Accountants divided: research selectivity and academic accounting labour in UK universities

Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2000) 11, 549–582 doi: 10.1006/cpac.1999.0405 Available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

ACCOUNTANTS DIVIDED: RESEARCH SELECTIVITY AND ACADEMIC ACCOUNTING LABOUR IN UK UNIVERSITIES S ANDRA H ARLEY De Montfort University, Leicester, UK

This paper presents data from a postal survey designed to explore the impact of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) on academic accounting labour in the UK. The RAE is seen as integral to the growth of managerialism in UK higher education and to the increasing commodification of academic labour. The data indicates that academic accountants are divided in their perceptions of and reactions to the RAE. It is argued that in co-opting peer review for managerial ends, the RAE appeals to traditional academic identities, re-enforcing existing divisions within the academic accounting community and dissipating resistance to its perceived negative effects. The conclusion is that despite a significant degree of hostility to the RAE, UK accountants are themselves in large part responsible for enacting this particular managerial control strategy. In the process, there is a danger that academic accounting knowledge is being distorted, the profession divided and academics disillusioned by its power to direct what “counts” as high status academic research. c 2000 Academic Press
“Well, for a discipline dominated by critical accountants, why are we so uncritical about all of this?”

Introduction This paper reports the results of a survey of academic accountants working in UK universities, the aim of which was to investigate the impact of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) on the academic labour process in the UK.1 The paper is positioned within the general debate about the growth of managerialism in higher education and the commodification of academic labour consequent upon a government-led push for tighter monetary control over public services at a time of severe resource constraint (Willmott, 1995). In higher education, as elsewhere in the public sector in the UK, the principal control mechanisms have been the generation of increased competition amongst institutional providers in quasi-markets and the introduction of “performance indicators” to judge quality and determine funding (Farnham & Horton, 1993; Townley, 1993; Clark & Newman, 1997). We argue that Received 25 November 1998; revised 21 October 1999; accepted 30 November 1999

549 1045–2354/00/100549+34/$35.00/0

c 2000 Academic Press


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S. Harley

in the case of academic labour, the RAE achieves both these objectives under cover of peer review. First we describe the origins of research selectivity in UK universities and the institutional mechanism of the RAE, contrasting it with the system of informal peer review that previously characterised the academic labour process as a self-referring “reputationally based” work organisation (Whitley, 1986). The results of the survey of academic accountants are then presented in an effort to meet demands made by writers concerned with the commodification of academic accounting labour for more empirical investigation into its negative impact on the academic accounting profession and the production and evaluation of academic accounting knowledge (Puxty et al., 1994; Humphrey et al., 1995, 1996; Parker et al., 1998). The data indicates that whilst there is a good deal of hostility to the RAE, academic accountants are divided in their perceptions of and reactions to it, thereby dissipating active resistance. It is argued that, in co-opting peer review for managerial ends, the RAE appeals to traditional academic identities, reinforcing existing divisions within the academic (accounting) community and creating others, which did not exist before. As audit, it has been “the ultimate divide and rule technique” (Power, 1997) for UK universities in the late 20th century. The question is raised as to whether academics, who of necessity still have some operational control over the substance of their work, will summon the will to resist its disciplinary power or whether they will allow it to continue to legitimise the unequal allocation of research funds in UK universities into the 21st century. The contention is that, if the RAE is allowed to continue in its present form, there is the potential not only for further division within the academic accounting community but also distortion in the production and dissemination of academic accounting knowledge. The implication is that this can be avoided if there is a return to some form of the status quo ante, whereby funds for research are built into the unit cost per student on the assumption that the opportunity to engage in both research and scholarship should be available to all academics who teach in higher education if there is not to emerge a self-perpetuating elite of gatekeepers within the profession employed in equally elitist institutions.

The Commodification of Academic Accounting Research Until the early eighties, public funding for research in UK universities was based on a system of “dual funding” (Halsey, 1992) whereby monies were made available from the government funding councils built into funds per student on the grounds that all academics were contractually obliged to engage in some sort of research and scholarly activity, and upon successful application to the Research Councils for a grant to pursue a particular project. The underlying “equity principle” demanded that all universities had a more or less equal right to funding council research monies on the grounds of the historic unity of teaching and research. Massive cuts in university expenditure, however, raised doubts as to whether it was practicable for all university departments to engage in research of the highest standard, especially in the natural sciences where expensive equipment was needed. Consequently, the

Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour

551

principle of “research selectivity” was put forward by the University Grants Committee (the body responsible for distributing the funds at that time) and accepted, somewhat reluctantly, by the university authorities as a means of securing adequate funding for those pursuing the best research in their field. The first Research Selectivity Exercise (later to become the RAE) was carried out in 1986, a somewhat ad hoc affair with only a small proportion of funding council research funds (14%) dependent upon the deliberations of hurriedly appointed assessors. In 1989 a rather larger proportion of funding (30%) was dependent upon the judgement of formally constituted “subject panels”, membership of which was meant to reflect a breadth of knowledge and experience sufficient to place the relevant university departments on a five-point scale according to their judgement of the quality of research submitted. In 1992, all of a university department’s money for research coming from the funding councils came to depend on the subject panel’s assessment and that money had now to be shared with the ex-polytechnics, which had been recently incorporated as universities. By the time of the 1996 exercise, the immediate context of the research reported here, UK universities were competing for a bigger slice of an ever diminishing cake, with even greater differentiation between departments on a seven point scale, which now distinguished between a “3A” and “3B” rating as well as a adding a “5∗ ” category. It was also possible for subject panels to “flag” particular strengths within a given department as being outstanding in relation to others. At the time of writing, UK universities are preparing for the next RAE in the year 2001. 2 Academic communities have traditionally been more or less self-referring with a high degree of professional control over research priorities and goals as well as the “reputational systems” (Whitley, 1986) created by them. In this sense research productivity and quality judged by peer review has long been central to academic work. What has changed is the institutional context in which peer review takes place and the governmental, hierarchical and bureaucratic controls to which it is now subject. Informal peer review based on established intellectual authority relations within a given discipline is very different from that which is externally imposed for funding purposes. 3 . The collegiate, self-referring quality of peer review has been harnessed to managerial ends through a research selectivity exercise designed to distribute research funds unequally between different university departments in a given subject area according to the panel’s assessment of their degree of “excellence”. As such, the RAE has come to dominate university research activity in the UK over the last decade. Halsey (1992, p. 189) describes it as a “dramatic moment in the decline of donnish dominion” and the educational press has reported that the funding councils have considered making funds for teaching as well as research dependent on audit as this has proved such a “powerful mechanism for steering institutions’ behaviour” (Times Higher Education Supplement, Dec. 8, 1995). Where academic accounting labour is concerned, Puxty et al. (1994, pp. 142–3) note considerably increased research output in recent years, especially amongst “premier” research departments (defined as those then ranked 3, 4 or 5 in the 1992 RAE) and Humphrey et al. (1996, p. 141) tell us that “research selectivity exercises have played an increasingly influential role in defining the meaning of life in British university accounting departments”. Parker et al. (1998) note an “obsession” with

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research on the part of senior academics or “gatekeepers” within the profession, particularly with its measurable output in terms of publications in high status refereed journals. All these writers would agree with Willmott (1995, 1998) that academic research in the UK has become increasingly commodified and that the RAE has been central to this commodification process. As the unit of resource continues to be cut and institutions are forced to compete for a greater proportion of their funding, institutional managers become increasingly concerned with the exchange value of their “product” in terms of its ability to attract either research funding or fee-paying “customers”, once known as students. Pressure is put on individual academics, research groups and even whole departments to produce more where it is believed to count most for ranking purposes. 4 Where academic accounting labour is concerned, Puxty et al. (1994, p. 159) argue that academic accountants themselves “are now commodified as more or less productive achievers of research rankings”. Writing in 1994, they leave open the degree to which this drive will be realised, pointing to the possible unintended consequences of commodification in terms of a dilution of standards, the intensification of academic labour and more general disaffection and demoralisation of academic staff. In addition to the above concerns, Humphrey et al. (1996) fear the breakdown of the collegiate ideal in the face of the individual pursuit of self-interest on the part of career-minded academics anxious for promotion and willing to sell themselves to the highest bidders. Parker et al.’s (1998) particular concern is with the definition of what constitutes high status academic accounting knowledge on the part of senior academics whose social constructions as to what constitutes “quality” research impacts not only on individual career prospects but also on the production and evaluation of academic accounting knowledge. They argue that what counts as “real” academic accounting knowledge is that which is publishable in a tacit hierarchy of elite journals. Dominelli & Hoogvelt (1996) go further and argue more generally that the RAE is destroying academic freedom and the potential of “counter-hegemonic intellectuals” to challenge the ideological status quo. This it does without recourse to overt ideological or political manipulation but through financial and economic incentives. “The government,” they tell us, “has tackled the problem of controlling its intellectual elite by subjecting universities to quasi-market disciplines” (Dominelli & Hoogvelt, 1996, p. 192). The strong implication is that the academic community is both victim and perpetrator of the commodification process. For this reason, all consider the issues raised by the operation of the RAE important enough to warrant further empirical investigation in the hope of exposing “its numerous contradictions and paradoxical consequences” (Puxty et al., 1994). It was in that spirit that the present survey was carried out. 5

The Sample The mailing list for the survey was taken from listings in the Universities Commonwealth Yearbook and the questionnaires were sent out in January, 1997, which was a month after the results of the 1996 RAE had been made public. A one in two sample of academics was taken from departments which could be identified

553

Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour Table 1 Proportions of staff in senior posts in the old and the new universities Old universities Post Professor/Head of Dept Reader Senior Lecturer (old)/ Principal Lecturer (new) Non-senior posts Total

New universities

n

(%)

n

(%)

29 3 25

32.6 3.3 28.1

10 2

9.2 1.8

32

36.0

28 70

24.6 61.4

100.0

110

89

=

=

100.0

Table 2 Staff by length of time working in higher education Old universities Time in HE 5 years or less 6–10 years 11–15 years 16–20 years 20 years plus Total

New universities

n

(%)

n

(%)

6 24 17 19 31

6.2 24.7 17.5 19.6 32.0

24 34 19 16 21

21.1 29.8 16.7 14.0 18.4

100.0

114

97

=

=

100.0

as Accounting and Finance Departments and from Business Schools where they could not. We estimate that about 400 questionnaires reached accountants working in both the old and the new universities (ex-polytechnics) in the UK. We received 212 replies from respondents who when asked their discipline said that they worked within accounting and/or finance. Forty-five institutions were represented, of which 27 were “old” universities and 18 were “new”. Ninety-seven respondents could be identified as working in the “old” universities and 114 in the “new”. Of the respondents from the old universities, 64% held promoted posts (senior lecturer and above) and within this category there were 29 who were professors and/or heads of department. Thirty-six per cent of respondents from the new universities held promoted posts (principal lecturer and above) of whom 10 were professors and/or heads of department (see Table 1). Table 2 shows that greater seniority of staff in the old universities was reflected in the longer time they had spent working in higher education compared with their colleagues in the new universities. Fifty-two per cent of staff in the old universities had been working in higher education for more than 15 years compared with 32% in the new universities. This means that at the time or the survey just over half of old university staff had been working in UK higher education since before the date of the first RAE (1986). In comparison, about four-fifths of new university staff would have been in post before the polytechnics were incorporated as universities and the RAE applied to them (1992). As was to be expected given their different history and culture, there was an asymmetry in RAE ratings between the old universities with relatively well estab-

554

S. Harley Table 3 Staff by 1996 RAE departmental rating Old universities

New universities

Departmental rating

n

(%)

n

(%)

5∗

17 20 41 11 5 0 0 0 3

17.5 20.6 42.3 11.3 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1

0 0 0 15 33 17 8 35 6

0.0 0.0 0.0 13.2 28.9 14.9 7.0 30.7 5.3

100.0

114

5 4 3a 3b 2 1 Did not submit Don’t know Total

97

=

=

100.0

lished research cultures and the new universities often struggling to take off from a zero or near zero research base. Table 3 shows the number of staff in differently rated departments in both the old and the new universities. Eighty-five per cent of respondents from the old universities were working in departments ranked “4” and above whilst no respondents from the new universities found themselves in departments ranked higher than “3A”. Thirty-one per cent of respondents from the new universities were in departments that did not make any submission at all to the RAE.6 Despite the wide spread of respondents, we do not wish to claim that our sample is representative of the total population of academic accountants in the UK in any strict statistical sense. As with any postal survey, it is possible that the returns overrepresent those with the strongest feelings about the RAE as they would be the most likely to respond. It is also possible that those who responded were those who felt the most aggrieved, though it was apparent from the responses that there were many, especially professors and heads of high ranking departments, but not exclusively so, who felt similarly moved to defend the exercise.7 The aim of the research was not to generate generalisable statistical outcomes in any positivistic sense but to understand the felt impact of research selectivity from the perspectives of those concerned. The questionnaire was for the most part open ended, designed to prompt as many academics as possible to say what they believed to be the effect of the RAE on their discipline, their departments and themselves. This was particularly important given claims by policy-makers, institutional managements and academic gatekeepers that the RAE has now become an acceptable part of academic life. It was thought that there might be a set of stories to be told about the RAE alternative to those deriving from positions of power and influence. The intention was to examine the extent to which this might be true by accessing the subjectivity of a broad range of academics at the sharp end of research selectivity enabling them, through the survey, to find a “voice” (Power, 1997; Rustin, 1998). From this point of view, as long as they are not atypical, the significance of statements made by respondents to questionnaires is never strictly proportional to their number.

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Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour Table 4 Perceived changes in recruitment and selection of staff In discipline Old universities

In department

New universities

Old universities

New universities

Perceived Change

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(0%)

Yes No Not sure

87 10 0

89.7 10.3 0.0

102 12 0

89.5 10.5 0.0

82 12 3

84.5 12.4 3.1

79 20 15

69.3 17.5 21.2

Total

97

100.0

114

100.0

97

100.0

114

=

=

=

=

100.0

The Data A central hypothesis of the research was that the need to secure research funding through the institutional mechanism of the RAE has meant that research is being privileged over other aspects of an academic’s role and that there is pressure on academics not only to publish, but to publish more where it is believed to count most for ranking purposes. When respondents were asked whether they perceived any changes in recruitment and selection in their discipline in recent years, 90 per cent of respondents (N = 189) believed that there had been changes and threequarters of these (N = 138) believed them to be directly consequent upon the RAE. A further nine respondents believed that the changes had been partly due to the RAE and 22 were not sure. Only 14 out of the 189 accountants who perceived change believed that the RAE was not at all responsible. Furthermore, there was almost no difference between the old and the new universities in the degree to which change was perceived. Closer to home, when asked directly whether they thought the RAEs had had any influence on recruitment and selection in their departments, 85 per cent of respondents working in the old universities (N = 82) and 70 per cent of those in the new (N = 79) believed that they had (see Table 4). When presented with a list of possible types of change in both their disciplines generally and in their own departments, on both counts the vast majority who perceived change believed it to constitute a greater concentration on the sort of criteria assumed to gain high ratings in the periodic assessment exercises. These were overwhelmingly thought to be a greater emphasis on research and publication generally, and in some cases on particular types of research (variously described as abstract/theoretical/academic) and publication (in refereed/top class/international/US journals). A correspondingly large number of academic accountants also believed that the RAE had had an effect on the work of their departments, 88 per cent of respondents (N = 84) in the old universities and 70 per cent in the new (N = 79) attributing change directly to the impact of the RAE. A large majority of the sample was therefore agreed that the RAE had had an impact both on their discipline and on their own working lives. Where there was less agreement was on whether this impact was a good or a bad thing. There were four open-ended questions on the questionnaire that gave respondents the opportunity

556

S. Harley Table 5 Feelings about perceived changes in discipline Old universities Feelings about change

New universities

n

(%)

n

(%)

Good Good and bad Bad

23 10 35

33.8 14.7 51.5

27 13 39

34.2 16.5 49.4

Total

68

100.0

79

=

=

100.0

to register their feelings about the exercise. The first asked them directly how they felt about any changes they perceived in their discipline; the second asked them what type of influence they thought the RAE had had on the work of their department; and the third what influence the RAE had had on their own work. The last question on the questionnaire asked whether they had any further comments they would like to add. Where a respondent’s feelings about the RAE could not be elicited from their response to the first open-ended question, which was sometimes the case for those who were broadly in favour of the RAE, their response to the other open-ended questions was taken into account.8 Thirty-four per cent of the respondents who gave a definite opinion (N = 50) felt that they were good or predominantly good; 15 per cent felt that they were both good and bad (N = 23); and 50 per cent felt they were unequivocally bad (N = 74). There was very little difference in the spread of feelings about change between the old and the new universities (see Table 5). The biggest variations in the survey were found in the influence of rating of department and rank of academic on feelings about change. Table 6 shows that in the old universities those located in the highest 5∗ ranking departments were considerably less likely to be unhappy about the changes taking place than those located in the lower ranking departments (though it is interesting to note that 5 ranking departments were no more likely to be happy than lower rated departments, presumably because of the additional differentiation introduced between them and the elite 5∗ ratings in the 1996 exercise). This was a pattern repeated in the larger data-set (comprising sociologists, psychologists and marketers as well as accountants), where the numbers were sufficient to show a statistical significance at both the five per cent and one per cent levels. There was a similar relationship between departmental ranking and dissatisfaction in the new universities, with the highest ranked departments (3A) being the least unhappy although satisfaction in these departments was tempered by a certain degree of ambivalence, making the numbers of staff unconditionally happy with the exercise higher in the lower rated 3B category. Again this pattern was repeated in the larger data-set, where the numbers were sufficient to show a level of significance at the five per cent level. Table 7 shows that professors and heads of department were considerably more likely than other members of staff to be happy with RAE-led changes and that this relationship was even more marked in the old universities than in the new, a pattern of response that was again repeated in the larger data-set and also significant at both the five per cent and one per cent levels.9 The length of time accounting academics had been working in higher education also had an impact on feelings about RAE-led change but the impact was in a different

557

Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour Table 6 Feelings about change in discipline by department rating Departmental rating 3B/3A/4 n (%)

Feelings about change Good Good and bad Bad Total

=

Old universities 5 n (%)

n

(%)

26.7 13.3 60.0

8 3 3

34.8 21.4 21.4

100.0

14

100.0

11 5 21

29.7 13.5 56.8

4 2 9

37

100.0

15

=

5∗

New universities didn’t submit/1/2

Good Good and bad Bad Total

=

3B

3A

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

11 3 22 36

30.6 8.3 61.1 100.0

11 1 12 24

45.8 4.2 50.0 100.0

5 4 5 14

35.7 28.6 35.7 100.0

Table 7 Feelings about RAE-led change in discipline by job grade Old universities

New universities Job grade

Prof/ HoD Feelings about change

Other post

Prof/ HoD

Other post

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

Good Good and bad Bad

12 3 6

57.1 14.3 28.6

9 6 13

21.4 14.3 64.3

4 2 2

50.0 25.0 25.0

22 11 37

31.4 15.7 52.9

Total

21 = 100.0

42 = 100.0

8 = 100.0

70 = 100.0

direction in the two types of institution. In the new universities 40 per cent of those who had been working in higher education for less than 15 years were happy as opposed to 24 per cent of those who had been working for more than 15 years. In the old universities the respective values were 20 per cent for those working in higher education for less than 15 years and 45 per cent for those with the greater length of service (see Table 8) Some of this difference can be explained by the larger numbers of staff in the sample from the old universities who were in senior positions (see Table 7 above) but it is also likely that some of the difference in direction of response can be explained by the different histories and culture of the two types of institution. Business-related disciplines in the new universities would have had very little experience of academic research before their incorporation as universities and subsequent access to RAE funds. The emphasis in the new universities was on teaching and consultancy with

558

S. Harley Table 8 Feelings about change in discipline by length of service in higher education Old universities

New universities Length of service

Feelings about change

under 15 years

Good Good and bad Bad

over 15 years

under 15 years

over 15 years

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

6 3 21

20.0 10.0 70.0

17 7 14

44.7 18.5 36.8

20 8 22

40.0 16.0 44.0

7 5 17

24.1 17.2 58.7

Total 30 =

100.0

38 =

100.0

50 = 100.0

29 =

100.0

Table 9 Changed own work to fit in with RAE demands Old universities

New universities

n

%

n

%

Yes No Not sure

60 32 4

62.5 33.3 4.2

58 50 5

51.3 44.2 4.5

Total

96

100.0

113

=

=

100.0

the majority of staff recruited as practitioners. Members of staff recruited during this period would be the ones most unhappy with changes that emphasised academic research and publication as they would lack the necessary skills and knowledge to meet the new demands placed on them whilst younger members of staff in the new universities might see the RAE as presenting the first real opportunity to engage in academic research and might in fact have been recruited specifically to raise their department’s research profile. On the other hand, younger academics in old university departments in search of the highest ratings might be under the most pressure to perform, to produce more, possibly different, research to a tighter timescale. Indeed, it did seem that pressure to comply with the demands of the RAE were generally greater in the old universities than in the new. When asked whether the RAE had influenced their own work in any way, rather more respondents in the old universities said that they had changed the direction of their work to fit in with the perceived demands of the RAE than in the new (see Table 9) and this was despite the fact that many in the old universities would have been doing the sort of work necessary to gain a high ranking in any case. Three out of the 43 academic accountants in the new universities who gave a reason for not changing the direction of their work said it was because they were already doing what was necessary to obtain a high rating as opposed to 27 who said that it was because they were primarily involved in teaching and/or administration. Seventeen out of the 26 in the old universities who gave a reason for not changing the direction of their work said it was because they were already doing what was

559

Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour Table 10 Perceived positive effects of RAE on discipline Old universities

Increased research Better research Helps focus teaching Selectivity a good thing Division of labour a good thing Accountability a good thing Total

New universities

n

%

n

%

12 4 1 1 0 2 20

60.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 10.0 100.0

12 0 4 1 1 1 19

63.2 0.0 21.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 100.0

=

=

necessary to gain a high rating. On the other hand, only six out of 26 respondents from the old universities said they had not changed the direction of their work because they were involved primarily in teaching and administration. Finally, as many as threequarters of those in the old universities who said they were unhappy about the RAE’s impact on their discipline had changed the direction of their own work to fit in with its perceived demands. This applied to 38 per cent of those who disapproved of its impact in the new universities.

The Benefits It is clear from the above that whilst senior academics in high ranking departments were, not surprisingly, more likely to view research selectivity positively, there were others less obviously privileged who also approved of it. Furthermore, many of those who were in principle hostile nevertheless in practice complied with its demands. Analysis of responses to the open-ended questions on the questionnaire would indicate that the disciplinary power of the assessment exercises has derived not only from straightforward financial and economic incentives (Dominelli & Hoogvelt, 1996), significant though they might be, but also from the opportunity they present to secure or reaffirm status within the “reputational system” (Whitley, 1986) of the discipline they represent. The rewards are both material and symbolic, striking at the very heart of traditional academic identity and culture. This is well illustrated by the academic accountants who approved of them. By far the biggest stated reason (N = 28) given by those who approved of the impact of the RAE’s on their discipline revolved around the positive impact it was felt to have had on research, an activity central to academic identity and the one whereby reputations are established in the wider academic community (see Table 10). The greater emphasis on research and publication was seen by those who approved as an indication that their discipline was “maturing”, by which was meant beginning to look like a “real” academic discipline rather than a low status vocational subject, a direction some believed would have been taken in any case regardless of the RAE. Take for example the following responses from accountants in the traditional pre-1992 universities where research had been longer established than in the new:

560

S. Harley Table 11 Perceived positive effects of RAE on own department Old universities

New universities

n

%

n

%

Increased research Increased publication Target research/journals Makes some people work harder Division of labour a good thing

14 11 11 6 4

30.3 23.9 23.9 13.2 8.7

26 11 3 0 5

57.8 24.4 6.7 0.0 11.1

Total

46

100.0

45

=

=

100.0

They have led to a systematic improvement in UK Accounting research. (Professor, old university, 5 rating) They have established research as an essential academic activity. I approve. (Professor, old university, 4 rating) I think we should welcome the RAE. Research is an important part of university work and league tables (in spite of their many defects) are useful indicators of quality. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)

The perceived positive effects of the RAE on the development of accounting as an academic discipline generally were mirrored in the reasons why accountants approved of the RAE’s impact on the work of their own department. As might be expected, given the historic mission of the ex-polytechnics as teaching institutions, rather more academics in the new universities mentioned increased research per se as a positive impact on departmental work than in the old where a research culture, even in business-related disciplines, was more likely to be established. Accounting researchers within the new universities felt that the RAE enabled them to secure a recognition for their work that might not otherwise have been forthcoming: (I feel) very positively. My first HE post was in a polytechnic where research was neglected and regarded with suspicion. Without the RAE this would still be the case. The methodology can be criticised in detail, but it has increased the influence and career prospects of research active staff in ways which would not have otherwise occurred. (Professor, old university, 4 rating) Positive shift to provide resources to support research (Head of Dept, new university, did not submit) Acknowledgement of the need to free up time to do research (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3B rating) The RAE has made research a respectable activity in the new universities. (Lecturer, new university, 2 rating) I support the higher profile given to research in an institution which would like to be teaching only. (Senior Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

In the old universities, it was the increased pressure to publish research, especially in high status refereed journals, more than the opportunity to do it per se, which was seen to be a good thing:

Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour

561

Greater reliance on quantitative research methods and more emphasis on publication in leading journals a good thing (Professor, old university, 5 rating)

And others (N = 5) explicitly defended the RAE in terms of the traditional unity of teaching and research: Has helped improve the quality of teaching through in-depth coverage. (Professor, new university, 3B rating) The quality of research has improved steadily and this has benefited our teaching also. (Professor, old university, 5 rating)

Finally, some respondents, especially professors and heads in old university departments, were pleased that the RAE at last gave the opportunity for the obligation on academics to do research to be enforced, thus enabling them to fulfil their managerial role more effectively: It is helping to focus academic work and shake some of the “time-servers” out of the system. (Professor, old university, 4 rating) Non-researchers can’t hide. (Professor, old university, 4 rating)

whilst other believed that it was only right that academics, being public employees, should be subject to greater public accountability in the fulfilment of their role: The taxpayer has the right to make academics accountable. (Professor, old university, 4 rating)

Despite the fact that it was generally agreed that promotion and selection depended heavily on research performativity and that over half of our respondents (N = 118) admitted to changing the direction of their own work to fit in with the RAE’s perceived demands, only one respondent in favour of the research assessment exercise was prepared to admit that in increasing their research activity they were looking after their more immediate self-interest: Relevance is if I want to move job rather than current job. Need to produce more articles. (Lecturer, new university, 3B rating)

even though the degree to which the RAE was felt to encourage the pursuit of individual self-interest was a major source of complaint on the part of those against.

The Costs It is clear that many of the efforts to increase research and publication brought the desired results in terms of a higher rating. Almost 70 per cent of our respondents found themselves in departments that had increased their rating in the 1996 exercise, a further 22 per cent were in departments that had stayed the same and 6 per

562

S. Harley

cent were working in departments that had gone down (the few remaining did not know).10 What those against the RAE objected to was the degree of emphasis now placed on these activities together with constraints on the type of research activity and publication that were valued. They felt their discipline distorted, their profession divided and themselves disillusioned by it. This discontent was often expressed in terms of what was thought to be an unacceptable intensification of academic labour and increased managerial surveillance and control. Take for example the pattern of response from an accounting department in an old university whose rating had gone up from a “2” to a “4” between the 1992 and 1996 exercises. Out of eight responses, four were professors and all of these were in favour of the exercise on the grounds that the RAE was good for research and research was good for the discipline. The attitudes of other members of staff in the department were rather more hostile: I am no longer motivated to compete on the current culture’s terms, (but) there is greater interference under the guise of staff appraisal. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) Given that my discipline is vocational, I think the emphasis on academic publications almost to the exclusion of professional journals is regrettable. . . research has become more important relative to teaching. (The RAE) encourages short-termism. Our dept. bought in two professors at a premium because they had good quality journals in the period. One has since left already. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) (I am) disappointed. Quality professionals will not be employable because of lack of publication no matter how knowledgeable and experienced. . . it has encouraged the pursuit of self-interest. No concern for the department. Just sort the CV. . . I have 15 years commercial/professional experience and an FCA. 5 years ago I was encouraged to join the academic world—this would no longer be the case today. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) Greater emphasis on quick publications (often quantitative) and refereed publications. (Books, especially text-books, don’t count). Desire for young and active or “high flyers” with a reputation AND 4 RAE papers. Buying in staff just pre-RAE leading to too many “professors” some of whom are weak. I am no longer allowed to do the research that I want to and instead have to do much more teaching. Staff are also being victimised/bullied. There is no longer any “academic freedom”. Managerialism and dictatorship on rule. It should be discontinued. It is divisive both within and between institutions, and will lead to a long-term decline in the standard of UK research. . . Research relies on co-operation and communication of ideas AND on risk-taking innovation. The current RAE process leads to the breakdown of communications, secrecy and low-risk, low quality research. (Lecturer, old university 4 rating)

Out of eight respondents in a new university business school that had gone up from a “1” to a “3A” not one was in favour. As an ex-poly we are/were a teaching establishment with some research. We are being forced into becoming a research establishment with some teaching. (Principal Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) More teaching work for those not involved in research. More money spent on research staff therefore less available for other purposes. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

563

Research Selectivity and Academic Accounting Labour Table 12 Perceived negative effects of RAE on discipline Old universities

Quantity not quality Too academic Only what’s publishable Neglects teaching Overwork/stress Managerialism/control Divisive of staff total

New universities

n

%

n

%

11 12 10 6 4 2 2 47

22.4 24.5 20.4 12.2 8.2 4.1 4.1 100.0

5 5 2 25 6 6 6 51

9.8 9.8 3.9 49.0 11.8 4.0 3.9 100.0

=

=

Table 13 Perceived negative effects of RAE on department Old universities

New universities

n

%

n

%

Too much emphasis on research Too much emphasis on publication Few risks/no creativity Teaching suffers Divisive of colleagues Pressure/overwork

5 19 4 11 12 3

9.3 35.2 7.4 20.4 22.2 5.5

16 7 3 8 9 6

32.7 14.3 6.1 16.3 18.4 12.2

Total

54

100.0

49

=

=

100.0

More work, having to cover for staff doing research coupled with higher student numbers. Pressure now intense on “teaching” staff. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

In fact, despite its history as a “fledgling academic discipline” (Humphrey et al., 1995), the research untapped a stream of hostility towards the RAE amongst academic accountants who were against the RAE not dissimilar to that found amongst other, more established, social science disciplines (Harley & Lee, 1997; Harley & Lowe, 1998).11 As with the other disciplines, it was verbalised in terms of what was perceived to be interference in the academics’ traditional freedom to set their own research agenda, to produce the knowledge which they considered important and to disseminate it in the way that they saw fit. There were similar concerns about the RAE’s effect on the quality of research being produced as well as its divisive impact upon the collegiate ideal. Last but not least, there was concern about its negative impact on teaching, especially, but not exclusively, in the new universities. Tables 12 and 13 summarise the negative responses to the open-ended question asking accountants how they felt about changes in their discipline in general and on the work of their departments in particular consequent upon the RAEs. Whilst the differences of emphasis between the two types of institution were to be expected given their different histories and culture, the types of concern taken as a whole were surprisingly similar. As too was the strength of feeling expressed by those against.

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The Price of Everything Thompson (1990) argues that central to the analysis of any labour process is the indeterminacy of labour potential in the production of exchange rather than use value; in other words, the commodification of labour, where production is not for intrinsic worth but for profit. In the case of academic labour, the production and dissemination of academic knowledge is subordinated to the institutional need to secure funding (Puxty et al., 1994; Willmott, 1995) and/or the individual desire to secure a career (Lee, 1995). The result, it is argued, is the mass product of research for a rating which is more important than what is produced: Simplistic measurement processes now drive HE funding. Currently academia accepts this—a sad comment on the state of British higher education (Lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating) Publication has taken priority over research (Senior Lecturer, old university, 3B rating) Good quality publications are essentially taken to be anything that scores points (Senior Lecturer, new university, 2 rating) More pressure to publish a certain kind of research (that which pays RAE-wise!) (Professor, old university, 5 rating) Research has to be directed at refereed publications and in sufficient volume to count (Professor, old university, 4 rating)

What those in favour of the RAE saw as the elevation of academic accounting knowledge through targeting prestige journals and concentration of effort, those who were against saw as the distortion of accounting knowledge and of the traditional accounting academic’s role. In the days before the RAE, informal peer review, for all its weaknesses, left space for the pursuit of independent and critical scholarship, at least until the point of publication. A centrally organised and bureaucratically controlled ranking system designed for funding purposes, however, “colonises” that space and subjects it to “a disciplinary project of classification, categorisation and assessment” (Hillyard & Sim, 1997, p. 10). This would seem to be particularly true of paradigm-bound “normal science” (Kuhn, 1970) such as economics and psychology (Lee & Harley, 1998a; Harley & Lowe, 1998) where a number of high status, mainstream journals can come to dominate the field. Surprisingly, however, academic accountancy, with its much less established research tradition and characterisation as “a low paradigm consensus field” (Lee, 1995, p. 257), did not seem to be exempt from this process. Reference was made by our respondents to the way in which the need to target what were variously referred to as “high status”, “quality”, “top”, “international”, “US” or “prestige” journals was fixing the research agenda, restricting the range of research being undertaken and misdirecting research efforts:12 It forces you to concentrate on publishable research in the “right” journals rather than on research that “you” want to do. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 3B rating) Emphasis on journal articles rather than books inappropriate for legal issues in finance, my area of specialism.

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(Professor, old university, 5 rating) Journals listed as “top” journals for RAE define types of research: statistically based stock markets. I use qualitative research methods on unusual topics—this has been under pressure. Ends of the RAE are shaping the research agenda. (Lecturer, old university, 5 rating) Publication in top US journals, concentration on particular types of research—econometric (capital markets) take away European focus. (Lecturer, old university, 5 rating) Shift to empirical research where publication in top journals is relatively easier (Senior Lecturer, old university, 3B rating)

Zeff (1989, p. 169) has argued that “an unmistakable trend in US accounting research during the past 25 years has been the increasing use of formal empiricism and mathematical model-building.” From comments made by the UK accountants in our sample, this would now seem to be increasingly the case in UK accounting research, too. Of those who mentioned this trend, the majority disapproved, but there were several professors and heads of high ranking departments who thought the greater reliance on quantitative research methods and more emphasis on publication in leading journals was a good thing. From that point of view, said one professor in a high ranking department, the RAE merely reflected changes in thinking within a discipline struggling to establish an academic identity. Similarly the “greater distance between the academic discipline and professional experience” brought about by the emphasis on publication in leading journals was felt by another to reflect “long-standing attitudes within the profession as well as changes in academe.” Those who objected to these trends were not as convinced that the RAE was quite so neutral an instrument. They feared that the combination of peer review and research selectivity had produced a mechanism that, because of its control over monies for research coming directly from the funding councils, had the power to direct the bulk of accounting research being carried out and to institutionalise the divisions that already existed within the profession, making them even more difficult to break down. In this sense, the RAE, like other forms of external audit, stands accused not of reflecting but of distorting the reality it is meant to monitor, leading to demoralisation and demotivation amongst those who disagree with or are disadvantaged by the process (Power, 1997): If you make rules, people will play to win according to the rules so changing/distorting their behaviour. (Professor, old university, 5 rating)

Academics versus Practitioners When asked how they felt about recent trends in their profession, a number of the accountants in our sample (N = 25) explicitly expressed a concern that the search for publication in high status academic journals had occasioned a move away from the publication of professionally relevant and accessible research.(12) This disquiet was by no means confined to the more vocationally oriented, lower- or non-rated departments in the new universities, but found expression throughout:

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S. Harley I am totally demotivated as far as any sort of writing is concerned. Only activity which counts in the RAE is valued although I personally feel that other types of writing is valid. In my discipline I think writing for professional journals should be valued as accountancy is a profession. (Senior Lecturer, old university, rating unknown) Accounting academe is moving further away from the profession of accounting as a result of the accounting journals becoming more and more academic. (Professor, old university, 5 rating) Fifteen years ago in the profession, staff felt that the ABR was of minimal interest–today it is doubtful if they could even understand it. The danger is that the RAEs give money for academic research ignoring any value to the profession who need accessible research. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 5 rating)

The emphasis on high status publications in prestigious journals was thought to reinforce an academic–practitioner divide, which was greatly regretted by some. A symptom of this growing divide was the increased tendency to appoint applicants with doctorates, especially in the old universities where the pressure to obtain a high rating was greatest: Quality professionals will not be employable because of the lack of publication no matter how knowledgeable and experienced they are. I have 15 commercial/professional years experience and an FCA. 5 years ago I was encouraged to join the academic world, this would no longer be the case today. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) Move towards recruiting PhD. . . Increasing perceived irrelevance of professional accounting qualifications, particularly for promoted posts. When I was a student I was told (mid-70s) that the only way to get a job teaching accountancy in a university was to get a professional qualification and 3 or 4 years experience working in industry. Neither seems very important now. (Professor, old university, 3A rating) A PhD. not originally a necessary qualification for an academic staff member in my subject. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)

Whilst professional bodies might fund research into the “real issues facing the discipline”, academic accounting departments knew exactly what was expected of them to achieve a high rating in the RAE, as witnessed by the response from a top 5∗ Finance and Accounting Department: The department is focused almost totally on “pure”, “academic” research. Contacts with the profession have diminished. Little applied research is undertaken. I have cut back on company specific research and consultancy in order to generate more research in academic journals. The RAE has provided a motivation for many departments to choose between research and teaching. We took the decision to establish ourselves as a leading research department. We have had a significant turnover of staff in the last 2 years as less committed researchers have moved on to be replaced by good, proven and potential researchers. The cost has been a fall in the quality of our teaching and the loss of some experienced staff with good professional and industrial contacts. The RAE encouraged the decision and, for us, it has been the right one, but I am convinced our students have suffered. (Senior lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)

and they pursued their goal with a brutality once alien to the academic community:

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Research is not an option for staff. They must deliver. Also, individual failure has collective repercussions so low research performance must be assisted (or dealt with). (Professor, old university, 5∗ rating) One particular benefit has been that it has forced staff over 45 to either increase their commitment to research or take early retirement thereby making way for younger talent. (Professor, old university, 5∗ rating)

Thus the unequal power relations inherent in the employment relationship of even this “key profession” (Perkin, 1969) are articulated in terms of and legitimated by the demands made by the RAE, and the discourse of peer review, in theory democratic and consensual, becomes inextricably linked with its original managerialist intent to intensify academic labour and bring it under greater surveillance and control. The irony is that the senior academics who defend it the most on academic grounds are often the line managers whose hierarchical power is thereby increased, a point not lost on some respondents: (The RAE) has exacerbated the dictatorial way in which universities are now managed. (Lecturer, old university, 3A rating)

Research-Active Staff versus Teaching Staff The divisions perceived to have grown up between academics and practitioners in academic accounting were sometimes expressed in terms of a felt division between those who did research and those who taught (N = 36) and/or the lesser value felt to be accorded to the act of teaching (N = 53). There was a feeling in both the old and the new universities that teaching accountancy was in danger of being neglected for two reasons. The first was that the increased emphasis on types of research which bore little relation to the needs of practitioners was by the same token of little benefit to the needs of the students either: It involves a great deal of effort. The benefits of the research done are not evaluated. Certainly no attempt is made to link research output with teaching input or the general health of the accounting profession. (Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

The second was that the increased emphasis on the need to research and publish under conditions of resource constraint was bound to have a negative impact on the attention which could be given to teaching and the rewards available for doing it well: No incentive, recognition or reward for good teaching. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 2 rating) More money spent on research staff therefore less available for other purposes. Now seem to be suffering severe financial embarrassment due to over-recruitment of researchers who benefit a very small number of our students (PG) and strain resources available to the majority of our students (UG) I hope eventually that our current activity will bring more income to us in due course but I doubt it. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

568

S. Harley Need to economise on teaching input to make space for research. Creation of different types of staff. (Principal Lecturer, new university, did not submit) Higher teaching, admin loads for non-researchers. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3B rating) Teaching unequally distributed–status given only to research. Students feel neglected, teaching under-resourced. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

A perceived neglect of teaching was felt particularly acutely in some ex-polytechnic departments where there was a feeling that the institutions were betraying their original mission as more vocationally-oriented teaching institutions: We are not recruiting teaching staff. As an ex-Poly we are/were teaching establishments with some research. We are forced into becoming research establishments with some teaching. (Principal Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) The changes are moving the institution (not just the discipline) away from its tradition as a teaching institution. Teaching expertise is being undermined. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3B rating) Generally feel that post-’92 universities were better as teaching polytechnics. (Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

In the new universities especially, the institutional pressure to achieve a respectable rating had in many cases resulted in a conscious management strategy to divide academic labour into research active and non-active, with those who were “nonactive” given additional teaching loads. Not surprisingly, this led to some bitterness on the part of those who either did not wish to do research or who were thereby rendered unable to do it because their research was not in areas targeted to improve the rating. Someone has to do the real work of teaching and administration. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 3A rating) My primary job is teaching, not research diverting resources to research leaves fewer people available for teaching. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) More academics have timetable remission to do research, leaving fewer to do teaching (of more students). (Lecturer, new university, did not submit) Added pressure on colleagues, especially those with little or no experience/interest in research. Identification of those willing to pursue research who are given time allowance and greater teaching loads on those who are not. (Principal lecturer, new university, 3B rating) People should be reminded that 70 per cent of current grant is for teaching which researchers seek to avoid. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

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and there were many others, themselves researchers, who saw the division between “academic high flyers” and “teaching drones” as having a negative impact on the traditional quality of the profession as a community of scholars valued equally for their teaching expertise and knowledge: (I feel) saddened. Staff are being divided. The lowly teach. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 2 rating) Lament “teaching of undergrads is for losers” ethos. No “care” for students. Research is everything. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)

or who resented the fact that in order to do research they were themselves put in the position of having to neglect their teaching: Conformed to pressure to publish—less effort put into teaching. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)

Even the old universities, where there has long been a contractual obligation on the part of all members of staff to engage in research, were not immune from internally divisive pressures. The RAE formula for funding comprises a rating for quality multiplied by the number of staff whose research was submitted (Whittington, 1997; Cooper & Otley, 1998). This had led to an element of “gaming” on the part of some institutions who might maximise their funding by submitting only those members of staff whose work was certain to be deemed of high quality and therefore boost the departmental rating, a practice both divisive of staff and detrimental to the authenticity of the exercise overall: The structure of the RAE causes departments to be manipulative and divisive. What is the sense in including five members of staff out of thirty in the only major assessment exercise applied to the department? (Lecturer, old university, 3A rating)

The Breakdown of Community and the Pursuit of Self-interest Knights (1990) argues that capitalist labour processes fragment, atomise, and individualise workers, setting them in competition with each other rather than encouraging co-operation and a sense of common interest. The “marketisation” (Marginson, 1995) of higher education is breaking down the sense of community once experienced amongst academics replacing high with low trust (Trow, 1996) and collegiality with relationships characteristic of more typically capitalist relations of production. Academic accountants in our sample were not insensitive to these developments: It should be terminated now. It is divisive and demoralising. (Professor, new university, 3A rating) It is highly divisive mechanism which promotes conflict between institutions and within institutions. It also serves to legitimate research cuts and blame the victims as the hoops get higher. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)

570

S. Harley

In the new universities especially, much of this bad feeling came from teachers who felt their contribution devalued and from practitioners who felt their status threatened, but it was also directed at colleagues in the old universities who were thought to have an unfair advantage in the funding stakes. For example, the greatest single source of ambivalence towards the RAE on the part of new university staff who were otherwise in favour of it because of increased opportunities for research was the lack of resources to do the job properly:

Ambivalent because research is more encouraged but there are not the resources to do it properly. Apart from the continual lack of resources still research in my “spare time”. (Lecturer, new university, 2 rating) Unsure. I am being encouraged to research and publish—as we all are—but teaching loads are increasing too. Balance is needed. Increased pressure on conscientious staff enormously. Later recruits seem to have less teaching and the load is passed on to the rest of us. Also some senior staff take advantage of their research profiles to alleviate their teaching responsibilities. Competitiveness increased. Not a healthy sign. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) Strong wish, even pressure, to engage in research but minimum structural support. (Senior Lecturer, new university, did not submit) We teach 15 hours per week plus have project supervision and personal tutees. We have no research assistants. If we have more than two papers accepted in one year we are unable to attend and deliver due to financial constraints. But the rationale of the RAE is that we are “judged” on equal terms with the pre-1992 universities. . . (Lecturer, new university, did not submit) I teach twice as many courses as I did 5 years ago. I don’t have time for anything else. (Principal Lecturer, new university, did not submit)

which led to an inevitable resentment against the old universities on the part of the new:

My perception is that the exercises are “fixed” to ensure the status of the old universities. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3B rating)

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The RAE is an attempt by an elite group of institutions to justify a disproportionate allocation of research funds. If carried to its logical conclusion it will destroy research in most universities (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) Whilst new universities have to make do with what they’ve got, more prestigious depts in old universities are busy “head-hunting” and poaching researchers—nothing else matters. (Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) It is a game the big boys play to ensure they get a bigger and bigger share of the cake and “kill” as competition up and coming university departments, old or new. It is arbitrary: who judges, and where do they come from? 13 (Lecturer, independent university, did not submit)

In fact, what has come to be known as a transfer market in “research stars” was a mixed blessing for many an old university department, serving often to create divisions within what was once considered to be a community of relative equals and generating an uneasy feeling that the profession was involved in something just a little bit dirty: Lecturers who did their research with us were “head-hunted” by other departments. Those who left us took their research with them. This is worse than the situation in football. At least the players can’t take their goals with them. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) Our department bought in two professors at a premium because they had good quality journals in the period leading up to the RAE. One has since left already. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) Totally superficial. Leads to the equivalent of football transfer around the key date. (Head of Department, new university, 2 rating) It seems to me that the major effect of the RAE on behaviour is the “poaching” of staff— buying in “stars” who will bring their work/publications with them as “dowry”. My dept. recruited two people (one a new professor) who started on 1st March 1996, just in time for the RAE. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)

At very least, argue Hillyard & Sim (1997, p.15) in their discussion of research in the socio-legal field, “the transfer market reinforces the divisions between established names and those attempting to break into academic life though securing a permanent post. These individuals are likely to remain on short-term contracts as resources are moved towards attractive package deals for those who have been bought and sold on the market.” It would seem, therefore, that in a number of different ways the commodification of academic research could be reconstituting academic labour in terms of the discourse of “self-interest, marketing and entrepreneurship” (Humphrey et al., 1995) rather than community, co-operation and the collegiate ideal. Whilst it is tempting to idealise collegiality, harking back to some mythical age of consensus and co-operation, it nevertheless remains a value to which many British academics aspire14 . This would certainly seem to be true for the academic accountants in our sample who were discomforted by what they perceived to be the competitive individualism of colleagues who wished to succeed on the RAE’s terms:

572

S. Harley It has encouraged self-interest. . . the selfish pursuit of individual publications. No concern for department—just sort the CV. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating) Individuals in the dept now tend to think of what benefits them as individuals i.e. to get promotion etc. (Lecturer, old university, 4 rating)

There was evidence of this competitive individualism in the response of some members of the business schools who, whilst generally in favour of the opportunities presented by the RAE, had had to submit under a general business and management heading. Their concern was that they might be dragged down by the lack of research productivity of colleagues not in their field. Take the comments of a lecturer in Human Resource Management in a new university business school who approved of the new emphasis on research and its impact “on the tiny band of us who are research active—little effect on the rest of the school who are moribund.” This lecturer recognised the “greater pressure to publish and recycle” but withheld his judgement of the RAE. “My views will be affected by the amount of money we get,” he said. Similarly, a professor of marketing could not hide his contempt for his relatively “unproductive” accounting colleagues: Though inevitably crude, it has had a useful influence. However, marketing (which made a major contribution here) has to be part of business and is saddled with unproductive accountants, IT specialists etc. I favour a more tightly defined classification. (Professor, new university, 3A rating)

who, no doubt, were also the sort of people to blame for the attitude of some within the old university sector who held the new university sector in similar contempt: The RAE has become largely predictable. It continues to reveal that the post-1992 “Universities” should in many cases not have been awarded that status. (Professor, old university, 5 rating)

The Degradation of Academic Work It has been argued that work in capitalist society is subjective in two senses (Knights, 1990; Willmott, 1990). The first is in the sense that workers are subject to or controlled by others for purposes which are not their own but those of the market. We have argued that in the case of the research assessment exercise, a new mechanism has been put in place through which the market works and to which the academic worker submits, more or less willingly. The second is in the “existential” sense that “work has implications for self-identity, in terms of the sense of confirmation or denial experienced in its accomplishment” (Willmott, 1997, p.1346) The RAE is seductive precisely because of the opportunities it offers for an affirmation of self on the part of those who wish to establish what they see as an academic identity, either for themselves or for their discipline. By the same token, a felt negation of self was a major source of resentment on the part of academics who felt constrained by the exercise. The final paradox of the RAEs is that the pursuit of high ratings was felt by

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many to produce lower rather than higher quality research. By far the biggest source of discontent across all the disciplines which the author has surveyed (Harley & Lee, 1997; Harley & Lowe, 1998) was felt to be the need to maximise publications within the given RAE “accounting period” independent of necessarily having anything significant to say. In accounting, as in other disciplines, this was thought to encourage “quick and dirty” research and “quick-fix”, ‘salami-sliced” publications which lacked academic rigour, scholarship and weight:15 RAE has led to more mechanical/safe research where publications are assured. A reduced emphasis on innovative/more risky research projects which pay dividends but take a long time to come to fruition. RAE has led to mediocrity in research in Business, Finance and Economics. (Senior Lecturer, old university, 3B rating) They have enforced publication by those who have little to say. They suppress reclusive scholars who read widely and do not write. Both negative (Reader, old university, 5∗ rating) More lecturers doing low-level research on substantially the same thing. Induces establishments to undertake research which is generally being “duplicated” all over the place—not unique, re-hash of same old stuff. (Lecturer, new university, did not submit) A lot of “academics” are publishing obscure, boring articles because of pressure from the university. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) Emphasis on number of publications appears to be diluting the quality of journals. Literature reviews frequently reveal one piece of research spread over two or three articles. (Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

Concern about quality was not confined to new university departments struggling to develop a research culture nor to lesser-ranked old university departments under pressure to make the grade, but was also found amongst the elite. Take, for example, the following responses from 5-rated departments: Narrowly defined research produced. Schools of Business are particularly prone. Focus on publications (not research) and teaching relegated to a secondary role. Some change was necessary but the current form of RAE is not designed to produce scholarship. May well produce research of the nature being attempted here! (Senior Lecturer, old university, 5 rating) I am not a fan of the RAE–it certainly leads to greater activity but it is narrowly focused and leads to a vast output of academic papers which basically nobody reads and those which count most in the RAE probably have least influence in the outside world. We are all playing a big game which is increasingly divorced from the real issues in my subject. (Professor, old university, 5 rating) It is a game which has more politic than substance (Lecturer, old university, 5∗ rating)

The need to produce papers sufficient to count within the relevant time period could lock academics into practices which not only reinforced their subordination but also, through the RAE’s negative impact on their work, their degradation as well. In this

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way, a growing sense of alienation was found not only amongst those on the wrong side of the research active–inactive divide, nor in just the low-rated departments. Many of those who were successfully playing the RAE game felt some doubt as to the value of what they were doing: Under pressure to produce quantity rather than quality. Quality publications are sought but difficult to achieve within the short time-scale of the assessment exercise. (Lecturer, old university, 3A rating) Downgrading of importance of teaching and support activities. I now “dabble” in research. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating) Encouraged to “write-up” experiences/projects which may not have bothered about before. (Senior lecturer, new university, 3A rating) Influenced to seek publication for research at very early stages. (Senior Lecturer, new university, did not submit) Inappropriate pressure to work in areas where I had no particular expertise; move to more “publishable” research areas (Lecturer, old university, 3A rating) (Pressure) towards forms of discourse which are currently marketable. My compromise is to protect my substance and publish in “their” journals. (Reader, old university, 5∗ rating)

This could explain the strength of feeling against the RAE which we found amongst our sample. Conscious of the damage being done to traditional academic values, to the unity of teaching and research, to the need for scholarship as well as publication, they resented the double bind in which they had been placed. It is important to recognise that much of the disciplinary power of the RAE emanates from the knowledge that both individual and collective destinies depend upon achieving a good rating. The consequences are both material and symbolic. Institutional ratings confirm high status within the profession and the funding to attract “good’ staff who will contribute to (even) higher ratings next time round. Low ratings could set in a vicious circle of decline: The ultimate consequences of the RAE are a matter for worry and need resolving. RAEs directly affect the funding of HE institutions. If the latter wish to develop, the RAE reports can make or break an institution. They therefore raise the stakes in workload and stress which academics are working under. A healthy research position does not, in reality equate with a happy and healthy academic staff. (Senior Lecturer, new university, 3A rating)

In a very real sense, therefore, resistance to the RAE could be self-defeating: Inequity i.e. established research departments tend to score well and receive funding. Those with records of inactivity (for good reason) score low, receive no funding and consequently will never catch up. A split between types of department. Some very academic will only recruit guaranteed publishers, others go for consultancy and pragmatism at the cost of scholarship let alone research! the division between research departments and practitioner departments is damaging to academic accounting. It makes it harder for academics to move from “new” university departments to “traditional” university departments, but encourages “poaching” in the other direction. (Principal Lecturer, new university, 1 rating)

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which some in high ranking departments and/or elite institutions thought might be no bad thing: Overall, I think they are fair and beneficial. They have, however, now established a barrier to the development of new research departments which may well have been the original objective. My dept moved progressively from a low rating to a 4. It took time and a lot of effort. I doubt that such a progression is now possible in the UK. (Professor, old university, 4 rating) It is essential for the discipline for some departments to be internationally excellent for research. It is not essential for all depts to be in this position. (Professor, old university, 5∗ rating)

To avoid being relegated to second-class citizenship within the profession in a predominantly teaching-only department devoid of the resources to pursue the most basic of scholarly activities, never mind research, it was, therefore, necessary to comply.

Summary and Conclusions This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the extent to which managerialist forms of control in UK universities have supplanted earlier, more collegiate, forms of control which had their origins in the Oxbridge ideal and became more or less general as the university sector expanded in the 19th and 20th centuries (Halsey, 1992). There is general agreement amongst academic observers that in recent years attempts have been made by both government and institutional managements to impose new forms of control on academic labour, which are centralised, bureaucratic and hierarchical. They point to the increasing “McDonaldisation” of higher education, the “commodification” of academic labour and the progressive “proletarianisation” of the academic worker (Wilson, 1991; Parker & Jary, 1995; Willmott, 1995; Puxty et al., 1994). As a result traditional values of professional autonomy and academic freedom are increasingly subordinated to those of the market (Miller, 1995; Marginson, 1995). The outcome, these writers argue, is both a degradation of academic work and the alienation of academic workers (Smyth, 1995) who, forced to continuously produce more and at less cost, lose control of the product of their labour in the need to bail their institutions out of a government-induced and senior management-led mess (Campion & Renner, 1995; Shumar, 1995). The data presented here would indicate that there is some truth in these claims albeit contingent upon institutional circumstance and personal history. It also contributes to our understanding of the degree to which academics themselves have been responsible for enacting new forms of managerial control. There has been considerable disagreement about the extent of academic complicity in recent changes. At one end of the spectrum, writers detect a “compliance culture” amongst UK academics (Henkel & Kogan, 1996) whereby at least part of the blame for what they consider to be a potentially much debased system of mass higher education falls on academics themselves who “complicitly through their inaction have knowingly contributed (without so much as a whimper)

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to the progressive fragmentation, stratification and alienation of academic work” (Smyth, 1995, p.8). Parker & Jary (1995) predict that the very identity of the “new” academic will come to reconstitute itself in terms of what is needed to gain reward, either personal or institutional, rather than in terms of independence and creativity of thought. Miller (1995) believes that in submitting to the increased surveillance and control of government audits and management-imposed performance indicators, academics displace personal goals of scholarship and independent inquiry, thereby colluding in the construction of their own fate. On the other hand, there are those who believe that the extent of this “selfsubordination” has been exaggerated. They doubt the degree to which any external mechanism of surveillance and control can be imposed on academics, whose identity has indeed been constituted in terms of the twin discourse of academic freedom and professional autonomy, values that have been strongly felt and fiercely defended (Halsey, 1992; Henkel, 1997). Prichard & Willmott (1997) put this side of the argument in their critique of Parker & Jary’s (1995) analysis of the changing subjectivity of the academic worker. Studies of the growth of managerialism in higher education, as elsewhere in the public sector, they argue, have overestimated the degree to which managerialist values have penetrated professional discourse and practice. In support of their argument they submit evidence from research amongst senior postholders in British universities where they found continuing commitment to traditional academic values and attempts to mediate any hard managerialist demands made on their staff by university “senior executives”. In similar vein, Townley (1997) uses the concept of “institutional logic” to explain why UK universities successfully resisted government attempts to impose judgmental rather than professional-developmental forms of staff appraisal consequent upon recommendations by the Jarratt report that university management should take on more of the characteristics of private industry (CVCP, 1985). She also makes the important point, as have others, that the intrinsic nature of much academic work places very real limits on the degree to which management can directly control the academic labour process without defeating its object (Townley, 1997; Wilson, 1991; Johnston, 1996; Dearlove, 1997). The research reported here would indicate a possible explanation for this apparent paradox, at least where the RAE is concerned. It does seem that “imperialistic management discourses” (Prichard & Willmott, 1997) have indeed found it hard to compete with those of existing locales of academic life. Academics still think and talk like academics. However whilst management discourse may have found it hard to penetrate the walls of UK academe, management practice has not. The RAE is such an effective mechanism of managerial control precisely because it does not need to replace one type of discourse with another but offers individuals the possibility of securing both material and symbolic rewards without ostensible violence to the traditional value systems that constitute academic identity and culture. In co-opting peer review for managerial ends, the managerialist intent behind the RAE is rendered both less transparent and more difficult to resist. There is no doubt that the RAE has reinforced and institutionalised divisions that already existed in the profession and it may be that that in itself has been sufficient to dissipate active resistance, especially since those who most approved of the RAE and agree with its criteria of excellence

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were concentrated in positions of power within both the institutions and the profession at large (Parker et al., 1998; Humphrey et al., 1996). More importantly, the RAE legitimates these divisions with reference to traditional academic values, thereby depriving those who would wish to resist with an alternative discourse through which academic life can be lived and worked. In this way, the RAE constitutes a much more subtle threat to academic diversity and freedom than the “hard” managerialist styles recommended for the public services in the Thatcher era (Clark & Newman, 1997) in that it deprives academics of the ideological means with which to resist at the same time as offering powerful incentives, both material and symbolic, to comply. However the significance of the RAE as a managerial control strategy goes deeper than the intensification, fragmentation, and degradation of academic labour, all of which would seem to be a consequence, albeit to greater or lesser degree. It also has fundamental implications for the structure of intellectual authority relations within accountancy as an academic field. In an analysis of the role of elite ´ academic journals in the production and evaluation of accounting knowledge, Lee (1995, p.259) argues that accounting research in the US “has become a process of commodification to enhance academic reputations and pedigree, rather than a means of facilitating criticism and accountability of practitioners.” This is the outcome, he argues, of “an institutionalised academic strategy of focusing on research rather than teaching”, which creates “a competitive and hierarchical university field, in which attention is paid mainly to the production and maintenance of cultural capital—predominantly of the individual but also of the institution.” Research selectivity would seem to be encouraging a similar process in the UK. The danger is not only one of increased fragmentation within the profession, with elite academic accounting departments (in the old universities) reproducing high status accounting knowledge for consumption by other elite researchers in equally high status departments, leaving others to get on with the job of teaching narrowly based principles of accounting practice to the mass of vocationally oriented undergraduates now pouring into UK universities. It is also one of potential censorship in the reproduction and dissemination of academic accounting knowledge. It would seem that despite a proliferation of journals and a number of competing methodologies and value-systems, it remains relatively clear what has to be done to attain a high reputation in accountancy as an academic field. This is evident in the tacit hierarchy of its journals, the elite ´ domination of its institutions and the now formal ranking of university departments, in what Bourdieu (1997) would call the “agencies of reproduction” within the discipline. In the case of research selectivity, institutionalised peer review designed for funding purposes reconstitutes itself as a powerful agent of reproduction, controlling access to elite positions and defining what shall and shall not be defined as “real” accounting research and “high status” academic accounting knowledge. As such it could lend ever greater weight to any mainstream that might emerge within the discipline in the production, evaluation and dissemination of academic accounting knowledge (Arrington, 1990; Niemark, 1993) thereby increasing the possibility of effective closure against more radical and critical ideas (Lee, 1997). This can only be avoided if the RAE’s potential to direct research, intended or otherwise, is diffused. An initial step might be to de-couple research “assessment” from funding so that genuine, honest and open debate can take place within the profession itself rather than

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allowing that space to be colonised by both managerial and self-interest.

Notes 1. The data on academic accountants was part of a larger study of four academic disciplines which included sociology, psychology, marketing and accounting and finance. See Harley & Lowe (1998) for a full report of the data. The original intent behind taking these four disciplines was to see whether any significant differences emerged in feelings about the RAE and its impact in two traditionally “pure” social sciences where an academic research culture had been long established and two more business-related disciplines where it would be less so. In the event, surprisingly few differences in the pattern of response emerged. These are reported in the text where relevant. 2. Accountancy submissions were made to either the Accountancy Panel or, as part of a larger Business and Management Studies grouping, to the Business and Management Studies (BMS) Panel. Twentythree submissions were made to the Accountancy Panel and 49 to the BMS Panel. However, the BMS panel submissions were passed on to the Accountancy Panel, which used the same criteria and procedures to judge them as to those submitted to its own panel. The Accountancy Panel then passed back the rankings awarded to accountancy groups to be incorporated into overall BMS rankings. Definitions of the degree of “quality” that each point on the scale is meant to denote and the processes recent Accountancy and BMS Panels have used to reach their assessments as well as details of the funding formulae can be found in Whittington (1997) and Cooper & Otley (1998) respectively. See Humphrey et al. “Questioning the Value of the Research Selectivity Process in British University Accounting” (1995) for a critical review of the operation of the accountancy panel and Willmott “On Measuring and Managing Research Quality: The State Industry and Peer Review” (1998) for a critique of the operations of the BMS Panel. 3. In this sense it is questionable whether the research assessment exercise constitutes a system of peer review in the traditional meaning of the term in that peer review is consensual and democratic with those subject to its authority freely entering into the process and accepting the legitimacy of the outcome. The RAE, on the other hand, is management led, externally imposed and widely questioned, with its constituents having little control over the composition of its panels and no right to feedback as to the basis of its decisions (Lee & Harley, 1998b; Willmott, 1998) 4. Previous research carried out by Harley & Lee (1997) into the impact which the RAE has had on the organisation of economics as an academic field showed that despite considerable disquiet on the part of many within the profession, academic economists had submitted to institutional, departmental and/or peer pressure to publish in journals that were believed to count most in the ranking exercise. The fact that these journals represented almost exclusively a mainstream neoclassical economic paradigm and that the economics subject panel was itself made up almost entirely of high ranking mainstream economists (Lee & Harley, 1998a) had the effect of pushing many nonmainstream economists in a more mainstream direction in the hope of securing increased funding for their department, and/or better career prospects for themselves. Where individual members of staff were either unwilling or unable to play this game, institutional managements resorted to recruitment policies that emphasised publication within the mainstream as a condition of appointment. In this way, institutional interests and managerial control combined with peer review to exercise an immense power of censorship over the reproduction and dissemination of economic knowledge and resistance to greater management control of research was successfully “outflanked” (Clegg, 1994) by the need of academics to secure jobs and/or build a career. 5. Parker et al. (1998, p.398), for example, argue that the co-implication of (at least some) senior academics in the implementation of research selectivity requires urgent debate and further investigation “if the academic accounting community is to constructively influence and develop its research agents rather than allowing it to develop virtually by default.” 6. There was a significant difference in performance in the RAEs between the old and the new universities with the old universities gaining an average weighting across all subjects of 4.3 and the new universities an average of 2.5 in the 1996 exercise. Both averages are an increase on the 1992 values, which were 1.9 and 3.8 respectively (Court, 1998). See Whittington (1997) and Cooper & Otley (1998) for a breakdown of the proportions of different rankings according to university status in the Accountancy and Business and Management Panels. 7. Some indication that our survey might not unduly over-represent the dissatisfied can be obtained

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9.

10.

11.

12.

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from a survey of academic staff in 15 institutions carried out in February and March 1996 as part of a larger study into the impact of the 1992 RAE financed by the Higher Education Funding Council (McNay, 1997). In response to the question as to whether on balance the effects of the RAE on higher education had been positive, 36.7 per cent in the old universities and 49.6 per cent in the new universities thought that they had. Taking into account the differences in the way the questions were phrased and the possibility of registering ambivalence in our survey, the results are not dissimilar. The first open-ended question asking directly about how respondents felt about changes in their discipline elicited only 39 unequivocally positive responses, less than the total number of respondents who could be identified as being in favour (N = 50) or ambivalent (N = 15) when looking at the pattern of response to the open-ended questions overall. It was therefore decided to take the responses to the other questions into account when deciding how many felt good about the RAE’s impact on their discipline so as not to under-represent those who were generally in favour of the RAE. On the other hand, those respondents who were against (N = 74) or ambivalent (N = 15) produced 100 negative responses to the first open-ended question, more than the total number who could be identified as being against from the questionnaire as a whole, so it was not necessary to take their other responses into account. There was a similar pattern of response to the fourth open-ended question (and last question on the questionnaire) asking respondents whether they had any further comments they would like to make. Twenty-five respondents offered clear reasons in favour and 56 clear reasons against. The 25 respondents in favour of the RAE gave a total of 29 reasons for their opinion in comparison with the 56 against who gave a total of 87. Taking the questionnaires as a whole into account, therefore, those who were against the exercise had a lot more they wanted to say in support of their opinion than those in favour. It is not surprising that those privileged by the process should be the most committed to it nor that those less privileged should be alienated by it, but recognition of the fact that subjective perception is structured by objective interest does not mean that we can dismiss the feelings of those who are unhappy with the RAE as the unreliable response of disgruntled individuals with a personal axe to grind any more than we can dismiss the responses of those committed to it as mere rhetoric or ideology. Both types of response to the RAE are in need of explanation. Furthermore, when we find a significant number of academics, many of whom are in senior positions within the profession and/or located in high ranking departments for their sector, agreeing with those less privileged by the system, we feel that we have identified a issue that should be a matter of concern to the profession as a whole, not just to one sectional interest. Perceptions of and reactions to the increasing commodification of academic research need to be understood at a level deeper than that of immediate self-interest if academics are to influence the production, evaluation and dissemination of academic accounting knowledge in a constructive and reflexive way. This increase in rating is in line with, if not strictly proportional to, the increase in ratings awarded by the Accountancy Panel where, out of 18 groups who submitted in both 1992 and 1996, nine improved their rankings, six maintained them and three declined (Whittington, 1997). The overall average ranking also went up in the BMS panel but it is more difficult to isolate the contribution specifically accountancy rankings made to the overall BMS ratings, which were on average somewhat lower than those awarded by the accountancy panel (Cooper & Otley, 1998). Whilst the types of reason both for and against the exercise were similar across all the disciplines examined, the business-related disciplines were overall somewhat happier with the impact of the RAE than the more traditional social sciences. The sociologists were the least happy with 23 per cent believing change to be good, 18 per cent both good and bad and 56 per cent believing it to be bad closely followed by the psychologists. On the other hand 34 per cent of accountants believed the changes to be good, 10 per cent both good and bad and 50 per cent bad (see Table 6 above), closely followed by those in marketing. This difference can be explained primarily by the aspirations of many within the business-related disciplines to establish themselves as working within an accepted academic discipline. (See Harley & Lowe, 1998) More (N = 79) noted, but did not necessarily comment on, an increased trend not only towards research and publication, but towards particular types of research and publication which were felt to be in high status academic journals. Whittington (1997) and Cooper & Otley (1998) tell us that their panels considered but then rejected the use of an “official list” of journals publication that might serve as a proxy for determining research “quality”. This does not negate the fact that individuals on the panel might work with their own tacit understanding of what would constitute such a list, nor that such lists have been circulated “unofficially” amongst academic accounting departments keen to maximise their ratings. See Brinn et al. (1996) for a fuller discussion of UK accountants’ perceptions of research

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journal quality and Lee & Harley (1998a) for a critical discussion of the role the “Diamond List” of economics journals played in the production and evaluation of economic research in UK universities. 13. The composition of the panels for Accountancy, Business and Management and Economics was made up overwhelmingly of academics from old universities in high rated departments. See Whittington (1997) for the composition of the 1996 Accountancy Panel; Cooper & Otley (1998) for the composition of 1996 Business and Management Panel and Lee & Harley (1998a) for the composition of the 1992 and 1996 Economics Panel. 14. In an initial summary of findings from a research study on the impact of “new public management” reforms on higher education in England, Sweden and Norway, Henkel (1997, pp.134–138) argues that “academics are struggling to hold on to values and conceptions of professional practice that are traditionally held to depend on pre-modern forms of governance and organisation.” She describes these values as embodying not only the assumption that academics will combine research, administration and teaching in their roles but also that all academics, as academics, should have: “security of tenure, relatively generous allocations of time, relatively low levels of administration, a common salary structure, the interdependence of at least teaching and research, an emphasis on equality values in the allocation of work and the idea that academic specialisation is discipline rather than functionally based”. In combination, she tells us, these assumptions represent deeply held academic values. It could be argued from our data that whether intentionally (as part of a managerialist project to gain greater control over academics and their work) or as unintended consequence of the desire to secure academic status on the part of academics themselves, the RAE has the power to violate each one of these values in turn. 15. Short-termism was mentioned explicitly 63 times by the academic accountants as a reason for being against the RAE’s impact on either their discipline, the work of their department or themselves. Too much emphasis on publication (which might implicitly amount to the same thing) was referred to on 154 separate occasions.

Acknowledgement The author wishes to acknowledge the help of her colleague at De Montfort University, Peter Lowe, who has been responsible for the computer analysis of the survey data, and the comments of two anonymous reviewers.

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