A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium: a developmental approach

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY @) 1982 Butterworths

QUARTERLY,

Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1982, 223-241

A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium: a developmental approach SAUL B. COHEN

President, @een’s

College of the City Universio of New York, Flushing, NY 11367, USA

ABSTRACT. This work presents a geopolitical theory to guide policy makers in formulating long-range plans. The theory applies the developmental approach in general systems theory to the geopolitical world. It is hypothesized that the world system has evolved from undifferentiated, differentiated, and specialized integrative stages, to one that is now unfolding-hierarchical integration. Critical to the emergence of this last stage is the role of regional, or second-order powers. Globalism and regionalism can be accommodated as these two levels of the hierarchy interact. A ranking of second-order powers is presented, and their role in moulding the new geopolitical map of the world is explicated.

Introduction America faces the 1980s in search of a fresh philosophy and strategy affairs. The reality that confronts President Reagan’s administration superpower-dominated

global

order has disintegrated.

In addition

of foreign is that the

to the appear-

ance of other major powers, new regional forces are making major impacts upon international affairs. The new global order that eventually emerges will be strongly affected by the behavior of these regional forces. There theory that will take into account structural relations second-order international

powers, hierarchy

and the relationships of to states of lower orders.

states

is need for a geopolitical between these first- and in these

levels

of

the

The Carter administration’s lack of consistency in foreign affairs was in part the result of the absence of guiding geopolitical theory. It is to be hoped that the readiness of Reagan policy makers to cast aside so many outmoded economic principles will be matched by equal open-mindedness in foreign affairs. Surely a return to policies based upon outmoded, static geopolitical thinking, such as the Containment policy of the 195Os, would be disastrous. Instead, a dynamic theory is needed that takes into account the emergence of new forces that are giving new content and direction to the international system. The stated purpose of this work is to present a geopolitical theory which will guide policy makers in formulating long-range plans. The theory being offered here derives from applying the developmental approach in general systems theory to the

224

A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium

geopolitical world. As with any set of life organisms, the world system can be expected to evolve from its most simple form to its most complex through a process that moves

from undifferentiation

to specialized

and then hierarchical

integration

(Bertalanffy, 1968). The equilibrium that had been struck by the United States and the Soviet Union during both the eras of the Cold War and Detente had as its theoretical underpinnings the geopolitical view of a world divided between the Eurasian Heartland and its North Atlantic-centered maritime reaches (Mackinder, 1904, 1943).

The passing

of this old order is due to sweeping

and social conditions,

to the spread of advanced

changes

military

in world economic

technology

and hardware,

and to new global ideological currents that have rejected both Western capitalism and Moscow’s brand of communism. One manifestation of the upheaval has been the introduction of new myths, symbols, and definitions of national interest, prestige, and security. Another manifestation is variable and often cynical response to terrorism, war, famine, and maldistribution of resources within the world’s family of nations.

Conflicts As in any revolutionary process, many old political with the new to expose sweeping contradictions confirm that we live in a period of geopolitical some insights into the direction that restoration

patterns of behavior co-mingle and conflicts. While conflicts

disequilibrium, of equilibrium

they also provide can take. Conflict is

used here in the Hegelian sense-as the struggle of opposites within social, political and economic thoughts and worlds which ultimately merge into a higher level of world development. It might be argued that the prominence of contradictions and conflicts of political philosophy in the 1970s represents a transition, from the equilibrium of the previous quarter of a century to faltering entry into a new and higher

stage of global

order through

the unification

of opposites.

Thus, the United States announced an arms transfer policy of restraint in 1977, yet arms sales continued to climb because 18 states were exempted from controls in the interest

of maintaining regional balances. Indeed, sales to such countries as Israel, Sudan, Taiwan and Morocco are now Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, burgeoning as the United States places greater weight on regional security problems. The Carter administration heralded its human rights doctrine, but applied it selectively in the process, treating with caution some left-wing totalitarian countries. As a consequence, the Reagan administration has met with vocal and enthusiastic support from conservatives and neo-conservatives in its decision to deal with human rights violations as a separate issue from that of supporting right-wing regimes in the interest of American national security. It rationalizes this as support for ‘authoritarian’ as distinct from totalitarian regimes. Moreover, the current administration offers strong pledges to restore American global preeminence, but its fiscal directors introduce various proposals, such as that of stretching AID budgets over longer periods, or reducing international exchange programs. The ultimate effect of these will be to erode America’s international position. Contradictions are not peculiar to United States foreign policy; they have long been a characteristic of Soviet behavior. Today, the Soviet Union makes alliance with neighboring Syria and Iraq, despite their repression of local communist

SAUL B. COHEN

225

parties, and undermines Euro-communists for their ‘aiding imperialism’ by backing Polish workers. Also, the Russians deny complicity in international terrorism, but permit their satellites to engage directly in training ventures, and supply arms for these purposes even if the question of the direct Soviet training role is debatable. From another quarter, in the pursuit of reulpolitik, China offers to discontinue support of local communist guerilla movements in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in the interest of building alliances with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and repudiates the heirs of Mao for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. This is the same China, however, that assists the renegade and genocidal Khmer Rouge in their struggle to return Pol Pot to power in Kampuchea, rationalizing its support of one of the most repressive regimes to have emerged in modern times in terms of its conflict with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Smaller states are no less prone to contradictions. Both Mexico and Venezuela have abandoned neutralist postures of the past half century to become increasingly involved in Central American affairs, although they maintain much of the neutralistic rhetoric. (It should be recalled that Mexico took such an interventionist posture between 1910 and 1930.) Saudi Arabia is equally fearful of Khomeini’s Islamic radicalism and the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, it sponsored the 1981 Taif Summit Conference which called for United States withdrawal from the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, largely to appease neighboring Iraq and to outflank politically Iran’s radical Syrian and Libyan allies. While it might be argued that Saudi acquiescence was pro forma, its participation did strengthen the hand of extremist Arab states. Algeria, harborer of international terrorists, is asked to mediate one of the most blatant cases of terrorism-the holding of American hostages by Iran. Zimbabwe urges the West to act against South Africa in Namibia, but continues to trade with the neighbor whose race relations policies it so bitterly condemns. In perhaps the ultimate of ironies, the day after Saudi Arabia’s ruler called for ‘ Jihad’ against I srael, he was awarded a United Nations gold peace medal. On the international level, the 1981 20th Anniversary Conference of the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers was replete with slogans of the movement’s unity. In fact, differences over the Gulf War, Afghanistan and Kampuchea have torn apart that cloak of unity. This same Nonaligned Movement of more than 100 Third World countries has as its chairman, Fidel Castro, the head of a Soviet satellite state.

Trends Through

the maze of conflicts and contradictions,

several trends can be discerned:

1. Major powers are taking steps to deal with security and economic affairs in their immediate regions, often at the expense of long-held ideological tenets. 2. These powers are turning more and more to the use of surrogates in military involvements outside their own regions. The Soviet use of Cuban and East German personnel in Angola and Ethiopia is one example. In the Middle East, although the United States has made arrangements for bases in Oman, Bahrein, Somalia and Kenya, and is likely to use Egyptian and Israeli bases in times of emergencies, it is probable that America will turn to Egypt and Israel as surrogates, where the USSR is not directly involved. Whereas the Soviet

226

A new map of global Union’s surrogates are satellites, surrogates as partners. Regional

geopolitical equilibrium

it is important powers expect

for the United States to treat its to share in the determination of

regional strategies, not simply to carry out American dictates. 3. Major powers are retreating from Shatterbelt regions that are distant from them, as proximate major and regional powers are strengthening their positions there. (A Shatterbelt is defined as a region whose internal, geographical, cultural, religious and political fragmentation is compounded by pressures from external major powers attracted resources: Cohen, 1973.) involvement competing

in Southeast political

by the region’s strategic Thus, the United States Asia,

and military

as China influence,

location and economic has reduced its level of

and the USSR meanwhile

have increased

Japan

and Australia

their have

expanded their economic and political commitments. In SubSaharan Africa, China has withdrawn from its involvements of the 196Os, the United States and the Soviet

Union

are playing

and the Maritime European initiative on the subcontinent.

more

temperate

and sometimes

backstage

roles,

nations are regaining the international political In the Middle East, while the United States and

the USSR confront each other directly and through surrogates, the increasingly independent Western European stance on matters affecting the region may ultimately undercut American initiatives. 4. Regional powers, often breaking with traditions of isolation, are beginning to sometimes without regard to major assert themselves within their regions, power interests, and are developing extra-regional alliances amongst themselves. These trends offer insight into the kinds of geopolitical forces which are working towards a new global equilibrium in what is a dialectical process. 1. Thesis:

With profound changes in the control and use of world resources and shifts in the

distribution of wealth, the global poiitical sweep of major powers is less encompassing, the signifiance of regiona& has becomegreater, and regionalpowers have risen to international prominence. 2. Antithesis:

This does not mean, as is being wide4 suggested, that ‘global’ versus ‘regional’

thinking is a polar opposite. 3. Synthesis: Rather it means that our ‘globalists’ and ‘regionalists’ have notyet found a theor_y that can accommodate the interactions of the two levels of geopolitical hierarchy (Russett,

1967).

The regional geopolitical landscape Regions are not new to the contemporary international geopolitical arena. While the recent rise of regional states has focused our attention on the region as a geopolitical entity, it should be recalled that regions first took on geopolitical significance when the global system expanded its great power framework from bipolarity to multipolarity (Hanreider, 1965). Within a post-World War II world geostrategically divided into two realms-the trade-Dependent Maritime and the Eurasian Continental-regionalism evolved as Maritime Europe, Japan and China re-emerged as major forces. ’ By the early 196Os, European economic recovery had provided political strength and independence to its geopolitical region, particularly to the core-Common Market Europe and its political counterpart, the European Communities. Meanwhile, Japan’s social metamorphosis and sweeping industrial

SAUL &COHEN

227

gains had enabled it to gain a powerful economic role in Offshore Asia, from South Korea to Australia, and in Southeast Asia. Finally, China’s break with the Soviet Union divided the Heartland and East European geopolitical region from the East Asian region. Moreover, the split contributed to further confirmation of Southeast Asia as a Shatterbelt region. This multipolarity of the great powers also enabled other regions of the world to take clearer geopolitical form, as the bipolar monopoly over the economic and military conditions within their global or geostrategic realms was broken. Japan and the European Economic Community countries competed more heavily with the United States in Latin America, and their resurgence offered Middle Eastern nations new options in international orientation. Each situation also provided some leeway for states located within a geopolitical region to increase their influence within this region. In South Asia, India maintained itself against Chinese military and political pressures with the help of the USSR. In Southeast Asia, the combination of the Sino-Soviet split and the American withdrawal has given Vietnam the opportunity to organize the northern half of this Shatterbelt region. In reaction to the Vietnam-Soviet alliance, the ASEAN pact, a more realistic regional organization than SEATO, has been strengthened as an indigenously based regional movement. Meanwhile, regional organizations supported by distant extra-regional powers, such as the Middle East and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization Treaty Organization (METO) (SEATO), have disintegrated. Within this unfolding regional geopolitical landscape, a number of second-level (regional) powers began to emerge in the 1970s through varying combinations of oil wealth, population growth, adoption of modern technology and successful trial by military ordeal. The regional influence of such states has grown as they have offered economic support to certain states within their regions, enhancing the general character of regionality. With strength that is intrinsic rather than dependent upon outside powers, this new order of states has developed ideological dynamism to enhance the importance of the socio-economic factor. Moreover, these new powers have reached outside of their regions to affect not only the capitals and major cities of those major powers that had so long monopolized the world’s affairs, but also to influence the actions of regional states in other parts of the world. (Egypt has influenced Pakistan’s recent pro-American stance; Nigeria and Brazil are trying to strengthen their economic bonds.) The impact of these second-order powers has many kinds of manifestations. None has had a greater political/psychological effect on the major powers than the omnipresence of persons, symbols and signs in Europe’s great cities, and in such American centers as New York, Miami, New Orleans and Los Angeles. In Europe, billboards advertising Asian, African and Latin-American airlines, store signs in Arabic script, national airline offices and ethnic food restaurants from the three continents, a plethora of Arabic language newspapers displayed prominently in kiosks, and, above all, the businessman, tourist, shopper, student and adolescent youth from these newly powerful countries demonstrate that the world has changed. They have joined the overseas symbols of American power-the Hilton, the Holiday Inn, Hertz, Avis, ESSO, Mobil, IBM, the English-language newspaper, the American bar and restaurant, and the tourist, student, and businessman-to share the landscape of sight, sound and taste with Americans. The same picture can be sketched for the centers of American cities that have

228

drawn

A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium

Brazilian,

Venezuelan,

Mexican

and

Argentinian

visitors

and

investment migration).

(as distinct from the Cuban presence that is the product Moreover, Americans are now assuming new roles abroad;

post-World

War II economic

director

servant-the technician serving As a result of their new-found political gap between themselves them and neighbours sense and the reality

and military

financial of forced not as the

leader, but as a new class of civil

the behest of rising nations. strength, second-order powers have narrowed the and the major powers. Also, the disparity between

within their regions has grown, further contributing to their of power. Their presence is thus manifested in all political

arenas-global (oil states at Can&n), regional (Nigeria in the OAU), interregional (Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia), and binational (Vietnam in Kampuchea)-and accurately reflects the changes that have come to our global system. American policy makers have not been oblivious to the importance

of regional

powers. Certainly the voices of regionalists have tried to clarify the political and economic goals that the United States should be seeking in specific countries or parts of the world, as distinct from more generally defined geostrategic interests. The Carter administration paid obeisance to regional states when, in the early days of his term, the President scheduled a ‘package’ tour to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Poland, Belgium and France. Even though the trip had to be rescheduled and broken up because of a Congressional energy bill impasse, the diplomatic point made was that the first six states were states of new international stature, several

and that some of the issues to be discussed were of common of the nations visited. Moreover, at the Can&n Conference

industrialized and developing states, while six were from major power of the 22 participating nations were states of regional prominence. However, its relations

concern to of Western groups,

10

the ambiguities and hesitations that the United States has displayed in with regional powers suggests that their place in the international

structure

is not clearly set. What constitutes

in effect,

a junior

partner,

to what

degree

a regional should

power?

If a regional

it be encouraged

state is,

to develop

independent stances? Also, while there is focus on the emergence of regional powers, there has been little attention to the role that such states play with third parties, except as attempts are made to enlist regional powers in efforts to achieve certain objectives with those third parties. Where, in short, do regional powers fit in the overall scheme of a global system?

Geopolitical

theory-hierarchical

integration

It is in this connection that geopolitical theory assumes relevance. Geopolitical theory is rooted in the analysis of the interrelationship of the body politic and nature. While man’s political institutions may seem to be unaffected by laws of equilibrium, nature is not. It operates within laws of equilibrium that are observable and understandable. Space, relative location, distance, climate, soils, water and mineral and human resources, all of which have consequences for the behavior of states, are not static commodities. Whether they vary in response to man’s actions or to natural processes, their changes are predictable. However complicated the interactions of humans and the natural environments, these interactions create geopolitical forces that can ultimately be brought into balance. If we speak of ‘geopolitical’ rather than political order, therefore, it is because

SAUL B. COHEN

229

politics are not separable from natural elements. Since these are linked, homeostasis in the international system can be a realistic goal rather than a pious wish. Ironically, the term ‘geopolitical’ has become popularized in foreign policy circles to express a crude form of locational and spatial determinism more akin to the normative way in which Germangeopolitik was employed, and leading to such conclusions as uncritical acceptance of the domino theory. In applying this approach to the relations among states, we suggest that, in medieval times, there was undifferentiation among geopolitical systems. With the national period came differentiation and competition among states. When truly global reach was attained after World War II, the system evolved into specialized integration, first through major power bipolarity and then through multipolarity among major powers. In the past decade, however, the system has been thrown into disequilibrium by the emergence of regional, or second-order powers. Equilibrium will be restored when the system achieves a higher form of specialization-hierarchical integration. For clarification, we can apply this developmental sequencing to the national state: (a) Undijkentiation is the stage in which none of the parts is distinguishable; instead the parts arefu.Fedso that detachment of any part does not affect the ability of the whole to survive. An example is the earliest stage of the feudal system in which the whole is kept together by allegiance to the King, rather than to a particular piece of territory. There is no core area save the castle at which the King happens to be residing at any given time, and this is a ‘portable’ core. (b) The Manoriaf System, in effect a more advrnced stage of feudalism in which the lord of the manor usually held the land from a more powerful lord and in turn granted the peasant use of the land, represents a diJ%entiated stage of feudalism. The fiefholdings are parts of the whole. They are distinguishable from one another, but are isolated or atomiqed. Loss of any single fiefdom does not affect the feudal kingdom as a whole. Moreover, a core area with which the King is identified becomes an essential part of the Kingdom. (c) Specialixed Integration is the stage in which parts of the state have specialized functions, integration being achieved by exchange of said functions. In this stage, there is some duplication of effort among the parts, because of the coordinate nature of the system, which involves conflict, creative tension and ultimate reconciliation. A political federation is most representative of specialized integration. Loss of any of the parts is likely to dismember the whole. Political core areas play a minor role and are transferable. (9 Hierarchical Integration is the stage in which specialized parts are integrated and controlled from a central node. Duplication is eliminated for efficiency’s sake. The core area plays the dominant role as a uniquely specialized part. Loss of any single part may not cause dismemberment of the whole, but will require major redistribution of functions among the parts. In effect, we are describing the highly centralized national state. For the future, it is possible to consider the redevelopment of a stage of flexible hierarchical integration, in which specialized parts have sufficient breadth and complexity to assume, through transposition, new roles within the hierarchy without undermining the system’s unity. For example, the functions of political core areas might be decentralized (distributing ministries or functions of

230

A new map of global geopolitical eqdibrium

government the political

in different parts of the country, such as in South Africa), or the role of core might be transferred periodically (a national capital might be

alternately located, every two decades, in Washington, Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles). Flexible hierarchy and transposition depend upon a nation’s ability to transcend barriers of time and space through sophisticated telecommunications; upon the breadth of resources in each specialized part so that changes of emphasis in specialization can be readily achieved; and upon a people’s and willingness to exchange resources and responsibilities The hierarchical

integration

envisaged

high degree of openness amongst its parts.’

in this paper for the international

system

is based upon a number of orders or levels of states that are linked across levels (horizontally), and among levels (vertically), i.e. the global and regional. The emerging system has a five-fold hierarchical structure. The first order consists of the major powers, the United States, the USSR, the European Communities, Japan and China which have a global reach within the world’s two major geostrategic realms.3 The second order consists of regional powers whose reach extends throughout their geopolitical regions and, in specialized ways, to other parts of the world. The third, fourth and fifth levels are reserved for states whose reach is generally limited to parts of regions only (K a pl an, 1974; Cohen, 1976). Policy makers must deal with states in accordance with their appropriate levels of power, if restoration of international equilibrium is to be achieved. In particular, we in the United States must change. We must be sensitive to how states are organizing themselves within and across the hierarchy. We must, especially, learn how to deal with the second-order powers of this world. A nation’s rank in the hierarchy can be assessed through a number of measures. The higher the scale that is reached on the following criteria, the greater the level of power: (a)

critical variety

mass of human and material resources and level of technology and culture;

(b) (c)

nuclear technology; degree of national cohesiveness, and racial factors,

based upon

and sense of national

including

social,

numbers,

religious,

cultural,

quality,

ethnic

history;

(d) political-military energy threshold, from high surplus, to maintenance, to minimum survival levels. Surplus energy can be defined as energy which is available to a state to expend beyond its borders. This is measured in such terms as size of weaponry and armed forces needed to protect national interests abroad, military and economic foreign aid, size of embassy and other mission staffs, diplomatic visit exchanges, and international organizational activities devoted to external links; geographical range based upon global locations and reach to other orders of the hierarchy within the geopolitical region; cf) pattern and density of network of international links; (g) degree to which national system characteristics are open; (h) economic, political and military strength relative to neighboring states; (z] value goals and strategy for wielding influence beyond its border; u) number and complexity of international issues that a state can handle simultaneously, a measure of its political scope, maturity and options; (k) perception or self-image as to rank in the hierarchy.4

(e)

Power

rankings

or inventories

are commonly

used in international

assessment.

SAUL

B. COHEN

231

They admittedly suffer from being somewhat mechanical. Therefore, the attempt has been here to include a number of value and political behavioral characteristics that reach beyond the traditional emphasis upon population, area, economic resources and military capacities. The second-order power For second-order powers, the above criteria relate to both the regional and global settings. Because the second-order power is so pivotal in shaping the geopolitical regional framework, specific assessments of these states should view the above criteria in the following context: First, the success with which a national state can achieve some measure of intra-regional superiority. This is partly a function of how the state perceives itself and is perceived by its neighbors as mirroring the goals and values of the region as a whole. It is also a function of the degree of nodality of the state-transportation, communications and resources exchange base-which promotes its emergence as the regional core. In effect, the second-order power is politically motivated to take the lead in pan-regional activities. In this connection, note the attempts of Nigeria, Egypt and India to gain ascendancy within their respective regions. Second, the strength of a state’s ties to second-order and other levels outside the region. Extra-regional ties are measured in such terms as political-military alliances, complementarity of economic aims, or ideological compatibility. Much of a second-order state’s strength as a political innovator lies in its ability to export innovations to other second-order powers (and to import others in return). Here note India’s traditional lead in fostering the concept of Third World neutrality, despite its ambiguities over Afghanistan, or the role that Sweden claims for itself as a dispassionate neutral. Third, the ability of a state to gain sustenance from one or more great powers without becoming a satellite. Second-order powers continually strive for economic, political and military independence from first-order states. While these goals are not fully attainable, independence in one sphere (e.g. technological or economic) may act as a counterweight to dependence in another sphere (e.g. military). An example is Iraq’s dependence upon the USSR for military hardware, but its reliance upon France for nuclear technology, which in turn prompted Israel to bomb the Baghdad reactor. In all of the above, geographic proximity stimulates the process of national political and economic development, either out of fear, jealousy or hatred, or out of emulation and attraction. The nearness to second-order aspirants of first-order powers and other second-order nations or aspirants nurtures an action-reaction process, a form of dialectic. Moreover, regional propinquity facilitates transnational flows (labor, tourism, goods). The quality of regionality also exposes to questioning cultural and ideological norms that would otherwise perhaps not be challenged if peoples did not live side-by-side. As a result, the regional framework may nurture the emergence of more than one regional power hopeful, especially when first-orders are located nearby to stimulate the dialectic process (e.g. Venezuela and Mexico). To assess second-order power states, 27 states were ranked on an ordinal scale (see Figure 7). The ranking was based on 12 items derived from the aforementioned

SHATTERBELTS

1HDEPENiXW

~xO~WLIT~SAL

4

*

@

0

l

First-Order

Power

Current Second-Order Power Contsnder Lonptarm Second-Order Power Prospects Non-Regional Focus Changing Geopolitical Regional Boundaries

Erc;wa~ 1. Current geopolitical status of major world regions.

H)I(;ION

work0

POWER

M~TIME

hUf?ASIAN CONTINENfM

Tft~Ofi-DEPENDENT

SAUL B. COHEN

233

hierarchical ranking criteria, each item being assigned weighting. The resulting score is given in Table 1.

a one through

four

TABLE 1. Regional power rankings

Top third (42 through 33points): (42) India, (41) Brazil, (40) Australia-Canada-Sweden, (35) Israel, (34) South Africa, (33) Yugoslavia. (b) Middle third (31 through 29 points): (31) German Democratic Republic-Nigeria-Turkey-Venezuela-Vietnam, (30) Mexico, (29) Argentina-Egypt Cc) Lower third (26 through 2Opoint.r): (26) Algeria-Indonesia-Spain, (24) Cuba-Iran-Morocco-Poland, (23) Pakistan, (22) Iraq, (21) Saudi Arabia, (20) Zaire.

(a)

Table 2 shows the distribution of global and regional power aspirants by geopolitical region. Emphasis upon value and political behavioral characteristics in the criteria produces ranking results that are substantially different from those produced by other rating scales. Thus Cline, who used critical mass, economic capability, military capability and strategic purpose to arrive at a perceived power ranking, emerged with very different results (Cline, 1980). His rank order for the states listed in Table I are: Brazil, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam-South Africa-Israel-Spain, India, Argentina, Pakistan-Nigeria-Mexico, Zaire, Algeria-Poland, Turkey, German Democratic Republic, Iran, Sweden, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Venezuela and Cuba. Moreover, in Cline’s ranking, Taiwan and South Korea are close to the top of the list, Chile and the Philippines outrank Pakistan, Nigeria and Mexico, Thailand outranks Turkey, and the Sudan and Colombia outrank Venezuela and Cuba! Second-order states in the hierarchy are not homogeneous in nature. Some must compete directly with the primary power located within their geopolitical region

TABLE 2. Number

of first- and second-order

Geopohtical region Anglo-America South America

by geopolitical

region

First-order Second-order Second-order powers power contenders power prospects 1

and the Caribbean

3 2

1 1 1 1

Maritime Europe and the Maghreb Offshore Asia Heartland and Eastern Europe East Asia South Asia Southeast Asia The Middle East SubSaharan Africa

powers

-

1 -

1 1 2

3

1 1 1 1

1 1 5 2

1

-

234 (e.g.

A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium

Yugoslavia

vies with the USSR).

Others

compete

for influence

within

their

own region with first-order states that are located in adjoining regions (e.g. Brazil vying with the United States in South America, India with China in South Asia, or Vietnam with China in Southeast Asia). Still others face pressures and competition within their region from distant major powers (e.g. Nigeria from the European Communities, the United States and the USSR in Sub-Saharan Africa; Venezuela from Japan and the United States in Western South America). The accessibility factor that is important to the definition of the geopolitical region has clear military, political and psychological consequences, and somewhat less compelling economic influences. While

20 to 30 nations

either aspire to or are perceived

as having

second-order

status, some have not yet achieved the necessary geopolitical maturity and others may never achieve their goal. Among those states that have attained such status are India, Brazil, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Vietnam, Australia and Canada. They possess, in varying degrees, the prerequisite size, resource base, technological capacity, skilled military forces, ideological dynamic consensus

and sense of national identity (although the struggle continues to pose serious problems for Nigeria, Yugoslavia

for national and Canada).

Venezuela and Mexico, as they cast aside traditions of isolation, invest more heavily in their military forces and join the United States and Canada to spearhead Caribbean economic development, will meet the criteria. So will Argentina and Turkey, once they resolve their class upheavals, and Iran when it emerges from the turmoil of revolution. Egypt, despite its present split with the rest of the Arab world, has the potential,

too. Resolution

of the Arab-Israeli

conflict

is necessary

for

Egypt to regain primacy within the Arab world, but only an Egypt at peace with Israel can hope to have second-order status. Should conditions allow Egypt also to assert strategic control over Libya and its oil resources, then the Egyptian position would be assured. Surely Libya, the arch-sponsor of international terrorism, is a major destabilizing force in the Middle East and the West. Certain nations seem to have overwhelming second-order level. Poverty, internal religious,

odds against their gaining the racial or ethnic divisiveness,

geographical isolation, limitations of size or resources, the massive, often hostile pressure of neighboring first-order powers are the contributing factors. These states include Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Za’ire-all of which at one time or another have been or are being treated by policy makers of major powers as regional powers. Poland, because of its critical strategic location between Central and Eastern Europe, has thus far been unable to attain that modicum of independence from the Soviet Union that second-order powerdom requires. Despite the persistence and strength of Polish upheavals, the USSR does not seem prepared to permit Poland to go the way of Romania’s type of ideological independence, let alone that of Yugoslavia. The United States should bear this in mind in weighing the Cuban threat in Central America where the Soviet shield would be of little value to Cuba should America deem a genuine regional emergency to arise. Saudi Arabia is too limited in manpower, too weak militarily, too traditional in political structure, too dependent on its outside workforce, and too vulnerable to pressure from neighbors for pre-eminent regional power status. Its royal family must even employ Pakistani troops as mercenaries to protect the regime against tribal factionalism.

On the other

hand,

Saudi oil wealth

and adherence

to Islamic

SAUL

B. COHEN

235

fundamentalism does allow the Kingdom to exercise influence over the other Gulf states and some of the Arab parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraq’s basic religious and ethnic schisms are too great a Iiability. Moreover, its well-armed military machine has not been able to inflict decisive defeat upon an Iran caught up in utter turmoil. Impoverished Pakistan has too limited a resource base, and must export part of its army as mercenaries to keep afloat economically. Zaire’s physical geography and tribal composition nurtures cultural separatism and political fragmentation. American foreign policy has made critical errors in over emphasizing the possible benefits of accords with such countries as Morocco and ZaYre, or in deferring to the threats of hostility by such states as Pakistan and Iraq. Two nations hold unique positions-Israel and the Republic of South Africa. While they each possess many important attributes of second-order powerdom, they lack regional hinterlands. Israel and South Africa are politically isolated from their regions as the result of drawn-out conflict and hostility. As an offset, their geographically peripheral locations which inhibit regional ties make it somewhat easier for them to escape isolation through extra-regional ties. Canada, too, might be said to have a regional hinterland that is too geographically limited, but it must be pointed out that its relationship with its adjoining major power, the United States, is one that provides increasingly greater scope for economic and political independence; witness Canada’s policies of buying out American controlling interests in Canadian energy companies. Following the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Caribbean, Canada briefly flirted with the prospect of developing substitute political links with several of the former British dependencies, but nothing came to pass. Nevertheless, Canada’s economic links are growing in certain of the islands, and its political relations with Mexico and Venezuela are likely to become stronger as all three nations continue to take more independent stances vi.+h-vis the United States. While second-order powers have extra-regional as well as regional reach, third-order powers are generally regionally confined. Some compete with second-order powers, less on military and economic grounds, than on moral and spiritual ones (the extreme Third World orientation of Jamaica under Manley or Bourguiba’s moderate approach to the search for Third World neutrality) (Dore, 1975). Such states are more likely to seek roles of regional accommodators and to avoid global entanglements that might have military consequences because of their subordinate relationship to second-order states. Third-order states can reach beyond their regions when acting as surrogates (e.g. Cuba), and their militant regional activities have had global repercussions (e.g. Ethiopia on Somalia, Syria on Lebanon, North Korea on South Korea, Libya on Chad, Iraq on Iran). Others, in the absence of nearby second-order states, may exercise their limited military power to influence events in neighboring countries (e.g. Tanzania’s successful use of its military to overthrow Amin in Uganda; and Libya’s failure there, but its success in Chad). In sum, emergence of third-order powers further projects the geopolitical region as an international action setting. Fourth-order nations, such as the Sudan, Ecuador or Zambia, have meaningful impacts only on their neighbors. Fifth-order states Iike Nepal or Paraguay try to remain only marginally involved with other states, their prime concern being survival. They must apply all their energies to their internal affairs.

Maritime World

_p

EMCEE 2. The world’s geostrategic

rtgions and their geopolitical

1 Eurasian Cantinental Power I .vmm~cilts I Independent Geopolitical Region

Tra&4@pendent

MARITIME /EUROPE

subdivisions.

SAUL B. COHEN

Geopolitical

structure

237

and equilibrium

To return to the theme that globalism and regionalism are compatible, we note that, developmentally speaking, the international political system is in a stage of differentiation and early specialized integration on the regional scale, and in a stage of hierarchical integration at the global scale. Geopolitical regions lie spatially within or are caught between the geostrategic realms. (See Figure 2 for a map of a hierarchically structured world as conceived by the author 20 years ago, with two geostrategic and 10 geopolitical divisions: Cohen, 1973.) The geopolitical regions within the Trade-Dependent Maritime Realm today are Anglo-America and the Caribbean, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, Offshore Asia and South America. The two regions within the Continental Eurasian Realm are the Heartland and Eastern Europe, and East Asia. South Asia constitutes an independent geopolitical region, and the world’s three Shatterbelt regions are the Middle East, Southeast Asia and SubSaharan Africa. Thus, there are six dependent, one independent, and three Shatterbelt geopolitical regions, the latter fragmentized and caught up in major power conflicts. Today’s geopolitical map of the world (see Figure I) differs from the earlier one in that the regions have acquired greater weight relative to the global realms, because of the combination of major multipolarity and second-order power emergence. The significance of geopolitical change over the past two decades is not in the regional boundary modifications that are shown-this was inevitable; nor is it in shifts of regional status-e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa’s shifting from the role of a component of the Maritime World to that of a Shatterbelt. Instead, it is in the inherent dynamism of the regions that stems from changes in resource values, population growth, improved access and new systems of political organization. This significance also lies in the greater interconnectedness of regions, partly because of links among major powers, and partly because of economic, cultural and ideological ties among second-order states. All of these linkages are complex, and generate issues that overlap and are sometimes at cross-purposes-e.g. arms sales and controls, nuclear policy, human rights, energy, environmental pollution, migration policies, technology transfer, economic disparities. The playing out of this multiplicity of issues makes purely bilateral action within or across regions most unlikely, and gives greater salience to more general regional characteristics and features. To envisage a world in equilibrium, we should adopt a new mental map of the world. This is not a world divisible into two, along traditional seapower and landpower lines (nor into the five major powers-the United States, the USSR, the European Communities, Japan and China). The Soviet Union is now a major maritime power, and for Westerners to continue to speak of containing the USSR from ‘reaching warm waters’ is to lock the stable after the horse has fled. Since the distinction between ‘perceived’ and ‘objective’ environments is often more apparent than real, the writer must be forgiven if he injects some of the conclusions that he has drawn as an American scholar from the world view that has been presented. The fact that the United States cannot confine the outreach of the Soviet Union does not mean, however, that it should concede supremacy on the open seas. On the contrary, allowing American naval forces to erode in strength was America’s single greatest strategic error of the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, it was a failure of the West as a whole. The Reagan administration’s commitment to the

238

A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium

build-up of naval forces reflects its understanding that America’s tied to its abilities to secure the links of the Trade-Dependent

vital interests are Maritime World.

Twenty-five per cent of US Gross National Product is involved in either imports or as it uses about a quarter of the earth’s annual production of natural exports, resources to maintain 5 per cent of its population. America’s survival is tied to its ability to import and to export-a process that is related not only to warships, but to a viable (and necessarily subsidized) merchant fleet. Just as the United States must be prepared to meet the Soviet challenge on the open seas, so must it have the naval capacity

to carry

the challenge

Pacific waters. On land, the United

States

to the Soviet

Union

is not in a position

in its northern

to seek military

Atlantic

and

parity with the

USSR operating from its Continental Eurasian Realms. America should accept the reality that it will remain strategically handicapped in the face of various Soviet probes and pressures around its Eurasian periphery, and tailor its political actions and military strategies to this reality. The Soviet Union needs to invest in superior land-force numbers to act simultaneously in any possible direction-Europe, East Asia, and even the Arctic. The United

the Middle East, Central Asia, States, on the other hand, needs

sufficient land power which, in combination with air and sea power, assures its ability to act decisively in those geopolitical regions which are part of the Maritime World, and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The build-up of NATO conventional parity level with those of the Warsaw Pact, and the Rapid Deployment

forces to a Force to

limited actions outside Europe, are the most pressing needs in this context. Pressing the European NATO allies to accept modernized tactical nuclear weapons would seem to have a greater cost than benefit, because it suggests that America is prepared to abandon the use of strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet attack on Western Europe. In Southeast Asia and the Middle East, it is clear that United States strategy cannot depend upon matching the Soviet Union’s or China’s land forces. In such regions, American naval and air strength must bear the lion’s share of the burden, hence the need for the Trident submarines and the Stealth bomber (the B-l bomber has more questionable value because of its vulnerability to existing technology). Clearly, a direct engagement with the USSR in such regions would be linked to confrontation in Maritime Europe and/or Offshore Asia. In Maritime Europe, where the strategic goals are global, not regional, NATO will not risk anything less than land-power parity with the Soviet Union. The USSR

uses surrogates

in regions

in which

it is at a strategic

disadvantage

(e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia), or where it does not want to risk direct confrontation with the United States (e.g. the Middle East). America should seek to build up surrogates in regions where it does not wish to risk direct confrontation (e.g. the Middle East), or where there is no need for massive American intervention because of Soviet strategic inferiority (e.g. the Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia). Parity in the air, land inferiority in Eurasia, and superiority on the seas represent strategic conditions that are consistent with American vital interests and within the limits of its capacities. The new mental map envisages a world, then, with several meaningful divisions, with a great deal of overlap at the level of both global strategic realms and geopolitical subdivisions. The United States shares responsibility or competes in these arenas of land, air and water with both major and

SAUL

B.

COHEN

239

second-order states whose outreach penetrates broad regional and extra-regional hinterlands. In addition, the mental map should be changed to extend the geographical outlines of these regions to include combinations of current landmasses and adjoining ocean waters and floors. Think of the world’s geopolitical regions as embracing the banks or shallow seas of the world up to the 100 fathom line, and, as technological development extends their exploitation, up to 1500 fathoms. Modern technology already permits the use of the banks and adjacent waters and, although at greater cost, even far deeper ocean troughs. Within the outlines of such a mental map would lie the Arctic, Antarctic, the waters off both sides of the North Atlantic from Greenland to the Bahamas and from Iceland to the Cape Verde Islands, the eastern seaward extensions of Asia from the Bering Sea in the North Pacific to the Eastern Philippine Sea to Melanesia beyond Australasia, and most of the Caribbean and the Southeast Asian waters. If we viewed the northern and southern hemispheres as two cones whose lids rested on one another, the top half of the upper cone could be nearly solid, as would the lower quarter of the bottom cone. Within the two cones, the oceanic parts of the globe with limited exploitation possibilities would look like diamond-shaped holes in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean basins, and there would be a smaller triangular hole representing the Indian Ocean. Within all of the holes there would be solid areas, many larger than the island of Madagascar. The implications of this are that geopolitical regions would cover much larger geographical areas than the current landmasses. While we would not conceive of the new, expanded regions as capable of self-sufficiency, the main value of the ocean extensions being in specialized minerals and foodstuffs, such regions surely would contribute to a greater global economic interdependence. Finally, in viewing the new and unfolding map of world geopolitical equilibrium, we should be mindful that the NorthhSouth dialogue has been cast too simplistically. The South or the Developing World is not a unified entity. It consists of diverse clusters of nations in different regions, with varying potential and at various stages of maturity. The interests of each of these clusters is increasingly regional, and nations within them are organizing themselves hierarchically. In addition to the likelihood that the dialogue will become more regionally framed, there is the reality that East-West relations within the Developed World will retain their geostrategic or global-spanning primacy. The major lines of cooperation and contention amongst the major powers will continue to play the primary role in determining the geopolitical order to come. The geopolitical regions that are in developing stages will play equilibria1 roles, but in the context of their unique needs for specialized relationships with other parts of the world, both developed and developing. Restoration of global geopolitical equilibrium cannot simply be willed. It depends upon a system of shared responsibility by the first- and second-order powers located within the Maritime world and, although to a more limited extent, upon shared responsibilities by the West, the USSR and China in the Shatterbelts of the world. Actions which further the rise of second- and third-order powers, in hierarchical relationship to one another and to fourth- and fifth-order states, is a major aspect of the sharing of responsibility. Such action has to be taken by all major powers, despite the fact that their national interests may often be in conflict with such sharing. Global geopolitical equilibrium cannot be restored by the

240

A new map of globalgeopolitical

equilibrium

United States and the Soviet Union, individually or jointly, and the world cannot achieve this goal without these powers. This is the essence of interdependence, and this is the guiding strategy which must shape the foreign policies of all nations genuinely concerned with the need to restore global equilibrium.

Notes Cohen (1973, chapter 3) proposed the concept of geopolitical regions as vital subsystems of global spanning (geostrategic realms). The geostrategic region is defined as ‘the expression of the interrelationship of a large part of the world in terms of location, movement, trade orientation, and cultural or ideological bonds’. The geopolitical region is ‘derived directly from geographic regions and provides a framework for common political and economic actions. Contiguity of location and complementarity of resources are particularly distinguishing marks’. In effect, geostrategic regions are strategic in scope and nodal in structure, while geopolitical regions are tactical in scope and more uniform in structure. The author is indebted to B. Kaplan and S. Wapner of the Department of Psychology, Clark University for their various approaches to defining organismic-developmental stages. Fusion, isolation, coordinate integration and hierarchical integration were specifically proposed as stages in Bibace et al. (1968). See also, Kaplan et al. (1973) and Wapner (1980). For ideological reasons, the Chinese communist leadership rejects China’s being classed as a superpower, characterizing theirs as a ‘third world’ nation, and characterizing Maritime Europe and Japan as ‘second world’. This perspective stems from a world view of divisions into three contending but interdependent parts, with ultimate victory for the ‘third world’ emerging through revolutionary struggle. There is little of a regional framework in this perspective. For the rise in political status of Japan see Overholt (1975). We have classed the European Community (Common Market Europe) as a first-order power. While it may be argued that the Community of Nine does not behave as a common front, and that its three leaders, the German Federal Republic, France and the United Kingdom, are, individually, second-order states, there are sufficient common political as well as economic bonds to justify treating the Community as a unit. Examples of political unity are the agreement on an Elected European Parliament, cooperation on anti-terrorism, consultative bloc organization within the United Nations, and the European Commission’s common policy on growth rates and inflation. For views that relegate individual European states to second-class powers, see Spencer (1977). For an argument on the need for small states to join the European alliance, see Hirsch (1976). Geopolitical systems can be analyzed from the perspective of agent-environment interrelationships. Nations may be treated as agents and geostrategic and geopolitical regions as environments. What the agent nation knows, feels and values is the basis for selecting the salient objects of the environment, be these narrow straits, minerals, soils, or peoples (Cohen, 1973). Also, Korany (1974) discusses self-perception as an important criterion in the ranking of Third World nations.

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