Ameliorating Some Negative Effects of Positive Mood: Encouraging Happy People to Perceive Intragroup Variability

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ARTICLE NO.

32, 361–386 (1996)

0017

Ameliorating Some Negative Effects of Positive Mood: Encouraging Happy People to Perceive Intragroup Variability SARAH QUELLER

AND

DIANE M. MACKIE

University of California, Santa Barbara AND

STEVEN J. STROESSNER Barnard College Received: February 15, 1995; revised: January 17, 1996; accepted: February 1, 1996 Subjects in positive moods typically perceive groups as being more homogeneous than do subjects in neutral moods (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992). Two experiments tested the idea that increasing the attention that happy perceivers paid to information that differentiated target group members would eliminate this effect. In Experiment 1, salience of distinguishing information was manipulated by either attributing stereotype-inconsistent information to a number of mildly atypical group members or attributing the same stereotypeinconsistent information to a few extremely atypical, and therefore highly salient, group members. In Experiment 2, the salience of distinguishing information was manipulated by asking subjects to merely read descriptions of the group members or to sort them into subgroups on the basis of similarities and differences. In both experiments, happy subjects perceived the group as more homogeneous than did subjects in neutral moods when distinctive information was not made salient, but perceived the group in a manner similar to their neutral mood counterparts when the distinctive information was made salient. r 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

Imagine the following situation. A group of some friends are sitting around chatting and one begins to complain about her boyfriend. Why didn’t he call her when he said he would? The friends sympathize, criticize, or analyze the boyfriend’s behavior. Someone asks, ‘‘Why do men behave this way?’’ The This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship to the first author and National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9209995 to the second author. We thank Charity Bracy, Andrea Dobija, Janice Krusinski, Jeanine Sherrick, and Niki VanDervoort for their help collecting data and coding recall. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Sarah Queller, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660. 361 0022-1031/96 $18.00 Copyright r 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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assumption implicit in such a question, of course, is that all men behave similarly. Such inferences of intragroup homogeneity are a common consequence of social categorization, especially for outgroups (Allport, 1954; Quattrone & Jones, 1980; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Wilder, 1981). Unfortunately, research has shown that perceptions of homogeneity within a group can increase stereotypic perceptions of the group (Park & Rothbart, 1982; Stroessner & Mackie, 1992; Wilder, 1978). This apparent link has heightened recent interest in both how homogeneity and stereotypicality are related and how perceptions of homogeneity and stereotypically can be changed (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Judd & Park, 1988; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Park & Hastie, 1987; Sedikides & Ostrom, 1993). By far the most common experimental technique designed to induce changes in perceptions of stereotypicality and homogeneity involves exposing perceivers to information—about group members or their behavior—that both contradicts prevalent stereotypes and increases intragroup variability (for reviews see Messick & Mackie, 1989; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Wilder, 1981). This emphasis derives, at least in part, from the assumption that stereotypic and homogeneous expectations are rooted in inaccurate perceptions (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969), and that those inaccuracies can be corrected by exposing people to the full variability and heterogeneity of group members and group behavior. Unfortunately, getting perceivers to recognize behavior as stereotypeinconsistent, or group members as stereotype-atypical, has proven somewhat difficult. Perceivers are conservative, and their first line of defense when presented with inconsistencies seems to be to ignore them, reinterpret them, or explain them away (Darley & Gross, 1983; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Razran, 1950; Rothbart, Fulero, Jenson, Howard, & Birrel, 1979; Rothbart & John, 1985; Sagar & Schofield, 1980; Wilder & Shapiro, 1984), thus maintaining their preconceptions. When group behaviors and group members are not recognized as inconsistent with prior expectations, there is no reason to change those expectations, and exposure to ‘‘inconsistent’’ information has no impact on stereotype change. Considerable research attention has thus turned to documenting psychological and environmental factors that facilitate or inhibit the recognition of evidence inconsistent with social stereotypes (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Rothbart & John, 1985; Wilder, 1984). Positive mood state is one such factor currently enjoying considerable research attention. For both intuitive and theoretical reasons, positive mood is of natural interest to social psychologists trying to change stereotypic perceptions. Intuitively, interacting with and making judgments about members of another group while in a good mood seems likely to improve the favorability of those interactions and judgments. Theoretically, being in a positive mood may trigger more positive judgments because of mood congruency (Bower, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Niedenthal & Showers, 1991) or because being in a positive mood slants processing toward the positive (Petty, Gleicher, & Baker, 1991). The potential benefits of positive mood for improving intergroup perceptions is embodied most

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clearly in Amir’s (1969) conclusion that pleasant contact with outgroups is one of the kinds of contact most conducive to stereotype change. Despite the many reasons to believe that being in a positive mood might improve intergroup perceptions, recent evidence suggests that positive mood does not always have a beneficial impact on how groups are seen. First, positive mood has been found to increase reliance on preconceived stereotypic expectations, rather than encouraging extensive information processing about groups (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992, Experiment 2) and group members (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994). Second, Stroessner and Mackie (1992) found that being in a positive mood increased perceptions of homogeneity in both well-known and newly encountered groups. For example, happy subjects viewing behavioral descriptions of highly variable groups saw those groups as more homogeneous than did subjects in neutral moods exposed to the same descriptions. Two separate lines of research suggest that these findings may be related to a tendency for happy perceivers to focus on similarities rather than differences. First, Stroessner and Mackie (1992) found that the behaviors that were most accessible to the happy subjects—who had rated the group as being relatively homogeneous—were those behaviors clustered around the group’s central tendency. In contrast, affectively neutral subjects’ most highly accessible behaviors were more distant from the group’s central tendency. In addition, Isen and Daubman (1984) found that happy subjects rated items that were poor examples of a category as being more similar to that category than did subjects in neutral moods. Together, these lines of research suggest that, left to their own devices, subjects in positive moods appear to focus on what exemplars and their categories have in common rather than what distinguishes them (see Murray, Sujan, Sujan, & Hirt, 1990 for the impact of explicit directions on such responses). How might a proclivity toward information conveying similarities rather than differences influence perceptions of social groups? When presented with information depicting stereotype-inconsistent behaviors or stereotype-atypical group members, such a proclivity should make perceivers more likely to see similarities between the presented information and the group stereotype. As a result, group members and their behaviors will seem more uniform. If such a tendency to focus on what group members have in common rather than what differentiates them does indeed contribute to happy peoples’ increased perceptions of group homogeneity, however, then manipulations that make salient the ways in which group members do in fact differ should allow happy perceivers to recognize the same degree of variability that their neutral mood counterparts do. These ideas were tested in two experiments designed to assess the effect of increasing happy subjects’ attention to differentiating information about group members. In the first experiment, we manipulated exposure to either mildly or extremely atypical group members, and compared happy and affectively neutral subjects’ perceptions of homogeneity. In the second experiment, we used a processing goal manipulation to influence attention to differentiating information, while holding constant the objective degree to which group members differed. We

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expected that when differences between the group members and the stereotype were not made salient, happy subjects would perceive more group homogeneity than subjects in neutral moods, replicating prior research. When attention to distinguishing information was increased, however, we expected that happy subjects would no longer exhibit greater perceptions of homogeneity than affectively neutral subjects. EXPERIMENT 1 Experiment 1 was intended to test a number of novel hypotheses that stemmed from the idea that positive mood increases perceptions of similarities rather than differences. First, if happy perceivers have enhanced perceptions of similarities to the stereotype and inhibited perceptions of dissimilarities, they should see more behavioral consistency and member typicality within a social group when compared to perceivers in neutral moods. Thus, we assessed the impact of mood states on perceptions of behavioral consistency and member typicality, with the expectation that these perceptions would be related to increased perceptions of homogeneity. A second set of hypotheses addressed by Experiment 1 concerned possible boundary conditions on the increases in perceived variability associated with positive mood. That is, if the distinguishing information about the group was made particularly salient, would this override happy subjects’ tendencies to perceive similarities rather than differences? In previous research, perceptions of groups in which inconsistent information is dispersed across a number of mildly atypical individuals have been compared with perceptions of groups in which the same inconsistent information is concentrated in a few, highly atypical individuals. Generally, the concentration of inconsistent information in a few highly atypical individuals makes their atypicality quite salient, with the usual result that these individuals are subtyped or mentally segregated from the rest of the group. Once the highly atypical individuals are mentally ousted from the group, the remaining members are objectively quite homogeneous, displaying only stereotypeconsistent and stereotype-irrelevant information. Ratings of the group’s typicality, consistency, and stereotypicality then reflect this objective homogeneity. The result is that perceptions of typicality, consistency, and stereotypicality for groups in which the inconsistent information is concentrated are higher than they are for a group in which the inconsistent information is dispersed (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Weber & Crocker, 1983; but see Gurwitz & Dodge, 1977). Presentation of identical stereotype-inconsistent information concentrated in a few very atypical members or dispersed across multiple mildly atypical group members in this way allowed us to assess the impact of making information about group member differences salient. When inconsistent information was dispersed, our prediction was that happy perceivers would focus on similarities to the stereotype and would see more behavioral consistency and group member typicality, and thus more similarity, than perceivers in neutral moods. When

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inconsistent information was concentrated among a few highly atypical group members and was therefore salient, two possibilities presented themselves. One possibility was that happy perceivers’ tendencies to focus on similarities rather than differences may be strong enough to lead them to perceive even highly atypical individuals as at least somewhat similar to the rest of the group—as perhaps only moderately atypical. However, seeing the highly atypical group members as not so atypical might restrain happy perceivers, compared to perceivers in neutral moods, from subtyping them. Thus happy perceivers might make estimates of consistency and typicality that are lower than those made by subjects in neutral moods, who mentally dismiss the highly atypical individuals and base group judgments on the remaining typical ones. Not only would such a result demonstrate quite remarkable robustness for happy perceivers’ focus on similarities, but it would also constitute a situation in which positive mood had a beneficial effect on group perceptions (that is, reduced perceptions of similarity and typicality) relative to perceivers in neutral moods (for a discussion, Mackie et al., in press). The alternate possibility was that the highly atypical group members may be so distinctive that even perceivers in positive moods could not help but notice how different these individuals are from the rest of the group. This would lead to happy perceivers subtyping the highly atypical group members, just as perceivers in neutral moods do. With the atypical group members ignored, the remaining group members are highly stereotypic. If happy perceivers do subtype, then, we might expect their perceptions of the group to be no different from the perceptions of subjects in neutral moods. Finally, because we presented subjects with group members who performed both consistent and inconsistent behaviors, and because we asked subjects both about consistency and inconsistency as well as about typicality and atypicality, we were able to see if the predicted effects were due to an overestimation of consistency and typicality or to an underestimation of inconsistency and atypicality. Thus, when inconsistent information was dispersed, we expected happy perceivers to report more behavioral consistency, more member typicality, and more intragroup similarity than people in neutral moods (consistent with previous research). When inconsistent information was concentrated, happy people might see even the highly atypical individuals as more typical than do people in neutral moods. If so, we expected less evidence of subtyping and lower perceptions of consistency, typicality, and similarity on the part of happy perceivers than on the part of perceivers in neutral moods. On the other hand, the concentration of inconsistent information in a few highly atypical members might lead happy perceivers, like their neutral mood counterparts, to show evidence of subtyping. If so, we expected happy people’s perceptions of the group’s behavioral consistency and member typicality to be equivalent to those of people in neutral moods.

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Method Subjects and Design Eighty-two (45 male and 37 female) undergraduates from the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) received partial course credit for their participation in the experiment. Mood state and information distribution were manipulated in a 2 (Neutral or Positive Mood) 3 2 (Concentrated or Dispersed Information Presentation) between-subjects design. Up to six subjects participated in any given experimental session. All subjects in a session were randomly assigned to one of the two information conditions. Each subject within a session was randomly assigned to one of the two mood conditions.

Procedure To reduce suspicion that the mood manipulation and presentation of information about the group were connected, subjects were told that they would participate in two separate and unrelated experiments. Mood manipulation. In the ‘‘first experiment,’’ subjects in the positive mood condition read a story about old friends getting together and encountering the kindness of strangers. Subjects in the neutral mood condition read a story about an economic recovery in Chicago (these stories were adapted from Kuykendall & Keating, 1990). Subjects then completed a questionnaire that included items assessing how happy or sad the newspaper articles made them feel, how happy or sad they felt in general, and how good or bad a mood they were in (1 5 ‘‘sad/bad,’’ 11 5 ‘‘happy/good’’). Presentation of information about group members. A second experimenter (who was blind to the mood manipulation) described the second experiment as a study about perceptions of social groups and then described traits considered stereotypic of several groups, including surfers. This was done to activate the stereotype for surfers. Subjects then read the descriptions of eight surfers and formed an impression of each surfer as they did so. Each description consisted of the surfer’s initials and six behavioral statements and was presented in writing on an index card. The 48 behavioral statements consisted of six statements reflecting the stereotypic trait ‘‘casual’’ (e.g., ‘‘Even in November, he had tan lines from his Teva sandals’’); six statements reflecting the stereotypic trait ‘‘clique-ish’’ (e.g., ‘‘As soon as the other guys were gone, he and his friends loosened up and started joking again’’), six statements reflecting the counterstereotypic trait ‘‘success oriented’’ (e.g., ‘‘He was worried about the history midterm and started studying a week in advance’’), six statements reflecting the counterstereotypic trait ‘‘intellectual’’ (e.g., ‘‘He enjoyed the British Repertory Theater’s presentation of Shakespeare’s Macbeth’’), and 24 statements reflecting 12 traits that were neutral with respect to the surfer stereotype. The stereotype-consistent, stereotype-inconsistent, and stereotype-irrelevant nature of the traits was confirmed by pretesting. Manipulation of concentrated and dispersed inconsistent information. Half of the subjects in each mood condition were presented with stereotype-inconsistent information that was concentrated in two group members out of eight. The other half saw the same 12 stereotype-inconsistent items dispersed across six group members out of eight (following Johnston & Hewstone, 1992). The distribution of the statements across the stimulus individuals in the different conditions is summarized in Table 1. Dependent measures. When they finished the impression formation task, subjects were first asked to recall as many of the statements as they could. Next, subjects rated the homogeneity of the surfers they had read about on a 7-point scale (1 5 ‘‘not at all similar’’ and 7 5 ‘‘extremely similar’’). The main dependent measures assessing similarity to the stereotype were then collected. Subjects estimated the percentage of statements they had read that were consistent with the stereotype of surfers, inconsistent with the stereotype, and irrelevant to the stereotype. Subjects were not reminded that these should total

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AMELIORATING NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF POSITIVE MOOD TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF INCONSISTENT BEHAVIORS ACROSS GROUP MEMBERS IN THE CONCENTRATED AND DISPERSED CONDITIONS Concentrated inconsistent information

Dispersed inconsistent information

Atypical members

Two members with 6 Inconsistent 0 Consistent 0 Irrelevant

Six members with 2 Inconsistent 1 Consistent 3 Irrelevant

Typical members

Six members with 0 Inconsistent 2 Consistent 4 Irrelevant

Two members with 0 Inconsistent 3 Consistent 3 Irrelevant

to 100. In addition, subjects estimated how many of the surfers they had read about were ‘‘typical of surfers in general’’ and how many were ‘‘atypical of surfers in general.’’ Subjects were not reminded that they had seen information about eight individuals.

Results Check on Effectiveness of Mood Manipulation Two subjects were excluded for failing to complete the manipulation check items, leaving 80 subjects. Responses to the mood manipulation check items were highly correlated (Cronbach’s a 5 .85) and were averaged. Analysis indicated that mood had been successfully manipulated, F(1, 76) 5 26.38, p , .0001. Subjects reading the positive story reported being in a significantly more positive mood (M 5 8.25) than subjects reading the neutral story (M 5 6.45). Perceptions of Behavioral Consistency Subjects’ estimates of the percentages of behaviors they had seen that were consistent and inconsistent with their overall impression of the group were analyzed in a 2 (Neutral or Positive Mood) 3 2 (Concentrated or Dispersed Information) 3 2 (Consistent and Inconsistent Behaviors) ANOVA. The interaction between induced mood and behavior estimates was significant, F(1, 76) 5 4.75, p , .03. Examination of the means indicated that whereas subjects in a neutral mood saw slightly more inconsistent (M 5 51.22) than consistent (M 5 43.22) behaviors overall, F(1, 39) 5 1.52, p , .23, subjects in positive moods saw significantly more consistent (M 5 48.54) than inconsistent (M 5 37.69) ones, F(1, 37) 5 4.28, p , .05. As predicted, however, this effect was further qualified by a significant interaction between mood, information presentation, and behavior estimates, F(1, 76) 5 3.93, p , .051. Cell means are

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FIG. 1. Perceived consistency of behaviors performed by group (upper panel) and perceived typicality of group members (lower panel) as a function of induced mood and concentrated versus dispersed presentation of inconsistent behaviors, Experiment 1.

presented in the top panel of Fig. 1. Given our predictions, we analyzed subjects’ responses in the dispersed and concentrated conditions separately to ascertain the form of this interaction. Because we wished to see if happy subjects underutilized inconsistency information or overutilized consistency information, we also analyzed these measures separately. Dispersed stereotype-inconsistent information. Happy subjects exposed to dispersed stereotype-inconsistent information were expected to perceive more behavioral consistency and less behavioral inconsistency than subjects in neutral moods. Analysis of the behavioral consistency estimates showed that happy subjects made higher estimates of the percentage of stereotype-consistent behaviors than did subjects in neutral moods (Positive M 5 49.11, Neutral M 5 35.32,

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F(1, 39) 5 4.3, p , .05). Analysis of the behavioral inconsistency estimates showed the opposite pattern: Happy subjects estimated a smaller percentage of the behaviors were inconsistent with the stereotype than did subjects in neutral moods (Positive M 5 35.10, Neutral M 5 55.91, F(1, 39) 5 11.4, p , .002). Thus, subjects’ perceptions in these conditions were precisely in line with our predictions. Although both effects were significant, there was greater underestimation of inconsistency than overestimation of consistency on the part of happy subjects relative to subjects in neutral moods. Concentrated stereotype-inconsistent information. Responses in the concentrated condition were analyzed to assess whether the impact of positive mood on perceptions of similarity continued to have an effect even in the face of highly atypical individuals, or whether happy subjects also appeared to notice, and thus to subtype these clearly atypical group members. If happy subjects perceived them as similar to other group members, we expected lower estimates of behavioral consistency and higher estimates of behavioral inconsistency from happy subjects than from subjects in neutral moods. If, on the other hand, happy subjects subtyped the highly atypical group members, their estimates of behavioral consistency and inconsistency would not differ from those of subjects in neutral moods. Analysis showed that happy subjects’ estimates of the percentage of consistent behaviors were no lower than those made by subjects in neutral moods (Neutral M 5 52.37, Positive M 5 48.00, F(1, 37) 5 .39, p 5 .54) and their estimates of the percentage of inconsistent behaviors were no higher than those made by subjects in neutral moods (Neutral M 5 45.78, Positive M 5 40.15, F(1, 37) 5 .67, p 5 .42). These results are consistent with the proposed alternative that making differentiating information salient by concentrating inconsistent information in a few individuals leads both happy and neutral-mood subjects to subtype, or set aside, these highly atypical individuals, bringing happy subjects’ perceptions of the group in line with those of subjects in neutral moods. Perceptions of Member Typicality Because the numbers of typical and atypical group members presented differed in the dispersed and concentrated conditions (refer to Table 1), separate analyses provided a more appropriate test of our hypotheses regarding perceptions of member typicality.1 Cell means are presented in the bottom half of Fig. 1. Dispersed stereotype-inconsistent information. If happy subjects tend to perceive similarities rather than differences, we expected them to report seeing more typical group members and fewer atypical group members than subjects in neutral moods. Analysis showed only a weak, nonsignificant trend for happy subjects to 1 An ANOVA did reveal a significant interaction between information presentation and member estimates, F(1, 75) 5 11.56, p , .001 (one subject failed to answer one of these questions). Overall, subjects perceived more typical (M 5 4.21) and fewer atypical (M 5 3.11) group members in the concentrated condition, F(1, 36) 5 6.42, p , .02 and fewer typical (M 5 3.11) and more atypical (M 5 4.48) members in the dispersed condition, F(1, 39) 5 5.91, p , .02. This effect was qualified by a three-way interaction involving mood, F(1, 75) 5 3.90, p , .052.

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report the presence of more typical group members compared to subjects in neutral moods (Positive M 5 3.6, Neutral M 5 2.7, F(1, 39) 5 2.3, p 5 .14). However, happy subjects did think there were fewer atypical group members than did subjects in neutral moods (Positive M 5 3.8, Neutral M 5 5.0, F(1, 39) 5 4.0, p 5 .053). This pattern of results was again consistent with our predictions, and once again the effect was stronger for estimation of inconsistency than for estimation of consistency. Concentrated stereotype-inconsistent information. If happy subjects don’t subtype because they perceive the highly atypical individuals as only moderately atypical, then they might think there are fewer typical members and more atypical members compared to subjects in neutral moods (who are expected to subtype). If happy perceivers do subtype, their estimates of the numbers of typical and of atypical group members should be similar to those of subjects in neutral moods. Analysis showed that happy subjects’ estimates of the number of typical group members were equivalent to the estimates of subjects in neutral moods (Positive M 5 4.1, Neutral M 5 4.6, F(1, 37) 5 .75, p 5 .39). As there were actually six typical group members in the concentrated condition, both happy and neutralmood subjects underestimated the number of typical individuals presented. Happy subjects’ estimates of the number of atypical group members also failed to differ from the estimates of subjects in neutral moods (Positive M 5 3.2, Neutral M 5 3.1, F(1, 36) 5 .025, p 5 .87). As there were actually two atypical group members in this condition, all subjects overestimated the number of atypical individuals presented.2 In summary, results in the dispersed conditions were consistently in line with our predictions. Even when faced with information that affectively neutral perceivers see as indicating a quite heterogeneous group, happy perceivers reported the presence of significantly fewer inconsistent behaviors and significantly fewer atypical individuals than subjects in neutral moods. At the same time, they reported significantly more consistent behaviors and insignificantly more typical members than subjects in neutral moods. These effects were eliminated when inconsistent information was concentrated in a few individual group members, an outcome consistent with the idea that this informational presentation makes the ways in which these members differ from the rest of the group so salient that happy perceivers, like neutral-mood perceivers, subtype or set aside

2 We also verified that results in the neutral mood conditions replicated those found by Johnston & Hewstone (1992). Subjects in neutral moods reported more consistent behaviors and more typical group members in the concentrated than in the dispersed condition (for behavioral consistency, concentrated M 5 52.37, dispersed M 5 35.31, F[1, 39] 5 6.2, p , .02; for group member typicality, concentrated M 5 4.57, dispersed M 5 2.73, F[1, 39] 5 12.3, p , .002). These subjects also perceived significantly fewer atypical group members in the concentrated (M 5 3.07) than dispersed conditions (M 5 5.05), F(1, 39) 5 10.6, p , .003, and slightly but not significantly fewer inconsistent behaviors in the concentrated (M 5 45.8) than dispersed (M 5 55.9), conditions F(1, 39) 5 2.2, p 5 .15).

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these highly unusual individuals. Further evidence for this interpretation was pursued in analysis of processing measures. Evidence for Subtyping Our alternative predictions for the possible responses of happy perceivers when inconsistent information was concentrated were based on assumptions about whether both they and subjects in neutral moods subtyped the highly inconsistent individuals. If the atypical individuals were subtyped, information pertaining to those atypical individuals was likely to be associated in memory and thus to appear consecutively when subjects recalled the information presented about group members. Thus, more clustering of the behaviors recalled about atypical individuals in the concentrated condition would serve as evidence that subtyping had occurred. The behaviors subjects recalled were coded for whether they were performed by a typical group member or by an atypical group member.3 Subjects who recalled behaviors that could not be coded (e.g., ‘‘casual’’ instead of a specific behavior) and subjects who recalled fewer than eight behaviors were excluded from these analyses. Adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) scores (Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971) were used to measure the extent of clustering in subjects’ recall lists. An ARC score of 1 indicates perfect clustering of recall in terms of coded groups and a score of 0 indicates no clustering of recall. A negative score indicates clustering along some dimension other than the one coded for. ARC scores were analyzed in a 2 (Positive or Neutral Mood) 3 2 (Concentrated or Dispersed Information) ANOVA. The results indicated significantly more clustering of information about atypical individuals in the concentrated condition (M 5 0.30) than in the dispersed condition (M 5 0.05, F(1, 59) 5 11.13, p , .001). This result is consistent with the idea that subtyping occurred in the concentrated condition. There was no effect of mood, and in fact, the ARC scores were identical for subjects in neutral and positive moods (M 5 0.30)

3 Subjects were asked to recall as many of the behaviors they had seen, and these were coded as consistent, inconsistent, irrelevant, or intrusions by two independent coders unaware of conditions (coders agreed on 98% of items, and disagreements were resolved by the first author). Intrusions were few and did not differ by condition. Analysis of the recall of the 12 consistent, 12 inconsistent, and 24 irrelevant items indicated that a greater proportion of consistent (M 5 .40) than inconsistent (M 5 .31) than irrelevant (M 5 .24) items was recalled, F(1, 152) 5 40.84, p , .0001 (all Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons p , .0003). A further (repeated measures) analysis of the consistent and inconsistent items recalled revealed an interaction, F(1, 76) 5 5.68, p , .02, indicating that more consistent relative to inconsistent behaviors were recalled in the concentrated condition (M 5 4.97, M 5 3.36 respectively) than in the dispersed condition (M 5 4.65, M 5 4.12), regardless of mood state. These data indicate that the mood-induced differences in our main dependent measures (within the dispersed information condition) were probably not memory-driven, since the mood manipulation did not seem to affect the type of behavior that was recalled. Happy subjects also tended to recall more than affectively neutral subjects about the typical group members (Concentrated F(1, 37) 5 3.64, p , .08; Dispersed F(1, 39) 5 3.62, p , .07).

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within the concentrated condition. These results are thus consistent with previous research (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Weber & Crocker, 1983) arguing that perceivers subtype highly atypical individuals to whom all inconsistent information in a group is attributed and suggest that both happy subjects and subjects in neutral moods subtyped under these conditions. We eliminated the possibility that this result was due to artificially inflated ARC scores in the concentrated condition because all subjects were merely clustering inconsistent behaviors together, rather than clustering information about atypical individuals together. Recall that in the concentrated condition, atypical individuals performed only inconsistent behaviors and thus associations between inconsistent behaviors would look like associations between atypical individuals. If the differences in ARC scores were simply due to all subjects having a tendency to cluster inconsistent behaviors together, then ARC scores based on the consistency or inconsistency of each behavior should be equally high for subjects in the dispersed condition and for subjects in the concentrated condition. Subjects’ recall lists were thus recoded for whether the behaviors were consistent or inconsistent and ARC scores were recomputed. These behavioral consistency ARC scores were then analyzed in a 2 (Positive or Neutral Mood) 3 2 (Concentrated or Dispersed Information) ANOVA. The results indicated that there was in fact a trend for subjects in the concentrated condition to cluster inconsistent behaviors together more than subjects in the dispersed condition (concentrated M 5 .30, dispersed M 5 .17), although this difference did not reach significance, F(1, 59) 5 2.72, p , .11. These results suggest that although the inconsistent behaviors were associated in memory for all subjects, they were more closely associated in memory for subjects in the concentrated condition. Together, these analyses suggest that whereas there is some association between inconsistent behaviors in memory, this association does not fully explain the degree of clustering in the concentrated condition. The ARC scores of subjects in the concentrated condition thus provide converging evidence that perceivers, regardless of their affective condition, subtyped the highly atypical individuals (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Relations among Similarity, Consistency, and Typicality If biased perceptions of behavioral consistency and member typicality contribute to happy perceivers’ tendency to perceive increased intragroup similarity, we expected greater ratings of intragroup similarity from happy subjects than from subjects in neutral moods in the dispersed information conditions. Given that the ratings of consistency and typicality did not differ for subjects in happy and neutral moods when inconsistent information was concentrated, we did not expect any mood dependent differences in similarity ratings in the concentrated conditions. Despite the consistency of the pattern of results with this prediction, the expected interaction was not significant, F(1, 76) 5 2.16, p , .15. As expected,

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within the dispersed condition, happy subjects’ reported marginally greater intragroup similarity (M 5 4.84) than did subjects in neutral moods (M 5 4.36), F(1, 39) 5 2.88, p , .09, and similarity ratings in the concentrated conditions did not differ depending on mood, F , 1. Relations between consistency, typicality, and similarity were assessed by correlations among the main dependent measures. Estimates of behavioral consistency were positively correlated with estimates of member typicality, r(79) 5 .62, p , .01, and estimates of behavioral inconsistency and member atypicality were also significantly associated, r(79) 5 .43, p , .01. Not surprisingly, estimates of behavioral consistency were negatively correlated with estimates of behavioral inconsistency, r(79) 5 2.60, p , .01 and estimates of the number of typical individuals were negatively correlated with estimates of the number of atypical individuals, r(79) 5 2.64, p , .01. Overall, only estimates of behavioral consistency were related to judgments of similarity, r(79) 5 .31, p , .01. However, when inconsistent information was dispersed, both estimates of behavioral consistency, r(40) 5 .52, p , .01 and estimates of member typicality, r(40) 5 .32, p , .05, were significantly related to similarity judgments. Similarity ratings were not correlated with the inconsistency and atypicality measures. Thus although affective states appeared to have slightly greater impact on perceptions of inconsistency and atypicality, similarity ratings were most closely related to ratings of consistency and typicality. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that happy subjects tend to perceive similarities rather than differences, even when faced with stimulus information replete with inconsistencies and atypicalities. When inconsistent information was presented so that a number of group members appeared mildly atypical the results supported our predictions: Happy perceivers reported more behavioral consistency, more member typicality, as well as slightly more similarity, in the group than did people in neutral moods. At the same time, happy people perceived less inconsistency and less atypicality than did observers in neutral moods. These results thus extend previous findings by demonstrating mood effects on consistency and typicality ratings, two measures of central importance to intragroup homogeneity. Overall, positive mood seemed to have a slightly stronger effect on underestimation of atypicality and inconsistency than on overestimation of typicality and consistency. Thus, positive mood seems to induce slightly more underutilization of information conveying distinctiveness than overutilization of information conveying similarities. This finding is consistent with earlier studies (Stroessner, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992; Stroessner & Mackie, 1992). In the present experiment, the results of this diminished attention to information about differences, combined with a somewhat enhanced attention to information about similarities, are that group members appear to be more typical and to perform relatively more consistent behaviors. The fact that both higher ratings of behavioral consistency and higher ratings of member typicality were associated in these conditions with

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higher estimates of intragroup similarity suggests that these perceptions play an important role in happy subjects’ overestimation of intragroup homogeneity.4 The second important issue investigated in Experiment 1 was whether happy people’s proclivity to focus on similarities and not on differences might lead to a reduction in perceptions of homogeneity when the fact that some members differed from the group was made very salient. Making differences salient by presentation of highly atypical individuals usually increases affectively neutral subjects’ estimates of homogeneity in the group because the salient, different individuals are excluded from the group. Our neutral mood subjects appeared to do exactly that. Both the reduced estimates of variability and the high level of clustering of information about atypical individuals shown by affectively neutral subjects in this condition were consistent with the idea that they were mentally setting aside the unusual individuals and basing their judgments on the other objectively quite similar individuals. How did making the atypical individuals salient influence the variability perceptions of happy perceivers? The pattern of data is most consistent with the idea that making these atypical individuals salient led happy perceivers, like perceivers in neutral moods, to subtype and exclude them from the group. Happy subjects’ ratings of consistency and typicality in this condition did not differ from those made by subjects in neutral moods. In addition, analysis of recall clustering supported the idea that both happy subjects and subjects in neutral moods were subtyping the highly inconsistent group members. Thus, the tendency for happy subjects to perceive similarities over differences was not so strong that they did not recognize very salient differences. In the face of these extreme differences, happy subjects were no more likely than observers in neutral moods to see the group as homogeneous. Thus our attempt to eliminate increased perceptions of variability by making differences within the group salient was successful to the extent that happy subjects’ perceptions now matched those of subjects in neutral moods, demonstrating informational conditions under which the group perceptions of happy people are no worse than the group perceptions of more affectively neutral perceivers. Because happy people appeared to subtype the highly atypical individuals, however, increasing their salience did not result in happy perceivers having more varied perceptions of the group. EXPERIMENT 2 In Experiment 2, we again attempted to eliminate happy subjects’ tendencies to see more similarities than differences in group information by manipulating the 4 Because we activated the group concept before presenting behaviors, we cannot distinguish the possibility that perceptions of behavioral consistency and member typicality dictate perceptions of similarity from the possibility that the causal direction is reversed. Happy subjects may see everything as more consistent and typical, and thus see the group as more similar to one another. On the other hand, happy subjects may have stronger expectations of intragroup similarity, or rely on that expectation more strongly, so that the expectancy influences perceptions of incoming information in a way that makes behaviors seem more consistent and individuals seem more typical.

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amount of attention they paid to information that distinguished group members. To prevent the subtyping that appeared to have occurred in Experiment 1, we presented all subjects with the same information about a group of moderately heterogeneous members (rather than manipulating information about the members) and induced different processing goals as subjects read the information. Thus, half of the happy subjects and half of the affectively neutral subjects formed their impressions while simply reading the information about the group members. The rest of the subjects formed their impressions of the group while sorting the descriptions of the group members so that subgroups of members who were somehow different from other subgroups of members were separated from one another. We expected that when subjects formed their impressions by simply reading about the group members, happy subjects would see the group members as more similar to one another than would subjects in neutral moods, replicating previous research. However, we also predicted that sorting the descriptions of the group members would increase happy subjects’ attention to distinctive information and that this would, in turn, undermine their tendency to see the group as homogeneous. Finally, because we expected subjects in neutral moods to attend to distinctive information as a matter of course, we did not expect these subjects’ similarity ratings to be particularly influenced by the nature of the processing task. Method Subjects and Design Ninety male and female students from an introductory psychology class at UCSB received partial course credit for participating in the experiment. Subjects’ mood states and the task they performed while forming an impression of the group were manipulated in a 2 (Neutral or Positive Mood) 3 2 (Read or Sort Group Impression Task) between-subjects design. Up to six subjects participated in any given experimental session. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two mood conditions and sessions were randomly assigned to one of the two group impression task conditions.

Procedure As in Experiment 1, a ‘‘two-experiment ruse’’ was used. Mood manipulation. The mood manipulation and the items used to check its effectiveness were identical to those used in Experiment 1. Presentation and evaluation of group information. The second experimenter (again blind to the induced mood) described the experiment as a study of the recruitment procedures for an organization called the Big Brothers. Subjects were told they would be forming impressions of 16 different members of the Big Brother organization. (Stimulus materials and instructions were adapted from Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). The experimenter described the Big Brother members as being generally above average scholastically and as frequently volunteering to support liberal causes. This information was included in order to provide a sense of cohesion among the members of the Big Brother group. Manipulation of processing task. Half of the subjects in each mood condition were instructed to form their impressions while simply reading the descriptions of the group members. The other half were instructed to form their impressions while sorting the descriptions of the group members into piles such that members in different piles were different from each other in some way(s). The sort instructions were intended to increase subjects’ attention to distinctive information about the group members. The experimenter told subjects in both conditions that they could look at the Big Brother

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descriptions as many times as they liked. This instruction was included to convey to subjects in the read condition that they could read the information multiple times (as we assumed subjects who sorted the information about the group members might). Presentation of group information. A randomized stack of 16 cards was then given to each subject. Typed on each card were a group member’s initials and three statements that described that individual. The first two statements on each card reflected consistency across all 16 individuals described. The first statement always described the individual performing a helpful behavior and the second statement always described the individual as having lenient parents. The third statement on each card was intended to allow subjects to differentiate between the 16 target individuals. Thus, the third statement described an athletic behavior for eight of the target individuals and described a musical behavior for the other eight target individuals. Of the eight athletic individuals, four were described as competitive athletes (‘‘took second place in the regional soccer tournament’’) while four were described as casual athletes (‘‘played tennis with a friend on Wednesdays’’). Of the eight musical individuals, four were described as being involved in classical music studies (‘‘practices the violin at least three times a week’’) while the other four were described as being casual music listeners (‘‘turned the radio on before he sat down to study’’). Thus, the third statement provided a relatively sharp division between the two distinct types of people (athletically inclined people and musically inclined people) while providing some finer distinctions as well (casual music listeners vs students of classical music; casual athletes vs competitive athletes). Note that neither interest in music nor interest in athletics is stereotype-inconsistent for the Big Brother group. Thus, the stimulus materials provide distinctiveness information without contradicting the stereotype. Dependent measures. When subjects had completed the impression formation task, they completed the dependent measures. Subjects rated ‘‘How similar to each other were the Big Brother members you read about?’’ on a 9-point Likert scale (1 5 not at all similar, 9 5 extremely similar). Next, subjects rated the similarity among the group members on each of the trait dimensions described in the stimulus materials (helpful, lenient, athletic, musical; 1 5 not at all similar, 9 5 extremely similar). Subjects were then asked to list any of the statements they could recall about the Big Brother members.

Results Elimination of Outliers Two subjects were eliminated from all analyses. One subject took much longer than other subjects to complete the impression formation task (z 5 4.17). The other subject reported feeling significantly less happy than all other subjects (z 5 23.49), despite having read the story that was intended to induce positive mood. Mood Manipulation In order to ensure that reading the news stories had indeed induced the intended mood states, subjects’ responses to the three mood manipulation check questions were averaged together (Cronbach’s a 5 .83) and analyzed. Analysis of this mood index indicated that the news stories were again successful at inducing neutral and positive moods. Subjects who read the happy story were significantly happier (M 5 8.37, where 1 5 sad and 11 5 happy) than subjects who read the neutral story (M 5 6.18), F(1, 87) 5 42.6, p , .001. General Similarity Ratings Recall that we expected the similarity ratings to reflect an interaction between mood and group impression task. When attention was not specifically drawn to

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FIG. 2. Perceived general similarity ratings as a function of Mood and Group Impression Task, Experiment 2.

distinctive information about the group, we expected happy subjects to pay less attention to that information and to see the group as more homogeneous than subjects in a neutral mood. In contrast, we expected the sort task to draw happy subjects’ attention to the distinctive information, reducing their tendency to see groups members as more similar. Thus, we expected happy subjects who participated in the sort task to see the group as less homogeneous than happy subjects who simply read about the group members. Because we expected subjects in neutral moods to attend to distinctive information as a matter of course, we did not expect that the information processing task would affect their perceptions of similarity. The similarity ratings were analyzed using a 2 (Positive or Neutral Mood) 3 2 (Read or Sort Group Impression Task) ANOVA. This analysis produced a significant main effect for mood, F(1, 86) 5 4.80, p 5 .03, with happy subjects perceiving the group to be more homogeneous (M 5 6.91) than subjects in neutral moods (M 5 6.33). However, as predicted, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between mood and group impression task, F(1, 86) 5 4.13, p 5 .045. The means for each condition are shown in Fig. 2. Among subjects who had simply read the information to form their impressions of the group, we expected subjects in positive moods would perceive the group members as more similar to one another than subjects in neutral moods would. A planned comparison confirmed this prediction. Subjects in positive moods perceived more similarity among the group members (M 5 7.27, where 1 5 not at all similar and 9 5 extremely similar) than did subjects in neutral moods (M 5 6.14), F(1, 41) 5 9.23, p , .005, replicating the findings of Stroessner and Mackie (1992). However, as expected, when happy subjects were encouraged to pay attention to the distinctive information about the group by engaging in the sort

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task, their similarity ratings decreased (M 5 6.57) compared to when they simply read about the group (M 5 7.27), F(1, 43) 5 5.26, p 5 .027. Finally, neutral mood subjects’ perceptions of group homogeneity were unaffected by the manipulation intended to increase attention to distinctive information, F(1, 45) , 1. Trait Similarity Ratings Ratings of similarity on common traits (helpfulness and parental leniency) that described all of the group members were compared to ratings of similarity on distinctive traits (athletic or musical interests) that described only some of the group members. A repeated measures analysis with two between-subjects factors (Neutral or Positive Mood; Read or Sort Group Impression Task) and one within-subjects factor (Common and Distinctive Trait Type) indicated a strong main effect for Trait Type such that the group members were rated as more similar to one another on the common traits (M 5 7.13, where 9 indicated ‘‘extremely similar’’) than on the distinctive traits (M 5 5.61, F(1, 86) 5 104.35, p , .01). This main effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between Group Impression Task and Trait Type, F(1, 86) 5 3.73, p 5 .054. Examination of the relevant means indicated that engaging in the sort task tended to decrease perceptions of similarity based on distinctive traits (Read M 5 5.86, Sort M 5 5.38, F(1, 88) 5 2.26, p 5 .14) while having less impact on perceptions of similarity based on the common traits (Read M 5 7.08, Sort M 5 7.18, F , 1). Because our predictions suggested that engaging in the sort task would have the specific effect of drawing happy subjects’ attention to the distinctive information, we expected the distinctive-trait similarity ratings of happy subjects in the read condition to be high relative to those of all other subjects. A contrast confirmed this hypothesis, F(1, 86) 5 8.15, p , .01. As can be seen in Fig. 3, compared to simply reading about the group, sorting group members’ behaviors apparently made happy subjects more aware of the distinctive information, and lowered their perceptions of the group’s similarity on those traits to levels comparable with those of subjects in neutral moods. Happy subjects apparently paid less attention to distinctiveness information than subjects in neutral moods, unless they were specifically encouraged to attend more carefully by engaging in a sorting task. A contrast testing if happy subjects who simply read the group information perceived more similarity on the common traits than did subjects in the other conditions was also significant, F(1, 86) 5 4.28, p , .05. This result is consistent with previous findings that happy subjects see more similarity in groups, and it suggests that deficits in happy subjects’ attention to distinctive information may not be the sole cause of this effect. Number of Behaviors Recalled An analysis of the absolute number of behaviors recalled revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all F’s , 1). A ratio of recall of distinctive behaviors (regarding athletic and musical interests) to the total number of behaviors recalled was also calculated for each subject. This ratio was submitted

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FIG. 3. Perceived similarity of common and distinctive traits as a function of Mood and Group Impression Task, Experiment 2.

to a 2 (Mood) 3 2 (Group Impression Task) ANOVA. Results indicated that subjects who sorted the descriptions of the Big Brother group members recalled a higher proportion of distinctive behaviors (M 5 0.36) than subjects who simply read about the Big Brother group members (M 5 0.29), F(1, 80) 5 4.00, p , .05. Thus, results of Experiment 2 were largely consistent with our predictions. When asked to simply read descriptions of group members to form a group impression, subjects in neutral moods perceived a heterogeneous group as more variable than did subjects in happy moods. Importantly, our results also showed that when happy subjects were encouraged to notice distinctive information by engaging in a sorting task, they no longer perceived more group homogeneity relative to those in neutral moods. This finding supports the thesis that happy people pay less attention to distinctive information unless they are specifically prompted to do so. There were several indications that happy subjects’ restored perceptions of variability in the sort condition were due to their increased attention to distinctiveness information, rather than being due to other factors. First, note that the processing task manipulation had no impact on the responses of neutral mood subjects: just the results that would be expected if those subjects were paying attention to distinctive information regardless of specific instructions to do so. When happy subjects simply read the behaviors, their responses were quite different from those of subjects in neutral moods, but directing their attention to the distinctive behaviors made their performance indistinguishable from that of subjects in neutral moods who either read or sorted the materials. Thus it appears

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that the attention to distinctive information prompted by the sort task makes the key difference to happy subjects’ perceptions. Second, the perceptions of increased variability that followed happy subjects’ participation in the sorting task were not due to decay of affective state. Analysis of a second mood manipulation check assessed immediately prior to completion of the similarity ratings indicated that subjects who read the happy story were still marginally happier (M 5 6.36) than subjects who read the neutral story (M 5 5.87), F(1, 86) 5 5.30, p 5 .09). Lack of other effects indicated that induced mood states were not differentially changed by which group impression task was performed. Thus it is clear that the sorting task did not have its effect on perceived similarity because it undermined the happy subjects’ positive moods. Most importantly, ratings of perceived similarity along distinctive trait dimensions were consistent with our expectation that the sorting task would increase attention to distinctive information relative to when subjects simply read about the group members. Happy subjects who sorted group members’ descriptions saw the group as less similar to one another in terms of the distinctive athletic and musical traits than did happy subjects who simply read the descriptions. Thus, it appears that the sort task did, in fact, increase happy subjects’ attention to the distinctive athletic and musical traits. GENERAL DISCUSSION These two experiments were designed to provide evidence that drawing attention to information that conveys differences among members of a social group would eliminate happy perceivers’ usual tendency to see more intragroup homogeneity than do neutral mood observers. In Experiment 1, happy subjects presented with very obviously atypical group members made homogeneity ratings no different from those made by subjects in neutral moods, despite the fact that happy subjects had seen much more intragroup homogeneity than their neutral mood counterparts when the same inconsistent information had been dispersed among multiple not-so-salient group members. In Experiment 2, happy subjects asked to think about ways in which group members differed as well as were similar also produced intragroup homogeneity ratings identical to those made by perceivers in neutral moods. Again, this was despite the fact that in a low salience condition when subjects simply read the information, happy subjects saw more intragroup similarity than did subjects in neutral moods. Thus in both cases, drawing attention to the ways in which some members of the group differed from others eliminated happy perceivers’ tendency to see greater intragroup homogeneity relative to affectively neutral observers. Given the mounting evidence that being in a positive affective state can have detrimental effects on the homogeneity and stereotypicality of group perceptions, our results provide evidence of informational and processing conditions that can undermine these effects. Eliminating these effects by drawing attention to differences in group behavior also provides some evidence about the processes contributing to happy subjects’ enhanced perceptions of homogeneity. We suggested earlier that subjects in

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positive moods tend to take more account of information about similarities and less account of information about differences and distinctiveness. Our results are consistent with this view on both counts. In Experiment 1, happy subjects underestimated inconsistency and atypicality relative to subjects in neutral moods. In addition, they overestimated consistency and typicality relative to subjects in neutral moods. However, the overestimation of consistency and typicality was both smaller and weaker than the underestimation of inconsistency and atypicality. In Experiment 2, happy subjects who sorted group members’ descriptions saw the group as less significantly homogeneous in terms of the distinctive athletic and musical traits than did happy subjects who simply read the descriptions. However, increasing happy subjects’ attention to how group members differed also appeared to encourage them to see differences even within the behaviors that reflected common traits. For example, subjects may have noticed that some behaviors reflected helping one’s family, whereas other behaviors reflected helping strangers, or that some lenient parents were generous with their money, whereas others were lax about rules. As a result, happy subjects’ similarity ratings on the common traits of helpfulness and parental leniency decreased when they sorted the group member descriptions. As in Experiment 1, however, the effects of the salience manipulation were stronger on the distinctive information than on the information conveying similarities. Thus, the salience manipulations appeared to affect both information conveying distinctiveness and commonalities, but to have had particular impact, as expected, on attention to the information relevant to differences. Coupled with findings that extreme behaviors were less accessible to subjects in positive moods than they were to subjects in neutral moods (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992) and that information making some group members very distinctive was not given the attention by happy observers that is was by affective neutral observers (Stroessner, Hamilton & Mackie, 1992), these experiments provide further converging evidence that inadequate processing of information conveying distinctiveness contributes to happy perceivers’ decreased perceptions of group variability and increased stereotypicality of judgments about groups and group members. The nature of the causal relation between these perceptions and variability remains to be clarified. Our results suggest that because happy subjects see similarities rather than differences, they interpret more instances (both of group behavior and of group members) as more stereotype-consistent and thus see individual members and the group as a whole as more stereotypical. Of course, the reverse causal sequence is also possible. That is, subjects in positive moods might be more likely than subjects in neutral moods to approach group information with the confident expectancy that the stereotype is a perfectly adequate description of the group. The overwhelming presence of this expectancy would thus bias interpretation of information, producing a perceptual self-fulfilling prophecy and increased perceptions of homogeneity. In both of the experiments, because subjects had clear stereotypes or expectancies about the groups they evaluated, it is difficult to ascertain direction of causality.

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An interesting strategy for clarifying these issues of causality, both for the case of generic expectations of similarity and specific stereotypic expectations, would be to manipulate whether the group concept was activated before or after processing of the behaviors. Target individuals could be described as an aggregate, an unspecified group, or a stereotyped group before or after presentation of group member descriptions. An even more powerful test of these hypotheses could be attempted if induction of the mood state were also manipulated, with positive and neutral moods being induced before behavior presentation in some cases and after behavior presentation in others. Such strategies would reveal more about the conditions under which happy subjects do and do not focus on similarities rather than differences and how this influences their group perceptions. Why might happy subjects be less oriented toward, less capable of clearly interpreting, or less influenced by information about how things differ rather than how they are the same? Much previous work has suggested that (compared to perceivers in neutral or sad moods) happy perceivers’ judgments are less likely to reflect the details of presented information (for reviews, see Forgas, 1991; Isen, 1987). This means in turn that their judgments are more likely to reflect their preconceptions, their general expectancies about the situation, or salient cues in the situation (Bless & Fiedler, 1995). So, for example, in the persuasion domain, happy recipients are less affected by argument quality (Batra & Stayman, 1990; Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989) and more affected by prior opinions (Rosselli, Skelly, & Mackie, 1995) and persuasion heuristics (Worth & Mackie, 1987). Similarly, in the stereotype domain, happy subjects are less affected by individuating information (Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and variability information (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992), and more influenced by stereotypic preconceptions (Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Stroessner & Mackie, 1992). Our results are consistent with these findings, as happy subjects seemed more influenced by stereotypic expectancies than were subjects in neutral moods. These effects have been attributed variously to reduced motivation and reduced ability (Bless et al., 1990; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989; for overviews, see Forgas, 1991). For example, Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Susser (1994) found that happy subjects relied more on their stereotypes when asked to make judgments of guilt. Importantly, when subjects were held accountable for their judgments, happy subjects behaved like affectively neutral subjects and did not make more stereotypic judgments. Such a manipulation of accountability might be expected to increase processing of all relevant information just as our request that subjects sort behavioral descriptions drew attention to information that happy perceivers might otherwise have overlooked. In another study, Asuncion and Lam (1995) found that happy observers do not show the preferential recall of expectancy-inconsistent information that affectively neutral observers do. From analyses of recall, they concluded that happy subjects do not focus special resolution-oriented attention on the

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distinctive behaviors in the same way that subjects in neutral moods do. However, when provided with more motivation and more time, happy subjects do pay the same attention to the distinctive information that affectively neutral subjects do (Asuncion & Lam, unpublished). As evidenced in these studies, the mixture of experimental support for motivational and cognitive capacity mechanisms as underlying the differential perceptions of subjects in happy and neutral moods has led some researchers to turn to multi-process models to better understand the causal processes involved (Petty, Gleicher, & Baker, 1991; Forgas, 1992). The implications of our results for improving intergroup relations have something of a ‘‘good news, bad news’’ flavor. The bad news is that the introduction of an incidental positive mood state prior to exposure to information about a social group has now been found to increase perceptions of typicality and consistency, as well as increasing homogeneity and stereotypicality in ratings of both the group as a whole and of individual group members. Although it remains to be seen if manipulations of integral positive mood—a mood state that arises because of intergroup relations or because of intergroup interactions—have the same effect, there are plenty of situations in which incidental mood states might color our perceptions of other groups. Positive interactions with friends can precede encounters with out-group members. Comedy shows can precede news reports that feature outgroup members. Success at school or work can precede interactions with co-workers and classmates from different groups. Thus our results have significance for a wide variety of social interactions. Moreover, our results are particularly significant because they show subjects in positive moods to be relatively immune to an informational manipulation—inconsistent information dispersed across a number of otherwise typical group members—that typically leads those in neutral moods to be influenced by the stereotype-inconsistent information. The good news, however, is that our findings make some novel suggestions about how such negative effects can be reversed. Making information about differences salient encouraged happy perceivers to pay attention to that information and brought their perceptions of the group into line with those of their neutral mood counterparts. The benefits of such manipulations are at this stage restricted to eliminating negative effects of positive mood on group perceptions. However, the tendency of happy subjects to see similarities could also be used in ways that might benefit intergroup relations. Stroessner and Mackie (1993) suggested, for example, that happy subjects might be more likely to see similarities between groups as well as within them. Thus when happy subjects are encouraged to simultaneously consider two groups (like an in-group and an out-group, for example), they might be more likely to see them as a single group than subjects in a neutral mood. Of course, the finding that happy subjects are still capable of recognizing highly atypical individuals and of subtyping them suggests that some commonalties between the two groups would be necessary. These ideas are consistent with the findings of a recent experiment showing that happy subjects were more likely to form inclusive group representations in a social categoriza-

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