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Albert J. Sullivan's theory of public relations ethics
Ilion Peaz'soM
Albert J. Sullivan's Theory Of Public Relations Ethics Increasingly, public relations practitioners and many scholars are approaching public relations as an applied social science. Enlightened practitioners are apt to view themselves as applied social scientists or sociopolitical technicians. In contrast, many public relations practitioners and scholars of public relations are capable of philosophical thought, but few seem to develop basic philosophical theory to undergird their discussion of public relations. An exception is Albert J. Sullivan, a writer on public relations issues who more than 20 years ago articulated genuinely philosophical statements about what public relations is fundamentally, and about what it means to practice public relations ethically., Sullivan's work represents some of most significant basic public relations theory, yet he is not often cited as a source in major public relations textbooks. Sullivan is not cited in the recently issued PRSA body of knowledge document., Neither is he cited in Pavlik's recent review of public relations research., These facts alone warrant a retrospective look at Sullivan's work. But the important reason for reexamining Sullivan's thinking is that his theory of public relations ethics is arguably the most complete theory of its kind in the public relations literature and is still relevant to current debates about public relations ethics. To support these claims about the value of Sullivan's work, this article begins by examining his general theory of public rela rio ns and shows how this theory raises ethical questions. The article then focuses on the main points in Sullivan's ethical theory and identities the philosophical arguments Sullivan appeals to in support of this theory. A final section comments on Sullivan's ideas to suggest how they have contributed to the development of ethical theory in public relations.
Ron Pearson is an assistant professor, Department of Public Relations, Mount Saint Vincent University.
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SuUh-an's T h e o r y (1) Sullivan's Theory of Images Sullivan begins his general theory of public relations with the Aristotelian notion that each discipline has a subject area that is proper to it. Medicine, for instance, is concerned with the human body. Images, writes Sullivan, are the proper subject matter of public relations. Sullivan is, of course, well aware that the detractors .of public relations attack the profession precisely because, they argue, it is concerned with images instead of substance. But he points out that this argument--one which seeks to distinguish between mere images or representations of things and the things themselves--is a deep philosophical question that has by no means been resolved. This is the ancient philosophical dispute, writes Sullivan, concerning the relationship between the mind and objective reality, though he does have something to say about it and, indeed, makes some assumptions about it. The core assertion of his discussion is that what he calls the 'judgement center' of the mind deals only with images, never directly with reality. Rather neatly, this argument reduces to a truism the hitherto pejorative claim that public relations practitioners are merchants of images. In particular, it undercuts an argument like Finn's that public relations practitioners waste their time worrying about images and impressions when they should be worrying about substance and conviction., The point is not that practitioners should forego images for the truth, but rather that they need to approach their deployment of images with great circumspection. Finn suggests that it is not the image that is important, but the way the company is run. Sullivan's point is that all knowledge about how an organization should be run will be based on images and communicated through images. While Finn's advice is to stop worrying about images, Sullivan's is that public relations should worry a great deal about images because there is nothing else with which practitioners can replace them. A decision maker or communicator cannot simply replace images of reality with reality itself, only with other images. Sullivan's argument is not that we should be unconcerned with how a business is actually run but that our concern should include the images that are communicated about the business and, perhaps more importantly, the images upon which are based decisions about running the business. Sullivan breaks down his discussion of images into two parts, one concerned with the characteristics of what he calls external images transmitted from institutional, public relations sources through the mass media to target audiences, the other concerned with the process whereby internal images are produced in our minds when we look at reality. If it is true that a public relations practitioner begins with images of his or her institution in his own mind, it follows that members of a public who receive images in the mass media are receiving images of images. Indeed, if one considers the 58
Pttbllc Relations Review selection process of mass media gatekeepers, members of publics receive images of images of images. Sullivan doesn't explicitly identify this compound effect of the image-making process and devotes most of his discussion to the characteristics of external images, those that are sent by practitioners to their publics. There is some irony in this because, as he points out, "the dangers involved in transmitting external images are literally negligible compared to the dangers of getting images unchanged through the mind process.'s This observation reflects what is the core philosophical issue in Sullivan's discussion, that the messages produced and sent by public relations practitioners are based on images that the practitioner has about the reality of his or her institution, images that represent an interpretation of reality, not an exact picture of it. Sullivan suggests a number of reasons why the practitioner's picture will not be exact, all of which are familiar to students of the various extant communication models. Among the variables, or agents as Sullivan calls them, that affect images are cultural background, emotions, life experiences and processes of selective perception. In spite of his skepticism about the possibility of producing accurate images, Sullivan still holds up truth as the goal of public relations--'public relations is charged with the responsibility of delivering true information to large audiences.", He advocates a definition of truth that philosophers associate with what is called the correspondence theory of truth. According to this theory, ~uth is "the conformity between reality outside the mind and its perception by the mind's judgement center.", This type of definition implies an objectivism approach to epistemology and the belief that the "way things really are' is the final arbiter of truth. But Sullivan is equivocal on this point, for he advances arguments that a belief in objectivism is not fruitful. Some contemporary language theorists and philosophers argue that different groups or cultures not only attach different meanings to the same words but also, for all intents and purposes, live in different worlds and experience different images. This may seem rather obvious when one considers the cultural differences between a group of public relations professionals and a tribe of African pygmies. But Sullivan, having prefaced his remarks with an allusion to C. P. Snow's Two Cultures, suggests "stockholders and factory hands, management and labor, teenagers and adults, urban and rural dwellers, mid-Westerners and Southerners, and men and women"'do not share the same language or the same culture. He thus seems well aware of the theory of cultural relativism that is suggested by his theory of images, a theory that is a quite at odds with objectivism. Although they are left unamplified, clear moral imperatives are implied in Sullivan's discussion of images. Images sent as public relations messages, on Sullivan's analysis, are necessarily partial because they are compressed, involve inferences and emphasis, and are separated in time and space from other, related messages. The images in these messages are
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Stfllh~an's T h e o r y also colored and distorted by context and they are also inaccurate because it follows from the nature of language that encoder and decoder necessarily attach different meanings and interpretations to the same symbols. Identifying the particular responsibility and obligation of public relations, Sullivan writes: Because these qualities of indirectness exist, because they operate with variable power, because they affect the truth of the image willy-nilly, there is placed on public relations a far heavier responsibility than is commonly realized. Public relations is properly concerned with images; its function is to represent indirectly the reality of institutions; if t~uth is its proper final obj ective, it (public relations) must be overcautious, indeed unreasonably cautious, about the images it proposes.' ...Public relations has been too superficial in its thinking ab out information as an image-process...(P)ublic relations has not realized its far more serious obligation to the whole truth.~ Sullivan's remarks are similar to observations made in hermeneutics and critical theory that no interpretation can be taken as final and complete; indeed the public relations responsibility that Sullivan identifies follows logically from his theory of images. If images are by definition incomplete interpretations, then all assertions of truth must be tentative and marked by excessive caution. It follows, as Sullivan indicates, that an important moral responsibility of public relations is to recognize this incompleteness. In practical terms, this could mean designing organization/public communication systems with certain characteristics, characteristics that limit message segmentation or encourage continual interaction so that communicators are not forced to accept the images of others as the best or natural interpretation of reality. Deetz, for instance, has observed that simply maintaining communication can be seen as an important moral imperative. Moreover, he too makes this conclusion after arguingabout the impossibility of arriving at theoretical positions or images of reality that can be taken as final and complete.,, Sullivan nowhere seems to notice, however, that his theory of images is quite at odds with his realist theory of truth, for even in the passage above he fails to mention that his theory of meaning makes attainment of "the whole truth' impossible. (2) Sullivan's Theory Of Public Relations Ethics Sullivan does not provide philosophical justification for the introduction of ethical terms such as obligation or responsibility into his discussion of images. But he takes these issues up in his discussion of public relations values. Sullivan identifies three separate value systems operating
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PtlblIe Relations Review in public relations and by doing this is able to articulate clearly the important dilemmas in public relations ethics. He also develops basic philosophical arguments why an organization has a moral obligation to its publics. Sullivan distinguishes technical, partisan and mutual values in public relations. The first of these, technical values, involve what Sullivan calls pride of craft and the efficient use of technique. Technical values as far as Sullivan is concerned are also amoral in the sense that they assume or take for granted that the applications of technique are for a good purpose. "Technical values look to the job and to its effective accomplishment; they reflect the technical expert's pride in using his skill efficiently.",~ Within this category, Sullivan identifies creative values, productive values and strategic values. Creative values, for instance, are inherent in making a message memorable, though Sullivan does not allow that public relations practitioners are artists, even when they use artistic techniques, because they lack complete freedom of expression. Productive values are those which rate highly getting the job done within budget and on deadline. Strategic values are those which rate success highly by emphasizing the perceptive recognition of a public relations opportunity, the establishment of clear objectives and the achievement of these through effective strategies. Sullivan observes that strategic values are the most underdeveloped of the three technical values, making a point that basic textbooks continue to make: that public relations people too often over-value production activity at the expense of careful planning. Partisan values include ideas such as commitment, trust, loyalty and obedience. A public relations practitioner serves aninstitution and furthers its interests. Partisan values have much in common with patriotism. Although he does not put it quite this way, Sullivan suggests partisanship assumes without question that the organization is right and that its interpretation of images is complete and correct, an assumption that Sullivan has already attacked in his theory of images. He points out that this belief in the essential rightness and completeness of the organization's point of view leads to a belief that the end justifies the means and to a belief that oneway communication is always sufficient. This latter belief can be seen to follow from acceptance of the organization viewpoint as final, for this acceptance implies that other viewpoints are irrelevant and misguided. Sullivan criticizes public relations for excessive partisanship but also acknowledges that some degree of partisanship is essential for the integrity of practitioners. It would be the height of cynicism to advocate that practitioners should have no commitment to an employer, Sullivan says. It needs to be noted that partisanship as Sullivan defines it is taken by some practitioners to be the highest value. These practitioners deny that they are motivated, or ought to be motivated, by anything like mutual values. This point is stated emphatically by Lewis, at that time vice56
Slflll~n's Theory president, public information and communications, U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness (Washington) and formerly director of corporate communications for Union Carbide Corporation. Lewis writes: It may be useful to recognize unequivocally that we are being paid to promote the self-interest of our client or corporation, no more no less... Compromise and concession are the very nature of the democratic process, b u t I believe thatpublic affairs canbest be u n d e r s t o o d b y first thinking about it as a "win-lose" situation for the practitioner. Compromise is what we do w h e n all else fails. ~ One of the things that Lewis seems to assume is that everyone is capable of entering into the public policy fray in pursuit of his or her own self-interest. But his point is that self-interest is no more a dirty word in public relations than it is in the courtroom, assuming, of course, that there is really some thing analogous to the courtroom in the so-called court o f public opinion. Another interesting aspect of Lewis" argument is that it suggests democratic methods such as compromise and concession are relevant to public relations practice only after a practitioner fails to win public sentiment to the organization's point of view. The implication is that a practitioner should begin by using undemocratic methods. Sullivan's argument, as will become clear in the discussion of mutual values below, stands in contrast to the position taken by Lewis. Mutual values, values which Sullivan sometimes refers to as 'higher values,' are necessary to balance partisan values. Mutual values take into account the viewpoints, interests and rights of others and, according to Sullivan, "light up the road to professionhood.',' Perhaps Sullivan's most important contribution to ethical theory in public relations is his argument for institutional obligations to its publics. These arguments he grounds in a philosophical theory about the nature of rights and the nature of a human being. Rights, he says, belong to a human person by virtue of the fact he or she is a human person. We have rights to those things a human requires to be human. Life is a right, food is a right, love is a right, Sullivan argues, because without these things a human would cease to be human. Regarding these rights, Sullivan asserts aprincipIe ofmutuality, a principle that is one of two basic propositions in his theory. The principle states: "If one has a right, another man has an obligation to respect that fight, to fulfill that right....'~ Because of these fights, it can be seen that certain professions have obligations. The medical profession, for instance, has an obligation to preserve life while the profession of public relations has an obligation to produce certain kinds of images. There are two fights relevant for public relations and each establishes a particular obligation for public relations. Both rights follow from the 57
Public Relations Review second basic proposition of Sullivan's theory, his definition of a person as rational and free. Because a person is rational, that person has a right to the preconditions for rationality, and Sullivan argues that this involves access to accurate and complete information in matters that affect him or her. Similarly, because a person is free, that person has a right to participate in decisions which affect him or her. Following from Sullivan's principle of mutuality, along with these two rights go concommitant obligations on the part of organizations to provide accurate information and to facilitate participation. Sullivan is not naive about his theory, for he also identifies three obstacles to the kind of information flow and participation he has described: people do not realize they possess the rights to information and freedom; institutional managers do not accept the fact that people possess these rights; and itis extremelydifficult to image just how this kind of participation and information sharing can be brought about in a mass society: "there is hardly any structure yet devised whereby every person in every group to which he belongs has the chance to get representation before institutional management."~ (3) Sullivan's Contribution To Ethical Theory In PR Sullivan develops a number of valuable insights and perspectives on public relations ethics that remain highly relevant. And even where his conclusions are questionable, they can be seen to focus on concerns that are important for a discussion of ethics in the context of public relations. The following paragraphs recap some of Sullivan's most important arguments and offer comment on their value and relevance for public relations theory. The topics discussed below are 1) Sullivan's decision to locate the focus of public relations ethics at the point where partisan and mutual values intersect; 2) Sullivan's suggestion that technique can be considered as morally neutral; 3) Sullivan's epistemological and moral arguments for the necessity of ongoing, balanced two-way communication; and 4) Sullivan's principle ofmutualityand its relationship to systems theoretic ideas that are currently receiving attention in public relations literature. 9 Sullivan identifies the focus of ethical issues in public relations at the point where partisan values and mutual values intersect and come into conflict. This remains the central dilemma and focus for public relations ethics and one which has inspired a significant volume of public relations thinking and research. Ryan and Martison, for instance, have suggested that a focus on the tension between organization interests and broader public interests is the key focus for public relations ethics.~ In one study of PRSA members, these researchers found that virtually all respondents agreed that a responsible practitioner must represent two publics--management and outside publics. They concluded that "an ethical theory
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Sulllvan's T h e o r y for public relations must demand that practitioners show considerable concern for the public in the tug-of-war of ethical decision making.",' Bivens has also written about the tension or tug-of-war between the advocate and advisor roles in public relations practice, pointing out that the advocate is expected to be subjective in taking up the interests of a client or employer, while the advisor is expected to be more objective by taking into account other perspectives. He identifies the central problem for public relations ethics as the development of a system of ethical standards that can bridge the gap between advocate and advisor roles.,, In sum, as these two examples indicate, Sullivan clearly articulated public relations' central ethical dilemma as a tension between partisan and mutual values. This distinction continues to be relevant for discussions of public relations ethics. 9 Sullivan makes the provocative, though somewhat dangerous, suggestion that technical expertise in a public relations context can be considered as neither moral nor immoral. This point of view can be challenged, of course, for it can be argued that no application of technique isvalue-neutral. The application of research and communication technology, for instance, is always carried out in the service of some goals and objectives, even if the so-called communication technician cannot or will not articulate these goals. Sullivan suggests the technician assumes or takes for granted that his o r h e r technical expertise serves a morally good cause. But as public relations adopts increasingly sophisticated management and communication technologies, and takes up the methods of social scientific research and evaluation, it may become increasingly difficult for practitioners to see the connection between the application of technique and questions of ethics. At the same time, it becomes increasingly urgent that these connections be made. Thus, it is probably inappropriate to follow Sullivan and attempt a separation between technical values as amoral, on the one hand, and partisan and mutual values as the realms in which moral questions become relevant, on the other hand. Logsdon and Palmer make a related point in their discussion of the ethical implications of issues management techniques. They argue that issues management is often touted as a "benigntool to implement desirable social performance without a full exploration of its less-than-benign potential. "~*Their point is that issues management techniques are not benign or value-neutral but necessarily serve either partisan or mutual values. It is thus vital, they suggest; to insert ethical norms and values into the issues management process and not to vaew this process merely as the application of technique. If the connection between the application of techniques like issues management and ethical matters is not made explicit and a possible topic of discussion, these techniques often privilege organizational interests. 9 Another important contribution of Sullivan's comes from the interaction between his theory of images and his theory of the human x
9
9
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Ptlblle Relations Re~qew person and its rights. By combining these theories, he makes an intriguing argument for the importance of ongoing, dialogical, two-way communication in public relations. Consider the steps in his argument: 1) the mind has access to images, not reality itself; 2) these images are ahvays partial and incomplete; 3) humans have a right to complete information about matters which affect them and a right to participate in decisions that affect them. Together, these principles all point to the moral necessity for continual communication in and through communication systems that allow for balanced and equal input from all communicators, that is, from both the organization and its publics. One-way communication will not suffice because the one-way communicator makes the implicit claim that his or her own point of view is adequate without taking into account other viewpoints. This is an organization-knows-best approach to public relations that Awad suggests is institutional arrogance, and that Gaudino, Fritch and Hayes call the "if you knew what I knew, you'd make the same decision" syndrome in public relations. = Moreover, only communication systems that allow balanced dialogue between organizations and publics meet Sullivan's requirement for participation. In making these important claims, Sullivan develops arguments that are central to discussions of public relations ethics that focus on concepts such as two-way symmetrical communication=and dialogue.~ It is important to note that Sullivan combines his theory of images with a correspondence theory of truth with which it is at odds. This tendency to retain an objectivism epistemology--the view that it will be possible, given sufficient time and methodological rigor, to discover some final arbiter to decide among competing images---also crops up in Sullivan's discussion of ethics, for there he talks about a right to accurate information, something his epistemology suggests is impossible. It is crucial to observe that a belief in objectivism easilyleads to a belief on the part of an individual communicator that he or she, through some privileged moral insight, has seen beyond mere images to get a grasp on the way things really are in themselves. A belief in the possibility of these kind of insights can be used to justify one-way communication and a lack of interest in other perspectives because these are thought to be immature and uninformed. Olasky's recent critique of the public relations philosophies of Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays suggests that both these venerated fathers of public relations believed in social engineering for the good of the masses, a belief that can only be justified if one accepts the possibility of privileged moral insight.~ The combination of Sullivan's theory of images and his ethical theory provide arguments that run counter to a view of public relations as a tool for managing ill-informed and unruly publics. 9 Finally, Sullivan's principle of mutuality can be shown to have implications that connect it with ideas in systems theory, a perspective that is becoming increasingly important in public relations. It can be asked: 60
Stfllivan's T h e o r y Does the fight of another truly imply an obligation on the part of all other persons to recognize that right? Is there not some limit to this principle, if only a practical one? The observations of systems theorists that seem to have inspired so many public relations theorists, offer support for Sullivan's claim. For, as persons, organizations or systemsbecome mutually dependent on one another as a result of increased social complexity, it can be said that the limits to Sullivan's mutuality principle become less absolute. Increased interdependence would seem to bring with it an increase in the kinds of responsibilities and obligations Sullivan describes. Indeed, one of systems theory's valuable contributions to public relations theory is its emphasis on this idea of system interdependence and the arguments it offers w h y one system should take other systems into account. To be sure, these arguments do not usually yield moral imperatives as much as strategic imperatives associated with system survival and growth. But there is no reason w h y a moral side, as opposed to a narrow functional side, of systems theory cannot be emphasized. This would be to find in the systems theory language of interconnectedness and interdependence a basis for developing a moral theory that privileged relationships and mutual interests and recognized the value of Sullivan's principle of mutuality. References
' Albert J. Sullivan, "Toward a philosophy of public relations: Images," in 9Otto Lerbinger and Albert Sullivan eds, Information, Influence and Communication: A Reader in Public Relations, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publisher, 1965a), pp. 240249; "Values in public relations," in Otto Lerbinger and Albert Sullivan eds, Information, Influence and Communication: A Reader in Public Relations, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publisher, 1965b), pp. 412-439. Public Relations Society of America Task Force," Public Relations Body of Knowledge," Public Relations Review 14 (Fall 1988), pp. 3-39. 3 John Pavlik, Public Relations: What Research Tells Us (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1987). , David Finn, "Stop worrying about your image," Harpers (June 1962), pp. 7782. s Sullivan (1965a), p. 247. , Sullivan (1965a), p. 248. 7Sullivan (1965a), p. 241. * Sullivan (1965a), p. 245. ' Sullivan (1965a), pp. 241-2. " Sullivan (1965a), pp. 248-9. .' Stan Deetz, "Keeping the conversation going: The Principle of dialectic ethics," Communication 7 (1983), pp. 263-288. '~ Sullivan (1965b), p. 413. Marshall Lewis, "Policy planning," In Bill Cantor and Chester Burger eds., Experts in Action, (New York: Longman Inc., 1984). 1, Sullivan (1965b), p. 437. 61
Pttblle R e l a t i o n s R e v i e w '~ Sullivan (1965b), p. 427. " Sullivan (1965b), p. 437. " Michael Ryan and David Martinson, "Ethical values, the flow of journalistic information and public relations persons," Journalism Quarterly 61 (Summer 1984), pp. 27-34. " Ryan and Martinson (1984), p. 34. " Thomas Bivens, "Applying ethical theory to public relations," Journal of Business Ethics 6 (1987), pp. 195-200. Jeanne Logsdon and David Palmer, "Issues management and ethics," Journal of Business Ethics 7 (1988), pp. 191-98. Joseph Awad, The Power of Public Rdations, (New York: Praeger, 1985). = James Gaudino, Joe Fritch and Bruce Haynes, "If you knew what I knew, you'd make the same decision: A common misconception underlying public relations campaigns," Paper presented to the Conference on Applications of Communication Theory to Public Relations, Normal, IL, May 1987. Marvin Olasky, Corporate public relations and American private enterprise: A new historical perspective, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates). 2' James Grunig, "Symmetrical presuppositions as a framework for public relations theory," Paper presented to the Conference on Applications of Communication Theory to Public Relations, Illinois State University, Normal, IL, May 1987. Ron Pearson, "Beyond ethical relativism in public relations: Coorientation, rules and the idea of communication symmetry," in James Grunig and Larissa Grunig, eds. Public Relations Research Annual, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, in press).
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Albert J. Sullivan's Theory Of Public Relations Ethics Increasingly, public relations practitioners and many scholars are approaching public relations as an applied social science. Enlightened practitioners are apt to view themselves as applied social scientists or sociopolitical technicians. In contrast, many public relations practitioners and scholars of public relations are capable of philosophical thought, but few seem to develop basic philosophical theory to undergird their discussion of public relations. An exception is Albert J. Sullivan, a writer on public relations issues who more than 20 years ago articulated genuinely philosophical statements about what public relations is fundamentally, and about what it means to practice public relations ethically., Sullivan's work represents some of most significant basic public relations theory, yet he is not often cited as a source in major public relations textbooks. Sullivan is not cited in the recently issued PRSA body of knowledge document., Neither is he cited in Pavlik's recent review of public relations research., These facts alone warrant a retrospective look at Sullivan's work. But the important reason for reexamining Sullivan's thinking is that his theory of public relations ethics is arguably the most complete theory of its kind in the public relations literature and is still relevant to current debates about public relations ethics. To support these claims about the value of Sullivan's work, this article begins by examining his general theory of public rela rio ns and shows how this theory raises ethical questions. The article then focuses on the main points in Sullivan's ethical theory and identities the philosophical arguments Sullivan appeals to in support of this theory. A final section comments on Sullivan's ideas to suggest how they have contributed to the development of ethical theory in public relations.
Ron Pearson is an assistant professor, Department of Public Relations, Mount Saint Vincent University.
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SuUh-an's T h e o r y (1) Sullivan's Theory of Images Sullivan begins his general theory of public relations with the Aristotelian notion that each discipline has a subject area that is proper to it. Medicine, for instance, is concerned with the human body. Images, writes Sullivan, are the proper subject matter of public relations. Sullivan is, of course, well aware that the detractors .of public relations attack the profession precisely because, they argue, it is concerned with images instead of substance. But he points out that this argument--one which seeks to distinguish between mere images or representations of things and the things themselves--is a deep philosophical question that has by no means been resolved. This is the ancient philosophical dispute, writes Sullivan, concerning the relationship between the mind and objective reality, though he does have something to say about it and, indeed, makes some assumptions about it. The core assertion of his discussion is that what he calls the 'judgement center' of the mind deals only with images, never directly with reality. Rather neatly, this argument reduces to a truism the hitherto pejorative claim that public relations practitioners are merchants of images. In particular, it undercuts an argument like Finn's that public relations practitioners waste their time worrying about images and impressions when they should be worrying about substance and conviction., The point is not that practitioners should forego images for the truth, but rather that they need to approach their deployment of images with great circumspection. Finn suggests that it is not the image that is important, but the way the company is run. Sullivan's point is that all knowledge about how an organization should be run will be based on images and communicated through images. While Finn's advice is to stop worrying about images, Sullivan's is that public relations should worry a great deal about images because there is nothing else with which practitioners can replace them. A decision maker or communicator cannot simply replace images of reality with reality itself, only with other images. Sullivan's argument is not that we should be unconcerned with how a business is actually run but that our concern should include the images that are communicated about the business and, perhaps more importantly, the images upon which are based decisions about running the business. Sullivan breaks down his discussion of images into two parts, one concerned with the characteristics of what he calls external images transmitted from institutional, public relations sources through the mass media to target audiences, the other concerned with the process whereby internal images are produced in our minds when we look at reality. If it is true that a public relations practitioner begins with images of his or her institution in his own mind, it follows that members of a public who receive images in the mass media are receiving images of images. Indeed, if one considers the 58
Pttbllc Relations Review selection process of mass media gatekeepers, members of publics receive images of images of images. Sullivan doesn't explicitly identify this compound effect of the image-making process and devotes most of his discussion to the characteristics of external images, those that are sent by practitioners to their publics. There is some irony in this because, as he points out, "the dangers involved in transmitting external images are literally negligible compared to the dangers of getting images unchanged through the mind process.'s This observation reflects what is the core philosophical issue in Sullivan's discussion, that the messages produced and sent by public relations practitioners are based on images that the practitioner has about the reality of his or her institution, images that represent an interpretation of reality, not an exact picture of it. Sullivan suggests a number of reasons why the practitioner's picture will not be exact, all of which are familiar to students of the various extant communication models. Among the variables, or agents as Sullivan calls them, that affect images are cultural background, emotions, life experiences and processes of selective perception. In spite of his skepticism about the possibility of producing accurate images, Sullivan still holds up truth as the goal of public relations--'public relations is charged with the responsibility of delivering true information to large audiences.", He advocates a definition of truth that philosophers associate with what is called the correspondence theory of truth. According to this theory, ~uth is "the conformity between reality outside the mind and its perception by the mind's judgement center.", This type of definition implies an objectivism approach to epistemology and the belief that the "way things really are' is the final arbiter of truth. But Sullivan is equivocal on this point, for he advances arguments that a belief in objectivism is not fruitful. Some contemporary language theorists and philosophers argue that different groups or cultures not only attach different meanings to the same words but also, for all intents and purposes, live in different worlds and experience different images. This may seem rather obvious when one considers the cultural differences between a group of public relations professionals and a tribe of African pygmies. But Sullivan, having prefaced his remarks with an allusion to C. P. Snow's Two Cultures, suggests "stockholders and factory hands, management and labor, teenagers and adults, urban and rural dwellers, mid-Westerners and Southerners, and men and women"'do not share the same language or the same culture. He thus seems well aware of the theory of cultural relativism that is suggested by his theory of images, a theory that is a quite at odds with objectivism. Although they are left unamplified, clear moral imperatives are implied in Sullivan's discussion of images. Images sent as public relations messages, on Sullivan's analysis, are necessarily partial because they are compressed, involve inferences and emphasis, and are separated in time and space from other, related messages. The images in these messages are
54
Stfllh~an's T h e o r y also colored and distorted by context and they are also inaccurate because it follows from the nature of language that encoder and decoder necessarily attach different meanings and interpretations to the same symbols. Identifying the particular responsibility and obligation of public relations, Sullivan writes: Because these qualities of indirectness exist, because they operate with variable power, because they affect the truth of the image willy-nilly, there is placed on public relations a far heavier responsibility than is commonly realized. Public relations is properly concerned with images; its function is to represent indirectly the reality of institutions; if t~uth is its proper final obj ective, it (public relations) must be overcautious, indeed unreasonably cautious, about the images it proposes.' ...Public relations has been too superficial in its thinking ab out information as an image-process...(P)ublic relations has not realized its far more serious obligation to the whole truth.~ Sullivan's remarks are similar to observations made in hermeneutics and critical theory that no interpretation can be taken as final and complete; indeed the public relations responsibility that Sullivan identifies follows logically from his theory of images. If images are by definition incomplete interpretations, then all assertions of truth must be tentative and marked by excessive caution. It follows, as Sullivan indicates, that an important moral responsibility of public relations is to recognize this incompleteness. In practical terms, this could mean designing organization/public communication systems with certain characteristics, characteristics that limit message segmentation or encourage continual interaction so that communicators are not forced to accept the images of others as the best or natural interpretation of reality. Deetz, for instance, has observed that simply maintaining communication can be seen as an important moral imperative. Moreover, he too makes this conclusion after arguingabout the impossibility of arriving at theoretical positions or images of reality that can be taken as final and complete.,, Sullivan nowhere seems to notice, however, that his theory of images is quite at odds with his realist theory of truth, for even in the passage above he fails to mention that his theory of meaning makes attainment of "the whole truth' impossible. (2) Sullivan's Theory Of Public Relations Ethics Sullivan does not provide philosophical justification for the introduction of ethical terms such as obligation or responsibility into his discussion of images. But he takes these issues up in his discussion of public relations values. Sullivan identifies three separate value systems operating
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PtlblIe Relations Review in public relations and by doing this is able to articulate clearly the important dilemmas in public relations ethics. He also develops basic philosophical arguments why an organization has a moral obligation to its publics. Sullivan distinguishes technical, partisan and mutual values in public relations. The first of these, technical values, involve what Sullivan calls pride of craft and the efficient use of technique. Technical values as far as Sullivan is concerned are also amoral in the sense that they assume or take for granted that the applications of technique are for a good purpose. "Technical values look to the job and to its effective accomplishment; they reflect the technical expert's pride in using his skill efficiently.",~ Within this category, Sullivan identifies creative values, productive values and strategic values. Creative values, for instance, are inherent in making a message memorable, though Sullivan does not allow that public relations practitioners are artists, even when they use artistic techniques, because they lack complete freedom of expression. Productive values are those which rate highly getting the job done within budget and on deadline. Strategic values are those which rate success highly by emphasizing the perceptive recognition of a public relations opportunity, the establishment of clear objectives and the achievement of these through effective strategies. Sullivan observes that strategic values are the most underdeveloped of the three technical values, making a point that basic textbooks continue to make: that public relations people too often over-value production activity at the expense of careful planning. Partisan values include ideas such as commitment, trust, loyalty and obedience. A public relations practitioner serves aninstitution and furthers its interests. Partisan values have much in common with patriotism. Although he does not put it quite this way, Sullivan suggests partisanship assumes without question that the organization is right and that its interpretation of images is complete and correct, an assumption that Sullivan has already attacked in his theory of images. He points out that this belief in the essential rightness and completeness of the organization's point of view leads to a belief that the end justifies the means and to a belief that oneway communication is always sufficient. This latter belief can be seen to follow from acceptance of the organization viewpoint as final, for this acceptance implies that other viewpoints are irrelevant and misguided. Sullivan criticizes public relations for excessive partisanship but also acknowledges that some degree of partisanship is essential for the integrity of practitioners. It would be the height of cynicism to advocate that practitioners should have no commitment to an employer, Sullivan says. It needs to be noted that partisanship as Sullivan defines it is taken by some practitioners to be the highest value. These practitioners deny that they are motivated, or ought to be motivated, by anything like mutual values. This point is stated emphatically by Lewis, at that time vice56
Slflll~n's Theory president, public information and communications, U.S. Committee for Energy Awareness (Washington) and formerly director of corporate communications for Union Carbide Corporation. Lewis writes: It may be useful to recognize unequivocally that we are being paid to promote the self-interest of our client or corporation, no more no less... Compromise and concession are the very nature of the democratic process, b u t I believe thatpublic affairs canbest be u n d e r s t o o d b y first thinking about it as a "win-lose" situation for the practitioner. Compromise is what we do w h e n all else fails. ~ One of the things that Lewis seems to assume is that everyone is capable of entering into the public policy fray in pursuit of his or her own self-interest. But his point is that self-interest is no more a dirty word in public relations than it is in the courtroom, assuming, of course, that there is really some thing analogous to the courtroom in the so-called court o f public opinion. Another interesting aspect of Lewis" argument is that it suggests democratic methods such as compromise and concession are relevant to public relations practice only after a practitioner fails to win public sentiment to the organization's point of view. The implication is that a practitioner should begin by using undemocratic methods. Sullivan's argument, as will become clear in the discussion of mutual values below, stands in contrast to the position taken by Lewis. Mutual values, values which Sullivan sometimes refers to as 'higher values,' are necessary to balance partisan values. Mutual values take into account the viewpoints, interests and rights of others and, according to Sullivan, "light up the road to professionhood.',' Perhaps Sullivan's most important contribution to ethical theory in public relations is his argument for institutional obligations to its publics. These arguments he grounds in a philosophical theory about the nature of rights and the nature of a human being. Rights, he says, belong to a human person by virtue of the fact he or she is a human person. We have rights to those things a human requires to be human. Life is a right, food is a right, love is a right, Sullivan argues, because without these things a human would cease to be human. Regarding these rights, Sullivan asserts aprincipIe ofmutuality, a principle that is one of two basic propositions in his theory. The principle states: "If one has a right, another man has an obligation to respect that fight, to fulfill that right....'~ Because of these fights, it can be seen that certain professions have obligations. The medical profession, for instance, has an obligation to preserve life while the profession of public relations has an obligation to produce certain kinds of images. There are two fights relevant for public relations and each establishes a particular obligation for public relations. Both rights follow from the 57
Public Relations Review second basic proposition of Sullivan's theory, his definition of a person as rational and free. Because a person is rational, that person has a right to the preconditions for rationality, and Sullivan argues that this involves access to accurate and complete information in matters that affect him or her. Similarly, because a person is free, that person has a right to participate in decisions which affect him or her. Following from Sullivan's principle of mutuality, along with these two rights go concommitant obligations on the part of organizations to provide accurate information and to facilitate participation. Sullivan is not naive about his theory, for he also identifies three obstacles to the kind of information flow and participation he has described: people do not realize they possess the rights to information and freedom; institutional managers do not accept the fact that people possess these rights; and itis extremelydifficult to image just how this kind of participation and information sharing can be brought about in a mass society: "there is hardly any structure yet devised whereby every person in every group to which he belongs has the chance to get representation before institutional management."~ (3) Sullivan's Contribution To Ethical Theory In PR Sullivan develops a number of valuable insights and perspectives on public relations ethics that remain highly relevant. And even where his conclusions are questionable, they can be seen to focus on concerns that are important for a discussion of ethics in the context of public relations. The following paragraphs recap some of Sullivan's most important arguments and offer comment on their value and relevance for public relations theory. The topics discussed below are 1) Sullivan's decision to locate the focus of public relations ethics at the point where partisan and mutual values intersect; 2) Sullivan's suggestion that technique can be considered as morally neutral; 3) Sullivan's epistemological and moral arguments for the necessity of ongoing, balanced two-way communication; and 4) Sullivan's principle ofmutualityand its relationship to systems theoretic ideas that are currently receiving attention in public relations literature. 9 Sullivan identifies the focus of ethical issues in public relations at the point where partisan values and mutual values intersect and come into conflict. This remains the central dilemma and focus for public relations ethics and one which has inspired a significant volume of public relations thinking and research. Ryan and Martison, for instance, have suggested that a focus on the tension between organization interests and broader public interests is the key focus for public relations ethics.~ In one study of PRSA members, these researchers found that virtually all respondents agreed that a responsible practitioner must represent two publics--management and outside publics. They concluded that "an ethical theory
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Sulllvan's T h e o r y for public relations must demand that practitioners show considerable concern for the public in the tug-of-war of ethical decision making.",' Bivens has also written about the tension or tug-of-war between the advocate and advisor roles in public relations practice, pointing out that the advocate is expected to be subjective in taking up the interests of a client or employer, while the advisor is expected to be more objective by taking into account other perspectives. He identifies the central problem for public relations ethics as the development of a system of ethical standards that can bridge the gap between advocate and advisor roles.,, In sum, as these two examples indicate, Sullivan clearly articulated public relations' central ethical dilemma as a tension between partisan and mutual values. This distinction continues to be relevant for discussions of public relations ethics. 9 Sullivan makes the provocative, though somewhat dangerous, suggestion that technical expertise in a public relations context can be considered as neither moral nor immoral. This point of view can be challenged, of course, for it can be argued that no application of technique isvalue-neutral. The application of research and communication technology, for instance, is always carried out in the service of some goals and objectives, even if the so-called communication technician cannot or will not articulate these goals. Sullivan suggests the technician assumes or takes for granted that his o r h e r technical expertise serves a morally good cause. But as public relations adopts increasingly sophisticated management and communication technologies, and takes up the methods of social scientific research and evaluation, it may become increasingly difficult for practitioners to see the connection between the application of technique and questions of ethics. At the same time, it becomes increasingly urgent that these connections be made. Thus, it is probably inappropriate to follow Sullivan and attempt a separation between technical values as amoral, on the one hand, and partisan and mutual values as the realms in which moral questions become relevant, on the other hand. Logsdon and Palmer make a related point in their discussion of the ethical implications of issues management techniques. They argue that issues management is often touted as a "benigntool to implement desirable social performance without a full exploration of its less-than-benign potential. "~*Their point is that issues management techniques are not benign or value-neutral but necessarily serve either partisan or mutual values. It is thus vital, they suggest; to insert ethical norms and values into the issues management process and not to vaew this process merely as the application of technique. If the connection between the application of techniques like issues management and ethical matters is not made explicit and a possible topic of discussion, these techniques often privilege organizational interests. 9 Another important contribution of Sullivan's comes from the interaction between his theory of images and his theory of the human x
9
9
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Ptlblle Relations Re~qew person and its rights. By combining these theories, he makes an intriguing argument for the importance of ongoing, dialogical, two-way communication in public relations. Consider the steps in his argument: 1) the mind has access to images, not reality itself; 2) these images are ahvays partial and incomplete; 3) humans have a right to complete information about matters which affect them and a right to participate in decisions that affect them. Together, these principles all point to the moral necessity for continual communication in and through communication systems that allow for balanced and equal input from all communicators, that is, from both the organization and its publics. One-way communication will not suffice because the one-way communicator makes the implicit claim that his or her own point of view is adequate without taking into account other viewpoints. This is an organization-knows-best approach to public relations that Awad suggests is institutional arrogance, and that Gaudino, Fritch and Hayes call the "if you knew what I knew, you'd make the same decision" syndrome in public relations. = Moreover, only communication systems that allow balanced dialogue between organizations and publics meet Sullivan's requirement for participation. In making these important claims, Sullivan develops arguments that are central to discussions of public relations ethics that focus on concepts such as two-way symmetrical communication=and dialogue.~ It is important to note that Sullivan combines his theory of images with a correspondence theory of truth with which it is at odds. This tendency to retain an objectivism epistemology--the view that it will be possible, given sufficient time and methodological rigor, to discover some final arbiter to decide among competing images---also crops up in Sullivan's discussion of ethics, for there he talks about a right to accurate information, something his epistemology suggests is impossible. It is crucial to observe that a belief in objectivism easilyleads to a belief on the part of an individual communicator that he or she, through some privileged moral insight, has seen beyond mere images to get a grasp on the way things really are in themselves. A belief in the possibility of these kind of insights can be used to justify one-way communication and a lack of interest in other perspectives because these are thought to be immature and uninformed. Olasky's recent critique of the public relations philosophies of Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays suggests that both these venerated fathers of public relations believed in social engineering for the good of the masses, a belief that can only be justified if one accepts the possibility of privileged moral insight.~ The combination of Sullivan's theory of images and his ethical theory provide arguments that run counter to a view of public relations as a tool for managing ill-informed and unruly publics. 9 Finally, Sullivan's principle of mutuality can be shown to have implications that connect it with ideas in systems theory, a perspective that is becoming increasingly important in public relations. It can be asked: 60
Stfllivan's T h e o r y Does the fight of another truly imply an obligation on the part of all other persons to recognize that right? Is there not some limit to this principle, if only a practical one? The observations of systems theorists that seem to have inspired so many public relations theorists, offer support for Sullivan's claim. For, as persons, organizations or systemsbecome mutually dependent on one another as a result of increased social complexity, it can be said that the limits to Sullivan's mutuality principle become less absolute. Increased interdependence would seem to bring with it an increase in the kinds of responsibilities and obligations Sullivan describes. Indeed, one of systems theory's valuable contributions to public relations theory is its emphasis on this idea of system interdependence and the arguments it offers w h y one system should take other systems into account. To be sure, these arguments do not usually yield moral imperatives as much as strategic imperatives associated with system survival and growth. But there is no reason w h y a moral side, as opposed to a narrow functional side, of systems theory cannot be emphasized. This would be to find in the systems theory language of interconnectedness and interdependence a basis for developing a moral theory that privileged relationships and mutual interests and recognized the value of Sullivan's principle of mutuality. References
' Albert J. Sullivan, "Toward a philosophy of public relations: Images," in 9Otto Lerbinger and Albert Sullivan eds, Information, Influence and Communication: A Reader in Public Relations, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publisher, 1965a), pp. 240249; "Values in public relations," in Otto Lerbinger and Albert Sullivan eds, Information, Influence and Communication: A Reader in Public Relations, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publisher, 1965b), pp. 412-439. Public Relations Society of America Task Force," Public Relations Body of Knowledge," Public Relations Review 14 (Fall 1988), pp. 3-39. 3 John Pavlik, Public Relations: What Research Tells Us (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1987). , David Finn, "Stop worrying about your image," Harpers (June 1962), pp. 7782. s Sullivan (1965a), p. 247. , Sullivan (1965a), p. 248. 7Sullivan (1965a), p. 241. * Sullivan (1965a), p. 245. ' Sullivan (1965a), pp. 241-2. " Sullivan (1965a), pp. 248-9. .' Stan Deetz, "Keeping the conversation going: The Principle of dialectic ethics," Communication 7 (1983), pp. 263-288. '~ Sullivan (1965b), p. 413. Marshall Lewis, "Policy planning," In Bill Cantor and Chester Burger eds., Experts in Action, (New York: Longman Inc., 1984). 1, Sullivan (1965b), p. 437. 61
Pttblle R e l a t i o n s R e v i e w '~ Sullivan (1965b), p. 427. " Sullivan (1965b), p. 437. " Michael Ryan and David Martinson, "Ethical values, the flow of journalistic information and public relations persons," Journalism Quarterly 61 (Summer 1984), pp. 27-34. " Ryan and Martinson (1984), p. 34. " Thomas Bivens, "Applying ethical theory to public relations," Journal of Business Ethics 6 (1987), pp. 195-200. Jeanne Logsdon and David Palmer, "Issues management and ethics," Journal of Business Ethics 7 (1988), pp. 191-98. Joseph Awad, The Power of Public Rdations, (New York: Praeger, 1985). = James Gaudino, Joe Fritch and Bruce Haynes, "If you knew what I knew, you'd make the same decision: A common misconception underlying public relations campaigns," Paper presented to the Conference on Applications of Communication Theory to Public Relations, Normal, IL, May 1987. Marvin Olasky, Corporate public relations and American private enterprise: A new historical perspective, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates). 2' James Grunig, "Symmetrical presuppositions as a framework for public relations theory," Paper presented to the Conference on Applications of Communication Theory to Public Relations, Illinois State University, Normal, IL, May 1987. Ron Pearson, "Beyond ethical relativism in public relations: Coorientation, rules and the idea of communication symmetry," in James Grunig and Larissa Grunig, eds. Public Relations Research Annual, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, in press).
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