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Aggressive behavior of delinquent, dependent, and “normal” white and black boys in social conflicts
,OUHXAL
"1'
EXPERIhlENTAL
S"ClAL
7, 545-550
PS:yCH"LO::Y
CRITICAL Aggressive and
Behavior
of
(1971)
NOTE Delinquent,
“Normal” White and Black in Social Conflicts
Dependent, Boys
P. K. BURGESS Nufield
College,
Oxford
In their recent paper Berger and Tedeschi (1969) present data obtained from an experimental procedure involving a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game ( PDG) . From this data they draw conclusions relating to differences between blacks and whites in terms of various attitudes and personality traits. It is the contention of the present writer that such conclusions cannot adequately be supported on the data cited, which was presented in a possibly misleading form. For the purpose of making my objections clearer, I shall quote here the authors’ conclusions although it is, of course, essential that the reader refers to the original article in order to assess the legitimacy of my criticism. Black subjects cooperated more and won less by their strategy selections in the PDG. Also they were more aggressive when “other” player displayed vulnerability by cooperating on the trial preceding the option than were white subjects. The inability of black subjects to time-bind and delay gratifications, their feelings of powerlessness, and high fear of failure were pointed to as the personality characteristics likely to be associated with poor policies within the PDG. Poor policies led to fewer winnings and more frustration (“humiliation”) for black subjects. When the “other” cooperated, and thus was vulnerable to exploitation on the trial preceding an option to take $10 from him, black subjects were more willing to attempt to “save by retaliating than were white subjects. “Saving face” was more face” important to dependents than to delinquents, who, in turn, retaliated more The latter result was interpreted as being often than did “normals.” associated with the need for approval, which is assumed to be highest in the dependent population. Masculinity concepts associated with “toughness” in bargaining were linked with identity needs. Black subjects are presumecl to be more insecure in their identity; thus appearing “tough’ is a “good” thing to do in the presence of the experimenter. 545
546
1’ . K . HJIlGESS
Many interesting and w dc.mbt valid results are rcbported, but I propose to concentrate my discussion on those relating to alleged racial differences in “poor policies” and “aggression.” The highly significant main effect that blacks arc more cooperative than whites (p < 0.001) receives surprisingly little comment per se, yet surely the finding that blacks cooperate half as much again as whites deserves some explanatory comment no matter whether one regards this as evidence of black altruism or white competitiveness. To concentrate SO much on “ineffectiveness,” lack of “toughness,” “humiliation,” etc. is just a little tcndentious. Bergcr and Tedeschi elect to focus their attention on the ineffectiveness of the strategy employed by the blacks (if we assume, that is, that only economic transactions are invoIved) and seek to explain this in terms of tendencies towards “riskiness,” Zllld inability to “postpone gratification.” Firstly, one must question the argument that blacks are characterized by traits that are likely to lead them into high risk strategies in this situation. The authors cite Kogan and Wallach (1967) to maintain that “blacks are more inclined towards a pattern of internal control (low risk) in a context of chance-a context where control is in fact not possible,” and assert that “such a view would be compatible with the present results since a game of strategy may be thought of as a test of skills.” It ?nay be, but in the absence of any direct evidence, this can hardly be more than speculation. However, since the strategy of “other” was one of 50% random cooperation, then there could in fact be no control by the subject. Whether he won or lost on any particular trial was a matter of pure chance. The fact that one group won more than another is no evidence for the employment of skill, since given the matrix supplied, a position habit would have produced the same results. In addition, if one is interested in perceptions rather than reality, one is forced to invoke the finding of Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965) that “the black may be characterized as a person who has a low expectancy that he can control his reinforcements.” Quod non erat demonstrandum. Now one might also argue that the concept of “riskiness” involves not the relative magnitudes of possible gains or losses, but the relative likelihood of one’s choice resulting in a “gain” or a “loss.” A point reflected in the Kogan and Wallach paradigm. In Berger and Tedeschi’s experiment, the risk level, in this sense, on any one trial, was fixed at 50%. If we take a long-run view, it is the opinion of this writer that it is just as plausible to describe the competitive white behavior as relatively excitement-inducing “gambling” behavior aimed at large, im-
COMMENT
ON
BERGER
AND
TEDESCHI
s47
mediate financial rewards, while the blacks might be seen to be pursuing a more conservative strategy calculated to induce future cooperation from the “other,” and to increase the likelihood that mutual gains would come from the bank (white), rather than each other (both presumed blacks). The foregoing interpretation would vitiate the authors’ argument that . insensitivity to the lack of responsiveness of the “other,” and lack of time perspective associated with inability to delay rewards would account for the failure of black subjects to develop an effective long term policy. Thus bIack subjects won less than did white subjects. For unless they can present data to show that whites skillfully modified their strategy in response to their observation of the “other’s” 50% random cooperation, while blacks did not, then they must concede that the observed differences in winnings are merely an artifact of the payoff matrix, containing as it does a built-in advantage to the autistic competitor, and that the only thing to be explained is the basic difference in cooperativeness between blacks and whites. It is interesting to consider what would have happened had a matrix biased toward the cooperator been used. If blacks and whites had used the same strategies, the former would have won more. Alternatively, the black strategy might have been one of matching, or even contingently reinforcing cooperation by “other.” Thus one might expect 50% cooperation, which is close to the observed 45%. Would this be “rational” or “efficient”? Surely, speculation in the absence of trialby-trial data is fruitless. In any case, in the absence of data from this experiment to show that individual propensities to cooperate are correlated with independent measures of risk-taking tendencies, the conclusions of the authors can hardly bc justified. Berger and Tedeschi also report no main effect when comparing races on their measure of “aggression.” However, they note that one can split the data in such a way that “when the ‘other’ had cooperated on the trial preceding the ‘zap’ option, blacks aggressed significantly more often than whites.” Much of the following discussion is then concerned to explain this “aggressiveness” in terms of “identity problems,” need to display “masculinity,” “face-saving,” and “need for approval,” etc. Unfortunately, since the full data are not presented, it is impossible to tell whether or not the inferences are fair. If one has two groups of subjects whose mean scores on some measure are equal (and in this case we arc given no reason to presume other\vis(,), and then one proceeds to split each group into two parts thereby
548
P. Ii.
BUHGESS
producing four unequal means, one is in duty bound to present and explain all four of the new relationships created, and not just one of them. In the present example, if blacks are overall no more aggressive than whites, but after a cooperative response by “other” they are more aggressive, then after exploitive choices by “other” they should be less aggressive than whites. The failure to present three of the group means must cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions drawn from the fourth, One must further challenge the rationale for using the (n - 1) th choice by “other” as the criterion for splitting the data. The evidence cited refers to the finding that the subject considers the “other’s” strategy on trial (n - 1) in deciding his own strategy on trial n (i.e., his choice on the next iteration of the game). This is not, unfortunately, the parameter considered by Berger and Tedeschi, who examine instead the use of the “zap” option. A very different proposition indeed, I would contend. Later, they explain the differential use of this option in terms of hypothesized retaliatory saving face due to “humiliation” at lower winnings. Now this depends on the total number of cooperative choices by “other” in the previous block of seven trials or even more directly on the net winnings of subjects in a preceding block. This suggests that the authors should have considered differential responses after differentially successful blocks of trials if they wished to test their explanatory hypothesis. Why do the authors designate a cooperative choice by “other” as exhibiting “vulnerability” rather than “cooperation” or even “strength”? Would not an exploitive choice by the subject on his next trial demonstrate his “toughness” just as well as exercising his “zap” option? This sort of speculation is fruitless unless we are told whether the appearance of significantly different means after the split was caused by one or other or both groups giving differential responses depending on the result of “other’s” previous choice. For example, if one group gave similar “zaps” no matter what “other” had just done, then perhaps one is measuring not aggression, but random or ritual behavior, or even an attempt to use the “zap” option as a contingent threat designed to induce cooperation from “other” as is often the purpose of such devices in the PDG. A further point of interest is that since a competitive choice by a subject must result in a loss by “other,” the persistent use of such choices by whites might also be considered “aggressive” on the definition offered by Berger and Tedeschi. In addition, one must note that if one: accepts their argument that use of the “zap” option by blacks is ;I result of attempts to strive for social approval by demonstrating “masculinity” to the white exprrimenter (an indirect argument unsupported by
COMMENT
ON
HERGER
AND
TEDESCHI
549
data from these subjects), then one can hardly be justified in considering the use of the option as a genuine measure of aggression as well. One has also to explain the paradoxes that blacks do not similarly seek to assert “toughness” by using a “tough” competitive strategy in the PDG itself and that compared with “normals,” delinquents also appear to be using the “zap” option to strive for approval from the experimenter. One is tempted to ask why, if they arc so desirous of approval from adults, they commit offenses at all? In their analysis of the effects of opportunity costs on use of the option, Berger and Tedeschi are again more sanguine in their ‘h2” conclusions than the data would appear to warrant. They state that The three way interaction of Opportunity Costs X Race >< Population \vas also significant (F( 6,96) = 10.78, 11 < ,001). If the dependent children are removed from this three way interaction, [a removal of a large group of subjects whose results contradict crucial hypotheses and for which no justification is offered] a clear pattern emerges as is shown in Figure 5. Blacks increased in aggression until costs became excessively high. Whites demonstrated a general tendency to decline in use of aggression as costs went up . . . ( Bracketed comment added. ).
Are these really fair conclusions to draw from Figures 2 and 5P If anything blacks show a tendency to decline in aggression from the second point in the curve (i.e., Opportunity Cost level 5), and what about the striking increclse in white aggression evident at the highest level of opportm~ity cost? If trends mean anything, a further condition at cost level 14 might have reversed all the results. Yet the authors conclude that “black subjects are less sensitive to the costs of using power when aggression cues are present, perhaps because they are less able to discriminate between utilities.“ Firstly, I object that since subjects only played in one condition of the cxperimcnt each, then the question of “discrimination” between different utilities does not strictly arise. Secondly, the authors have an obligation to explain in what way white subjects show discrimination between cost levels 5, 8, and 11 in Figure 2. One suspects that these results arose chiefly because of the deviantly unaggressive behavior of a few white subjects at cost level S, but it really is fruitless to interpret what arc’ clearly curvilinear relationships when only four points arc plotted and on one’ of these (cost level 2) the main contention that blacks arc mart aggressivr is clearly not supported. Hcrgcr and Trdcschi’s attempt to relate their results to urban blacks They argue that blacks ill contemporary America is also unconvincing. aggress retaliativcly to save face when they are frustrated by whites \VIIO tl(~fect on prom&c3 to improve th(bir conditions. Y
550
P. K. BURGESS
argued previously that retaliation tends to follow cooperation by “other.” Perhaps the most telling criticism is that, as the authors concede, their black subjects were drawn from lower socioeconomic status levels than their whites and many of their explanatory hypotheses are applicable to class differences. To what extent then is it justifiable to dwell 011 racial differences in explaining the results? Only the introduction of class variables into the analysis and the partialling of such effects from the results could tell us. Unfortunately, this was omitted and so the only possible verdict is one of “not proven.” It is not this writer’s intention to suggest that Berger and Tedeschi have in any way been concerned to mislead deliberately. Considerations of space must necessarily restrict discussion about possible interpretations of findings. However, it is unfortunate that a desire to produce interpretations consistent with some of the established literature and consequent failure to apply a sufficiently rigorous standard of analysis might result in the acceptance of unjustified and seriously erroneous conclusions. REFERENCES BERGER, S. E., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Aggressive behavior of delinquent, dependent, and “normal” white and black boys in social conflicts, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 325370. KOGAN, N., & WALLACH, M. A. Risk taking as a function of the situation, the person, and the group. New directions in psychology III. New York: Holt, 1967. LEFCOURT, H. M., & LADWIG, G. W. The effect of reference group upon negroes’ task persistence in a biracial competitive game. Jourd of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 668-671.
"1'
EXPERIhlENTAL
S"ClAL
7, 545-550
PS:yCH"LO::Y
CRITICAL Aggressive and
Behavior
of
(1971)
NOTE Delinquent,
“Normal” White and Black in Social Conflicts
Dependent, Boys
P. K. BURGESS Nufield
College,
Oxford
In their recent paper Berger and Tedeschi (1969) present data obtained from an experimental procedure involving a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game ( PDG) . From this data they draw conclusions relating to differences between blacks and whites in terms of various attitudes and personality traits. It is the contention of the present writer that such conclusions cannot adequately be supported on the data cited, which was presented in a possibly misleading form. For the purpose of making my objections clearer, I shall quote here the authors’ conclusions although it is, of course, essential that the reader refers to the original article in order to assess the legitimacy of my criticism. Black subjects cooperated more and won less by their strategy selections in the PDG. Also they were more aggressive when “other” player displayed vulnerability by cooperating on the trial preceding the option than were white subjects. The inability of black subjects to time-bind and delay gratifications, their feelings of powerlessness, and high fear of failure were pointed to as the personality characteristics likely to be associated with poor policies within the PDG. Poor policies led to fewer winnings and more frustration (“humiliation”) for black subjects. When the “other” cooperated, and thus was vulnerable to exploitation on the trial preceding an option to take $10 from him, black subjects were more willing to attempt to “save by retaliating than were white subjects. “Saving face” was more face” important to dependents than to delinquents, who, in turn, retaliated more The latter result was interpreted as being often than did “normals.” associated with the need for approval, which is assumed to be highest in the dependent population. Masculinity concepts associated with “toughness” in bargaining were linked with identity needs. Black subjects are presumecl to be more insecure in their identity; thus appearing “tough’ is a “good” thing to do in the presence of the experimenter. 545
546
1’ . K . HJIlGESS
Many interesting and w dc.mbt valid results are rcbported, but I propose to concentrate my discussion on those relating to alleged racial differences in “poor policies” and “aggression.” The highly significant main effect that blacks arc more cooperative than whites (p < 0.001) receives surprisingly little comment per se, yet surely the finding that blacks cooperate half as much again as whites deserves some explanatory comment no matter whether one regards this as evidence of black altruism or white competitiveness. To concentrate SO much on “ineffectiveness,” lack of “toughness,” “humiliation,” etc. is just a little tcndentious. Bergcr and Tedeschi elect to focus their attention on the ineffectiveness of the strategy employed by the blacks (if we assume, that is, that only economic transactions are invoIved) and seek to explain this in terms of tendencies towards “riskiness,” Zllld inability to “postpone gratification.” Firstly, one must question the argument that blacks are characterized by traits that are likely to lead them into high risk strategies in this situation. The authors cite Kogan and Wallach (1967) to maintain that “blacks are more inclined towards a pattern of internal control (low risk) in a context of chance-a context where control is in fact not possible,” and assert that “such a view would be compatible with the present results since a game of strategy may be thought of as a test of skills.” It ?nay be, but in the absence of any direct evidence, this can hardly be more than speculation. However, since the strategy of “other” was one of 50% random cooperation, then there could in fact be no control by the subject. Whether he won or lost on any particular trial was a matter of pure chance. The fact that one group won more than another is no evidence for the employment of skill, since given the matrix supplied, a position habit would have produced the same results. In addition, if one is interested in perceptions rather than reality, one is forced to invoke the finding of Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965) that “the black may be characterized as a person who has a low expectancy that he can control his reinforcements.” Quod non erat demonstrandum. Now one might also argue that the concept of “riskiness” involves not the relative magnitudes of possible gains or losses, but the relative likelihood of one’s choice resulting in a “gain” or a “loss.” A point reflected in the Kogan and Wallach paradigm. In Berger and Tedeschi’s experiment, the risk level, in this sense, on any one trial, was fixed at 50%. If we take a long-run view, it is the opinion of this writer that it is just as plausible to describe the competitive white behavior as relatively excitement-inducing “gambling” behavior aimed at large, im-
COMMENT
ON
BERGER
AND
TEDESCHI
s47
mediate financial rewards, while the blacks might be seen to be pursuing a more conservative strategy calculated to induce future cooperation from the “other,” and to increase the likelihood that mutual gains would come from the bank (white), rather than each other (both presumed blacks). The foregoing interpretation would vitiate the authors’ argument that . insensitivity to the lack of responsiveness of the “other,” and lack of time perspective associated with inability to delay rewards would account for the failure of black subjects to develop an effective long term policy. Thus bIack subjects won less than did white subjects. For unless they can present data to show that whites skillfully modified their strategy in response to their observation of the “other’s” 50% random cooperation, while blacks did not, then they must concede that the observed differences in winnings are merely an artifact of the payoff matrix, containing as it does a built-in advantage to the autistic competitor, and that the only thing to be explained is the basic difference in cooperativeness between blacks and whites. It is interesting to consider what would have happened had a matrix biased toward the cooperator been used. If blacks and whites had used the same strategies, the former would have won more. Alternatively, the black strategy might have been one of matching, or even contingently reinforcing cooperation by “other.” Thus one might expect 50% cooperation, which is close to the observed 45%. Would this be “rational” or “efficient”? Surely, speculation in the absence of trialby-trial data is fruitless. In any case, in the absence of data from this experiment to show that individual propensities to cooperate are correlated with independent measures of risk-taking tendencies, the conclusions of the authors can hardly bc justified. Berger and Tedeschi also report no main effect when comparing races on their measure of “aggression.” However, they note that one can split the data in such a way that “when the ‘other’ had cooperated on the trial preceding the ‘zap’ option, blacks aggressed significantly more often than whites.” Much of the following discussion is then concerned to explain this “aggressiveness” in terms of “identity problems,” need to display “masculinity,” “face-saving,” and “need for approval,” etc. Unfortunately, since the full data are not presented, it is impossible to tell whether or not the inferences are fair. If one has two groups of subjects whose mean scores on some measure are equal (and in this case we arc given no reason to presume other\vis(,), and then one proceeds to split each group into two parts thereby
548
P. Ii.
BUHGESS
producing four unequal means, one is in duty bound to present and explain all four of the new relationships created, and not just one of them. In the present example, if blacks are overall no more aggressive than whites, but after a cooperative response by “other” they are more aggressive, then after exploitive choices by “other” they should be less aggressive than whites. The failure to present three of the group means must cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions drawn from the fourth, One must further challenge the rationale for using the (n - 1) th choice by “other” as the criterion for splitting the data. The evidence cited refers to the finding that the subject considers the “other’s” strategy on trial (n - 1) in deciding his own strategy on trial n (i.e., his choice on the next iteration of the game). This is not, unfortunately, the parameter considered by Berger and Tedeschi, who examine instead the use of the “zap” option. A very different proposition indeed, I would contend. Later, they explain the differential use of this option in terms of hypothesized retaliatory saving face due to “humiliation” at lower winnings. Now this depends on the total number of cooperative choices by “other” in the previous block of seven trials or even more directly on the net winnings of subjects in a preceding block. This suggests that the authors should have considered differential responses after differentially successful blocks of trials if they wished to test their explanatory hypothesis. Why do the authors designate a cooperative choice by “other” as exhibiting “vulnerability” rather than “cooperation” or even “strength”? Would not an exploitive choice by the subject on his next trial demonstrate his “toughness” just as well as exercising his “zap” option? This sort of speculation is fruitless unless we are told whether the appearance of significantly different means after the split was caused by one or other or both groups giving differential responses depending on the result of “other’s” previous choice. For example, if one group gave similar “zaps” no matter what “other” had just done, then perhaps one is measuring not aggression, but random or ritual behavior, or even an attempt to use the “zap” option as a contingent threat designed to induce cooperation from “other” as is often the purpose of such devices in the PDG. A further point of interest is that since a competitive choice by a subject must result in a loss by “other,” the persistent use of such choices by whites might also be considered “aggressive” on the definition offered by Berger and Tedeschi. In addition, one must note that if one: accepts their argument that use of the “zap” option by blacks is ;I result of attempts to strive for social approval by demonstrating “masculinity” to the white exprrimenter (an indirect argument unsupported by
COMMENT
ON
HERGER
AND
TEDESCHI
549
data from these subjects), then one can hardly be justified in considering the use of the option as a genuine measure of aggression as well. One has also to explain the paradoxes that blacks do not similarly seek to assert “toughness” by using a “tough” competitive strategy in the PDG itself and that compared with “normals,” delinquents also appear to be using the “zap” option to strive for approval from the experimenter. One is tempted to ask why, if they arc so desirous of approval from adults, they commit offenses at all? In their analysis of the effects of opportunity costs on use of the option, Berger and Tedeschi are again more sanguine in their ‘h2” conclusions than the data would appear to warrant. They state that The three way interaction of Opportunity Costs X Race >< Population \vas also significant (F( 6,96) = 10.78, 11 < ,001). If the dependent children are removed from this three way interaction, [a removal of a large group of subjects whose results contradict crucial hypotheses and for which no justification is offered] a clear pattern emerges as is shown in Figure 5. Blacks increased in aggression until costs became excessively high. Whites demonstrated a general tendency to decline in use of aggression as costs went up . . . ( Bracketed comment added. ).
Are these really fair conclusions to draw from Figures 2 and 5P If anything blacks show a tendency to decline in aggression from the second point in the curve (i.e., Opportunity Cost level 5), and what about the striking increclse in white aggression evident at the highest level of opportm~ity cost? If trends mean anything, a further condition at cost level 14 might have reversed all the results. Yet the authors conclude that “black subjects are less sensitive to the costs of using power when aggression cues are present, perhaps because they are less able to discriminate between utilities.“ Firstly, I object that since subjects only played in one condition of the cxperimcnt each, then the question of “discrimination” between different utilities does not strictly arise. Secondly, the authors have an obligation to explain in what way white subjects show discrimination between cost levels 5, 8, and 11 in Figure 2. One suspects that these results arose chiefly because of the deviantly unaggressive behavior of a few white subjects at cost level S, but it really is fruitless to interpret what arc’ clearly curvilinear relationships when only four points arc plotted and on one’ of these (cost level 2) the main contention that blacks arc mart aggressivr is clearly not supported. Hcrgcr and Trdcschi’s attempt to relate their results to urban blacks They argue that blacks ill contemporary America is also unconvincing. aggress retaliativcly to save face when they are frustrated by whites \VIIO tl(~fect on prom&c3 to improve th(bir conditions. Y
550
P. K. BURGESS
argued previously that retaliation tends to follow cooperation by “other.” Perhaps the most telling criticism is that, as the authors concede, their black subjects were drawn from lower socioeconomic status levels than their whites and many of their explanatory hypotheses are applicable to class differences. To what extent then is it justifiable to dwell 011 racial differences in explaining the results? Only the introduction of class variables into the analysis and the partialling of such effects from the results could tell us. Unfortunately, this was omitted and so the only possible verdict is one of “not proven.” It is not this writer’s intention to suggest that Berger and Tedeschi have in any way been concerned to mislead deliberately. Considerations of space must necessarily restrict discussion about possible interpretations of findings. However, it is unfortunate that a desire to produce interpretations consistent with some of the established literature and consequent failure to apply a sufficiently rigorous standard of analysis might result in the acceptance of unjustified and seriously erroneous conclusions. REFERENCES BERGER, S. E., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Aggressive behavior of delinquent, dependent, and “normal” white and black boys in social conflicts, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5, 325370. KOGAN, N., & WALLACH, M. A. Risk taking as a function of the situation, the person, and the group. New directions in psychology III. New York: Holt, 1967. LEFCOURT, H. M., & LADWIG, G. W. The effect of reference group upon negroes’ task persistence in a biracial competitive game. Jourd of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 668-671.