent the impact of the coming energy crisis. This would improve the chances of Western democratic societies surviving the stresses and strains caused by the energy crisis. To put it bluntly, we would be more secure if we spent less on the military. To underestimate our strength now is in itself dangerous. To do so saps political will. And it encourages the diversion of scarce resources to unproductive

military activities, just

when

they

are most

needed

to

shore up our economies. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

FRANK BARNABY

Occasional Survey DRIVING AND INSULIN-DEPENDENT DIABETES BRIAN M. FRIER

JUDITH M. STEEL

DAVID M. MATTHEWS LESLIE J.P. DUNCAN

Diabetic and Dietetic Department, Royal Infirmary, Edinburgh EH3 9YW

A survey of 250

patients with insulindiabetes (IDD) holding a full dependent motor vehicle driving licence revealed that 107 (42·8%) had not declared IDD on their application for a driving licence. 70 of these (28% of entire group) claimed that they were unaware of the statutory requirements. There was no difference in the declaration-rate between men and women. 159 patients (66%) declared IDD for their motor insurance. 86 patients (34·4%) had had severe or frequent hypoglycæmia in the preceding six months, during which they had been driving regularly. 34 patients (13·6%) admitted involvement in a driving accident since commencing treatment with insulin, and 13 of these patients were aware that hypoglycæmia had been an important causal factor. The prevalence of diabetic retinopathy and cataracts was considerable, but few patients (2·4%) had severe impairment of vision in both Summary

eyes. INTRODUCTION

INSULIN-DEPENDENT diabetes (IDD) is designated a "prospective disability" for the issue of a full motor vehicle driving licence. With the implementation in January, 1976, of the Road Traffic Act, 1974,1 full driving licences were issued that were valid until the holder reached the age of 70 years (a "Till 70" licence). The licensing authority, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre (D.V.L.C.) at Swansea, was authorised to restrict the validity of licences to a maximum of three years for insulin-taking diabetics. The onus of notifying a relevant

medical condition, such as diabetes, rests with the licence holder.2 We suspect that many diabetic patients are either unaware of the statutory requirements, or deliberately do not disclose their diabetes. A group of patients with IDD who possess full driving licences was surveyed to assess the frequency of declaration of diabetes, knowledge of the regulations, and medical fitness to drive. PATIENTS AND METHODS

Patients with IDD who

regularly

attend the diabetic

out-

patient department of Edinburgh Royal Infirmary were selected at

random for the survey. All possessed a full driving licence or a full driving licence which had been revoked. Patients

had held