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A comparison of extreme religious and political ideologies: Similar worldviews but different grievances
Personality and Individual Differences 159 (2020) 109888
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A comparison of extreme religious and political ideologies: Similar worldviews but different grievances
T
⁎
Jan-Willem van Prooijena,b, , Sophia M.H.C. Kuijpera a b
VU Amsterdam, the Netherlands The NSCR, the Netherlands
A R T I C LE I N FO
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Political extremism Religious fundamentalism Significance quest Grievances Worldview
People can polarize into various ideologies, including tendencies towards political left- and right-wing extremism, and religious fundamentalism. Here we compare polarization in these different ideologies in a US online sample (N = 424). Building on significance quest theory, we specifically investigate how individual tendencies towards political extremism and religious fundamentalism are associated with grievance and worldview variables within the same study. As grievance variables we measured personal and fraternal deprivation, and socio-economic fear. As worldview variables we measured belief significance, dogmatic intolerance, and parochial altruism. Results revealed that political extremism and religious fundamentalism were similarly associated with the worldview variables but not with the grievance variables. We conclude that independent of content, ideological polarization is associated with a common worldview characterized by the feeling that one supports a meaningful cause, intolerance of alternative ideologies, and a willingness to make personal sacrifices for one's ideals.
1. Introduction People can polarize into qualitatively different ideologies. Citizens leaning towards political left-wing extremism advocate egalitarianism and reject free-market capitalism. Citizens leaning towards political right-wing extremism embrace traditional values and express negative attitudes towards immigrants. Citizens leaning towards religious fundamentalism believe in a literal interpretation of Holy Scriptures and reject ‘infidels’. Here we define ideological extremism as the extent to which regular citizens polarize into, and strongly identify with, a particular ideological outlook on the world (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). Such ideologies differ not only in content but can also come with different psychological signatures. For instance, ample research has focused on the question what psychological traits predict the specific political ideologies that people endorse (e.g., Jost, 2017). But while examining such differences is paramount to understanding the psychological dynamics underlying specific ideologies, to understand the psychology of ideology one also needs to examine what different extreme ideologies have in common. In the present contribution, we empirically compare different extreme ideologies by focusing on regular citizens’ strong adherence to political left-wing, political rightwing, and religious fundamentalist ideologies.
Previous research comparing relatively extreme versus moderate citizens has largely examined political extremism versus religious fundamentalism separately. For instance, studies have revealed how politically left- and right-extreme citizens differ from moderates in belief confidence (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2009), prejudice (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford & Wetherell, 2014), and intolerance (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017); yet, these studies did not empirically assess whether or not these psychological features would generalize to religious fundamentalism. Likewise, scholars have examined how religious fundamentalism is associated with variables such as prejudice and certainty needs (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017), coalitional commitment (Ginges, Hansen & Norenzayan, 2010), and sacred values (Atran & Ginges, 2012), but typically without examining political extremism. Finally, some studies did examine these different forms of extremism yet in different datasets, and without explicitly testing for similarities and differences in the psychological dynamics underlying (left- or rightwing) political extremism versus religious fundamentalism (e.g., Webber et al., 2018). The present study investigated to what extent polarization into left-wing, right-wing, and religious fundamentalist ideologies converges or differs in their relationships with a range of grievance and worldview variables that theoretically are associated with ideological extremism.
⁎ Correspondence author at: Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, VU Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.-W. van Prooijen).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109888 Received 9 December 2019; Received in revised form 2 February 2020; Accepted 4 February 2020 Available online 18 February 2020 0191-8869/ © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
Personality and Individual Differences 159 (2020) 109888
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to make sacrifices for one's own group is commonly referred to as parochial altruism (Bernhard, Fischbacher & Fehr, 2006), which theoretically has been linked with ideological extremism (Van Prooijen, 2018). We predicted that participants who score relatively high on (left- or right-wing) political extremism and religious fundamentalism scales would have stronger grievances, and a more extreme worldview, than relatively moderate participants.
1.1. The quest for personal significance A central theoretical assumption is that ideological extremism is rooted in a psychological quest for personal significance: A desire to be respected and to matter in the eyes of oneself or important others (Kruglanski et al., 2014; see also Webber et al., 2018). People can acquire such a sense of personal significance through the combination of many sources, such as family, work, and the pursuit of meaningful goals. Sometimes people may experience a loss of significance, however, when they encounter grievances such as humiliation, injustice, or insecurities. Such grievances prompt a sense of meaninglessness, and therefore stimulate a desire to restore a sense of personal significance through a worldview in which perceivers are focally committed to specific ideological goals. Put differently, extreme ideologies help perceivers to restore a sense of significance through a worldview in which they appear to be supporting a meaningful cause. Previous research findings are consistent with these ideas. For instance, experiences of significance loss increase the appeal of clear-cut ideologies that help perceivers restore a sense of closure and certainty (Webber et al., 2018). Likewise, feelings of uncertainty and fear lead perceivers to pursue ideological goals with zeal and conviction (McGregor, Prentice & Nash, 2013), and is associated with both leftand right-wing extremism (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten & Eendebak, 2015). Furthermore, mortality salience manipulations predict polarization into both political left-wing and right-wing ideologies (Burke, Kosloff & Landau, 2013). Finally, feelings of injustice have been proposed as central to both political and religious extremism (Midlarsky, 2011; Van den Bos, 2018). Significance quest theory assumes that there are varying degrees of ideological extremism, ranging from well-functioning citizens with some sympathy for extreme ideas, up until terrorist groups and suicide bombers that are fully committed to their ideological goals (Kruglanski et al., 2014; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & Orehek, 2009). Empirical studies have examined the theoretical processes proposed by significance quest theory among members of extremist groups, as well as among regular citizens who for instance are at the edges of the political spectrum (e.g., Webber et al., 2018). By using a quantitative survey approach, the present project focuses exclusively on regular citizens, and empirically compares relatively extreme citizens with relatively moderate citizens. In the present study we investigate two classes of variables that theoretically are associated with both political extremism and religious fundamentalism, namely grievance variables and worldview variables. As to grievance variables, we focus on feelings of injustice at two levels, notably personal and fraternal relative deprivation (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Personal relative deprivation pertains to the feeling that one as a person is deprived of equal opportunities; fraternal relative deprivation pertains to the feeling that one's political or religious group as a whole is deprived of equal opportunities. Furthermore, we assess socio-economic fear, defined as fear that the well-being of oneself or the group that one is part of is compromised by current political or economic developments (Van Prooijen et al., 2015). Besides grievances, significance quest theory stipulates that extreme ideologies involve a worldview characterized by focal goal commitment, where one believes to endorse a meaningful cause. Based on this proposition we focus on three worldview variables. First, we examine belief significance, that is, the extent to which people experience their political or religious beliefs as meaningful and important (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Second, focal goal commitment implies a perception of one's ideology as superior to alternative belief systems. A relatively extreme worldview therefore includes dogmatic intolerance, defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, ideological beliefs that differ from one's own (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). Third, focal goal commitment often involves a willingness to make personal sacrifices in service of one's ideology, even if it includes harming outgroup members (e.g., Ginges et al., 2010). Such a tendency
2. Method 2.1. Procedure The study was run online on a US sample, from 26 April to 2 May 2017, through the Crowdflower forum (a crowdsourcing website similar to Mturk). We first measured basic demographics and the two independent variables, and then the dependent variables. 2.2. Sample We aimed to recruit 400 participants; however, at the end of data collection 428 participants had participated (178 men, 250 women). We dropped 4 participants for being underage (< 18 years)1 yielding 424 participants for the analyses (Mage = 35.75, SD = 12.18). This sample yields 95% statistical power to detect a small-to-medium effect size (f2 = 0.04). 2.3. Independent variables Participants placed themselves on two rating scales ranging from very left-wing (1) to very right-wing (11), and from very liberal (1) to very conservative (11). Their responses to these two items were strongly correlated (r = 0.82, p < .001) and we averaged them into a single index of political orientation. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Downing, Judd & Brauer, 1992) we mean-centered participants’ political orientation scores for the regression analyses, and calculated a political extremism index by taking the absolute deviations from the scale midpoint of political orientation. Furthermore, we measured the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) on a scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) (e.g., “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed”; 6 items recoded; α = 0.95). We mean-centered participants’ religious fundamentalism scores for the regression analyses. 2.4. Dependent variables All dependent variables were measured on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), in a fixed order. We provide the full scales, and more information about the questionnaire, in the Online Supplementary Materials. 2.4.1. Grievance variables To measure personal relative deprivation, we assessed six items (e.g., “It makes me angry when I think about the way I get treated compared to other Americans”; α = 0.89). To measure fraternal relative deprivation, we assessed seven items, six of which has parallel wording as personal relative deprivation (e.g., “It makes me angry when I think about the way people who share my political or religious beliefs are treated, compared to other groups in America”; α = 0.90). We measured socio-economic fear with an abbreviated, 9-item version of the original scale by Van Prooijen et al. (2015), tailored to a US context (e.g., “I frequently worry about the future of America”; α = 0.78). 1
2
Results were similar if these participants were included.
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therefore conducted the two-lines test on these variables, with the centered political ideology measure as independent variable, while statistically controlling for gender, age, education, and religious fundamentalism. The two-lines test calculates two interrupted regression lines separated by a break point determined by the Robin Hood algorithm to maximize fit (Simonsohn, 2018). In this procedure, two significant regression lines of opposing sign indicate that the data are Ushaped. For fraternal deprivation, the regression coefficient was nonsignificant at the left of the political spectrum (B = −0.02, z = −0.38, p = .70), but revealed significantly stronger feelings of fraternal deprivation to the extent that participants were more extremely rightwing (B = 0.16, z = 2.65, p = .008). For socio-economic fear, the regression coefficient was significant at the left of the political spectrum (B = −0.21, z = −3.08, p = .002), indicating stronger socio-economic fear to the extent that participants were more extremely leftwing; the effect was nonsignificant at the right of the spectrum, however (B = 0.01, z = 0.14, p = .89). The online supplemental materials include figures displaying these interrupted regression lines (Figures S1 and S2). These results do not support the hypothesis that different extremist ideologies are associated with similar grievances.
2.4.2. Worldview variables To measure the extent to which participants experience their political or religious beliefs as meaningful and significant, we modified the passion scale by Vallerand et al. (2003) towards the purposes of the current research.2 Example items include “My political or religious beliefs allow me to live memorable experiences”, and “I cannot live without my political and religious beliefs”. We averaged participants’ responses into a reliable belief significance scale (α = 0.89). We measured dogmatic intolerance with the scale by Van Prooijen and Krouwel (2017), tailored towards the purposes of the current research (e.g., “I believe that everyone should think like me about political and religious issues”; α = 0.81).3 Finally, we operationalized parochial altruism as participants’ tendency to make personal sacrifices, and if necessary to hurt others, for their ideals. We developed a scale for this construct by combining three modified items of Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje (2009) (e.g., “I am prepared to use violence against other people in order to realise important political or religious ideals”) with three modified items of Routledge and Arndt (2008; e.g., “I would die for people who share my political or religious beliefs”; α = 0.88). 3. Results
3.2. Worldview variables The means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the variables are in Table 1. We analyzed the results through hierarchical regression analyses in which we entered participants’ gender, age, education level, and the mean-centered term of political orientation in Step 1. We added the political extremism index and the mean-centered religious fundamentalism term in Step 2. The hierarchical regression results are in Table 2. Degrees of freedom differ from the total sample (and across dependent variables) due to attrition and missing values.
For all the worldview variables Step 1 was significant: For belief significance, (R2 = 0.04), F(4, 397) = 3.81, p = .005; for dogmatic intolerance, (R2 = 0.21), F(4, 406) = 27.69, p < .001; and for parochial altruism, (R2 = 0.10), F(4, 390) = 10.70, p < .001. More important for the present purposes was that Step 2 was significant for all of the worldview variables: For belief significance, (ΔR2 = 0.20), F(2, 395) = 52.53, p < .001; for dogmatic intolerance, (ΔR2 = 0.03), F(2, 404) = 8.65, p < .001; and for parochial altruism, (ΔR2 = 0.06), F(2, 388) = 14.19, p < .001. Furthermore, the political extremism and religious fundamentalism terms were significant for all three worldview variables (Table 2). We then tested for the U-shaped relationship between political ideology and the worldview variables, again using the two-lines test (Simonsohn, 2018), statistically controlling for gender, age, education, and religious fundamentalism. The interrupted regression coefficient at the political left was significant and negative for belief significance (B = −0.28, z = −4.78, p < .001) and parochial altruism (B = −0.25, z = −3.44, p < .001), suggesting that participants scored higher on these worldview variables to the extent they were more extremely left-wing. The interrupted regression coefficient of dogmatic intolerance was non-significant at the left extreme, however (B = −0.05, z = −1.23, p = .22), suggesting that left-wing extremists did not differ from political moderates in dogmatic intolerance. The interrupted regression coefficient at the right of the political spectrum was significant and positive for belief significance (B = 0.14, z = 3.84, p < .001), dogmatic intolerance (B = 0.16, z = 2.85, p = .004), and parochial altruism (B = 0.17, z = 2.69, p = .007), indicating that participants scored higher on all the worldview variables to the extent that they were more extremely right-wing. The interrupted regression results on the worldview variables are displayed graphically in Fig. 1a to c.
3.1. Grievance variables Step 1 was significant for all grievance variables: For personal relative deprivation (R2 = 0.07), F(4, 401) = 7.29, p < .001; for fraternal relative deprivation (R2 = 0.08), F(4, 398) = 9.11, p < .001; and for socio-economic fear (R2 = 0.06), F(4, 389) = 5.96, p < .001. As can be seen in Table 2, right-wing political orientation was associated with increased fraternal deprivation (Jost, 2017), but left-wing political orientation was associated with increased socio-economic fear (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht & Lelkes, 2014). Step 2 was non-significant for personal relative deprivation, F < 1, but it was significant for fraternal deprivation, (ΔR2 = 0.02), F(2, 396) = 4.08, p = .02, and for socioeconomic fear, (ΔR2 = 0.01), F(2, 387) = 3.02, p = .05. For both these variables, the religious fundamentalism effect was nonsignificant, but the political extremism effect was significant (Table 2). To further examine the political extremism effect, we sought to establish whether the relationship between political ideology and fraternal deprivation and socio-economic fear was U-shaped, suggesting increased grievances among both left- and right-wing extremists. We 2 We omitted one item from the original 14-item passion scale by mistake from our questionnaire, so our modified scale had 13 items. Furthermore, the original passion scale has two subscales, harmonious passion (first 6 items; see Online Supplemental Materials) versus obsessive passion (last 7 items). Given that we had a reliable unidimensional scale, and for ease of presentation, we aggregated the items into one belief significance scale. If analyzed separately, results were similar for both of these subscales. 3 Some of the items of the religious fundamentalism scale suggest semantic overlap with dogmatic intolerance (e.g., “When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not”). A factor analysis on the items of these two scales (principle axis factoring, oblimin rotation) showed a two-factor solution, however (Eigenvalues > 2.55), with all items loading on the intended scale and no cross-loadings.
4. Discussion Building on significance quest theory, the present study investigated how adherence to different extreme ideologies are associated with grievance and worldview variables. The results revealed that individual tendencies towards left-extreme, right-extreme, or religious fundamentalist ideologies were associated with the worldview variables but not with the grievance variables. These findings suggest that polarization into different ideologies may be associated with a common worldview, which includes the feeling that one supports a meaningful 3
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Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of the measured variables.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Political orientation Political extremism Religious fundamentalism Personal relative deprivation Fraternal relative deprivation socio-economic fear Belief significance Dogmatic Intolerance Parochial altruism
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5.54 2.03 3.36 3.26 3.52 4.25 4.08 3.12 2.70
2.56 1.55 1.54 1.31 1.24 0.95 1.01 1.15 1.35
– −0.05 .58*** .05 .11* −0.21*** .11* .22*** .13*
– −0.10* −0.04 .10* .13** .25*** .09 .16**
– .01 .03 −0.14** .35*** .21*** .19***
– .64*** .34*** .13* .39*** .49***
5
6
7
8
9
– .12* .12* .26***
– .30*** .44***
– .55***
–
−
.43*** .21*** .46*** .45***
Note. Political orientation is measured on an 11-point scale, and political extremism is the absolute deviation from the scale midpoint of political orientation. All other variables are measured at 7-point scales. ⁎ p < .05. ⁎⁎ p < .01. ⁎⁎⁎ p < .001. Table 2 Results of hierarchical regression analyses: Grievance and worldview variables. Grievance variables: Personal relative deprivation Step 1 Gender Age Education Political orientation Step 2 Religious fundamentalism Political extremism Worldview variables: Step 1 Gender Age Education Political orientation Step 2 Religious fundamentalism Political extremism
Fraternal relative deprivation
Socio-economicfear
β −0.11* −0.21*** −0.06 .05
B(SE) −0.22(0.13) −0.02(0.01) 0.00(0.07) 0.06(0.02)
95%CI −0.47; 0.03 −0.03; −0.01 −0.14; 0.14 0.01; 0.11
β −0.09† −0.24*** .00 .13*
B(SE) 0.16(0.10) −0.01(0.004) −0.04(0.06) −0.06(0.02)
95%CI −0.03; −0.02; −0.15; −0.10;
−0.11; 0.09 −0.10; 0.07
−0.01 −0.02
−0.02(0.05) 0.11(0.04)
−0.11; 0.08 0.03; 0.19
−0.02 .14**
0.002(0.04) 0.08(0.03)
−0.07; 0.08 0.02; 0.14
Belief significance B(SE) 95%CI 0.14(0.11) −0.07; 0.35 0.00(0.004) −0.01; 0.01 0.18(0.06) 0.07; 0.30 0.05(0.02) 0.01; 0.09
β .07 −0.01 .15** .12*
Dogmatic Intolerance B(SE) 95%CI −0.68(0.11) −0.89; −0.47 −0.02(0.004) −0.02; −0.01 0.23(0.06) 0.11; 0.36 0.08(0.02) 0.04; 0.12
β −0.29*** −0.16** .17*** .18***
Parochial altruism B(SE) 95%CI −0.34(0.14) −0.61; −0.07 −0.01(0.01) −0.02; −0.003 0.32(0.08) 0.16; 0.48 0.06(0.03) 0.01; 0.11
β −0.12* −0.12* .20*** .12*
0.30(0.04) 0.19(0.03)
.46*** .28***
0.10(0.04) 0.11 (0.03)
.14** .15**
0.18(0.05) 0.18(0.04)
.20*** .20***
B(SE) −0.30(0.13) −0.02(0.01) −0.09(0.08) 0.03(0.03)
95%CI −0.57; −0.03; −0.24; −0.02;
−0.01(0.05) −0.01(0.04)
−0.04 −0.01 0.06 0.08
0.23; 0.37 0.13; 0.25
0.03; 0.18 0.05; 0.18
0.36 −0.001 0.07 −0.03
0.08; 0.28 0.10; 0.26
β .09† −0.11* −0.03 −0.18** .004 .12*
Note:. † p < .010;. ⁎ p < .05;. ⁎⁎ p < .01;. ⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
correlated with all the worldview variables (see Table 1). These issues suggest that future research should more extensively examine the role that grievances play in the psychological processes associated with relatively extreme ideologies. Our findings did not reveal higher levels of dogmatic intolerance among the left extreme as compared to political moderates. This finding is inconsistent with previous research that observed higher levels of dogmatic intolerance at both the left and right extremes (Rollwage, Dolan & Fleming, 2018; Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017), and relatively high levels of prejudice towards ideologically dissimilar groups at both the left and right (Brandt et al., 2014). One possible explanation for this discrepancy pertains to our measurement of dogmatic intolerance. Given the purposes of the present study, we modified the items of this scale so that they referred to both political and religious beliefs (e.g., “I believe that everyone should think like me about political and religious issues”). It is well-known, however, that the political left is less religious (and instead more spiritual) than the political right in the US (Hirsch, Walberg & Peterson, 2013). The framing of the questions, which explicitly included religion, therefore may have attenuated dogmatically intolerant responses among the political left extreme.
cause (i.e., belief significance), intolerance of alternative ideologies (i.e., dogmatic intolerance), and a willingness to make personal sacrifices, if necessary by hurting others, for one's ideals (i.e., parochial altruism). The findings do not support the prediction that different extremist ideologies would be rooted in similar grievances. Instead, different ideologies were associated with different types of grievances: Fraternal relative deprivation predicted a tendency towards the extreme right, and socio-economic fear predicted a tendency towards the extreme left. Previous research is consistent with the view that specific grievances may predict support for specific ideologies. For instance, security needs are associated with culturally right-wing but economically left-wing attitudes (Malka et al., 2014). Furthermore, while no relationships emerged between religious fundamentalism and the grievances investigated here, it is likely that religious fundamentalism is associated with specific grievances as well (e.g., perceived blasphemy, such as cartoons designed to ridicule sacred prophets). At the same time, we should note that in a previous, more strongly powered study socioeconomic fear was associated with both political left-wing and rightwing extremism (Van Prooijen et al., 2015). Finally, although the grievance variables did not predict political extremism or religious fundamentalism directly, all the grievance variables were significantly 4
Personality and Individual Differences 159 (2020) 109888
J.-W. van Prooijen and S.M.H.C. Kuijper
Fig. 1a. to 1c. Interrupted Regression Lines (in Blue) of Belief Significance (1a), Dogmatic Intolerance (1b), and Parochial Altruism (1c), as Functions of Political Ideology. U-shaped regression lines in red.
although we only offer a single study in this contribution it has appropriate statistical power for our regression models, and hence the main findings are likely to be robust. At the same time, the effects reported here were tested only in a US context. The US arguably provides a good setting to test these phenomena given that (compared to other Western countries) it is a very religious society with a relatively
4.1. Strengths, limitations, and future research This study is the first to explicitly compare relatively extreme political and religious ideologies in the same data. By suggesting a common worldview, the present study may inform future research about the question why citizens polarize into their beliefs. Furthermore, 5
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polarized two-party system. Yet, it would be useful to replicate these results also in different societies (e.g., a less religious EU country with a multi-party system). A natural limitation of the present design is the correlational survey approach, rendering it impossible to draw conclusions about cause and effect. One important direction for further research, therefore, is to test the associations observed here in longitudinal research designs, to track the process of ideological radicalization over time. For instance, it might be speculated that grievances shape the process of ideological polarization over a longer period of time. Furthermore, although a strength of our approach is that we quantitatively assessed the convergence of different extreme ideologies, a limitation is that we necessarily had to focus on regular citizens who are unlikely to be active members of extremist fringe groups (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2014). Finally, our study focused only on a small set of variables that we derived from significance quest theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014). We do not claim (nor did our study aim) to provide a complete picture of all the variables possibly associated with different forms of extremism. Indeed, it is quite plausible to assume that an extremist worldview is conceptually broader than the variables under investigation here, and for instance might include prejudice (Brandt et al., 2014), conspiracy beliefs (Bartlet & Miller, 2010; Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson & Markstedt, 2017), and overconfidence (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2020). These examples suggest that future research may more elaborately establish the psychological similarities of different extreme ideologies.
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Rollwage, M., Dolan, R. J., & Fleming, S. M. (2018). Metacognitive failure as a feature of those holding radical beliefs. Current Biology, 28, 4014–4021. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.cub.2018.10.053 e8. Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2008). Self-sacrifice as self-defence: Mortality salience increases efforts to affirm a symbolic immortal self at the expense of the physical self. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 531–541. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp. 442. Simonsohn, U. (2018). Two lines: A valid alternative to the invalid testing of U-shaped relationships with quadratic regressions. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 1, 538–555. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918805755. Vallerand, R. J., Blanchard, C., Mageau, G. A., Koestner, R., Ratelle, C., & Léonard, M. (2003). Les passions de l’Âme: On obsessive and harmonious passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 756–767. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514. 85.4.756. Van den Bos, K. (2018). Why people radicalize. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Van den Bos, K., Loseman, A., & Doosje, B. (2009). Waarom jongeren radicaliseren en sympathie krijgen voor terrorisme: Onrechtvaardigheid, onzekerheid, en bedreigde groepen. WODC: Ministerie van Justitie. Van Prooijen, J.-. W. (2018). The moral punishment instinct. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Van Prooijen, J.-.W., & Krouwel, A.P.K. (in press). Overclaiming knowledge predicts antiestablishment voting. Social Psychological and Personality Science. 10.1177/ 1948550619862260. Van Prooijen, J.-. W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2017). Extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8, 292–300. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616671403. Van Prooijen, J.-. W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2019). Psychological features of extreme political ideologies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28, 159–163. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0963721418817755. Van Prooijen, J.-W., Krouwel, A. 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4.2. Concluding remarks Previous theorizing has assumed that polarization into different ideologies is associated with a range of common features, including grievances and a relatively extreme worldview (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Our findings suggest that while different extreme ideologies may not be rooted in the same grievances, they do share a similar overarching worldview. Notwithstanding the fact that political left-wing, right-wing, and religious fundamentalist movements pursue rather different—and sometimes diametrically opposing—societal goals, polarization into such ideologies appears to converge in beliefs to support a meaningful cause, intolerance of competing ideologies, and a willingness to make personal sacrifices for their ideals. We conclude that independent of content, extreme ideologies share a common worldview. Declaration of Competing Interest None Supplementary materials Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.paid.2020.109888. References Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). A revised religious fundamentalism scale: The short and sweet of it. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14, 47–54. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4. Atran, S., & Ginges, J. (2012). Religious and sacred imperatives in human conflict. Science (New York, N.Y.), 336, 855–857. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1216902. Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2010). The power of unreason: Conspiracy theories, extremism and counter-terrorism. London, UK: Demos. Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2006). Parochial altruism in humans. Nature, 442, 912–915. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04981.
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Personality and Individual Differences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
A comparison of extreme religious and political ideologies: Similar worldviews but different grievances
T
⁎
Jan-Willem van Prooijena,b, , Sophia M.H.C. Kuijpera a b
VU Amsterdam, the Netherlands The NSCR, the Netherlands
A R T I C LE I N FO
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Political extremism Religious fundamentalism Significance quest Grievances Worldview
People can polarize into various ideologies, including tendencies towards political left- and right-wing extremism, and religious fundamentalism. Here we compare polarization in these different ideologies in a US online sample (N = 424). Building on significance quest theory, we specifically investigate how individual tendencies towards political extremism and religious fundamentalism are associated with grievance and worldview variables within the same study. As grievance variables we measured personal and fraternal deprivation, and socio-economic fear. As worldview variables we measured belief significance, dogmatic intolerance, and parochial altruism. Results revealed that political extremism and religious fundamentalism were similarly associated with the worldview variables but not with the grievance variables. We conclude that independent of content, ideological polarization is associated with a common worldview characterized by the feeling that one supports a meaningful cause, intolerance of alternative ideologies, and a willingness to make personal sacrifices for one's ideals.
1. Introduction People can polarize into qualitatively different ideologies. Citizens leaning towards political left-wing extremism advocate egalitarianism and reject free-market capitalism. Citizens leaning towards political right-wing extremism embrace traditional values and express negative attitudes towards immigrants. Citizens leaning towards religious fundamentalism believe in a literal interpretation of Holy Scriptures and reject ‘infidels’. Here we define ideological extremism as the extent to which regular citizens polarize into, and strongly identify with, a particular ideological outlook on the world (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). Such ideologies differ not only in content but can also come with different psychological signatures. For instance, ample research has focused on the question what psychological traits predict the specific political ideologies that people endorse (e.g., Jost, 2017). But while examining such differences is paramount to understanding the psychological dynamics underlying specific ideologies, to understand the psychology of ideology one also needs to examine what different extreme ideologies have in common. In the present contribution, we empirically compare different extreme ideologies by focusing on regular citizens’ strong adherence to political left-wing, political rightwing, and religious fundamentalist ideologies.
Previous research comparing relatively extreme versus moderate citizens has largely examined political extremism versus religious fundamentalism separately. For instance, studies have revealed how politically left- and right-extreme citizens differ from moderates in belief confidence (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2009), prejudice (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford & Wetherell, 2014), and intolerance (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017); yet, these studies did not empirically assess whether or not these psychological features would generalize to religious fundamentalism. Likewise, scholars have examined how religious fundamentalism is associated with variables such as prejudice and certainty needs (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017), coalitional commitment (Ginges, Hansen & Norenzayan, 2010), and sacred values (Atran & Ginges, 2012), but typically without examining political extremism. Finally, some studies did examine these different forms of extremism yet in different datasets, and without explicitly testing for similarities and differences in the psychological dynamics underlying (left- or rightwing) political extremism versus religious fundamentalism (e.g., Webber et al., 2018). The present study investigated to what extent polarization into left-wing, right-wing, and religious fundamentalist ideologies converges or differs in their relationships with a range of grievance and worldview variables that theoretically are associated with ideological extremism.
⁎ Correspondence author at: Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, VU Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081BT Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.-W. van Prooijen).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109888 Received 9 December 2019; Received in revised form 2 February 2020; Accepted 4 February 2020 Available online 18 February 2020 0191-8869/ © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
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to make sacrifices for one's own group is commonly referred to as parochial altruism (Bernhard, Fischbacher & Fehr, 2006), which theoretically has been linked with ideological extremism (Van Prooijen, 2018). We predicted that participants who score relatively high on (left- or right-wing) political extremism and religious fundamentalism scales would have stronger grievances, and a more extreme worldview, than relatively moderate participants.
1.1. The quest for personal significance A central theoretical assumption is that ideological extremism is rooted in a psychological quest for personal significance: A desire to be respected and to matter in the eyes of oneself or important others (Kruglanski et al., 2014; see also Webber et al., 2018). People can acquire such a sense of personal significance through the combination of many sources, such as family, work, and the pursuit of meaningful goals. Sometimes people may experience a loss of significance, however, when they encounter grievances such as humiliation, injustice, or insecurities. Such grievances prompt a sense of meaninglessness, and therefore stimulate a desire to restore a sense of personal significance through a worldview in which perceivers are focally committed to specific ideological goals. Put differently, extreme ideologies help perceivers to restore a sense of significance through a worldview in which they appear to be supporting a meaningful cause. Previous research findings are consistent with these ideas. For instance, experiences of significance loss increase the appeal of clear-cut ideologies that help perceivers restore a sense of closure and certainty (Webber et al., 2018). Likewise, feelings of uncertainty and fear lead perceivers to pursue ideological goals with zeal and conviction (McGregor, Prentice & Nash, 2013), and is associated with both leftand right-wing extremism (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten & Eendebak, 2015). Furthermore, mortality salience manipulations predict polarization into both political left-wing and right-wing ideologies (Burke, Kosloff & Landau, 2013). Finally, feelings of injustice have been proposed as central to both political and religious extremism (Midlarsky, 2011; Van den Bos, 2018). Significance quest theory assumes that there are varying degrees of ideological extremism, ranging from well-functioning citizens with some sympathy for extreme ideas, up until terrorist groups and suicide bombers that are fully committed to their ideological goals (Kruglanski et al., 2014; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & Orehek, 2009). Empirical studies have examined the theoretical processes proposed by significance quest theory among members of extremist groups, as well as among regular citizens who for instance are at the edges of the political spectrum (e.g., Webber et al., 2018). By using a quantitative survey approach, the present project focuses exclusively on regular citizens, and empirically compares relatively extreme citizens with relatively moderate citizens. In the present study we investigate two classes of variables that theoretically are associated with both political extremism and religious fundamentalism, namely grievance variables and worldview variables. As to grievance variables, we focus on feelings of injustice at two levels, notably personal and fraternal relative deprivation (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Personal relative deprivation pertains to the feeling that one as a person is deprived of equal opportunities; fraternal relative deprivation pertains to the feeling that one's political or religious group as a whole is deprived of equal opportunities. Furthermore, we assess socio-economic fear, defined as fear that the well-being of oneself or the group that one is part of is compromised by current political or economic developments (Van Prooijen et al., 2015). Besides grievances, significance quest theory stipulates that extreme ideologies involve a worldview characterized by focal goal commitment, where one believes to endorse a meaningful cause. Based on this proposition we focus on three worldview variables. First, we examine belief significance, that is, the extent to which people experience their political or religious beliefs as meaningful and important (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Second, focal goal commitment implies a perception of one's ideology as superior to alternative belief systems. A relatively extreme worldview therefore includes dogmatic intolerance, defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, ideological beliefs that differ from one's own (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). Third, focal goal commitment often involves a willingness to make personal sacrifices in service of one's ideology, even if it includes harming outgroup members (e.g., Ginges et al., 2010). Such a tendency
2. Method 2.1. Procedure The study was run online on a US sample, from 26 April to 2 May 2017, through the Crowdflower forum (a crowdsourcing website similar to Mturk). We first measured basic demographics and the two independent variables, and then the dependent variables. 2.2. Sample We aimed to recruit 400 participants; however, at the end of data collection 428 participants had participated (178 men, 250 women). We dropped 4 participants for being underage (< 18 years)1 yielding 424 participants for the analyses (Mage = 35.75, SD = 12.18). This sample yields 95% statistical power to detect a small-to-medium effect size (f2 = 0.04). 2.3. Independent variables Participants placed themselves on two rating scales ranging from very left-wing (1) to very right-wing (11), and from very liberal (1) to very conservative (11). Their responses to these two items were strongly correlated (r = 0.82, p < .001) and we averaged them into a single index of political orientation. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Downing, Judd & Brauer, 1992) we mean-centered participants’ political orientation scores for the regression analyses, and calculated a political extremism index by taking the absolute deviations from the scale midpoint of political orientation. Furthermore, we measured the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) on a scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) (e.g., “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed”; 6 items recoded; α = 0.95). We mean-centered participants’ religious fundamentalism scores for the regression analyses. 2.4. Dependent variables All dependent variables were measured on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), in a fixed order. We provide the full scales, and more information about the questionnaire, in the Online Supplementary Materials. 2.4.1. Grievance variables To measure personal relative deprivation, we assessed six items (e.g., “It makes me angry when I think about the way I get treated compared to other Americans”; α = 0.89). To measure fraternal relative deprivation, we assessed seven items, six of which has parallel wording as personal relative deprivation (e.g., “It makes me angry when I think about the way people who share my political or religious beliefs are treated, compared to other groups in America”; α = 0.90). We measured socio-economic fear with an abbreviated, 9-item version of the original scale by Van Prooijen et al. (2015), tailored to a US context (e.g., “I frequently worry about the future of America”; α = 0.78). 1
2
Results were similar if these participants were included.
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therefore conducted the two-lines test on these variables, with the centered political ideology measure as independent variable, while statistically controlling for gender, age, education, and religious fundamentalism. The two-lines test calculates two interrupted regression lines separated by a break point determined by the Robin Hood algorithm to maximize fit (Simonsohn, 2018). In this procedure, two significant regression lines of opposing sign indicate that the data are Ushaped. For fraternal deprivation, the regression coefficient was nonsignificant at the left of the political spectrum (B = −0.02, z = −0.38, p = .70), but revealed significantly stronger feelings of fraternal deprivation to the extent that participants were more extremely rightwing (B = 0.16, z = 2.65, p = .008). For socio-economic fear, the regression coefficient was significant at the left of the political spectrum (B = −0.21, z = −3.08, p = .002), indicating stronger socio-economic fear to the extent that participants were more extremely leftwing; the effect was nonsignificant at the right of the spectrum, however (B = 0.01, z = 0.14, p = .89). The online supplemental materials include figures displaying these interrupted regression lines (Figures S1 and S2). These results do not support the hypothesis that different extremist ideologies are associated with similar grievances.
2.4.2. Worldview variables To measure the extent to which participants experience their political or religious beliefs as meaningful and significant, we modified the passion scale by Vallerand et al. (2003) towards the purposes of the current research.2 Example items include “My political or religious beliefs allow me to live memorable experiences”, and “I cannot live without my political and religious beliefs”. We averaged participants’ responses into a reliable belief significance scale (α = 0.89). We measured dogmatic intolerance with the scale by Van Prooijen and Krouwel (2017), tailored towards the purposes of the current research (e.g., “I believe that everyone should think like me about political and religious issues”; α = 0.81).3 Finally, we operationalized parochial altruism as participants’ tendency to make personal sacrifices, and if necessary to hurt others, for their ideals. We developed a scale for this construct by combining three modified items of Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje (2009) (e.g., “I am prepared to use violence against other people in order to realise important political or religious ideals”) with three modified items of Routledge and Arndt (2008; e.g., “I would die for people who share my political or religious beliefs”; α = 0.88). 3. Results
3.2. Worldview variables The means, standard deviations and inter-correlations of the variables are in Table 1. We analyzed the results through hierarchical regression analyses in which we entered participants’ gender, age, education level, and the mean-centered term of political orientation in Step 1. We added the political extremism index and the mean-centered religious fundamentalism term in Step 2. The hierarchical regression results are in Table 2. Degrees of freedom differ from the total sample (and across dependent variables) due to attrition and missing values.
For all the worldview variables Step 1 was significant: For belief significance, (R2 = 0.04), F(4, 397) = 3.81, p = .005; for dogmatic intolerance, (R2 = 0.21), F(4, 406) = 27.69, p < .001; and for parochial altruism, (R2 = 0.10), F(4, 390) = 10.70, p < .001. More important for the present purposes was that Step 2 was significant for all of the worldview variables: For belief significance, (ΔR2 = 0.20), F(2, 395) = 52.53, p < .001; for dogmatic intolerance, (ΔR2 = 0.03), F(2, 404) = 8.65, p < .001; and for parochial altruism, (ΔR2 = 0.06), F(2, 388) = 14.19, p < .001. Furthermore, the political extremism and religious fundamentalism terms were significant for all three worldview variables (Table 2). We then tested for the U-shaped relationship between political ideology and the worldview variables, again using the two-lines test (Simonsohn, 2018), statistically controlling for gender, age, education, and religious fundamentalism. The interrupted regression coefficient at the political left was significant and negative for belief significance (B = −0.28, z = −4.78, p < .001) and parochial altruism (B = −0.25, z = −3.44, p < .001), suggesting that participants scored higher on these worldview variables to the extent they were more extremely left-wing. The interrupted regression coefficient of dogmatic intolerance was non-significant at the left extreme, however (B = −0.05, z = −1.23, p = .22), suggesting that left-wing extremists did not differ from political moderates in dogmatic intolerance. The interrupted regression coefficient at the right of the political spectrum was significant and positive for belief significance (B = 0.14, z = 3.84, p < .001), dogmatic intolerance (B = 0.16, z = 2.85, p = .004), and parochial altruism (B = 0.17, z = 2.69, p = .007), indicating that participants scored higher on all the worldview variables to the extent that they were more extremely right-wing. The interrupted regression results on the worldview variables are displayed graphically in Fig. 1a to c.
3.1. Grievance variables Step 1 was significant for all grievance variables: For personal relative deprivation (R2 = 0.07), F(4, 401) = 7.29, p < .001; for fraternal relative deprivation (R2 = 0.08), F(4, 398) = 9.11, p < .001; and for socio-economic fear (R2 = 0.06), F(4, 389) = 5.96, p < .001. As can be seen in Table 2, right-wing political orientation was associated with increased fraternal deprivation (Jost, 2017), but left-wing political orientation was associated with increased socio-economic fear (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht & Lelkes, 2014). Step 2 was non-significant for personal relative deprivation, F < 1, but it was significant for fraternal deprivation, (ΔR2 = 0.02), F(2, 396) = 4.08, p = .02, and for socioeconomic fear, (ΔR2 = 0.01), F(2, 387) = 3.02, p = .05. For both these variables, the religious fundamentalism effect was nonsignificant, but the political extremism effect was significant (Table 2). To further examine the political extremism effect, we sought to establish whether the relationship between political ideology and fraternal deprivation and socio-economic fear was U-shaped, suggesting increased grievances among both left- and right-wing extremists. We 2 We omitted one item from the original 14-item passion scale by mistake from our questionnaire, so our modified scale had 13 items. Furthermore, the original passion scale has two subscales, harmonious passion (first 6 items; see Online Supplemental Materials) versus obsessive passion (last 7 items). Given that we had a reliable unidimensional scale, and for ease of presentation, we aggregated the items into one belief significance scale. If analyzed separately, results were similar for both of these subscales. 3 Some of the items of the religious fundamentalism scale suggest semantic overlap with dogmatic intolerance (e.g., “When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not”). A factor analysis on the items of these two scales (principle axis factoring, oblimin rotation) showed a two-factor solution, however (Eigenvalues > 2.55), with all items loading on the intended scale and no cross-loadings.
4. Discussion Building on significance quest theory, the present study investigated how adherence to different extreme ideologies are associated with grievance and worldview variables. The results revealed that individual tendencies towards left-extreme, right-extreme, or religious fundamentalist ideologies were associated with the worldview variables but not with the grievance variables. These findings suggest that polarization into different ideologies may be associated with a common worldview, which includes the feeling that one supports a meaningful 3
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Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of the measured variables.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Political orientation Political extremism Religious fundamentalism Personal relative deprivation Fraternal relative deprivation socio-economic fear Belief significance Dogmatic Intolerance Parochial altruism
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5.54 2.03 3.36 3.26 3.52 4.25 4.08 3.12 2.70
2.56 1.55 1.54 1.31 1.24 0.95 1.01 1.15 1.35
– −0.05 .58*** .05 .11* −0.21*** .11* .22*** .13*
– −0.10* −0.04 .10* .13** .25*** .09 .16**
– .01 .03 −0.14** .35*** .21*** .19***
– .64*** .34*** .13* .39*** .49***
5
6
7
8
9
– .12* .12* .26***
– .30*** .44***
– .55***
–
−
.43*** .21*** .46*** .45***
Note. Political orientation is measured on an 11-point scale, and political extremism is the absolute deviation from the scale midpoint of political orientation. All other variables are measured at 7-point scales. ⁎ p < .05. ⁎⁎ p < .01. ⁎⁎⁎ p < .001. Table 2 Results of hierarchical regression analyses: Grievance and worldview variables. Grievance variables: Personal relative deprivation Step 1 Gender Age Education Political orientation Step 2 Religious fundamentalism Political extremism Worldview variables: Step 1 Gender Age Education Political orientation Step 2 Religious fundamentalism Political extremism
Fraternal relative deprivation
Socio-economicfear
β −0.11* −0.21*** −0.06 .05
B(SE) −0.22(0.13) −0.02(0.01) 0.00(0.07) 0.06(0.02)
95%CI −0.47; 0.03 −0.03; −0.01 −0.14; 0.14 0.01; 0.11
β −0.09† −0.24*** .00 .13*
B(SE) 0.16(0.10) −0.01(0.004) −0.04(0.06) −0.06(0.02)
95%CI −0.03; −0.02; −0.15; −0.10;
−0.11; 0.09 −0.10; 0.07
−0.01 −0.02
−0.02(0.05) 0.11(0.04)
−0.11; 0.08 0.03; 0.19
−0.02 .14**
0.002(0.04) 0.08(0.03)
−0.07; 0.08 0.02; 0.14
Belief significance B(SE) 95%CI 0.14(0.11) −0.07; 0.35 0.00(0.004) −0.01; 0.01 0.18(0.06) 0.07; 0.30 0.05(0.02) 0.01; 0.09
β .07 −0.01 .15** .12*
Dogmatic Intolerance B(SE) 95%CI −0.68(0.11) −0.89; −0.47 −0.02(0.004) −0.02; −0.01 0.23(0.06) 0.11; 0.36 0.08(0.02) 0.04; 0.12
β −0.29*** −0.16** .17*** .18***
Parochial altruism B(SE) 95%CI −0.34(0.14) −0.61; −0.07 −0.01(0.01) −0.02; −0.003 0.32(0.08) 0.16; 0.48 0.06(0.03) 0.01; 0.11
β −0.12* −0.12* .20*** .12*
0.30(0.04) 0.19(0.03)
.46*** .28***
0.10(0.04) 0.11 (0.03)
.14** .15**
0.18(0.05) 0.18(0.04)
.20*** .20***
B(SE) −0.30(0.13) −0.02(0.01) −0.09(0.08) 0.03(0.03)
95%CI −0.57; −0.03; −0.24; −0.02;
−0.01(0.05) −0.01(0.04)
−0.04 −0.01 0.06 0.08
0.23; 0.37 0.13; 0.25
0.03; 0.18 0.05; 0.18
0.36 −0.001 0.07 −0.03
0.08; 0.28 0.10; 0.26
β .09† −0.11* −0.03 −0.18** .004 .12*
Note:. † p < .010;. ⁎ p < .05;. ⁎⁎ p < .01;. ⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.
correlated with all the worldview variables (see Table 1). These issues suggest that future research should more extensively examine the role that grievances play in the psychological processes associated with relatively extreme ideologies. Our findings did not reveal higher levels of dogmatic intolerance among the left extreme as compared to political moderates. This finding is inconsistent with previous research that observed higher levels of dogmatic intolerance at both the left and right extremes (Rollwage, Dolan & Fleming, 2018; Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017), and relatively high levels of prejudice towards ideologically dissimilar groups at both the left and right (Brandt et al., 2014). One possible explanation for this discrepancy pertains to our measurement of dogmatic intolerance. Given the purposes of the present study, we modified the items of this scale so that they referred to both political and religious beliefs (e.g., “I believe that everyone should think like me about political and religious issues”). It is well-known, however, that the political left is less religious (and instead more spiritual) than the political right in the US (Hirsch, Walberg & Peterson, 2013). The framing of the questions, which explicitly included religion, therefore may have attenuated dogmatically intolerant responses among the political left extreme.
cause (i.e., belief significance), intolerance of alternative ideologies (i.e., dogmatic intolerance), and a willingness to make personal sacrifices, if necessary by hurting others, for one's ideals (i.e., parochial altruism). The findings do not support the prediction that different extremist ideologies would be rooted in similar grievances. Instead, different ideologies were associated with different types of grievances: Fraternal relative deprivation predicted a tendency towards the extreme right, and socio-economic fear predicted a tendency towards the extreme left. Previous research is consistent with the view that specific grievances may predict support for specific ideologies. For instance, security needs are associated with culturally right-wing but economically left-wing attitudes (Malka et al., 2014). Furthermore, while no relationships emerged between religious fundamentalism and the grievances investigated here, it is likely that religious fundamentalism is associated with specific grievances as well (e.g., perceived blasphemy, such as cartoons designed to ridicule sacred prophets). At the same time, we should note that in a previous, more strongly powered study socioeconomic fear was associated with both political left-wing and rightwing extremism (Van Prooijen et al., 2015). Finally, although the grievance variables did not predict political extremism or religious fundamentalism directly, all the grievance variables were significantly 4
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Fig. 1a. to 1c. Interrupted Regression Lines (in Blue) of Belief Significance (1a), Dogmatic Intolerance (1b), and Parochial Altruism (1c), as Functions of Political Ideology. U-shaped regression lines in red.
although we only offer a single study in this contribution it has appropriate statistical power for our regression models, and hence the main findings are likely to be robust. At the same time, the effects reported here were tested only in a US context. The US arguably provides a good setting to test these phenomena given that (compared to other Western countries) it is a very religious society with a relatively
4.1. Strengths, limitations, and future research This study is the first to explicitly compare relatively extreme political and religious ideologies in the same data. By suggesting a common worldview, the present study may inform future research about the question why citizens polarize into their beliefs. Furthermore, 5
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polarized two-party system. Yet, it would be useful to replicate these results also in different societies (e.g., a less religious EU country with a multi-party system). A natural limitation of the present design is the correlational survey approach, rendering it impossible to draw conclusions about cause and effect. One important direction for further research, therefore, is to test the associations observed here in longitudinal research designs, to track the process of ideological radicalization over time. For instance, it might be speculated that grievances shape the process of ideological polarization over a longer period of time. Furthermore, although a strength of our approach is that we quantitatively assessed the convergence of different extreme ideologies, a limitation is that we necessarily had to focus on regular citizens who are unlikely to be active members of extremist fringe groups (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2014). Finally, our study focused only on a small set of variables that we derived from significance quest theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014). We do not claim (nor did our study aim) to provide a complete picture of all the variables possibly associated with different forms of extremism. Indeed, it is quite plausible to assume that an extremist worldview is conceptually broader than the variables under investigation here, and for instance might include prejudice (Brandt et al., 2014), conspiracy beliefs (Bartlet & Miller, 2010; Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson & Markstedt, 2017), and overconfidence (Van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2020). These examples suggest that future research may more elaborately establish the psychological similarities of different extreme ideologies.
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4.2. Concluding remarks Previous theorizing has assumed that polarization into different ideologies is associated with a range of common features, including grievances and a relatively extreme worldview (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Our findings suggest that while different extreme ideologies may not be rooted in the same grievances, they do share a similar overarching worldview. Notwithstanding the fact that political left-wing, right-wing, and religious fundamentalist movements pursue rather different—and sometimes diametrically opposing—societal goals, polarization into such ideologies appears to converge in beliefs to support a meaningful cause, intolerance of competing ideologies, and a willingness to make personal sacrifices for their ideals. We conclude that independent of content, extreme ideologies share a common worldview. Declaration of Competing Interest None Supplementary materials Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.paid.2020.109888. References Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). A revised religious fundamentalism scale: The short and sweet of it. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14, 47–54. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4. Atran, S., & Ginges, J. (2012). Religious and sacred imperatives in human conflict. Science (New York, N.Y.), 336, 855–857. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1216902. Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2010). The power of unreason: Conspiracy theories, extremism and counter-terrorism. London, UK: Demos. Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2006). Parochial altruism in humans. Nature, 442, 912–915. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04981.
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