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Addendum to “Theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies” [Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 83–105]
International Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (2006) 1077 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
Addendum
Addendum to “Theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies” [Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 83–105] Cenk Kocas a,⁎, Tunga Kiyak b a
b
Graduate School of Management, Sabanci University, Turkey, Sabanci University, Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla, İstanbul, Turkey Eli Broad Graduate School of Management, Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Received 23 February 2006; received in revised form 15 March 2006; accepted 26 March 2006 Available online 6 June 2006
In Koçaş and Kiyak (2006) we fail to benefit from an already existing solution to the asymmetric firm pricing model as presented in Baye et al. (1992). In their work, Baye et al. (1992) provide a characterization of the equilibria in an oligopoly when uninformed customers do not allocate themselves equally across firms and when reservation prices across firms are homogenous. The characterization of the equilibria when reservation prices across firms are homogenous (propositions 1 through 4 in Koçaş and Kiyak, 2006) is a substantial component of the theoretical part of our paper and hence we recognize the precedence of Baye et al. (1992) in presenting this characterization. References Baye, M.R., Kovenock, D., de Vries, C.G., 1992. It takes two-to-Tango: equilibria in a model of sales. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 493–510. Koçaş, Cenk, Kiyak, Tunga, 2006. Theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies. International Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (1), 83–105.
DOI of original article: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.02.003. ⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 216 483 9674; fax: +90 216 483 9699. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Kocas), [email protected] (T. Kiyak). 0167-7187/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.03.004
Addendum
Addendum to “Theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies” [Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 83–105] Cenk Kocas a,⁎, Tunga Kiyak b a
b
Graduate School of Management, Sabanci University, Turkey, Sabanci University, Orhanli, 34956 Tuzla, İstanbul, Turkey Eli Broad Graduate School of Management, Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Received 23 February 2006; received in revised form 15 March 2006; accepted 26 March 2006 Available online 6 June 2006
In Koçaş and Kiyak (2006) we fail to benefit from an already existing solution to the asymmetric firm pricing model as presented in Baye et al. (1992). In their work, Baye et al. (1992) provide a characterization of the equilibria in an oligopoly when uninformed customers do not allocate themselves equally across firms and when reservation prices across firms are homogenous. The characterization of the equilibria when reservation prices across firms are homogenous (propositions 1 through 4 in Koçaş and Kiyak, 2006) is a substantial component of the theoretical part of our paper and hence we recognize the precedence of Baye et al. (1992) in presenting this characterization. References Baye, M.R., Kovenock, D., de Vries, C.G., 1992. It takes two-to-Tango: equilibria in a model of sales. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 493–510. Koçaş, Cenk, Kiyak, Tunga, 2006. Theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies. International Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (1), 83–105.
DOI of original article: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.02.003. ⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 216 483 9674; fax: +90 216 483 9699. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Kocas), [email protected] (T. Kiyak). 0167-7187/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.03.004