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Agricultural changes in the American—Canadian border zone, 1952–1978
POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY
QUARTERLY.
Vol. 7, No. 1. January
1988, 23-38
Agricultural changes in the American-Canadian border zone, 1954-1978 H. A. REITWA Inrtituut VOOTSoctile Geografie, University of Amsterdam, Jodenbreestraat 2.3, 1011 LV~? Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT. This study analyzes for the period 1954-1978 the effects which changes in the agricultural policies of the United States and Canada have had on changes in crop and livestock production on either side of the common border. An important reason why during the 1950s and 1960s agriculture showed a number of remarkable differences north and south of the American-Canadian boundary is that agricultural policies were not the same in the two countries. The most notable difference was that government intervention in agriculture was much greater in the United States than in Canada. This contrast became weaker during the late 1960s and virtually disappeared between 1970 and 1975 as government involvement decreased drastically in the States while it increased in Canada. Largely as a result of these opposite trends in the countries’ farm policies, transboundary differences in -agriculture were considerably smaller during the mid 1970s than they had been one or two decades earlier.
Introduction geography is the theme centred on the analysis of of policy decisions and laws, especially those clearly observable in the landscape. This ‘law-landscape’ theme, as Kasperson and Minghi (1969: 11) have pointed out, was given major impetus by Whittlesey in the mid 1930s while several decades later it occupied a prominent place in Cohen and Rosenthal’s (197 1) geographical model for political systems analysis (see Muir, 1975: 66-67). Both in his article on ‘The impress of effective central authority upon the landscape’ (1935) and his book The A time-honored
distributional
approach
in political
manifestations
Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography
(1939,
Whittlesey
different
physical
environments.
suggested
laws produce
contrasts
that these contrasts
in man’s
use of identical
can best be seen in a borderland
on opposite
stressed
that
He further
sides of a political
1939: 588). More recently, Prescott (1965: 90-91, 94-99) has made the same point, emphasizing that striking landscape differences frequently occur on opposite sides of a political boundary. He has encouraged students of political geography to pay more attention to ‘the influence of political factors upon the cultural landscape’ (Prescott, 1965: 90), and ‘to examine the extent to which variations in landscape and landuse on either side of a boundary can be explained by the proximity of two different political boundary
(Whittlesey,
0260-9827188101 0023-16 503.00 E 1988 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd
24
Agricultural
changes in the American-Canadian
border :one
systems. and the regulations they have developed’ (Prescott. 1965: 91). To this xe may add that whenever conspicuous transboundary differences occur. they are an almost sure sign that human activities on at least one side of the border are strongly influenced by (past) policy decisions. The importance of the role played by political factors in shaping the man-made environment often becomes particularly apparent when the historical approach is used-an approach which was successfully employed by Whittlesey (1934) in his study of Andorra. and which formed one of the bases for his The Earth and the State. Examples of the use of the historical approach in borderland studies are Daveau (1959) and Albrecht (1974), both of which pay considerable attention to transboundary landscape differences. The reason why historical studies bring out the importance of political factors is that drastic changes in policy result in clearly visible changes in spatial patterns. Thus, the dynamics of the political process is reflected in the dynamics of the landscape. The present study is an attempt to gain insight into the landscape-shaping significance of policy decisions by relating changes in agricultural land use patterns in a border area to changes in agricultural policies on opposite sides of the political dividing line. It is a case study which endeavors to test the following hypothesis: contrasts in crop and livestock production on either side of an international boundary are much greater when the agricultural policies of the two countries involved are markedly different than when government intervention in agriculture is approximately the same on both sides of the boundary. Over the years, crop and livestock production on one side of the American-Canadian boundary has often differed from that on the other side. Despite similarities in climatic, edaphic and topographic conditions, some differences have been quite striking (Van Royen. 1954; Reitsma, 1969, 197 1, 1972). The complex interplay of economic, political. cultural. demographic and other factors usually makes it anything but easy to provide an adequate explanation for the occurrence of transboundary differences (TBDs). And trying to determine to what degree a particular TBD is caused exclusively by the political factor-that is, by policy differences-may be equally difficult. Some TBDs are of recent origin and may only be temporary. whereas others have come into existence many years ago. In the latter case, an attempt at explanation obviously calls for an historical approach (see Reitsma, 1986). In a sense, every explanation is historical in nature because the present is but the past at this moment. For instance, a presently occurring TBD in barley production may well be the result of a past decline in barley acreage on one side of the boundary and/or an increase on the other side. Sometimes, a certain TBD exists simply because a particular process of agricultural change, taking place in both countries, has progressed further on one side of the border line than on the other.’ Clearly, then, a study of agricultural changes in a border zone may be useful for explaining why at a given point in time the boundary stands out as a line separating different rural landscapes. The first objective of this study is to discover and explain the more important differences in agricultural changes which have occurred on either side of the American-Canadian boundary between 1954 and 1978. The second objective is to determine whether and how these differing changes have caused TBDs in crop and livestock production to become either more or less pronounced. The ultimate purpose is to gain insight into the importance of policy as a factor influencing spatial patterns. The area chosen for investigation is exactly the same as that of earlier studies (Reitsma, 1969, 197 1). It is located in the Interior Plains of North America, partly in the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and partly in the states of Montana, North Dakota and Minnesota (see Figure 1). The area measures about 800 X 250 km (500 X 160 miles) and consists of 46 unit areas: 24 in Canada (census districts) and 22 in the United States
H. A. REITS~I.~
25
FIGURE1. Study area. (counties). The major reason for selecting this region is that physical conditions (soil. slope, drainage, climate) are nearly identical north and south of the boundary. This means that TBDs in agricultural production must be related primarily to differences in man-made circumstances, rather than to physical differences. Considering the hypothesis formulated above, it was decided to start the period of investigation in the mid 1950s-when the agricultural policies of the two countries were markedly different-and to end it in the mid to late 1970s-when, for the first time in many years, government intervention in agriculture was much the same on both sides of the boundary. Thus, one would expect to find that by the end of the period agricultural TBDs had lost much of their former conspicuousness. Figures 2 to 6 are based on data from the agricultural censuses of the two countries. The Canadian information pertains to the years 1956, 19613 1966, 1971 and 1976: the American data refer to 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974 and 1978. Only the four leading crops in the study area have been studied: wheat (W), barley (B), oats (0) and flaxseed (F). For every one of the 46 unit areas, each crop was ranked on the basis of the number of hectares of land devoted to its production. The crop grown on the largest number of hectares (in a given year) was ranked first, the crop grown on the second largest number of hectares second, and so on. Using these four rankings, a ‘crop combination’ was derived for each unit area. To give an example: the combination WOFB indicates that wheat ranks first, oats second, flaxseed (or flax) third, and barley fourth (see Figure 4). Likewise, four types of livestock were investigated: milk cows (M), all cattle minus milk cows, or ‘beef cattle’ (C), hogs and pigs (P), and sheep (S).* Using their actual numbers in each unit area, the four types were ranked, and these rankings were subsequently used to determine the ‘livestock combinations’ on which Figure 6 is based.
Changes
in crop production
Figure 2 shows increases and decreases in wheat production for four five-year periods. Three of the four maps display remarkable TBDs. During the first ten years (maps (a) and (b)), increases in most Canadian unit areas contrasted with decreases south of the border. This pattern was reversed during the second half of the 1960s (map (c)). In view of these contrasting changes, it seems almost surprising that no TBD whatsoever shows up on map (d). In fact, TBDs in crop changes are so common (see also Figure 2, maps (e)-(h) and Figure _3),that the absence of a TBD on map(d) in Figure 2 may be considered as somewhat exceptional. However this may be, it is indeed exceptional that between 1969171 and
26
Agricuitural
changes
in the American-Canadian
border
zone
1974176 all 46 unit areas experienced a substantial increase in wheat acreage-30 percent or more in most of them! This unique development will be explained beiow. A comparison of map (a) (wheat) with map (e) (barley) in Figure 2 reveals that the two patterns of change were reversed. The same conclusion can be arrived at when comparing maps (c)i(g) and maps (d)/(h). Conversely, no opposite trends occurred between 1959iGl and 1964fbf (compare maps (b) and (f) in Figure 2), which is surprising considering that in the Interior Plains the production of both wheat and barley rarely increases (or decreases) at the same time. Note, however, that during the 1960s there were opposite trends in barley and oats production (maps (a) and (b) in Figure 3). In addition to the reversed patterns just mentioned, there were striking TBDs in changes in barley production. Maps (e), (f) and (g) in Fgi use 2 illustrate that the international boundary stands out as a line separating areas with contrasting change trends: increases on one side versus decreases on the other. Simiiar TBDs are apparent on maps (a). jb) and(c) in Figwe 3; only map (d) fails to show a TBD.
(a)
idI
WHEAT
1954/S
- 1959/61
(a)
BARLEY
1954/S
(f)
BARLEY
7953161- 1964166
WHEAT
1964/66 - t969/7t
is)
BARLEY
19&‘66
WHEAT
1969/7t - 1974176
(hl
BARLEY
1963/71-
Eiincrease #
aecrea5e “Ochange
FIGURE2. Changes in wheat and barley acreage, 1954156-1974176.
- 1959/6t
- 1969171
1974176
H. A. &ITShlA Ib)
1969/71-
OATS
FIGURE
Changing
patterns
1974/76
W
@
increase
m
decrease
#
no change
27 OATS
FLAXSEED
1959161 - 1969/71
1959/61 - 1974176
3. Selection of crop changes for different periods.
of crop combinations
Map (a) in Figure 4 shows that in 1954156 the relative importance (or rank order) of oats was greater north than south of the boundary. The very same contrast occurred in the westernmost portion of the study area. (No 1954 and 1978 census data on flaxseed production exist for Montana. presumably because flax was an unimportant crop. Assuming that flax did not rank first or second in northeastern Montana in 1954, the 1954156 cropcombination pattern in the western part of the study area-both north and south of the border-was exactly the same as that shown for 1964/66 on map (c).) Map (a) also demonstrates that in 1954156 barley and flax were relatively more important crops in the American than the Canadian area. As a result of an increase in barley production south of the boundary between 1954 and 1959 (Figure Z(e)) and a sharp decline in flax production there during the same period (Reitsma, 1969: 160), map (b) in Figure 4 displays a truly outstanding transboundary contrast in crop combinations. This TBD, like all others shown on the various maps, is all the more remarkable when we realize that natural conditions are essentially the same on either side of the ‘49th parallel’. Incidentally, because wheat is by far the most widely grown crop in the region (except sometimes in the area east of the Red River), increases and decreases in wheat production seldom alter the crop combinations as shown in Figure 4. The 1964166 and 1969/7 1 TBDs were no less impressive than the one for 1959/61. However, between 1959/61 and 1969/71 a dramatic turnabout took place. Comparing maps (b) and (d) in Figure 4 we notice that patterns became reversed during the intervening ten-year period. In 1969/7 1 barley was, for the first time, more important than oats in much of the Canadian area, while oats outranked barley in the majority of the American counties. This particular TBD did not last long, as can be learned from map (e). On the contrary, in 1974/76 there was little evidence of a TBD in crop combinations. In 1978, American census data were collected a year earlier than might have been expected. Because the three-year difference between 1978 (US Census) and 1981 (Canadian Census) was considered too large for a meaningful comparison, map (f) is partly the same as
Agricultural
28
changes in the American -Canadiun border
(a)
1954/56
Id)
1969/71
(b)
1959/61
(4
1974/76
(cl 1964/66
(f)
1976/78
D
Crop combinallons which began with WO or OW
/
Crop combmatlons which begin wth WB or EW
@jYjj
Crop combmalions which begin &h
WF
m
Crop combinalions which begln wth BO or OB Crop combtnation
/
FIGURE4. Crop combinations,
zone
OFWB
No data on flaxseed
1954/56-1976178.
map (e): both depict the Canadian
situation for 1976. As a consequence, comparison of maps (e) and (f) gives the possibly misleading impression that few agricultural changes took place around 1976. Be this as it may, map(f) does show that in 1976/78 crop combinations in southernmost Saskatchewan differed from those in neighboring areas south of the 49th parallel. Apparently, it makes a difference whether a farmer operates just north or just south of the border line. Canadian farmers often make different decisions from American farmers. We could come to a somewhat similar conclusion when comparing areas east and west of the Red River. In this paper, however, we are not interested in this latter contrast, for it has nothing to do with the boundary. Besides, an important reason why crop farming on one side of the Red River often differs from that on the other side is that soil and drainage conditions are quite different on opposite sides of the floodplain.
Changes
in livestock
production
and livestock
combinations
The maps in Figure S display a selection of change patterns for different time periods. Perhaps most notable is the long-term and virtually uninterrupted decline in numbers of milk cows (map (d)), but because this trend occurred on both sides of the boundary, it has little relevance for the present study. Furthermore, with many unit areas having experienced a 60 to 90 percent decrease between 1954156 and 1976178, dairy cows have come to play an insignificant role in the livestock combinations found in the study area-a situation which resembles that of flax with regard to crop combinations.3
29
H. A. &ITShM
Ia)
BEEF CATTLE
1954!56 - 1976178
(b)
PIGS
SHEEP
1964/66 - 1969171
(d)
MILK COWS
m
E
1969/71-
1974176
1954156 - 1974176
Increase
decrease no change
FIGURE5. Selection of livestock changes for different periods. At first sight, map (a) appears to show the most important TBD, all the more so because beef production is a significant economic activity in the region, especially north of the border. However, beef cattle outnumber the other types of livestock by so much in most unit areas, that changes (i.e. decreases) are rarely large enough to bring about changes in livestock combinations.” Put differently, an understanding of changes in beef cattle numbers does not by itself help us much to explain TBDs in livestock combinations or changes in those same TBDs. Apart from the contrasting change patterns portrayed in Figure 5, few trends can be discerned which differed markedly on opposite sides of the 49th parallel. This explains why the distribution patterns of livestock combinations in Figure 6 vary little over time. Thus, the sharp TBD which manifested itself in 1954/56 (map (a))-caused by a comparatively high density of hogs in Canada and a very large sheep population in the USA-was maintained until 1964/66 (see maps (b) and(c)). Although somewhat weakened by 196917 1, the TBD also shows up on map (d). Following a rapid and steady decline in sheep numbers (as well as a small increase in the number of hogs) on the American side of the border, this hog/sheep contrast began to become less pronounced around the mid-1970s (map (e)) and had disappeared almost completely a few years later (map (f)). The result has been that livestock combinations in the American area have come to resemble those in the Canadian area so closely that by 1976/78 the international boundary could no longer be considered as a line demarcating areas with significant differences in livestock production. The series of livestock-combination maps in Figure 6 reveals far less change over time than does the set of crop-combination maps in Figure 4. Nothing like the reversal of cropcombination patterns which took place between 1959/61 and 1969/71 can be detected in Figure 6. On the contrary, livestock-combination patterns have been quite stable over the years. This relative lack of change should not surprise us too much because it is more difficult and, at the same time, far more costly for a farmer to switch from one type of livestock to another than it is to replace one grain crop by another. An attempt
at explanation
Having described the more outstanding TBDs in agricultural changes and the effects thereof on TBDs in crop and livestock combinations, we now turn to the most important objective of
30 (a)
Agricuitural
charges in the American-Canadian
border _-one
Id) 1969/71
1954/56
(b) 1959/61
(c) 1964/66
(f) 1976/78
a
Livestock
combmaflons
which
begr
with
CS or SC
‘7
Livestock
combtnaltons
1
Lwestock
comb!natlons
which
begln
with
CP
‘7 A
Livestock
comblnatlon
FIGURE6.
or PC
which
beg#n wth
CM
MPCS
Livestock combinations, 1954156-1976178.
this study: providing an explanation for the changes in the magnitude livestock combinations. Four questions need to be answered:
of TBDs in crop and
1. Why did the TBD in crop combinations become more pronounced between 1954/56 and 1959/61? 2. Why was the 1959/61 pattern of crop combinations reversed ten years later? 3. What caused the TBD in crop combinations to become weaker after 1969 71? 4. How do we explain that the striking TBD in livestock combinations which existed in 1959/61 had all but vanished by 1976/78? Careful examination and comparison questions can be restated as follows:
of Figures 2 to 6 should make it clear that the four
1. Why did flax production decline and barley production increase south of the boundary between 1954 and 1959, and why did barley production decrease north of the boundary between 1956 and 1961? 2. Why did the American area experience an increase in oats acreage and a decrease in barley acreage between 1959 and 1969, while these trends were reversed in the Canadian area between 1961 and 1971? 3. Why did oats production in most of the American area and barley production in most of the Canadian area lose importance after 196917 1? 4. What caused the large and persistent decline in sheep numbers south of the 491h parallel after 1959?
H. A. REITSMA
31
Quedon
1. The decline in flax production-south as well as north of the border-was caused by unfavorable weather and falling prices. During the early 1950s. flax had become an important crop in parts of the Interior Plains. A combination of factors-high prices for flax-seed, above average amounts of rainfall, and declining wheat acreage due to overproduction-had encouraged farmers to greatly expand production. In North Dakota as a whole, production increased by 133 percent between 195 2 and 1957, and temporarily flax ranked as the second crop in many counties. Then, in 1957, crop failure struck as a result of drought, with yields being less than half as high as in previous years. As a consequence, farmers drastically cut back their flax production in 1958, on average by some 30 percent. In subsequent years, production further declined because of disappointing yields for several years in succession.s Moreover, flax prices in North Dakota were anything but attractive during the late 195Os, causing the crop to lose its former competitive strength vis-ci-t,ir other grains. After 1959, flax continued to lose ground in most of the study area (see map (d) in Figure 3), and since the 1960s it has been a relatively minor crop nearly everywhere in the region (maps (d)-(f) in Figure 4). In contrast to most agricultural changes in the study area between 1954156 and 1976178, the decline in flax production cannot be explained in terms of policy changes. The 1954-59 increase in barley production in the American portion of the study area was a direct consequence of a sharp reduction in wheat acreage. Prior to 1954. the USA produced large surpluses of wheat, resulting in growing stocks and mounting storage costs. Through the use of such production control measures as acreage allotments, marketing quotas and land retirement programs, the government tried to reduce the output of wheat. These Wheat Program efforts were successful, not only in the study area (map (a), Figure 2), but also elsewhere in the country. Nationwide, the number of hectares sown to wheat plummeted from 32 million in 1953 to 23 million in 1959 (Cochrane and Ryan. 1976: 203). The decrease in wheat acreage made possible an increase in barley acreage from four million to seven million hectares between 1953 and 1959 (Cochrane and Ryan. 1976: 183). Much of this expansion took place in the area studied here (map (e), Figure 2). Increased barley output in the USA caused barley prices in Canada to drop precipitously between 1952 and 1959: by 28 percent in Saskatchewan and by 30 percent in AIanitoba (Canada Year Book, 1960: 471). Another consequence was a reduction in exports of Canadian barley to the USA. Considering this combination of lower profits and reduced exports, we can understand that barley production took a nose dive in the Canadian area: in nearly all 24 unit areas it fell by more than 50 percent. An additional reason for die large decrease was the very substantial increase in wheat acreage north of the border (map (a), Figure 2). Whereas wheat prices in North Dakota dropped almost 14 percent between 1954 and 1959, they rose approximately 40 percent in Saskatchewan and Manitoba in the period 1956-61.
Question 2. Between 1961 and 1968, Canada’s total wheat acreage climbed from 10 to 12 million ha. This increase was largely a response to unusully large wheat sales to China (in the years 1961-66) and the USSR (1963-66). After 1966, wheat shipments to these two countries and Eastern Europe-as well as to the European Community (due to import restrictions)-were appreciably smaller, causing total wheat exports to dwindle from 15 million tons in 1966 to 9 million tons in 1967, 1968 and 1969 (Foreign Agriculture, 4 January 1971). At the same time, Canada’s year-end carryover wheat stocks jumped from 148 million hectoliters in 1966 to 355 million in 1970 (Canada Year Book. various years). This latter amount, the highest on record at that moment, was the equivalent of two years’ market absorption (i.e. exports plus domestic consumption).
32
.4gricultural
chatqes
in the American-Canadinn
border zone
Alarmed by these developments, the Canadian government decided to take steps aimed at a reduction of the output of surplus wheat. In February 1970, it launched a Wheat Reduction Programme, popularly known as ‘Operation LIFT’ (Lower Inventory For Tomorrow). This one-year program offered payments to farmers who converted 1969 wheat land to perennial forage or summer fallow (e.g. Foreign Agriculture. 3 August and 7 September 1970; Crown and Heady, 1972: 18; OECD, 1973: 40). Largely as a result of Operation LIFT, Canada’s wheat acreage in 1970 amounted to no more than five million hectares, down 50 percent from 1969 (e.g. OECD, 1973: 13). Although Sahi and Craddock (1971) have come to the questionable conclusion that Canada’s wheat area would have declined nearly as much if there had been no LIFT program, the fact remains that Canadian wheat stocks were down by 129 million hectoliters by the end of the year. Manitoba’s total wheat area declined from 1.4 million hectares in 1969 to 0.57 in 1970, and Saskatchewan’s from 6.7 to 3.2 million hectares. Despite the fact that the LIFT program was designed in such a way that it would discourage a mass switch from wheat to barley and other prairie crops (Foreign Agriculture, 3 August 1970). it did result in substantial increases in barley acreage (OECD, 1973: 14): in Manitoba from 0.5 million hectares in 1969 to 0.9 million in 197 1, and in Saskatchewan from 1.1 to 2.3 million hectares.6 Operation LIFT did not lead to increased oats production; the very gradual decline which had begun in the early 1950s simply continued. This long-term trend is presumably related to the disappearance of draft horses and the replacement of oats by barley as a feed crop (United States, Department of Agriculture, 1972: 33). Besides, Sonntag and Ketilson (1980: 8) ascribe the decline to rational, economic decisions by the farmers, pointing out that oats has been a less profitable prairie crop than rapeseed, mustard seed and barley. After having expanded from 3.6 million hectares in 1952 to 6.9 million hectares in 1959, USA barley acreage fell back to 4.0 million hectares by 1969. This decrease appears to have been brought about by government policies. Faced with increasingly burdensome carryover surpluses, further aggravated by the termination of export subsidies for barley and other feed grains, Washington introduced two new land retirement programs: the 1962 Cropland Conversion Program and the 1965 Cropland Adjustment Program (OECD, 1974: 72). Starting in 1962, barley producers were required to curtail plantings in order to qualify for price support loans. In other words, they were paid to idle land (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 199). The result was a massive diversion of barley land, ranging from 1.0 million hectares in 1962 to 1.8 million in 1969 (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 183). It stands to reason that these measures were responsible for the widespread decline in barley production in the American portion of the study area between 1959 and 1969. From 1959 to 1964, oats production increased slightly in all but three of the 22 American unit areas. This was followed by substantial increases in all 22 areas in the years 1964-1969. Altogether, oats production nearly doubled between 1959 and 1969 (map(b), Figure 3). After 1969, oats production underwent a rapid decline throughout the American area, and by 1974 (and 1978) it was less than it had been in 1959. No explanation has been found for the oats increase between 1959 and 1969. Because US census data are for harvested (instead of planted) acreage, and 1959 was a drought year in the Interior Plains, it is likely that the small increase between 1959 and 1964 was the result of more favorable weather conditions in 1964 than in 1959. The large increase after 1964, however, remains a puzzle, especially because in the US as a whole oats production declined almost continuously during the period 1955-1973: from 19 million hectares (planted) to 8 million hectares (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 184)’
H. AREITSMA
33
Searching through the literature, there is no reason to believe that the 1964-1969 increase in oats production south of the boundary was caused by: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
comparatively favorable oats prices; the relative absence of governmental efforts to idle land previously seeded to oats; an increase in the number of farms raising riding horses; increases in the number of cattle and/or swine in the area; or highly favorable weather conditions in 1969.
This leads us to conjecture that it may well have been stimulated by the large reduction in barley acreage. With many hectares of land taken out of barley production (through government-induced diversions), it seems reasonable to suspect that many farmers must have seeded more land to oats for the simple reason that in the Interior Plains they can grow few alternative crops.8 Question 3.
The year 1972 has been described as a ‘historic turning point’ or ‘watershed’ in North American agriculture (Brandow, 1977: 71; Tweeten, 1977: 38). After many years of overproduction, mounting wheat surpluses, large stocks of feed grains, enormous storage costs, and numerous efforts by Ottawa and especially Washington to reduce the production of wheat and other grains (e.g. Canada’s Operation LIFT and America’s Wheat and Feed Grains Programs), a sudden surge in demand in 1972 greatly improved the agricultural situation in both countries. Particularly important were the huge purchases of wheat by the USSR and China (Foreign Agriculture, 28 August and 23 October 1972; United States, Department of Agriculture, 1975: 9). But also sales of feed grains soared. These developments signalled the beginning of the ‘Great Agricultural Transformation’ in North American agriculture (e.g. Brandow, 1977: 80). Market prices of wheat shot up from about $3.83 per hectoliter in 1971 to about $13.21 in 1973. Canadian wheat exports increased from 10.7 million tons in 1970 to 13.8 million tons in 1972, while American exports of wheat plus wheat flour nearly doubled in just one year: from 17.2 to 30.6 million tons. The immediate result was a sharp decline in wheat stocks. Another consequence was a drastic change in farm policy. By curtailing government intervention, farm policy lost much of its former influence. In the USA, acreage control and land retirement programs were discontinued, and by 1974 practically all previously idled cropland had been returned to production. America’s total wheat acreage expanded from 20 million hectares in 1970 to 24 million hectares in 1973. The Canadian total jumped from 5.1 to 9.7 million hectares. Figure 2 (map (d)) shows that, for the first time in 20 years, changes in wheat production were the same on both sides of the border line; all 46 unit areas registered (impressive) gains. With large increases in wheat production throughout the study area it is understandable that barley production declined during the early 1970s (Figure 2) map(h)). Only the central portion of the American area (and a small area in southern Manitoba) experienced increases, the probable reason being that beef production gained in importance there between 1969 and 1974. According to Figure 3 (map (c)), oats production between 1969171 and 1974176 decreased nearly everywhere in the study area-only six Canadian unit areas formed exceptions. South of the boundary, this decline was a recontinuation of a long-term downward trend, which had been reversed temporarily during the late 1960s (see above). North of the boundary, the same long-term decline was apparent in most unit areas, The increase in two of them was so small-less than two percent-as to require no explanation. In the remaining four unit areas, however, it was rather substantial: about 26 percent. Attempts to
34
Agricultural
changes in the American-Canadian
border :one
account for this ‘anomaly’ have not been successful. It could be that because of disappointing results with the growing of mixed grains (e.g. oats and rye on the same field) in previous years, farmers returned to raising individual crops on separate fields. But this is merely a conjecture. Question 4.
Over the years, livestock production on one side of the 49th parallel has resembled that on the other side in many respects. There were some notable differences, however. First, livestock densities generally have been higher north of the border as beef cattle, dairy cows and swine were more numerous there (Reitsma, 1969). A second difference was, and to some extent still is, the much greater importance of sheep raising south of the political dividing line. It is above all this latter contrast which was responsible for the striking TBD in livestock combinations prior to the early 1970s (see Figure 6). During the Korean War (1950-53), America’s wool stocks became all but exhausted due to increased demand for wool (for military uniforms, blankets, etc.). The government became concerned and began to rebuild the stockpile for national security reasons. Imports were expanded, while price supports were introduced to encourage American farmers to produce more wool. Soon, imports had increased so much that Washington became alarmed and a special program to promote domestic wool production was adopted: the National Wool Act of 1954. The price supports were replaced by direct payments to wool producers. Under the Act, farmers were offered a guaranteed incentive price of 62 cents per pound of shorn wool, which was well above the market price of about 42 cents. The effect of the price support program (1950-54) and the special promotion program (after 1954) was an unprecedented increase in sheep numbers: in North Dakota alone from 398000 in 1950 to 732000 in 1961, which compares with only 90000 in the entire province of Manitoba in that same year. Because of the growing replacement of wool by synthetic fibers, the sheep population began to go down again after 1961 (Foreign Agriculture, 22 February 197 1 and 14 October 1974). In an attempt to halt this decline the incentive price was raised several times, and in 1970 it stood at 72 cents, which was more than double the average market price at that time (Cotton and Wool Situation, May 1978). These costly measures to maintain output were to no avail (Schnittker, 1974: 15). Sheep numbers declined further: in the USA as a whole from 27 million in 1964 to 21 million in 1969, 16 million in 1974, and 12 million in 1978. In the American portion of the study area the number dwindled from 239000 in 1964 to 57000 in 1978. The Canadian area, too, experienced a decline: from 42 500 in 1966 to 16 800 in 1976. Because this latter decrease has not affected the TBD in livestock combinations. it is of little relevance to this study. The decline south of the boundary, however, has meant that in most unit areas sheep occupied a lower rank position in 1978 than 15 or 20 years earlier. As indicated by Figure 6 (map (f)), hogs outnumbered sheep in much of the American area in 1978. In other words, the increasing use of artificial fibers in garments, blankets. carpets and other consumer goods has wiped out the conspicuous TBD in livestock combinations which existed during the 1950s and 1960s a TBD which was much more a product of government policy than of economic forces.
Conclusion Figures 4 and 6 clearly demonstrate
that TBDs in crop and livestock combinations were less pronounced in the mid to late 1970s than they were during the 1960s. A most important reason for this change is that the agricultural policies of the two countries have become more
H. A. fi1TSM.A
35
alike over the years. At the same time, foreign trade policies have become more alike. During the 1960s Canada sold large amounts of wheat (and other grains) to communist countries, whereas the United States did not. The differences in trade relations were in no small measure responsible for TBDs in agricultural policies. From about 1971, when the USA began to export large quantities of feed grains and wheat to the USSR and other communist countries, American farm policy came to resemble that of Canada in a number of ways. When comparing the agricultural policies of the two countries for the period 1954/561976/78, we notice that trends became reversed around 1970. Prior to that year, American farm policy was characterized by a great deal of government intervention. On the one hand, there was generous support of farm product prices-sometimes well above marketdetermined levels-resulting in overproduction and the accumulation of stocks. On the other hand, the US government employed a host of measures aimed at output and surplus reduction (e.g. Robinson, 1970: 120- 12 1). Canada’s agricultural policy, by contrast, was more market-oriented as there was less willingness to support prices and impose production controls (Shaffner et al., 1980: 547). Government intervention in Canada was largely limited to price stabilization measures and promotion of exports, especially wheat. through quality controls and subsidized transportation. During the late 196Os, and even more so after 1970, Washington moved away from expensive support programs and adopted a more market-oriented policy (e.g. United States Committee for Economic Development, 1974: 4Off; Paarlberg, 1977: 200; Tweeten, 1977: 41). This new trend became particularly obvious in 1972 (e.g. Brandow, 1977: 80). The sudden surge in world demand for wheat, feed grains and oilseeds, most of which had been surplus crops in the USA for many years, made it possible for American farmers to compete effectively around the world. Price supports were lowered or eliminated. and most output controls were abandoned.9 Much of the 25 million ha of cropland that was out of production in 1972 had been returned to production by 1974. Conversely, agricultural policy in Canada after 1970 became characterized by more government involvement (Warley, 1974: 112; 1977: 17). In addition to the LIFT program, Ottawa introduced various deficiency-payment programs in order to assure producers adequate incomes. For example, in 1976 the Western Grains Stabilization Programme was implemented, guaranteeing that the net cash flow to commercial grain producers on the prairies would not fall in any given year below the average of the previous five years (Foreign Agriculture, 30 October 1978). The underlying philosophy was that the entire nation should share the risk of severe fluctuations in farm incomes (Warley, 1977: 17; Shaffner et al., 1980: 548ff). Clearly, then, during the first half of the 1970s American and Canadian policy responses to problems of instability and low incomes in farming moved in opposite directions, that is, closer to one another. In the USA the role of government in agriculture was reduced; in Canada it was expanded. In view of these policy changes, it is hardly surprising that by 1976/78 TBDs in agricultural land use had lost much of their former strength. The striking transboundary contrasts which stood out on aerial photographs taken around 1960 (as well as on LANDSAT images taken in the early 198Os), were for a number of years considerably less conspicuous. to The type of agriculture found in a region is shaped by a wide variety of factors. One of these is the political factor, especially the package of governmental measures to influence agricultural production. Students interested in determining the impact of (farm) policy on agricultural land use patterns may find it helpful to
36
Agricultural
changes in the Amerikan-Canadian
border zone
1. focus their attention on areas bisected by an international boundary; 2. attempt to relate agricultural changes to policy changes; or 3. combine these two approaches, as has been done here. It is hoped that this case study makes some contribution to the realization that the political factor, so often neglected in rural landscape studies, should not be ignored when trying to explain the many different ways in which humans use their environment.
Acknowledgments Thanks are due to Carl Nielsen (University of Washington) and Jan ter Haar (University Amsterdam) for the fine job they did drafting the 29 maps.
of
Notes 1. For example, before World War LI mechanization proceeded more rapidly on American than Canadian farms, resulting in a lower density of draft horses in North Dakota than in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. After the war, mechanization made rapid strides in southern Canada, causing the number of horses there to decline faster than south of the border, and by 1960 densities were roughly the same on both sides of the line. After 1960, when Canada still witnessed a decrease in draft horses, an increase in riding horses began to take place in the USA. Before long, horse densities were appreciably higher south than north of the boundary (Reitsma, 1972: 8). 2. The symbol P instead of H is used because in earlier studies H referred to horses. .An S (swine) could not be used because that symbol stands for sheep. 3. In 1976/78, flax ranked fourth in all but three of the 46 unit areas. Milk cows ranked fourth in 26 areas and third in 18 areas. 4. In 1976/78, beef cattle ranked first in 41 areas and second in the remaining five areas-all next to the Red River. 5. Following a more than tenfold increase in area between 1949 and 1957, Canada’s total flax area fell from 1.4 million hectares in 1957 to 0.57 million hectares in 1962. 6. Canada’s barley exports jumped from 657 000 tons (or 12 percent of the world total) in 1969 to 4 million tons (or 33 percent) in 1971, making Canada the world’s leading barley exporter (United States, 1975). 7. American output dropped from 527 million hectoliters in 1959 to 235 million in 1973. Despite this decline, carryover stocks did not become smaller. On the contrary, they reached a peak in 1971, suggesting that over the years the demand for oats had declined substantially. 8. The same reasoning may explain part of the increase in wheat production in the American area between 1964 and 1969 (Figure 2, map (c)). 9. Since 1975, the trend in American agriculture has been back to more intervention. and in 1978 acreage restrictions and higher farm price supports were implemented. Five years later, in the face of a giant crop glut, the Reagan administration persuaded grain (and cotton) farmers not to plant crops on a total of 33 million ha. Farmers who signed up for the program received cash payments for taking 20 percent of their land out of production. Growers who retired an additional 10 to 30 percent of their land could collect an extra payment-in-kind, the so-called PM program (NerusweeR, 4 April 1983). Canadian farmers in 1983 were also encouraged to ctutail production of wheat and barley (Globe and Mail, 6 April 1983). 10. For a beautiful illustration of how conspicuous and visibly apparent in the landscape agricultural contrasts can be, see the front cover of Norris and Haring’s (1980) textbook on political geography. The LANDSAT photograph shown was taken some 300 km west of the area studied here.
37
H. A. REITS&IA
References ALBRECHT,V. (1974). Der Einj’uss desdeutsch~ranrdsischen Siidlichen
Oberrheingebiet.
Freiburger
Geographische
BRANDOW, G. E. (1977). AgriculturalPolicy
Freiburg: Hefte 14.
Geographisches
Grenre aufdie Gestultungder
Institut
Kulturlandschaft
der Hubert-Ludwigs-Universitlt
im
Freiburg,
Agricultural production, prices and costs: how have the farmers fared? In Food and (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ed.) pp. 71-9 1. Washington,
DC.: AEIPPR. CANADA, D~ML”IIONBUREAUOF STATISTICS(various years). Canada of Agriculture. Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer. CANADA, DohttNtoN BUREAUOF STATISTICS(various years). Canada Year Book. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer. COCHRANE,W. W. AND RYAN, M. E. (1976). American Farm Policy, 29448-2973. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. COHEN, S. B. AND ROSENTHAL,L. D. (1971). A geographical model for political systems analysis. Geographical Review 61, 5-31. CROWN, R. W. AND HEADY, E. 0. (1972). Policy Integration
in Canadian Agricuhre. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press. DAVEAU, S. (1959). ,!.es r&gionsfrontalihes de la montagne Jwassienne. Lyon: Institut des Etudes Rhodaniennes de l’llniversite de Lyon. Memoires et documents 14. Globe and Mail (6 April 1983). KASPERSON,R. E. AND MIXHI, J. V., EDS(1969). The Structure o/Political Geography. Chicago: hldine. MUIR, R. (1975). Modern Political Geography. London: Macmillan. Newmeek (4 April 1983). NORR~, R. E. AND HARING, L. L. (1980). Political Geography. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill. OECD (1973). Agricubural Policy in Canada. Paris: OECD. OECD (1974). Agricultural Policy in the United States. Paris: OECD. PAARLBERG,D. (1977). A market-oriented agricultural policy and its implications for the Farm Bill. In Foodand Agricultural Policy (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ed.) pp. 197-203. Washington, D.C.: AEIPPR. PRESCOTT,J. R. V. (1965). The Geography ofFrontiersand Boundaries. Chicago: Aldine. REITSMA,H. A. (1969). Crop and livestock dzyferences on opposite sides of the United States-Canada boundary. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin. REITSLIA, H. A. (1971). Crop and livestock production in the vicinity of the United States-Canada border. Professional Geographer 23, 216-223. REITSMA, H. A. (1972). Areal differentiation along the United States-Canada border. Tijdzcbrifr VOOI Economiscbe
en Sociole Geografie
REITSMA,H. A. (1986).
Agricultural
63, 2-10.
transboundary
differences in the Okanagan
region. Journal o/‘RuralStudies
2, 53-62.
ROBINSON,K. L. (1970). Commodity policies and programs. In Contours of Change-the Yearbook of Agriculture 2970 (USDA, ed.) pp. 118-123. Washington, D.C.: USDA. SAHI, R. K. AND CRADDOCK,W. J. (1971). Estimating the effects of operation LIFT on 1970 prairie land utilization. Canadian Farm &onomics 6, l-7. SXNTTKER, J. A. (1974). US agricultural policy in relation to world trade. In U.S. Agriculture in a World Context: Policies and Approaches for the Next Decade (Johnson, D. G. and Schnittker. J. A., eds) pp. 6-26. New York: Praeger. SHAFMR, R., QUINN, F. J. AND CARROLL,J. E. (1980). Other replenishable resources. In Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Rekztions (Beigie, C. E. and Hero, Jr., A. 0.. eds) Vol. 2, pp. 541-572. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. SONNTAG, B. H. AND KETILXIN, N. D. (1980). The economics of oat production in the prairie provinces. Chadian Farm Economics 15, 1-9. TWEETEN, L. G. (1977). Agricultural policy: a review of legislation, programs, and policy. In Food and A&cultural Policy (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ed.) pp. 29-58. Washington, D.C.: AEIPPR. UNITED STATEZ(various years). Census of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: Government Printer. UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE,BUREAUOF THE CENSUS(various years). Census of’ ‘4grtiultirre. Washington, D.C.: Government Printer. UNITEDSTATES,COMMI~E FORECONOMICDEVELOPME.~(1974). A New U.S. Farm PoIicyfor Changing World Food Needs. New York: CED. UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENTOFAGRICULTURE(1970-1978). Foreign Agriculture. Washington. DC.: USDA. UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENTOF AGFXUL~URE(1972). Canada: Growth Potential of the Grain and Livestock
38
Agricultural
changes in the Amertian-Canadian
Sectors. Washington,
border zone
D.C.: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Economic Repon 77. Canada i &port Market Developmentioor Agrtculturai Products. Washington, D.C.: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report 107. UNITED STATES, DEPARTMESTOF AGRICULTURE(1978-1979). Cotron and Wool.Sitw~ron. Washington, D.C.: USDA. VAX ROMN, W. (1954). The Agricultural Resources of the Wo+ld. Atlas of the World’s Resources, Vol. 1. New York: Prentice-Hall. WARLEY,T. K. (1974). Canada, Australia and New Zealand in international trade. In US. Agriculture in a WorLd Context: Policies and Approaches for the Next Decade (Johnson, D. G. and Schnittker, J. A., eds) pp. 103-l 28. New York: Praeger. WARLEY, T. K. (1977). Agriculture in an Interdependent World: U.S. and Chadian Perspecfives. Montreal and Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee. WHIITLESEY, D. S. (1934). Andorra’s autonomy. Journal of Modem History 6, 147-155. WHITTLESEY,D. S. (1935). The impress of effective central authority upon the landscape. Annals offhe Assocrixtion of American Geographers 25, 85-97. WHITTLESEY,D. S. (1939). The Earth and the State: A Study o/Political Geography. New York: Henry Holt & co. UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE: (1975).
GEOGRAPHY
QUARTERLY.
Vol. 7, No. 1. January
1988, 23-38
Agricultural changes in the American-Canadian border zone, 1954-1978 H. A. REITWA Inrtituut VOOTSoctile Geografie, University of Amsterdam, Jodenbreestraat 2.3, 1011 LV~? Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT. This study analyzes for the period 1954-1978 the effects which changes in the agricultural policies of the United States and Canada have had on changes in crop and livestock production on either side of the common border. An important reason why during the 1950s and 1960s agriculture showed a number of remarkable differences north and south of the American-Canadian boundary is that agricultural policies were not the same in the two countries. The most notable difference was that government intervention in agriculture was much greater in the United States than in Canada. This contrast became weaker during the late 1960s and virtually disappeared between 1970 and 1975 as government involvement decreased drastically in the States while it increased in Canada. Largely as a result of these opposite trends in the countries’ farm policies, transboundary differences in -agriculture were considerably smaller during the mid 1970s than they had been one or two decades earlier.
Introduction geography is the theme centred on the analysis of of policy decisions and laws, especially those clearly observable in the landscape. This ‘law-landscape’ theme, as Kasperson and Minghi (1969: 11) have pointed out, was given major impetus by Whittlesey in the mid 1930s while several decades later it occupied a prominent place in Cohen and Rosenthal’s (197 1) geographical model for political systems analysis (see Muir, 1975: 66-67). Both in his article on ‘The impress of effective central authority upon the landscape’ (1935) and his book The A time-honored
distributional
approach
in political
manifestations
Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography
(1939,
Whittlesey
different
physical
environments.
suggested
laws produce
contrasts
that these contrasts
in man’s
use of identical
can best be seen in a borderland
on opposite
stressed
that
He further
sides of a political
1939: 588). More recently, Prescott (1965: 90-91, 94-99) has made the same point, emphasizing that striking landscape differences frequently occur on opposite sides of a political boundary. He has encouraged students of political geography to pay more attention to ‘the influence of political factors upon the cultural landscape’ (Prescott, 1965: 90), and ‘to examine the extent to which variations in landscape and landuse on either side of a boundary can be explained by the proximity of two different political boundary
(Whittlesey,
0260-9827188101 0023-16 503.00 E 1988 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd
24
Agricultural
changes in the American-Canadian
border :one
systems. and the regulations they have developed’ (Prescott. 1965: 91). To this xe may add that whenever conspicuous transboundary differences occur. they are an almost sure sign that human activities on at least one side of the border are strongly influenced by (past) policy decisions. The importance of the role played by political factors in shaping the man-made environment often becomes particularly apparent when the historical approach is used-an approach which was successfully employed by Whittlesey (1934) in his study of Andorra. and which formed one of the bases for his The Earth and the State. Examples of the use of the historical approach in borderland studies are Daveau (1959) and Albrecht (1974), both of which pay considerable attention to transboundary landscape differences. The reason why historical studies bring out the importance of political factors is that drastic changes in policy result in clearly visible changes in spatial patterns. Thus, the dynamics of the political process is reflected in the dynamics of the landscape. The present study is an attempt to gain insight into the landscape-shaping significance of policy decisions by relating changes in agricultural land use patterns in a border area to changes in agricultural policies on opposite sides of the political dividing line. It is a case study which endeavors to test the following hypothesis: contrasts in crop and livestock production on either side of an international boundary are much greater when the agricultural policies of the two countries involved are markedly different than when government intervention in agriculture is approximately the same on both sides of the boundary. Over the years, crop and livestock production on one side of the American-Canadian boundary has often differed from that on the other side. Despite similarities in climatic, edaphic and topographic conditions, some differences have been quite striking (Van Royen. 1954; Reitsma, 1969, 197 1, 1972). The complex interplay of economic, political. cultural. demographic and other factors usually makes it anything but easy to provide an adequate explanation for the occurrence of transboundary differences (TBDs). And trying to determine to what degree a particular TBD is caused exclusively by the political factor-that is, by policy differences-may be equally difficult. Some TBDs are of recent origin and may only be temporary. whereas others have come into existence many years ago. In the latter case, an attempt at explanation obviously calls for an historical approach (see Reitsma, 1986). In a sense, every explanation is historical in nature because the present is but the past at this moment. For instance, a presently occurring TBD in barley production may well be the result of a past decline in barley acreage on one side of the boundary and/or an increase on the other side. Sometimes, a certain TBD exists simply because a particular process of agricultural change, taking place in both countries, has progressed further on one side of the border line than on the other.’ Clearly, then, a study of agricultural changes in a border zone may be useful for explaining why at a given point in time the boundary stands out as a line separating different rural landscapes. The first objective of this study is to discover and explain the more important differences in agricultural changes which have occurred on either side of the American-Canadian boundary between 1954 and 1978. The second objective is to determine whether and how these differing changes have caused TBDs in crop and livestock production to become either more or less pronounced. The ultimate purpose is to gain insight into the importance of policy as a factor influencing spatial patterns. The area chosen for investigation is exactly the same as that of earlier studies (Reitsma, 1969, 197 1). It is located in the Interior Plains of North America, partly in the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and partly in the states of Montana, North Dakota and Minnesota (see Figure 1). The area measures about 800 X 250 km (500 X 160 miles) and consists of 46 unit areas: 24 in Canada (census districts) and 22 in the United States
H. A. REITS~I.~
25
FIGURE1. Study area. (counties). The major reason for selecting this region is that physical conditions (soil. slope, drainage, climate) are nearly identical north and south of the boundary. This means that TBDs in agricultural production must be related primarily to differences in man-made circumstances, rather than to physical differences. Considering the hypothesis formulated above, it was decided to start the period of investigation in the mid 1950s-when the agricultural policies of the two countries were markedly different-and to end it in the mid to late 1970s-when, for the first time in many years, government intervention in agriculture was much the same on both sides of the boundary. Thus, one would expect to find that by the end of the period agricultural TBDs had lost much of their former conspicuousness. Figures 2 to 6 are based on data from the agricultural censuses of the two countries. The Canadian information pertains to the years 1956, 19613 1966, 1971 and 1976: the American data refer to 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974 and 1978. Only the four leading crops in the study area have been studied: wheat (W), barley (B), oats (0) and flaxseed (F). For every one of the 46 unit areas, each crop was ranked on the basis of the number of hectares of land devoted to its production. The crop grown on the largest number of hectares (in a given year) was ranked first, the crop grown on the second largest number of hectares second, and so on. Using these four rankings, a ‘crop combination’ was derived for each unit area. To give an example: the combination WOFB indicates that wheat ranks first, oats second, flaxseed (or flax) third, and barley fourth (see Figure 4). Likewise, four types of livestock were investigated: milk cows (M), all cattle minus milk cows, or ‘beef cattle’ (C), hogs and pigs (P), and sheep (S).* Using their actual numbers in each unit area, the four types were ranked, and these rankings were subsequently used to determine the ‘livestock combinations’ on which Figure 6 is based.
Changes
in crop production
Figure 2 shows increases and decreases in wheat production for four five-year periods. Three of the four maps display remarkable TBDs. During the first ten years (maps (a) and (b)), increases in most Canadian unit areas contrasted with decreases south of the border. This pattern was reversed during the second half of the 1960s (map (c)). In view of these contrasting changes, it seems almost surprising that no TBD whatsoever shows up on map (d). In fact, TBDs in crop changes are so common (see also Figure 2, maps (e)-(h) and Figure _3),that the absence of a TBD on map(d) in Figure 2 may be considered as somewhat exceptional. However this may be, it is indeed exceptional that between 1969171 and
26
Agricuitural
changes
in the American-Canadian
border
zone
1974176 all 46 unit areas experienced a substantial increase in wheat acreage-30 percent or more in most of them! This unique development will be explained beiow. A comparison of map (a) (wheat) with map (e) (barley) in Figure 2 reveals that the two patterns of change were reversed. The same conclusion can be arrived at when comparing maps (c)i(g) and maps (d)/(h). Conversely, no opposite trends occurred between 1959iGl and 1964fbf (compare maps (b) and (f) in Figure 2), which is surprising considering that in the Interior Plains the production of both wheat and barley rarely increases (or decreases) at the same time. Note, however, that during the 1960s there were opposite trends in barley and oats production (maps (a) and (b) in Figure 3). In addition to the reversed patterns just mentioned, there were striking TBDs in changes in barley production. Maps (e), (f) and (g) in Fgi use 2 illustrate that the international boundary stands out as a line separating areas with contrasting change trends: increases on one side versus decreases on the other. Simiiar TBDs are apparent on maps (a). jb) and(c) in Figwe 3; only map (d) fails to show a TBD.
(a)
idI
WHEAT
1954/S
- 1959/61
(a)
BARLEY
1954/S
(f)
BARLEY
7953161- 1964166
WHEAT
1964/66 - t969/7t
is)
BARLEY
19&‘66
WHEAT
1969/7t - 1974176
(hl
BARLEY
1963/71-
Eiincrease #
aecrea5e “Ochange
FIGURE2. Changes in wheat and barley acreage, 1954156-1974176.
- 1959/6t
- 1969171
1974176
H. A. &ITShlA Ib)
1969/71-
OATS
FIGURE
Changing
patterns
1974/76
W
@
increase
m
decrease
#
no change
27 OATS
FLAXSEED
1959161 - 1969/71
1959/61 - 1974176
3. Selection of crop changes for different periods.
of crop combinations
Map (a) in Figure 4 shows that in 1954156 the relative importance (or rank order) of oats was greater north than south of the boundary. The very same contrast occurred in the westernmost portion of the study area. (No 1954 and 1978 census data on flaxseed production exist for Montana. presumably because flax was an unimportant crop. Assuming that flax did not rank first or second in northeastern Montana in 1954, the 1954156 cropcombination pattern in the western part of the study area-both north and south of the border-was exactly the same as that shown for 1964/66 on map (c).) Map (a) also demonstrates that in 1954156 barley and flax were relatively more important crops in the American than the Canadian area. As a result of an increase in barley production south of the boundary between 1954 and 1959 (Figure Z(e)) and a sharp decline in flax production there during the same period (Reitsma, 1969: 160), map (b) in Figure 4 displays a truly outstanding transboundary contrast in crop combinations. This TBD, like all others shown on the various maps, is all the more remarkable when we realize that natural conditions are essentially the same on either side of the ‘49th parallel’. Incidentally, because wheat is by far the most widely grown crop in the region (except sometimes in the area east of the Red River), increases and decreases in wheat production seldom alter the crop combinations as shown in Figure 4. The 1964166 and 1969/7 1 TBDs were no less impressive than the one for 1959/61. However, between 1959/61 and 1969/71 a dramatic turnabout took place. Comparing maps (b) and (d) in Figure 4 we notice that patterns became reversed during the intervening ten-year period. In 1969/7 1 barley was, for the first time, more important than oats in much of the Canadian area, while oats outranked barley in the majority of the American counties. This particular TBD did not last long, as can be learned from map (e). On the contrary, in 1974/76 there was little evidence of a TBD in crop combinations. In 1978, American census data were collected a year earlier than might have been expected. Because the three-year difference between 1978 (US Census) and 1981 (Canadian Census) was considered too large for a meaningful comparison, map (f) is partly the same as
Agricultural
28
changes in the American -Canadiun border
(a)
1954/56
Id)
1969/71
(b)
1959/61
(4
1974/76
(cl 1964/66
(f)
1976/78
D
Crop combinallons which began with WO or OW
/
Crop combmatlons which begin wth WB or EW
@jYjj
Crop combmalions which begin &h
WF
m
Crop combinalions which begln wth BO or OB Crop combtnation
/
FIGURE4. Crop combinations,
zone
OFWB
No data on flaxseed
1954/56-1976178.
map (e): both depict the Canadian
situation for 1976. As a consequence, comparison of maps (e) and (f) gives the possibly misleading impression that few agricultural changes took place around 1976. Be this as it may, map(f) does show that in 1976/78 crop combinations in southernmost Saskatchewan differed from those in neighboring areas south of the 49th parallel. Apparently, it makes a difference whether a farmer operates just north or just south of the border line. Canadian farmers often make different decisions from American farmers. We could come to a somewhat similar conclusion when comparing areas east and west of the Red River. In this paper, however, we are not interested in this latter contrast, for it has nothing to do with the boundary. Besides, an important reason why crop farming on one side of the Red River often differs from that on the other side is that soil and drainage conditions are quite different on opposite sides of the floodplain.
Changes
in livestock
production
and livestock
combinations
The maps in Figure S display a selection of change patterns for different time periods. Perhaps most notable is the long-term and virtually uninterrupted decline in numbers of milk cows (map (d)), but because this trend occurred on both sides of the boundary, it has little relevance for the present study. Furthermore, with many unit areas having experienced a 60 to 90 percent decrease between 1954156 and 1976178, dairy cows have come to play an insignificant role in the livestock combinations found in the study area-a situation which resembles that of flax with regard to crop combinations.3
29
H. A. &ITShM
Ia)
BEEF CATTLE
1954!56 - 1976178
(b)
PIGS
SHEEP
1964/66 - 1969171
(d)
MILK COWS
m
E
1969/71-
1974176
1954156 - 1974176
Increase
decrease no change
FIGURE5. Selection of livestock changes for different periods. At first sight, map (a) appears to show the most important TBD, all the more so because beef production is a significant economic activity in the region, especially north of the border. However, beef cattle outnumber the other types of livestock by so much in most unit areas, that changes (i.e. decreases) are rarely large enough to bring about changes in livestock combinations.” Put differently, an understanding of changes in beef cattle numbers does not by itself help us much to explain TBDs in livestock combinations or changes in those same TBDs. Apart from the contrasting change patterns portrayed in Figure 5, few trends can be discerned which differed markedly on opposite sides of the 49th parallel. This explains why the distribution patterns of livestock combinations in Figure 6 vary little over time. Thus, the sharp TBD which manifested itself in 1954/56 (map (a))-caused by a comparatively high density of hogs in Canada and a very large sheep population in the USA-was maintained until 1964/66 (see maps (b) and(c)). Although somewhat weakened by 196917 1, the TBD also shows up on map (d). Following a rapid and steady decline in sheep numbers (as well as a small increase in the number of hogs) on the American side of the border, this hog/sheep contrast began to become less pronounced around the mid-1970s (map (e)) and had disappeared almost completely a few years later (map (f)). The result has been that livestock combinations in the American area have come to resemble those in the Canadian area so closely that by 1976/78 the international boundary could no longer be considered as a line demarcating areas with significant differences in livestock production. The series of livestock-combination maps in Figure 6 reveals far less change over time than does the set of crop-combination maps in Figure 4. Nothing like the reversal of cropcombination patterns which took place between 1959/61 and 1969/71 can be detected in Figure 6. On the contrary, livestock-combination patterns have been quite stable over the years. This relative lack of change should not surprise us too much because it is more difficult and, at the same time, far more costly for a farmer to switch from one type of livestock to another than it is to replace one grain crop by another. An attempt
at explanation
Having described the more outstanding TBDs in agricultural changes and the effects thereof on TBDs in crop and livestock combinations, we now turn to the most important objective of
30 (a)
Agricuitural
charges in the American-Canadian
border _-one
Id) 1969/71
1954/56
(b) 1959/61
(c) 1964/66
(f) 1976/78
a
Livestock
combmaflons
which
begr
with
CS or SC
‘7
Livestock
combtnaltons
1
Lwestock
comb!natlons
which
begln
with
CP
‘7 A
Livestock
comblnatlon
FIGURE6.
or PC
which
beg#n wth
CM
MPCS
Livestock combinations, 1954156-1976178.
this study: providing an explanation for the changes in the magnitude livestock combinations. Four questions need to be answered:
of TBDs in crop and
1. Why did the TBD in crop combinations become more pronounced between 1954/56 and 1959/61? 2. Why was the 1959/61 pattern of crop combinations reversed ten years later? 3. What caused the TBD in crop combinations to become weaker after 1969 71? 4. How do we explain that the striking TBD in livestock combinations which existed in 1959/61 had all but vanished by 1976/78? Careful examination and comparison questions can be restated as follows:
of Figures 2 to 6 should make it clear that the four
1. Why did flax production decline and barley production increase south of the boundary between 1954 and 1959, and why did barley production decrease north of the boundary between 1956 and 1961? 2. Why did the American area experience an increase in oats acreage and a decrease in barley acreage between 1959 and 1969, while these trends were reversed in the Canadian area between 1961 and 1971? 3. Why did oats production in most of the American area and barley production in most of the Canadian area lose importance after 196917 1? 4. What caused the large and persistent decline in sheep numbers south of the 491h parallel after 1959?
H. A. REITSMA
31
Quedon
1. The decline in flax production-south as well as north of the border-was caused by unfavorable weather and falling prices. During the early 1950s. flax had become an important crop in parts of the Interior Plains. A combination of factors-high prices for flax-seed, above average amounts of rainfall, and declining wheat acreage due to overproduction-had encouraged farmers to greatly expand production. In North Dakota as a whole, production increased by 133 percent between 195 2 and 1957, and temporarily flax ranked as the second crop in many counties. Then, in 1957, crop failure struck as a result of drought, with yields being less than half as high as in previous years. As a consequence, farmers drastically cut back their flax production in 1958, on average by some 30 percent. In subsequent years, production further declined because of disappointing yields for several years in succession.s Moreover, flax prices in North Dakota were anything but attractive during the late 195Os, causing the crop to lose its former competitive strength vis-ci-t,ir other grains. After 1959, flax continued to lose ground in most of the study area (see map (d) in Figure 3), and since the 1960s it has been a relatively minor crop nearly everywhere in the region (maps (d)-(f) in Figure 4). In contrast to most agricultural changes in the study area between 1954156 and 1976178, the decline in flax production cannot be explained in terms of policy changes. The 1954-59 increase in barley production in the American portion of the study area was a direct consequence of a sharp reduction in wheat acreage. Prior to 1954. the USA produced large surpluses of wheat, resulting in growing stocks and mounting storage costs. Through the use of such production control measures as acreage allotments, marketing quotas and land retirement programs, the government tried to reduce the output of wheat. These Wheat Program efforts were successful, not only in the study area (map (a), Figure 2), but also elsewhere in the country. Nationwide, the number of hectares sown to wheat plummeted from 32 million in 1953 to 23 million in 1959 (Cochrane and Ryan. 1976: 203). The decrease in wheat acreage made possible an increase in barley acreage from four million to seven million hectares between 1953 and 1959 (Cochrane and Ryan. 1976: 183). Much of this expansion took place in the area studied here (map (e), Figure 2). Increased barley output in the USA caused barley prices in Canada to drop precipitously between 1952 and 1959: by 28 percent in Saskatchewan and by 30 percent in AIanitoba (Canada Year Book, 1960: 471). Another consequence was a reduction in exports of Canadian barley to the USA. Considering this combination of lower profits and reduced exports, we can understand that barley production took a nose dive in the Canadian area: in nearly all 24 unit areas it fell by more than 50 percent. An additional reason for die large decrease was the very substantial increase in wheat acreage north of the border (map (a), Figure 2). Whereas wheat prices in North Dakota dropped almost 14 percent between 1954 and 1959, they rose approximately 40 percent in Saskatchewan and Manitoba in the period 1956-61.
Question 2. Between 1961 and 1968, Canada’s total wheat acreage climbed from 10 to 12 million ha. This increase was largely a response to unusully large wheat sales to China (in the years 1961-66) and the USSR (1963-66). After 1966, wheat shipments to these two countries and Eastern Europe-as well as to the European Community (due to import restrictions)-were appreciably smaller, causing total wheat exports to dwindle from 15 million tons in 1966 to 9 million tons in 1967, 1968 and 1969 (Foreign Agriculture, 4 January 1971). At the same time, Canada’s year-end carryover wheat stocks jumped from 148 million hectoliters in 1966 to 355 million in 1970 (Canada Year Book. various years). This latter amount, the highest on record at that moment, was the equivalent of two years’ market absorption (i.e. exports plus domestic consumption).
32
.4gricultural
chatqes
in the American-Canadinn
border zone
Alarmed by these developments, the Canadian government decided to take steps aimed at a reduction of the output of surplus wheat. In February 1970, it launched a Wheat Reduction Programme, popularly known as ‘Operation LIFT’ (Lower Inventory For Tomorrow). This one-year program offered payments to farmers who converted 1969 wheat land to perennial forage or summer fallow (e.g. Foreign Agriculture. 3 August and 7 September 1970; Crown and Heady, 1972: 18; OECD, 1973: 40). Largely as a result of Operation LIFT, Canada’s wheat acreage in 1970 amounted to no more than five million hectares, down 50 percent from 1969 (e.g. OECD, 1973: 13). Although Sahi and Craddock (1971) have come to the questionable conclusion that Canada’s wheat area would have declined nearly as much if there had been no LIFT program, the fact remains that Canadian wheat stocks were down by 129 million hectoliters by the end of the year. Manitoba’s total wheat area declined from 1.4 million hectares in 1969 to 0.57 in 1970, and Saskatchewan’s from 6.7 to 3.2 million hectares. Despite the fact that the LIFT program was designed in such a way that it would discourage a mass switch from wheat to barley and other prairie crops (Foreign Agriculture, 3 August 1970). it did result in substantial increases in barley acreage (OECD, 1973: 14): in Manitoba from 0.5 million hectares in 1969 to 0.9 million in 197 1, and in Saskatchewan from 1.1 to 2.3 million hectares.6 Operation LIFT did not lead to increased oats production; the very gradual decline which had begun in the early 1950s simply continued. This long-term trend is presumably related to the disappearance of draft horses and the replacement of oats by barley as a feed crop (United States, Department of Agriculture, 1972: 33). Besides, Sonntag and Ketilson (1980: 8) ascribe the decline to rational, economic decisions by the farmers, pointing out that oats has been a less profitable prairie crop than rapeseed, mustard seed and barley. After having expanded from 3.6 million hectares in 1952 to 6.9 million hectares in 1959, USA barley acreage fell back to 4.0 million hectares by 1969. This decrease appears to have been brought about by government policies. Faced with increasingly burdensome carryover surpluses, further aggravated by the termination of export subsidies for barley and other feed grains, Washington introduced two new land retirement programs: the 1962 Cropland Conversion Program and the 1965 Cropland Adjustment Program (OECD, 1974: 72). Starting in 1962, barley producers were required to curtail plantings in order to qualify for price support loans. In other words, they were paid to idle land (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 199). The result was a massive diversion of barley land, ranging from 1.0 million hectares in 1962 to 1.8 million in 1969 (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 183). It stands to reason that these measures were responsible for the widespread decline in barley production in the American portion of the study area between 1959 and 1969. From 1959 to 1964, oats production increased slightly in all but three of the 22 American unit areas. This was followed by substantial increases in all 22 areas in the years 1964-1969. Altogether, oats production nearly doubled between 1959 and 1969 (map(b), Figure 3). After 1969, oats production underwent a rapid decline throughout the American area, and by 1974 (and 1978) it was less than it had been in 1959. No explanation has been found for the oats increase between 1959 and 1969. Because US census data are for harvested (instead of planted) acreage, and 1959 was a drought year in the Interior Plains, it is likely that the small increase between 1959 and 1964 was the result of more favorable weather conditions in 1964 than in 1959. The large increase after 1964, however, remains a puzzle, especially because in the US as a whole oats production declined almost continuously during the period 1955-1973: from 19 million hectares (planted) to 8 million hectares (Cochrane and Ryan, 1976: 184)’
H. AREITSMA
33
Searching through the literature, there is no reason to believe that the 1964-1969 increase in oats production south of the boundary was caused by: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
comparatively favorable oats prices; the relative absence of governmental efforts to idle land previously seeded to oats; an increase in the number of farms raising riding horses; increases in the number of cattle and/or swine in the area; or highly favorable weather conditions in 1969.
This leads us to conjecture that it may well have been stimulated by the large reduction in barley acreage. With many hectares of land taken out of barley production (through government-induced diversions), it seems reasonable to suspect that many farmers must have seeded more land to oats for the simple reason that in the Interior Plains they can grow few alternative crops.8 Question 3.
The year 1972 has been described as a ‘historic turning point’ or ‘watershed’ in North American agriculture (Brandow, 1977: 71; Tweeten, 1977: 38). After many years of overproduction, mounting wheat surpluses, large stocks of feed grains, enormous storage costs, and numerous efforts by Ottawa and especially Washington to reduce the production of wheat and other grains (e.g. Canada’s Operation LIFT and America’s Wheat and Feed Grains Programs), a sudden surge in demand in 1972 greatly improved the agricultural situation in both countries. Particularly important were the huge purchases of wheat by the USSR and China (Foreign Agriculture, 28 August and 23 October 1972; United States, Department of Agriculture, 1975: 9). But also sales of feed grains soared. These developments signalled the beginning of the ‘Great Agricultural Transformation’ in North American agriculture (e.g. Brandow, 1977: 80). Market prices of wheat shot up from about $3.83 per hectoliter in 1971 to about $13.21 in 1973. Canadian wheat exports increased from 10.7 million tons in 1970 to 13.8 million tons in 1972, while American exports of wheat plus wheat flour nearly doubled in just one year: from 17.2 to 30.6 million tons. The immediate result was a sharp decline in wheat stocks. Another consequence was a drastic change in farm policy. By curtailing government intervention, farm policy lost much of its former influence. In the USA, acreage control and land retirement programs were discontinued, and by 1974 practically all previously idled cropland had been returned to production. America’s total wheat acreage expanded from 20 million hectares in 1970 to 24 million hectares in 1973. The Canadian total jumped from 5.1 to 9.7 million hectares. Figure 2 (map (d)) shows that, for the first time in 20 years, changes in wheat production were the same on both sides of the border line; all 46 unit areas registered (impressive) gains. With large increases in wheat production throughout the study area it is understandable that barley production declined during the early 1970s (Figure 2) map(h)). Only the central portion of the American area (and a small area in southern Manitoba) experienced increases, the probable reason being that beef production gained in importance there between 1969 and 1974. According to Figure 3 (map (c)), oats production between 1969171 and 1974176 decreased nearly everywhere in the study area-only six Canadian unit areas formed exceptions. South of the boundary, this decline was a recontinuation of a long-term downward trend, which had been reversed temporarily during the late 1960s (see above). North of the boundary, the same long-term decline was apparent in most unit areas, The increase in two of them was so small-less than two percent-as to require no explanation. In the remaining four unit areas, however, it was rather substantial: about 26 percent. Attempts to
34
Agricultural
changes in the American-Canadian
border :one
account for this ‘anomaly’ have not been successful. It could be that because of disappointing results with the growing of mixed grains (e.g. oats and rye on the same field) in previous years, farmers returned to raising individual crops on separate fields. But this is merely a conjecture. Question 4.
Over the years, livestock production on one side of the 49th parallel has resembled that on the other side in many respects. There were some notable differences, however. First, livestock densities generally have been higher north of the border as beef cattle, dairy cows and swine were more numerous there (Reitsma, 1969). A second difference was, and to some extent still is, the much greater importance of sheep raising south of the political dividing line. It is above all this latter contrast which was responsible for the striking TBD in livestock combinations prior to the early 1970s (see Figure 6). During the Korean War (1950-53), America’s wool stocks became all but exhausted due to increased demand for wool (for military uniforms, blankets, etc.). The government became concerned and began to rebuild the stockpile for national security reasons. Imports were expanded, while price supports were introduced to encourage American farmers to produce more wool. Soon, imports had increased so much that Washington became alarmed and a special program to promote domestic wool production was adopted: the National Wool Act of 1954. The price supports were replaced by direct payments to wool producers. Under the Act, farmers were offered a guaranteed incentive price of 62 cents per pound of shorn wool, which was well above the market price of about 42 cents. The effect of the price support program (1950-54) and the special promotion program (after 1954) was an unprecedented increase in sheep numbers: in North Dakota alone from 398000 in 1950 to 732000 in 1961, which compares with only 90000 in the entire province of Manitoba in that same year. Because of the growing replacement of wool by synthetic fibers, the sheep population began to go down again after 1961 (Foreign Agriculture, 22 February 197 1 and 14 October 1974). In an attempt to halt this decline the incentive price was raised several times, and in 1970 it stood at 72 cents, which was more than double the average market price at that time (Cotton and Wool Situation, May 1978). These costly measures to maintain output were to no avail (Schnittker, 1974: 15). Sheep numbers declined further: in the USA as a whole from 27 million in 1964 to 21 million in 1969, 16 million in 1974, and 12 million in 1978. In the American portion of the study area the number dwindled from 239000 in 1964 to 57000 in 1978. The Canadian area, too, experienced a decline: from 42 500 in 1966 to 16 800 in 1976. Because this latter decrease has not affected the TBD in livestock combinations. it is of little relevance to this study. The decline south of the boundary, however, has meant that in most unit areas sheep occupied a lower rank position in 1978 than 15 or 20 years earlier. As indicated by Figure 6 (map (f)), hogs outnumbered sheep in much of the American area in 1978. In other words, the increasing use of artificial fibers in garments, blankets. carpets and other consumer goods has wiped out the conspicuous TBD in livestock combinations which existed during the 1950s and 1960s a TBD which was much more a product of government policy than of economic forces.
Conclusion Figures 4 and 6 clearly demonstrate
that TBDs in crop and livestock combinations were less pronounced in the mid to late 1970s than they were during the 1960s. A most important reason for this change is that the agricultural policies of the two countries have become more
H. A. fi1TSM.A
35
alike over the years. At the same time, foreign trade policies have become more alike. During the 1960s Canada sold large amounts of wheat (and other grains) to communist countries, whereas the United States did not. The differences in trade relations were in no small measure responsible for TBDs in agricultural policies. From about 1971, when the USA began to export large quantities of feed grains and wheat to the USSR and other communist countries, American farm policy came to resemble that of Canada in a number of ways. When comparing the agricultural policies of the two countries for the period 1954/561976/78, we notice that trends became reversed around 1970. Prior to that year, American farm policy was characterized by a great deal of government intervention. On the one hand, there was generous support of farm product prices-sometimes well above marketdetermined levels-resulting in overproduction and the accumulation of stocks. On the other hand, the US government employed a host of measures aimed at output and surplus reduction (e.g. Robinson, 1970: 120- 12 1). Canada’s agricultural policy, by contrast, was more market-oriented as there was less willingness to support prices and impose production controls (Shaffner et al., 1980: 547). Government intervention in Canada was largely limited to price stabilization measures and promotion of exports, especially wheat. through quality controls and subsidized transportation. During the late 196Os, and even more so after 1970, Washington moved away from expensive support programs and adopted a more market-oriented policy (e.g. United States Committee for Economic Development, 1974: 4Off; Paarlberg, 1977: 200; Tweeten, 1977: 41). This new trend became particularly obvious in 1972 (e.g. Brandow, 1977: 80). The sudden surge in world demand for wheat, feed grains and oilseeds, most of which had been surplus crops in the USA for many years, made it possible for American farmers to compete effectively around the world. Price supports were lowered or eliminated. and most output controls were abandoned.9 Much of the 25 million ha of cropland that was out of production in 1972 had been returned to production by 1974. Conversely, agricultural policy in Canada after 1970 became characterized by more government involvement (Warley, 1974: 112; 1977: 17). In addition to the LIFT program, Ottawa introduced various deficiency-payment programs in order to assure producers adequate incomes. For example, in 1976 the Western Grains Stabilization Programme was implemented, guaranteeing that the net cash flow to commercial grain producers on the prairies would not fall in any given year below the average of the previous five years (Foreign Agriculture, 30 October 1978). The underlying philosophy was that the entire nation should share the risk of severe fluctuations in farm incomes (Warley, 1977: 17; Shaffner et al., 1980: 548ff). Clearly, then, during the first half of the 1970s American and Canadian policy responses to problems of instability and low incomes in farming moved in opposite directions, that is, closer to one another. In the USA the role of government in agriculture was reduced; in Canada it was expanded. In view of these policy changes, it is hardly surprising that by 1976/78 TBDs in agricultural land use had lost much of their former strength. The striking transboundary contrasts which stood out on aerial photographs taken around 1960 (as well as on LANDSAT images taken in the early 198Os), were for a number of years considerably less conspicuous. to The type of agriculture found in a region is shaped by a wide variety of factors. One of these is the political factor, especially the package of governmental measures to influence agricultural production. Students interested in determining the impact of (farm) policy on agricultural land use patterns may find it helpful to
36
Agricultural
changes in the Amerikan-Canadian
border zone
1. focus their attention on areas bisected by an international boundary; 2. attempt to relate agricultural changes to policy changes; or 3. combine these two approaches, as has been done here. It is hoped that this case study makes some contribution to the realization that the political factor, so often neglected in rural landscape studies, should not be ignored when trying to explain the many different ways in which humans use their environment.
Acknowledgments Thanks are due to Carl Nielsen (University of Washington) and Jan ter Haar (University Amsterdam) for the fine job they did drafting the 29 maps.
of
Notes 1. For example, before World War LI mechanization proceeded more rapidly on American than Canadian farms, resulting in a lower density of draft horses in North Dakota than in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. After the war, mechanization made rapid strides in southern Canada, causing the number of horses there to decline faster than south of the border, and by 1960 densities were roughly the same on both sides of the line. After 1960, when Canada still witnessed a decrease in draft horses, an increase in riding horses began to take place in the USA. Before long, horse densities were appreciably higher south than north of the boundary (Reitsma, 1972: 8). 2. The symbol P instead of H is used because in earlier studies H referred to horses. .An S (swine) could not be used because that symbol stands for sheep. 3. In 1976/78, flax ranked fourth in all but three of the 46 unit areas. Milk cows ranked fourth in 26 areas and third in 18 areas. 4. In 1976/78, beef cattle ranked first in 41 areas and second in the remaining five areas-all next to the Red River. 5. Following a more than tenfold increase in area between 1949 and 1957, Canada’s total flax area fell from 1.4 million hectares in 1957 to 0.57 million hectares in 1962. 6. Canada’s barley exports jumped from 657 000 tons (or 12 percent of the world total) in 1969 to 4 million tons (or 33 percent) in 1971, making Canada the world’s leading barley exporter (United States, 1975). 7. American output dropped from 527 million hectoliters in 1959 to 235 million in 1973. Despite this decline, carryover stocks did not become smaller. On the contrary, they reached a peak in 1971, suggesting that over the years the demand for oats had declined substantially. 8. The same reasoning may explain part of the increase in wheat production in the American area between 1964 and 1969 (Figure 2, map (c)). 9. Since 1975, the trend in American agriculture has been back to more intervention. and in 1978 acreage restrictions and higher farm price supports were implemented. Five years later, in the face of a giant crop glut, the Reagan administration persuaded grain (and cotton) farmers not to plant crops on a total of 33 million ha. Farmers who signed up for the program received cash payments for taking 20 percent of their land out of production. Growers who retired an additional 10 to 30 percent of their land could collect an extra payment-in-kind, the so-called PM program (NerusweeR, 4 April 1983). Canadian farmers in 1983 were also encouraged to ctutail production of wheat and barley (Globe and Mail, 6 April 1983). 10. For a beautiful illustration of how conspicuous and visibly apparent in the landscape agricultural contrasts can be, see the front cover of Norris and Haring’s (1980) textbook on political geography. The LANDSAT photograph shown was taken some 300 km west of the area studied here.
37
H. A. REITS&IA
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