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A little something about a little something
89
Squibs
whether q is true or false). In other words, s is considered true in such a case, as one of the conjuncts of (l). This gives (2) the truth table in figure l, i.e., that of the standard material implication, p D q. p T T F F
q T F T F
qc--p T F T T
pDq T F T T
Fig. 1. The equivalent definitions of q ~ p and p D q.
Whether this example suffices to give legal standing to standard material implication is arguable, but it does bring matters down to earth. It also dovetails with Fulda's conclusion that 'to explain the simple material conditional, we need not go beyond the framework of the classical, two-valued, truth-functional logic', by showing that it functions quite naturally in everyday life. There is a need, it seems, by the way, to 'revert to a three-valued logic' to account for the meanings of all and only in examples like the one above - i.e., ¥ fares less well than D as an explication of everyday usage - but that is quite a different matter. See Cushing (1984, 1987) for discussion of that issue. References Cushing, S., 1984. Dynamic model selection in the interpretation of discourse. In: L. Vaina and J. Hintikka, eds., Cognitive constraints on communication: Representations and processes. Dordrecht: Reidel. Cushing, S..~ 1987. Two explanatory principles in semantics. In: L. Vaina, ed., Matters of intelligence. Dordrecht: Reidel. Fulda, J.S., 1989. Material implication revisited. Amer. Math. Monthly, 96, 247-250. Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 1990. Form ! 1989 Massachusetts Resident Income Tax Form Schedules and Instructions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 1990.
A little something about a little something Bruce Fraser* Consider the following sentences: (1) I think a little something is in order. (2) Can I have a little something before I leave? (3) Your dog left a little something in front of my house. * Correspondence to: B. Fraser, School of Education, Boston University, 605 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, MA 02215, USA.
90
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Squibs
The baby has a little something in his diaper. Your father will have a little something to say about that. I'll say a little something before you begin. I photographed a little something last night.
In (1), a little something might be used to refer to an amount of money or remind a child for a thank you, while in (2), it might refer to something to eat, perhaps a quick alcoholic drink, or, for the more familiar, a little something more intimate. In (3) and (4), the speaker is usually referring to fecal matter, something one usually doesn't talk about, while in (5) the little something is certainly going to be of negative import. Although there is no negative inference to be drawn in (6), there is still the sense that the speaker wants to avoid specificity, perhaps because what is to be said is not yet worked out. Finally, (7) might be used when the speaker has successfully taken a picture of certain secret documents and does not wish those listening in to realize this. In these and similar cases, the expression a little something cannot be taken literally: it does not refer to a small, unspecific entity. Rather, it signals that the speaker wishes to avoid saying exactly what is being referred to, leaving this to the interpretive pleasure of the listener.
Poor Leonard! F r a n c k Nicoloff* When Leonard Bloomfield first presented his Immediate Constituents analysis, he tested it by way of illustration on what he probably thought was an extremely banal, non-problematic sentence, the now half-legendary (1) Poor John ran away. The author's initial cut into the sentence, which was supposed to reveal incontestably immediate constituents, produced a nice Noun Phrase/Verb Phrase, subject/predicate, topic/comment dichotomy (Poor John~ran away). This may have appeared then, and may still appear now, as a legitimate analysis, though the feeling of 'immediacy' of structural components might induce one to first operate a distinction between sentence-type and proposition, something like [DECLARATIVE/Poor John ran away], for Bloomfield's excessively 'propositional' or superficial conception of the lr:lmediate Constituents of (1). *
Correspondence to: F. Nicoloff, 18, Rue A. Allais, 38400 St. Martin d'Heres, France.
Squibs
whether q is true or false). In other words, s is considered true in such a case, as one of the conjuncts of (l). This gives (2) the truth table in figure l, i.e., that of the standard material implication, p D q. p T T F F
q T F T F
qc--p T F T T
pDq T F T T
Fig. 1. The equivalent definitions of q ~ p and p D q.
Whether this example suffices to give legal standing to standard material implication is arguable, but it does bring matters down to earth. It also dovetails with Fulda's conclusion that 'to explain the simple material conditional, we need not go beyond the framework of the classical, two-valued, truth-functional logic', by showing that it functions quite naturally in everyday life. There is a need, it seems, by the way, to 'revert to a three-valued logic' to account for the meanings of all and only in examples like the one above - i.e., ¥ fares less well than D as an explication of everyday usage - but that is quite a different matter. See Cushing (1984, 1987) for discussion of that issue. References Cushing, S., 1984. Dynamic model selection in the interpretation of discourse. In: L. Vaina and J. Hintikka, eds., Cognitive constraints on communication: Representations and processes. Dordrecht: Reidel. Cushing, S..~ 1987. Two explanatory principles in semantics. In: L. Vaina, ed., Matters of intelligence. Dordrecht: Reidel. Fulda, J.S., 1989. Material implication revisited. Amer. Math. Monthly, 96, 247-250. Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 1990. Form ! 1989 Massachusetts Resident Income Tax Form Schedules and Instructions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 1990.
A little something about a little something Bruce Fraser* Consider the following sentences: (1) I think a little something is in order. (2) Can I have a little something before I leave? (3) Your dog left a little something in front of my house. * Correspondence to: B. Fraser, School of Education, Boston University, 605 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, MA 02215, USA.
90
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Squibs
The baby has a little something in his diaper. Your father will have a little something to say about that. I'll say a little something before you begin. I photographed a little something last night.
In (1), a little something might be used to refer to an amount of money or remind a child for a thank you, while in (2), it might refer to something to eat, perhaps a quick alcoholic drink, or, for the more familiar, a little something more intimate. In (3) and (4), the speaker is usually referring to fecal matter, something one usually doesn't talk about, while in (5) the little something is certainly going to be of negative import. Although there is no negative inference to be drawn in (6), there is still the sense that the speaker wants to avoid specificity, perhaps because what is to be said is not yet worked out. Finally, (7) might be used when the speaker has successfully taken a picture of certain secret documents and does not wish those listening in to realize this. In these and similar cases, the expression a little something cannot be taken literally: it does not refer to a small, unspecific entity. Rather, it signals that the speaker wishes to avoid saying exactly what is being referred to, leaving this to the interpretive pleasure of the listener.
Poor Leonard! F r a n c k Nicoloff* When Leonard Bloomfield first presented his Immediate Constituents analysis, he tested it by way of illustration on what he probably thought was an extremely banal, non-problematic sentence, the now half-legendary (1) Poor John ran away. The author's initial cut into the sentence, which was supposed to reveal incontestably immediate constituents, produced a nice Noun Phrase/Verb Phrase, subject/predicate, topic/comment dichotomy (Poor John~ran away). This may have appeared then, and may still appear now, as a legitimate analysis, though the feeling of 'immediacy' of structural components might induce one to first operate a distinction between sentence-type and proposition, something like [DECLARATIVE/Poor John ran away], for Bloomfield's excessively 'propositional' or superficial conception of the lr:lmediate Constituents of (1). *
Correspondence to: F. Nicoloff, 18, Rue A. Allais, 38400 St. Martin d'Heres, France.