A Transactional Perspective on Mental Retardation*

A Transactional Perspective on Mental Retardation* H. CARL HAYWOOD VANDERBILT KENNEDY CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The predominantly intelligence‐based concept of mental retardation is examined critically and found to be inadequate to encompass what is known about the behavior and development of individuals with mental retardation. The author suggests that the nature of human ability itself must be re‐ conceptualized and freed from the restrictions of an exclusive concept of intelligence. He proposes a ‘‘transactional perspective on human ability’’ in order to understand variability in behavior and development in general, and applies that perspective to the phenomena of mental retardation. The transactional perspective rests on the three constructs: intelligence, cognitive processes, and motivation, principally task‐intrinsic motivation. Intelligence and cognitive processes are sharply distinguished from each other. Implications of the transactional perspective on human ability are drawn for developmental intervention in the lives of individuals with mental retardation. In a majority of research reports published in the American Journal on Mental Retardation (formerly, American Journal of Mental Deficiency) over the last 50 years, groups of persons with and without mental retardation were constituted solely on the basis of IQ. Some investigators gave nodding recognition to other criteria, such as adaptive behavior, but modern research on mental retardation has been guided primarily by concepts that center on the nature of intelligence. *An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a keynote address to the Australian Society for the Study of Intellectual Disability, Brisbane, Australia, November 2003. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION, Vol. 31 0074-7750/06 $35.00

289

Copyright 2006, Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1016/S0074-7750(05)31009-3

290

H. Carl Haywood II.

A LITTLE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE AND MENTAL RETARDATION

The words that we have used, even in scientific parlance, to refer to the phenomenon of mental retardation reflect both a very imprecise concept of its nature and a commitment to an exclusively intelligence‐based definition. For example, what is now the American Association on Mental Retardation was originally called the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Feeble Minded and its journal was known for several years as the Journal of Psychoasthenics—both implying weakness of the mind and centering on an intelligence‐based concept of mental retardation. Even the current eponyms refer to ‘‘intellectual disability’’ or ‘‘cognitive delay,’’ demonstrating the persistence of our dedication to an intelligence‐based concept. While Alfred Binet (Binet & Henri, 1895) was insisting on the study of individual diVerences as part of the then‐new science of psychology, he published his famous paper (Binet & Simon, 1905a) entitled ‘‘On the necessity of establishing a scientific diagnosis of inferior states of intelligence,’’ a paper that did much to stimulate psychologists toward more precise diagnostic criteria and, at the same time, helped to preserve the intelligence‐based concept (see also Binet & Simon, 1905b). Edgar Doll (1935, 1953, 1965) insisted on the relatively independent assessment of adaptive behavior, but it was not until 1959 that the American Association on Mental Deficiency adopted a three‐part criterion for the diagnosis of mental retardation: significantly subnormal measured intelligence (meaning IQ), significantly subnormal adaptive behavior, and onset of these conditions during the developmental period, now interpreted to mean before the age of either 18 or 21 years (Heber, 1959, 1961). One of the most important conceptual developments during that time of change was the appearance of Gestalt psychology (KoVka, 1935; Ko¨hler, 1929). The gurus of Gestalt, Ko¨hler, KaVka, and Wertheimer, set the stage for today’s cognitive psychology by describing the richness of mental experience, by insisting on the study of events that one could not observe directly, and by emphasizing the interrelatedness of psychological events that cut across the classical triad of cognition, conation, and volition (Ash, 1995; Boring, 1950; Simonis, 2001). Some of their intellectual descendants, including Lewin (1935, 1936), Zigler (1966; Balla & Zigler, 1979), and Cromwell (1963, 1967), studied personality correlates of individual diVerences in learning and performance in persons with mental retardation, with the clear implication that variables other than intelligence itself were exerting major influence on individual diVerences in learning and performance (Heber, 1964).

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

291

Thus, over much of the last century, serious scientists and professionals have been finding the heavily, if not exclusively, IQ‐based concept of mental retardation to be too limiting and to restrict our understanding of the nature of mental retardation and the development of persons with mental retardation. III.

INADEQUACY OF THE IQ‐BASED CONCEPT OF MENTAL RETARDATION

The inadequacy of that limited concept is demonstrated by at least the following observations: 1. First, variability in the performances of persons with mental retardation is so great that diVerences among them are often greater than is the mean diVerence between the performance of persons with and without mental retardation. We often confront the question, ‘‘Why is it that some persons with mental retardation perform so well on many tasks, in spite of low IQ?’’ and its corollary question, ‘‘Why is it that some persons with mental retardation perform even better on some tasks than do others who do not have mental retardation?’’ 2. The second observation is that, under certain conditions, the learning and performance of persons with mental retardation can be improved substantially. 3. The third is a series of demonstrations of the powerful eVects of motivational and environmental (settings) variables on the learning and performance of persons with mental retardation. 4. The fourth is the frequently observed large ‘‘discrepancy’’ between IQ and adaptive behavior.

IV.

VARIABILITY IN THE BEHAVIOR OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

The first of these observations, the extreme variability within the mental retardation category, accompanied by mean diVerences within that group that are sometimes greater than is the diVerence between those persons and persons of average IQ, is so familiar as to require scant discussion, except to note that it has been seen typically as an annoying circumstance for researchers because it has made the statistical determination of diVerences among conditions, population subgroups, and experimental treatments

292

H. Carl Haywood

diYcult to accomplish. This has been so because parametric statistical tests require large mean diVerences relative to group variances in order for those diVerences to reach statistical significance. As Binet and Henri (1895) pointed out so long ago, we should have been focusing our attention on that very variability, that is, on within‐group individual diVerences in the eVectiveness and eYciency of learning and performance, rather than wishing they would go away. The latter attitude implies the assumption that all or nearly all persons within a category constituted on the basis of IQ can be expected to behave, especially in learning situations, in essentially the same ways, reflecting something of the old mental age concept. It just isn’t so! Even more troubling to psychological researchers is the phenomenon of intra‐individual variability in performance, meaning that reliability of performance within persons in the mental retardation category tends to be low, and to be even lower as one descends the IQ scale (see, e.g., Baumeister, 1968, 1998; Berkson & Baumeister, 1967; Jensen, 1992).

V.

LEARNING AND PERFORMANCE CAN BE IMPROVED: A VERY SMALL SELECTION OF EXAMPLES

If the learning and performance of persons with mental retardation can be improved significantly under certain conditions, then the obvious task for us is to specify those conditions. Here is a very simple, and rather old, example from my research group. My graduate students and I had been investigating what we call verbal abstracting behavior, that is, the ability to categorize items according to their similarity and then to assign an abstract label to the resulting class. We used a variation on the verbal similarities subtests that are found in several intelligence tests, giving the tests under two conditions. Under the ‘‘regular’’ condition, we presented two exemplars of each concept, for example, ‘‘In what way are an orange and a banana alike?’’ Under the ‘‘enriched’’ condition, we presented five exemplars of each concept, for example, ‘‘In what way are an orange, a banana, a peach, a plum, and a pear alike?’’ Figure 1 shows the results of that study (from Gordon & Haywood, 1969). We can see here the outcome of that early study: A larger number of exemplars of each concept did not help the subjects who did not have mental retardation, nor did it improve the scores of those with severe, organically based mental retardation, but it resulted in a 55% improvement in the verbal abstracting scores of those with mild mental retardation that had been diagnosed, in that era, as ‘‘cultural–familial.’’ In fact, their 5‐exemplar scores were not diVerent from those of another group of younger subjects without mental retardation who were matched with them on mental age. Later,

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

293

FIG. 1. Verbal abstracting scores of persons with cultural–familial (C–F) and organic (ORG) mental retardation and nonretarded (NMR) children matched with them on mental age. Adapted from Gordon and Haywood (1969).

by adding visual cues (the words printed on cards, plus pictures of the objects represented), Call (1973) demonstrated that the verbal abstracting performance of the participants with mild mental retardation came all the way up to that of the typically developing participants of the same chronological age, although these procedures did not help persons without mental retardation. Thus, Call essentially eliminated altogether the eVect of mental retardation on verbal abstracting. Tymchuk (1973) subsequently found similar eVects of this procedure in delinquent adolescents with mild mental retardation. Perhaps, some part of their initially poor performance on this task had been related to ignorance rather than inability; for example, they might not have had the vocabulary with which to understand the meanings of the spoken words. It is also possible that they had become so inept at making meaning out of minimal information that they had to be given enriched information in order to find abstract levels of meaning. In another pair of widely unread studies, Haywood and Heal (1968, 1969) demonstrated that apparent IQ diVerences in long‐term memory of persons with mental retardation are illusory, and should be attributed to learning levels rather than to IQ. That is to say, those who learned a set of associations most eVectively retained them best, regardless of their IQ. Figure 2 shows the retention performance on a learned visual paired‐associates task of

294

H. Carl Haywood

FIG. 2. Total number of learned visual associations correctly recalled at four retention intervals by persons at four IQ levels (80–100, 70–79, 55–64, 40–49) as a function of training levels and intelligence (Haywood & Heal, 1968).

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

295

participants at three levels of mental retardation (as suggested by IQ) and a nonretarded group, as a function of IQ and of levels of original training. When controls were introduced for learning level (Haywood & Heal, 1969; all participants went through repeated trials until they reached the same probability of making a correct response), IQ‐group diVerences in retention were reduced even further. Here, then, is another condition under which performance is improved—secure initial learning. Many other investigators have been able to identify conditions under which the performance of persons with mental retardation can be significantly improved, all of them representing environmental changes and not changes in intelligence. Applied behavioral interventions have also very successfully improved the performance of persons with mental retardation using environmental change techniques in all activities of daily living, instruction, vocational training, and social competence (Evans & Meyers, 1987; Jacobson & Mulick, 1996; Lovaas & Smith, 1989). Techniques exist for increasing prosocial behavior (e.g., positive reinforcement and shaping), and decreasing behavior that is anti‐social, self‐destructive, aggressive, and self‐injurious (e.g., extinction, diVerential reinforcement procedures, punishment, and time out from positive reinforcement). See also Schroeder, 1990.

VI.

EFFECTS OF MOTIVATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

Positive eVects of changes in motivational and environmental variables have been demonstrated repeatedly. In the 1960s, Butterfield and Zigler (1965) demonstrated that success or failure on one task could significantly aVect the probability of success or failure on ensuing tasks in persons with mental retardation. That motivational eVect on performance was replicated by Johnson et al. (1992) with typically developing school children. Switzky and Haywood have found repeatedly that the learning and work performance of persons both with and without mental retardation is significantly better when they are oVered interesting tasks to do; are permitted to regulate the complexity, the pace, and the reward system associated with performing those tasks; and are not distracted with task‐extrinsic incentives and rewards (see Haywood & Switzky, 1985; Switzky & Haywood, 1974, 1991, 1992; see also Haywood & Weaver, 1967). The questions that have occupied the psychology of mental retardation over the last 40 years might well be characterized as social ecological questions, that is, the ‘‘where’’ questions: Where should people with retardation live, work, go to school, play? Those issues are far too large to be

296

H. Carl Haywood

treated with due respect in this chapter, but it is essential to note the summary concept: Settings have considerable influence on the development, behavior, and life satisfaction of people in general, and especially of socially vulnerable people such as those with mental retardation and developmental disabilities (Barker & Schoggen, 1973; Begab, Haywood, Garber, 1981; Bruininks, 1981; Bruininks & Lakin, 1985; Haywood & Newbrough, 1981; O’Connor, 1976). The implication for the present argument is simply that if behavior and development of persons with mental retardation is heavily influenced by variations in the environments in which they live, then one’s concept of mental retardation must extend well beyond performance on intelligence tests and must include the ways in which individual diVerences interact with settings variables. VII.

RELATION OF IQ AND ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR

So‐called ‘‘discrepancies’’ between IQ and adaptive behavior continue to puzzle psychologists, but there is no particular reason why they should. Indeed, if the two were perfectly, or even extremely highly, correlated, then we would need only one or the other and not both. Doll (1935) devised the Vineland Social Maturity Scale, and others have developed its successors, because and only because of the observation that very many persons with mental retardation behave in social and everyday activity domains in ways that are not predicted by IQ. Mercer (1965, 1970) used to relate this story. She was doing a survey of all persons assigned to special education classes in a California city. One adolescent who was then classified as ‘‘trainable mentally retarded’’ (with IQ and adaptive behavior scores more than three standard deviations below the population mean) could not be located, in spite of repeated visits to his home. He was always absent from the home. Finally, the research team learned the reason for his absences: He had a job and was out working, helping to support the family! Mercer wondered, quite rightly, on what basis he could be classified as retarded, much less not even ‘‘educable.’’ Psychometric studies of adaptive behavior by the Minnesota group (Bruininks et al., 1986, 1996) have shown that maladaptive behavior imposes severe restrictions on adaptability and daily performance, and even on the appropriateness of residential settings, in cases of persons with relatively mild mental retardation, that is, those whose IQ would predict a higher level of social adaptation and would also suggest less restrictive residential settings. The point is that if adaptive behavior can sometimes be substantially above or below what would be expected on the basis of IQ alone, then an exclusively or even heavily intelligence‐based concept of mental retardation is found once again to be inadequate.

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

VIII.

297

NEED TO RECONCEPTUALIZE THE NATURE OF HUMAN ABILITY

All of these observations suggest the need for a newer set of constructs that would be less global, more precise, and far more developmental in character. How, then, might we choose such concepts? I suggest a minimal list of criteria for choosing theoretical concepts that might help us to understand the nature of mental retardation. The first is that any theoretical constructs about mental retardation must now explain a much greater variety of developmental and behavioral phenomena than has been true in the past; that is, new constructs must be broadly encompassing. The second is the quite standard requirement that new constructs must refer to events that are observable and ultimately testable. The third is that new constructs must be developmental in nature, that is, they cannot merely identify important variables but must oVer some assistance in understanding their development as well as the occurrence of individual diVerences. The fourth requirement derives from the third: Because development constitutes ongoing change, new constructs must be dynamic and, ultimately, transactional; that is, not merely interactive, but capable of helping one to understand constantly changing relationships and interrelationships. My fifth requirement is one that is not universally shared in scientific theory building. It is the expectation that the constructs that we choose to explain the phenomena of mental retardation must themselves be related to aspects of development that are subject to intervention and change, that is, that are treatable. This last requirement is propelled not merely by a humanitarian motive but also by a strategic scientific consideration: Induced change is an important investigative strategy that frequently permits one to explain events that cannot be explained in any other way, by permitting inferences about events that are not directly observable. IX.

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Trying hard to stick to this list of requirements, I now oVer a particular, and perhaps idiosyncratic, view of the nature and development of human ability that I believe can be more useful than older concepts have been in helping us to understand the nature of mental retardation. I refer to this point of view as a transactional perspective on human ability (see, e.g., Haywood, 1998, 2004; Haywood & Switzky, 1986a,b, 1992; Haywood & Wachs, 1981; Haywood, Tzuriel, & Vaught, 1992). The three principal elements of the transactional perspective are intelligence, cognition, and motivation.

298 A.

H. Carl Haywood Intelligence

Intelligence is seen as largely genetically determined, with opportunity for only modest modifiability through experience. It is multi‐determined, that is, although largely polygenic in origin, its ontogenetic expression may be influenced, especially early in life, by the quality, intensity, timing, and duration of experience, which exerts its eVects through direct action on the morphology of the nervous system itself. Thus defined, intelligence is essentially a biological characteristic. Because some persons who are judged to be high in intelligence perform poorly in learning tasks and in problem‐solving tasks, and because some persons who are judged to be low in intelligence perform better than they are expected to do, intelligence is inadequate to explain, by itself, individual diVerences in learning aptitude and performance. For example, in spite of a full century of work on standardized intelligence tests and on standardized tests of school achievement, about the best we can do by way of predicting school achievement from IQ is a correlation of þ0.70, which leaves fully 50% of the variance in school achievement unexplained (see, e.g., Anastasi, 1965). Even taking into account the limits placed on this predictive correlation by the unreliability of the IQ, the unreliability of achievement tests, and their joint unreliability, we are still left with a considerable chunk of unexplained variance. Therefore, it is necessary to posit other influencing, if not determining, variables. B.

Cognitive Processes

Cognition refers to person‐characteristic modes of logical perception, thinking, learning, and problem solving. It is a process variable rather than a stable trait. Cognitive processes are not biologically determined but must be acquired through individuals’ successive encounters with their environments, and are shaped by feedback from such encounters. It is possible to identify a certain number of quite fundamental cognitive processes that appear to be universal, and that are so basic that they are required for the performance of a very wide variety of everyday behavior. Piaget’s criteria of concrete operatory thought (comparison, categorization, classification, class inclusion, seriation, quantitative and spatial relations, beginning of transitive relations) constitute the beginning of such a list. Cognitive processes, having been acquired through experience, can be modified relatively easily. Structural cognitive change (change in thinking modes that is basic, durable, and generalizable) can be brought about by carefully constructed and applied educational strategies. One can compare the constructs of intelligence and cognitive processes on a number of criteria of comparison. Such a comparison is shown in Table I.

299

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

COMPARISON Dimension

OF

TABLE I INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES Intelligence

Source Modifiability Character Assessment Composition

Genetic (polygenic) Modest, with great eVort Global, ‘‘g’’ Achievement Intellectual factors

Developmental requirements

Genes, nutrition, health, safety, fostering environment

Cognition Acquired, experience High Generalizable, Specific Process Native ability, motives, habits, attitudes Active, directed teaching; mediation of cognitive processes

The dimensions of comparison in this scheme are their origin or source, their relative modifiability, their conceptual nature, the principal method by which each is assessed, the composition or principal components of each, and the primary role of parents in their development. With respect to origin, the transactional perspective holds that intelligence is primarily (although not entirely) genetically determined, but that cognitive processes must be acquired, primarily through learning. This dimension alone constitutes the largest single diVerence between the two constructs, but there is a catch: The more biological intelligence one has, the easier it is to acquire the cognitive processes through experience. Nevertheless, it is not possible to have so much intelligence that it would be unnecessary to acquire systematic, generalizable, and durable modes and habits of logical thought, and without them eVective perception, learning, thinking, and problem solving will not be possible. Because intelligence is largely genetically determined, it is only modestly modifiable, with great eVort. For example, the eVect of well organized and systematically delivered programs of early education on subsequent IQ is only about 10 to 15 IQ points on the average (although much greater in some studies and much less in others), and even that much gain frequently disappears after 2 or 3 years. Cognitive processes, on the other hand, being acquired in the first place, are much more readily modifiable, thus satisfying my requirement of concepts that are treatable. Although less important than the criteria of source and modifiability, the other comparisons are worth noting. The third criterion of comparison is the conceptual nature of the two. Most of the time, intelligence is thought of as a ‘‘global’’ or very broad characteristic that encompasses a wide range of behavior and ability. This is not always true, of course. Some theorists distinguish narrower dimensions of intelligence (Guilford, 1967; Meeker,

300

H. Carl Haywood

1969; Thurstone, 1938) and diVerent kinds of intelligence (Gardner, 1999; Sternberg, 2000, 2003), and these distinctions are often useful, but the weight of evidence up to now is in favor of a powerful ‘‘g’’ (general intelligence) factor, individual diVerences in which are strongly correlated with a very wide range of performance variables (Jensen, 1998). Cognitive processes, on the other hand, are relatively narrow abilities, even though they are, by definition, generalizable to (basic to, required in the performance of) a wide range of behavioral variables. It is a case of a ‘‘one‐to‐many’’ phenomenon (Haywood, 1986): Acquisition of the most fundamental modes of systematic thinking allows those thinking modes to be applied to the understanding and manipulation of an almost infinite variety of thinking, learning, perceptual, and performance domains. For example, the ability to think representationally or symbolically enables one to abandon dependence on concrete reality, to categorize, to compare on multiple dimensions, to seriate, to form subordinate and superordinate classes, to manipulate symbols (e.g., words) rather than to depend on objects or actual events, to project potential outcomes, and to think hypothetically. The fourth criterion refers to assessment of individual diVerences in intelligence and in cognitive processes. So far, assessment of intelligence relies heavily on achievement; estimation of learning ability is done by assessing what one has already learned or not learned. Thus, the standard intelligence tests contain information items, vocabulary tests, tests of mental calculating and social inference, as well as tests of visual–spatial competence and often of speed of performance or problem solving. The operative concepts here are ‘‘competence’’ and ‘‘achievement.’’ This reliance on the products of presumed past opportunities to learn require some patently untenable assumptions. The most obvious of these is the assumption that all persons at a given age, gender, and broad demographic characteristic (e.g., urban versus rural residence) will have had the same opportunities to learn, and that individual diVerences in their achievement or store of information and skill reflect diVerences in the extent to which they have benefited from those opportunities. Such an assumption is ridiculous on its face. Further, the product of such a test is a comparison of the performance of individual test subjects with the average performance of some ‘‘normative’’ group, assumed to be like them in important respects. By reference to norm tables, one is then able essentially to rank‐order individuals’ performance (and presumably ability) with respect to members of the normative samples. The comparison is one of an individual with other individuals, or, worse yet, with the central tendency of a group of other individuals. Assessment of cognitive processes, by contrast, is done by comparing individuals’ performances in a variety of tasks with their own performance at a diVerent time and under diVerent conditions, typically using the technology of

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

301

‘‘dynamic assessment’’ (see, e.g., Feuerstein et al., 1979; Haywood, 1997; Haywood & Lidz, in press; Haywood & Tzuriel, 1992, 2002; Lidz, 1987; Lidz & Elliott, 2000). By using such methods of assessment, one can identify obstacles to performance, structure the test situation in such a way as to overcome those obstacles (e.g., impoverished vocabulary, ineVective performance motivation, or inadequate development of basic cognitive and metacognitive processes), and then estimate the kind and amount of investment required to produce better performance. Thus, the emphasis is on finding out why test subjects do not perform better, and on specifying the conditions that can lead to improved performance. The next criterion of comparison is composition—examining the presumed components of intelligence and of cognitive processes. Over the last century, we have distinguished quite determinedly between ‘‘intellective’’ and ‘‘non‐intellective’’ contributors to performance diVerences. Ability variables are the components of intelligence, as they have been identified in hundreds of structural studies: verbal ability, visual–spatial–perceptual ability, memory ability, and speed of processing ability, for example. Cognitive processes, on the other hand, are (as defined here) composed of quite a mix of ‘‘intellective’’ and ‘‘non‐intellective’’ variables, including intelligence itself, learning history, attitudes toward thinking and learning, work habits, and motives (see Feuerstein et al., 1979, 1986). In other words, the definition of cognitive processes is a more pragmatic and somewhat circular one: Those acquired characteristics that influence the eVectiveness and eYciency of thinking, perceiving, learning, and problem solving. Finally, there is the criterion of developmental requirements, or the fundamental role of parents and other caregivers in the development of individual diVerences in intelligence and in cognitive processes. According to this conceptual position, the role of parents in the development of intelligence is to contribute genes, safety, nutrition, and a hospitable environment in which one’s native intelligence can flourish. The role of parents in the development of cognitive processes is a much more active and deliberate one. They provide ‘‘mediated learning experiences’’ (Deutsch, 2003; Feuerstein & Rand, 1974) through which children learn, partly by imitation, some culture‐characteristic modes of logical thinking. For more complete discussions of mediated learning experience and techniques of mediation from diVerent conceptual perspectives, see Deutsch (2003); Feuerstein et al. (1980); Hansen (2003); Haywood (2003); Karpov (2003); Karpov and Haywood (1998). This comparison of the concepts of intelligence and cognitive processes is presented for the purpose of distinguishing them as sharply as possible from each other, and to suggest that such a distinction, one that is critical to the

302

H. Carl Haywood

transactional perspective, can be very useful in understanding the nature of human abilities and of mental retardation, as well as in constructing intervention strategies designed to improve the performance capabilities of persons with mental retardation.

C.

Task‐Intrinsic Motivation

Motivation, especially task‐intrinsic motivation, is the third important aspect of a transactional perspective. Intrinsic motivation is the motivation that is, as Hunt (1963) observed, ‘‘inherent in information processing and action.’’ It is the motivation to behave, to take in and act upon information, to learn, to solve problems, all for the sake of doing so and with no reward other than the satisfaction of doing so. Just as intelligence alone is not suYcient for eVective thinking and learning, requiring the addition of individually developed cognitive processes, the combination of intelligence and cognition is still not suYcient. That combination requires complex transactions in development with task‐intrinsic motivation. Motivation and cognition develop in individuals in such a way that each facilitates the development of the other, with every increment in either motivation or cognition bringing about qualitative changes in their transactional relations. Table II shows some of the characteristics of persons who are primarily intrinsically motivated and those who are primarily extrinsically motivated. Figure 3 shows an example of a behavioral method of assessing individual diVerences in intrinsic motivation. The subject’s task is to work through this paper‐and‐pencil maze without lifting the pencil and, insofar as possible, without ‘‘crashing through’’ any lines. Whenever the subject can reach the

ORIENTATION

OF

TABLE II INTRINSICALLY MOTIVATED MOTIVATED PERSONS

AND

EXTRINSICALLY

Intrinsically motivated persons

Extrinsically motivated persons

seek satisfaction by concentrating on:

avoid dissatisfaction by concentrating on:

Task involvement Challenge Creativity Responsibility Opportunities to learn Psychological excitement Aesthetic considerations

Avoidance of eVort Ease Comfort Safety Security Practicality Material gain

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

303

FIG. 3. The intermediate diYculty level of a Mazes Test of Intrinsic Motivation (Delclos & Haywood, unpublished).

goal, he/she may stop working on this task or may continue to solve the next maze problem. That is to say, there are three choice points, at each of which the subject may choose to continue to work on the mazes or to stop work altogether. Thus, the amount of work done and the time spent engaged in this task is a function of the subject’s own motivation. One can then count the number of mazes each subject chose to enter. There are three levels of complexity of this task, so adjusting task diYculty to the manifest ability level of each participant should help to avoid confounding motivational and diYculty variables. The number of mazes done voluntarily is positively correlated with mental age, chronological age up to middle adolescence,

304

H. Carl Haywood

persistence in laboratory learning tasks, grades in school with IQ and CA held constant, and scores on self‐report tests of intrinsic motivation. Interestingly enough, these scores are also positively correlated with the number of hours of classroom cognitive education the subjects have had. It is also true that the intrinsic motivation scores of children who have been in a cognitive education program increase significantly more from pre‐ to post‐ training than do those of control group children (Tzuriel & Kaniel, 1992). So we can see that intelligence, cognition, and intrinsic motivation are related in interesting and even ‘‘symbiotic’’ ways (Haywood, 1992). In previous attempts to articulate a motivational theory of cognition (Haywood & Burke, 1977), I have taken the position that individual diVerences in the tendency to seek one’s principal satisfaction from factors intrinsic to task involvement and achievement may develop largely as a function of the outcomes of one’s previous encounters with tasks and attempts to gain mastery over the environment. This observation is yet another way of suggesting the intimate and transactional relation of intelligence, cognition, and motivation. The ease with which one acquires basic cognitive and metacognitive processes depends in some part upon one’s level of biologically determined intelligence, but experiential encounters with one’s environment are necessary for the acquisition of those cognitive and metacognitive processes. The amount of help one might need in the process of acquiring basic thinking modes may depend upon intelligence, but also upon one’s relative level of task‐intrinsic motivation. Haywood and Burke (1977) illustrated this process by comparing the motivational and cognitive development of two infants, one genetically and otherwise predestined to the ‘‘competent,’’ the other not so. They concluded that motivational and cognitive developmental variables, together with intelligence, relate to each other in a transactional manner, each aVecting the susceptibility and reactivity of the others to mutual influences. (See Haywood & Burke, 1977, for that detailed illustration, and Haywood & Switzky, 1986a, for a detailed discussion of intrinsic motivation and mental retardation.) It is the dynamic character of the relations among these three determinants of human ability that makes their relation transactional (Haywood, 1992). If the relation were merely interactive, then it would suYce to observe that the expression of each component, that is, of intelligence, of cognition, and of motivation, would be influenced by each of the other two. In a far more complex way, the eVect of B on A depends upon the prior eVect of A on B, and of C on both A and B. This occurs in such a way that the eVect of B on A today may be vastly diVerent from the eVect of B on A one week ago, because in the interim, A could have aVected B in a way that changed the character of B, and C could have changed the receptivity of both B and A. Once B has acted upon A, the subsequent eVect of A on B or on C is changed

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

305

irrevocably. In more physical and mathematical terms, the eVect of B on A is not a constant vector, but rather one whose precise angle of eVect as well as velocity can be expected to produce a diVerent resultant, depending upon A’s prior response to B and on the probability that either A or B has been the object of one or more C vectors. Prediction in such a complex situation is horribly diYcult, because it is necessary to take account of both a large number of influencing variables and the constantly changing character of both the actor variables and the acted‐upon variables. Happily for our field, the mathematical tools and statistical models to manage developmental change variables have become available, for example, in the form of Structural Equation modeling and Hierarchical Linear modeling techniques that permit us to use the slope of change curves as the dependent variable (see, e.g., Dunst & Trivette, 1994). X.

TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND MENTAL RETARDATION

One may now ask how all of this theorizing about the nature and development of human ability helps us to understand the nature and development of mental retardation and of persons with mental retardation. First, the transactional perspective fulfills the requirements for new conceptions of intelligence and of mental retardation that I posed in the beginning of this chapter. The tripartite conception encompasses phenomena that intelligence alone cannot explain, and integrates those phenomena into a comprehensive scheme. Although cognition and motivation are not themselves directly observable, they are no less so than is intelligence. In fact, all three must be inferred from their presumed eVects upon other, more directly observable, phenomena, especially the behavior of persons who are thought to vary in intelligence, cognition, and/or motivation. All three concepts are developmental ones, and it is possible to construct and to test models for their ontogenesis, not only separately but, more importantly, with respect to their transactional eVects upon each other and upon developing persons. All three are important individual diVerences variables that are both dynamic and transactional. At least the latter two, cognition and motivation, are constantly changing quantities and qualities whose relations to each other and to intelligence shift with each quantitative change. The last requirement was to focus upon developmental aspects that are treatable and thus subject to change. I have argued that intelligence itself is modifiable only to a relatively minor degree, and that producing positive change in intelligence requires great eVort over quite a long time. Yet, it is not the qualities themselves that one seeks to change; it is rather the behavior and development of persons. In

306

H. Carl Haywood

an important sense, if we can help persons to think more eVectively, to learn, to solve the problems of everyday life, then it matters little what the IQ is. It is the incorporation of the concepts of cognition and motivation into the mix with intelligence that makes possible quite substantial behavioral and developmental change. The mix constitutes a kind of closed system in which intervention in any one of the three domains, that is, intelligence, cognition, or motivation, influences the other two as well as their subsequent eVects on each other. We already know that if intelligence is higher, we can expect, all other things being equal, that cognitive processes will be acquired and elaborated more readily and that motivational orientation will be somewhat more likely to be of a task‐intrinsic nature. The problem is that raising intelligence is too diYcult and not at all certain. So, the most promising interventions must be in the areas of cognition and motivation. There is quite convincing evidence that carefully planned and executed intervention in the cognitive and motivational systems of persons with mental retardation can lead to behavior that is characteristic of persons with considerably higher IQs. In persons with mental retardation, individual diVerences in intrinsic motivation may be associated with diVerences in both laboratory and classroom learning as large as that associated with 20 to 25 IQ points (Haywood, 1968a). Many years ago, I found that children with mental retardation who made high scores on a test of intrinsic motivation were achieving in the primary grades at a level that was not diVerent from that of age‐ and gender‐matched children of average intelligence, although the children with mental retardation who were extrinsically motivated were achieving at a much lower level (Haywood, 1968b). The program of cognitive early education that my colleagues and I have developed (Bright Start; Haywood, Brooks, & Burns, 1986, 1992; Brooks & Haywood, 2003) has been applied in preschool and primary classes with children who are diagnosed with mental retardation (Cole et al., 1993; Dale & Cole, 1988; Haywood et al., 1986; Mills, et al., 1995; Molina & Vived, 2004), autism (see Butera & Haywood, 1992, 1995; Pou & Lam, 2003), emotional disturbances, significant language delays (Nevalainen, 2002; Samuels et al., 1988; Vanden Wijngaert, 1991; Warnez, 1991), socioeconomic disadvantage and/or cultural diVerence (Ce`be, 2000; Ce`be & Paour, 2000; Haywood et al., 1986; Paour et al., 1992, 2000; Tzuriel et al., 1998, 1999), and learning disabilities (Garrido, 1996; Samuels et al., 1992). One eVect has been to shift their motivational orientation modestly toward a more task‐intrinsic one. Another has been to improve, sometimes quite dramatically, their abstract reasoning performance, and they also gain significantly in IQ. Taken as a group, these studies have also shown improvements in task persistence in the face of diYcult learning tasks, and ultimately higher levels of school achievement, especially in reading and in math (Ce`be & Paour, 2000; Paour et al., 1992, 2000).

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

307

Paour (1992; Paour & Soavi, 1992) and his students and colleagues, applying a diVerent but conceptually related treatment, have found quite consistently that it is possible to elevate the performance of adolescents and adults with mild and moderate mental retardation on tasks that require analogical reasoning, planning, and the usual Piagetian criteria of concrete operatory thinking. Their intervention is, on the face of it, a purely cognitive one, but both casual observation and the research team’s own reports suggest that a powerful motivational component is involved. In a typical experimental sequence, Paour and his colleagues give their subjects repeated opportunities to discover logical principles and to apply them to the solution of logic problems. There is a minimum of actual teaching. As the subjects begin to gain cognitive competence, their enthusiasm for the task increases, leading them to more and more exploratory interaction with the task, which, in turn, leads to more and more success. After only about 40 hours of such training spread over several months, they find typically that their subjects have moved from pre‐operatory thinking to concrete operatory thinking. After the treatment, they ‘‘pass’’ Piagetian challenges on conservation and several of the other operatory thinking tasks, and, perhaps more important from a practical standpoint, some of their subjects are able to apply their newfound cognitive competence to the learning of such academic subjects as reading, math, and language. It would be wrong to conclude that any of the persons with mental retardation in these studies lacked the necessary intelligence to master the learning and reasoning tasks that were presented to them. It would be equally wrong to conclude that any of these cognitive interventions actually created intelligence that had not already been present. According to this transactional perspective, neither good environments nor good psycho‐educational treatments can create intelligence, nor can bad environments or the absence of psycho‐educational treatments destroy intelligence (that is, short of actual assaults on the nervous system), although I suspect that some American television programs might actually accomplish the latter feat. The eVect of ‘‘good’’ environments and of eVective psychological and educational treatments is to enhance both intrinsic motivation and cognitive processes in such a way that they lead to greater access to and application of one’s intelligence. The eVect of ‘‘bad’’ environments, defined as those that deprive developing persons of opportunities for cognitive and motivational growth, is to mask intelligence, to limit one’s access to one’s own intelligence, and to limit the daily applications of intelligence in the domains of systematic perception, thinking, learning, and problem solving. It is time to view mental retardation, as Paour (1988) has suggested, as chronic subnormal functioning that eventually leads to subnormal

308

H. Carl Haywood

development in systematic thinking processes. Although it is very likely low intelligence that brings about the initial deficient functioning, the subsequent deficient development is not the direct result of low intelligence but is rather the result of poor everyday functioning, which limits opportunities for cognitive growth and for development of task‐intrinsic motivation. Deficiencies in these two areas then lead quite directly to deficient cognitive development, which ultimately means deficiencies in getting access to one’s own intelligence and in applying one’s own intelligence to everyday perceiving, thinking, learning, and problem solving situations. As I have argued elsewhere (Haywood, 1987, 1989), the experience of being retarded makes one more so in a way that is not ultimately necessary. The transactional nature of the relations among intelligence, cognitive processes, and intrinsic motivation is of such a nature that intervention in any one or any combination of these three domains can resound throughout one’s developmental system. Thus, those who intervene have the opportunity to select the modes of intervention that present the best opportunities to make a diVerence. Inasmuch as we know that changing intelligence itself is very diYcult to accomplish and promises only limited gains from behavioral treatments, transactional treatment personnel should emphasize attempts to enhance the development and elaboration of systematic cognitive processes and intrinsic motivational systems. There are many programs of ‘‘cognitive education’’ (curricula designed to promote the application of systematic logical thinking modes), some of which have been used experimentally with persons with mental retardation (see Costa, 1991, for a list and descriptions of some such programs). Cognitive education is known to be associated with increases in intrinsic motivation, and even with increases in performance on intelligence tests. In the treatment of mental retardation, great emphasis should be placed upon engineering environments so as to maximize opportunities to acquire, elaborate, and apply fundamental cognitive modes and operations as well as the motivation to process information, to learn, and to solve problems entirely for the sake of doing so and without further reward. To the extent that that is done, the biological intelligence of persons with mental retardation will become more accessible, they will apply it more successfully in their everyday lives, and they will have a chance to become lifelong independent learners. REFERENCES Anastasi, A. (1965). Individual diVerences. New York: Wiley. Ash, M. G. (1995). Gestalt psychology in German culture, 1890–1967: Holism and the quest for objectivity. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

309

Balla, D., & Zigler, E. (1979). Personality development in retarded persons. In N. R. Ellis (Ed.), Handbook of mental deficiency: Psychological theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 142–168). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Barker, R. G., & Schoggen, P. (1973). Qualities of community life. San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass. Baumeister, A. A. (1968). Behavioral inadequacy and variability of performance. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 73, 477–483. Baumeister, A. A. (1998). Intelligence and the ‘‘personal equation.’’ Intelligence, 26, 255–265. Begab, M. J.,, Haywood, H. C.,, & Garber, H. L. (Eds.) (1981). Psychosocial influences in retarded performance. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Berkson, G., & Baumeister, A. A. (1967). Reaction time variability of mental defectives and normals. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 72, 262–266. Binet, A., & Simon, Th. (1905a). Sur la ne´cessite´ d’e´tablir un diagnostic scientifique des e´tats infe´rieur de l’intelligence [On the necessity of establishing a scientific diagnosis of low intelligence]. Anne´e Psychologique, 11, 163–190. Binet, A., & Simon, Th. (1905b). Me´thode nouvelle pour le diagnostic du niveau intellectual des anormaux [A new method for the diagnosis of intellectual level of abnormal persons]. Anne´e Psychologique, 11, 191–244. Binet, A., & Henri, V. (1895). La psychologie individuelle [The psychology of individual diVerences]. Anne´e Psychologique, 2, 411–465. Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd ed.). New York: Appleton‐ Century‐Crofts. Brooks, P. H., & Haywood, H. C. (2003). A preschool mediational context: The Bright Start curriculum. In A. S. S. Hoon, L. P. K. Hoon, & O.‐S. Tan (Eds.), Mediated learning experience with children: Applications across contexts (pp. 98–132). Singapore: McGraw‐ Hill Education (Asia). Bruininks, R. H. (1981). Deinstitutionalization and community adjustment of mentally retarded people. Washington, DC: American Association on Mental Deficiency. Bruininks, R. H., & Lakin, K. C. (Eds.) (1985). Living and learning in the least restrictive environment. Baltimore: P. H. Brookes. Bruininks, R. H., Hill, B. K., Weatherman, R., & Woodcock, R. W. (1986). Inventory for client and agency planning. Chicago, IL: Riverside Publishing Co. Bruininks, R. H., Woodcock, R. W., Weatherman, R., & Hill, B. K. (1996). Scales of independent behavior, revised. Chicago, IL: Riverside Publishing Co. Butera, G., & Haywood, H. C. (1992). A cognitive approach to the education of children with autism. Focus on Autistic Behavior, 6(6), 1–14. Butera, G. D., & Haywood, H. C. (1995). Cognitive education of young children with autism: An application of Bright Start. In E. Schopler & G. Mesibov (Eds.), Learning and cognition in autism (pp. 269–289). New York: Plenum Press. Butterfield, E. C., & Zigler, E. (1965). The eVects of success and failure on the discrimination learning of normal and retarded children. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 70, 25–31. Call, R. J. (1973). Verbal abstracting performance of low‐SES children: An exploration of Jensen’s theory of mental retardation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Peabody College. Ce`be, S. (2000). De´veloper la conceptualisation et la prise de conscience me´tacognitive a` l’e´cole maternelle: EVets sur l’eYcience scolaire ulte´rieure du CP au CE´2. Une contribution a` la pre´vention de l’e´chec scolaire des e´le`ves de milieux populaires [Developing conceptualization and metacognitive awareness in preschool: EVects on subsequent school achievement from first to third grades. A contribution to the prevention of school failure of pupils from low socio‐economic level families]. Doctoral dissertation, Universite´ de Provence a` Aix‐en‐ Provence (France).

310

H. Carl Haywood

Ce`be, S., & Paour, J.‐L. (2000). EVects of cognitive education in kindergarten on learning to read in the primary grades. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology [online], 1, 177–200. http://www.iacep.coged.org/. Cole, K. N., Dale, P. S., Mills, P. E., & Jenkins, J. R. (1993). Interaction between early intervention curricula and student characteristics. Exceptional Children, 60, 17–28. Costa, A. L. (1991). Developing minds: Programs for teaching thinking. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. Cromwell, R. L. (1963). A social learning approach to mental retardation. In N. R. Ellis (Ed.), Handbook of mental deficiency: Psychological theory and research (pp. 41–91). New York: McGraw‐Hill. Cromwell, R. L. (1967). Success–failure reactions in mentally retarded children. In J. Zubin & G. A. Jervis (Eds.), Psychopathology of mental development (pp. 345–356). New York: Grune & Stratton. Dale, P. S., & Cole, K. N. (1988). Comparison of academic and cognitive programs for young handicapped children. Exceptional Children, 54, 439–447. Deutsch, R. (2003). Mediation from the perspective of mediated learning experience. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology (online), 3(1), 29–45. www.iacep.coged.org. Doll, E. A. (1935). A generic scale of social maturity. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 5, 180–188. Doll, E. A. (1953). The measurement of social competence: A manual for the Vineland Social Maturity Scale. Circle Pines, MN: American Guidance Service. Doll, E. A. (1965). Vineland Social Maturity Scale. Circle Pines, MN: American Guidance Service. Dunst, C. J., & Trivette, C. M. (1994). Methodological considerations and strategies for studying the long‐term eVects of early intervention. In S. Friedman & H. C. Haywood (Eds.), Developmental follow‐up: Concepts, domains, and methods (pp. 277–314). New York: Academic Press. Evans, I., & Meyers, L. H. (1987). Moving to educational validity: A reply to Test, Spooner, and Cooke. Journal of the Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps, 12, 103–106. Feuerstein, R., & Rand, Y. (1974). Mediated learning experiences: An outline of the proximal etiology for diVerential development of cognitive functions. International Understanding, 9/10, 7–37. Feuerstein, R., Rand, Y., & HoVman, M. B. (1979). Dynamic assessment of retarded performers: The Learning Potential Assessment Device. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Feuerstein, R., Rand, Y., HoVman, M. B., & Miller, R. (1980). Instrumental enrichment. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Feuerstein, R., Haywood, H. C., Rand, Y., HoVman, M. B., & Jensen, M. (1986). Examiner manual for the Learning Potential Assessment Device. Jerusalem: Hadassah‐WIZO‐Canada Research Institute. Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence reframed: Multiple intelligences for the 21st century. New York: Basic Books. Garrido, J. M. (1996). Disen˜o e implementacio´n del programa Bright Start en una muestra denin˜os con dificultades de aprendizaje del Primer Ciclo de Primaria [Design and application of the Bright Start program in a sample of primary school children with learning problems]. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Murcia (Spain). Gordon, J. E., & Haywood, H. C. (1969). Input deficit in cultural–familial retardates: EVect of stimulus enrichment. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 73, 604–610. Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence. New York: McGraw‐Hill. Hansen, A. (2003). On mediation from Magne Nyborg’s perspective. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology (online), 3(1), 54–70. www.iacep.coged.org.

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

311

Haywood, H. C. (1968a). Motivational orientation of overachieving and underachieving elementary school children. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 72, 662–667. Haywood, H. C. (1968b). Psychometric motivation and the eYciency of learning and performance in the mentally retarded. In B. W. Richards (Ed.), Proceedings of the First Congress of the International Association for the Scientific Study of Mental Deficiency (pp. 276–283). Reigate, Surrey (England): Michael Jackson. Haywood, H. C. (1986). On the nature of cognitive functions. The Thinking Teacher, 3(1), 1–3. Haywood, H. C. (1987). The mental age deficit: Explanation and treatment. Uppsala Journal of Medical Science, Supplement 44, 191–203. Haywood, H. C. (1989). Multidimensional treatment of mental retardation. Psychology in Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 15(1), 1–10. Haywood, H. C. (1992). The strange and wonderful symbiosis of motivation and cognition. International Journal of Cognitive Education and Mediated Learning, 2(3), 186–197. Haywood, H. C. (1997). Interactive assessment. In R. L. Taylor (Ed.), Assessment of individuals with mental retardation (pp. 103–130). San Diego, CA: Singular Publishing Group. Haywood, H. C. (1998). On the transactional relation of cognitive and aVective development. In J. M. Martinez, J. Lebeer, & R. Garbo (Eds.), Is intelligence modifiable? (pp. 115–120). Madrid: Brun˜o. Haywood, H. C. (2003). Mediation within a neo‐Piagetian framework. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology (online), 3(1), 71–81. www.iacep.coged.org. Haywood, H. C. (2004). Thinking in, around, and about the curriculum: The role of cognitive education. International Journal of Disability, Development, and Education, 51(3), 231–252 (Schonell Memorial Lecture,University of Queensland: Brisbane, November 2003). Haywood, H. C., & Burke, W. P. (1977). Development of individual diVerences in intrinsic motivation. In I. C. Uzgiris & F. Weizman (Eds.), The structuring of experience (pp. 235–263). New York: Plenum. Haywood, H. C., & Heal, L. W. (1968). Retention of learned visual associations as a function of IQ and learning levels. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 72, 828–838. Haywood, H. C., & Heal, L. W. (1969). Memory for learned visual associations across IQ levels with learning levels controlled. Unpublished research report, George Peabody College. Haywood, H. C., & Lidz, C. S. (in press). Dynamic assessment in practice: Clinical and educational applications. New York: Cambridge University Press. Haywood, H. C., & Newbrough, J. R. (Eds.) (1981). Living environments for developmentally retarded persons. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Haywood, H. C., & Switzky, H. N. (1985). Work response of mildly mentally retarded adults to self versus external regulation as a function of motivational orientation. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 90, 151–159. Haywood, H. C., & Switzky, H. N. (1986a). Intrinsic motivation and behavior eVectiveness in retarded persons. In N. R. Ellis & N. W. Bray (Eds.), International Review of Research in Mental Retardation (Vol. 14, pp. 1–46). New York: Academic Press. Haywood, H. C., & Switzky, H. N. (l986b). The malleability of intelligence: Cognitive processes as a function of polygenic–experiential interaction. School Psychology Review, 15, 245–255. Haywood, H. C., Brooks, P., & Burns, S. (1986). Stimulating cognitive development at development level: A tested, non‐remedial preschool curriculum for preschoolers and older retarded children. In M. Schwebel & C. A. Maher (Eds.), Facilitating cognitive development: Principles, practices, and programs (pp. 127–147). New York: Haworth Press. Also published in Special Services in the Schools, 2, No. 3 (Spring). Haywood, H. C., Brooks, P. H., & Burns, M. S. (1992). Bright Start: Cognitive curriculum for young children. Watertown, MA: Charlesbridge Publishing.

312

H. Carl Haywood

Haywood, H. C., Tzuriel, D., & Vaught, S. (1992). Psychoeducational assessment from a transactional perspective. In H. C. Haywood & D. Tzuriel (Eds.), Interactive assessment (pp. 38–63). New York: Springer Verlag. Haywood, H. C., & Switzky, H. N. (1992). Ability and modifiability: What, how, and how much? In J. S. Carlson (Ed.), Cognition and educational practice: An international perspective (pp. 25–85). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Haywood, H. C., & Tzuriel, D. (Eds.) (1992). Interactive assessment. New York: Springer‐ Verlag. Haywood, H. C., & Tzuriel, D. (2002). Applications and challenges in dynamic assessment. Peabody Journal of Education, 77(2), 38–61. Haywood, H. C., & Wachs, T. D. (1981). Intelligence, cognition, and individual diVerences. In M. J. Begab, H. C. Haywood, & H. Garber (Eds.), Psychosocial influences in retarded performance issues and theories in development (Vol. 1, pp. 95–126). Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Haywood, H. C., & Weaver, S. J. (1967). DiVerential eVects of motivational orientation and incentive conditions on motor performance in institutionalized retardates. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 72, 459–467. Heber, R. (Ed.) (1959). A manual on terminology and classification in mental retardation. Washington, DC: American Association on Mental Deficiency. Heber, R. (Ed.) (1961). A manual on terminology and classification in mental retardation (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: American Association on Mental Deficiency. Heber, R. (1964). Personality. In H. A. Stevens & R. Heber (Eds.), Mental retardation: A review of research . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hunt, J. McV. (1963). Motivation inherent in information processing and action. In O. J. Harvey (Ed.), Motivation and social interaction: The cognitive determinants (pp. 35–94). New York: Ronald Press. Jacobson, J. W., & Mulick, J. A. (Eds.) (1996). Manual of diagnosis and professional practice in mental retardation. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Jensen, A. R. (1992). The importance of intraindividual variation in reaction time. Personality and Individual DiVerences, 13, 869–881. Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Westport, CT: Praeger. Johnson, K., Haywood, H. C., & Hays, D. R. (1992). EVects of failure within the test on subsequent subtest performance. Paper presented at the Third International Conference of the International Association for Cognitive Education, Riverside, CA . Karpov, Y. V. (2003). Vygotsky’s concept of mediation. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology (online), 3(1), 46–53. www.iacep.coged.org. Karpov, Y. V., & Haywood, H. C. (1998). Two ways to elaborate Vygotsky’s concept of mediation: Implications for education. American Psychologist, 53(1), 27–36. KoVka, K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Ko¨hler, W. (1929). Gestalt psychology. New York: H. Liveright. Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory of personality: Selected papers (Translated by D. K. Adams & K. E. Zener). New York, London: McGraw‐Hill. Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological psychology (Translated by F. Heider & G. M. Heider). New York, London: McGraw‐Hill. Lidz, C. S. (Ed.) (1987). Dynamic assessment: An interactional approach to evaluating learning potential. New York: Guilford. Lidz, C. S., & Elliott, J. G. (Eds.) (2000). Dynamic assessment: Prevailing models and applications. New York and Amsterdam: JAI/Elsevier.

A TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

313

Lovaas, O., & Smith, T. (1989). A comprehensive behavioral theory of autistic children: Paradigm for research and treatment. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 20, 17–29. Meeker, M. N. (1969). Structure of intellect: It’s interpretation and uses. Columbus, OH: Merrill. Mercer, J. R. (1970). Sociological perspective on mild mental retardation. In H. C. Haywood (Ed.), Social‐cultural aspects of mental retardation (pp. 378–391). New York: Appleton‐ Century‐Crofts. Mercer, J. R. (1965). Social system perspective and clinical perspective: Frames of reference for understanding career patterns of persons labeled as mentally retarded. Social Problems, 13(1), 18–34. Mills, P. E., Dale, P. S., Cole, K. N., & Jenkins, J. R. (1995). Follow‐up of children from academic and cognitive preschool curricula at age 9. Exceptional Children, 61, 378–391. Molina, S., & Vived, E. (2004). Improvement of cognitive functions in children with Down syndrome through the Bright Start program. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology (online), 4(1), 65–86. www.iacep.coged.org/journal. Nevalainen, V. (2002). Bright Start curriculum in the cognitive rehabilitation of dysphasic pupils during their first school year. (Abstract in English of a Finnish‐language thesis). Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology (online), 2(3), 314. www.iacep.coged.org. O’Connor, G. (1976). Home is a good place: A national perspective of community residential facilities for developmentally disabled persons. Washington, DC: American Association on Mental Deficiency. Paour, J.‐L. (1988). Retard mental et aides cognitives [Mental retardation and cognitive aides]. In J.‐P. Caverni, C. Bastien, P. Mendelsohn, & G. Tiberghien (Eds.), Psychologiecognitive: Mode`les et me´thodes [Models and methods in cognitive psychology] (pp. 191–216). Grenoble, France: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble. Paour, J.‐L. (1992). Induction of logic structures in the mentally retarded: An assessment and intervention instrument. In H. C. Haywood & D. Tzuriel (Eds.), Interactive assessment (pp. 119–166). New York: Springer Verlag. Paour, J.‐L., & Soavi, G. (1992). A case study in the induction of logic structures. In H. C. Haywood & D. Tzuriel (Eds.), Interactive assessment (pp. 419–442). New York: Springer Verlag. Paour, J.‐L., Ce`be, S., & Haywood, H. C. (2000). Learning to learn in preschool education. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology [online], 1, 3–25. http://www.iacep.coged. org/. Paour, J.‐L., Ce`be, S., Lagarrigue, P., & Luiu, D. (1992). A partial evaluation of Bright Start with pupils at risk of school failure. The Thinking Teacher, 8, 1–7. Pou, L. K. H., & Lam, C.‐M. (2003). Bright Start for children with autism spectrum disorder. In A. S.‐H. Seng, L. K.‐H. Pou, & O.‐S. Tan (Eds.), Mediated learning experience with children: Applications across contexts (pp. 133–142). Singapore: McGraw‐Hill Education (Asia). Samuels, M., Fagan, J., MacKenzie, H., & Killip, S. M. (1988). Cognitive education for preschool children with severe learning diYculties. Final report. The Learning Centre: 3930 20th St., S. W., Calgary, Alberta, T2T 4Z9, Canada. Samuels, M., Killip, S. M., Mackenzie, H., & Fagan, J. (1992). Evaluating preschool programs: The role of dynamic assessment. In H. C. Haywood & D. Tzuriel (Eds.), Interactive assessment (pp. 251–271). New York: Springer Verlag. Schroeder, S. R. (Ed.) (1990). Ecobehavioral analysis and developmental disabilities: The twenty‐ first century. New York: Springer‐Verlag.

314

H. Carl Haywood

Simonis, A. (2001). Gestalttheorie von Goethe bis Benjamin: Diskursgeschichte einer deutschen Denkfigur [Gestalt theory from Goethe to Benjamin: A narrative history of a German thought construct]. Ko¨ln (Germany): Bo¨hlau. Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.) (2003). Models of intelligence: International perspectives. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Sternberg, R. J. (2000). Practical intelligence in everyday life. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Switzky, H. N., & Haywood, H. C. (1974). Motivational orientation and the relative eYcacy of self‐monitored and externally imposed reinforcement systems in children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 360–366. Switzky, H. N., & Haywood, H. C. (1991). Self‐reinforcement schedules in persons with mild mental retardation: EVects of motivational orientation and instructional demands. Journal of Mental Deficiency Research, 35, 221–230. Switzky, H. N., & Haywood, H. C. (1992). Self‐reinforcement schedules in young children: EVects of motivational orientation and instructional demands. Learning & Individual DiVerences, 4(1), 59–71. Thurstone, R. L. (1938). Primary mental abilities. Psychometric Monographs, No. 1. Tymchuk, A. (1973). EVects of verbal concept training versus stimulus enhancement on verbal abstracting in institutionalized retarded delinquent boys. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 77, 551–555. Tzuriel, D., & Kaniel, S. (1992). Cognitive curriculum for young children (Bright Start): Implementation of the Bright Start program in Israel. Paper presented at the 3rd conference of the International Association for Cognitive Education, Riverside, CA. Tzuriel, D., Kaniel, S., Kanner, A., & Haywood, H. C. (1999). EVects of the Bright Start program in kindergarten on transfer and academic achievement. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 14(1), 111–141. Tzuriel, D., Kaniel, S., Zeliger, M., Friedman, A., & Haywood, H. C. (1998). EVects of the Bright Start program in kindergarten on use of mediation and children’s cognitive modifiability. Child Development and Care, 143, 1–20. Vanden Wijngaert, R. (1991). Cognitive education with speech and language disordered children. The Thinking Teacher, 6(3), 1–5. Warnez, J. (1991). Implementation of the CCYC in a therapeutic center. The Thinking Teacher, 6(1), 7–9. Zigler, E. (1966). Research on personality structure in the retardate. In N. R. Ellis (Ed.), International review of research in mental retardation (Vol. 1, pp. 77–108). New York: Academic Press.