- Email: [email protected]
Absenteeism, overtime, and the compressed work week
ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE
ANALYSIS ACTIONS
function, and the role of ideology in determining the utility of public goods. Needless to say, the inclusion of ideology and commitment will pose a significant problem in the estimation process, the discussion of which is outside the realm of this paper [see Shoemaker, 19821. Synthesis
Without specifying the exact form of the utility function, we may, therefore, assume it to be determined by the actor’s subjective assessment of the probability of success of the movement, the perceived private benefits of the probability of success of the movement, the perceived private benefits of a changed social structure, the perceived welfare of the group, and the cost of participation in the movement. To this we may also assume the cost of nonparticipation [Sugden, 1982; Frehlic et al., 19751. Despite some recent efforts [Muller and Opp. KarlDieter, 19861, it seems fairly obvious that it is difScult to obtain data from a real life revolutionary situation to estimate the utility functions at the micro level. Instead we will have to depend upon ex nest verification of our hypothesis based upon aggregate data and the aggregate explanation of political violence,10 which allow us to relate the above discussion with the aggregate theories of Smelser [19631 and Gurr [19701. Recalling our discussion of Smelser in Section III, we can argue that the structural conduciveness factor will primarily impact the cost of participation, since in an authoritarian regime, the cost of participation is higher than in a permissive one. The growth of generalized belief refers to people’s perception of the outcome of the movement, and as such can impact the perception of both private as well as public good resulting from the movement. The structural strain factors, by making the status quo frustrating, will add to the expectations of future benefits (both private and public) from a changed sociopolitical structure. The precipitating factors can help
OF
VIOLENT
COLLECTIVE
reinforce these future expectations by exposing the limitations of the present structure. The mobilization factor, in a fashion similar to the bandwagon effect [Leibenstein, 19761, will impact a person’s assessment of subjective probability of success of a movement. This mobilization and the lightening of an actor’s assessment of the probability of success of a movement (and a corresponding lowering of the probability of failure and getting caught) can explain the seemingly “irrational” crowd behavior painted vividly by Shakespear and reported by Le Bon [1895]. Finally, the effectiveness of social control will influence an individual’s assessment of the cost factor of participation in an antisystemic movement.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the states-of-the-art in economics, sociology, and political science have made it possible to mode1 violent collective behavior as both a product of the socioeconomic system as well as a determinant of the performance of the economy. Such an integrated approach which starts with broader behavioral assumptions than the one dimensional homeoconomicus, carries some important implications. Within the neoclassical framework a strict separation between ethics and efficiency is maintained. We submit that this schism is the result of the exclusion of antisystemic activities within the rational behavioral framework of the economic actor. Hence, without the “political man,” ethics enters into economics as an afterthought, a matter of ideological belief of the policy maker. However, in an expanded system, the separation of ethics from efficiency will be impossible since the goals of efficiency, if perceived as unethical by tbe homopoliticeconomicus, will generate conditions under which the economy will have to settle for a suboptimal solution. The study of collective violent behavior and its impact on the economy is still in its
Dipak K. Gupta
39
JOURNAL
OF BEHAVIORAL
infancy. However, the existing stock of knowledge is suflicient to imply that future research must start with an expanded behavioral assumption, which will offer economics the much needed dose of reality, and the scholars a fertile new ground for research. The author is grateful to Professors George Babilot, Roger Fran& and Richard Hattwick for their helpful comments. ***** *Dipak K. Gupta is a Professor in the School of Public Administration and Urban Studies, College of Professional Studies and Fine Arts, San Diego State University. ***** NOTES IAristotle, for example, was aware of the fact that the poor and the deprived generate political violence, while the middle class provide stability in the society [see Welldon, 19051. %mith’s optimism was tempered by Ricardo and Malthus. However, the rapid acceptance of leisez fair as the basis of the social philosophy for the social sciences in general, and the science of economics, in particular saw a conflict-free, narrowly defined scope of economics. Marshall 11920, p. 11, typified the paradigm by defining economics as merely “a study of mankind in the ordinary business life.” For a more detailed discussion, see Hirshleifer 119851. 350 strong was this moral imperative, that Marshall [1920, mathematical appendix, ibid1 refused to consider gambling behavior within the domain of economics on ethical grounds. 4It may be noted that structural functionalism has come under intense fire for ignoring individual’s arbitrations and the resulting conflict within the society.
40
Dipak
ECONOMICS
(Summer
1987)
Starting with the blustery criticism by Gouldner 119701. However, its influence in the development of present sociological thought remains substantial. For a detailed discussion of the recent development of functionalism, see Alexander [ 19851. 5For a detailed survey of empirical studies on the determinants of political violence, see Gupta [1984], and Wood and Jackson [1982]. sin fact, psychological studies [Gurr, 19701 as well as empirical evidence [Venieris and Gupta, 1983; Muller, 1985; and Gupta, 19861 point to a quadratic relationship between aggression and repression. This is because, as Gurr as argued that answer force with counter force is part of “man’s biological makeup.” However, after a point of high repression and high aggression, violence can be mitigated by the use of brutal force. But, after an extremely strong spell of repression, a sudden relaxation may expose the inability of the regime to supply repressive measures. This may lead to fullscale revolution. For excellent examples, consider the cases of the Russian [Trotsky, 19361 and Iranian [Keddie, 19811 revolutions. 7Critics have pointed out that the relationship between frustrations and aggression is not an isomorphic one, that is, existence of frustration may not always lead to aggression (as there may be other responses to frustration, such as apathy, fixation or even submission). Similarly, there can be aggression without a properly defined source of frustration. See Wood and Jackson 119821, for an excellent review. Also, for an empirical repudiation of the relative deprivation theory see Miller, Bolce, and Halligan [1977], and for a strong rebuttal see Crosby 119791. sThe fundamental behavioral precept inherent in Becker’s formulation is that an individual maximizes his utility function Zi = ffcil and subject to the budget constraint, Ci = C, where Zi’s are the utility yielding commodities and Ci’s are the individual’s
K. Gupta
ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE ANALYSIS ACTIONS
investments to the production of the Zi’s. This formulation yields the first order equilibrium condition of
afJi z=
A XX %ri=-=- &i/Xi
A MPCi
Where A is the actor’s marginal utility of investment, and MPCi is the marginal price of commodity i. Since in equilibrium, the ratio of these prices must equal the ratio of their marginal ability, it implies an inverse relationship between the relative level of consumption of a commodity i and its marginal cost of production (investment). This behavioral precept, insists Becker, is fundamental to any rational choice. sFor a detailed discussion of the expected utility models, see Shoemaker, 1982. loFor an excellent study of the process of recruitment of peasant revolutionaries in Viet Nam, see Popkin [19791, especially, Chapter 6. ***** REFERENCES 1.
Alexander, F. “The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 66,1941, pp. 505-520.
2. Alexander, J. Neo Functionalism, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985. 3. Aron, R. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1968. 4. Becker, G. The Economic Approach to Human Behauior, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 5. Crosby, F. “Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bole, and Halligan,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, March 1979, pp. 103-112.
OF VIOLENT
COLLECTIVE
6. Eliott, J.E. “Karl Marx on Last Stage of Capitalism,” Journal ofEconomic Issues, Vol. 18, June 1984. 7. Freud, S. Civilization and Its Discontents, (trans. J. Riviere) London: Hogarth Press, 1930. a. Feuer, L. The Conflict of Genrations, New York, Basic Books, 1969. 9. Frehlic, N. et al. “Individual Contributions to Collective Goods: Alternative Models,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 19, June 1975, pp. 310329. 10 Galbraith, J.K. The Age of Uncertainty, Boston: Haughton Mifflin, 1977. 11. Gouldner, A. The Coming Crisis of Westero Sociology, New York: Equinox Books, 1971. 12. Gupta, D.K. The Socioeconomic Costs of Unemployment and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Study, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 1977. and Y. Venieris, 13. --A-“Introducing New Dimensions in Macro Models: The Sociopolitical and Institutional Environment,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1981, pp. 31-58. 14. -----. “Assessing Risk in Planning: Sociopolitical Violence, Economic Development and Implications of an Integrated Model,” Managing International Development, March/April 1984, pp. 47-61. 15.
“Political Psychology and Neoclassical Economic Growth: The Possibilities and Implications of an Attempted Resynthesis,” Political Psychology, forthcoming 1987.
Dipak K. Gupta
41
JOURNAL
16.
OF BEHAVIORAL
. “On the Methodology of Constructing a Composite Indicator for Political Instability,” Unpublished paper, School of Administration, San Diego State University, 198613.
17. Gurr, T. Why Men Rebel, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University press, 1970. 18. Guttman, J.M. “Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior,” American Economic Review, Vol. 68, Papers and Proceedings, 1978, pp. 251-255. 19. Harsanyi, J.C. “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” Theory and Decision, Vol. 12, pp. 113-133.
ECONOMICS
(Summer
1987)
26. Lenin, V.I. What Is To Be Done? New York: International Publishers, 1969, Originally written in 1902. 27. Marx, K. Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts, Translated by T.B. Bottomore, pp. 85-196 in Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, New York: Frederick Unger Publishers, Originally written in 1844. 28. Margolis, H. Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 29. Marshall, A. Principles of Economics, 8th Ed., London: MacMillan, 1920.
20. Hibbert, C. The Great Mutiny: India of 1857, New York: The Viking Press, 1978.
30. Mason, T.D. “Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, pp. 1040-1056.
21. Holloway, R. “Human Aggression: The Need for a Species-SpeciBc Framework,” in F. Martin and others (eds.) The , Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression, News York: Natural History Press, 1969.
31. Miller, A., L. Bolce and M. Halligan. ‘The J-Curve Theory and Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Deprivation Theory,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, 1977, pp. 964982.
22. Keddie, N. The Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
32. Muller, E.N., and K. Opp. Karl-Dieter. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,,, American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, (2), June 1986, pp. 471487.
23. Killian, L. “Social Movements,” in R. Feris fed.1 Handbook of Modern Sociology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 426456.
33. Muth, J.F. “Rational Expectations and Theory of Price Movements,” Econometrica, 1961, pp. 413-429.
24. Le Bon, G. Psychologie des Foules 1895, Transl. as The Crowd, London: Unwin, 1954.
34. Oberschall, A. Social Conflicts and Social Movements, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973.
26. Leibenstein, H. Beyond Economic Man: a New Foundation for Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
35. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.
42
Dipak
K. Gupta
ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE
ANALYSIS ACTIONS
36. Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action, Glencoe: The Press, 1949. 37. Parsons, T. and J.J. Smelser. Economy and Society: A Study in the Zntegration of Economic and Social Theory, New York: Free Press, 1956. 38. Popkin, S.L. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Viet Nam, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 39. Sandma, A. “Capita1 Risk, Consumption, and Portfolio Choice,” Econometrica, Vol. 37, October 1969, pp. 586-599. 40. Sen, A.K. “Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 78, 1967, pp. 112-124. 41. Sherman, H. and J.L. Wood. Sociology: Traditional and Radical Perspectives, New York: Harper and Row, 1979. 42. Simon, H.A. “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 79 (21, June 1985, pp. 293-304. 43. Smelser, N.J. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: Free Press, Glencoe, 1963.
45.
“Some Additional Thoughts on Collective Behavior,” Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 42.1972, pp. 97-101.
46.
’ . (od.) Karl Marx on Society and Social Change, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1973.
47. Spencer, H. The Evolution of Society: Selections from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
VIOLENT
COLLECTIVE
48. Spencer, R. “Nature and Value of Functionalism in Anthropology,’ in D. Martindale ted.1 Functionalism in the Social Sciences, Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1965, pp. 1. 49. Stewart, D. and Y.P. Venieris. “Sociopolitical Instability and Savings Behavior,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, November 1985, pp. 557-563. 50. Sugden, R. “Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 94, December 1984, pp. 772-787. 51. Trotsky, L. The Rqjssian Revolution: The Overthrow of Zsarism and the Triumph of the Soviets, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959. 52. Venieris, Y. and D.K. Gupta. “Sociological and Economic Dimensions of Development: A Cross-Section Model,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, July 1983, pp. 727-752. “Income Distribution and 53. ---Sociopolitical Instability as Determinants of Savings: A CrossSectional Model,” Journal of Political Economy, January 1985, pp. 681-696. 54.
44.
OF
“Macro Interactions in a Social System: A Case Study of Great Britain,” Southern Economic Journal, January 1985. pp. 681-696.
55. Weisskopf, K.W. “Psychological Aspects of Economic Thought,” Journal of Political Economy, LKII, August 1949, pp. 304-314. 55. Welldon, J.E.C. The Politics of ArtsWe, New York: MacMillan, 1965. 56. Wolfenstein, E. The RevolutiaMly Personulity: Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi,
Dipak K. Gupta
43
JOURNAL
Princeton: 1967.
OF BEHAVIORAL
Princeton University
Press,
57. Wood, J.L. The Sources of American Student Activism, Lexington, MA: DC. Heath, 1974.
44
ECONOMICS
58.
(Summer
1987)
and M. Jackson. Social Movements: Development, Participation and Dynamics, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1982.
The following two articles originally appeared in earlier issues of the JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS. Unfortunately, both articles contained serious typographical errors. Therefore, the JBE is reprinting corrected versions of both articles in this issue.
45
46
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE
ANALYSIS ACTIONS
function, and the role of ideology in determining the utility of public goods. Needless to say, the inclusion of ideology and commitment will pose a significant problem in the estimation process, the discussion of which is outside the realm of this paper [see Shoemaker, 19821. Synthesis
Without specifying the exact form of the utility function, we may, therefore, assume it to be determined by the actor’s subjective assessment of the probability of success of the movement, the perceived private benefits of the probability of success of the movement, the perceived private benefits of a changed social structure, the perceived welfare of the group, and the cost of participation in the movement. To this we may also assume the cost of nonparticipation [Sugden, 1982; Frehlic et al., 19751. Despite some recent efforts [Muller and Opp. KarlDieter, 19861, it seems fairly obvious that it is difScult to obtain data from a real life revolutionary situation to estimate the utility functions at the micro level. Instead we will have to depend upon ex nest verification of our hypothesis based upon aggregate data and the aggregate explanation of political violence,10 which allow us to relate the above discussion with the aggregate theories of Smelser [19631 and Gurr [19701. Recalling our discussion of Smelser in Section III, we can argue that the structural conduciveness factor will primarily impact the cost of participation, since in an authoritarian regime, the cost of participation is higher than in a permissive one. The growth of generalized belief refers to people’s perception of the outcome of the movement, and as such can impact the perception of both private as well as public good resulting from the movement. The structural strain factors, by making the status quo frustrating, will add to the expectations of future benefits (both private and public) from a changed sociopolitical structure. The precipitating factors can help
OF
VIOLENT
COLLECTIVE
reinforce these future expectations by exposing the limitations of the present structure. The mobilization factor, in a fashion similar to the bandwagon effect [Leibenstein, 19761, will impact a person’s assessment of subjective probability of success of a movement. This mobilization and the lightening of an actor’s assessment of the probability of success of a movement (and a corresponding lowering of the probability of failure and getting caught) can explain the seemingly “irrational” crowd behavior painted vividly by Shakespear and reported by Le Bon [1895]. Finally, the effectiveness of social control will influence an individual’s assessment of the cost factor of participation in an antisystemic movement.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the states-of-the-art in economics, sociology, and political science have made it possible to mode1 violent collective behavior as both a product of the socioeconomic system as well as a determinant of the performance of the economy. Such an integrated approach which starts with broader behavioral assumptions than the one dimensional homeoconomicus, carries some important implications. Within the neoclassical framework a strict separation between ethics and efficiency is maintained. We submit that this schism is the result of the exclusion of antisystemic activities within the rational behavioral framework of the economic actor. Hence, without the “political man,” ethics enters into economics as an afterthought, a matter of ideological belief of the policy maker. However, in an expanded system, the separation of ethics from efficiency will be impossible since the goals of efficiency, if perceived as unethical by tbe homopoliticeconomicus, will generate conditions under which the economy will have to settle for a suboptimal solution. The study of collective violent behavior and its impact on the economy is still in its
Dipak K. Gupta
39
JOURNAL
OF BEHAVIORAL
infancy. However, the existing stock of knowledge is suflicient to imply that future research must start with an expanded behavioral assumption, which will offer economics the much needed dose of reality, and the scholars a fertile new ground for research. The author is grateful to Professors George Babilot, Roger Fran& and Richard Hattwick for their helpful comments. ***** *Dipak K. Gupta is a Professor in the School of Public Administration and Urban Studies, College of Professional Studies and Fine Arts, San Diego State University. ***** NOTES IAristotle, for example, was aware of the fact that the poor and the deprived generate political violence, while the middle class provide stability in the society [see Welldon, 19051. %mith’s optimism was tempered by Ricardo and Malthus. However, the rapid acceptance of leisez fair as the basis of the social philosophy for the social sciences in general, and the science of economics, in particular saw a conflict-free, narrowly defined scope of economics. Marshall 11920, p. 11, typified the paradigm by defining economics as merely “a study of mankind in the ordinary business life.” For a more detailed discussion, see Hirshleifer 119851. 350 strong was this moral imperative, that Marshall [1920, mathematical appendix, ibid1 refused to consider gambling behavior within the domain of economics on ethical grounds. 4It may be noted that structural functionalism has come under intense fire for ignoring individual’s arbitrations and the resulting conflict within the society.
40
Dipak
ECONOMICS
(Summer
1987)
Starting with the blustery criticism by Gouldner 119701. However, its influence in the development of present sociological thought remains substantial. For a detailed discussion of the recent development of functionalism, see Alexander [ 19851. 5For a detailed survey of empirical studies on the determinants of political violence, see Gupta [1984], and Wood and Jackson [1982]. sin fact, psychological studies [Gurr, 19701 as well as empirical evidence [Venieris and Gupta, 1983; Muller, 1985; and Gupta, 19861 point to a quadratic relationship between aggression and repression. This is because, as Gurr as argued that answer force with counter force is part of “man’s biological makeup.” However, after a point of high repression and high aggression, violence can be mitigated by the use of brutal force. But, after an extremely strong spell of repression, a sudden relaxation may expose the inability of the regime to supply repressive measures. This may lead to fullscale revolution. For excellent examples, consider the cases of the Russian [Trotsky, 19361 and Iranian [Keddie, 19811 revolutions. 7Critics have pointed out that the relationship between frustrations and aggression is not an isomorphic one, that is, existence of frustration may not always lead to aggression (as there may be other responses to frustration, such as apathy, fixation or even submission). Similarly, there can be aggression without a properly defined source of frustration. See Wood and Jackson 119821, for an excellent review. Also, for an empirical repudiation of the relative deprivation theory see Miller, Bolce, and Halligan [1977], and for a strong rebuttal see Crosby 119791. sThe fundamental behavioral precept inherent in Becker’s formulation is that an individual maximizes his utility function Zi = ffcil and subject to the budget constraint, Ci = C, where Zi’s are the utility yielding commodities and Ci’s are the individual’s
K. Gupta
ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE ANALYSIS ACTIONS
investments to the production of the Zi’s. This formulation yields the first order equilibrium condition of
afJi z=
A XX %ri=-=- &i/Xi
A MPCi
Where A is the actor’s marginal utility of investment, and MPCi is the marginal price of commodity i. Since in equilibrium, the ratio of these prices must equal the ratio of their marginal ability, it implies an inverse relationship between the relative level of consumption of a commodity i and its marginal cost of production (investment). This behavioral precept, insists Becker, is fundamental to any rational choice. sFor a detailed discussion of the expected utility models, see Shoemaker, 1982. loFor an excellent study of the process of recruitment of peasant revolutionaries in Viet Nam, see Popkin [19791, especially, Chapter 6. ***** REFERENCES 1.
Alexander, F. “The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 66,1941, pp. 505-520.
2. Alexander, J. Neo Functionalism, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985. 3. Aron, R. Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1968. 4. Becker, G. The Economic Approach to Human Behauior, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 5. Crosby, F. “Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to Miller, Bole, and Halligan,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, March 1979, pp. 103-112.
OF VIOLENT
COLLECTIVE
6. Eliott, J.E. “Karl Marx on Last Stage of Capitalism,” Journal ofEconomic Issues, Vol. 18, June 1984. 7. Freud, S. Civilization and Its Discontents, (trans. J. Riviere) London: Hogarth Press, 1930. a. Feuer, L. The Conflict of Genrations, New York, Basic Books, 1969. 9. Frehlic, N. et al. “Individual Contributions to Collective Goods: Alternative Models,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 19, June 1975, pp. 310329. 10 Galbraith, J.K. The Age of Uncertainty, Boston: Haughton Mifflin, 1977. 11. Gouldner, A. The Coming Crisis of Westero Sociology, New York: Equinox Books, 1971. 12. Gupta, D.K. The Socioeconomic Costs of Unemployment and Income Inequality: A Cross-National Study, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 1977. and Y. Venieris, 13. --A-“Introducing New Dimensions in Macro Models: The Sociopolitical and Institutional Environment,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1981, pp. 31-58. 14. -----. “Assessing Risk in Planning: Sociopolitical Violence, Economic Development and Implications of an Integrated Model,” Managing International Development, March/April 1984, pp. 47-61. 15.
“Political Psychology and Neoclassical Economic Growth: The Possibilities and Implications of an Attempted Resynthesis,” Political Psychology, forthcoming 1987.
Dipak K. Gupta
41
JOURNAL
16.
OF BEHAVIORAL
. “On the Methodology of Constructing a Composite Indicator for Political Instability,” Unpublished paper, School of Administration, San Diego State University, 198613.
17. Gurr, T. Why Men Rebel, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University press, 1970. 18. Guttman, J.M. “Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior,” American Economic Review, Vol. 68, Papers and Proceedings, 1978, pp. 251-255. 19. Harsanyi, J.C. “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” Theory and Decision, Vol. 12, pp. 113-133.
ECONOMICS
(Summer
1987)
26. Lenin, V.I. What Is To Be Done? New York: International Publishers, 1969, Originally written in 1902. 27. Marx, K. Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts, Translated by T.B. Bottomore, pp. 85-196 in Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, New York: Frederick Unger Publishers, Originally written in 1844. 28. Margolis, H. Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 29. Marshall, A. Principles of Economics, 8th Ed., London: MacMillan, 1920.
20. Hibbert, C. The Great Mutiny: India of 1857, New York: The Viking Press, 1978.
30. Mason, T.D. “Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, pp. 1040-1056.
21. Holloway, R. “Human Aggression: The Need for a Species-SpeciBc Framework,” in F. Martin and others (eds.) The , Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression, News York: Natural History Press, 1969.
31. Miller, A., L. Bolce and M. Halligan. ‘The J-Curve Theory and Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Deprivation Theory,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, 1977, pp. 964982.
22. Keddie, N. The Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
32. Muller, E.N., and K. Opp. Karl-Dieter. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,,, American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, (2), June 1986, pp. 471487.
23. Killian, L. “Social Movements,” in R. Feris fed.1 Handbook of Modern Sociology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 426456.
33. Muth, J.F. “Rational Expectations and Theory of Price Movements,” Econometrica, 1961, pp. 413-429.
24. Le Bon, G. Psychologie des Foules 1895, Transl. as The Crowd, London: Unwin, 1954.
34. Oberschall, A. Social Conflicts and Social Movements, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973.
26. Leibenstein, H. Beyond Economic Man: a New Foundation for Economics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
35. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.
42
Dipak
K. Gupta
ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR
AND
THE
ANALYSIS ACTIONS
36. Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action, Glencoe: The Press, 1949. 37. Parsons, T. and J.J. Smelser. Economy and Society: A Study in the Zntegration of Economic and Social Theory, New York: Free Press, 1956. 38. Popkin, S.L. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Viet Nam, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 39. Sandma, A. “Capita1 Risk, Consumption, and Portfolio Choice,” Econometrica, Vol. 37, October 1969, pp. 586-599. 40. Sen, A.K. “Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 78, 1967, pp. 112-124. 41. Sherman, H. and J.L. Wood. Sociology: Traditional and Radical Perspectives, New York: Harper and Row, 1979. 42. Simon, H.A. “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 79 (21, June 1985, pp. 293-304. 43. Smelser, N.J. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: Free Press, Glencoe, 1963.
45.
“Some Additional Thoughts on Collective Behavior,” Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 42.1972, pp. 97-101.
46.
’ . (od.) Karl Marx on Society and Social Change, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1973.
47. Spencer, H. The Evolution of Society: Selections from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
VIOLENT
COLLECTIVE
48. Spencer, R. “Nature and Value of Functionalism in Anthropology,’ in D. Martindale ted.1 Functionalism in the Social Sciences, Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1965, pp. 1. 49. Stewart, D. and Y.P. Venieris. “Sociopolitical Instability and Savings Behavior,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, November 1985, pp. 557-563. 50. Sugden, R. “Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 94, December 1984, pp. 772-787. 51. Trotsky, L. The Rqjssian Revolution: The Overthrow of Zsarism and the Triumph of the Soviets, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959. 52. Venieris, Y. and D.K. Gupta. “Sociological and Economic Dimensions of Development: A Cross-Section Model,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, July 1983, pp. 727-752. “Income Distribution and 53. ---Sociopolitical Instability as Determinants of Savings: A CrossSectional Model,” Journal of Political Economy, January 1985, pp. 681-696. 54.
44.
OF
“Macro Interactions in a Social System: A Case Study of Great Britain,” Southern Economic Journal, January 1985. pp. 681-696.
55. Weisskopf, K.W. “Psychological Aspects of Economic Thought,” Journal of Political Economy, LKII, August 1949, pp. 304-314. 55. Welldon, J.E.C. The Politics of ArtsWe, New York: MacMillan, 1965. 56. Wolfenstein, E. The RevolutiaMly Personulity: Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi,
Dipak K. Gupta
43
JOURNAL
Princeton: 1967.
OF BEHAVIORAL
Princeton University
Press,
57. Wood, J.L. The Sources of American Student Activism, Lexington, MA: DC. Heath, 1974.
44
ECONOMICS
58.
(Summer
1987)
and M. Jackson. Social Movements: Development, Participation and Dynamics, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1982.
The following two articles originally appeared in earlier issues of the JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS. Unfortunately, both articles contained serious typographical errors. Therefore, the JBE is reprinting corrected versions of both articles in this issue.
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