- Email: [email protected]
A credo for a revitalized behaviorism: characteristics and emerging principles
Behavioural Processes 54 (2001) 5 – 10 www.elsevier.com/locate/behavproc
A credo for a revitalized behaviorism: characteristics and emerging principles W.R. Uttal * Department of Industry and Management System Engineering, Arizona State Uni6ersity, Tempe, AZ 85287 5906, USA Accepted 5 January 2001
Abstract The fundamental assumptions of scientific psychology are examined by asking three key questions concerning the accessibility, analyzability, and reducibility of mental processes. It is concluded that current research does not support the premises of mentalistic cognitive psychology and that we should return to a modernized version of behaviorism if psychology is to prosper as a valid science. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Accessibility; Analyzability; Behaviorism; Neuroreduction
1. Introduction In my spoken presentation at the SQAB 2000 meeting I posed three questions concerning the foundation assumptions of scientific psychology: 1. Are mental processes accessible? 2. Are mental processes analyzable into components? 3. Are mental processes reducible to neurophysiological primitives. The answers that I arrived at after considering these three questions were all negative. On that basis, I concluded that contemporary cognitive
This discussion is adapted from material in Uttal (2000) and from a manuscript currently in Press entitled The New Phrenology: On The Localization of Cognitive Processes in the Brain (Uttal, in press). * Tel./fax: + 1-602-9658634. E-mail address: [email protected] (W.R. Uttal).
psychology is unsupportable and a proper future psychology should be based on a revitalized behaviorism. This article is intended to flesh out this skeleton conclusion by tabulating the characteristics of such a ‘new’ behaviorism as well as listing the emerging principles and metaprinciples that should guide scientific psychology in the next century. The revised version of behaviorism that I propose here has some of the characteristics of classic ones, but also some new properties that distinguish it from older versions.
2. The characteristics of a revitalized psychophysical behaviorism The behaviorist science that should guide future psychological science should have the following characteristics.
0376-6357/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 7 6 - 6 3 5 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 1 4 6 - 2
6
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
Psychophysical: A revitalized behaviorism must be psychophysical. That is, to the maximum extent possible, it must anchor all responses to some measure of the physical or situational stimulus. A psychophysical approach makes the least demands on its subjects (and thus distort the findings the least) by requiring the simplest possible (i.e. Class A) responses. The quality and the longevity of the acceptance of empirical results declines in inverse relation to the complexity of the cognitive decisions that must be made in formulating a response. Operational: A revitalized behaviorism must define its concepts in terms of procedures, not in terms of unverifiable, ad hoc hypothetical constructs, preexisting theories, or the vested interests of its scholars. Mathematically descriptive: A revitalized behaviorism must accept the fact that most psychological theories are, in principle, descriptive in a mathematical, computational or even a verbal sense. Truly reductive theories (i.e. ontologically reductive) are rare and, except in some special cases, impossible. Neuronally nonreductive: A revitalized behaviorism must eschew any physiological reductionism. There is ample evidence now that the search for neuroreductive explanations at either the neuron or neuronal network level for complex cognitive processes is an unachievable goal. Experimental: A revitalized behaviorism must dote on its empirical and experimental roots. Direct contact with nature by objective exploration and experimentation is the sine qua non of this or any other science. Molar: Because of the difficulties in teasing apart the internal structures of mental activity, and the neutrality of behavior and mathematics, a revitalized behaviorism must study mental activity and behavior from a molar point of view. Both empiricist1 and nativist: A radical environmental or learning explanation of human behavior is as inappropriate as is a pure genetic determinism. Both are rigid and dogmatic scientific doctrines that do not accept the obvious interplay between heredity and environment.
The selection of an appropriate response may be a very complex process depending on the experiential history and development of the organism as well as the current stimuli. The only acceptable approach to studying human mentation and behavior must take into account genetic and experiential factors. Both empiricist2 and rationalist: A revitalized behaviorism must accept the eclectic position that both logically mediated and automatic factors jointly affect behavior. Pragmatically neutral: Psychology must accept its primary role as a theoretical science and base it ideas on the nature of our nature rather than on the immediate needs of society or the utility that some of its findings may seem to have. Useful theories do not have the same validity as true theories.
3. Emerging metaprinciples By a metaprinciple I refer to a generalization of such breadth and universal importance that it has to be considered fundamental to any discussion of the great controversy between cognitive mentalism and behaviorism. These are not just the answers to technical issues that have been or can be resolved by empirical studies or logical argument. Rather, these are the foundation premises on which all other conclusions must be based. If they are not accepted, then the rest of the discussion becomes moot.
3.1. The first ontological metaprinciple: psychoneural equi6alence The first ontological metaprinciple of any naturalist psychology states simply and directly that neural activity is the sole basis of mental activity. Mind is a function of the brain and without a comparable material substrate, the function could not occur. Nevertheless, the most likely misinterpretation of any new behaviorist approach to studying psychology is that the suggestion that there are limits to our understanding of mental activity is tantamount to a cryptodualism. The expression of an ‘in principle’ barrier between our
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
intrapersonal mental states and our interpersonal ability to communicate ideas is not, however, a dualistic assertion. Scientific psychology would make no sense unless mental processes were a part of the natural world. The basic nature of the reality of the mind is that the brain is both necessary and sufficient to account for it in both fundamental and axiomatic principle. That is the essence of this first metaprinciple. If it is not accepted a priori, then there is little hope that any progress can be made in any scientific psychology. To not accept this principle is to push psychology, either cognitive or behaviorist, out of the realm of natural science. A corollary of this metaprinciple is that the essential level at which mental activity must be represented is the ensemble activity of many neurons, not in the representation provided by single neurons. But, that is another story.
3.2. The second ontological metaprinciple: the reality of mind Regardless of how inaccessible mental activity may or may not be to the scientific observer, nothing that is said here should be misinterpreted to mean that mental processes are less real than the function of any other organ of the body, in particular, nor of any machine, in general. There are many reasons to accept the reality of mental processes including: (1) we are each aware of our own consciousness (even if we cannot always correctly interpret the motivating forces or logic that drive our behavior); and (2) the variability and adaptability of human behavior indicates that stimulus information is operating on what must be considered to be, at least, an extremely complicated and active system. To assume that mind and its associated self awareness are not real is to assert that all is illusion. To do otherwise than accept this second metaprinciple would mean that we would have to ask: Whose illusion? This brings us to the boundaries of the ridiculous as it would inevitably challenge the reality of everything else. However important it is to accept mental activity and even consciousness as real, there is no question that their exact definitions, if not explanations, remain extremely refractory problems.
7
3.3. The epistemological metaprinciple: the inaccessibility of mental processes There is an abundance of logical, theoretical, and even empirical evidence to support the assertion that mental processes are inaccessible. The arguments are of three kinds. (1) Because of the extreme complexity of the neural networks in which mental processes are instantiated, they are not amenable to neuroreductive analysis. That is, the probability of developing a reductive explanation for the detailed interconnections of large numbers of neurons (the essential level at which the origins of mind must be sought) is extremely low, if not an outright impossibility. (2) Because of the fundamental limits of input output techniques that must treat the brain mind as a ‘black box’, the likelihood of using psychological techniques to analyze or describe the actual inner workings of the mind is also vanishingly small. Cognitive reductionism is as remote a possibility as is neuroreductionism. (3) Individual subjects do not have any special insight into their own cognitive processes. Any new technique that purports to allow such insight is actually only a resurrected version of classic introspection. Such a technique must ultimately also fail for the same reasons its predecessors did. Therefore, notwithstanding the fundamental ontological reality of both the brain and the mind, it is maintained here that there are epistemological barriers to accessing and then analyzing mental activity. These barriers arise from criteria of both deep principle and empirical fact. It is this epistemological principle that has been violated by mentalisms, cognitive or otherwise, throughout the history of our science. It is here that behaviorism and mentalism find their most crucial and essential differences. It is on the foundation provided by this metaprinciple that a revitalized scientific psychology must be based if it is to have any chance of providing a valid understanding of the human condition in the future. Beyond these three ‘metaprinciples’ there are also a number of other general conclusions and general principles of only slightly less import that have to be highlighted to fully understand the need for the revitalized behaviorist approach to
8
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
psychological science. Some are derivative of the three metaprinciples, but others help to flesh out its logic and assumptions. These principles are enumerated in the following section.
8.
4. Emerging conclusions and principles
1. Behaviorism has been under attack for the last 40 years often for reasons that lie far outside the acceptable boundaries of scientific discourse. Some of these wounds are self inflicted. 2. Behaviorism has been criticized for being ‘antihumanism’, ‘antifree will’, ‘antireligious’, and ‘uninteresting’ as well as ‘authoritarian’, ‘mechanical’, and ‘trivial’. It is criticized for rejecting ‘inner feelings’ or for not allowing us ‘to enjoy music’. These are all value judgements that are irrelevant to the real scientific issues. 3. Behaviorism has been poorly served by illfated attempts to extrapolate its scientific findings into the social, educational, or cultural domain. First and foremost, it must evaluated as a science, free of vested interests and secondary goals concerning matters about which it has little to say. 4. Behaviorism has its own history but it also has a rich background of influence from other fields of science and philosophy. 5. Some behaviorisms are actually mentalisms. An objective empirical approach is not the same thing as a behaviorist approach to the study of organisms. 6. No behaviorist psychologist has ever rejected the fact that people think, feel, emote, and reason. All accept the basic idea that the brain and the mind are active elements in adaptive behavior. 7. Theological issues have often played an important role in an individual’s acceptance of either mentalism or behaviorism. One anonymous respondent has been quoted as saying ‘Another [factor in cognitivism’s rise] was ideology, in other words, the influence of believers in soul and spirit defending the ho-
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
munculus and thereby its Creator, even if they didn’t realize they were doing so’. (Boneau, 1992, p. 1590). Pragmatic concerns about psychology’s potential contributions to human welfare have often misled theory building. Where objective empirical or logical arguments should take priority, utility has sometimes been used to justify parascientific silliness. There are powerful vested interests (e.g. the psychotherapeutic industry) that draw their sustenance from mentalist theories and approaches to psychology. To meet their needs, they have often ignored the basic scientific issues and findings. New empirical and theoretical information from the other sciences returns the debate between behaviorism and mentalism from armchair speculation to scientific investigation (see Uttal, 1998). Some behaviorists as well as most mentalists have been ‘in principle’ reductionists asserting the cognitive components can be analyzed and assayed from behavioral measurements. Behaviorists, however, have generally taught that a holistic, molar approach was preferred when approaching experiments or theories. A close examination (Pachella, 1974) of the assumptions that must hold, and do not hold, suggests that such mental modularity is not achievable. Behaviorism and cognitivism are alternative approaches to the study of human thought and behavior and, thus, must cover the same range of topics. It is the interpretation of the significance and meaning of experimental findings, not the topics chosen for study or even the data that is collected, that distinguishes the two kinds of psychology. Contemporary cognitivism is closely associated with information processing, computer analogies, and neuroreduction of psychological processes. Contemporary behaviorism is closely associated with a nonreductive study of observed responses in a way that eschews the creation of unwarranted hypothetical constructs. Its forays into verbal behavior have been met with strong resistance.
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
15. The main difference between behaviorism and cognitivism, however, has been their respective answers to the question: Is mind accessible? Cognitivists assume that it is; behaviorists that it is not because of the limits of introspection, the fallibility of verbal reports, and the fundamental constraints on input output analyses. Intrapersonally privileged awareness is not tantamount to interpersonal communication. 16. Another major difference between behaviorists and cognitivists is their respective answers to the question of analyzability. Cognitivists believe that mental behavior can be reduced to a system of ‘internal information processing states’. Behaviorists believe this is not possible. Arguments supporting the behaviorist position come from thermodynamics, complexity theory, chaos theory, automata theory, and many other facts from other sciences. 17. As with any other field of science, scientific psychology must include both empirical and theoretical approaches to understanding its content matter. What psychologists mean by an ‘acceptable’ theory, however, is highly variable. 18. Theory in science can be reductive or descriptive. Cognitive psychologists lean toward the former; behaviorists toward the latter. 19. Quite different questions of science are often confused with each other. Localization of a particular region of the brain that seems to have some behavioral effect is not the same as a detailed analysis of the network of neurons that represents or encodes that function in that location. 20. There is no question that organism plays an important role in determining what kind of a response should be made to a stimulus. Organisms are, however, not simple automata. At the very least, they are very complicated systems. The difference in complexity is of such a great degree that there is currently a qualitative difference between artificial and natural intelligence. 21. Extreme versions of conflicting theories are both usually incorrect. Compromises enjoy-
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28. 29.
9
ing features of both extremes are more usually accepted in the final analysis. Many of the standard criteria for choosing a scientific theory are inappropriate for psychology. Parsimony, simplicity, elegance, practical utility, and exact repeatability become irrelevant in a system made up of so many parts that they can be wasted or a system that is so adaptive that it usefully change its behavior from trial to trial. Even what is ‘objective’, therefore, becomes a matter of opinion. Because of the adaptability and variability of the component mental processes (even if one accepts for the sake of argument that they, in fact, exist), a cognitively reductive approach is unlikely to succeed. Fundamental physical principles such as the theorem of Moore (1956) and the engineer’s ‘Black Box’ constraint preclude any kind of approach that depends solely on stimuli and responses from providing access into the inner workings of the brain or the mind. Both behavior and mathematics are essentially descriptive approaches and are neutral with regard to internal mechanisms, structures, and processes. Computational models, however well they may describe the behavior of a system, are also neutral with regard to internal mechanisms, structures, and processes. Humans have a very poor appreciation of their own motives, logic, and other forces driving their behavior. They cannot analyze the processes that lead to their behavior nor are they aware of any part of their mental activity except the final outcome. When their introspective explanations agree with independent measures, it is often coincidental or based on a priori predilections, prejudices and opinions. Human memory is extremely fallible. False memories are easily implanted. Scientists generally underestimate the importance of exceptions to rules. The logic of syllogistic reasoning asserts that exceptions can completely disprove overgeneralized hypotheses.
10
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
30. Analogies are not the same thing as homologies. Isomorphic response trends in data and in theories may be accounted for by totally different internal mechanisms. 31. Because of the limits on accessibility, there are inadequate constraints on the construction of hypothetical constructs. Mentalist theorists are, therefore, free to invent an infinite variety of ad hoc explanations of human behavior. Behavioral theories honor these constraints to a greater degree. 32. Because of the complexity of human mental activity experimental results may often be qualitatively altered by slight changes in experimental design. 33. Subjects often do not play the game that the experimenter wishes them to play. 34. Humans should enjoy no special role as the subject of psychological or any other kind of science. The principles and factors that drive organic behavior are common to all organisms even though the level of sentience may vary greatly. 35. There remains an enormous question, of such magnitude as to change humanity’s view of its own nature. It is: Is mind epiphenomenal or does it exert a direct force on the brain or behavior? The ultimate answer to this question, if it can be answered, will have a drastic effect on human affairs both in science and other domains. 36. There is no need for a major change in the kind of research that is carried out by psy-
chologists, neurophysiologists, and computer scientists. Each of these fields is of value and stands in its own right. Changes, however, are necessary in our interpretations of the relations between these fields. Finally, it must be appreciated that many of the questions that psychologists have raised have not been answered and may not be answerable. Distinguishing the possible and achievable from the will-o-the-wisps is an important task for any future student of this very important field of science. Sadly, there are no killer arguments for the most controversial of the principles and metaprinciples presented here.
References Boneau, C.A., 1992. Observations on psychology’s past and future. Am. Psychol. 47, 1586 – 1596. Moore, E.F., 1956. Automata Studies. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Pachella, R.G., 1974. The interpretation of reaction time in information processing research. In: Kantowitz, B.H. (Ed.), Human Information Processing: Tutorials in Performance and Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. Uttal, W.R., 1998. Toward a New Behaviorism: The Case Against Perceptual Reductionism. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ. Uttal, W.R., 2000. The War Between Mentalism and Behaviorism: On the Accessibility of Mental Processes. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ. Uttal, W.R., in press. The New Phrenology: On the Localization of Cognitive Processes in the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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A credo for a revitalized behaviorism: characteristics and emerging principles W.R. Uttal * Department of Industry and Management System Engineering, Arizona State Uni6ersity, Tempe, AZ 85287 5906, USA Accepted 5 January 2001
Abstract The fundamental assumptions of scientific psychology are examined by asking three key questions concerning the accessibility, analyzability, and reducibility of mental processes. It is concluded that current research does not support the premises of mentalistic cognitive psychology and that we should return to a modernized version of behaviorism if psychology is to prosper as a valid science. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Accessibility; Analyzability; Behaviorism; Neuroreduction
1. Introduction In my spoken presentation at the SQAB 2000 meeting I posed three questions concerning the foundation assumptions of scientific psychology: 1. Are mental processes accessible? 2. Are mental processes analyzable into components? 3. Are mental processes reducible to neurophysiological primitives. The answers that I arrived at after considering these three questions were all negative. On that basis, I concluded that contemporary cognitive
This discussion is adapted from material in Uttal (2000) and from a manuscript currently in Press entitled The New Phrenology: On The Localization of Cognitive Processes in the Brain (Uttal, in press). * Tel./fax: + 1-602-9658634. E-mail address: [email protected] (W.R. Uttal).
psychology is unsupportable and a proper future psychology should be based on a revitalized behaviorism. This article is intended to flesh out this skeleton conclusion by tabulating the characteristics of such a ‘new’ behaviorism as well as listing the emerging principles and metaprinciples that should guide scientific psychology in the next century. The revised version of behaviorism that I propose here has some of the characteristics of classic ones, but also some new properties that distinguish it from older versions.
2. The characteristics of a revitalized psychophysical behaviorism The behaviorist science that should guide future psychological science should have the following characteristics.
0376-6357/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 7 6 - 6 3 5 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 1 4 6 - 2
6
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
Psychophysical: A revitalized behaviorism must be psychophysical. That is, to the maximum extent possible, it must anchor all responses to some measure of the physical or situational stimulus. A psychophysical approach makes the least demands on its subjects (and thus distort the findings the least) by requiring the simplest possible (i.e. Class A) responses. The quality and the longevity of the acceptance of empirical results declines in inverse relation to the complexity of the cognitive decisions that must be made in formulating a response. Operational: A revitalized behaviorism must define its concepts in terms of procedures, not in terms of unverifiable, ad hoc hypothetical constructs, preexisting theories, or the vested interests of its scholars. Mathematically descriptive: A revitalized behaviorism must accept the fact that most psychological theories are, in principle, descriptive in a mathematical, computational or even a verbal sense. Truly reductive theories (i.e. ontologically reductive) are rare and, except in some special cases, impossible. Neuronally nonreductive: A revitalized behaviorism must eschew any physiological reductionism. There is ample evidence now that the search for neuroreductive explanations at either the neuron or neuronal network level for complex cognitive processes is an unachievable goal. Experimental: A revitalized behaviorism must dote on its empirical and experimental roots. Direct contact with nature by objective exploration and experimentation is the sine qua non of this or any other science. Molar: Because of the difficulties in teasing apart the internal structures of mental activity, and the neutrality of behavior and mathematics, a revitalized behaviorism must study mental activity and behavior from a molar point of view. Both empiricist1 and nativist: A radical environmental or learning explanation of human behavior is as inappropriate as is a pure genetic determinism. Both are rigid and dogmatic scientific doctrines that do not accept the obvious interplay between heredity and environment.
The selection of an appropriate response may be a very complex process depending on the experiential history and development of the organism as well as the current stimuli. The only acceptable approach to studying human mentation and behavior must take into account genetic and experiential factors. Both empiricist2 and rationalist: A revitalized behaviorism must accept the eclectic position that both logically mediated and automatic factors jointly affect behavior. Pragmatically neutral: Psychology must accept its primary role as a theoretical science and base it ideas on the nature of our nature rather than on the immediate needs of society or the utility that some of its findings may seem to have. Useful theories do not have the same validity as true theories.
3. Emerging metaprinciples By a metaprinciple I refer to a generalization of such breadth and universal importance that it has to be considered fundamental to any discussion of the great controversy between cognitive mentalism and behaviorism. These are not just the answers to technical issues that have been or can be resolved by empirical studies or logical argument. Rather, these are the foundation premises on which all other conclusions must be based. If they are not accepted, then the rest of the discussion becomes moot.
3.1. The first ontological metaprinciple: psychoneural equi6alence The first ontological metaprinciple of any naturalist psychology states simply and directly that neural activity is the sole basis of mental activity. Mind is a function of the brain and without a comparable material substrate, the function could not occur. Nevertheless, the most likely misinterpretation of any new behaviorist approach to studying psychology is that the suggestion that there are limits to our understanding of mental activity is tantamount to a cryptodualism. The expression of an ‘in principle’ barrier between our
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
intrapersonal mental states and our interpersonal ability to communicate ideas is not, however, a dualistic assertion. Scientific psychology would make no sense unless mental processes were a part of the natural world. The basic nature of the reality of the mind is that the brain is both necessary and sufficient to account for it in both fundamental and axiomatic principle. That is the essence of this first metaprinciple. If it is not accepted a priori, then there is little hope that any progress can be made in any scientific psychology. To not accept this principle is to push psychology, either cognitive or behaviorist, out of the realm of natural science. A corollary of this metaprinciple is that the essential level at which mental activity must be represented is the ensemble activity of many neurons, not in the representation provided by single neurons. But, that is another story.
3.2. The second ontological metaprinciple: the reality of mind Regardless of how inaccessible mental activity may or may not be to the scientific observer, nothing that is said here should be misinterpreted to mean that mental processes are less real than the function of any other organ of the body, in particular, nor of any machine, in general. There are many reasons to accept the reality of mental processes including: (1) we are each aware of our own consciousness (even if we cannot always correctly interpret the motivating forces or logic that drive our behavior); and (2) the variability and adaptability of human behavior indicates that stimulus information is operating on what must be considered to be, at least, an extremely complicated and active system. To assume that mind and its associated self awareness are not real is to assert that all is illusion. To do otherwise than accept this second metaprinciple would mean that we would have to ask: Whose illusion? This brings us to the boundaries of the ridiculous as it would inevitably challenge the reality of everything else. However important it is to accept mental activity and even consciousness as real, there is no question that their exact definitions, if not explanations, remain extremely refractory problems.
7
3.3. The epistemological metaprinciple: the inaccessibility of mental processes There is an abundance of logical, theoretical, and even empirical evidence to support the assertion that mental processes are inaccessible. The arguments are of three kinds. (1) Because of the extreme complexity of the neural networks in which mental processes are instantiated, they are not amenable to neuroreductive analysis. That is, the probability of developing a reductive explanation for the detailed interconnections of large numbers of neurons (the essential level at which the origins of mind must be sought) is extremely low, if not an outright impossibility. (2) Because of the fundamental limits of input output techniques that must treat the brain mind as a ‘black box’, the likelihood of using psychological techniques to analyze or describe the actual inner workings of the mind is also vanishingly small. Cognitive reductionism is as remote a possibility as is neuroreductionism. (3) Individual subjects do not have any special insight into their own cognitive processes. Any new technique that purports to allow such insight is actually only a resurrected version of classic introspection. Such a technique must ultimately also fail for the same reasons its predecessors did. Therefore, notwithstanding the fundamental ontological reality of both the brain and the mind, it is maintained here that there are epistemological barriers to accessing and then analyzing mental activity. These barriers arise from criteria of both deep principle and empirical fact. It is this epistemological principle that has been violated by mentalisms, cognitive or otherwise, throughout the history of our science. It is here that behaviorism and mentalism find their most crucial and essential differences. It is on the foundation provided by this metaprinciple that a revitalized scientific psychology must be based if it is to have any chance of providing a valid understanding of the human condition in the future. Beyond these three ‘metaprinciples’ there are also a number of other general conclusions and general principles of only slightly less import that have to be highlighted to fully understand the need for the revitalized behaviorist approach to
8
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
psychological science. Some are derivative of the three metaprinciples, but others help to flesh out its logic and assumptions. These principles are enumerated in the following section.
8.
4. Emerging conclusions and principles
1. Behaviorism has been under attack for the last 40 years often for reasons that lie far outside the acceptable boundaries of scientific discourse. Some of these wounds are self inflicted. 2. Behaviorism has been criticized for being ‘antihumanism’, ‘antifree will’, ‘antireligious’, and ‘uninteresting’ as well as ‘authoritarian’, ‘mechanical’, and ‘trivial’. It is criticized for rejecting ‘inner feelings’ or for not allowing us ‘to enjoy music’. These are all value judgements that are irrelevant to the real scientific issues. 3. Behaviorism has been poorly served by illfated attempts to extrapolate its scientific findings into the social, educational, or cultural domain. First and foremost, it must evaluated as a science, free of vested interests and secondary goals concerning matters about which it has little to say. 4. Behaviorism has its own history but it also has a rich background of influence from other fields of science and philosophy. 5. Some behaviorisms are actually mentalisms. An objective empirical approach is not the same thing as a behaviorist approach to the study of organisms. 6. No behaviorist psychologist has ever rejected the fact that people think, feel, emote, and reason. All accept the basic idea that the brain and the mind are active elements in adaptive behavior. 7. Theological issues have often played an important role in an individual’s acceptance of either mentalism or behaviorism. One anonymous respondent has been quoted as saying ‘Another [factor in cognitivism’s rise] was ideology, in other words, the influence of believers in soul and spirit defending the ho-
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
munculus and thereby its Creator, even if they didn’t realize they were doing so’. (Boneau, 1992, p. 1590). Pragmatic concerns about psychology’s potential contributions to human welfare have often misled theory building. Where objective empirical or logical arguments should take priority, utility has sometimes been used to justify parascientific silliness. There are powerful vested interests (e.g. the psychotherapeutic industry) that draw their sustenance from mentalist theories and approaches to psychology. To meet their needs, they have often ignored the basic scientific issues and findings. New empirical and theoretical information from the other sciences returns the debate between behaviorism and mentalism from armchair speculation to scientific investigation (see Uttal, 1998). Some behaviorists as well as most mentalists have been ‘in principle’ reductionists asserting the cognitive components can be analyzed and assayed from behavioral measurements. Behaviorists, however, have generally taught that a holistic, molar approach was preferred when approaching experiments or theories. A close examination (Pachella, 1974) of the assumptions that must hold, and do not hold, suggests that such mental modularity is not achievable. Behaviorism and cognitivism are alternative approaches to the study of human thought and behavior and, thus, must cover the same range of topics. It is the interpretation of the significance and meaning of experimental findings, not the topics chosen for study or even the data that is collected, that distinguishes the two kinds of psychology. Contemporary cognitivism is closely associated with information processing, computer analogies, and neuroreduction of psychological processes. Contemporary behaviorism is closely associated with a nonreductive study of observed responses in a way that eschews the creation of unwarranted hypothetical constructs. Its forays into verbal behavior have been met with strong resistance.
W.R. Uttal / Beha6ioural Processes 54 (2001) 5–10
15. The main difference between behaviorism and cognitivism, however, has been their respective answers to the question: Is mind accessible? Cognitivists assume that it is; behaviorists that it is not because of the limits of introspection, the fallibility of verbal reports, and the fundamental constraints on input output analyses. Intrapersonally privileged awareness is not tantamount to interpersonal communication. 16. Another major difference between behaviorists and cognitivists is their respective answers to the question of analyzability. Cognitivists believe that mental behavior can be reduced to a system of ‘internal information processing states’. Behaviorists believe this is not possible. Arguments supporting the behaviorist position come from thermodynamics, complexity theory, chaos theory, automata theory, and many other facts from other sciences. 17. As with any other field of science, scientific psychology must include both empirical and theoretical approaches to understanding its content matter. What psychologists mean by an ‘acceptable’ theory, however, is highly variable. 18. Theory in science can be reductive or descriptive. Cognitive psychologists lean toward the former; behaviorists toward the latter. 19. Quite different questions of science are often confused with each other. Localization of a particular region of the brain that seems to have some behavioral effect is not the same as a detailed analysis of the network of neurons that represents or encodes that function in that location. 20. There is no question that organism plays an important role in determining what kind of a response should be made to a stimulus. Organisms are, however, not simple automata. At the very least, they are very complicated systems. The difference in complexity is of such a great degree that there is currently a qualitative difference between artificial and natural intelligence. 21. Extreme versions of conflicting theories are both usually incorrect. Compromises enjoy-
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28. 29.
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ing features of both extremes are more usually accepted in the final analysis. Many of the standard criteria for choosing a scientific theory are inappropriate for psychology. Parsimony, simplicity, elegance, practical utility, and exact repeatability become irrelevant in a system made up of so many parts that they can be wasted or a system that is so adaptive that it usefully change its behavior from trial to trial. Even what is ‘objective’, therefore, becomes a matter of opinion. Because of the adaptability and variability of the component mental processes (even if one accepts for the sake of argument that they, in fact, exist), a cognitively reductive approach is unlikely to succeed. Fundamental physical principles such as the theorem of Moore (1956) and the engineer’s ‘Black Box’ constraint preclude any kind of approach that depends solely on stimuli and responses from providing access into the inner workings of the brain or the mind. Both behavior and mathematics are essentially descriptive approaches and are neutral with regard to internal mechanisms, structures, and processes. Computational models, however well they may describe the behavior of a system, are also neutral with regard to internal mechanisms, structures, and processes. Humans have a very poor appreciation of their own motives, logic, and other forces driving their behavior. They cannot analyze the processes that lead to their behavior nor are they aware of any part of their mental activity except the final outcome. When their introspective explanations agree with independent measures, it is often coincidental or based on a priori predilections, prejudices and opinions. Human memory is extremely fallible. False memories are easily implanted. Scientists generally underestimate the importance of exceptions to rules. The logic of syllogistic reasoning asserts that exceptions can completely disprove overgeneralized hypotheses.
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30. Analogies are not the same thing as homologies. Isomorphic response trends in data and in theories may be accounted for by totally different internal mechanisms. 31. Because of the limits on accessibility, there are inadequate constraints on the construction of hypothetical constructs. Mentalist theorists are, therefore, free to invent an infinite variety of ad hoc explanations of human behavior. Behavioral theories honor these constraints to a greater degree. 32. Because of the complexity of human mental activity experimental results may often be qualitatively altered by slight changes in experimental design. 33. Subjects often do not play the game that the experimenter wishes them to play. 34. Humans should enjoy no special role as the subject of psychological or any other kind of science. The principles and factors that drive organic behavior are common to all organisms even though the level of sentience may vary greatly. 35. There remains an enormous question, of such magnitude as to change humanity’s view of its own nature. It is: Is mind epiphenomenal or does it exert a direct force on the brain or behavior? The ultimate answer to this question, if it can be answered, will have a drastic effect on human affairs both in science and other domains. 36. There is no need for a major change in the kind of research that is carried out by psy-
chologists, neurophysiologists, and computer scientists. Each of these fields is of value and stands in its own right. Changes, however, are necessary in our interpretations of the relations between these fields. Finally, it must be appreciated that many of the questions that psychologists have raised have not been answered and may not be answerable. Distinguishing the possible and achievable from the will-o-the-wisps is an important task for any future student of this very important field of science. Sadly, there are no killer arguments for the most controversial of the principles and metaprinciples presented here.
References Boneau, C.A., 1992. Observations on psychology’s past and future. Am. Psychol. 47, 1586 – 1596. Moore, E.F., 1956. Automata Studies. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Pachella, R.G., 1974. The interpretation of reaction time in information processing research. In: Kantowitz, B.H. (Ed.), Human Information Processing: Tutorials in Performance and Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. Uttal, W.R., 1998. Toward a New Behaviorism: The Case Against Perceptual Reductionism. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ. Uttal, W.R., 2000. The War Between Mentalism and Behaviorism: On the Accessibility of Mental Processes. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ. Uttal, W.R., in press. The New Phrenology: On the Localization of Cognitive Processes in the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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