A robust attribution error in the personality domain

JOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL

17. 587-600

PSYCHOLOGY

( 1981)

A Robust Attribution Error in the Personality Domain ARTHUR

G.

MILLER

EDWARD E.

JONES

AND

STEVE

Received

The

error

of

inferring

HINKLE

August

dispositional

causes

I.

1980

for

constrained

vestigated in the domain of personality. Subjects were write essays presenting themselves as strongly introverted groups, subjects ersioniextraversion

exchanged of the

essays writer.

and The

estimated procedure

the actual minimized

certain factors conducive to correspondent inference. constraint or nonrepresentative sample of disposition\ experiment included an the situational constraint the writer. occurred. consistent rection of

instructional or reinforcing

attitude attribution an initial hypothesis

in-

e.g.. the low salience of among essay writers. The

of

accentuating to individuate

correspondent of the essays.

research. suggest of correspondent

Subjects may then use their impression of the essay’s which to adjust their attribution in accord with the

was

(self-rated) mtrov the likelihood of

set variable which involved the subjects inclination

In all conditions. a significant pattern with attributions aligned to the directionality with findings from the essay provides

behavior

randomly assigned to or extraverted. Within

extremity constraint

The

inference result\.

that the diinference.

as a basis upon of the position

assignment.

This study was conducted while the first author was an NIMH postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University. The research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BNS-7707290) to Edward E. Jones. The writer\ wish to thank David DeVoe. of Miami University. and Janet Morgan Riggs and Chat-les Perdue. of Princeton University. for their help at various stages of this experiment. Requests for reprints should be sent to

Arthur

G. Miller,

Department

of Psychology.

Miami

University.

Oxford.

OH

45056.

587 00X-1031/81/060587-14$0?.00/0 Copyright ,tl 1981 by Academic Pres\, Inc All rightc of reproductwn ,n any fwm rerervrd.

588

MILLER. JONES. .4ND HINKLE

Compelling evidence from a variety of experimental contexts suggests that observers underestimate the role of external constraints in attributing acts to internal dispositions. Much of this evidence for a “fundamental attribution error” (Ross. 1977) comes from studies in which observers attribute attitudes in line with opinion statements presumably constructed and delivered under highly constraining instructions (e.g.. Jones & Harris, 1967). Although there seems little debate about the pervasiveness of a fundamental attribution error, there is dispute about its origins and its generality. The present experiment was designed to reduce the area of dispute about processes involved and to explore whether the error also obtains when a classic personality dimension is the referent. Jones (1979) considers a number of largely artit‘actual explanations for the attribution error which might logically determine or contribute to the bias effect. Such explanations include: (a) the pitting of strong behavioral against weaker situational manipulations (Kelley, 1971): (b) assumptions that no-choice conditions result in subject mortality of those truly opposed to the assignment: tc) the contention that observer:, are themselves persuaded by the statement and project their new attitudes onto the target person: and (d) often linked with this. the suggestion that observer\ believe target persons have been influenced by their own arguments. this belief is valid. and thus observers arc accurately assessing the target person’s new true attitude (Yandell & lnsko, 1977). Jones (1979) interprets the existing evidence to suggest that none ot these conditions is a necessary condition for the fundamental attribution error. However. it is reasonable to assume that factors affecting the relative salience of the constraints on the target person’s behavior will determine the magnitude and possibly even the existence of the error. Typical instructions in the attitude attribution paradigm present the esperiment as involving the accuracy of first impressions (e.g.. Jones & Harris. 1967. p. 4: Jones. Riggs. & Quattrone. 1979. p. 1131). These instructions may set the subject to individuate or to capitalize on what seems distinctive about the target person. The experimental instructions may contain an implicit message or demand that the essay is in fact diagnostic of the writer‘s attitude. thus contradicting the hypothesis of correspondent inference theory. i.e.. that the sub.ject should essentially discount the essay and estimate the modal or typical attitude tJone\ 6i McGillis. 1976). A variation in the present experiment was to present the study as concerned with the effects of situational constraints on behavior, thus making the no-choice instructions highly salient. If such variations in the experiment’s cover story could be shown to have substantial effects on the magnitude of the error. this would place clear limitations upon the generality of the phenomenon. Reeder and Brewer (1979) have suggested that an explanation of the observer error in attitude attribution may be derived from research on

ATTRIBUTION ERROR IN PERSONALITY DOMAIN

589

the “false consensus bias” (Ross, 1977). Kelley and Michela (1980) have also made this point. From this perspective, subjects consider the essays that they would write (were they in the role of essay writer) as relatively moderate, typical. and appropriate to the experimenter’s instructions. When they are presented with the target’s actual essay, they naturally find some novel arguments and are inclined to explain such novelty (i.e.. the difference between the target’s essay and their own) in dispositional causal terms. An implication of this argument is that subjects who are asked to write an essay on a given side of an issue would compare the extremity of their essays with that of the targets and infer that the targets who wrote more (less) extreme essays held attitudes or dispositions more (less) in the direction of the essay assignment than did the subjects themselves. To test this formulation of the Reeder and Brewer position, subjects first were asked to write essays under position assignment and then to estimate the dispositional status of targets who are known to have written essays after being assigned to the same position. Subsequently, all essays were rated by independent raters in terms of their extremity in presenting the assigned position. Each subject-target pairing (i.e., the subject’s own essay and the particular target essay they were given to read) was then categorized in terms of the target’s essay being more extreme than, similar to, or less extreme than the subject’s essay. The difference between the subject’s self-rating on the essay topic and the dispositional attribution made to the target could then be assessed with respect to the essay extremity combinations. Another major purpose of the present study was to see if the error extends to the personality domain where more lasting, stable dispositions are being considered. For a number of reasons the dimension of introversion-extraversion was selected. It is a dimension that is easily understood by the layman and easily expressed in prototypic terms (cf. Cantor & Mischel. 1979). It is a dimension that captures very stable. long-term dispositional orientations: true introverts cannot be easily influenced to become true extraverts and vice versa. Finally, an early attributional experiment by Jones, Davis, and Gergen (1961) found virtually no tendency to overattribute “inner directedness” or “other directedness” when these behaviors fell clearly within the experimentally specified role of submariner or astronaut, respectively. Though there are many procedural differences distinguishing that study from the typical attitude attribution study, it seemed possible at the outset that the inner-outer dimension (which seems quite similar to introversion-extraversion) might be inherently resistant to dispositional bias when situational constraints are high. In order to pursue these various objectives, an experiment was designed in which all subjects in a given session were either asked to write a persuasive self-descriptive statement designed to convince a reader

590

MILLER.

JONES.

AND

HINKLE

that they were introverted or extraverted. The study was explicitly described for some subjects as concerned with first impressions of a person (individuation set) and for other subjects as concerned with the effects of situations on behavior (constraint set). A control condition was subsequently run in which there was no specific mention of the purpose of the study. In all cases the statements were exchanged within the group and subjects were asked to rate the author of the statement they received on the dimension of introversion-extraversion. METHOD Subjects The

main

experiment

The sub.ject\ participating in groups condition

was

a 2

I

were 95 undergraduate as part of an introductory of h to I I participants. and 5 in the extravert

randomly control

assigned condition.

ticipated

in groups

Subjects

were

participants.

seated

Each

I?. Three

in a manner

sub,ject

sheets and materials e.~~l-trr’cr/ and asked a IO-point collected

‘4 total essay

to the instructional run as a separate of 7 to

was

2 factorial

(Essay

Assignment

students (64 females. psychology course

groups

that

given

Set).

at Miami University Subjects reported

run. each

introvert subjects

of IO groups were condition. Within

set factor experiment.

s Instructional

31 males) requirement.

3 in the \ession.

essa! wet-e

tindividuation 58 subjects

or constraint). In a no-set (37 female\. 21 malesl par-

run

of the two

were

prevented

in each

them

an identttication

from letter

seeing which

essay

the materials was

used

in the study. An initial questionnaire defined the terms subjects to rate their own level of introv,ersioniextraversion

scale II -= extreme extravert. IO = extreme and a ,econd sheet was distributed describing

introvert). the essay

conditrons.

of other

on all rating intn)t,err and I I/J-Y) on

These ratings task. Subjects

wet-e within

a given experimental session were asked to write an essay designed to convtnce anothetperson (who might read the essay1 that they were extreme introverts or extreme c\traverts. There were no restrictions on the composition of the essays with the exception that the word “introvert” to these highly

or “extravert” not be used in the essay. All stmjecty constraining instructions. After allowing approximately

pletion of the essays. As the experimenter

the essays were collected. passed out a third set of forms.

that the group‘s l/E self-ratings range from extreme introversion sub.jects that the reason. personally then shuffled the mediately prior to tional set factor. fndi~~idrrr~rio~t This

in a ca\uaI

manner’

on the initial questionnaire were diverse. spanning the to extreme extraversion. This was done to suggest to the

sessions were not composed of sub.iects who were. for any particular inclined toward the direction of the essay assignment. The exper-imrntetessays and redistributed them among the members of the gr-oup. Imthe essay exchange. subjects received a sheet manipulating the tnstruc-

.ser. Sub.jects

is one

he mentioned

complied readily 15 min for com-

of a aeries

tn the

tndividuation

of eaperiments

set condition we arc

conducting

read

the

on how

following: good

people

are at forming accurate first impressions of a tat-get person when they hav,c dtffet-ent amounts and kinds of information about the target person. Different group\ ot subjects will be shown different kinds of information about tat-get persons and we shall be able to see what kinds of information about a person are most u\eful in forming accurate impressions about him or her Try to be as dtscernrng and insightful as you can in judging how the author of the essay must have rated himself

ot- herself.

ATTRlBUTlON

Co~r.st~~~i~tt This

.vcr. Subjects is one

behavior

of has

in the

a series

is affected

Each of you be accurate-you

ERROR

IN

PERSONALITY

constraint

set condition

read

of experiments

we

are

conducting

in which

they

by the different been asked have done

situations

to describe so because

yourself I asked

feel that you had much choice in the matter. subjects will have more choice in deciding help us determine the role of constraining understand

what

the

constrained

experimenter

check

on the

the fact

that the experimenter

person

is really

introverted standing

or extraverted. on the disposition

collected instructional

had told

quentlv.

all subjects

were

on might

how

people’s

find themselves.

set manipulation. writer had rated

person\

Because correspondent a\ the rational estimate

on

After himself

eight others

ratings

set asked

the target

when

sub.ject\

the

item> the

themselves

Inference theory for :I judgment

asked to estimate subjects m their

bipolar scales. some not related (e.g.. de-

to rate

to present

reading the essay. or herself on the

had

a written

RESULTS

description

of the study’\

heen

significance

ol

as extremely

posits the normative about a target person

the average standing on session. Finally. \ubjects

of per\uasivenes\ 01. convincinpne~\, All ratings were on collected all forms and gave a shot-t verbal debrieting. mailed

to to

like.

these

in the no-choice essay condition. subject\ were I/E among students on campus as well as among rated the essay‘s degree scales. The experimenter

following:

in terms that may or may not you to and you probably didn’t

l/E dimension and to rate the essay writer’s personality intuitively related to l/E (e.g.. hold-shy. smooth-awkward). The

the

In other conditions of the experiment. how to behave We want you instructions in making it difficult

The experimenter was blind to the instructional subjects were asked to estimate how the essay

ceptive-sincere). completed. A manipulation

s91

DOMAIN

pur-poses

IO-point Suhse-

and tindings.

AND DISCUSSION

Ratings on the significance of the constraint factor on attributions did not indicate a statistically significant effect of judgmental set l,V,,,,,,,,,, = 7.17. Mc,m\,,.unr = 6.62. Ft I. 911 = .85]. In retrospect, it would have been preferable to check on the sub.jects’ memory for the specific cover story they had been given. It is unlikely that most subjects would have failed to recall this information. Essays written in each of the four conditions were of similar average length (134 to 254 words) and rated persuasiveness (5.6 to 6.0. The self-ratings of perceivers on I/E (4.3 to 5.6) and, similarly. the self-ratings of the target persons on I/E (4.X to 5.0) did not differ significantly according to set or essay conditions. Estimates of the average level of I/E on campus were also similar in the four conditions (4.3 to 4.9). Attr-ihlrtiotl

c?f’Essciy Writer’5 Ititr.o~~rrsioi7lEl~t~~~r~~rr-.viorl

Attributions of I/E were analyzed in a 2 (Essay Assignment) x 2 (Set) analysis of variance.’ Cell means are shown in Table I. Judgments were influenced by the essay content. with the mean attributions differing in ment these

Additional analyse\ were conducted considering sessions nested within essay assignand subject sex. There were essentially no stgniticant effects or interactions involving factor-\ on anv of the measures of thiy research.

592

Judgmental Individuation Constraint Control,’

MlLLEK.

Set

JONES.

Introversion S.Yh (24. 5.57 (23. h.5Y (27.

AND

HINK1.E

tulra\rr4ion 3.Fl) 2.52) 2.21)

4.0x

(71.

4.08 1.x1

124. 2.10) lil. 7.33,

7.5Y)

the direction of the assignment IM, ,,,,<), = 5.77. M, ,,,, li, = 4.08; 1’3 I. 91 1 = 10.98, /’ < ,011. Responses to the attribution item in the (no set) control group also indicated a significant effect for essay assignment [F(I. 56) = 21.53, p < .Ol].’

There was a substantial generalization from the essay5 to related personality traits. Writers in the introvert condition were seen as relatively more shy [ AI ,,,,,,,, = 5.60. M, ,,,.,, = 3.33: F(I. 91) = 13.70. /I c. .Ol]. more awkward [IV ,,,,,1,, = 5.06. M, ,,,,,\ = 3.92: F‘( I. 91) = 6.72. /I .. .U5]. mot-c rigid IM ,,,,,c)\ = 5.40. M, ,,,.,, = 3.14; I-‘( I. 91) = 9.Q. i> x .Ol]. and less likable [M ,,,,,,,, = 4.30. iz!,. ,,,,i, = 3.38; /+I I.911 = 5.04. p i .05]. The willingness to make such inferences from constrained essays is. however. limited. as writers in the introvert condition wcrc not seen a4 significantly more maladjusted (M,, ,,,,,, = 4.06. M, ,,,,,,, = !.4to. more nervous (,I4 ,,,,,,), = 5.43. :\I, ,,,.,, = 1.92). mot-e sincere (,%I ,,,,,,,, = 6.87. 121,\,,,,\ = 6.88). or more intelligent (M ,,,,,(,, = 7. I I. ,\I, ,,,,,, = 6.83). As in the attribution measure. there were no effect4 ofjudgmental set on any of the personality ratings.

Correlations involving a number of conceptually relevant variablex arc shown in Table 3. Data are included from both the 2 -, 2 design as u,ell as the control. Correlations. in general. are low. and when significant. display ;I marked inconsistency across conditions. Several trends are

/Vofc. On the introversion/extraversion greater perceived extremity and essay ,’ Ratings of subjects. h Ratings of two independent judge\. * p < .05. ** p .: .Ol.

Attribution of introv./extrav.: Perceiver’s self-rating Attribution of introv./extrav.: Target’s self-rating Attribution of introv./extrav.: Rated persuasiveness of essay’ Attribution of introv./extrav.: Rated extremity of essay” Rated persuasiveness of essay: Target’s self-rating Rated extremity of essay: Target’s self-rating N

Item

.02

.oo

.-II”

.36

.3X”

Control

essay

the high end of the ~calr

.I2

.Ol

measure. persuasivene\\.

.I8

Individ.

IU

Constr.

Introversion

reprc\ents

IO

.?I

.I?

Pooled

cltreme

introvcr\ion.

.25

,117

.‘iZ”

.03

Constr

High

rating5

Individ.

Eritraversion

are also

Control

essay

a
Pooled

with

594

MILLER.

JONES,

AND

HINKLE

apparent. however. The possibility that subjects projected their own selfrating on I/E to the essay writer is suggested in two instances. and there is the trend for a correlation between the target person’s self-rating and the perceivers’ attribution of I/E. Analyses of covariance indicated that the effects of the essay conditions on the primary attribution measure were significant after controlling for the perceivers’ self-ratings [F( 1.90) = 11.14, p < ,011 and the targets’ self-ratings [E‘(l.90) = 12.42. p < .Ol]. Previous research (Jones et al.. 1971; Miller & Rorer, in press) has suggested that subjects utilize their perception of the essay’s extremity or persuasiveness as a basis for inferring the target’s real attitude. On the matter of perceived persuasiveness of the essays. the present results provide limited support for this relationship. As noted in Table 1. the correlation between subjects’ attributions of l/E and their ratings of essay persuasiveness achieves significance in three instances. While these correlations are in the appropriate direction, there is an inconsistency across conditions. Also. because the persuasiveness ratings were made after the attribution response (and by the same subjects providing the attribution response). the cause-effect basis of the relationship is ambiguous. To pursue this issue, independent ratings of the extremity of the essays were made by one of the experimenters and a research assistant. Each essay was -judged on a 4-point scale (weak to extreme) in terms of its perceived extremity in presenting an introverted or extraverted personality profile. The ratings of the two judges? were summed to yield an index of 3-8. As noted in Table 2. none of the correlations between essay extremity and attribution of I/E achieve significance. However. there is a logical consistency in terms of the direction of these correlations. All of the correlations in the introversion conditions are positive (i.e., higher extremity associated with more introversion). and three of four correlations in the extraversion conditions are negative (i.e.. higher extremity associated with more extraversion). To examine the extremity/attribution relationship further. an analysis of variance was performed on the attribution responses using two categories of extremity ratings (weak = 1-4. strong = 5-8) as an independent variable in addition to the factors of essay assignment and judgmental set. Cell means are shown in Table 3. A main effect for assignment [F( 1.87) = 8.05. p < ,011 indicated a general pattern of attributions being correspondent with essay content. but it is clear that this effect was present only with respect to essays rated as relatively extreme. For essays rated as relatively weak, the mean attributions in the two assignment conditions were virtually identical [ Fk\,,Fnmc,l, , \trc”lll\(1.81) = 6.3, p < .()I]. ’ The judgments.

correlation ratings

between judges’ extremity ratings was I’ = were identical or within one point of each other

.4? (11 c_ .(III. in 13 instances

Of 153 (Ml‘; ).

ATTRIBUTION

ERROR

IN

PERSONALITY

TABLE ATTRIBUTION

Extremity

5.14 5.06

Extraversion h’orc. scale:

FLW.TIO~

OF .ASSIGLMENT

Cell IO =

N’s

and

extreme

standard

,4\1)

category

Weak

Introversion

595

3

OF INTRO~FRSION/EXTRAVFRSION 4s A EXTREMITY

Assignment

DOMAIN

Strong

(21. (16.

1.311 2.57,

deviations

are

in parentheses.

6.27

(76.

2%)

3.iY

(3’.

7.0X)

Means

are based

on IO-point

introversion.

There was also a suggestion that the effect of essay extremity was more pronounced in the individuation set than in the constraint set. In the weak essay categories, differences between sets were trivial. However, for essays rated as relatively strong, the attributions to the two essay conditions were more polarized in the individuation set [M,,,,,,, = 6.85, MExt,.:,,, = 3.21. t(Z) = 4.49, p < ,011 than in the constraint set I MI,,,,,, = 5.69. MF.\,r,i> = 3.88. r(29) = 1.93. p < ,101. The threeway interaction bearing on these results did not achieve significance [F(l, 87) = 2.10, p < .15], but the pattern is a potentially meaningful one in suggesting that the individuation set may accentuate the perceived informational value of essay extremity. Although there is the suggestion of a trend for attributions to be correlated with the targets’ self-ratings (Table 2. row 2). there is virtually no evidence to indicate that the actual self-ratings of the essay writers were related to the judged extremity of the essays or their perceived persuasiveness. Not surprisingly. there was a link between the judges’ extremity ratings and the subjects’ persuasiveness ratings. Essays in the relatively extreme category were judged as more persuasive than essays in the weak category lMsl,,,,g = 6.40, Mwcstk = 5.40. F(l. 87) = 4.40, p < .05].

If the attribution error is primarily a function of the false consensus bias, subjects who have written an essay comparable to the one received should perceive the writer as more similar to themselves than should subjects receiving essays low in comparability to their own. One index of comparability is the extremity of the self-descriptive statement. Based upon the independent extremity judgments described ab0ve.l three categories of subject-target essay pairings were defined within the introvert ’ This Missing

analysis includes essays from the 7 * 2 experiment and data from one subject yield an R: of 73 for the introversion

the control condition.

experiment.

Intro\er\ion s M

s ~~ T

2.0, 22 2.Y6

N S.D. IYor~. self-rating

,T

condition

- 1.3, ‘Y 3.33

Enti-ic\ iire mean difference on I’EI. The moi-e positive

Elitraversion s

T

s

- 0.7, 22 2.12 bwre\ the

,T I.X, 20 I .Y4

tattribulion the

value.

condltiun s

T

S-

11.9, -III ?.YO

T + 0.1, IY 1.Y4

of FE lo target minu\ \uhject’\ greaterthe perceived intro\.el-\lon

relative to the \uhject\‘ heIf-ratings. The more negative the value. the gr-rater the perceived extraver’km relative to the subjects’ \elf-rating\. S -’ ‘I‘: extremity rating of\ubject’\ es\a! greater than that of target (ty 2 ~)r mar-e): S = T: rating of sub.ject’\ c\\ay equal to that of target Value\

I -c II: sharing

S ’ the

T: same

rating

of wb.ic‘ct’\

subwript\.

uithin

essay

le\\

condition\.

than are

that

of target

not

\ignilicantly

rhh

2 or- more). different.

and extravert conditions. These consisted of the subject.5 essay being more extreme, approximately the same as. or less extreme than the target’s essay. The algebraic differences between the subjects’ self-ratings of I/E and their attributions of l/E to the essay writer for each extremity combination were then computed. Data for this analysis are shown in Table 4. If essay cstremity is indeed a relevant dimension for triggering social comparison and the consensus bias, then subjects who read an essay which is les$ extreme than their own tin the direction of the essay assignment) should make weaker dispositional attribution\. In the case of introverted essays. for example. if a subject reads an essay which is less extreme than his or her own. the subject presumably infer5 that the target’s disposition ix relatively cxtraverted. and that this accounta fol the target’s inability to write an appropriately introverted essay. Conversely. sub.jects reading essays which are more extreme than their own should infer that the targets are dispositionally more in accord with the assignment than arc the subjects themselves. The data in Table 4 provide no support for the false consensus hypothesis. In the introversion condition. the effect of the essay extremity combination (i.e.. S > T, S = T, S < T) is not significant (F(?. 70) = 1.21. In the extraversion condition. there is a trend IF(2. 76) = 2.39. p < ,101 but in a direction opposite to that predicted by the false consensus effect. Thus, subjects reading an essay waker than their own attribute relatively greater extraversion than subjects reading essays similar to or more extreme than their own. Thus, the judged extremity ratings yield no support for ;t false con-

ATTRIBUTION

ERROR

IN

PERSONALIT-Y

DOMAIN

597

sensus bias interpretation of the attribution error.‘ It is possible. however. that other bases of comparability between the perceiver’s and target person’s esssy may be important, for instance, the particular arguments or experiences mentioned. One might test this idea by presenting subjects with an essay which is a virtual replication of their own (but which has ostensibly been written by another target) and examine the degree to which similarity in content bears on the attributed disposition. CONCLUSIONS Written self-descriptions. such as those accompanying applications for a position or for college admission. are often shaped by situational constraints. As Schlenker has noted in his recent analysis of impression management, “there is invariably some reason for people to control the images they project. since the reward/cost ratios people receive from social life are predicated in large part on these images” (1980. p. 304). In this context, perhaps the most important finding of the present study is that a robust act-to-disposition error involving such a basic personality dimension as extraversion-introversion occurs, particularly under circumstances that hardly seem to favor its appearance. All bubjects in ;I given session were exposed to the same unequivocal written instructions reinforced by the experimenter’s oral reading. Thus there could he no confusion about the nature of the assignment. Because each subject complied with the experimental request (there being no overlap between extraverted and introverted statements in their obvious location at one end or the other of the dimension). it is not reasonable to account fol the attribution error in terms of misunderstandings about the influence of constraint on the direction of the essay. Subjects in both judgmental set conditions tended to rate the constraint factor as relatively important. In spite of the failure of the available manipulation check, the cover story instructions were quite different in emphasizing individuation vs. constraint. It seems reasonable to conclude that the often-replicated attribution error is not triggered by or confined to judgment settings that emphasize accuracy of first impressions. The present results extend at least to the point where the burden of proof lies on those who feel that the particular expressed purpose of the experiment is a critical determinant of the attribution error. Finally, the experiment provides little or no support for alternative explanations that depend on the relationship between judges’ self-attributions and attributions made or on factors related to the distinctness of essay content. In data from the extravert sessions there is minimally significant evidence of a relationship between the reader’s self-rating and ’ Additional analy\es, using and the subject’s estimate of Gmilar

results.

the dift’erence between the average l/E among

the attrihution of l/E 11, the target university student\. yielded highly

his or her attribution (5% of the variance): in the introvert session data there is no evidence whatsoever. Yandell and Insko (IY77) have offered an alternative explanation of the fundamental attribution error which involves the subject’s projection of his own attitude. presumably changed by exposure to the target person’s persuasive statement. on the target person. It might be argued that the crucial correlation should be between the reader’s self-ratings c!fic,r exposure to the essay and his or her attributions. Although this might bc mot-c relevant to their argument of projected attitude change. it is unlikely that subjects would have changed their self-rating\ on l/E: having read an cs\ay designed not to persuade t/~c/~ to be introverted or extraverted. but rather to persuade the I-cadet that the writer is introverted (or estraverted). This point5 to ;I genuine distinction bctwcen the present experiment and those in the attitude attribution paradigm. When someone espouse\ a strong pro or anti position on marijuana legalization or federalized medicine or Castro or aftirmativc action policies. it i\ quite conceivable that the arguments and opinions expressed will persuade a reader to modify his own position because of the new information contained OI because the essay causes the reader to perceive the issue in a new light. In the pre\ent instance. however. not only are the readers explicitly alerted to the persuasive intent of the writer. but also the writer is emphasikng his own relative standing rather than advocating that extraversion CM- introversion is the correct stance or that everyone should be the same as the writer. If anything. reading a statement of unrelieved extraversion or introversion should make the reader feel that hi\ own orientation is more complex and cause him to move his self-rating away from the position of the target person. The present results are consistent with recent conceptual accounts of observer bias in attitude attribution (Ajzen, Dalto, & Blyth. 1979: Jones. 1970). The essay or statement produced by a constrained target person elicits a tentative hypothesis of correspondence between act and di+ position, This induce\ the perceiver to focus upon whether the target truly believes what he or \hc is writing, rather than to entertain seriously the possibility that the target truly believes the opposite of what is being written. Thcrc is considerable evidence to suggest that when people post a hypothetical question about another’s character. they tend to elicit confirming information more than disconfirming information just as a matter of course (e.g., Snyder. 1981). In the attitude attribution paradigm. furthermore. the content of the essay or statement contain\ abundant confkming evidence and little or no disconfirming evidence. At some point. however an inf
ATTRIBUTION

ERROR

IN

PERSONALlTY

DOMAIN

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the feature of essay extremity as a guide to the “proper” extent of their inferential adjustment. Relatively extreme ebsays may be viewed as particularly representative of genuinely introverted or extraverted individuals. Nisbett and Ross (1980. p. IX) have discussed evidence bearing on the conceptual relationship between the representativeness heuristic and the fundamental attribution error. Miller and Rorer (in press) have also argued that essay extremity may constitute-in the eyes of subjects-important diagnostic information in the attitude attribution paradigm. The data in Table 3 arc consistent with this line of reasoning. Although the present research does not provide a direct or crucial test of the anchoring-ad.justment interpretation. the plausibility of competing explanations is clearly t-educed. REFERENCES

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