A new look at selective exposure

JOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

15,

(1979)

l-15

A New Look at Selective

Exposure

JAMES M. OLSON University

of Western

Ontario

AND MARK P. ZANNA University

of Waterloo

Received October 28, 1977 The relevance of the personality dimension “repression-sensitization” (D. Byrne in 9. A. Maher (Ed.), Progress in experimental personality research, Vol. I, NY: Academic Press, 1964, pp. 169-219) to selective exposure processes was investigated. Experimental repressors (who typically employ “avoidance” strategies in dealing with threatening stimuli) and experimental sensitizers (who generally “approach” threatening stimuli) were allowed to choose and keep one of two pairs of painting reproductions, each pair containing one positively and one negatively valued painting. After the decision, which experimental subjects believed terminated the experiment, subjects were allowed to inspect the alternatives ad libitum for 75 sec. Eye gaze during this period was unobtrusively videotaped. Compared to their matched controls, who were simply asked to inspect the paintings in order to decide which ones they liked best, experimental repressors inspected paintings that were consonant with their choices and avoided looking at paintings that were dissonant with their decisions. Experimental sensitizers did not manifest such postdecisional selective exposure. The implications of these results for past and future research on dissonance-produced selective exposure were discussed.

A widely accepted principle within many social psychological formulations is that voluntary exposure to information is highly selective. Festinger (1957), for example, has discussed “selective exposure” in terms of approaching and avoiding certain kinds of information: People seek out The present research was supported by Canada Council Grant S76-0344 to the second author and was conducted while the first author was supported by a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship. The authors wish to thank Jack Block, Judson Mills, and Michael Ross for their comments on an earlier version of this manuscript and Ken Bowers for providing some of the experimental materials. A version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, August 1977. Requests for reprints can be sent to James M. Olson, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A SC2, or to Mark P. Zanna, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1. 1

0022-1031/79/010001-15$02.00/O Copyright @ 1979 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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OLSON AND ZANNA

information that supports their beliefs and avoid information that challenges their opinions. However, research has indicated that dissonanceproduced selective exposure is more elusive than originally thought (e.g., Feather, 1963; Freedman & Sears, 1965; Mills & Ross, 1964; Rosen, 1961; Sears, 1965). It has become clear that a variety of factors other than the dissonance-arousing or dissonance-reducing potential of a piece of information will affect an individual’s decision to seek it out or to avoid it. Beginning with the research of Mills (1965a, 1965b), the conditions conducive to motivated selective exposure have gradually been clarified. Wicklund and Brehm (1976, Chapter 12) discuss a number of factors that can mask dissonance-produced selective exposure if not properly controlled. For example, the novelty and utility of the information will affect attention to it. These confounds might account for Rosen’s (1961) finding that students, after committing themselves to take either an essay or a multiple choice exam, preferred an article that advised changing to the type of exam they had not chosen over an article that advised changing to the type they had chosen. For example, students who had committed themselves to the objective test tended to choose an article described as follows: “The results of this study suggest that students who like objective tests would probably do much better to switch to essay.” Clearly, both utility considerations and curiosity would lead these subjects to prefer this article to one that explains why people who like essay exams do better on objective tests. Thus, a fair test of the hypotheses concerning dissonance-produced selective exposure was not possible. Norms of intellectual honesty and fairness can,also lead to exposure to information supporting the “other side” in spite of the dissonance aroused by such material. For example, Sears (1965) found that subjects presented with synopses of criminal trials preferred information opposing their preliminary beliefs about the defendant’s guilt or innocence to information that supported their initial leanings. The courtroom setting simulated in this study seems likely to have elicited a norm of fairness and openness that led subjects to examine evidence supporting the other side. Thus, Festinger’s (1957) hypotheses were again not put to a fair test. Although no single experiment has simultaneously controlled all of the confounding factors that have been identified, certain methodological features increase the probability of obtaining the theoretically predicted exposure effects. For example, subjects should be given most or all of the information prior to the experimenter’s measurement of exposure, because only then can curiosity and the desires for novel and useful information be satisfied in a manner that does not interfere with the predicted effects of dissonance. Thus, the common procedure of asking for subjects’ preferences among pieces of information when only titles or short descriptions are presented may not constitute the most desirable method for testing dissonance theory’s predictions. It is also important that the

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AT SELECTIVE

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3

measurement of exposure be as unobtrusive as possible, so that norms of openness and honesty are not made salient. Almost all past studies have forced subjects to indicate publicly their preferences for certain kinds of information and, therefore, have not optimally satisfied this latter condition. Several studies with one or the other of these methodological features have obtained results consistent with Festinger’s (1957) predictions (e.g., Brock & Balloun, 1967; Lowin, 1967; Mills, 1965a). Wicklund and Brehm (1976) conclude that although individual experiments have been open to alternative interpretations of their results, the accumulated evidence makes a strong case for the approach segment of selectivity. These authors do not believe that selective avoidance of dissonant information has been conclusively demonstrated, although some supportive evidence does exist for this half of Festinger’s hypothesis (most notably Mills, 1965a). The present experiment was designed to test Festinger’s predictions using a paradigm that employed both methodological features discussed above and that controlled for the potentially confounding factors elucidated by Wicklund and Brehm. A recent innovative study by White and Gerard (Note 1) suggested the particular context within which dissonance-produced selective exposure could be most fairly tested. Using a free choice paradigm, subjects inspected two pairs of painting reproductions, each pair containing one positively and one negatively valued painting. Eye gaze was unobtrusively videotaped throughout the procedure. Experimental subjects were allowed to choose and keep one of the two pairs of paintings: matched control subjects were simply asked to inspect the paintings in order to decide which ones they liked best. After experimental subjects made a choice, which they believed terminated the experiment, they were allowed to inspect the alternatives ad libitum for 75 seconds. To the extent that experimental subjects, compared to their matched controls, spend a greater proportion of this postdecisional time period inspecting paintings that were consonant with their choices and a smaller proportion of time inspecting paintings that were dissonant with their choices, Festinger’s (1957) hypotheses would be supported. By making the behavioral response nonpublic and the measurement of exposure unobtrusive, this procedure removed the problems associated with forcing subjects to indicate publicly their desires for certain kinds of information. In addition, the procedure removed the potential effects of utility and novelty on exposure by making the experimental period postdecisional; utility would not affect exposure because the decision had already been made, and novelty’s effects were reduced because subjects had inspected the alternatives thoroughly before the experimental period began.

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OLSON AND ZANNA

The White and Gerard paradigm also allowed a more diagnostic analysis of dissonance-produced selective exposure than past procedures, because it separated the positive and negative components of the chosen and rejected alternatives. Thus, the positively valued painting of the chosen pair and the negatively valued painting of the rejected pair were both considered consonant with the decision; the negatively valued painting of the chosen pair and the positively valued painting of the rejected pair were considered dissonant with the decision. Past research has simply taken account of the chosen-rejected dimension, without separating the positive and negative components of each alternative. Of course, each of the four paintings in this procedure may itself consist of both positive and negative components. (For example, the negatively valued painting of the chosen pair may possess some attractive features and thus may not be entirely dissonant with subjects’ decisions.) Nonetheless, this procedure is at least more diagnostic than the traditional one, and although interpretive ambiguities remain, they are less serious than in past research. Further, we felt that most nonartists’ reactions to paintings are global rather than specific to particular aspects of the work and that, therefore, the psychological meaning of inspecting a given alternative could be specified with some confidence. There was an additional purpose to the present experiment-to explore possible individual differences in the manifestation of dissonanceproduced selective exposure. Given the nearly two decades of research on Festinger’s exposure hypotheses, it is surprising how little attention has been given to individual differences. One reason for the inconsistency of past findings may be that some people selectively approach or avoid certain kinds of information, while others do not. If dissonant information is considered threatening or negatively arousing (Zanna & Aziza, 1976; Zanna & Cooper, 1974, 1976; Zanna, Higgins, & Taves, 1976), then the manner in which individuals deal with anxiety-arousing or threatening stimuli in general should influence the way they deal with dissonance. For example, a tendency to avoid or to deny the existence of anxietyprovoking stimuli, in conjunction with an accentuation of positive or reassuring information, would suggest a different pattern of exposure to consonant and dissonant material than would a tendency to deal with anxiety-arousing information by approaching it and separating its cognitive from its affective impact through such processes as “intellectualization.” Specifically, the former tendency would be expected to lead to selective seeking of consonant information and selective avoidance of dissonant information, while the latter tendency would not be expected to produce such selectivity. The personality dimension “repression-sensitization” (Bell & Byrne, 1977; Byrne, 1964) is postulated to reflect chronic differences in exactly these sorts of tendencies. Repressors generally employ “avoidance” strategies (e.g., repression, denial) to deal with anxiety-

NEW LOOK AT SELECTIVE

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5

provoking stimuli and accentuate positive or reassuring information about themselves and their environment. Sensitizers, on the other hand, generally employ “approach” strategies (e.g., intellectualization, rumination) to deal with threatening stimuli and do not focus on the positive as do repressors. Thus, repressors should manifest dissonance-produced selective exposure, while sensitizers should not. The present experiment tested this hypothesis. METHOD

Subjects Eighty introductory psychology students, 40 males and 40 females, participated in the experiment approximately 3 months after having participated in a preliminary personalitytesting session. In the preliminary session, subjects completed Byrne’s (1964) Revised Repression-Sensitization Scale. Subjects were run in groups of three to eight in the preliminary session: in the experimental session, they were run individually. Subjects were paid $1.00 for their participation in the experimental session.

Design Based on their repression-sensitization (R-S) scores, subjects were classified according to personality type. The median R-S scores for males (39) and females (46) served as the division points for each sex: Subjects at or above the median were classified as “sensitizers,” and subjects below the median were classified as “repressors.” The mean R-S scores for the four groups produced by this classification (sex x R-S) were as follows: male repressors 27.9, female repressors 33.9, male sensitizers 59.0, and female sensitizers 55.8. Within each of these four groups, subjects were then paired on the basis of their having nearly identical R-S scores. In order to ensure the comparability of the experimental and control conditions, one subject from each pair was then randomly assigned to either the experimental or the control condition, with the other member of the pair being assigned to the other condition. Thus, the experiment constituted a 2 (male-female) x 2 (repressorsensitizer) x 2 (experimental-control) factorial design, with the 80 subjects evenly distributed over the eight cells.

Procedure After being seated in the laboratory by the experimenter, who was blind with respect to personality type, the subject rated (on IO-point scales ranging from “strongly like” to “strongly dislike”) and ranked (from most to least favorite) 20 color postcard-sized reproductions of paintings. Of the 20 painting reproductions (which were chosen from a larger sample on the basis of pretests using subjects from the same population as our subjects), IO were well liked and 10 disliked. After finishing the ranking task, the subject completed a short attitude survey. During this period, the experimenter selected from a box slides of those paintings that the subject had ranked 3, 5, 15, and 17. When the attitude survey had been completed, the subject was told that the experimenter was interested in the effects of “involvement” on aesthetic preference and that in the next part of the experiment (s)he would be seeing slides of paintings chosen at random from among those rated and ranked earlier. The subject was told that (s)he would be asked which slides (s)he liked best. Following White and Gerard (Note I), experimental subjects were then told that to involve them in their task, they would be given a choice between two pairs of painting reproductions. They would be shown slides of four paintings and asked to choose one pair (either the pair on the left or the pair on the right) for their very own. Control subjects were simply told to look at the slides for awhile and to decide which paintings they liked best.

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AND ZANNA

The subject then moved to a chair approximately 3 m in front of a wall, toward which four slide projectors were pointed. The wall measured 4 m wide by 3 m high, and the slides, when projected, covered approximately a I-ft square (.093 mZ, in each of the four corners. In the center of the wall and directly in front of the subject was a “papered-over” one-way mirror through which eye gaze was videotaped. Pilot testing and experimental debriefing indicated that subjects were not aware of being videotaped. Any questions the subject had about the procedure were answered, and the projectors were turned on. Paintings ranked 3 (a positively valued painting) and 15 (a negatively valued painting) constituted one pair; paintings ranked 5 (a positively valued painting) and I7 (a negatively valued painting) constituted the other. The location of the pairs and the position of the paintings within each pair were counterbalanced across subjects. Experimental subjects were allowed as long as they wished to choose one pair of paintings. When they indicated that they had made a choice, the experimenter said that he would “be with them in a second,” and waited 75 more seconds before terminating the observation period. Control subjects were each allowed to observe the paintings for exactly the same length of time as their matched experimental subject had taken to make a choice, plus 75 seconds. After terminating the observation period, the experimenter turned off the projectors and replaced the slides in the box. Subjects then rerated and reranked the entire set of 20 paintings, so that the traditional postdecisional reevaluation effects could be assessed. In addition, a “thought-listing” technique (Greenwald, 1968) was employed to provide some exploratory measures of intellectualization (another possible way of reducing postdecisional dissonance-a mode theoretically preferred by sensitizers). Specifically, subjects were asked to list some thoughts they had about their choices (or about the paintings, for control subjects) and then to rate each thought in two ways. First, they indicated whether the thought supported or opposed their decision (or was positive or negative toward the paintings), on a ‘J-point scale ranging from “extremely favorable’* to “extremely unfavorable”; this was taken to reflect the cognitive favorableness of the thought. Second, they indicated whether the thought pleased them or bothered them, on a ‘J-point scale ranging from “very pleasing” to “very bothering”, this was taken to reflect the affective favorableness of the thought. Three exploratory measures of intellectualization were computed from these classifications. The proportion of listed thoughts that subjects classified as cognitively unfavorable to the decision (or to the paintings) was taken to reflect the extent to which they admitted negative thoughts, with higher proportions indicating more intellectualization. The proportion of listed thoughts that subjects classified as affectively neutral was taken to reflect the extent to which they maintained affective neutrality, with higher proportions indicating more intellectualization. And the within-subject correlation between the cognitive and affective favorableness ratings of the thoughts generated was taken to reflect the dependence of cognitive and affective responses to thoughts, with lower correlations meaning greater independence of affect from cognition and hence more intellectualization. A composite measure of intellectualization was also calculated by standardizing these three measures and summing each subject’s three standardized scores. Finally, subjects were debriefed, asked to keep the details of the procedure to themselves, paid $1.00, and thanked for their participation. All experimental subjects were mailed reprints of the two paintings they chose, approximately 1 month after completion of the experiment.

RESULTS Selective Exposure

The paintings (i.e.,

were designated as either the “positive-chosen” painting the positively valued painting of the chosen pair), the “negative-

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chosen” painting, the “positive-rejected” painting, or the “negativerejected” painting. The percentage of time spent inspecting each painting and that spent “looking away” were computed for the pre- and postdecisional time periods. These percentages were calculated using an event recorder to track the videotaped eye movements of the subjects. The scorer was blind with respect to condition, personality type, and location of the paintings. The permanent recordings of the eye movements allowed extensive practice in scoring. The videotaped eye movements of 10 randomly selected subjects were also scored by a second judge, and the percentage of total viewing time for each painting by which these two scorers varied was calculated. For the 40 paintings scored by both judges, the mean disagreement was only 4.3% of total viewing time per painting, indicating that scoring was highly reliable. Preliminary analyses indicated that the only effect in percentage of time spent “looking away” (i.e., not inspecting any of the paintings) was due to a substantial postdecisional difference between experimental subjects (who spent 39.2% of their total postdecisional viewing time not inspecting any of the paintings) and the control subjects (who looked away for only 8.7% of their comparable period). This difference reflected the fact that experimental subjects believed that the experiment ended with their decision, whereas control subjects were not even aware of any “decision time.” In order to be able to compare directly experimental and control postdecisional percentages of viewing time for the paintings, it was necessary to calculate percentages of time spent looking at each painting OUT of the total time spent looking at paintings. An analysis of the predecisional percentages of viewing time spent inspecting each painting showed no reliable effects. Therefore, the changes in percentage of viewing time spent inspecting each painting from the predecisional to the postdecisional time periods were computed by subtracting predecisional from postdecisional percentages (these computations yielded four scores per subject-one for each painting). Table 1 presents the mean changes in percentages of viewing time spent inspecting each painting from the pre- to the postdecisional time periods. Analyzing these data in ways that will enable changes in inspection of individual paintings to be tested is problematic, however, since the pattern of inspection for a given painting is not independent from viewing the other paintings. Specifically, time that is spent inspecting one painting is also time that is spent not inspecting the other paintings; thus, whether the behavior should be considered approach or avoidance is ambiguous (this dependence can be seen from Table 1, where the changes over the four paintings necessarily sum to 0). To eliminate this problem, a single composite score was calculated for each subject to reflect the overall change in the distribution of viewing times in the direction predicted by dissonance theory. This score was the

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AND TABLE

-

MEAN

Defensive style

PRE-

TO POSTDECISIONAL

Condition

CHANGES

Chosen Positive

ZANNA I IN PERCENTAGES

painting Negative

Repressors

Experimental Control

.09 .oo

- .07 -.04

Sensitizers

Experimental Control

.OO .03

.06 .oo

Rejected Positive -.09 .03 -.02 -.03

OF VIEWING ~--~__-

painting Negative

TIME

Total selective Exposure score”

.07 .Ol

.32 .02

-.04 .oo

-.08 .06

n Total Selective Exposure scores represent the interaction between chosen-rejected and positive-negative, and are the change in percentages of time spent uppro~hinl: consonant paintings (positive-chosen and negative-rejected) plus the change in amounts of time spent rrvoiding dissonant paintings (negative-chosen and positive-rejected).

pre- to postdecisional increase in the proportion of time spent viewing the consonant (positive-chosen and negative-rejected) paintings minus the increase in time spent viewing the dissonant (negative-chosen and positive-rejected) paintings. A 2 (repressor-sensitizer) x 2 (experimentalcontrol) x 2 (male-female) analysis of variance on these scores yielded two significant effects: a repressor-sensitizer main effect, F (1,72) = 6.99,~ < .Ol , and an interaction involving repressor-sensitizer and experimental-control, F (1, 72) = 10.87, p < .00.5. The main effect indicates that repressors changed their viewing times in the direction predicted by dissonance theory more than sensitizers (M = .17 and - .Ol, respectively). The interaction, however, indicates that the selective exposure index was contingent upon both personality type and whether subjects made a choice among the alternatives (experimental vs control). The nature of this interaction, shown in the last column of Table 1, indicates that repressors showed much more selective exposure under experimental conditions (M = .32) than under control conditions (M = .02), r (72) = 3.21, p < .Ol, whereas sensitizers did not appreciably differ under the two conditions (M = -.08 and .06, respectively), t (72) = 1.46, ns. Dissonance Reduction While these results appear to show individual differences in dissonanceproduced selective exposure, there are at least two possible explanations for the effects. Selective exposure effects could have occurred for repressors but not for sensitizers either because (a) repressors experienced more dissonance than sensitizers, or (b) repressors and sensitizers experienced similar dissonance, but responded to it differently. To determine which explanation best accounts for the selective exposure results, analyses were conducted on the reevaluation and intellectualization measures obtained from the subjects after the observation period. If, within the experimental conditions, repressors experienced more disso-

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nance than sensitizers, then the former group should manifest more attitude change and/or intellectualization than the latter group. An analysis of variance on the total changes in ranks for the four projected paintings, with changes in a consonant direction (up for chosen paintings, down for rejected paintings) given positive scores and changes in a dissonant direction given negative scores, revealed two reliable effects: an experimental-control main effect, F (1, 56) = 13.21, p < .OOl, and an interaction of repressor-sensitizer x experimental-control, F ( 1, 56) = 8.14, p < .Ol. Specifically, while experimental subjects manifested more attitude change in a consonant direction (M = +2.47) than control subjects (M = - 1.22), the interaction qualified this main effect: this difference was substantially greater in the case of repressors (M = +4.00 vs -2.06, t (56) = 5.55,~ < .OOl) than in the case of sensitizers (M = + .50 vs -.14, t (56) < I).’ An analysis of variance on the composite measure of intellectualization (a sum of three standardized variables) revealed a different pattern of dissonance reduction than the attitude change data. The only reliable effect was an interaction of repressor-sensitizer x experimental-control, F (1, 72) = 9.38, p < .005. This interaction reflected the fact that sensitizers manifested the behaviors that we have characterized as intellectualization more under experimental (M = .867) than under control conditions (M = -.406), t (72) = 2.22, p < .05, whereas repressors manifested these behaviors less under experimental (M = - .845) than under control conditions (M = .365), t (72) = 2.11, p < .05. (For more detailed analyses of the reevaluation and intellectualization measures, see Olson & Zanna, Note 2.) Conflict, Dissonance Reduction, and Selective Exposure To explore possible relationships between decisional conflict, postdecisional dissonance reduction, and postdecisional selective exposure, correlational analyses were conducted within the experimental conditions, using time taken to make a decision as a measure of decisional conflict (cf. Festinger, 1964). A preliminary male-female x repressor-sensitizer analysis of variance on the decision times for experimental subjects revealed no reliable differences between groups (the mean decision time for experimental repressors was 63.54 seconds, and the mean decision time ’ The data from eight pairs of subjects were excluded from the attitude change analyses, because the experimental subject inexplicably chose the pair of paintings initially ranked 5 and 17 over the pair initially ranked 3 and 15 ( it was expected that all experimental subjects would choose the 3-15 pair). The data from these subjects were excluded because it was impossible to determine whether any apparently “postdecisional” attitude change in fact occurred predecisionally. Since it would seem that at least some reevaluation had to occur predecisionally in order for the 5-17 pair to be preferred to the 3-15 pair, the data from these subjects were excluded.

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for experimental sensitizers was 70.76 seconds, F (1, 36) < 1). Therefore, the correlational analyses were conducted across all experimental subjects. In addition, the correlations were computed for the cells where significant dissonance reduction or dissonance-produced selective exposure had been manifested. Consistent with the work reported by Festinger (1964), conflict was not related to overall attitude change, either across all experimental subjects or, more importantly, within the experimental repressors, r (16) = .19, who manifested significant reevaluation of the paintings in a consonant direction. In addition, conflict was not related to the overall composite measure of intellectualization, either across all experimental subjects or, more importantly, within the experimental sensitizers, r (18) = -. 11, who manifested significant intellectualization. And finally, conflict was not related to overall dissonance-produced selective exposure (postdecisional approach of consonant paintings plus postdecisional avoidance of dissonant paintings), either across all experimental subjects or, more importantly, within the experimental repressors, Y (18) = -.20, who manifested significant dissonance-produced selective exposure. It should also be noted that none of the pooled within-cell correlations between overall dissonance-produced selective exposure, overall attitude change, and overall intellectualization was reliably different from zero for the experimental subjects (selective exposure-attitude change Y (30) = -.07, selective exposure-intellectualization r (38) = .16, and attitude changeintellectualization Y (30) = .07). DISCUSSION Experimental repressors manifested dissonance-produced selective exposure, while experimental sensitizers did not. Indeed, if we had not taken repression-sensitization into account, we would have found nothing: the experimental-control main effect was not significant. This suggests that failure to identify these subgroups could severely attenuate the existence of selective exposure effects. Future research should move toward specifying not only the conditions under which, but also the populations within which, dissonance-produced selective exposure effects can be expected. It should also be noted that if we had considered only the chosenrejected dimension and had ignored the positive and negative components of each alternative, then we would not have found the expected exposure effects. Experimental repressors did not substantially increase their inspection of chosen paintings postdecisionally (M = .02), nor did they avoid inspecting rejected paintings (A4 = -.02). Only when the positivenegative dimension was taken into account were the predictions of disso-

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nance theory supported for these subjects. Thus, the expectation that this paradigm would allow a more diagnostic analysis of dissonance-produced selective exposure was supported. The dissonance reduction data suggest that the individual differences in selectivity of exposure were not due to differential levels of dissonance arousal in repressors and sensitizers. Rather, it would appear that both experimental repressors and sensitizers experienced postdecisional dissonance, but responded to it differently. Repressors reduced dissonance by reevaluating the paintings so as to make them more consonant with their choices. Sensitizers coped with dissonance by intellectualizing about the pros and cons of their choices and by separating their affective responses from the cognitive aspects of their decisions. Thus, dissonance was apparently experienced by both groups, but the preferred modes of dissonance reduction were different.2 Similarly, the effects of dissonance on approach and avoidance behaviors were different in the two groups. Repressors avoided inspection of the dissonant paintings and actively focused on the consonant paintings; sensitizers did not seem to approach or avoid the paintings selectively. Given that both groups manifested dissonance reduction via one of the measured modes, these approach/ avoidance differences seem best interpreted as reflecting differences in preferred strategies for dealing with dissonance. The fact that the positively valued paintings produced the largest experimental-control differences in selective exposure for the repressors may suggest that these paintings were more “phenomenologically important” to the experimental repressors. Specifically, it would appear that after making a decision, the negative paintings were neither comforting nor disturbing and, therefore, were not selectively abproached or avoided, but the positive paintings were, depending upon their chosenrejected status, either reassuring or upsetting. However, a word of caution about the generality of these results is in * A recent study tested the reliability of these dissonance reduction differences following a more involving decision (a choice between two pairs of record albums with a total value of about $15, by subjects preselected on the basis of their interest in owning such materials). In addition, to make the experimental and control conditions more directly comparable on the intellectualization measures, control subjects were asked to indicate which pair of albums they would have chosen if they had been offered a choice. The intellectualization results exactly replicated those in the present study, with experimental sensitizers manifesting more postdecisional intellectualization than subjects in any other cell. However, the attitude change data were less clear: Experimental repressors and experimental sensitizers manifested comparable total changes in ranks in a consonant direction, with the magnitudes ofthese total effects being nearly identical to the attitude change manifested by experimental repressors in the present study. On only one album (the negative rejected alternative) did the attitude change results parallel those ofthe present study. Thus, one’s involvement in the decision may be an important factor affecting the chosen mode of dissonance reduction.

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order. It seems likely that when more than two choice alternatives are involved, or when the negative elements of various alternatives are particularly strong, the principles suggested above may not apply. In addition, although the choice made by experimental subjects was conceptualized as a choice between pairs of paintings, it is possible that subjects simply concerned themselves with the attractive paintings in making their decisions. Since the positive and negative paintings were separable within each pair (for example, subjects could throw away the unattractive painting), perhaps only the positive paintings were important in this context, thus producing the selective exposure effects discussed above. It would be possible to manipulate directly the “separableness” of positive and negative alternatives in future research and examine the effects of this factor on exposure. It is interesting to speculate about the conceptual underpinnings of repression-sensitization, especially as they relate to the obtained differences in dissonance-produced selective exposure. One possible conceptual explanation is that differences on this dimension bear upon the assumptions that subjects make about whether or not threatening information can be discredited and thus dealt with directly. Specifically, sensitizers may assume that threatening information can be discredited and, therefore, approach it (or at least do not avoid it), whereas repressors may not make such an assumption. This explanation would place the present findings in the same context as Lowin’s (1967, 1969) research, which demonstrated that subjects will seek dissonant information if they believe that it will be easily refutable. Repression-sensitization might simply be a measure of chronic individual differences along the same dimension that Lowin varied experimentally. One problem with this interpretation of repression-sensitization is that the dimension is correlated with self-esteem (e.g., Feder, 1968), and the direction of this relationship is toward repressors having more positive self-concepts. While it is conceivable that low self-esteem individuals might have more confidence than high self-esteem persons that they can discredit potentially dissonant information, this hypothesis does not have much intuitive appeal. Extant theorizing about repression-sensitization provides little help in assessing the validity of this interpretation. Our position is that the basic difference between repressors and sensitizers relates to the extent to which they separate the affective impact of the potentially threatening information from their cognitive response to it. Specifically, sensitizers do not become upset by threatening information: They take an intellectual approach to the analysis of and response to such stimuli. Repressors, on the other hand, respond in a more “gut reaction” fashion: They do not separate the cognitive and affective components of threatening stimuli, and their affective response leads to a focus upon the

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positive and an avoidance of the negative. This explanation can account for the attitude change and intellectualization results in the present study and for the demonstrated differences in approach and/or avoidance of consonant and dissonant material. While the developmental factors that produce these differences in the tendency to separate affect from cognition are unclear, this analysis suggests that it might be possible to design instructional procedures that encourage responses to threatening stimuli paralleling those of either repressors or sensitizers. And, in fact, several studies by Lazarus and his colleagues (e.g., Lazarus, 1964; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Speisman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, & Davison, 1964) have shown that subjects’ strategies for coping with film-induced threat can be affected by instructional procedures, and that either intellectualizing or repressing strategies can make coping more effective. Conclusions

This experiment has demonstrated that when potentially confounding factors are controlled and appropriate subgroups of subjects are identified, postdecisional dissonance-produced selective exposure can be demonstrated. All of the potentially confounding factors listed by Wicklund and Brehm (1976) were controlled in this experiment. The utility of inspecting each of the alternatives was equal (since the decision had already been made), the familiarity of each painting was presumably approximately equal, and the effects of the “general attractiveness” of the alternatives were constant across conditions (since paintings from the same ranked positions were presented to all subjects). In addition, norms of intellectual honesty or fairness were clearly not applicable to this situation, since experimental subjects believed that the experiment was over when they made their decision and were unaware that they were being monitored. Future research should be directed toward ascertaining the generality of the selective exposure effects obtained here and toward exploring precisely how, if at all, the positive-negative and chosenrejected dimensions interact in determining the phenomenological importance of various types of information. The present experiment also clearly suggeststhat the repression-sensitization dimension be taken into account in contexts where selective approach of consonant material and selective avoidance of dissonant material are being studied. REFERENCES Bell, P. A., & Byrne, D. Repression-sensitization. In H. London & J. E. Exner, Jr. (Eds.) Dimensions of personality. New York: Wiley, 1977. Brock, T. C., & Balloun, J. L. Behavioral receptivity to dissonant information. Journal of Personality

and Social

Psychology,

1967, 6, 413-428.

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14 Byrne, D. Repression-sensitization Progress

in experimental

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REFERENCE

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NOTES

1. White, G. L., & Gerard, H. B. Conflict, decision, and attention to choice alternatives. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974. 2. Olson, J. M., & Zanna, M. P. Exploring repression-sensitization differences in resolving cognitive dissonance: Rationalization versus intellectualization. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, June 1977.