A TimeSpace for electoral geography: economic restructuring, political agency and the rise of the Nazi party

Political Geography 20 (2001) 301–329 www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

A TimeSpace for electoral geography: economic restructuring, political agency and the rise of the Nazi party Colin Flint

*

Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16803, USA

Abstract Using the electoral rise of the Nazi party in Weimar Germany as an example, this paper proposes the use of cyclico-ideological TimeSpace from Immanuel Wallerstein for the analysis of electoral geography. Elections are viewed as acts of political agency within structural constraints. From a world-systems perspective, the temporal dynamics and spatial structure of the capitalist world-economy are used to identify Weimar Germany as a semi-peripheral country during a period of global economic stagnation and restructuring, a Kondratieff B-phase. The structure and dynamics of the world-economy are expected to mobilize three classes in the semi-periphery; the “national” bourgeoisie, professionals, and skilled workers. Conflicts between factions of capital in Weimar Germany, defined by the economic restructuring, created a period of political instability exploited by the Nazi party. Furthermore, the Nazi party pursued policies to capture the votes of the three classes mobilized in the semi-periphery. However, electoral politics was mediated by regional contextual settings so that different classes supported the Nazi party in different regions of Germany. The regional specificity of the Nazi party’s ability to capture the votes of people disaffected by the dynamics of the world-economy is modeled using spatial regression models. Consideration of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace allows electoral geography to analyze how voters in contextual settings react to global processes.  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: World-systems analysis; Electoral geography; Nazi party; TimeSpace

* Tel.: +1-814-865-2493; fax: +1-814-863-7943. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Flint). 0962-6298/01/$ - see front matter  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 2 - 6 2 9 8 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 6 6 - 4

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Introduction

Electoral geography and electoral studies have focused on particular and constrained dimensions of time and space, namely, a single election or series of elections within a particular state or smaller political jurisdiction. Attempts by electoral geographers to break out of these temporal and spatial scales of analysis have theorized space rather than time. Space, or the geographic context of political behavior, has been theorized by electoral geographers as either a place-specific (Agnew, 1987), neighborhood (Johnston & Pattie, 1998) or regional (Archer & Shelley, 1986) dimension. Also, global spaces of democratic and non-democratic regimes have been mapped (O’Loughlin et al., 1998). However, these conceptualizations of space are incomplete without a consideration of time. Wallerstein (1998) defines the concept of TimeSpace to show that time and space are intertwined into a single dimension. In other words, the spaces defined by electoral geographers are imbued with a particular temporal domain. Interpreting electoral geographies within a TimeSpace broader than the single event of a particular election promotes electoral geography as the study of political agency within structural constraints. In other words, electoral geography is the analysis of visible manifestations of political choices and strategies within the dynamics of the world-economy. This essay illustrates the benefits of conceptualizing electoral geography in a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace by reference to global economic restructuring and the subsequent crisis of the state in Weimar Germany that led to the electoral rise of the Nazi party (NSDAP or National Socialist German Workers Party). Criticisms of electoral geography have characterized the sub-discipline as “data driven” and divorced from theoretical innovations regarding the social construction ´ Tuathail 1996, 1998; Reynolds, 1993). Electoral geography of space and place (O is in danger of being left behind as the rest of the discipline engages the spatial turn in the social sciences. On the other hand, electoral geography is uniquely positioned to inform theoretical debates by providing empirical analysis and evaluation of theoretical frameworks. Thus, electoral geography may play a pivotal role by showing the spatiality of the political manifestations of a variety of social theories. One such social theory, and the one I have chosen to adopt, is Immanuel Wallerstein’s worldsystems theory. Wallerstein (1998) identifies five varieties of TimeSpace; episodic geopolitical, cyclico-ideological, structural, eternal, and transformational. Of these five, the episodic geopolitical and cyclico-ideological TimeSpaces are most relevant to this paper. Episodic geopolitical TimeSpaces are the categories used to discuss immediate history or events (Wallerstein, p. 72). The key point is those conceptualizing elections, for example, as events can divorce them from broader but related processes, such as economic change. Cyclico-ideological TimeSpace is the category used to discuss phenomena by reference to the dynamics of the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, p. 73). Interpreting an event, such as an election, in a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace allows for the inclusion of processes operating at other temporal and spatial scales. Conceptualizing electoral geography within a cyclico-ideological

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TimeSpace leads to an analysis of electoral politics as local collective responses within a global structural setting. Structural TimeSpace refers to the long-term structures and institutions that define historical systems, such as the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1998, p. 73). For example, a core-periphery hierarchy is a necessary and constant feature of the capitalist world-economy and the spatial manifestations of core and peripheral processes constrain the possibilities of electoral politics (Taylor, 1986). Transformational TimeSpaces are particular moments when social action may profoundly affect the institutions and structures of historical systems (Wallerstein, p. 72). If the Nazis had been successful then one could hypothesize the attempted establishment of a worldempire to challenge the capitalist world-economy. However, the Nazis’ failure prevented such transformational action. Finally, eternal TimeSpaces are constant and pervasive relationships such as the perceived aggressive instincts of human beings (Wallerstein, p. 73), and hence act as ideological constructs. The particular usefulness of Wallerstein’s framework lies in its ability to transgress the dominant view of social science that time and space are exogenous, and, therefore unimportant in social actions (Wallerstein, 1998, p. 79). Instead, the spatial extent of elections at the national scale, for example, is a social construct and a means to limit the impact of social change. The state, an institution of the capitalist worldeconomy, limits the scope of electoral politics to within its borders and also promotes a national rather than a global agenda. On the other hand, consideration of a cyclicoideological TimeSpace situates elections within the dynamics of the capitalist worldeconomy. Hence, electoral behavior is a means to react to and influence structural developments through the control of one institution of the historical system. Within the framework of TimeSpaces, electoral geography becomes the analysis of creating limited spaces of power within the constraints of the capitalist world-economy. The focus of the paper is upon an appropriate TimeSpace for electoral geography, one that allows electoral geography to engage political agency and the structure and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy simultaneously. The structure and cyclical dynamics of the capitalist world-economy will be described to define a TimeSpace to explain electoral behavior. Specifically, electoral politics in the semi-periphery at a time of global economic restructuring will be discussed. Structural and cyclicoideological TimeSpaces have been used to interpret electoral politics at a time of economic growth and/or in other parts of the world-economy [for example, see OseiKwame and Taylor (1984) and Archer and Taylor (1981)]. However, the electoral rise of the Nazi party in Weimar Germany offers a particularly fertile exemplification of political agency within global dynamics and state institutions via the mobilization of voters within local spatial settings. The paper is organized in the following way. First a brief summary of the relevant dynamics and processes of the capitalist world-economy will be given. Then a discussion of the state as an institution within the capitalist world-economy will demonstrate the concept of maneuverability, crisis, and the implications for electoral dynamics. Third particular manifestations of these dynamics and processes in Weimar Germany are explored through an examination of economic and social data and, fourth, the role of political agency is explored through a discussion of state crises

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and the response of political coalitions. Finally, data showing the electoral support for the Nazi party within particular spatial settings is reported and interpreted within a context of global economic restructuring. In conclusion, it is argued that the particular economic and political constraints faced by the established parties became opportunities for the Nazi party. These opportunities were exploited by the Nazi party and resulted in the mobilization of electoral support in local spatial settings. By applying Wallerstein’s cyclico-ideological TimeSpace to theorize the construction of electoral politics at the local scale, electoral geography shows how the global scale is implicated in the construction of place-specific politics.

TimeSpace and the politics of the world-economy The temporal and spatial elements of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace relevant to electoral geography can be defined by reference to world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 1979; Wallerstein, 1984a). Kondratieff waves regulate the temporal dynamic of the capitalist world-economy. These are 50 year economic fluctuations at the global scale consisting of 25 years of economic growth (an A-phase) followed by 25 years of economic stagnation and restructuring (a B-phase) (Wallerstein, 1984b). Associated with each A-phase is a new technological innovation that leads to a new round of investment. The B-phase is a period in which the capitalist worldeconomy reorganizes to allow for another period of economic growth (Wallerstein, 1984b). The formation of electoral politics within states is a manifestation of political agency within the constraints of the world-system set by these dynamics. There are four features of restructuring during a Kondratieff B-phase: the peripheralization of core-like activities to reduce costs, the creation of new core-like activities to attract new investment, conflicts between classes within states and within classes between states that serve to increase overall consumer demand, and the expansion of the borders of the world-economy to incorporate new pools of cheap workers (Wallerstein, 1984a, pp. 16–17). In combination, the features of B-phase restructuring allow for a renewed round of economic growth and capital accumulation by simultaneously reducing the production costs of established economic activities, creating new lead sectors to attract investment, and reorganizing the geographic pattern of consumption such that more people in the world-economy can consume at high levels to produce consumer demand for the new innovation (Wallerstein, p. 16). Two significant political–economic implications result from these processes. First, the peripheralization of established industries and the creation of new lead sectors leads to tensions and differences of interest within the capitalist class. That section of the capital elite related to new core-like industries will favor policies facilitating free-trade, minimal government subsidies, and the creation of an educated if expensive workforce. On the other hand, capital interests related to the declining industries are likely to favor protectionist policies and a further reduction of costs via a disciplined workforce. Each of these capital interests will require something different out of the state apparatus and so will be unable to unite in a political alliance.

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Second, the working class is also divided between those employed in the emerging industries and those with jobs in industries that are being peripheralized. However, all workers and members of the working class are likely to experience acute difficulties because of the global economic downturn. In such a situation, members of the electorate may look to the state to provide respite, but the state may not have the funds to offer assistance. Economic crisis and political impotency can then provoke new political agendas, ones that offer alternative visions of state, society, and economics. The spatial component of the TimeSpace context requires reference to the different processes in operation in the capitalist world-economy. Wallerstein (1984a, p. 16) identifies two types of processes in the capitalist world-economy. Core processes are economic activities that add a large amount of value to a product (such as services and skilled manufacturing), command high wages, and, therefore, are associated with high levels of consumption (Wallerstein, p. 4). On the other hand, peripheral processes are the exact opposites, the social relations of peasant agriculture for example. The tendency for the core and peripheral processes to cluster in particular parts of the world leads to the definition of core or peripheral zones (Wallerstein, p. 15). Countries or zones in the world-economy where there is a relatively even mixture of core and peripheral processes are classified as the semi-periphery. Wallerstein (1979) identifies three major class dynamics that occur in the semiperiphery during a Kondratieff B-phase. First, the “national” bourgeoisie (or the internal property-owning bourgeoisie) seek security in a strong state to defend their position (Wallerstein, p. 102). Second, the state plays an important role in providing the guarantees and mechanisms for middle-class professionals to become small-property owners (Wallerstein, p. 105). This leads to the expectation that the selfemployed and professionals would support a political party aimed at expanding and strengthening state institutions. Third, the semi-periphery is the venue for a class struggle over the amount of surplus value to be appropriated by the proletariat. Either the proletariat’s demands are kept in check by utilizing cheaper, or semi-proletarianized labor, or the demands are met and additional appropriation is extracted from the semi-proletariat (Wallerstein, p. 107). In Weimar Germany the former strategy was dominant. Though workers were able to bargain effectively for better wages and working conditions in the 1920s they were soon undermined by the effects of the Great Depression and the subsequent increase in the use of semi-skilled and unskilled labor (Kele, 1972; Childers, 1983). Thus, we would also expect skilled workers to support a political party with an agenda that suppressed the demands of manual workers. Though Wallerstein provides us with an expectation of the class dynamics within the semi-periphery, he offers no discussion of their interaction with politics and the state. The adoption of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace results in a consideration of the state as an institution within the capitalist world-economy, and so subject to the constraints of the structure and dynamics of that historical system (Taylor 1991a,b, 1994). Political parties represent the interests of social groups seeking to control the state to maneuver it for their perceived benefit within the constraints of the worldeconomy (Taylor & Flint, 2000, p. 183). The changing nature of those constraints

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will have an impact upon the efficacy of political parties to deliver on the programs designed for their constituents. However, particular cyclico-ideological TimeSpaces will negate the ability of traditionally dominant parties to maneuver the state effectively. Furthermore, during a Kondratieff B-phase, the broad class strategies identified by Wallerstein are fractured by the trajectory of different industrial sectors in the capitalist world-economy. Class interests are complicated by self-interest based upon employment in either a peripheralizing and stagnant industry or a dynamic and innovative sector (for examples of Weimar Germany see Brustein, 1996; Abraham, 1986).1 The fracture of social class interests produces a particular crisis of the state, one that established electoral alliances are unable to accommodate. By considering a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace, electoral politics are seen as the means to gain access to the state apparatus to maneuver it within an inter-state context. The nature of that context is defined by the cycles and structures of the capitalist world-economy. Electoral dynamics are the geopolitical episodic manifestation of domestic political challenges and opportunities emanating from change within a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace. From this perspective, electoral geography analyzes the response of voters in localized spatial settings to global dynamics while also considering the way the structure of the world-economy limits political options (Taylor 1986, 1990; Osei-Kwame & Taylor, 1984). For example, the economic crisis within Weimar Germany is understood as the turbulence facing a country containing a mixture of core and peripheral processes at a time of economic restructuring. On the other hand, political ideologies, programs, parties, and constituencies are acts of political agency. In other words, global and cyclical contexts offer opportunities and constraints for political actors. The opportunities and constraints facing politicians and voters in Weimar Germany will be addressed in the following section. Empirical support for the argument that electoral behavior can be explained from a cyclico-ideological perspective requires a number of steps. First, social and economic data must be used to establish Weimar Germany as a semi-peripheral zone. Second, the nature of the economic conflicts within Weimar Germany is described, followed by their translation into party politics. Finally, the ability of the Nazi party to use the economic and political dynamics to their advantage is examined. Following Wallerstein’s identification of the class dynamics within the semi-periphery during a period of restructuring, the professional and “national” middle-class, and skilled workers, are expected to have supported the Nazi party. A spatial analysis of the socio-economic composition of the Nazi party electorate examines how the structural processes of class conflict were mediated within spatial settings to create regionallyspecific electorates.

1 David Abraham’s (1986) book has been the topic of intense and troubling criticism [see Abraham (1983, 1984), Turner (1983), Mason (1983) and Feldman (1984) for details]. However, I have avoided the empirical details of Abraham’s work that have been the most hotly contested. More important, it is not Abraham’s factual detail that is important to this paper but his question regarding how divided elites create national projects (Abraham, 1984, p. 186). It is this theoretical framework that is important for my own regarding electoral support and state maneuverability in the capitalist world-economy.

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Weimar Germany and the semi-periphery

In his history of the Weimar Republic, Peukert (1993) identifies inter-war Germany as a “society at the crossroads” facing “modernization and its tribulations.” Looking past the developmentalist tone of these phrases, Peukert identified the tensions and dynamics of a semi-peripheral zone at a time of economic restructuring and as it was harnessing a greater share of core processes. For example, German society had been experiencing demographic changes since about 1900 with increasing life-expectancy, a declining birth rate, and growing acceptance of the two-child family model (Peukert, p. 7–12). In other words, Germany was undergoing a move toward demographic patterns associated with core countries. Underlying these demographic changes were changes in the pattern of employment across industrial sectors. The general trend was a decline in the percentage of workers employed in the primary sector, from about 48% of the workforce in 1880 to 25% in 1939 (Peukert, 1993, p. 9). Employment in the tertiary sector grew from just more than 20% in 1880 to about 32% in 1939 and employment in the secondary sector fluctuated over this period but by 1939 was at just less than 40%, up from 29% of the workforce in 1880 (Peukert, p. 9). In conjunction with these trends, the class structure also changed dramatically. The proportion of the workforce who were selfemployed fell from 20% in 1907 to 16% in 1925 (Peukert, p. 10). On the other hand, the percentage of white-collar workers and public officials rose from 10% to 17% in the same period (Peukert, p. 10). Not surprisingly, rural to urban migration continued, though the rate declined from the period at the turn of the century. In 1925, about one-third of the German population fell into each of the categories of city-dweller, small-town resident or rural resident (Peukert, p. 10). Further evidence for Germany’s semi-peripheral status is found in the mosaic of modes of production to be found in Weimar Germany. Particular regions were the location of agriculture, industry, or services in which the relations of production were defined by core or peripheral processes. In aggregation, at the national scale the relatively balanced mosaic of core and peripheral processes produced a semiperipheral state. Alongside industrial capitalism there also existed vestiges of feudalism as well as family-peasant, and small-commodity production (Abraham, 1986, p. 10). With regard to agriculture, the eastern provinces of East Prussia, Pommerania, Grenzmark, Posen, Brandenburg, and Silesia (Fig. 1) were dominated by large grainproducing farms owned by Junkers and employing salaried agricultural workers (Brustein, 1996, p. 64). The states of Middle Germany (Saxony, Thuringia and Anhalt) (Fig. 1) contained a high proportion of independent small- and mediumsized farms producing a variety of crops (Brustein, p. 64). Farms in the northwest region of Germany (Hannover, Schleswig–Holstein, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Braunschweig, and Schaumburg–Lippe) (Fig. 1) were mainly independently owned, medium-sized and specialized in animal husbandry (Brustein, p. 65). Agriculture in the three remaining regions of Rhineland–Westphalia, Hesse and southern Germany (Fig. 1) was distinguished by the practice of partible inheritance, whereby land was divided amongst heirs (Brustein, p. 65). Thus, the diversity of modes of production

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Fig. 1.

Regions and cities of Weimar Germany.

in agriculture was defined by economic factors, such as farm size and ownership, but also by the maintenance of different social relations. The dominance of the Junker classes as well as the existence of peasant agriculture produced a complex mixture of modes of production, such that Abraham argues that Weimar Germany still suffered “not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from its incompleteness. Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us, arising from the survival of antiquated modes of production” (Marx, 1967, p. 9 quoted in Abraham, 1986, p. 10). Within industry, different attitudes toward free-trade, labor relations, and the role of the state produced a variety of relations of production (Abraham, pp. 10–13). The German state was defining new core-like economic practices by playing an advanced role in the management and control of the economy and increasing workers’ involvement in decision-making, a relationship that was to define the post-1945 core economies under the title of Keynesian economics (Haimson, 1989). The definition of these new state-economy relationships at the same time as the vestiges of feudalism were being maintained in the Junker estates is the most vivid illustration of the existence of core and peripheral processes in Weimar Germany. Changes were also occurring in the service sector. A tension existed between an old middle class of shopkeepers and artisans and a new middle class of white collar employees (clerical staff and civil servants) (Brustein, 1996). The expansion of a German welfare state and the increased profile of department stores and consumer cooperatives threatened the way of life and livelihood of shopkeepers and owners of other small businesses as they had to compete with bigger enterprises and provide

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contributions to pay for state benefits (Abraham, 1986). On the other hand, the new middle classes employed by the government were dependent upon those contributions for their salaries. In Weimar Germany, the increased role of the state and processes of rationalization were threatening the traditional independence and status of the old middle class, while a new class of salaried employees was forming. The mixture of demographic change, modes of production, industrial dynamics and class formation in Weimar Germany give support for the contention that it was a country in the 1920s and 1930s with a mixture of core and peripheral processes. Furthermore, all the trends affirm that core processes were beginning to outweigh peripheral processes. The transition from semi-peripheral to core status occurs during a period of B-phase restructuring when semi-peripheral countries have greater relative power toward core countries (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 100). Thus, the full story of flux and division within Weimar Germany requires concentration upon the implications of the processes of B-phase restructuring.

Economic restructuring and Weimar Germany Kondratieff B-phase restructuring is a periodic crisis aimed at reversing periods of over-accumulation by devaluing capital. Idle fixed capital, inflation, unemployment, and the destruction of fixed capital are all means of devaluing capital (Harvey, 1982, p. 194). Specific examples of these processes were to be found in Weimar Germany. The presence of idle fixed capital is evident by the production index in 1932–33 being half of what it was in 1927–28 (Petzina, 1969). Between 1918 and 1923, inflation was rampant. In 1923, the currency was stabilized by the introduction of the Rentenmark when the paper mark exchanged at the rate of 4,200,000,000,000 to the dollar. In 1932, the official unemployment figure was six million, but many once entitled to unemployment benefit could no longer claim at that time, and one in three of the workforce were estimated to be without employment (Petzina, p. 60). The destruction of fixed capital was also prevalent. In 1931, disinvestment — decreases in inventory and the wearing down of industrial plant — amounted to approximately five billion marks (Stolper, 1967, p. 119). B-phase restructuring is also a period where new core-like activities are defined and old ones peripheralized. A major cleavage within the German bourgeoisie existed during the Weimar Republic based on the different trajectory of industries (Abraham, 1986). On the one hand were capital interests in the new and dynamic electrical, chemical, machine and textile industries. These industries can be equated with the new core-like “innovations” in Wallerstein’s (1979, 1984a) language. On the other hand were the older iron and steel and extractive industries which were facing pressures of peripheralization. The different fortunes facing these industries are reflected in production and employment figures. The peripheralization of the mining industry is exemplified by the large declines in output and the size of the workforce. The number of coal mines declined from 350 in 1913 to 223 in 1932, and the size of the workforce and output dropped by about 50% in the same period (Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutsche Reich (SJDR),

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1933). In the steel industry, the number of plants using the Thomas and Bessemer methods declined as core-industries while the number of plants using the new electric oven method rose from 27 in 1913 to 48 in 1931 (SJDR, 1933). Economic rationalization was evident in the chemical industry as the number of sulfuric acid plants declined, from 107 in 1913 to 67 in 1931, and the size of the workforce was reduced to a third of its original size in the same period, while output remained steady (SJDR, 1933). Oil-refining, at this time, began to impose itself as a new core process, as the size of the workforce rose from 1958 in 1913 to 6816 in 1931 (SJDR, 1933). Within the textile industry, high value products such as silk were doing well, with the number of plants and size of the workforce increasing, compared to the same trends in flax (SJDR, 1933). These trends illustrate the broad processes of German economic transition within the constraints and opportunities of Kondratieff B-phase restructuring. New sectors of industry were becoming dominant over the older ones, such as mining and the majority of the iron and steel industry, and these new sectors had the ability and desire to compete in the world-economy. The older sectors wanted to remain domestically oriented behind protectionist tariffs. Another difference between the dynamic and stagnating industries in Weimar Germany was the form of labor relations. Following on from government involvement in the economy during the First World War, the Weimar economy saw the development of corporatist policies (Haimson, 1989). One manifestation of this process was the growth in collective contracts, a written contract between employers and employees regulating working conditions. Two million employees were working under collective contracts before World War One in comparison to twelve to fourteen million in the Weimar Republic (Reich, 1938, p. 107). Comparison of the number of employees per collective contract across industrial sectors indicates a disparity between the agricultural, mining, and metal sectors versus the machines and tools, chemical, textiles, and woodwork sectors (SJDR, 1929). Broadly speaking, the dynamic industries were more likely to adopt collective contracts than those facing peripheralization within the world-economy. The pattern of collective contracts is evidence that core processes were being redefined in some sections of German industry and not others. The dynamic exportoriented industries adopted new mechanized production processes which reduced the necessary labor input (Abraham, 1986, p. 13). Consequently, the relative cost of labor input in the production process declined, but the amount of surplus value gained by the worker increased. For example, wages grew in the oil-refining sector, compared to the decline of wages in the coal mining industry (SJDR, 1933). Differences in the adoption of collective contracts and wage increases across industrial sectors reflect the class struggles within Kondratieff B-phase restructuring. Collective contracts were part of innovative labor relations that produced higher wages and higher consumption. Therefore, augmenting world effective demand (Wallerstein, 1984a, p. 17). Another component of the “innovation” of new core-like activities is the development of new production processes. Such new processes were introduced under the title of rationalization which, in Weimar Germany, took the form of the managerial principles of Taylorism and labor- or time-saving forms of investment (Peukert,

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1993, p. 113). Rationalization was perceived differently by entrepreneurs in the dynamic and declining industries. Elites in heavy industry saw rationalization as a means of maintaining power over the workforce, while those in the chemical and electrical industries viewed it as a means of securing the cooperation of workers (Peukert, 1993, p. 112). The macrochanges occurring in the service sector have already been described. In the agricultural sector livestock and dairy farmers had made investments to make their enterprises more capital intensive. The result was increasing indebtedness as agricultural prices fell in the late 1920s (Brustein, 1996, p. 66). For the agricultural sector, global restructuring meant a shift from national markets to global competition. New economic imperatives favored the importation of cheaper agricultural products from neighboring countries and the influx of American capital went mainly to the industrial sector (Abraham, 1986, p. 44). The result was that global capitalism was intruding into German agriculture where anticapitalist sentiments and vestiges of feudal practices existed (Abraham, p. 171). Economic stagnation and restructuring were evident in Weimar Germany. The tensions between fractions of capital within Germany, the growth of collective bargaining, and the devaluation of capital illustrate the conflicts that emanated from Kondratieff B-phase restructuring. However, the specific nature of these processes did not simply emerge from structural necessities, but were defined by political struggles. Though restructuring was necessary, such a transition was contingent upon political action within states. The following section shows that in Weimar Germany the outcome was political impotency on behalf of established parties and aggressive agency and opportunism by parties of the extreme left and right. TimeSpace and coalition building in Weimar Germany The key rift within the Weimar bourgeoisie ran between those with a global export-oriented perspective and those preferring an autarkic stance. Abraham (1986) argues that the new and dynamic industries were interested in low prices for basic industrial goods, “pacific” expansion through trade treaties, and did not perceive wage and social costs as important as long as international economic preeminence was gained. In contrast, the older industries, focused upon the domestic market, wanted higher prices and low costs, and faced a higher share of total costs in the form of wages. Cleavage also existed within German agriculture between the large estates who wanted self-sufficiency in grain at relatively high prices versus the smallholders who wanted to import feed from Germany’s neighbors at cheaper prices (Abraham). However, peasants and estate owners managed to maintain a united political front until 1928. The established political parties neglected the political interests of the new middle class and concentrated upon industrial and agricultural issues instead (Brustein, 1996). This neglect was to have grave consequences as the Nazi party began to tap into the political concerns of civil servants as well as the old middle class. With specific reference to trade policies, W.D. Smith supports Abraham’s argument by saying:

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On the whole, the heavy-industrial organizations tended to accept the idea of autarky more readily than did the representatives of the other major agglomerations, both because they had a long history of attempting to accommodate the agrarian right and because their export aims were still largely directed toward continental Europe and thus could be to some extent encompassed within an autarkic economic policy. On the other hand, banks, industries dependent on extraEuropean imports, and industries with diversified markets abroad found the prospect of an autarkic economic policy less attractive under normal circumstances (W.D. Smith, 1986, p. 211). The fractures within the Weimar bourgeoisie led to the construction of political coalitions to form governments that could maneuver the state to the perceived benefit of particular interests. The dynamic and export branches preferred coalitions with organized labor and salaried employees, while heavy industry favored cooperation with the conservative rural sector (Abraham, 1986). The tensions between the different factions of industry were based upon their position on the world-economy, and the role of labor in the production process. The chief point of contention was the cost of labor as a result of the Republic’s experimentation with industrial democracy as a means of negating socialist movements (Peukert, 1993, p. 127). The split within German industry was first manifested in 1895 when the Central League of German Industrialists split into two hostile organizations, supplemented by a host of regional, specialty, and commercial groups (Abraham, 1986, p. 107). The interests of dynamic export oriented industry tended to be dominant prior to 1931 while inter-industrial agreements were formed to maintain cohesion (Abraham, p. 108). However, in 1930, the three matters of inter-industry dispute — labor costs, trade policies, and reparation payments — could no longer be balanced. Chancellor Bru¨ning’s government required the support of the Social Democrats while promising lower wages, reduced state expenditures, a revision of reparation payments, austerity, and expanded trade (Abraham, p. 109). The contradictions of such a program came to a head when Bru¨ning did not alter labor’s economic gains and made moves to lower industrial payments to facilitate an export drive to fund rescheduled reparation payments. However, a decline in global trade after the Wall Street Crash of 1929 led to a shift in the political power of the different fractions of capital. Heavy industry believed that it could offer a united voice and outmaneuver dynamic industry, but the situation was one where the political interests of industry were divided and each sought alternative alliance partners (Abraham, pp. 155–165). Within the agricultural sector the lines of conflict ran between estate owners and peasants, though this was complicated by regionally-specific cultural practices of inheritance (Brustein, 1996, p. 93). However, though these groups had competing economic interests, rural social relations were more symbiotic than conflictual (Abraham, 1986, p. 43). The result was that peasants, on the whole, supported the rural elites, who acted as patrician. The basic economic divide between the two rural factions focused upon trade. Broadly speaking, the Junker class of estate owners wanted policies maintaining self-sufficiency in grain while promoting the import of dairy and livestock products (Brustein, p. 67). On the other hand, peasant farmers

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wanted to import grain to provide cheap imputs for dairy and livestock production (Abraham, p. 68). These divisions led to an obvious alliance between heavy industry and estate owners on the one hand and export industry and peasants on the other. However, the relationship between peasants and owners resulted in combined support of organized agricultural interests until the agricultural crisis of 1928 (Abraham, p. 72). The agricultural crises affected peasants more adversely than the grain producers. The political implication was that estate owners could no longer provide a voice for all of German agriculture and the peasants switched their political allegiance to the bloc led by export industry. The old middle class was represented by the conservative DNVP (German Nationalist People’s Party) and the two liberal parties, the DDP (German Democratic Party) and the DVP (German People’s Party). These parties favored the established order and mixed desires for agricultural tariffs with an ideology of private enterprise and concern over increased costs for urban consumers (Brustein, 1996, p. 78–83). These parties also tried to woo the new middle class by cooperating with white collar unions and advocating free trade (Brustein, pp. 109–111). However, support for established middle class practices necessarily required an attack on new developments such as department stores and consumer cooperatives. The liberal parties were unable to represent both the old and new middle classes and the result was that neither the DVP nor DDP was able to offer many concrete policies that would have excited the new middle class (Brustein, p. 110). Hence, the new middle classes were looking for a party that would recognize their concerns. Tensions also existed between the capitalist and working classes in Weimar Germany, despite the tendency for the dynamic export oriented fraction of capital to be more accommodative toward the demands of an organized working class. The SPD (German Social Democratic Party) was not part of a ruling coalition from 1924 to 1928, but it still retained political influence as governments needed its support. Aided by an improvement in Germany’s economic situation in the mid 1920s, the SPD was able to make gains for the working class in social welfare (Sozialpolitik) and labor legislation (Abraham, 1986, p. 221). Heavy industry, with its greater dependence upon labor inputs, became fearful of the gains made by the working class and began to attack it in 1927. However, it was not until global economic collapse and its impact on the export-oriented industries that capital interests formed a united front against the concessions gained by the working class. In December 1929, the League of German Industry published a report that signaled the end of a commitment toward Sozialpolitik and a move toward Wirtschaftpolitik, or policies more favorable to accumulation (Abraham, p. 252). At a time of economic downturn, the interests of capital and labor could not be blended into a form of society that balanced an imperative for accumulation and the need for legitimization (Habermas, 1975). After 1929, Weimar Germany had reached a crisis of the state in which neither capital nor labor interests believed that the established political parties could maneuver the state within the world-economy to their satisfaction. Furthermore, both interests were divided internally such that neither could form an alliance of parties. The working class was divided between supporters of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) and the SPD, or a revolutionary and reformist stance (Nicholls, 1968,

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p. 140). The bourgeois parties were split because of the gains made by white-collar workers as part of Sozialpolitik, as opposed to the self-employed who felt they were being overtaxed to pay for government policies favoring big business and organized labor (Brustein, 1996, p. 73). Economic restructuring and stagnation within Germany, as part of a global dynamic, had resulted in challenges to the particular form of the state, the Weimar Republic. In addition, a complex pattern of electoral alliances and conflicts had ebbed and flowed. The processes behind the collapse of these coalitions were the increasing strength of organized capital over organized labor (Anderson, 1945), the consequent loss of the need for cooperation between employers and employees, and the slowly growing dominance of capital interests involved in core processes and products over those being peripheralized. Thus, the imperatives of global economic restructuring, understood through a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace, created a context of political crisis. This context was seen as a window of opportunity for political agency by the Nazi party as they tailored their policies to the material needs of the German population. The NSDAP created political programs that promised to alleviate the specific economic concerns facing particular groups (Brustein, 1996). In addition, Lipset (1960) argues that the economic stresses being experienced by the lower middle classes in Germany made them particularly susceptible to the Nazi party’s appeal. Alternatively, other scholars found the disaffected and alienated to be attracted to the NSDAP (Arendt, 1958; Kornhauser, 1959). In other words, the changes in Weimar society created a sense of anomie that the Nazi party was able to counter through membership in its organizations. Falter and Zintl (1988) provide evidence for a mixed cause hypothesis, that the middle class was radicalized by the economic changes to support the Nazis while, on the other hand, working class support for the Nazi party was the result of protests against the dire economic situation. Other authors have noted the relationship between economic and political crisis in Weimar Germany and the rise of the Nazi party (for examples see Geiger, 1930; Petzina, 1969; Borchardt, 1984). These contributions can be phrased as theories predicting the socio-economic basis of Nazi party electoral support. Lipset’s (1960) theory leads to a prediction that white collar workers and the self-employed would have supported the Nazi party. The work of Arendt (1958) and Kornhauser (1959) suggests that the unemployed and previous non-voters supported the NSDAP. Falter’s (1990) work has evolved into the notion of the Nazi party being a “catch-all” party, hence no particular socio-economic groups should stand out in the Nazi electorate. Brustein’s (1996) rational choice approach demands that the basis of regionally-specific electorates be evaluated on the basis of the perception of the NSDAP as a party that could solve economic problems particular to different localities. Finally, Burnham (1972) notes that Catholic voters and the working class were relatively immune to the Nazis’ appeal. Though these theories may be evaluated by the empirical analysis below [see also O’Loughlin, Flint, and Anselin (1994) and Flint (1998a)], they all view elections in Weimar as an episodic TimeSpace and do not situate Weimar electoral behavior within broader temporal and spatial scales.

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Nazi party electoral support within a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace The Nazi party’s national socialist agenda was one that could appeal to a broad spectrum of society faced with the challenges and uncertainties of B-phase restructuring in the semi-periphery. Specifically, the Nazi party offered a political program that appealed to the three classes identified by Wallerstein (1979, p. 103) as under most stress during economic restructuring. The notion of a strong state that would be assertive in the world-economy while also maintaining order and traditional privileges would appeal to the middle-class and the more skilled workers (Wallerstein, pp. 103 and 107; Mayer & Pois, 1990). However, reference to a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace predicts such class politics at a national scale. The contribution of electoral geography is to explain how national and global processes are mediated within local and regional spatial settings. The analysis of the spatial patterns in aggregate voting behavior shows how places with particular characteristics were susceptible to radical political mobilization at a time of economic restructuring. Brustein’s (1996) rational choice approach to Nazi party membership offers a compelling argument as to why different socio-economic groups supported the Nazi party because of particular economic policies. The geographic dimension to this argument is added by showing how particular regional modes of production created local interests which were either represented by the Nazi party or not (Brustein, 1996; Ault & Brustein, 1998). Translating Brustein’s (1996) rational choice approach into the analysis of electoral support illustrates one aspect of the state maneuverability thesis (Taylor & Flint, 2000, p. 183), namely that social groups facing particular issues sought control of the state by parties perceived to be sympathetic to their needs. Brustein’s detailed analysis shows how people embedded within regionally-specific social and economic practices were either able to take advantage of global economic conditions or, on the other hand, were adversely affected. Further, the focus of their political activity was a party that could gain control of the state and, so the Nazi party supporters believed, maneuver the German state within the world-economy to their advantage. However, looking solely at the regional and state scales does not allow for an exploration of the sources of those concerns. In other words, only a consideration of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace allows for questions of why a particular place (Weimar Germany) and why a particular time (1920s and 1930s)? Consideration of global economic restructuring and its impact upon political behavior in localized spatial settings forms a more complete consideration of both political agency and structural constraints. Scholars have reached a consensus that the Nazi party gained electoral support from a broad socio-economic spectrum of voters (Childers, 1983; Falter, 1990, 1991; O’Loughlin et al., 1994; Flint 1998a). Though the Nazi party was less effective in prying Catholic voters away from the Center party and industrial workers from the Communist party (Burnham, 1972), it was able to attract significant electoral support from all other social groups. More specifically, the social groups looking for radical solutions, given Wallerstein’s (1979) interpretation of semi-peripheral class dynamics, formed the foundation of the NSDAP’s electoral support. Both the middle and working classes supported the Nazi party, with the working-class accounting for

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about 40% of the Nazi party vote and the middle-class about 60% in both 1928 and 1930 (Falter, 1990, p. 78). Though ecological analysis (Falter 1990, 1991) provides useful information about the proclivities of members of particular social groups to support the Nazi party, it does so at the expense of ignoring geographic patterns. An alternative approach is a spatial-analysis one that identifies the Nazi party’s socio-economic support in different spatial settings (Flint, 1998a,b; O’Loughlin et al., 1994). Electoral geographers conceptualize voting behavior as an act structured by local knowledge (Agnew, 1987; Cox, 1969). A cyclico-ideological TimeSpace broadens this perspective by defining what dynamics people are responding to within their local spatial settings. Thus, electoral geography can provide empirical support to discussions of “glocalization” or the way that global processes are manifested in, and constructed by, local actions (Swyngedouw, 1997). To put it another way, global restructuring was experienced in different ways in different regions of Weimar Germany. A regional analysis of the Nazi party vote distinguishes the construction of different electorates in different spatial settings. The definition of regionally-specific electorates illustrates that different social groups in different regions perceived the Nazis to be the party that could maneuver the state within the world-economy to their liking. Though the cyclico-ideological TimeSpace established processes of economic restructuring, or a common set of issues, the political response to these processes was mediated within diverse spatial settings. Hence, a geography of political responses is determined by different regional settings and practices — one manifestation of these responses is a geography of the socio-economic composition of the NSDAP’s electoral support. The following spatial analysis uses aggregate data to show how places with particular socio-economic characteristics were the locations of Nazi party support. Further, following Brustein’s (1996) rational choice approach the motivation for particular social groups can be related to demands placed upon the state at a time of economic restructuring. By constructing eight regions of Germany on the basis of historical–cultural features, and modeling the Nazi vote within each of the regions separately, regression coefficients indicate the differential socio-economic support for the Nazi party across Germany (Fig. 1).2 For each of the regions spatial–structural regression models were used to estimate the socio-economic composition of the Nazi party vote. Comparison of these models across the eight regions illustrates how different spatial settings promoted different political mobilization (O’Loughlin et al., 1994). However, the framework established by the cyclico-ideological TimeSpace of economic restructuring suggests that three socio-economic groups should dominate the Nazi party’s electorate — professionals, the self-employed, and skilled workers and artisans 2 The eight regions were constructed by reference to historical and cultural criteria. Common cultural traits, especially religion, as well as economic ties were identified to create coherent but contiguous regions. In addition, the boundaries of the Nazi party’s own political organizations (Gaue) were also considered. The goal was to create regions which experienced a similar political message from the Nazi party that was interpreted within similar cultural settings. The need to construct regions that consisted of contiguous regions with a sufficient number of cases acted as a methodological constraint.

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(Wallerstein, 1979). This is not to say that these groups were the only ones supporting the Nazi party. Instead, the notion of local responses to global restructuring predicts that these classes should dominate political mobilization, though the actual composition of the electorate will vary by region. The Nazi party used a massive shift in the voting preferences in Weimar Germany to support its claims for political legitimacy that, inevitably, allowed it to come to power and end the Weimar Republic. The problems of coalition formation between the established parties described above had electoral implications. Established and mainstream parties lost electoral support, while the extreme left and right gained votes (Epstein, 1963). The perceived inefficacy of established parties to maneuver the state within the world-economy was punished by the electorate. Moreover, economic restructuring created tensions that prevented the weakened parties from forming governing coalitions (Abraham, 1986). As the economic crisis worsened, the parties of the extreme left and right were seen as a viable option (Epstein, 1963). The KPD increased its electoral support from 12.6% of the Reichstag vote in 1924 to 14.3% in July 1932. On the other hand, the Nazi party, under Adolph Hitler’s leadership, rose from obscurity in 1924 to the party that could attract the most votes (37.3%) in July 1932. Simultaneously, the two main liberal parties, the DVP and the DDP, declined from 6.3% of the vote and 9.9% respectively in 1924 to only 1.1% each in July 1932. Two periods of electoral change established the Nazi party as a political force. The NSDAP increased their share of the vote from 2.6% in the Reichstag election of May 1928 to 18.3% in September 1930. In the following Reichstag election of July 1932 the Nazi party increased its support further to 37.3%. However, the level of support for the Nazi party was not uniform across the German nation. The strongest support for the party was found in the northeast (Prussia) and northeast of Germany, while the lowest levels of support were in the southern states of Wu¨rttemberg and Bavaria (Table 1).3 Broadly speaking, the regional pattern shows a trend of declining support for the Nazi party from the north to the south of Weimar Germany (Pollock, 1944; Passchier, 1980; O’Loughlin, Flint, & Shin, 1995). A geography of the level of support is not enough. To uncover the role of class dynamics uncovered by taking a structural perspective, a geography of the composition of that support must be found.4 In combination, the structural dynamics identified by Wallerstein 3 The data used to calculate the regional level of support and the subsequent spatial analysis were taken from the archive Wahl und Sozialdaten der Kreise und Gemeinden des Deutschen Reiches, 1920– 1933 at the Central Archive of the University of Cologne (Falter & Gruner, 1981). 4 As the purpose of this essay is to introduce a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace for electoral geography, relatively little space will be used in describing the statistical procedure of spatial–structural regression models. This technique and its application to electoral geography is explained in detail elsewhere (Flint, 1998a,b). Briefly, regression models are estimated using the Spacestat software (Anselin, 1992) that identify spatial structures in that data and, when necessary, incorporate it into the modeling (Anselin, 1988). Two types of spatiality in the data are identified and utilized, spatial heterogeneity and spatial dependence (Anselin, 1988). Spatial heterogeneity refers to instability in the parameters across the dataset, so that the relationship between an explanatory variable and the dependent variable is not consistent across all the units of analysis (Anselin, 1988). Heterogeneity has been incorporated into the research design so that

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Table 1 Regional pattern of the Nazi party percentage vote in the Reichstag elections of September 1930 and July 1932 Region

Nazi party percentage vote — September 1930

Nazi party percentage vote — July 1932

National Prussia Silesia North-West Germany Rhineland–Westphalia Central Germany Baden Wu¨rttemberg Bavaria

18.3 22.5 19.9 23.5 16.7 19.1 16.4 11.5 13.9

37.3 47.5 43.0 47.5 34.5 43.6 36.3 33.8 31.1

and the geography of unique spatial settings results in the expectation that electoral behavior by the three classes mobilized by economic restructuring in the semi-periphery will vary across the regions. The use of aggregate data and an interpretation of its spatiality shows any regional pattern in political behavior. However, the technique does not allow for claims to be made regarding individual behavior. Instead, the results should be interpreted in a manner that shows the tendency for counties with a higher or lower proportion of particular social groups to support the Nazi party. In other words, what the analysis shows is the behavior of collections of individuals at the local scale (necessarily aggregated within counties) within the dynamics of the world-economy, or, in other words, the tendency of particular places with different socio-economic characteristics to be locations of power for the Nazi party. In aggregation, the support of individuals within these localities allowed the NSDAP to seize power and maneuver the state to their advantage. Regionally-specific electorates for the period of electoral change between the

the instability in the significance of the explanatory variables can be seen by comparing the regional models. If a particular variable does not appear in a particular regional model, it was not statistically significant. In addition, the strength and even signs of significant variables may vary across regions. The other aspect of spatiality in the data is spatial dependence. Spatial dependence occurs when the assumption of the independence of observations is violated because of Galton’s problem, when voting behavior in one county is partly a function of voting behavior in neighboring counties (Anselin, 1988). Spatial–statistical regression incorporates spatial dependence, when present, into the analysis by including a spatial lag as an explanatory variable. The spatial lag took on one of two forms, depending upon the diagnostic tests reported by Spacestat. The spatially-lagged dependent variable was the average change in the Nazi party vote in neighboring counties. The temporal–spatial lag was the average Nazi party vote in neighboring counties for the first of the two elections in a particular period of electoral change. While the incorporation of heterogeneity illustrated regional differences in the socio-economic composition of the Nazi party vote, spatial dependence provided insight into processes of the local diffusion of the NSDAP vote (see Flint, 1998b).

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Reichstag elections of 1928 and 1930 are reported in Table 2.5 Support from the three expected groups was to be found, but that behavior was specific to particular regional contexts. In Baden, the professional classes and skilled workers supported the Nazi party, shown by the positive signs of the variables measuring the proportion of white collar workers in the health sector and proportion of blue collar workers in the trade and transport sector in the workforce.6 In Bavaria, evidence is found for rural middle-class support of the Nazi party, given the positive sign of the variable measuring white-collar workers in the rural sector. On the other hand, the regression model for Central Germany indicates that skilled workers and artisans (measured by proportion of blue collar workers in the trade and transport sector) voted for the NSDAP. The regionally-specific electorates for the period of electoral change between the Reichstag elections of 1930 and July 1932 are reported in Table 3. The support of the self-employed in Wu¨rttemberg for the Nazi party is evident, as suggested by Wallerstein’s discussion of class dynamics in the semi-periphery. In Rhineland– Westphalia, places where professionals were experiencing economic distress (measured by white-collar unemployment) supported the NSDAP. However, in Prussia the change in the Nazi party vote is negatively related to the variable measuring the proportion of white collar workers in the health sector. The regional setting of Prussia did not foster the type of professional support for the Nazi party seen in the southern states of Baden and Bavaria in the first period of electoral change. The ability of the Nazi party to mobilize the “national” bourgeoisie was restricted to particular spatial settings. In addition, there is no evidence of the mobilization of skilled industrial workers in this period of electoral change. Looking beyond the three groups identified by the consideration of a cyclicoideological TimeSpace to be supporters of the Nazi party, the regional approach supports Falter’s (1990 and 1991) claim that the Nazi party mobilized support from across the socio-economic spectrum. The absences of significant coefficients in many 5 The estimation of separate regression models for each of the eight regions did not account for all of the heterogeneity in the data. If heterogeneity was found to exist within the regions, the region was subdivided and an estimation technique was used that estimated separate regression coefficients for the subregions. The subregions are called spatial regimes and are identified in Tables 2 and 3. For example, in Table 2 the coefficient for the Protestant variable displayed a value of 0.09 in Lower Silesia but was not significant in Upper Silesia. 6 The variables were constructed to define socio-economic groups as a percentage of either the population as a whole (for example, with religion), eligible voters (for electoral turnout), and the workforce (with socio-economic/occupational variables). The variable blue collar workers in trade and transport measures the proportion of workers with skilled trades. This socio-economic group had similar political concerns and attitudes as the self-employed (Ault & Brustein, 1998, p. 1311). The final models reported in the tables were defined by first estimating an aspatial stepwise regression using the SPSS software to identify significant variables. This procedure was necessary in order to satisfy McAllister’s (1987) critique that the contextual factors identified by geographers are merely the product of mis-specified models. The SPSS model containing significant variables was then estimated in the Spacestat software so that the spatial structure of the data could be taken into account. The final models reported in Tables 2 and 3 display the significant variables once spatial effects had either been incorporated into the model or controlled for.

69 0.74

0.37 154 0.34

b

142 0.47

Schleswig– Holstein 0.15/NS −0.23/NS

Northwest

1.02/NS 183 0.65

−0.18/NS

0.16/0.14 −0.21/NS

Rhineland

Rhineland Westphalia

104 0.28

0.65

0.10

Central Germany

0.46/0.46 83 0.61

NS/7.89

0.60/NS

North Baden & Pfalz NS/0.12 −0.39/NS

Baden

88 0.05

−0.22

Wu¨rttemberg

Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. All the coefficients reported were significant at the 0.05 probability level. Coefficent in the spatial regime was not significant at the 0.05 level.

0.09/NS b 0.80/0.58 −0.29/−0.45

0.16 0.25 −0.21

Protestant Turnout Manual industrial workers Unemployment Blue collar domestic workers Blue collar workers in trade/transport White collar workers in agric. White collar workers/health sector Employment/ trade and transport sector Spatial lag N R-Squared

a

Lower Silesia

Silesia

Spatial Regime

Prussia

Table 2 Spatial regression models of the percentage change in the Nazi party vote, May 1928–September 1930a

0.44 146 0.63

0.69

2.81

−2.43

0.07 −0.19

Bavaria

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Protestant Turnout Manual industrial workers Self-employed Unemployment Manual worker unemployment Blue collar domestic workers Blue collar civil servants White Collar Workers/Health Assistants as % of workforce % of workforce working class Spatial lag N R-squared

Spatial regime

183 0.66

104 0.57

0.21

Central Germany

83 0.46

0.15

Baden

−0.76

146 0.86

NS/2.85 NS/−0.95

−0.93

1.2

−0.25/−0.89

0.27

Bavaria

Central/ Upper Franconia 0.29/0.27

Wu¨rttemberg

88 0.80

142 0.33

−0.41/−0.55

0.24/0.13 NS/0.91

Rhineland

Rhineland Westphalia

−0.39/−0.64 154 0.51

0.53

−0.92

0.18 −0.46

Northwest

0.89

69

−4.69

0.16 −0.69 −0.18

Silesia

−0.48/−0.75

−8.37/NS

0.10/0.28

East Prussia

Prussia

Table 3 Spatial regression models of the percentage change in the Nazi party vote, September 1930–July 1932

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of the regions, especially North-West Germany and Wu¨rttemberg in the first period and Central Germany and Baden in the second, show that no socio-economic groups were dominant in the Nazi party’s electoral support. In addition, in other regions, combinations of different socio-economic bases of support also produced cross-class support. For example, the latter period produced support by both the self-employed and workers for the Nazi party in Wu¨rttemberg. Though particular variables in particular regions may support or refute the more specific theories of Burnham (1972), Lipset (1960) or Arendt (1958) and Kornhauser (1959), a more complete national picture is gained by considering Falter’s ideas [see O’Loughlin et al. (1994) and Flint (1998a) for a fuller evaluation of these other theoretical approaches]. However, evidence for cross-class electoral support for the Nazi party at the national level neither refutes nor supports Wallerstein’s hypotheses about the political tendencies of classes in the semi-periphery because some in both the middle class and the working class will benefit from the economic changes and some will lose. A more fruitful exercise is to explore the nature of the regional settings that produced support from skilled workers in some spatial settings and professionals and the self-employed in others. The regression results show a broad pattern of professional and other middle class support in the southern regions of Baden, Wu¨rttemberg, and Bavaria (Tables 2 and 3). An explanation for the prominence of these groups in these regions lies in the influence of the institutional development of the Nazi party itself in creating a regional setting. Earlier disputes within the Nazi party had revolved around ideological questions which manifested themselves spatially. Activists in the north of Germany, calling themselves the “Front generation,” defined the party’s program as “front-line socialism” which consisted of hostility to large corporations and finance capital, revolution rather than social reaction, and an appeal to the working-class not the middle-class (Bullock, 1992, p. 150). On the other hand, the party in the southern part of Germany, classified sarcastically as “pioneers” by Goebbels, consisted mainly of men born before 1890 (Bullock, p. 150). The views of this group were defined by the experiences of the lower middle-class, such as shopkeepers and petty officials, who opposed industrialization and were strongly anti-Semitic (Orlow, 1969). Thus, in the regional settings of Baden, Wu¨rttemberg, and Bavaria the Nazi party was a political alternative that offered a strong state to appeal to the middle classes without threatening the disruption of capital accumulation (Mayer & Pois, 1990). In each of these three regions support from different sections of the middle class was evident (Tables 2 and 3). In other words, the NSDAP in the southern regions of Germany offered the “national bourgeoisie” a political alternative, while in the north of Germany the party’s program appeared more threatening to their interests. In contrast, no evidence is found for middle class support for the Nazi party in regions of northern Germany, while there is evidence that previous non-voters (or those politically alienated by the system) supported the NSDAP in Prussia and Silesia (Tables 2 and 3). The NSDAP in Baden and Central Germany created spatial settings in which skilled workers were mobilized into supporting the party (Table 2). In Central Germany, such a conducive spatial setting was the product of Nazi party agency within the already existing institutional setting. The region of Central Germany was com-

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posed of the states of Erfurt, Merseburg, Saxony, and Thuringia (Fig. 1). The location of Central Germany in what later became the German Democratic Republic has hindered the examination of the development of the Nazi party in this region (Grill, 1986). Fewer local and regional studies were undertaken in the former East Germany than the former West Germany and those that were undertaken were often polemic in nature. Research monographs published in the German Democratic Republic highlighted the resistance of the working class to the Nazi regime and argued that Nazism was a reactionary ideology of finance capital (Grill, 1986). The one exception is Tracey’s (1975) study of the development of the NSDAP in Thuringia and this will be used to help interpret the statistical analysis in Tables 2 and 3, though the restriction of Tracey’s study to one state within the region is acknowledged. Central Germany, as a whole, contained a relatively even mixture of peripheralizing and dynamic industry. The dynamic industries included metal-working, paper, glass, and chemical industries, including the production of soda, chlorine, nitrogen and photographic products (Dickinson, 1945). In addition, lignite and textile industries added a component of declining industry (Dickinson, 1945). Thuringia was a mainly agricultural economy with scattered small town industries including metalworking, glass-making, toys and porcelain. In Thuringia, the balance of industries was reflected in an almost even division in the workforce between workers (50%), agriculture (21%) and commercial and professional and other occupations (29%) (Tracey, 1975, p. 24). This economic balance created a balance of power between the parties of the left and the right and a lack of moderating center parties (Tracey, p. 24). The result of such political polarization was frequent state government instability (Tracey, p. 25). In combination, the economic composition and political institutions of Thuringia created a spatial setting where disparities of economic fortune were clearly apparent but political solutions were absent. In addition, between 1921 and 1923, the SPD held power in Thuringia with the support of the KPD. While in power, the SPD created reforms and programs resisted by much of the population (Tracey, 1975). Also, the KPD was given support by the SPD in return for maintaining the coalition. The result was an energetic repression of right-wing political activity (Tracey, p. 25). In sum, the political setting of Thuringia created a context in which skilled workers could readily perceive a political threat from the mobilization of manual and unskilled workers. Moreover, later the Nazi party was able to demonstrate its ability to create strong state institutions to protect the interests of skilled workers. After the Landtag elections of 1929, in which the NSDAP garnered 11.3% of the vote, the Nazi party held the balance of power in the governing coalition. In return, Hitler demanded that the key ministries of interior and education be given to the prominent Bavarian Nazi Wilhelm Frick (Tracey, p. 42). While in these positions, Frick stacked the police with Nazi supporters and introduced anti-Semitic prayers into the schools (Tracey, p. 43). Frick’s ability to make such changes was facilitated by a state fiscal crisis and the consequent need for governmental decrees. Though he was soon sacked for abuse of power, Frick’s actions had created a spatial setting in which skilled workers, previously threatened by the strength of the KPD, could envision the Nazis as a party that could strengthen the power of the state to support their interests.

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Skilled workers were also mobilized by the Nazi party in Baden. The lack of raw materials in this region required industries that mainly involved the skilled processing of high quality goods, creating a diverse mixture of industries such as textiles (including silk in southern Baden), clock manufacturing, musical instruments, and jewelry (Dickinson, 1945). Thus, there was an economic base of artisans and skilled workers. There were two sites of heavy industry, both of which were dynamic and export-oriented. Heavy chemical industries, especially coal-tar distillation, were located in Ludwigshafen–Mannheim in northern Baden and the Pfalz (Dickinson, 1945). Aluminum smelting and the production of alkaline chemicals were located in the Rhine towns of Waldshut and Rheinfelden in southern Baden (Dickinson, 1945) (Fig. 1). Similar to the situation in Central Germany, the economic base interacted with political institutions to create a spatial setting in which Nazi party activity could be fruitful. The Treaty of Versailles had severed Baden’s traditional economic ties with Alsace and made the state a border region. The result was an increase in nationalist emotions (Schnabel, 1982). Also, the SPD played a dominant role in the state government from the inception of the Weimar Republic until November 1932 (Grill, 1983). The role of the Social Democrats in the Baden government created an image of the “specter of Marxism” that was used for propaganda purposes by the NSDAP (Schnabel, 1982). In combination, a base of skilled workers was politicized by territorial changes and a perceived political threat from the left. The organizational capabilities of the NSDAP were able to mobilize skilled workers and the middle class. The Nazi party in Baden was active under the stable leadership of Robert Wagner, who led the Baden NSDAP from 1925 to 1945. From an initial focus upon urban workers in the north of the state, the Nazi party diffused its message via a rural campaign in 1927 and 1928. An influx of members from the lower middle classes between 1926 and 1928 resulted in the opportunistic switch to encourage farmer and Mittelstand unity (Grill, 1983, p. 152). The Nazi party honed their anti-Treaty of Versailles, anti-bank, and anti-Semitic messages to portray Jews as enemies of the Mittelstand, farmers and workers (Grill, p. 116). In Baden, the Nazi party had attracted artisans, craftsmen, and skilled workers to join the party as early as 1923 (Grill, 1983, p. 85). These occupational groups fall under the category of workers in the semi-periphery threatened by cheaper labor during a time of economic restructuring. Their support for the Nazi party was nurtured by NSDAP activity. The increased presence of the Nazi party attracted voters from the small economic interest parties after 1928, following effective and intensive Nazi party campaigning (Faris, 1975). The modeling of the change in the Nazi party vote in Baden from 1928 to 1930 (Table 2) captures these processes. The negative sign of the variable measuring electoral turnout shows that the Nazi party increased its support by capturing deserters from other parties. Also, the creation of an electoral coalition of skilled workers and members of the Mittelstand is evident in the positive sign of the variables measuring blue collar workers and white collar health workers in the workforce. The more detailed analyses of Baden and Central Germany show how important political agency was to mobilize support for the Nazi party in place-specific econ-

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omic and institutional contexts. Within the macrodynamics defined by the cyclicoideological TimeSpace certain classes were more or less susceptible to the NSDAP’s message, but the degree of mobilization was dependent upon local settings and the actions party leaders. Other local studies of the Nazi party have also illustrated the interaction between class interest and local traditions and developments [see Heberle (1943); Allen (1965) and Pridham (1973) for example and Grill (1986), Allen (1965), Pridham (1973) for a review of local studies of Nazi party support]. However, such analyses are restricted if they do not consider a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace as they are unable to uncover the causes of social and economic change nor the limitations of political action aimed at control of the state.

Conclusion Looking purely at electoral mobilization at the national or regional scale is a limited perspective. If one remains focused upon the empirical details of electoral behavior, elections are conceptualized as episodic geopolitical TimeSpaces (Wallerstein, 1998), or events limited in their historic and geographic scope. In the case of Weimar Germany for example, such an analysis begs the questions as to why the political scene was amenable to the rise of a radical nationalist and antidemocratic party, and what challenges were being faced by the electorate that led them to see the Nazi party as their political saviors. The regional analysis of the Nazi party vote illustrates that different social groups were mobilized in support of the NSDAP in different parts of Weimar Germany (O’Loughlin et al., 1994). It is also evident that skilled workers, the self-employed, and white-collar professionals were a significant component of the Nazi party’s electoral support (Falter, 1991). However, the degree to which one or more of these three groups constituted the NSDAP’s electoral support varied across the regional settings of Germany. Particular social groups with particular interests and concerns were attracted to the Nazi party more than others, but this varied as a result of regional differences in social practices and the relative strength of political institutions (Brustein, 1996; Ault & Brustein, 1998; Flint, 1998b; Burnham, 1972). To consider why the Nazi party gained support in places composed of these particular groups it is necessary to consider a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace. The structural dynamics and imperatives of the capitalist world-economy set a context of constraints and opportunities for political actors. Processes of economic peripheralization and innovation resulted in different trajectories for competing economic sectors. In turn, the economic competition prevented political parties in Weimar Germany from forming a stable political coalition. The macro-processes of economic restructuring provoked class dynamics within Weimar Germany that allowed the Nazi party to enter the political arena with a program that appealed to those threatened by economic restructuring. Consideration of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace establishes the political and economic context for electoral behavior. The structure and dynamics of the worldeconomy stimulate the broad questions and problems facing an electorate. A geo-

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graphic examination of electoral behavior within a structural setting examines one way in which people act to respond to global dynamics. The scope of electoral geography should extend beyond the immediate time and place of the election, and examine the nature of political and economic processes at the global scale. However, political actions and global processes are mediated by socially constructed scales and institutions. Electoral behavior is mediated by local and regional institutionalized practices to produce a geography of electoral responses. Also, the usual target of electoral politics is control of the state so that it can be maneuvered within the world-economy to the advantage of some interest groups. By considering a cyclicoideological TimeSpace, electoral geography considers how political behavior is mediated by a hierarchy of geographic scales in order to seize or influence the nature of those scales. The actual electoral behavior is merely a means of illuminating how voters and parties are mobilized as part of the continual construction of political institutions within a cyclico-ideological setting. The example of the electoral rise of the Nazi party was chosen because of its ability to link a regional pattern of electoral behavior to the dynamics of economic restructuring in the semi-periphery by reference to competition for control of the state apparatus. However, exemplification of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace by considering a political party voicing a nationalist agenda creates some limitations that require further analysis. The nationalist component of the NSDAP’s message highlighted unity and commonality across the German electorate. In this particular example, multiple identities held by voters were suppressed by Hitler’s call for vo¨lkisch unity. In other situations, the class identities suggested by world-systems analysis may be complicated by loyalties to region, race or ethnicity (Agnew, 1997; Wilson, 1999). The consideration of other identities will be a necessary and fruitful addition to the framework proposed here as they will require greater consideration of scales and institutions between the local and the global. For example, elections in post-Communist states may illustrate the intersection of ethnic identity and class in semi-peripheral states attempting to gain core status. On the other hand, in Russia the Communist party’s inability to mobilize more than about 25% of the electorate is surprising given the world-systems framework and needs to be explained by considering other voter motivations. Consideration of a cyclico-ideological TimeSpace does not lead to a deterministic view of electoral behavior. Instead, it identifies temporal and spatial contexts in which particular economic and political dynamics are expected. Further, it provides a theoretical framework for linking changes at the global scale to political imperatives at the state scale and to local and regional manifestations of political behavior. Equally important in such an electoral geography is political agency, such as the ability of party leaders for example. Examination of electoral behavior considers the actions of voters and parties within the situations identified by the cyclico-ideological perspective. Using this framework, the role of electoral geography is to interrogate how people construct political solutions, including the construction of localities and scales, within the context of wider processes and structures. Such an approach prioritizes the consideration of political and economic change in electoral geography rather than the geographic distribution of votes. Hence, it focuses electoral geographers

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toward the question of representation or, more specifically, how social groups seek control of particular institutions in light of the economic and political challenges they are facing. Thus, electoral geography may interrogate the structures and dynamics of the capitalist world-economy through the analysis of place-specific political behavior.

Acknowledgements Thank you to Michael Shin for his GIS work that made the analysis possible and to Rob Edsall and Mike DeGennaro for creating Fig. 1. Also, thank you to John O’Loughlin and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.

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