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Ability evaluation through social comparison
JOURNAL
OF EXPERIMENTAL
Ability
SOCIAL
Evaluation
PSYCHOLOGY
Through
l&133-146
Social
( 1974)
Comparison”
STEPHEN C. JONES AND DENNIS T. REGAN Cornell
University
Two experiments were conducted to clarify and extend social comparison theory for abilities. In the first experiment, the hypothesis was supported that people want information about their ability level more when they anticipate making a decision about an action based on the ability than when the decision has already been made. The evaluative need is thus primarily a predecision phenomenon. The second experiment showed that the preference for comparison with similar others predicted by social comparison theory is strongest when those others have had experience utilizing the ability in situations relevant to subjects’ decisions.
In 1954 Festinger (1954a, 1954b) revised and extended some of his earlier thinking about the motivational bases for opinion conformity in groups (Festinger, 1950) and argued that evaluations of one’s ability as well as opinions about the environment are subject to social influence processes. The key assumptions of his social comparison theory, as it applied to abilities, were: (1) there exists a drive to evaluate the capacity of one’s ability; (2) when objective means of evaluation are not available, a person will evaluate his ability by comparing his own performance with the performance of other people; and (3) the most useful sources of evaluative information are people with ability levels similar to his own. From these assumptions Festinger developed implications for such diverse social phenomena as conformity, communication, competition, attraction, and affiliation. In spite of the popularity of social comparison theory, a major problem arises from a failure to differentiate between accurate self-evaluation and esteem-enhancing self-validation (see Singer, 1966). Festinger clearly was most concerned with the former process; that is, with the necessity for realistically appraising the level of one’s abilities. He wrote, for example, “the holding of . . . inaccurate appraisals of one’s abilities can 1 Portions of the research reported in this article were funded by NIMH grant number MH-20341-OlAl to the first author. Our thanks to Diane Donnelly, Dennis Knurek, David Potter, and Virginia Pressler for their assistance in the planning and conduct of these experiments. Copyright All rights
133 @ 1974 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
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be punishing or even fatal in many situations” (1954a, p. 117). Most studies focusing on ability evaluation (e.g., Hakmiller, 1966a; Hakmiller, 196613; Thornton & Arrowood, 1966; Wheeler, 1966; and Wheeler et al., 1969) have shifted the emphasis from Festinger’s assumption that people want to evaluate themselves accurately to the assumption that people want to evaluate themselves in a way which enhances self-esteem or defends against self-derogation. As examples, Wheeler (X366) found that on a test of positive traits subjects want to see the score of, and assume similarity to, someone with a higher score than theirs; whereas Hakmiller (1966a) found that on a test of negative traits subjects want to see the score of the testtaker with the most negative score. What such results have to say about accurate self-appraisal is not obvious. It appears that anything resembling social comparison (even choosing to see a particular score) whether for reasons of evaluation, validation, curiosity, or whatever, has become fair game for interpreting within the framework of the theory. In the present investigation we attempted to clarify and elaborate the informational, self-evaluative basis of social comparison theory by focusing on two problems relating to assumptions of the theory: (1) what are the necessary conditions for assuming the existence of the self-evaluative drive; and (2) under what conditions are other people with similar abilities useful sources of self-evaluative information? In the first experiment we developed and tested hypotheses concerning limits to the theory’s applicability. It was our contention that the appropriate realm for testing and applying Festinger’s conception of ability evaluation is in situations in which decisions involving an ability evaluation and leading to actions utilizing the ability are anticipated. An additional purpose of this first experiment was to establish a paradigm for investigating other assumptions and implications of the theory. In the second experiment we argued that similar others are critical not so much for evaluating the level of one’s ability as for evaluating what one can do with the ability. In this analysis the ability of similar others is less important than information concerning their experiences utilizing that ability. EXPERIMENT
I
A most critical time for a person to evaluate an ability accurately is prior to making ability-related decisions for himself. For example, in choosing among alternatives for college, or whether or not to join a new group, or how hard to practice to make the first team, a person will want to appraise rather precisely his intelligence or social effectiveness or athletic skill. An accurate self-appraisal is important because choosing beneath one’s level ‘of competence results in relatively unattractive out-
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comes and choosing above one’s level of competence runs the risk of failure. We assume that after making an ability-related decision, the individual is much less concerned with accurately evaluating himself. Furthermore, his self-esteem need might become salient at this point. In discussing predecisional and postdecisional processes, Festinger ( 1964) drew a similar conclusion concerning the relatively unbiased weighing of alternatives occurring prior to a decision and the self-justifying cognitive work following a decision. He wrote, “Reevaluation of alternatives in the direction of favoring the chosen or disfavoring the rejected alternative, or both, is a postdecision phenomenon (pp. 39-31) ,” and, further, “There is no evidence of any biasing influences before the decision is made” (p. 153). In the present experiment, subjects were administered a test on which they received an ambiguous score, and were told that they would be asked to choose a second test for which they could win money depending upon the difficulty of the test chosen and how well they performed. All subjects were given an opportunity to compare their scores with the norms for other college students. Half the subjects were given this opportunity before deciding upon the second test (predecision condition), and half the subjects were given the opportunity after their decisions (postdecision condition). Our hypothesis was simply that subjects in the predecision condition would be more interested in seeing the comparative information than subjects in the postdecision condition. The argument regarding the anticipation of decisions also can be made concerning the anticipation of actions which require a particular skill. In fact, Festinger (1954a) argued that “the more important the . . . ability is to the person, the more related to behavior, . . . and the more immediate the behavior is, the greater will be the drive for evaluation” ( p. 130). It seemed to us that decisions regarding an ability would produce more self-evaluation drive than actually using the ability (which is presumably the “behavior” Festinger had in mind). However, there is the possibility that, by knowing the precise level of his skill, the individual can adjust his efforts on a task so as to more effectively maximize his outcomes. Therefore, we created two postdecision conditions. In one postdecision condition subjects anticipated taking a test of the same ability as the first test, and in the other condition they anticipated taking a test of a quite different ability. If there were no differences between these two conditions in desire for comparative information, we could conclude that, at least in this experiment, anticipating only the use of an ability does not create a self-evaluation drive. This result also would provide good support for our main argument that the boundary condi-
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tions for assuming a drive for accurate ability decisions leading to ability-related actions.
evaluation
are prior to
Method Forty-two male undergraduate students were recruited as volunteer subjects from an introductory psychology course and were run in groups of two or three through experimental sessions lasting approximately one hour. When they entered the experimental laboratory, the subjects were escorted to small, isolated booths and requested to put on earphones and to await further instructions. Throughout the experimental procedure information was given to subjects by a prearranged tape recording. Possibilities for experimenter bias were minimized by restricting the assistants’ role to passing out and collecting the various forms without additional interaction with subjects. The subjects were evenly distributed among three different experimental conditions (N = 14 in each condition). Since subjects in the various groups had virtually no contact with one another or the experimenter, they were treated independently in our statistical analyses. The experiment was introduced as an investigation of the effects on test performance of the conditions under which personality and ability tests are administered. The experimenter discussed at some length the importance of this issue for psychological testing in schools and industry and gave examples of some of the variables being investigated such as the ‘personality of the test administrator, whether the testees were isolated or in groups, and different kinds of financial and other incentives. The first test which subjects took was described as a measure of “cognitive flexibility,” but it was actually parts two and three of the California Short-Form Mental Maturity Test ( 1957). So as to reduce the possibility that subjects would judge their own competence on the basis of previous testing experiences, cognitive flexibility was portrayed as “a rather unique ability which is not highly correlated with other tests of mental aptitude or achievement.” A test form and answer sheet were given to each subject, and standard directions were read on the tape recording. To increase uncertainty about how well they were doing, subjects were given only ten minutes to work on the test, which is three minutes less than the usual time for these particular items. Then test forms and answer sheets were collected by the assistant and the answers ostensibly were scored while subjects were listening to the instructions for the second test. Experimental
Manipulations
The independent variables were manipulated through the instructions for the second test. Three different experimental treatments were created by varying: ( 1) whether the subject had already made an ability-related decision before being given the opportunity to accurately evaluate himself, and (2) whether the second test required the same ability or a quite different ability from the first test, In the Predecision-Same Ability condition, subjects were told that the second test also measured cognitive flexibility, that the items were similar, though not identical, to those on the first test, and that “how well a person does on the first test is a very accurate indication of how well he will do on the second test.” However, this second test would be administered under quite unique conditions involving personal choice and financial incentive. The experimenter explained that such conditions had been devised as analogs to many real-life situations in which ability-related performances were required. A series of ten different tests of the same general ability had been
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created and varied systematically in their levels of difficulty. Each subject would be able to choose which level of difficulty he preferred. In addition, at the conclusion of the second test subjects could win money depending upon how well they performed and also upon the difficulty of the test chosen, with maximum outcomes occurring if the subject accurately chose a test difficulty level commensurate with his own ability. These instructions were clarified by giving subjects a chart which showed the “Average Winnings as a Function of Difficulty Level and Individual Ability Level.” The chart presented expected winnings as a joint function of test difficulty level and subjects’ percentile ability level relative to other CorneIl students. In combination with the taped instructions, the chart made it very clear that, if he knew how skillful he was relative to other students, a subject could readily determine which of the 10 difficulty levels he should choose to maximize his financial outcomes. After the nature of this upcoming decision was explained, subjects were given their scores on the first “cognitive flexibility” test. In every case this score was highly ambiguous, having no obvious relation to the number of test items or to a standard loo-point scale. The score was “113, coded for IBM,” a score which, we felt, would maintain the uncertainty we intended to create about evaluations of personal skill. Finally, subjects in the Predecision-Same Ability condition were told that they did not yet have to make a decision about difficulty level on the second test. They would be given an opportunity to make their decision “just before you begin work on the second test.” From our perspective, this instruction meant measuring the dependent variable concerning comparative choice (see below) before the decision was made. In the Postdecision-Same Ability condition, the procedure was identical except that subjects were asked to make their decision about difficulty level on the second test immediately after seeing their score on the first test. These subjects were told, “Once you have made your choice, it cannot be changed.” This instruction meant that the dependent variable was measured after the irrevocable decision about difficulty level was made. Finally, in the Post&Mm-Different Ability condition subjects also made their choice of difficulty level immediately after the mechanics of that decision were described and the scores on the first test given to them. In this condition, however, both the decision and performance in the second test involved a quite different ability. Subjects anticipated taking a test of their “hand-eye coordination” which was described as a physical ability “totally unrelated to tests of mental ability.” The experimenter pointed out that “how well a person does on the first test of cognitive flexibility has no reIation whatsoever to his performance on the hand-eye coordination test.” Hence, for this group, accurate evaluation of the “cognitve flexibility” ability could be of no use for performance on the second test. Dependent
Variables
The major dependent variable concerned subjects’ interest in seeing normative information showing where their score placed them relative to other students. Earlier in the procedure, they had been told that all of their test scores would be interpreted and discussed at the conclusion of the experimental session. Hence, the question at this point was whether subjects wanted immediate further information about their scores on the first cognitive flexibility test or to move on to the second test. The specific instructions immediately preceding this measure were: “Right now you may move right on to this second test. However, if you are interested, the assistant can come around to your booth and give you more information about the meaning
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of your first test score. This information indicates tive to other students, that is, the charts show ability groupings you fall based on how well you indicated on a questionnaire their choices among . ~ -1
I prefer to gain further I have no preference. prefer to move right
information
where your score places you relainto what percentile brackets and did on the first test.” Subjects then the following courses of action. about
on to the second
my test score. testing
condition.
Subjects also indicated on a X-point scale the strength of their preferences “in case we have time conflicts.” One end of the scale was labeled “I very much prefer gaining further information now” and the other end was labeled “I very much prefer moving right on to the second testing condition.” Furthermore, we measured individual differences in birth-order, and, after the other measures were obtained, we asked subjects in the Predecision-Same Ability condition, “Because of time limitations,” to make their choices of difficulty level on the second test. Collecting this information concluded the experimental session. We thoroughly discussed with subjects our procedures, intentions, the necessity for deception, and any uncertainties they may have felt about their abilities. Of course, the abrupt and unexpected finale of the session generated a variety of suspicions among subjects. However, informal probes indicated that there had been virtually no prior suspicions regarding our stated intentions, our procedures, or our hypothesis, and that no subject had learned about the purpose of the experiment in advance of the session.
Results and Discussion The critical data, presented in Table 1, clearly support the hypothesis. Subjects in the predecision wanted to see the comparative norms, and subjects in both postdecision conditions wanted to move right on to the second test. The strength of preference data reveal a similar pattern. The average score on a 21-point scale of subjects in the Predecision-Same Ability condition (a = 16.21) was significantly higher than the average score in either the Postdecision-Same Ability condition (a = 8.93; U = 41.5; p < .Ol) or the Postdecision-Different Ability condition (a = 8.79; U = 21.0; p < 901 ), and there was no significant difference between the latter two conditions. Finally, an analysis of the actual choices of test TABLE CHOICE
OF ACTION
AS A FUNCTION
1 OF EXPERIMENTAL
See comparative norms Predecision-Same Postdecision-Same Postdecision-Different
ability ability ability
a X2 = 23.9;
df = 4; p < .OOl.
13 2 2
CONDITIONS~
No preference 0 2 3
Move on to second test 1 10
9
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difficulty revealed no significant differences between any two experimental conditions2 The main data provide a clear demonstration of a rather obvious phenomenon: persons who can use information about themselves will take advantage of its availability. In this particular case anticipating a decision leading to ability-related performance was a necessary condition for demonstrating the motivational effects of the self-evaluation drive. Less than 15% of the subjects in the postdecision conditons preferred normative information. In these conditions, this information was relatively unimportant for self-evaluation purposes. Since there were no significant differences between the two postdecision conditions, subjects’ expectations of being involved in ability related activities did not, by themselves, affect the self-evaluation. However, to conclude from this one finding that, contrary to Festinger’s assumption, immediate behaviors are unimportant probably would be incorrect. The existence of such a tendency could well depend on such variables as the nature of the ability, the role of effort in one’s performance, and the length of time involved in relevant tasks. The data of this first experiment lead to the con&sion that our attempt to develop an experimental paradigm for testing the assumptions and implications of Festinger’s social comparison theory was successful. EXPERIMENT
II
The second problem to be considered in this investigation is why, and under what conditions, an individual finds other persons with ability levels similar to his own useful sources of self-evaluative information. Although there is widespread acceptance of Festinger’s notion of the importance of similar others and a host of studies demonstrating attraction among similar others (see, e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1969, for a review of this literature), we find that the theory is incomplete and possibly contradictory ,on this issue. As noted elsewhere ( Nissen, 1954)) Festinger’s self-evaluation drive is not a uniquely social motivation. Indeed, the ultimate “test” of one’s ability involves an encounter between the person and the physical en’ A serendipitous finding bears mentioning. The strength of preference data were also analyzed by birth order. Although the interaction was not significant, only in the Predecision-Same ability condition, in which information seeking presumably was a salient motive, did first-born and only subjects (2 = 19.60) show a significantly greater desire to see the norms than later-born subjects (3 = 13.67; U = 4.0; p < .02). This suggests that when self-evaluation is important, there is a tendency for first-born subjects to seek out evaluative information more than later-born subjects, a finding consistent with Schachter’s (1959) attempt to argue that first-borns affiliate for selfevaluation purposes.
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vironment. “Am I capable of succeeding in college?” is best answered by going to college; “Am I capable of jumping across this stream?” is best answered by plunging ahead. The crux of social comparison theory seems to be that a person typically prefers to approximate answers to such questions before he risks a commitment to the activity. In these prior situations objective means of evaluation frequently are unavailable, and, consequently, people turn to others to gain the necessary information about themselves. From this perspective, Festinger (1954a) presented ZZ: To the extent that two of the theory’s major hypotheses: “Hypothesis objective, nonsocial means are not available, people evaluate their . . . abilities by comparison . . . with the . . . abilities of others” [p. 1181; and “Hypothesis ZZZ: The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his . . . ability and one’s own increases” [p. 1201. Presumably, comparison involves, at least, a juxtaposition of the individual’s performance with the performances of other people. Assuming for the moment that social comparison is a matter of relative social standing, one encounters a serious problem regarding hypothesis III. Why is comparison with similar others preferred? Knowing that one is much better or worse than another person (i.e., than a dissimilar other) would appear to be, by itself, no less useful information than knowing he is only slightly better or worse than another person (i.e., than a similar other). In addition, if comparison means only scale location, then there is a logical contradiction regarding preference for, or even mention of, similar others. How can an individual prefer comparison with similar or, indeed, dissimilar others unless the work of comparison has already been completed? Recognizing similarity or dissimilarity presupposes knowledge of both one’s own performance and another person’s performance; thus, attributions about similarity would seem to be effects rather than causes of scale location. A final and crucial difficulty with this conception of comparison concerns the value of knowing only how one compares with others, be they similar or dissimilar. We suggest that relative standing per se is rather meaningless information regarding ability evaluation and that other sorts of information resulting from an extended process of comparison are what the individual finds useful. Given these problems, we conclude that Festinger, implicitly, to be sure, viewed the process of social comparison as involving a good deal more than the individual’s appraising his standing relative to others. What appears to be a hidden assumption in the theory is that ‘by comparison the individual learns not only where he stands relative to others but also something about what it means for his decisions, actions, and outcomes to stand at that level. In other words, the critical knowledge the individual
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seeks to gain concerns not so much the level of his ability as what he can and cannot accomplish with whatever level of ability he has. Festinger (195413) may h ave had a similar idea in mind when he wrote, “It seems to be important for persons to know quite precisely what their abilities are, what they can and cannot do” [p. 1941 and, later, “We will assume that there is a motivation in the human organism . . . to know precisely what his abilities enable him to do in this world” [p. 194; italics ours]. This analysis of self-evaluation may be viewed most fruitfully as a twostage process involving two forms of uncertainty an individual must resolve in order to evaluate effectively his own ability. The first form of evaluative uncertainty concerns the individual’s subjective estimate of just how much ability he has. As Festinger argued, the individual reduces this form of uncertainty by appraising his performance relative to the performances of other people. The second form of uncertainty concerns the implications of his comparative evaluation for decision and action. At this stage, however, uncertainty reduction involves information gained not from knowledge of another person’s level of competence per se, but rather from observing the decisions, actions, and/or outcomes of other persons, persons whose ability level relative to one’s own has been established. Thus, if individual A knows how B’s ability level compares with his own and also knows the successes and failures B has experienced which are related to that ability, then A is in a good position to estimate the consequences of his own decision and action alternatives. This analysis has helped us to clarify the ambiguities of Festinger’s theory and to make sensible the special value of the comparison process with similar others. Hypothetically, if person B were identical to A, then by watching B, A would have a clear idea of what would happen to him in a similar situation. Indeed, the most widely used basis for making decisions about his future is A’s knowledge of his own past successes and failures in similar situations. Hence, although it is not obvious that similar others provide more useful information during the first (relative standing) stage of the self-evaluation process, we are suggesting that similar others can provide less ambiguous information than dissimilar others during the second stage of discovering the decision and action implications of one’s ability level. Previous studies have supported the notion that individuals prefer association with others of similar ability, but such preferences can be explained on several grounds. The relation between similarity on many attributes and soical attraction is a well established phenomenon which probably occurs for a variety of reasons including self-esteem needs (Morse & Gergen, 1971), social approval needs (Aronson & Worchel, 1966), feelings of efficacy (Byrne & Clore, 1967), and cognitive balance
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tendencies ( Heider, 1958). The problem, of course, is to discriminate our motivational analysis from these others. The critical variable which uniquely derives from, and suggests an appropriate test of, the present analysis is the presence or absence in another person of experiences related to the ability in question. In predecisional circumstances, which we demonstrated is an appropriate situation for assuming the existence of a self-evaluation drive, the individual can gain relatively more information from a similar as compared to a dissimilar other to the extent that both persons have experienced the decisions, actions, and/or outcomes that the individual anticipates. In the present experiment we created a predecisional situation similar to that in Experiment I, manipulated whether or not potential associates already had experienced the “world” a subject expected to encounter, and measured subjects’ preferences for a5liating with a similar other versus a dissimilar other. Our hypothesis was that the preference for association with a person of similar as opposed to dissimilar ability will be stronger rohen both other persons had experiences relevant to subjects’ decisions as compared to when they had no such experiences. Method Sixty undergraduates and advanced-placement high school students (20 males and 40 females) were recruited from a summer session introductory psychology course and run in groups of two to five subjects. The experimental session lasted about an hour, and subjects were paid $2.00 for their participation. One subject was eliminated from the sample because she misunderstood the instructions for the cognitive flexibility test. At the beginning of an experimental session a group of subjects were brought into the same room and seated at tables for the introductory instructions and the first testing session. The rationale given for the project, as in Experiment I, concerned the effects of testing conditions on test performance. Subjects were told that they would be taking three or four different kinds of tests under various conditions and be asked to indicate their immediate reactions to the tests. Then, in order to develop a rationale for asking subjects, later in the experiment, to choose between a similar and dissimilar other, the experimenter read the following instructions. “As a second feature of our project you will each be paired with some other person to discuss various aspects of the testing situation. You may be assigned to a partner from your immediate group or from other small groups which are being tested now in other rooms. . . We find it very useful to have persons with similar abilities as well as persons with different abilities discuss the tests; that seems to provide us with a wider range of information. To facilitate matters, we will allow you later on to choose whether you want to talk with someone similar to you in ability or different from you. . . During these discussions you may talk about any aspects of the tests, either those you’ve already taken or those you are about to take.” After
these
instructions,
the “cognitive
flexibility”
test used
in the
first experiment
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and subjects filled out a brief form was administered “under group conditions,” appraising their reactions to the test. This procedure was adopted to supplement the earlier rationale given for the project. Following the first test, subjects were taken to separate rooms to undergo further testing “under individual conditions.” They filled out and evaluated a personality inventory, while the experimenter and his assistant ostensibly were scoring the first test. The next testing procedure involved taking another cognitive flexibility test under the same choice and incentive conditions utilized in Experiment I. Each subject was given a chart, as in Experiment 1, and written instructions explaining in detail the nature of the “level of difficulty” choice and the strategy for maximizing outcomes. To increase their interest in making an optimum choice for themselves, we told subjects in this written set of instructions, “Since we know your score on the first cognitive flexibility test, we know which particular choice of difficulty level you should make to win the most money for yourself. To add incentive to your making that best choice we are paying an extra $1.00 to students whose choices line up accurately with their ability as indicated by the first test.” Unlike Experiment I, no ambiguous score on the first test was returned to subjects after these instructions about the pending decision, and subjects were informed that no participant would receive any test score until the conclusion of the session. At this point the procedure for choice of affiliation with either a similar or a dissimilar other was introduced. The instructions concerning this choice, its rationale, characteristics, and our interest in having discussions among persons with both similar and dissimilar abilities, were reiterated. It was explained, further, that, based on the first cognitive flexibility test scores, we had tried to match each person with someone similar and someone dissimilar to him. Then each subject was told, “You might be interested in knowing a little more about the two people between whom you will make your choice.” Two critical pieces of information were given about the partner choices. First, in order to eliminate the possibility that the choices would be influenced by preferences for members of the subject’s particular group, we said, “Both people are from other groups which started the testing earlier than your group.” Experimental
Manipulation
The second piece of information about partner choices constituted the manipulation of experience. The experimenter or the assistant determined by consulting a random number table the experimental condition of the subject and proceeded with one of the following two sets of instructions:
Experience
condition:
“Both persons, that is, the one who scored simiwho scored differently, already have taken both That means they have made their choice of diffisecond test, and also found out how much money they had made a good or bad choice of difficulty. has yet received his actual test scores.” No Experience Condition: “Both persons, that is, the one who scored similarly to you and the one who scored differently, have taken the first cognitive flexibility test, but the members of their particular groups will not be taking the second cognitive flexibility test at all. Of course, neither person has yet received his actual test scores.” larly to you and the one cognitive flexibility tests. culty level, have taken the they won, that is, whether Of course, neither person
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Variables
Immediately after making one of these sets of statements, we gave the subject a form on which he could make his choice of discussion partner. On this form subjects could choose from among the following three statements. -1 -1 -1
prefer to participate similar to mine on the have no preference. prefer to participate different from mine on
in the discussion with first cognitive flexibility in the discussion the first cognitive
a person test.
who
had
a score
with a person who flexibility test.
had
a score
In addition, in case there were “scheduling conflicts” subjects were asked to indicate the strength of their preferences for similar as compared to dissimilar others on a 9point scale with the extremes labeled. A final questionnaire was administered which asked subjects to answer on a ‘i-point scale “How strong is your interest in having a discussion with your partner at the present time?’ and “How anxious or uneasy do you feel at the present time?’ We followed the same debriefing procedure as in Experiment I. Again, we found virtually no suspicions about the procedure prior to its interruption and there was no obvious discontentment about the testing practices or deceptions.
Results and Di.scwsim The frequency of choice data are presented in Table 2. First of all, the preference for others with similar abilities, derived from social comparison theory as well, it seems, as most other theories in social psychology, is very strong. Almost 80% of the subjects chose their own kind. Although we came close to the ceiling here, we didn’t reach it. Second, our hypothesis was supported; as shown by the analyses of this distribution, there was a greater tendency to prefer the similar other in the Experience condition than in the No Experience condition. This tendency also occurred with a measure of the strength of subjects’ expressed preferences for similar versus dissimilar others; the mean scores were significantly lower (t = 2.29, p < .05), favoring a preference for similarity, in the Experience condition (a = 2.86) as compared to the No Experience condition (a = 4.03). There were no further differences
CHOICE Similar Experience No experience
other
TABLE 2 OF AFFILIATION" No preference
26
2
21
0
a X2 = 9.23; df = 2; p < .02. Since the expected than 5, a second analysis was conducted in which eliminated and a formula incorporating a correction df = 1; p < .05.
Dissimilar
other 1 9
frequencies in two cells were less the two No Preference cells were for continuity applied: Xe = 5.10,
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involving either birth order and sex differences or the remaining dependent variables measuring interest in the discussion and anxiety.3 The relation we obtained between ability similarity and the abilityrelated experiences of other persons supports our attempt to clarify and extend social comparison theory. Although similar others may provide useful information regarding the level of one’s ability, we have demonstrated in this study that the preference for similar others is particularly strong where they have had experiences relevant to that ability. In effect, perceiving the activities and outcomes of similar others is as though the individual were holding a mirror to himself. A few additional implications of this analysis should be noted. First, we have shifted the emphasis from the individual’s asking “How much ability do I have?” to “What happens to people with capacities like mine?” It is possible that the ability level question at times is bypassed altogether in the self-evaluation process; that is, the individual seeks, directly, to discover and associate with similar others, then to learn from their experiences. Especially when anticipating ability-relevant decisions and actions, he wonders, ‘Who is like me on this attribute, and what happens to them in the world?” Second, our analysis clearly suggests that comparative evaluation is a continuing process and that extended association with similar others is informative even after relative standing regarding abilities has been established. Changing situations produce new concerns, not with ability level which probably remains relatively constant, but with the implications of that ability level for dealing with those new circumstances. Finally, although we have focused on abilities in this investigation, a similar analysis of predecisional concerns for selfevaluation and the special value of similar others could be made for opinions, emotionality, attractiveness, and a variety of other personal attributes. For example, when faced with options in an uncertain new world of social discourse, an individual might associate with those holding opinions similar to his own, not so much to evaluate the correctness of his opinions, as to determine, “What happens in this situation to people with opinions like mine?” REFERENCES ARONSON, E., & WORCHEL, P. Similarity attractiveness. Psychonomic Science, ‘From the birth order results in subjects would show more general a similar or dissimilar other was means were in this direction, the that the comparative norms in the subjects’ decisions than the discussion
vs liking as determinants 1966, 5, 157-158.
of interpersonal
the first study, we had expected that first-born interest in the discussions, regardless of whether chosen, than later-born subjects. Although the failure to find significant differences may mean first study were of more obvious usefulness for in the present study.
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BERSCHEID, E., & WALSTER, E. H. Interpersonal attraction. Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 1969. BYRNE, D., & CLORE, G. L., JR. Effectance arousal and attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psycho!ogy, 1967, 6 (Whole No. 638). California Short-Form Mental Maturity Test. Monterey, Calif.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1957. FESTINGER, L. Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 1950, 57, 271282. FESTINCER, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 1954, 7, 117-140. (a) FESTINGER, L. Motivations leading to social behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 191-219. (b) FESTINGER, L. Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964. HAKMILLER, K. L. Threat as a determinant of downward comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 ( Supplement 1 ), 32-39. (a) HAKMILLER, K. L. Need for self-evaluation, perceived similarity and comparison choice. Journal of ExpeTimentaZ Social Psychology, 1966, 2 (Supplement l), 49-54. (b) HEIDER, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, lQ58. MORSE, S., & GERGEN, K. J. Social comparison, self-consistency, and the concept of self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 148-156. NISSEN, H. W. Comments on Dr. Festinger’s paper. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 219-223. SCHACHTER, S. The psychology of affiliation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. SINGER, J. E. Social comparison-progress and issues. Journul of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 ( Supplement 1 ), 103-110. THORTON, D. A., & ARROWOOD, A. J. Self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and the locus of social comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 (Supplement l), 4048. WHEELER, L. Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 (Supplement 1 ), 27-31. WHEELER, L., SHAVER, K. G., JONES, R. A., GOETHALS, G. R., COOPER, J,, ROBINSON, J. E., GRUDER, C. L., & BWIZINE, K. W. Factors determining choice of a comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 219-232. ( Received
March
29,
1973 )
OF EXPERIMENTAL
Ability
SOCIAL
Evaluation
PSYCHOLOGY
Through
l&133-146
Social
( 1974)
Comparison”
STEPHEN C. JONES AND DENNIS T. REGAN Cornell
University
Two experiments were conducted to clarify and extend social comparison theory for abilities. In the first experiment, the hypothesis was supported that people want information about their ability level more when they anticipate making a decision about an action based on the ability than when the decision has already been made. The evaluative need is thus primarily a predecision phenomenon. The second experiment showed that the preference for comparison with similar others predicted by social comparison theory is strongest when those others have had experience utilizing the ability in situations relevant to subjects’ decisions.
In 1954 Festinger (1954a, 1954b) revised and extended some of his earlier thinking about the motivational bases for opinion conformity in groups (Festinger, 1950) and argued that evaluations of one’s ability as well as opinions about the environment are subject to social influence processes. The key assumptions of his social comparison theory, as it applied to abilities, were: (1) there exists a drive to evaluate the capacity of one’s ability; (2) when objective means of evaluation are not available, a person will evaluate his ability by comparing his own performance with the performance of other people; and (3) the most useful sources of evaluative information are people with ability levels similar to his own. From these assumptions Festinger developed implications for such diverse social phenomena as conformity, communication, competition, attraction, and affiliation. In spite of the popularity of social comparison theory, a major problem arises from a failure to differentiate between accurate self-evaluation and esteem-enhancing self-validation (see Singer, 1966). Festinger clearly was most concerned with the former process; that is, with the necessity for realistically appraising the level of one’s abilities. He wrote, for example, “the holding of . . . inaccurate appraisals of one’s abilities can 1 Portions of the research reported in this article were funded by NIMH grant number MH-20341-OlAl to the first author. Our thanks to Diane Donnelly, Dennis Knurek, David Potter, and Virginia Pressler for their assistance in the planning and conduct of these experiments. Copyright All rights
133 @ 1974 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
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be punishing or even fatal in many situations” (1954a, p. 117). Most studies focusing on ability evaluation (e.g., Hakmiller, 1966a; Hakmiller, 196613; Thornton & Arrowood, 1966; Wheeler, 1966; and Wheeler et al., 1969) have shifted the emphasis from Festinger’s assumption that people want to evaluate themselves accurately to the assumption that people want to evaluate themselves in a way which enhances self-esteem or defends against self-derogation. As examples, Wheeler (X366) found that on a test of positive traits subjects want to see the score of, and assume similarity to, someone with a higher score than theirs; whereas Hakmiller (1966a) found that on a test of negative traits subjects want to see the score of the testtaker with the most negative score. What such results have to say about accurate self-appraisal is not obvious. It appears that anything resembling social comparison (even choosing to see a particular score) whether for reasons of evaluation, validation, curiosity, or whatever, has become fair game for interpreting within the framework of the theory. In the present investigation we attempted to clarify and elaborate the informational, self-evaluative basis of social comparison theory by focusing on two problems relating to assumptions of the theory: (1) what are the necessary conditions for assuming the existence of the self-evaluative drive; and (2) under what conditions are other people with similar abilities useful sources of self-evaluative information? In the first experiment we developed and tested hypotheses concerning limits to the theory’s applicability. It was our contention that the appropriate realm for testing and applying Festinger’s conception of ability evaluation is in situations in which decisions involving an ability evaluation and leading to actions utilizing the ability are anticipated. An additional purpose of this first experiment was to establish a paradigm for investigating other assumptions and implications of the theory. In the second experiment we argued that similar others are critical not so much for evaluating the level of one’s ability as for evaluating what one can do with the ability. In this analysis the ability of similar others is less important than information concerning their experiences utilizing that ability. EXPERIMENT
I
A most critical time for a person to evaluate an ability accurately is prior to making ability-related decisions for himself. For example, in choosing among alternatives for college, or whether or not to join a new group, or how hard to practice to make the first team, a person will want to appraise rather precisely his intelligence or social effectiveness or athletic skill. An accurate self-appraisal is important because choosing beneath one’s level ‘of competence results in relatively unattractive out-
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comes and choosing above one’s level of competence runs the risk of failure. We assume that after making an ability-related decision, the individual is much less concerned with accurately evaluating himself. Furthermore, his self-esteem need might become salient at this point. In discussing predecisional and postdecisional processes, Festinger ( 1964) drew a similar conclusion concerning the relatively unbiased weighing of alternatives occurring prior to a decision and the self-justifying cognitive work following a decision. He wrote, “Reevaluation of alternatives in the direction of favoring the chosen or disfavoring the rejected alternative, or both, is a postdecision phenomenon (pp. 39-31) ,” and, further, “There is no evidence of any biasing influences before the decision is made” (p. 153). In the present experiment, subjects were administered a test on which they received an ambiguous score, and were told that they would be asked to choose a second test for which they could win money depending upon the difficulty of the test chosen and how well they performed. All subjects were given an opportunity to compare their scores with the norms for other college students. Half the subjects were given this opportunity before deciding upon the second test (predecision condition), and half the subjects were given the opportunity after their decisions (postdecision condition). Our hypothesis was simply that subjects in the predecision condition would be more interested in seeing the comparative information than subjects in the postdecision condition. The argument regarding the anticipation of decisions also can be made concerning the anticipation of actions which require a particular skill. In fact, Festinger (1954a) argued that “the more important the . . . ability is to the person, the more related to behavior, . . . and the more immediate the behavior is, the greater will be the drive for evaluation” ( p. 130). It seemed to us that decisions regarding an ability would produce more self-evaluation drive than actually using the ability (which is presumably the “behavior” Festinger had in mind). However, there is the possibility that, by knowing the precise level of his skill, the individual can adjust his efforts on a task so as to more effectively maximize his outcomes. Therefore, we created two postdecision conditions. In one postdecision condition subjects anticipated taking a test of the same ability as the first test, and in the other condition they anticipated taking a test of a quite different ability. If there were no differences between these two conditions in desire for comparative information, we could conclude that, at least in this experiment, anticipating only the use of an ability does not create a self-evaluation drive. This result also would provide good support for our main argument that the boundary condi-
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tions for assuming a drive for accurate ability decisions leading to ability-related actions.
evaluation
are prior to
Method Forty-two male undergraduate students were recruited as volunteer subjects from an introductory psychology course and were run in groups of two or three through experimental sessions lasting approximately one hour. When they entered the experimental laboratory, the subjects were escorted to small, isolated booths and requested to put on earphones and to await further instructions. Throughout the experimental procedure information was given to subjects by a prearranged tape recording. Possibilities for experimenter bias were minimized by restricting the assistants’ role to passing out and collecting the various forms without additional interaction with subjects. The subjects were evenly distributed among three different experimental conditions (N = 14 in each condition). Since subjects in the various groups had virtually no contact with one another or the experimenter, they were treated independently in our statistical analyses. The experiment was introduced as an investigation of the effects on test performance of the conditions under which personality and ability tests are administered. The experimenter discussed at some length the importance of this issue for psychological testing in schools and industry and gave examples of some of the variables being investigated such as the ‘personality of the test administrator, whether the testees were isolated or in groups, and different kinds of financial and other incentives. The first test which subjects took was described as a measure of “cognitive flexibility,” but it was actually parts two and three of the California Short-Form Mental Maturity Test ( 1957). So as to reduce the possibility that subjects would judge their own competence on the basis of previous testing experiences, cognitive flexibility was portrayed as “a rather unique ability which is not highly correlated with other tests of mental aptitude or achievement.” A test form and answer sheet were given to each subject, and standard directions were read on the tape recording. To increase uncertainty about how well they were doing, subjects were given only ten minutes to work on the test, which is three minutes less than the usual time for these particular items. Then test forms and answer sheets were collected by the assistant and the answers ostensibly were scored while subjects were listening to the instructions for the second test. Experimental
Manipulations
The independent variables were manipulated through the instructions for the second test. Three different experimental treatments were created by varying: ( 1) whether the subject had already made an ability-related decision before being given the opportunity to accurately evaluate himself, and (2) whether the second test required the same ability or a quite different ability from the first test, In the Predecision-Same Ability condition, subjects were told that the second test also measured cognitive flexibility, that the items were similar, though not identical, to those on the first test, and that “how well a person does on the first test is a very accurate indication of how well he will do on the second test.” However, this second test would be administered under quite unique conditions involving personal choice and financial incentive. The experimenter explained that such conditions had been devised as analogs to many real-life situations in which ability-related performances were required. A series of ten different tests of the same general ability had been
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created and varied systematically in their levels of difficulty. Each subject would be able to choose which level of difficulty he preferred. In addition, at the conclusion of the second test subjects could win money depending upon how well they performed and also upon the difficulty of the test chosen, with maximum outcomes occurring if the subject accurately chose a test difficulty level commensurate with his own ability. These instructions were clarified by giving subjects a chart which showed the “Average Winnings as a Function of Difficulty Level and Individual Ability Level.” The chart presented expected winnings as a joint function of test difficulty level and subjects’ percentile ability level relative to other CorneIl students. In combination with the taped instructions, the chart made it very clear that, if he knew how skillful he was relative to other students, a subject could readily determine which of the 10 difficulty levels he should choose to maximize his financial outcomes. After the nature of this upcoming decision was explained, subjects were given their scores on the first “cognitive flexibility” test. In every case this score was highly ambiguous, having no obvious relation to the number of test items or to a standard loo-point scale. The score was “113, coded for IBM,” a score which, we felt, would maintain the uncertainty we intended to create about evaluations of personal skill. Finally, subjects in the Predecision-Same Ability condition were told that they did not yet have to make a decision about difficulty level on the second test. They would be given an opportunity to make their decision “just before you begin work on the second test.” From our perspective, this instruction meant measuring the dependent variable concerning comparative choice (see below) before the decision was made. In the Postdecision-Same Ability condition, the procedure was identical except that subjects were asked to make their decision about difficulty level on the second test immediately after seeing their score on the first test. These subjects were told, “Once you have made your choice, it cannot be changed.” This instruction meant that the dependent variable was measured after the irrevocable decision about difficulty level was made. Finally, in the Post&Mm-Different Ability condition subjects also made their choice of difficulty level immediately after the mechanics of that decision were described and the scores on the first test given to them. In this condition, however, both the decision and performance in the second test involved a quite different ability. Subjects anticipated taking a test of their “hand-eye coordination” which was described as a physical ability “totally unrelated to tests of mental ability.” The experimenter pointed out that “how well a person does on the first test of cognitive flexibility has no reIation whatsoever to his performance on the hand-eye coordination test.” Hence, for this group, accurate evaluation of the “cognitve flexibility” ability could be of no use for performance on the second test. Dependent
Variables
The major dependent variable concerned subjects’ interest in seeing normative information showing where their score placed them relative to other students. Earlier in the procedure, they had been told that all of their test scores would be interpreted and discussed at the conclusion of the experimental session. Hence, the question at this point was whether subjects wanted immediate further information about their scores on the first cognitive flexibility test or to move on to the second test. The specific instructions immediately preceding this measure were: “Right now you may move right on to this second test. However, if you are interested, the assistant can come around to your booth and give you more information about the meaning
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of your first test score. This information indicates tive to other students, that is, the charts show ability groupings you fall based on how well you indicated on a questionnaire their choices among . ~ -1
I prefer to gain further I have no preference. prefer to move right
information
where your score places you relainto what percentile brackets and did on the first test.” Subjects then the following courses of action. about
on to the second
my test score. testing
condition.
Subjects also indicated on a X-point scale the strength of their preferences “in case we have time conflicts.” One end of the scale was labeled “I very much prefer gaining further information now” and the other end was labeled “I very much prefer moving right on to the second testing condition.” Furthermore, we measured individual differences in birth-order, and, after the other measures were obtained, we asked subjects in the Predecision-Same Ability condition, “Because of time limitations,” to make their choices of difficulty level on the second test. Collecting this information concluded the experimental session. We thoroughly discussed with subjects our procedures, intentions, the necessity for deception, and any uncertainties they may have felt about their abilities. Of course, the abrupt and unexpected finale of the session generated a variety of suspicions among subjects. However, informal probes indicated that there had been virtually no prior suspicions regarding our stated intentions, our procedures, or our hypothesis, and that no subject had learned about the purpose of the experiment in advance of the session.
Results and Discussion The critical data, presented in Table 1, clearly support the hypothesis. Subjects in the predecision wanted to see the comparative norms, and subjects in both postdecision conditions wanted to move right on to the second test. The strength of preference data reveal a similar pattern. The average score on a 21-point scale of subjects in the Predecision-Same Ability condition (a = 16.21) was significantly higher than the average score in either the Postdecision-Same Ability condition (a = 8.93; U = 41.5; p < .Ol) or the Postdecision-Different Ability condition (a = 8.79; U = 21.0; p < 901 ), and there was no significant difference between the latter two conditions. Finally, an analysis of the actual choices of test TABLE CHOICE
OF ACTION
AS A FUNCTION
1 OF EXPERIMENTAL
See comparative norms Predecision-Same Postdecision-Same Postdecision-Different
ability ability ability
a X2 = 23.9;
df = 4; p < .OOl.
13 2 2
CONDITIONS~
No preference 0 2 3
Move on to second test 1 10
9
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difficulty revealed no significant differences between any two experimental conditions2 The main data provide a clear demonstration of a rather obvious phenomenon: persons who can use information about themselves will take advantage of its availability. In this particular case anticipating a decision leading to ability-related performance was a necessary condition for demonstrating the motivational effects of the self-evaluation drive. Less than 15% of the subjects in the postdecision conditons preferred normative information. In these conditions, this information was relatively unimportant for self-evaluation purposes. Since there were no significant differences between the two postdecision conditions, subjects’ expectations of being involved in ability related activities did not, by themselves, affect the self-evaluation. However, to conclude from this one finding that, contrary to Festinger’s assumption, immediate behaviors are unimportant probably would be incorrect. The existence of such a tendency could well depend on such variables as the nature of the ability, the role of effort in one’s performance, and the length of time involved in relevant tasks. The data of this first experiment lead to the con&sion that our attempt to develop an experimental paradigm for testing the assumptions and implications of Festinger’s social comparison theory was successful. EXPERIMENT
II
The second problem to be considered in this investigation is why, and under what conditions, an individual finds other persons with ability levels similar to his own useful sources of self-evaluative information. Although there is widespread acceptance of Festinger’s notion of the importance of similar others and a host of studies demonstrating attraction among similar others (see, e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1969, for a review of this literature), we find that the theory is incomplete and possibly contradictory ,on this issue. As noted elsewhere ( Nissen, 1954)) Festinger’s self-evaluation drive is not a uniquely social motivation. Indeed, the ultimate “test” of one’s ability involves an encounter between the person and the physical en’ A serendipitous finding bears mentioning. The strength of preference data were also analyzed by birth order. Although the interaction was not significant, only in the Predecision-Same ability condition, in which information seeking presumably was a salient motive, did first-born and only subjects (2 = 19.60) show a significantly greater desire to see the norms than later-born subjects (3 = 13.67; U = 4.0; p < .02). This suggests that when self-evaluation is important, there is a tendency for first-born subjects to seek out evaluative information more than later-born subjects, a finding consistent with Schachter’s (1959) attempt to argue that first-borns affiliate for selfevaluation purposes.
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vironment. “Am I capable of succeeding in college?” is best answered by going to college; “Am I capable of jumping across this stream?” is best answered by plunging ahead. The crux of social comparison theory seems to be that a person typically prefers to approximate answers to such questions before he risks a commitment to the activity. In these prior situations objective means of evaluation frequently are unavailable, and, consequently, people turn to others to gain the necessary information about themselves. From this perspective, Festinger (1954a) presented ZZ: To the extent that two of the theory’s major hypotheses: “Hypothesis objective, nonsocial means are not available, people evaluate their . . . abilities by comparison . . . with the . . . abilities of others” [p. 1181; and “Hypothesis ZZZ: The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his . . . ability and one’s own increases” [p. 1201. Presumably, comparison involves, at least, a juxtaposition of the individual’s performance with the performances of other people. Assuming for the moment that social comparison is a matter of relative social standing, one encounters a serious problem regarding hypothesis III. Why is comparison with similar others preferred? Knowing that one is much better or worse than another person (i.e., than a dissimilar other) would appear to be, by itself, no less useful information than knowing he is only slightly better or worse than another person (i.e., than a similar other). In addition, if comparison means only scale location, then there is a logical contradiction regarding preference for, or even mention of, similar others. How can an individual prefer comparison with similar or, indeed, dissimilar others unless the work of comparison has already been completed? Recognizing similarity or dissimilarity presupposes knowledge of both one’s own performance and another person’s performance; thus, attributions about similarity would seem to be effects rather than causes of scale location. A final and crucial difficulty with this conception of comparison concerns the value of knowing only how one compares with others, be they similar or dissimilar. We suggest that relative standing per se is rather meaningless information regarding ability evaluation and that other sorts of information resulting from an extended process of comparison are what the individual finds useful. Given these problems, we conclude that Festinger, implicitly, to be sure, viewed the process of social comparison as involving a good deal more than the individual’s appraising his standing relative to others. What appears to be a hidden assumption in the theory is that ‘by comparison the individual learns not only where he stands relative to others but also something about what it means for his decisions, actions, and outcomes to stand at that level. In other words, the critical knowledge the individual
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seeks to gain concerns not so much the level of his ability as what he can and cannot accomplish with whatever level of ability he has. Festinger (195413) may h ave had a similar idea in mind when he wrote, “It seems to be important for persons to know quite precisely what their abilities are, what they can and cannot do” [p. 1941 and, later, “We will assume that there is a motivation in the human organism . . . to know precisely what his abilities enable him to do in this world” [p. 194; italics ours]. This analysis of self-evaluation may be viewed most fruitfully as a twostage process involving two forms of uncertainty an individual must resolve in order to evaluate effectively his own ability. The first form of evaluative uncertainty concerns the individual’s subjective estimate of just how much ability he has. As Festinger argued, the individual reduces this form of uncertainty by appraising his performance relative to the performances of other people. The second form of uncertainty concerns the implications of his comparative evaluation for decision and action. At this stage, however, uncertainty reduction involves information gained not from knowledge of another person’s level of competence per se, but rather from observing the decisions, actions, and/or outcomes of other persons, persons whose ability level relative to one’s own has been established. Thus, if individual A knows how B’s ability level compares with his own and also knows the successes and failures B has experienced which are related to that ability, then A is in a good position to estimate the consequences of his own decision and action alternatives. This analysis has helped us to clarify the ambiguities of Festinger’s theory and to make sensible the special value of the comparison process with similar others. Hypothetically, if person B were identical to A, then by watching B, A would have a clear idea of what would happen to him in a similar situation. Indeed, the most widely used basis for making decisions about his future is A’s knowledge of his own past successes and failures in similar situations. Hence, although it is not obvious that similar others provide more useful information during the first (relative standing) stage of the self-evaluation process, we are suggesting that similar others can provide less ambiguous information than dissimilar others during the second stage of discovering the decision and action implications of one’s ability level. Previous studies have supported the notion that individuals prefer association with others of similar ability, but such preferences can be explained on several grounds. The relation between similarity on many attributes and soical attraction is a well established phenomenon which probably occurs for a variety of reasons including self-esteem needs (Morse & Gergen, 1971), social approval needs (Aronson & Worchel, 1966), feelings of efficacy (Byrne & Clore, 1967), and cognitive balance
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tendencies ( Heider, 1958). The problem, of course, is to discriminate our motivational analysis from these others. The critical variable which uniquely derives from, and suggests an appropriate test of, the present analysis is the presence or absence in another person of experiences related to the ability in question. In predecisional circumstances, which we demonstrated is an appropriate situation for assuming the existence of a self-evaluation drive, the individual can gain relatively more information from a similar as compared to a dissimilar other to the extent that both persons have experienced the decisions, actions, and/or outcomes that the individual anticipates. In the present experiment we created a predecisional situation similar to that in Experiment I, manipulated whether or not potential associates already had experienced the “world” a subject expected to encounter, and measured subjects’ preferences for a5liating with a similar other versus a dissimilar other. Our hypothesis was that the preference for association with a person of similar as opposed to dissimilar ability will be stronger rohen both other persons had experiences relevant to subjects’ decisions as compared to when they had no such experiences. Method Sixty undergraduates and advanced-placement high school students (20 males and 40 females) were recruited from a summer session introductory psychology course and run in groups of two to five subjects. The experimental session lasted about an hour, and subjects were paid $2.00 for their participation. One subject was eliminated from the sample because she misunderstood the instructions for the cognitive flexibility test. At the beginning of an experimental session a group of subjects were brought into the same room and seated at tables for the introductory instructions and the first testing session. The rationale given for the project, as in Experiment I, concerned the effects of testing conditions on test performance. Subjects were told that they would be taking three or four different kinds of tests under various conditions and be asked to indicate their immediate reactions to the tests. Then, in order to develop a rationale for asking subjects, later in the experiment, to choose between a similar and dissimilar other, the experimenter read the following instructions. “As a second feature of our project you will each be paired with some other person to discuss various aspects of the testing situation. You may be assigned to a partner from your immediate group or from other small groups which are being tested now in other rooms. . . We find it very useful to have persons with similar abilities as well as persons with different abilities discuss the tests; that seems to provide us with a wider range of information. To facilitate matters, we will allow you later on to choose whether you want to talk with someone similar to you in ability or different from you. . . During these discussions you may talk about any aspects of the tests, either those you’ve already taken or those you are about to take.” After
these
instructions,
the “cognitive
flexibility”
test used
in the
first experiment
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and subjects filled out a brief form was administered “under group conditions,” appraising their reactions to the test. This procedure was adopted to supplement the earlier rationale given for the project. Following the first test, subjects were taken to separate rooms to undergo further testing “under individual conditions.” They filled out and evaluated a personality inventory, while the experimenter and his assistant ostensibly were scoring the first test. The next testing procedure involved taking another cognitive flexibility test under the same choice and incentive conditions utilized in Experiment I. Each subject was given a chart, as in Experiment 1, and written instructions explaining in detail the nature of the “level of difficulty” choice and the strategy for maximizing outcomes. To increase their interest in making an optimum choice for themselves, we told subjects in this written set of instructions, “Since we know your score on the first cognitive flexibility test, we know which particular choice of difficulty level you should make to win the most money for yourself. To add incentive to your making that best choice we are paying an extra $1.00 to students whose choices line up accurately with their ability as indicated by the first test.” Unlike Experiment I, no ambiguous score on the first test was returned to subjects after these instructions about the pending decision, and subjects were informed that no participant would receive any test score until the conclusion of the session. At this point the procedure for choice of affiliation with either a similar or a dissimilar other was introduced. The instructions concerning this choice, its rationale, characteristics, and our interest in having discussions among persons with both similar and dissimilar abilities, were reiterated. It was explained, further, that, based on the first cognitive flexibility test scores, we had tried to match each person with someone similar and someone dissimilar to him. Then each subject was told, “You might be interested in knowing a little more about the two people between whom you will make your choice.” Two critical pieces of information were given about the partner choices. First, in order to eliminate the possibility that the choices would be influenced by preferences for members of the subject’s particular group, we said, “Both people are from other groups which started the testing earlier than your group.” Experimental
Manipulation
The second piece of information about partner choices constituted the manipulation of experience. The experimenter or the assistant determined by consulting a random number table the experimental condition of the subject and proceeded with one of the following two sets of instructions:
Experience
condition:
“Both persons, that is, the one who scored simiwho scored differently, already have taken both That means they have made their choice of diffisecond test, and also found out how much money they had made a good or bad choice of difficulty. has yet received his actual test scores.” No Experience Condition: “Both persons, that is, the one who scored similarly to you and the one who scored differently, have taken the first cognitive flexibility test, but the members of their particular groups will not be taking the second cognitive flexibility test at all. Of course, neither person has yet received his actual test scores.” larly to you and the one cognitive flexibility tests. culty level, have taken the they won, that is, whether Of course, neither person
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Variables
Immediately after making one of these sets of statements, we gave the subject a form on which he could make his choice of discussion partner. On this form subjects could choose from among the following three statements. -1 -1 -1
prefer to participate similar to mine on the have no preference. prefer to participate different from mine on
in the discussion with first cognitive flexibility in the discussion the first cognitive
a person test.
who
had
a score
with a person who flexibility test.
had
a score
In addition, in case there were “scheduling conflicts” subjects were asked to indicate the strength of their preferences for similar as compared to dissimilar others on a 9point scale with the extremes labeled. A final questionnaire was administered which asked subjects to answer on a ‘i-point scale “How strong is your interest in having a discussion with your partner at the present time?’ and “How anxious or uneasy do you feel at the present time?’ We followed the same debriefing procedure as in Experiment I. Again, we found virtually no suspicions about the procedure prior to its interruption and there was no obvious discontentment about the testing practices or deceptions.
Results and Di.scwsim The frequency of choice data are presented in Table 2. First of all, the preference for others with similar abilities, derived from social comparison theory as well, it seems, as most other theories in social psychology, is very strong. Almost 80% of the subjects chose their own kind. Although we came close to the ceiling here, we didn’t reach it. Second, our hypothesis was supported; as shown by the analyses of this distribution, there was a greater tendency to prefer the similar other in the Experience condition than in the No Experience condition. This tendency also occurred with a measure of the strength of subjects’ expressed preferences for similar versus dissimilar others; the mean scores were significantly lower (t = 2.29, p < .05), favoring a preference for similarity, in the Experience condition (a = 2.86) as compared to the No Experience condition (a = 4.03). There were no further differences
CHOICE Similar Experience No experience
other
TABLE 2 OF AFFILIATION" No preference
26
2
21
0
a X2 = 9.23; df = 2; p < .02. Since the expected than 5, a second analysis was conducted in which eliminated and a formula incorporating a correction df = 1; p < .05.
Dissimilar
other 1 9
frequencies in two cells were less the two No Preference cells were for continuity applied: Xe = 5.10,
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involving either birth order and sex differences or the remaining dependent variables measuring interest in the discussion and anxiety.3 The relation we obtained between ability similarity and the abilityrelated experiences of other persons supports our attempt to clarify and extend social comparison theory. Although similar others may provide useful information regarding the level of one’s ability, we have demonstrated in this study that the preference for similar others is particularly strong where they have had experiences relevant to that ability. In effect, perceiving the activities and outcomes of similar others is as though the individual were holding a mirror to himself. A few additional implications of this analysis should be noted. First, we have shifted the emphasis from the individual’s asking “How much ability do I have?” to “What happens to people with capacities like mine?” It is possible that the ability level question at times is bypassed altogether in the self-evaluation process; that is, the individual seeks, directly, to discover and associate with similar others, then to learn from their experiences. Especially when anticipating ability-relevant decisions and actions, he wonders, ‘Who is like me on this attribute, and what happens to them in the world?” Second, our analysis clearly suggests that comparative evaluation is a continuing process and that extended association with similar others is informative even after relative standing regarding abilities has been established. Changing situations produce new concerns, not with ability level which probably remains relatively constant, but with the implications of that ability level for dealing with those new circumstances. Finally, although we have focused on abilities in this investigation, a similar analysis of predecisional concerns for selfevaluation and the special value of similar others could be made for opinions, emotionality, attractiveness, and a variety of other personal attributes. For example, when faced with options in an uncertain new world of social discourse, an individual might associate with those holding opinions similar to his own, not so much to evaluate the correctness of his opinions, as to determine, “What happens in this situation to people with opinions like mine?” REFERENCES ARONSON, E., & WORCHEL, P. Similarity attractiveness. Psychonomic Science, ‘From the birth order results in subjects would show more general a similar or dissimilar other was means were in this direction, the that the comparative norms in the subjects’ decisions than the discussion
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the first study, we had expected that first-born interest in the discussions, regardless of whether chosen, than later-born subjects. Although the failure to find significant differences may mean first study were of more obvious usefulness for in the present study.
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BERSCHEID, E., & WALSTER, E. H. Interpersonal attraction. Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 1969. BYRNE, D., & CLORE, G. L., JR. Effectance arousal and attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psycho!ogy, 1967, 6 (Whole No. 638). California Short-Form Mental Maturity Test. Monterey, Calif.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1957. FESTINGER, L. Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 1950, 57, 271282. FESTINCER, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 1954, 7, 117-140. (a) FESTINGER, L. Motivations leading to social behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 191-219. (b) FESTINGER, L. Conflict, decision, and dissonance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964. HAKMILLER, K. L. Threat as a determinant of downward comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 ( Supplement 1 ), 32-39. (a) HAKMILLER, K. L. Need for self-evaluation, perceived similarity and comparison choice. Journal of ExpeTimentaZ Social Psychology, 1966, 2 (Supplement l), 49-54. (b) HEIDER, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, lQ58. MORSE, S., & GERGEN, K. J. Social comparison, self-consistency, and the concept of self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 148-156. NISSEN, H. W. Comments on Dr. Festinger’s paper. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 219-223. SCHACHTER, S. The psychology of affiliation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. SINGER, J. E. Social comparison-progress and issues. Journul of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 ( Supplement 1 ), 103-110. THORTON, D. A., & ARROWOOD, A. J. Self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and the locus of social comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 (Supplement l), 4048. WHEELER, L. Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 2 (Supplement 1 ), 27-31. WHEELER, L., SHAVER, K. G., JONES, R. A., GOETHALS, G. R., COOPER, J,, ROBINSON, J. E., GRUDER, C. L., & BWIZINE, K. W. Factors determining choice of a comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 219-232. ( Received
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