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“A summary of parole rules—Thirteen years later”: Revisited thirteen years later
Journal of CriminalJurrice, Vol. 12, pp. 591-m (1984) Pergamon Press, Printed in U.S.A.
0047-2352184 $3.00 + .OO Copyright 6 1984 Pergamon Press Ltd.
“A SUMMARY OF PAROLE RULES-THIRTEEN YEARS LATER”: REVISITED THIRTEEN YEARS LATER
LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III Criminal Justice Program University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
EDWARD J. LATESSA Criminal Justice Program University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
ABSTRACT Arluke conducted two surveys of American paroling authorities, thirteen years apart, in 1956 and 1969. He summarized and described the standard conditions or rules of parole then in force in America. His general conclusions to both surveys were that parole rules were too numerous to be of real value, that many were unrealistic and unenforceable, and that the basic rules were not uniform throughout the states. In summer 1981, thirteen years after Arluke’s second study, his survey was replicated. Copies of the standard parole conditions imposed on parolees of all fifty states and of the federal and District of Columbia jurisdictions were received and summarized. Many of Arluke’s conclusions from his 1956 and 1969 summaries are echoed in this study.
In 1956, Arluke published a summary of basic rules were not uniform throughout the parole conditions then in effect in the states (Arluke, 1956:13). forty-eight states. He concluded that in Arluke reexamined parole conditions many states, parole conditions were too thirteen years later. In 1969 he published numerous to be of real value, that some another summary of parole conditions in the conditions represented policy statements or fifty states and in federal parole jurisdicinterpretations of the penal law, and that tions. He concluded that most states had many conditions were unrealistic and unenincreased the number of parole conditions forceable. He further concluded that the imposed, and that “redundancies, impracti591
592
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS
III and EDWARD
cality of application, multiplicity of regulations and lack of uniformity are among the serious defects that continue to exist in most states” (Arluke, 1969:267). We have repeated this survey of parole rules yet another thirteen years later. We must echo many of Arluke’s conclusions from his 1956 and 1969 summaries. In all three surveys, no single condition was found to be universally imposed.
PAROLE
CONDITIONS
Parole is a conditional release from prison, in that the inmate is required to obey certain rules and regulations for the period of time during which he or she is under supervision. Failure to abide by these regulations may be grounds for parole revocation and reincarceration. Parole conditions, then, are the conditions under which the inmate is allowed to leave the prison prior to the expiration of his sentence (Star and Berecochea, 1977:2). Parole conditions are very similar to those required for probation, the distinction being that parolees are responsible to the parole authority, while probationers are responsible to the court. In both cases, conditions of release are of two types: standard and special. Standard conditions of supervision cover a variety of behaviors and are designed to prevent new criminal behavior (Newman, 1978:314; Barkdull, 1976:5). These conditions typically involve restrictions on associations with other offenders, travel, drug and alcohol use, employment, and residence. Such restrictions are expected to work to prevent the parolee from engaging in criminal behavior and to assure that the supervising officer can maintain surveillance. Often, special conditions of supervision, which are individually designed, are imposed on the parolee. These might place restrictions on the parolee that prohibit him or her from associating with particular persons, or entering particular cities or counties; or they might mandate some type of psychiatric or medical treatment. While
J. LATESSA
more common to probationers, these special conditions are often imposed on parolees and vary widely (Jaffe. 1979). There have been several critical analyses of parole and parole conditions published in the last decade. Almost all of these attack the number. variety, and vagueness of both parole conditions and the possible ramifications of violating parole conditions. Stanley (1976), in discussing parole revocation, noted an improvement in the quality of justice in the revocation process after the Morrz’ssey decision. Nonetheless. he expressed concern over the impact of revocation on parolees, given the inadequacies of parole supervision and the routine imposition of numerous conditions. He states (1976: 118) that parole revocation is “a process that invites inconsistency and arbitrariness in administration and decision-making.” In a thoughtful and comprehensive assessment of parole, von Hirsch and Hanrahan (1979: 103) conclude, ex-prisoner. it was thought, was to be supervised, in the community. in order to The
reduce this likelihood of returning to crime. We are skeptical about both the fairness and efficacy of supervision as it has historically operated. On what we have called the Desert Model, supervision should be eliminated entirely. On the alternative Modified Desert Model, supervision could be retained-but only if it met requirements of effectiveness and if the severity of sanctions for parole violations were substantially scaled down.
They object principally to the fact that the nature of parole conditions allows the imposition of potentially lengthy periods of incarceration for essentially non-criminal conduct. They write, Were parole violations seen as akin to criminal acts-as actions in themselves deserving of punishment-they still would not merit severe penalties unless the conduct seriously reprehensible. Yet how was blame-worthy can technical violations of parole be? (1979: 103)
Others have criticized parole conditions on the basis of their disproportionate impact
“A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later
on criminal penalties (Prus and Stratton, 1976). The fact remains, however, that prisoners released to parole are still subjected to a series of standard conditions, and often to conditions written especially for them. One of the factors that motivated us to undertake this survey was the development of these criticisms of parole. In less than a decade, the debate about parole release, supervision, and conditions has grown more heated, and states have taken steps to define new policies and procedures (Travis and O’Leary, 1979). In light of these developments, it seemed particularly appropriate to reassess the state of parole conditions in the United States.
METHODOLOGY In June 1981, letters were sent to the chairpersons of each parole authority in the United States requesting a copy of the parole conditions imposed in their jurisdictions. Follow-up letters were sent approximately one month later to those states from which no reply was received, and a third follow-up letter was sent approximately two weeks after that. Parole conditions were received from all fifty-two jurisdictions. One coder was used to record every parole condition that was identified as being a standard condition in any state. Although several states submitted lists of special parole conditions that are commonly imposed, these were not coded, as they require an affirmative action by the parole authority. and are typically case-specific. A decision was made to replicate the survey presented by Arluke, and thus his categorization of parole conditions was employed. A twenty-third and twenty-fourth category of parole conditions were added. These categories included conditions governing the general conduct or demeanor of parolees that did not fall into any of Arluke’s classifications, and rules that limit the areas or places parolees are allowed to enter or visit. A caveat must be entered here regarding
593
the classification of parole conditions into the twenty-four categories. The use of one coder enhances the reliability of the classification process, yet questions remain about its validity. The use of broad topical areas, such as “liquor usage,” enabled many of the coding decisions to be easily made; yet wide variation in the wording of parole conditions could potentially lead other coders to classify rules differently. Any restrictions on conduct or liberty routinely imposed on parolees in a jurisdiction were treated as standard parole conditions, whether or not they appeared in the enumerated list of conditions. Thus, if in the prefatory paragraph of the parole certificate, or in a separate paragraph after the listing of parole conditions, a restriction was imposed, it was coded as if it were a listed parole condition. For example, parolees in Georgia must agree to waive all extradition rights. This requirement is included in a paragraph which appears after the listing of standard parole conditions. Similarly, in several of the lists of parole conditions, more than one restriction on conduct was included under a single parole condition. In these instances, each restriction or prescription was counted as a parole condition. Thus, the sixth standard condition listed on the Georgia rules, which reads “I will not possess or use any dangerous drug . . . I will not use an alcoholic beverage to excess,” was classified as a restriction on drug use and as a restriction on alcohol use.
FINDINGS The distribution of parole conditions in effect in the United States in 1982 is presented in Table 1. A total of 139 different standard parole conditions were recorded, with a mean of 16.48 standard conditions and a median of 14.83 for each jurisdiction, ranging from a low of 6 to a high of 23 conditions. Table 1 differs from Arluke’s (1969) summary of parole rules in two respects. First, in order to aid comparisons, the conditions are listed in descending order of
594
c,
-
m
-PI
F?
m
m N
m m
r-4
hl
m
-
m* m
r-4 c-4
m
N
N
m r-4
N
N
3
mm m
_ m
-
_
--
m
m
mm N c-4
1. Must have permission 5. May receive a. If over 24 hours f. Within 48 hours
Out of State Travel Comply with Law Regular Reporting Weapons Change Residence Employment First Arrival Report Maintain Gainful Employment Narcotics (Controlled Substance) Usage Undesirable Associations/ Correspondence Report if Arrested Waive Extradition Support Dependents Liquor Usage Permit Home/Job Visits (Searches) General Conduct Motor Vehicle Registration And License Approval of Marriage (or Divorce Act as Informer Indebtedness Participation in Drug/ Alcohol/Psychological Program Curfew Civil Rights/Suffrage Frequenting Illicit/ Immoral Locations
KEY:
22. 23. 24.
19. 20. 21.
18.
16. 17.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
10.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1
2
3i
1
1
1
1 1
3 3
3 3 4
2
3
4
1
2
6d
2. Prohibited 6. Must report b. Monthly g. Within 72 hours
3 4
4
1
1 1
3 3
4
337
3
2
3
3
3 3 2
2
2
2
1
1
2
3 3;
1
1
1
333333 3 3
3 3 2
2
3 3 4
6d
2
1 3
i. Midnight to 6 AM
1
2
1 2
3 3 4
1
2
3
6f
2
2
1 3
1
1
3
3 4
6f
2
1 3
2
1
1
3
3 3 4
1
2
3
2 1 1
1
1
3
6f
1
1 1
1
1
1
3
15
I
5 4
16 12 8
16
22 19
26 26 26 23 23
33
2c 48 1 48 1 45 39 38
50
152 3
3b 36 36 49
1 3
e. Within 24 hours j. Set P.O.
3 -
3 3 4
3
3 3b 3b 3b 3b 3 2c 2 2 2c 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 6 3 3333 3 3 3 3
1 3
d. Immediately
2
6d
3
2
1
2
6f 6d
2
1 3 3b 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3
1 3
c. Firearms h. 11 PM to 6 AM
1
1
3
6d
1
2
1
3 3
1 3 3 2c 1 1 3 3
4. Allowed, but not to excess
1 1
3 3
3 4
3
3
6f
3 3
6d 1
3
3 3
1
1
2
1
2
2c 2 6dl
1 3
2
1
36 3
1
36 3
1 1 3 3 2
1
3. Compulsory
3 3
1 2 6f
2
2
2
2
2
la1 3 36 36 3b 3 2 2 2c lc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
1 1 333333 36 3 3 2 2 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
3
11 3
1
PAROLE CONDITIONS IN EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1982
TABLE 1-(Cmztinued)
g
596
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS
III and EDWARD
the frequency with which they are imposed. Second, several of the categories of conditions Arluke originally reported were omitted, as they are no longer routinely covered in the standard parole rules of the fifty-two jurisdictions. These include compulsory treatment for venereal disease, reeommended church attendance (only Mississippi still recommends church attendance), criminal registration, airplane or power boat licensure, gambling (only South Dakota retains a specific prohibition against gambling), and credit on return as a parole violator. This last condition ‘is included in the regulations of six states (Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey and Oregon). The mention of credit, however, does not represent a restriction on conduct, but rather prior notification to the parolee of possible penalties for parole revocation. A decision was made to exclude this category. Frequency
of Parole Rules
I. Out of state travel: A requirement that parolees obtain permission prior to travelling out of state or out of their parole district was added in Arizona and South Carolina during the last thirteen years. This requirement pertaining to travel beyond certain boundaries is now in effect in all fifty-two jurisdictions. The specific regulations differ in terms of (1) time limitations on the travel; (2) when permission is to be obtained; and (3) the boundaries or zone of free movement. Thus, while all jurisdictions impose some limits, no single regulation was found in all of them. 2. Comply with law: Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, New York, and Wyoming have added a condition that parolees comply with the law, while New Mexico has deleted this condition. 3. Weapons: A prohibition on parolees securing a hunting license or weapons was added in Alabama, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, and North Dakota. The requirement that parolees obtain permission prior to securing weapons or a hunting license was dropped in Dela-
J. LATESSA
ware, Maine, and Massachusetts. These changes most probably reflect the enactment of federal legislation making the possession of firearms or explosives by parolees a felony offense. 4. Regular reporting: West Virginia and Wisconsin have added a requirement that parolees submit written reports. Only California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have no requirement for regular reports. 5. Change of residence or employment. Five states stiffened their restrictions on parolees’ changing their employment or residence. Vermont, West Virginia, and Mississippi added a requirement that parolees notify the parole officer when they make such a change. Colorado, Delaware and Washington have abandoned the requirement to obtain permission before changing residence or employment, while the Federal Parole Commission, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Utah have moved from requiring permission to requiring various notifications of change. 6. First arrival report: A specific requirement that the parolee report to his parole officer or employer within a specified period after release, upon first arriving in the area in which he will reside, was added by Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Such a condition was deleted in Illinois. Iowa, Maine, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming. 7. Maintain gainful employment: A requirement that parolees maintain gainful employment was added in Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. This requirement was deleted by California, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey. New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 8. Use of narcotics: Prohibition of the use or possession of narcotics or controlled substances was added in Alaska, Arizona, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South
“A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later
Dakota, and Virginia. Similar prohibitions were deleted in California. Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon. 9. Undesirable associates or correspondence: Hawaii, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia have moved from prohibition to requiring permission. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming have dropped their prohibition against undesirable associates and correspondence. South Dakota has stopped requiring that parolees first obtain permission. 10. Report if arrested: A requirement that parolees report arrests to their supervising officers has been added by Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Only New York has deleted this requirement. 11. Waiver of extradition: A compulsory waiver of extradition was added in Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Vermont. This condition was dropped in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland. Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington. 12. Support dependents: A requirement that parolees support their dependents to the best of their ability was added in Arkansas, Illinois, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia. This requirement was dropped in Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana. Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. 13. Use of liquor: Three states stiffened their restrictions on alcohol use. Mississippi has added a condition prohibiting alcohol
597
use, while Kansas and Virginia now prohibit the excess use of liquor. Many states have moved away from prohibiting alcohol use. Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and North Virginia now only prohibit excessive alcohol use, while Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have dropped their prohibitions of the use of liquor. Currently only twenty-three jurisdictions regulate liquor use. 14. Permit home or job searches (visits): Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin have added a condition that allows parole officers to search or visit the parolee’s place of employment or residence. Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania have deleted this condition. 15. General conduct: Many states have conditions which prescribe the general conduct and behavior of parolees. These include stipulations such as the requirements that the parolee conduct himself/herself honorably, and refrain from assaultive conduct. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia now impose such conditions. 16. Motor vehicle registration and license: A requirement that parolees obtain permission before buying or operating a motor vehicle, or obtaining a driver’s .licerise, was added in Arizona, Georgia, and Mississippi. This restriction was dropped in Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas. Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, MassachuMichigan, Minnesota, Missouri, setts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
598
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS
III and EDWARD
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 17. Approval of marriage or divorce: Arizona and Mississippi have added a requirement that parolees obtain approval prior to marriage or divorce. The requirement of obtaining permission prior to changing marital status, or of notifying the parole officer of changes, was dropped by Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 18. Frequenting illicitlimmoral locations: Several jurisdictions restrict parolees from visiting bars, gambling establishments, and places where criminal activity is likely. Federal, District of Columbia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia parole conditions contain restrictions on frequenting such places. 19. Acting as an informer: Alaska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Texas have added restrictions against parolees serving as informers for law enforcement agencies. The Hawaii parole rules no longer contain these restrictions. 20. Indebtedness: Restrictions against parolees incurring indebtedness were added in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Such restrictions were dropped in Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 21. Participation in druglalcohollpsychological treatment: Five states have added conditions concerning the participation of parolees, at the advice of the parole officer or parole board, in various treatment programs. These conditions were added by
J. LATESSA
Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina. The three states which reported a condition relating to narcotics treatment in 1969-California, Illinois, and Texas-have all deleted the condition. 22. Curfew: Georgia has added a curfew to their parole conditions, while Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah have removed curfews from their parole conditions. 23. Civil rightslsuffrage: Kentucky now has restrictions on parolees’ civil rights and suffrage as part of their standard parole conditions. These restrictions are no longer part of the conditions of Illinois, Nevada, New York, and Ohio.
DISCUSSION The data presented above provide a partial description of parole conditions as they existed in mid-1981. In comparison with Arluke’s surveys of parole conditions in 1956 and 1969, a reversal of the trend, detected in 1969, towards increasing the numbers of conditions imposed on parolees can be observed. In the majority of the categories of parole rules employed in this study, the states dropping parole conditions outnumber those which have added parole conditions. Exceptions to this trend are found when parole conditions relate directly to the control of illegal behavior and the ability of the parole authority to maintain supervision over released offenders. This is seen particularly in conditions relating to the reporting of arrests, compliance with the law, possession and use of narcotics, and possession of weapons. While by no means a uniform trend, it appears that there is a movement away from controlling the social activities of parolees towards a focus on crime control matters. One possible explanation for this observation may be that several of the parole conditions that had been routinely imposed in the past are now imposed more selectively through the application of “special
“A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later
conditions.” Further, many of the parole conditions reported by Arluke, such as church attendance and the treatment of venereal disease, have been severely criticized or declared unconstitutional (Newman, 1978:315-19; von Hirsch and Hanrahan, 1979; Kittrie and Zenoff, 1981:488496). Finally, some requirements, such as registration as a criminal, may have been replaced by legislation that requires parole authorities to notify local law enforcement agencies of the impending release of an offender. Arluke (1969:274) suggested that since no single parole condition was applied in all states, we should move to reduce the number of parole conditions. In fact, he argued that only one condition, that the parolee “be of good behavior and lead an industrious life ,” might suffice. Hindsight is, of course, nearly perfect, but looking back at this suggestion made in 1969, we must wonder if such a condition would pass a test for vagueness. Part of the difficulty in understanding the development of the wide variety of parole conditions discovered in this survey is that such conditions serve a multitude of purposes. For example, some conditions may be imposed as a form of notice to the parolee, rather than as a restriction on behavior. This is probably true of the restrictions on weapon possession, civil rights, and time credit allowed on return as a parole violator. Other conditions are imposed as a necessary part of supervision. It is likely that parole boards release some inmates precisely because they will be supervised (Messinger, 1979:~~~). If this rationale is to prevail, the supervision process must be assured. For this reason, conditions relating to reporting, travel, home and job visits and searches, and the waiver of extradition are imposed. These conditions enable officers to supervise their parolees. Still another reason for the imposition of parole conditions may be characterized as instructional. in that these conditions provide an ideal of good citizenship the parolee should strive. These
to which conditions
599
include prescriptions about general conduct, the support of dependents, maintenance of employment, and appropriate positions and associates. A fourth rationale for parole conditions is that of risk control. These conditions are designed to limit the parolee’s likelihood of engaging in criminal conduct through restricting his or her use of alcohol, narcotics, and motor vehicles, as well as prohibiting the parolee from serving as a police agent or informer. Any of these activities puts the parolee at risk of violating the law and, indeed, the possession of narcotics is itself a crime. Conditions relating to the parolee’s participation in treatment or rehabilitative programs serve a risk control function in that these programs are expected to reduce the probability of future crime. It is likely, however, that most such treatment requirements are imposed as special conditions, and thus, are not included in our survey results. It is apparent that various conditions overlap and can serve more than one purpose. A final purpose served by all these conditions is that they constitute an “arsenal of the prosecutor” for the parole board. A parolee can be reincarcerated for violation of any of.the conditions of parole, and the fact of violation can be established on the basis of evidence which constitutes proof that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt, as the Supreme Court determined in Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471 (1972). It is this reduced burden of proof that led us to object to Arluke’s suggestion that we simply require parolees to behave and lead an industrious life. Rather, we would suggest that parole conditions be limited in number, clear, and specific, and regulate only those behaviors which are pertinent to crime control and supervision. In this vein we suggest the following conditions: I will obey all federal, state, and municipal laws.
I will report my whereabouts and activities to my parole officer as directed. I will inform my parole officer of any changes in residence or employment within forty-eight hours.
600
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS III and EDWARD
I will not travel outside of the state (parole district) without prior approval of my parole officer. These parole conditions, it seems, cover the essential areas. They restrict the parolee from criminal behavior (including the possession of controlled drugs), and enable the parole officer to supervise the parolee. Any requirements for treatment or risk control specific to the type of offense or offender should be added as special conditions, and not uniformly imposed on all paroled inmates. The adoption of this limited set of standard conditions would require that notification of specific prohibitions against suffrage, the possession of firearms, or sentence credits granted on return as a parole violator be conveyed in that manner-i.e., as a notification. This would prevent a general tendency in bureaucracies for rules and regulations to proliferate, and would simplify the parole supervision process from the perspective of both the parole officer and the parolee.
J. LATESSA
REFERENCES Arluke. N. R. (1956). A summary of parole rules. (January): 6-13.
NPPA Journal
-. (1969). A summary of parole rules-Thirteen years later. Crime and Delinq 15 (April): 267274. Barkdull, W. (1976). Probation: Call it control and mean it. Fed Prob 40 (December): 3-8. Jaffe, H. J. (1979). Probation with a flair: A look at some out-of-the ordinary conditions. Fed Prob 13 (March): 25-36. Kittrie, N. S. and Zenoff. E. H. (1981). Sanctions and corrections. Mineola. NY: Foundation Press.
sentencing
Messinger, S. L. (1979). Introduction to i%e quesby A. von Hirsch and K. J. Hanrahan. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. tion ofparole,
Newman, D. J. (1978). Introduction to criminal justice. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott. Prus, R. C. and Stratton, J. R. (1976). Parole revocation decision-making: Private typings and official designations. Fed Prob 40 (March): 48-53. D. T. (1976). Prisoners among us: The Washington. D. C.: The Brookings Institution. Stanley,
problem
ofparole.
Star, D. and Berecochea, J. E. (1977). Rationalizing the conditions of parole: Some recommended changes. Research Report No. 58. Sacramento, CA: California Department
of Corrections.
Travis, L. F. and .O’Leary, V. (1979). Changes jn ACKNOWLEDGEMENT An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Louisville, Kentucky, March 26, 1982.
sentencing
and parole decision-making:
Hackensack, Delinquency.
von Hirsch, A. and Hanrahan, question of parole:
Cambridge,
1976-1978.
NJ: National Council on Crime and
Retention,
MA: Ballinger.
K. J. (1979). The reform,
or abolition.
0047-2352184 $3.00 + .OO Copyright 6 1984 Pergamon Press Ltd.
“A SUMMARY OF PAROLE RULES-THIRTEEN YEARS LATER”: REVISITED THIRTEEN YEARS LATER
LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III Criminal Justice Program University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
EDWARD J. LATESSA Criminal Justice Program University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45221
ABSTRACT Arluke conducted two surveys of American paroling authorities, thirteen years apart, in 1956 and 1969. He summarized and described the standard conditions or rules of parole then in force in America. His general conclusions to both surveys were that parole rules were too numerous to be of real value, that many were unrealistic and unenforceable, and that the basic rules were not uniform throughout the states. In summer 1981, thirteen years after Arluke’s second study, his survey was replicated. Copies of the standard parole conditions imposed on parolees of all fifty states and of the federal and District of Columbia jurisdictions were received and summarized. Many of Arluke’s conclusions from his 1956 and 1969 summaries are echoed in this study.
In 1956, Arluke published a summary of basic rules were not uniform throughout the parole conditions then in effect in the states (Arluke, 1956:13). forty-eight states. He concluded that in Arluke reexamined parole conditions many states, parole conditions were too thirteen years later. In 1969 he published numerous to be of real value, that some another summary of parole conditions in the conditions represented policy statements or fifty states and in federal parole jurisdicinterpretations of the penal law, and that tions. He concluded that most states had many conditions were unrealistic and unenincreased the number of parole conditions forceable. He further concluded that the imposed, and that “redundancies, impracti591
592
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS
III and EDWARD
cality of application, multiplicity of regulations and lack of uniformity are among the serious defects that continue to exist in most states” (Arluke, 1969:267). We have repeated this survey of parole rules yet another thirteen years later. We must echo many of Arluke’s conclusions from his 1956 and 1969 summaries. In all three surveys, no single condition was found to be universally imposed.
PAROLE
CONDITIONS
Parole is a conditional release from prison, in that the inmate is required to obey certain rules and regulations for the period of time during which he or she is under supervision. Failure to abide by these regulations may be grounds for parole revocation and reincarceration. Parole conditions, then, are the conditions under which the inmate is allowed to leave the prison prior to the expiration of his sentence (Star and Berecochea, 1977:2). Parole conditions are very similar to those required for probation, the distinction being that parolees are responsible to the parole authority, while probationers are responsible to the court. In both cases, conditions of release are of two types: standard and special. Standard conditions of supervision cover a variety of behaviors and are designed to prevent new criminal behavior (Newman, 1978:314; Barkdull, 1976:5). These conditions typically involve restrictions on associations with other offenders, travel, drug and alcohol use, employment, and residence. Such restrictions are expected to work to prevent the parolee from engaging in criminal behavior and to assure that the supervising officer can maintain surveillance. Often, special conditions of supervision, which are individually designed, are imposed on the parolee. These might place restrictions on the parolee that prohibit him or her from associating with particular persons, or entering particular cities or counties; or they might mandate some type of psychiatric or medical treatment. While
J. LATESSA
more common to probationers, these special conditions are often imposed on parolees and vary widely (Jaffe. 1979). There have been several critical analyses of parole and parole conditions published in the last decade. Almost all of these attack the number. variety, and vagueness of both parole conditions and the possible ramifications of violating parole conditions. Stanley (1976), in discussing parole revocation, noted an improvement in the quality of justice in the revocation process after the Morrz’ssey decision. Nonetheless. he expressed concern over the impact of revocation on parolees, given the inadequacies of parole supervision and the routine imposition of numerous conditions. He states (1976: 118) that parole revocation is “a process that invites inconsistency and arbitrariness in administration and decision-making.” In a thoughtful and comprehensive assessment of parole, von Hirsch and Hanrahan (1979: 103) conclude, ex-prisoner. it was thought, was to be supervised, in the community. in order to The
reduce this likelihood of returning to crime. We are skeptical about both the fairness and efficacy of supervision as it has historically operated. On what we have called the Desert Model, supervision should be eliminated entirely. On the alternative Modified Desert Model, supervision could be retained-but only if it met requirements of effectiveness and if the severity of sanctions for parole violations were substantially scaled down.
They object principally to the fact that the nature of parole conditions allows the imposition of potentially lengthy periods of incarceration for essentially non-criminal conduct. They write, Were parole violations seen as akin to criminal acts-as actions in themselves deserving of punishment-they still would not merit severe penalties unless the conduct seriously reprehensible. Yet how was blame-worthy can technical violations of parole be? (1979: 103)
Others have criticized parole conditions on the basis of their disproportionate impact
“A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later
on criminal penalties (Prus and Stratton, 1976). The fact remains, however, that prisoners released to parole are still subjected to a series of standard conditions, and often to conditions written especially for them. One of the factors that motivated us to undertake this survey was the development of these criticisms of parole. In less than a decade, the debate about parole release, supervision, and conditions has grown more heated, and states have taken steps to define new policies and procedures (Travis and O’Leary, 1979). In light of these developments, it seemed particularly appropriate to reassess the state of parole conditions in the United States.
METHODOLOGY In June 1981, letters were sent to the chairpersons of each parole authority in the United States requesting a copy of the parole conditions imposed in their jurisdictions. Follow-up letters were sent approximately one month later to those states from which no reply was received, and a third follow-up letter was sent approximately two weeks after that. Parole conditions were received from all fifty-two jurisdictions. One coder was used to record every parole condition that was identified as being a standard condition in any state. Although several states submitted lists of special parole conditions that are commonly imposed, these were not coded, as they require an affirmative action by the parole authority. and are typically case-specific. A decision was made to replicate the survey presented by Arluke, and thus his categorization of parole conditions was employed. A twenty-third and twenty-fourth category of parole conditions were added. These categories included conditions governing the general conduct or demeanor of parolees that did not fall into any of Arluke’s classifications, and rules that limit the areas or places parolees are allowed to enter or visit. A caveat must be entered here regarding
593
the classification of parole conditions into the twenty-four categories. The use of one coder enhances the reliability of the classification process, yet questions remain about its validity. The use of broad topical areas, such as “liquor usage,” enabled many of the coding decisions to be easily made; yet wide variation in the wording of parole conditions could potentially lead other coders to classify rules differently. Any restrictions on conduct or liberty routinely imposed on parolees in a jurisdiction were treated as standard parole conditions, whether or not they appeared in the enumerated list of conditions. Thus, if in the prefatory paragraph of the parole certificate, or in a separate paragraph after the listing of parole conditions, a restriction was imposed, it was coded as if it were a listed parole condition. For example, parolees in Georgia must agree to waive all extradition rights. This requirement is included in a paragraph which appears after the listing of standard parole conditions. Similarly, in several of the lists of parole conditions, more than one restriction on conduct was included under a single parole condition. In these instances, each restriction or prescription was counted as a parole condition. Thus, the sixth standard condition listed on the Georgia rules, which reads “I will not possess or use any dangerous drug . . . I will not use an alcoholic beverage to excess,” was classified as a restriction on drug use and as a restriction on alcohol use.
FINDINGS The distribution of parole conditions in effect in the United States in 1982 is presented in Table 1. A total of 139 different standard parole conditions were recorded, with a mean of 16.48 standard conditions and a median of 14.83 for each jurisdiction, ranging from a low of 6 to a high of 23 conditions. Table 1 differs from Arluke’s (1969) summary of parole rules in two respects. First, in order to aid comparisons, the conditions are listed in descending order of
594
c,
-
m
-PI
F?
m
m N
m m
r-4
hl
m
-
m* m
r-4 c-4
m
N
N
m r-4
N
N
3
mm m
_ m
-
_
--
m
m
mm N c-4
1. Must have permission 5. May receive a. If over 24 hours f. Within 48 hours
Out of State Travel Comply with Law Regular Reporting Weapons Change Residence Employment First Arrival Report Maintain Gainful Employment Narcotics (Controlled Substance) Usage Undesirable Associations/ Correspondence Report if Arrested Waive Extradition Support Dependents Liquor Usage Permit Home/Job Visits (Searches) General Conduct Motor Vehicle Registration And License Approval of Marriage (or Divorce Act as Informer Indebtedness Participation in Drug/ Alcohol/Psychological Program Curfew Civil Rights/Suffrage Frequenting Illicit/ Immoral Locations
KEY:
22. 23. 24.
19. 20. 21.
18.
16. 17.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
10.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1
2
3i
1
1
1
1 1
3 3
3 3 4
2
3
4
1
2
6d
2. Prohibited 6. Must report b. Monthly g. Within 72 hours
3 4
4
1
1 1
3 3
4
337
3
2
3
3
3 3 2
2
2
2
1
1
2
3 3;
1
1
1
333333 3 3
3 3 2
2
3 3 4
6d
2
1 3
i. Midnight to 6 AM
1
2
1 2
3 3 4
1
2
3
6f
2
2
1 3
1
1
3
3 4
6f
2
1 3
2
1
1
3
3 3 4
1
2
3
2 1 1
1
1
3
6f
1
1 1
1
1
1
3
15
I
5 4
16 12 8
16
22 19
26 26 26 23 23
33
2c 48 1 48 1 45 39 38
50
152 3
3b 36 36 49
1 3
e. Within 24 hours j. Set P.O.
3 -
3 3 4
3
3 3b 3b 3b 3b 3 2c 2 2 2c 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 6 3 3333 3 3 3 3
1 3
d. Immediately
2
6d
3
2
1
2
6f 6d
2
1 3 3b 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3
1 3
c. Firearms h. 11 PM to 6 AM
1
1
3
6d
1
2
1
3 3
1 3 3 2c 1 1 3 3
4. Allowed, but not to excess
1 1
3 3
3 4
3
3
6f
3 3
6d 1
3
3 3
1
1
2
1
2
2c 2 6dl
1 3
2
1
36 3
1
36 3
1 1 3 3 2
1
3. Compulsory
3 3
1 2 6f
2
2
2
2
2
la1 3 36 36 3b 3 2 2 2c lc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
1 1 333333 36 3 3 2 2 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
3
11 3
1
PAROLE CONDITIONS IN EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1982
TABLE 1-(Cmztinued)
g
596
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS
III and EDWARD
the frequency with which they are imposed. Second, several of the categories of conditions Arluke originally reported were omitted, as they are no longer routinely covered in the standard parole rules of the fifty-two jurisdictions. These include compulsory treatment for venereal disease, reeommended church attendance (only Mississippi still recommends church attendance), criminal registration, airplane or power boat licensure, gambling (only South Dakota retains a specific prohibition against gambling), and credit on return as a parole violator. This last condition ‘is included in the regulations of six states (Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey and Oregon). The mention of credit, however, does not represent a restriction on conduct, but rather prior notification to the parolee of possible penalties for parole revocation. A decision was made to exclude this category. Frequency
of Parole Rules
I. Out of state travel: A requirement that parolees obtain permission prior to travelling out of state or out of their parole district was added in Arizona and South Carolina during the last thirteen years. This requirement pertaining to travel beyond certain boundaries is now in effect in all fifty-two jurisdictions. The specific regulations differ in terms of (1) time limitations on the travel; (2) when permission is to be obtained; and (3) the boundaries or zone of free movement. Thus, while all jurisdictions impose some limits, no single regulation was found in all of them. 2. Comply with law: Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, New York, and Wyoming have added a condition that parolees comply with the law, while New Mexico has deleted this condition. 3. Weapons: A prohibition on parolees securing a hunting license or weapons was added in Alabama, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, and North Dakota. The requirement that parolees obtain permission prior to securing weapons or a hunting license was dropped in Dela-
J. LATESSA
ware, Maine, and Massachusetts. These changes most probably reflect the enactment of federal legislation making the possession of firearms or explosives by parolees a felony offense. 4. Regular reporting: West Virginia and Wisconsin have added a requirement that parolees submit written reports. Only California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have no requirement for regular reports. 5. Change of residence or employment. Five states stiffened their restrictions on parolees’ changing their employment or residence. Vermont, West Virginia, and Mississippi added a requirement that parolees notify the parole officer when they make such a change. Colorado, Delaware and Washington have abandoned the requirement to obtain permission before changing residence or employment, while the Federal Parole Commission, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Utah have moved from requiring permission to requiring various notifications of change. 6. First arrival report: A specific requirement that the parolee report to his parole officer or employer within a specified period after release, upon first arriving in the area in which he will reside, was added by Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Such a condition was deleted in Illinois. Iowa, Maine, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming. 7. Maintain gainful employment: A requirement that parolees maintain gainful employment was added in Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. This requirement was deleted by California, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey. New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 8. Use of narcotics: Prohibition of the use or possession of narcotics or controlled substances was added in Alaska, Arizona, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South
“A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later
Dakota, and Virginia. Similar prohibitions were deleted in California. Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon. 9. Undesirable associates or correspondence: Hawaii, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia have moved from prohibition to requiring permission. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming have dropped their prohibition against undesirable associates and correspondence. South Dakota has stopped requiring that parolees first obtain permission. 10. Report if arrested: A requirement that parolees report arrests to their supervising officers has been added by Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Only New York has deleted this requirement. 11. Waiver of extradition: A compulsory waiver of extradition was added in Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Vermont. This condition was dropped in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland. Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington. 12. Support dependents: A requirement that parolees support their dependents to the best of their ability was added in Arkansas, Illinois, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia. This requirement was dropped in Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana. Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. 13. Use of liquor: Three states stiffened their restrictions on alcohol use. Mississippi has added a condition prohibiting alcohol
597
use, while Kansas and Virginia now prohibit the excess use of liquor. Many states have moved away from prohibiting alcohol use. Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and North Virginia now only prohibit excessive alcohol use, while Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have dropped their prohibitions of the use of liquor. Currently only twenty-three jurisdictions regulate liquor use. 14. Permit home or job searches (visits): Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin have added a condition that allows parole officers to search or visit the parolee’s place of employment or residence. Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania have deleted this condition. 15. General conduct: Many states have conditions which prescribe the general conduct and behavior of parolees. These include stipulations such as the requirements that the parolee conduct himself/herself honorably, and refrain from assaultive conduct. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia now impose such conditions. 16. Motor vehicle registration and license: A requirement that parolees obtain permission before buying or operating a motor vehicle, or obtaining a driver’s .licerise, was added in Arizona, Georgia, and Mississippi. This restriction was dropped in Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas. Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, MassachuMichigan, Minnesota, Missouri, setts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
598
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS
III and EDWARD
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 17. Approval of marriage or divorce: Arizona and Mississippi have added a requirement that parolees obtain approval prior to marriage or divorce. The requirement of obtaining permission prior to changing marital status, or of notifying the parole officer of changes, was dropped by Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 18. Frequenting illicitlimmoral locations: Several jurisdictions restrict parolees from visiting bars, gambling establishments, and places where criminal activity is likely. Federal, District of Columbia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia parole conditions contain restrictions on frequenting such places. 19. Acting as an informer: Alaska, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Texas have added restrictions against parolees serving as informers for law enforcement agencies. The Hawaii parole rules no longer contain these restrictions. 20. Indebtedness: Restrictions against parolees incurring indebtedness were added in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Such restrictions were dropped in Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 21. Participation in druglalcohollpsychological treatment: Five states have added conditions concerning the participation of parolees, at the advice of the parole officer or parole board, in various treatment programs. These conditions were added by
J. LATESSA
Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina. The three states which reported a condition relating to narcotics treatment in 1969-California, Illinois, and Texas-have all deleted the condition. 22. Curfew: Georgia has added a curfew to their parole conditions, while Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah have removed curfews from their parole conditions. 23. Civil rightslsuffrage: Kentucky now has restrictions on parolees’ civil rights and suffrage as part of their standard parole conditions. These restrictions are no longer part of the conditions of Illinois, Nevada, New York, and Ohio.
DISCUSSION The data presented above provide a partial description of parole conditions as they existed in mid-1981. In comparison with Arluke’s surveys of parole conditions in 1956 and 1969, a reversal of the trend, detected in 1969, towards increasing the numbers of conditions imposed on parolees can be observed. In the majority of the categories of parole rules employed in this study, the states dropping parole conditions outnumber those which have added parole conditions. Exceptions to this trend are found when parole conditions relate directly to the control of illegal behavior and the ability of the parole authority to maintain supervision over released offenders. This is seen particularly in conditions relating to the reporting of arrests, compliance with the law, possession and use of narcotics, and possession of weapons. While by no means a uniform trend, it appears that there is a movement away from controlling the social activities of parolees towards a focus on crime control matters. One possible explanation for this observation may be that several of the parole conditions that had been routinely imposed in the past are now imposed more selectively through the application of “special
“A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen
Years Later”: Revisited Thirteen Years Later
conditions.” Further, many of the parole conditions reported by Arluke, such as church attendance and the treatment of venereal disease, have been severely criticized or declared unconstitutional (Newman, 1978:315-19; von Hirsch and Hanrahan, 1979; Kittrie and Zenoff, 1981:488496). Finally, some requirements, such as registration as a criminal, may have been replaced by legislation that requires parole authorities to notify local law enforcement agencies of the impending release of an offender. Arluke (1969:274) suggested that since no single parole condition was applied in all states, we should move to reduce the number of parole conditions. In fact, he argued that only one condition, that the parolee “be of good behavior and lead an industrious life ,” might suffice. Hindsight is, of course, nearly perfect, but looking back at this suggestion made in 1969, we must wonder if such a condition would pass a test for vagueness. Part of the difficulty in understanding the development of the wide variety of parole conditions discovered in this survey is that such conditions serve a multitude of purposes. For example, some conditions may be imposed as a form of notice to the parolee, rather than as a restriction on behavior. This is probably true of the restrictions on weapon possession, civil rights, and time credit allowed on return as a parole violator. Other conditions are imposed as a necessary part of supervision. It is likely that parole boards release some inmates precisely because they will be supervised (Messinger, 1979:~~~). If this rationale is to prevail, the supervision process must be assured. For this reason, conditions relating to reporting, travel, home and job visits and searches, and the waiver of extradition are imposed. These conditions enable officers to supervise their parolees. Still another reason for the imposition of parole conditions may be characterized as instructional. in that these conditions provide an ideal of good citizenship the parolee should strive. These
to which conditions
599
include prescriptions about general conduct, the support of dependents, maintenance of employment, and appropriate positions and associates. A fourth rationale for parole conditions is that of risk control. These conditions are designed to limit the parolee’s likelihood of engaging in criminal conduct through restricting his or her use of alcohol, narcotics, and motor vehicles, as well as prohibiting the parolee from serving as a police agent or informer. Any of these activities puts the parolee at risk of violating the law and, indeed, the possession of narcotics is itself a crime. Conditions relating to the parolee’s participation in treatment or rehabilitative programs serve a risk control function in that these programs are expected to reduce the probability of future crime. It is likely, however, that most such treatment requirements are imposed as special conditions, and thus, are not included in our survey results. It is apparent that various conditions overlap and can serve more than one purpose. A final purpose served by all these conditions is that they constitute an “arsenal of the prosecutor” for the parole board. A parolee can be reincarcerated for violation of any of.the conditions of parole, and the fact of violation can be established on the basis of evidence which constitutes proof that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt, as the Supreme Court determined in Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471 (1972). It is this reduced burden of proof that led us to object to Arluke’s suggestion that we simply require parolees to behave and lead an industrious life. Rather, we would suggest that parole conditions be limited in number, clear, and specific, and regulate only those behaviors which are pertinent to crime control and supervision. In this vein we suggest the following conditions: I will obey all federal, state, and municipal laws.
I will report my whereabouts and activities to my parole officer as directed. I will inform my parole officer of any changes in residence or employment within forty-eight hours.
600
LAWRENCE
F. TRAVIS III and EDWARD
I will not travel outside of the state (parole district) without prior approval of my parole officer. These parole conditions, it seems, cover the essential areas. They restrict the parolee from criminal behavior (including the possession of controlled drugs), and enable the parole officer to supervise the parolee. Any requirements for treatment or risk control specific to the type of offense or offender should be added as special conditions, and not uniformly imposed on all paroled inmates. The adoption of this limited set of standard conditions would require that notification of specific prohibitions against suffrage, the possession of firearms, or sentence credits granted on return as a parole violator be conveyed in that manner-i.e., as a notification. This would prevent a general tendency in bureaucracies for rules and regulations to proliferate, and would simplify the parole supervision process from the perspective of both the parole officer and the parolee.
J. LATESSA
REFERENCES Arluke. N. R. (1956). A summary of parole rules. (January): 6-13.
NPPA Journal
-. (1969). A summary of parole rules-Thirteen years later. Crime and Delinq 15 (April): 267274. Barkdull, W. (1976). Probation: Call it control and mean it. Fed Prob 40 (December): 3-8. Jaffe, H. J. (1979). Probation with a flair: A look at some out-of-the ordinary conditions. Fed Prob 13 (March): 25-36. Kittrie, N. S. and Zenoff. E. H. (1981). Sanctions and corrections. Mineola. NY: Foundation Press.
sentencing
Messinger, S. L. (1979). Introduction to i%e quesby A. von Hirsch and K. J. Hanrahan. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. tion ofparole,
Newman, D. J. (1978). Introduction to criminal justice. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott. Prus, R. C. and Stratton, J. R. (1976). Parole revocation decision-making: Private typings and official designations. Fed Prob 40 (March): 48-53. D. T. (1976). Prisoners among us: The Washington. D. C.: The Brookings Institution. Stanley,
problem
ofparole.
Star, D. and Berecochea, J. E. (1977). Rationalizing the conditions of parole: Some recommended changes. Research Report No. 58. Sacramento, CA: California Department
of Corrections.
Travis, L. F. and .O’Leary, V. (1979). Changes jn ACKNOWLEDGEMENT An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Louisville, Kentucky, March 26, 1982.
sentencing
and parole decision-making:
Hackensack, Delinquency.
von Hirsch, A. and Hanrahan, question of parole:
Cambridge,
1976-1978.
NJ: National Council on Crime and
Retention,
MA: Ballinger.
K. J. (1979). The reform,
or abolition.