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An agenda of future tasks for international and indigenous NGOs: Views from the North
World Development,
Vol. Printed in Great Britain.
15, Supplement,
pp. X7-93.
tKW-750x/x7 $3.00 + o.to (Q I987 Pergamon Journals Ltd.
1987.
An Agenda of Future Tasks for International and Indigenous NGOs: Views From the North BRIAN
H. SMITH
Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin Summary. - Differences of viewpoints exist within the NGO network regarding critical issues affecting the future division of roles between international and indigenous NGOs. One view (common in the South) is that greater responsibility should be delegated to indigenous NGOs in resource allocation, project approval and ongoing oversight. Another view (prevalent in the North) is that more professionalization is needed in institutional management and evaluation and reporting procedures, and that more financial support for projects be forthcoming from the South. There are growing pressures on international NGOs in their home societies to make improvements on these fronts. They, in turn. are pressing indigenous NGOs to cooperate in meeting these challenges and they believe decentralizing authority in the NGO network alone will not resolve them.
as having a comparative advantage over bilateral and multilateral agencies in reaching and aiding the hard-core poor in the South with costeffective strategies tailored to meet their basic needs. Given the rapid expansion of indigenous NGOs in recent years, there are those (both in the North and the South) who feel that international NGOs should now play a less decisive role in priority setting, project approval and evaluation of performance, and allow their indigenous partners in the South a far greater deliberative as opposed to advisory role in decisionmaking. Such advocates believe that full and effective partnerships between international and indigenous NGOs require delegation by funding agencies in the North of authority to their counterparts in the South to make decisions regarding resource allocation, accountability procedures and project performance evaluation. In so doing, the argument goes, not only would indigenous NGOs be given the respect and full trust they deserve, but decisionmaking and oversight would be brought nearer to the local needs and realities of the grassroots poor in developing countries. Moreover, international NGOs freed from such administrative burdens - could devote more of their own time and energies to fundraising, development education and legislative advocacy work at home on behalf of developing country needs and priorities. Although such a future division of labor between international and indigenous NGOs
1. INTRODUCTION Over the past 20 years one of the has greatly
enhanced
the
attractiveness
factors
that
of inter-
national NGOs in the North as conduits of aid (both private and public) to developing countries has been the rapid growth of indigenous NGOs in the South. These private organizations (now numbering between 6,000 and 8,000, according to OECD estimates) have been the eyes and ears, so to speak, for NGOs home-based in OECD countries. Staffed largely by middle-class professionals who are not satisfied with the performance thus far of governmental or business institutions in reaching and adequately meeting the social and economic needs of the poor, these private development organizations act as intermediaries between international NGOs and the grassroots poor in their own societies. They provide the NGOs in the North with information about local needs and priorities, assist small grassroots organizations in the preparation of projects, advise international funding organizations on the strengths and weaknesses of funding proposals from local groups, channel foreign NGO funds to the community organizations when projects are finally approved, and provide ongoing oversight of these programs for international NGOs (the vast majority of whom have no or very few field representatives living abroad). In sum, it has been these partners in the South that have made it possible for international NGOs to establish their reputation
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might seem optimal to some, there are at present several obstacles to its implementation in the near future. Some of these involve differing opinions within the international NGO community about the future agenda with their partners in the South, and some originate among the North Atlantic donors to NGOs (including governmental aid agencies who are now a major source of their financial support).
2. DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS ABOUT ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS One issue over which there is some disagreement in the NGO community is how to define and assess ultimate effectiveness of the development work being sponsored by private development organizations in the South. There are those in the NGO community who believe that it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of small development projects according to quantifiable criteria since it is qualitative objectives that are the most important - enhancing self-confidence of the poor, increasing their participation in critical decisions that affect their lives, furthering their awareness about the wider structural problems underlying poverty, and empowering them to take action to confront these. Many of those in indigenous NGOs and some in staff and executive positions of international NGOs feel that such humanistic rather than technical goals are the most critical, that they are hard to measure in the short term, and certainly cannot be evaluated according to quantifiable methods used to study large development projects. Informal self-evaluations by the recipients and dialogue among themselves and with personnel of indigenous NGOs overseeing the projects, according to this school of thought, are much better ways to assess these qualitative objectives than evaluations carried out by outside professionals (foreign or domestic) not closely involved with the projects. Moreover, they argue, confidentiality is essential to the ultimate effectiveness of small development projects, since many take place in authoritarian regimes where efforts to enhance the dignity and critical awareness of the poor are considered politically subversive. Under such conditions, they claim, a minimum of information should be given to outsiders lest it get into the wrong hands and be used to harass or penalize the participants in the projects. Although all of these are cogent arguments, there are a growing number in the international NGO community who want to evaluate in a more systematized way the grassroots work they are
supporting through indigenous partners in the South. Part of this interest is due to the trend towards greater professionalization among international NGOs. There is a growing interest in pinpointing more precisely what their accomplishments have been after 20 years of development work so as to concentrate more of their resources in those areas where they can have the greatest leverage. Part of the stimulus for more careful and systematic evaluation is also coming from government aid agencies who have provided increasing amounts of subsidies to international NGOs since the mid-1970s. This is due to the reputation of NGOs as being more cost-effective and innovative than larger public agencies in reaching the hard-core poor overseas and having the capacities for meeting successfully their basic human needs in health, nutrition, training and credit. Between 1973 and 1985 matching grant contributions to NGOs from governmental aid agencies in Europe, Canada and the United States, in fact, more than tripled (in constant 1982 exchange rates) from $331.9 million to $1.1 billion, and now constitute over one-fourth of total resources being channeled through the international NGO network ($4.0 billion in 1985).’ Governmental aid agencies such as AID in the United States, CIbA in Canada, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation in the Netherlands and the Development Directorate of the EEC since the early 1980s have all been providing, in addition to matching grants for NGO projects, contributions to cover evaluations that will assess their development impact. The increasing interest in government circles in having more empirical data on NGO project performance is to justify to legislatures and taxpayers during the current era of budget cutbacks continued subsidies to international NGOs. It is also motivated by a desire to gather and disseminate throughout the development community what has been learned from such efforts and how possibly to replicate such smallscale experiences on a wider scale. It is resulting, therefore, not from a desire to spy on NGO activities, nor are public policymakers insensitive to arguments about the importance of some of the less tangible aspects of small-scale development efforts. They are eager themselves to learn how to meet more effectively the needs of low-income sectors in developing countries so as to make government-to-government aid programs more effective. The findings emerging from these professional evaluations confirm the strengths of NGOs, but also point to some structural weaknesses limiting their potential impact on wider development
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processes. The major studies undertaken thus far indicate that small private development projects are making significant headway in improving primary health services and water and sanitation facilities in remote rural areas, as well as in assisting very small urban business enterprises with credit and management training.2 Moreover, some of these evaluations (particularly those sponsored by European private and public aid agencies) also indicate that NGOsponsored projects that involve attempts to raise the awareness of grassroots participants about the wider socioeconomic and political dynamics of their respective locales, in fact, have a higher rate of success in achieving technical and material gains for the local population than those which do not. The reason is that they tend to include the beneficiaries actively from the start in articulating their most pressing needs and prioritizing objectives, thus making projects more realistic and adaptable to local circumstances. They also involve the poor in implementing and administering services through the life of the projects, thus stimulating greater local commitment and enhancing the viability for longer-term self-help efforts by the participants. These studies, therefore, are trying to be sensitive to some of the intangible issues considered crucial by indigenous NGOs and are, in fact, discovering their importance to project efficiency and viability.” The studies, however, are also identifying specific performance weaknesses. These include a chronic lack of sufficient management staff in international and indigenous NGOs, the tendency for projects to be designed and implemented in isolation from broader regional development strategies in host countries, the lack of replicability of many non-profit-sponsored projects, the failure of NGOs (both international and indigenous) to better coordinate their resources and strategies among one another, and underdeveloped mechanisms for information dissemination and evaluation feedback into future program planning.’ Evidence is also emerging that many NGOsponsored projects do not reach the poorest sectors in developing countries but concentrate on those easier to assist (and of lower risk) who have some minimum of land, education and capital. In addition, grassroots participants (especially women) are often not involved in the planning and design of projects, and frequently have little effective input into the decisionmaking process of indigenous NGOs that claim to represent them.’ Those in European and North American governmental aid agencies subsidizing NGOs. and
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many executive and staff personnel in international NGOs, as they become aware of these findings are not slackening their interest in working closely with indigenous NGOs but believe some of these structural factors limit the potential contribution to development the private aid network could be making. They believe that ultimate effectiveness of NGO work requires correcting what they consider institutional weaknesses both in international and indigenous NGOs by further professionalization of staff, scaling-up of programs, more coordinated action to reduce duplication, more attempts to link into wider development plans of governments in the region where projects are located, and expanded efforts to strengthen the autonomy and institutional capacities of grassroots organizations run by the recipients themselves. In such a way, NGOs will be able to act in more concerted fashion as leverage forces on larger development processes, upgrade the quality of services to the poor, and enhance the possibilities for the poor themselves to manage their own affairs more effectively and autonomously.6 None of these recommendations for greater professionalization of performance need be in opposition to the more humanistic objectives of empowering people and enhancing their selfesteem. In fact, effective project management and performance that leads to tangible improvements in the material and social well-being of recipients and has a multiplier effect by leveraging more and better public resources and services in a region can go a long way in serving precisely these ends. Hence, more dialogue is needed in the NGO community at present about how to combine these approaches to what ultimate effectiveness means. A narrow empiricism limited to counting numbers of inputs and outputs in project perSo are, however, formance is worthless. and categories such as “people-to-people” “empowerment of the poor” which can act as a smokescreen for poor planning and management and underutilized potential unless they are given more concrete and specific meaning. Whether NGOs like it or not, more information about their performance is being demanded and generated now than a decade ago, and while confirming some of the claims about the comparative advantage of NGOs in development these studies also indicate that some of the rhetoric is overblown. Addressing these issues is the task of both international and indigenous NGOs together. It cannot be solved merely by decentralizing more decisionmaking authority in the NGO community toward the South.
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3. ACCOUNTABILITY At present the vast bulk of resources for the development activities of indigenous NGOs is coming through international NGOs. Ultimate accountability for the use of such funds in legal terms lies with the boards of directors of these international organizations. Discretionary power for the allotment of small amounts of money (several thousand dollars) is delegated to staff personnel, and block grants to be used at will by indigenous NGOs for generic areas of development are becoming more common. However, trustees of international NGOs still must give account both to private and governmental donors in their home societies on how the funds are being spent overseas. In recent years, moreover, there has been growing pressure on international NGOs in their home societies to give more specific accounts to the public on the use of the money they send to indigenous NGOs in the South. Part of this pressure has resulted from criticisms that publicity used in fundraising campaigns has not been accurate. Some child-sponsorship organizations in the United States are being criticized in the media for using the “starving child” image on television to solicit funds, giving the misleading impression that contributions go directly to assist a specific child an individual donor wants to help. This is not the case for all such organizations.’ Some private organizations in the United States have also been accused of raising funds during the Ethiopian famine crisis purportedly to feed hungry people but then using the money for other (albeit laudatory) purposes later.x Part of the pressure for more disclosure of financial details is coming from the political Right in several North Atlantic countries (especially the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany) who have made accusations in the media against some international NGOs which are said to be funding Marxist-oriented or armed revolutionary groups in developing countries and not telling their contributors at home that some of their money is being used for such purposes. Although these accusations are in large part smear campaigns and not backed up with solid evidence, they are making international NGOs more cautious - especially those who see many causes of poverty rooted in unjustice and who support indigenous NGOs in the South that include in their agenda raising the political awareness and effective bargaining power of the grassroots poor.” Finally, the growing amount of information about the activities of NGOs resulting from the upgrading of evaluation procedures from time to
time uncovers misallocation of funds. Annual statistical accounts of international church activities, for example, have now begun to include a line item on “ecclesiastical crime” which gives estimates on the amount of money (in dollars) sent overseas by church-related organizations that purportedly is being embezzled by local church counterparts in developing countries. Although the percentage of overall church funds transferred abroad that are being embezzled is very small, if such estimates are correct the trend is growing rapidly. Statistics published in 1986 indicate that in 1970, of the $3 billion total income of Christian global foreign missions, 0.16% ($5 million) was misallocated. In 1980 the percentage increased nearly fourfold to 0.6% ($30 million of $5 billion), and in 1986 it was up to 0.85% ($64 million of $7.5 billion). By the year 2000 such estimates predict that the rate will jump to 2.9% ($350 million of $12 billion).‘” David Barrett, research consultant to the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention in the United States, who has been compiling such statistics on the basis of world surveys he is conducting identifies the source of the problem to be at both ends of the pipeline: In the Third World, ecclesiastical crime has now reached serious proportions. Whereas 95% of church leaders are honest persons of integrity, some 5% have become small-time ecclesiastical crooks embezzling sizable church grants, relief donations of foreign currency. or setting up phony relief or third-world mission projects. A major factor contributing to this rash of petty crime has been reluctance of Western donor agencies to enforce strict accounting for the huge sums of money they unload on Third World churches every year.”
In all fairness, “embezzlement” may not be the most accurate way to describe all forms of misallocation of NGO funds. In many cases when funds are spent differently by indigenous NGOs from purposes for which international NGOs allocate them, they are not being pocketed for personal gain. Most international NGOs are very reluctant to give indigenous NGOs adequate money for overhead expenses, since they want to be able to say to donors at home that they are keeping administration costs at a minimum (and well below those of government-to-government programs). Consequently, in order to pay realistic salaries and cover necessary clerical and building expenses, indigenous NC0 executives sometimes have to fudge or pad budgets and use project funds to pay some of their administrative costs. In such cases the fault lies with international NGOs who should be far more realistic in allowing for necessary overhead costs. For all of the above reasons, it would seem that
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more careful, honest accounting procedures of real costs and expenditures in the NGO network will be necessary in the years ahead. As in the area of evaluation, it is not producing more numbers that will solve the problem, nor is it, on the other hand, reliance on personalistic solutions based on “trust me, I’m your partner” approaches. Both international and indigenous NGOs need to confront these challenges together and more, not less, disclosure is part of the answer. A lesser role for NGOs in the area of resource accountability to donors is not likely in the foreseeable future, nor would it be wise.
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terminates, more domestic sources of support in developing countries will have to be found. Although not every potential source is possible or desirable, more aggressive investigation of feasible alternatives by indigenous NGOs in the business, banking and government sectors is in order, in the view of many in the international NGO community. The Philippine experience (as described by Ernest0 Garilao elsewhere in this volume) is a testimony that more domestic financing by indigenous NGOs is, in fact, possible and even desirable.
5. CONCLUSIONS 4. RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION
A final area over which there is some disagreement among NGOs is in the area of resource mobilization. There is almost unanimous feeling among indigenous NGOs that generation of significant resources in their own countries from public or private donors is not possible due to scarcity. Even when such funds are available, NGOs are reluctant to accept them due to the danger that indigenous political and economic elites would put far more restrictions on the use of such funds than foreign donors. A growing number in the international NGO community, however, want to see more initiative on the part of indigenous NGOs in generating domestic resources. They are concerned that long-term dependency relationships are being created by such a heavy reliance on outside funding year after year. They also feel that the availability of foreign support can at times give indigenous NGOs an excuse for not linking into domestic development plans and efforts, thus limiting the leverage and multiplier effect of the projects they support. If international NGOs are to play less of a role in the future in deciding priorities and approving projects, they are likely to expect in return more resource mobilization by indigenous NGOs in their own countries. This obviously cannot be made an across-the-board rule. In some situations this will be difficult to achieve for economic reasons, and in others the possibility of political manipulation by domestic donors is a grave danger. It is an issue, however, that needs more careful assessment in the years ahead. If international NGOs are to maximize their capacities to provide seed money to new and innovative strategies in development they need to “let go” of projects after a time and move on. If indigenous NGOs are to become more rooted in their contexts and the projects they support are to be viable after international NGO support
It may very well be that the roles of international and indigenous NGOs may change in the coming years. Much more responsibility may be delegated to indigenous NGOs in deciding funding priorities, approving projects and exercising administrative oversight. If this is to occur, however, several issues need clarification regarding the definition and empirical verification of effectiveness, the amount and quality of disclosure, and the source of financing. In each of these areas there are differences of perspective in the NGO network with cleavages often, but not always, running between international and indigenous NGOs. Growing pressures on international NGOs in their home context in the direction of more professionalization and disclosure of information are creating greater need on their part to show to private and public donors at home that they are supporting processes in developing countries which are having a measurable impact on alleviating poverty among the hard-core poor. In exchange for greater delegation of authority to indigenous NGOs in the South, international NGOs will want to see progress in evaluation and accounting procedures (a task both international and indigenous NGOs must work on together). International NGOs will also expect indigenous NGOs to pursue more aggressive efforts to generate local funds in their own countries. Just as there are dangers in too much emphasis on quantitative solutions to these challenges, so too are there dangers in vagueness and lack of definition. For better or for worse, more attention is being focused on NGOs now than in the past and more is being expected of them. They must not lose their flexibility, innovative thrust and capacities of building trust across national borders. They also cannot avoid facing up to some critical institutional challenges as the third decade of partnership in development begins between international and indigenous NGOs.
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DEVELOPMENT NOTES
1.
Van der Heijden
(1987)
Table
1.
2. Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary ance, AID (1986). pp. 4-5; Commission of the pean Communities (CEC) (1981) pp. iii, 2, Crombrugghe, Howes and Nieuwkerk (1985), 19.
AssistEuro10; de pp. 8,
3. De Crombrugghe, p. 8.
(1985),
Howes and Nieuwkerk
4. Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, AID (1986). pp. 6-7; Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (1981), pp. 10-13, 15-17. 5. Tendler 105-109.
(1982).
pp. 11-14,
25-28,
48-50.
84-93,
6. Hendrik van der Heijden, former head of the Aid Management Division in the Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD, concludes in reviewing the major evaluative studies of NGO project performance that “designing and scaling-up programs which are replicable and cost-effective remains the greatest challenge to NGOs” in the future. To accomplish this goal he believes greater institutional management support must be provided by indigenous NGOs to grassroots projects and greater collaboration among indigenous NGOs and between indigenous NGOs and larger private and public agencies engaged in development must occur. Van der Heijdcn (1985). pp. 21-22. 7. Save the Children Federation (SCF) in the United States in 1986 was criticized in print and on national television for being deceptive in its fundraising techniques since the children sponsored by donors never
receive the money sent to them. It is spent on community develooment aroiects that benefit. but most often do not involve the specific children. Behar, Richard, “SCF’s little secret,” Forbes (21 April 1986). pp. 106-197; 1986 (NBC-TV). 29 July 1986. 8. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the United States raised more money than it could spend (due to administrative problems in Ethiopia) during fundraising efforts during the height of the Ethiopian famine crisis. It banked much of the $50 million donated to it between October 1984 and mid-1985 to be used on longer-term agricultural projects in Africa. The agency was criticized for misleading donors since one could have received the impression from advertisements that all contributions would go to feeding hungry Ethiopians as quickly as possible. Blumenthal, Ralph, “Catholic Relief Services involved in dispute over spending in Ethiopia aid,” The New York Times (7 August 1985), p. A8; Filiteau, Jerry, “Famine relief in Ethiopia: CRS has nothing to hide,” The Wifness (Dubuque, IA: 24 November 1985) p. 1. 9. Isaac, Rael Jean, “Do you know where your church offerings go?” Reader’s Digest (January 1983), pp. 120-125; “The gospel according to whom?” 60 Minutes (CBS-TV), 23 January 1983; Maury, Guillaume, “Charite chretienne ou subversion marxiste?” Figaro Magazine (Paris: 26 October 1985), pp. 25-34; Leclerc, Gerard, “L’argent des chretiens au service de la revolution,” Quoridien de Paris (Paris: 25 March 1986). p. 23. IO.
Barrett
11.
Ibid.,
(1986),
p. 23.
p. 22.
REFERENCES Barrett, David B., “Annual statistical table on global mission: 1968,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Januarv 1986). DO. 22-23. Boiling, Landrum R., Private Foreign Aid: U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Deveioomenr (Boulder. CO: We&ew Press,- 1982). ‘ ’ Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, US Agency for International Development (AID), Developmenr Effectiveness of Private Volunrary Organizations (PVOs) (Washington, DC: AID, 1986). Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Comparative Evaluation of Projects Cofinanced with NGOs and Microprojects: Indicative Synthesis (Brussels: CEC, 1981). De Crombrugghe, Genevieve, Mick Howes, and Mark Nieuwkerk, An Evaluation of CEC Small Developmenf Projects (Brussels: CEC, 1985). Gorman, Robert F. (Ed.), Privafe Volunrary Organizations as Agents of Developmen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). Lissner, Jorgen, The Politics of Ahruism: A Smdy of the
Poliiical Behaviour of Voluntary Development Agencies (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1977). Padron Castillo, Mario, Cooperation al Desarrollo y Movimiento Popular: Las Asociaciones Privadas de Desarrollo (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promotion de1 Desarollo [DESCO], 1982). Smith, Brian H., “U.S. and Canadian PVOs as transnational development institutions,” in Gorman (1982), pp. 115-164. Smith, Brian H., ‘*Nonprofit organizations (PVOs) as transnational development agents: Donor institutions in North Atlantic co&rtries and recipient groups in Colombia,” Mimeo (Cambridge. MA: Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1985), 600 pp. Smith, Brian H., The Politics of Inrernational Charities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). Sommer, John G., Beyond Charity: U.S. Volunlary Aid for a Changing World (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1977). Tendler, Judith, Turning Private Voluntary Organiza-
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lions Into Developmew Axetries: Questions for Evaluafion (Wash&ton, DC: AID, i982). . Van der Heiiden, Hendrik, “Develoument imnact and effectiveness of nongovernmental organisations: The record of progress in rural development cooperation,” Mimeo (Paris: Aid Management Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, Organis-
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93
ation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD), September 1985). Van der Heiiden, Hendrik. “The reconciliation of NC0 autonomy: Program integrity and operational effectiveness with accountability to donors,” World Developmenr, Vol. 15, Supplement (Fall 1987).
Vol. Printed in Great Britain.
15, Supplement,
pp. X7-93.
tKW-750x/x7 $3.00 + o.to (Q I987 Pergamon Journals Ltd.
1987.
An Agenda of Future Tasks for International and Indigenous NGOs: Views From the North BRIAN
H. SMITH
Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin Summary. - Differences of viewpoints exist within the NGO network regarding critical issues affecting the future division of roles between international and indigenous NGOs. One view (common in the South) is that greater responsibility should be delegated to indigenous NGOs in resource allocation, project approval and ongoing oversight. Another view (prevalent in the North) is that more professionalization is needed in institutional management and evaluation and reporting procedures, and that more financial support for projects be forthcoming from the South. There are growing pressures on international NGOs in their home societies to make improvements on these fronts. They, in turn. are pressing indigenous NGOs to cooperate in meeting these challenges and they believe decentralizing authority in the NGO network alone will not resolve them.
as having a comparative advantage over bilateral and multilateral agencies in reaching and aiding the hard-core poor in the South with costeffective strategies tailored to meet their basic needs. Given the rapid expansion of indigenous NGOs in recent years, there are those (both in the North and the South) who feel that international NGOs should now play a less decisive role in priority setting, project approval and evaluation of performance, and allow their indigenous partners in the South a far greater deliberative as opposed to advisory role in decisionmaking. Such advocates believe that full and effective partnerships between international and indigenous NGOs require delegation by funding agencies in the North of authority to their counterparts in the South to make decisions regarding resource allocation, accountability procedures and project performance evaluation. In so doing, the argument goes, not only would indigenous NGOs be given the respect and full trust they deserve, but decisionmaking and oversight would be brought nearer to the local needs and realities of the grassroots poor in developing countries. Moreover, international NGOs freed from such administrative burdens - could devote more of their own time and energies to fundraising, development education and legislative advocacy work at home on behalf of developing country needs and priorities. Although such a future division of labor between international and indigenous NGOs
1. INTRODUCTION Over the past 20 years one of the has greatly
enhanced
the
attractiveness
factors
that
of inter-
national NGOs in the North as conduits of aid (both private and public) to developing countries has been the rapid growth of indigenous NGOs in the South. These private organizations (now numbering between 6,000 and 8,000, according to OECD estimates) have been the eyes and ears, so to speak, for NGOs home-based in OECD countries. Staffed largely by middle-class professionals who are not satisfied with the performance thus far of governmental or business institutions in reaching and adequately meeting the social and economic needs of the poor, these private development organizations act as intermediaries between international NGOs and the grassroots poor in their own societies. They provide the NGOs in the North with information about local needs and priorities, assist small grassroots organizations in the preparation of projects, advise international funding organizations on the strengths and weaknesses of funding proposals from local groups, channel foreign NGO funds to the community organizations when projects are finally approved, and provide ongoing oversight of these programs for international NGOs (the vast majority of whom have no or very few field representatives living abroad). In sum, it has been these partners in the South that have made it possible for international NGOs to establish their reputation
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might seem optimal to some, there are at present several obstacles to its implementation in the near future. Some of these involve differing opinions within the international NGO community about the future agenda with their partners in the South, and some originate among the North Atlantic donors to NGOs (including governmental aid agencies who are now a major source of their financial support).
2. DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS ABOUT ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS One issue over which there is some disagreement in the NGO community is how to define and assess ultimate effectiveness of the development work being sponsored by private development organizations in the South. There are those in the NGO community who believe that it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of small development projects according to quantifiable criteria since it is qualitative objectives that are the most important - enhancing self-confidence of the poor, increasing their participation in critical decisions that affect their lives, furthering their awareness about the wider structural problems underlying poverty, and empowering them to take action to confront these. Many of those in indigenous NGOs and some in staff and executive positions of international NGOs feel that such humanistic rather than technical goals are the most critical, that they are hard to measure in the short term, and certainly cannot be evaluated according to quantifiable methods used to study large development projects. Informal self-evaluations by the recipients and dialogue among themselves and with personnel of indigenous NGOs overseeing the projects, according to this school of thought, are much better ways to assess these qualitative objectives than evaluations carried out by outside professionals (foreign or domestic) not closely involved with the projects. Moreover, they argue, confidentiality is essential to the ultimate effectiveness of small development projects, since many take place in authoritarian regimes where efforts to enhance the dignity and critical awareness of the poor are considered politically subversive. Under such conditions, they claim, a minimum of information should be given to outsiders lest it get into the wrong hands and be used to harass or penalize the participants in the projects. Although all of these are cogent arguments, there are a growing number in the international NGO community who want to evaluate in a more systematized way the grassroots work they are
supporting through indigenous partners in the South. Part of this interest is due to the trend towards greater professionalization among international NGOs. There is a growing interest in pinpointing more precisely what their accomplishments have been after 20 years of development work so as to concentrate more of their resources in those areas where they can have the greatest leverage. Part of the stimulus for more careful and systematic evaluation is also coming from government aid agencies who have provided increasing amounts of subsidies to international NGOs since the mid-1970s. This is due to the reputation of NGOs as being more cost-effective and innovative than larger public agencies in reaching the hard-core poor overseas and having the capacities for meeting successfully their basic human needs in health, nutrition, training and credit. Between 1973 and 1985 matching grant contributions to NGOs from governmental aid agencies in Europe, Canada and the United States, in fact, more than tripled (in constant 1982 exchange rates) from $331.9 million to $1.1 billion, and now constitute over one-fourth of total resources being channeled through the international NGO network ($4.0 billion in 1985).’ Governmental aid agencies such as AID in the United States, CIbA in Canada, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation in the Netherlands and the Development Directorate of the EEC since the early 1980s have all been providing, in addition to matching grants for NGO projects, contributions to cover evaluations that will assess their development impact. The increasing interest in government circles in having more empirical data on NGO project performance is to justify to legislatures and taxpayers during the current era of budget cutbacks continued subsidies to international NGOs. It is also motivated by a desire to gather and disseminate throughout the development community what has been learned from such efforts and how possibly to replicate such smallscale experiences on a wider scale. It is resulting, therefore, not from a desire to spy on NGO activities, nor are public policymakers insensitive to arguments about the importance of some of the less tangible aspects of small-scale development efforts. They are eager themselves to learn how to meet more effectively the needs of low-income sectors in developing countries so as to make government-to-government aid programs more effective. The findings emerging from these professional evaluations confirm the strengths of NGOs, but also point to some structural weaknesses limiting their potential impact on wider development
FUTURE
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processes. The major studies undertaken thus far indicate that small private development projects are making significant headway in improving primary health services and water and sanitation facilities in remote rural areas, as well as in assisting very small urban business enterprises with credit and management training.2 Moreover, some of these evaluations (particularly those sponsored by European private and public aid agencies) also indicate that NGOsponsored projects that involve attempts to raise the awareness of grassroots participants about the wider socioeconomic and political dynamics of their respective locales, in fact, have a higher rate of success in achieving technical and material gains for the local population than those which do not. The reason is that they tend to include the beneficiaries actively from the start in articulating their most pressing needs and prioritizing objectives, thus making projects more realistic and adaptable to local circumstances. They also involve the poor in implementing and administering services through the life of the projects, thus stimulating greater local commitment and enhancing the viability for longer-term self-help efforts by the participants. These studies, therefore, are trying to be sensitive to some of the intangible issues considered crucial by indigenous NGOs and are, in fact, discovering their importance to project efficiency and viability.” The studies, however, are also identifying specific performance weaknesses. These include a chronic lack of sufficient management staff in international and indigenous NGOs, the tendency for projects to be designed and implemented in isolation from broader regional development strategies in host countries, the lack of replicability of many non-profit-sponsored projects, the failure of NGOs (both international and indigenous) to better coordinate their resources and strategies among one another, and underdeveloped mechanisms for information dissemination and evaluation feedback into future program planning.’ Evidence is also emerging that many NGOsponsored projects do not reach the poorest sectors in developing countries but concentrate on those easier to assist (and of lower risk) who have some minimum of land, education and capital. In addition, grassroots participants (especially women) are often not involved in the planning and design of projects, and frequently have little effective input into the decisionmaking process of indigenous NGOs that claim to represent them.’ Those in European and North American governmental aid agencies subsidizing NGOs. and
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many executive and staff personnel in international NGOs, as they become aware of these findings are not slackening their interest in working closely with indigenous NGOs but believe some of these structural factors limit the potential contribution to development the private aid network could be making. They believe that ultimate effectiveness of NGO work requires correcting what they consider institutional weaknesses both in international and indigenous NGOs by further professionalization of staff, scaling-up of programs, more coordinated action to reduce duplication, more attempts to link into wider development plans of governments in the region where projects are located, and expanded efforts to strengthen the autonomy and institutional capacities of grassroots organizations run by the recipients themselves. In such a way, NGOs will be able to act in more concerted fashion as leverage forces on larger development processes, upgrade the quality of services to the poor, and enhance the possibilities for the poor themselves to manage their own affairs more effectively and autonomously.6 None of these recommendations for greater professionalization of performance need be in opposition to the more humanistic objectives of empowering people and enhancing their selfesteem. In fact, effective project management and performance that leads to tangible improvements in the material and social well-being of recipients and has a multiplier effect by leveraging more and better public resources and services in a region can go a long way in serving precisely these ends. Hence, more dialogue is needed in the NGO community at present about how to combine these approaches to what ultimate effectiveness means. A narrow empiricism limited to counting numbers of inputs and outputs in project perSo are, however, formance is worthless. and categories such as “people-to-people” “empowerment of the poor” which can act as a smokescreen for poor planning and management and underutilized potential unless they are given more concrete and specific meaning. Whether NGOs like it or not, more information about their performance is being demanded and generated now than a decade ago, and while confirming some of the claims about the comparative advantage of NGOs in development these studies also indicate that some of the rhetoric is overblown. Addressing these issues is the task of both international and indigenous NGOs together. It cannot be solved merely by decentralizing more decisionmaking authority in the NGO community toward the South.
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DEVELOPMENT
3. ACCOUNTABILITY At present the vast bulk of resources for the development activities of indigenous NGOs is coming through international NGOs. Ultimate accountability for the use of such funds in legal terms lies with the boards of directors of these international organizations. Discretionary power for the allotment of small amounts of money (several thousand dollars) is delegated to staff personnel, and block grants to be used at will by indigenous NGOs for generic areas of development are becoming more common. However, trustees of international NGOs still must give account both to private and governmental donors in their home societies on how the funds are being spent overseas. In recent years, moreover, there has been growing pressure on international NGOs in their home societies to give more specific accounts to the public on the use of the money they send to indigenous NGOs in the South. Part of this pressure has resulted from criticisms that publicity used in fundraising campaigns has not been accurate. Some child-sponsorship organizations in the United States are being criticized in the media for using the “starving child” image on television to solicit funds, giving the misleading impression that contributions go directly to assist a specific child an individual donor wants to help. This is not the case for all such organizations.’ Some private organizations in the United States have also been accused of raising funds during the Ethiopian famine crisis purportedly to feed hungry people but then using the money for other (albeit laudatory) purposes later.x Part of the pressure for more disclosure of financial details is coming from the political Right in several North Atlantic countries (especially the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany) who have made accusations in the media against some international NGOs which are said to be funding Marxist-oriented or armed revolutionary groups in developing countries and not telling their contributors at home that some of their money is being used for such purposes. Although these accusations are in large part smear campaigns and not backed up with solid evidence, they are making international NGOs more cautious - especially those who see many causes of poverty rooted in unjustice and who support indigenous NGOs in the South that include in their agenda raising the political awareness and effective bargaining power of the grassroots poor.” Finally, the growing amount of information about the activities of NGOs resulting from the upgrading of evaluation procedures from time to
time uncovers misallocation of funds. Annual statistical accounts of international church activities, for example, have now begun to include a line item on “ecclesiastical crime” which gives estimates on the amount of money (in dollars) sent overseas by church-related organizations that purportedly is being embezzled by local church counterparts in developing countries. Although the percentage of overall church funds transferred abroad that are being embezzled is very small, if such estimates are correct the trend is growing rapidly. Statistics published in 1986 indicate that in 1970, of the $3 billion total income of Christian global foreign missions, 0.16% ($5 million) was misallocated. In 1980 the percentage increased nearly fourfold to 0.6% ($30 million of $5 billion), and in 1986 it was up to 0.85% ($64 million of $7.5 billion). By the year 2000 such estimates predict that the rate will jump to 2.9% ($350 million of $12 billion).‘” David Barrett, research consultant to the Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention in the United States, who has been compiling such statistics on the basis of world surveys he is conducting identifies the source of the problem to be at both ends of the pipeline: In the Third World, ecclesiastical crime has now reached serious proportions. Whereas 95% of church leaders are honest persons of integrity, some 5% have become small-time ecclesiastical crooks embezzling sizable church grants, relief donations of foreign currency. or setting up phony relief or third-world mission projects. A major factor contributing to this rash of petty crime has been reluctance of Western donor agencies to enforce strict accounting for the huge sums of money they unload on Third World churches every year.”
In all fairness, “embezzlement” may not be the most accurate way to describe all forms of misallocation of NGO funds. In many cases when funds are spent differently by indigenous NGOs from purposes for which international NGOs allocate them, they are not being pocketed for personal gain. Most international NGOs are very reluctant to give indigenous NGOs adequate money for overhead expenses, since they want to be able to say to donors at home that they are keeping administration costs at a minimum (and well below those of government-to-government programs). Consequently, in order to pay realistic salaries and cover necessary clerical and building expenses, indigenous NC0 executives sometimes have to fudge or pad budgets and use project funds to pay some of their administrative costs. In such cases the fault lies with international NGOs who should be far more realistic in allowing for necessary overhead costs. For all of the above reasons, it would seem that
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more careful, honest accounting procedures of real costs and expenditures in the NGO network will be necessary in the years ahead. As in the area of evaluation, it is not producing more numbers that will solve the problem, nor is it, on the other hand, reliance on personalistic solutions based on “trust me, I’m your partner” approaches. Both international and indigenous NGOs need to confront these challenges together and more, not less, disclosure is part of the answer. A lesser role for NGOs in the area of resource accountability to donors is not likely in the foreseeable future, nor would it be wise.
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terminates, more domestic sources of support in developing countries will have to be found. Although not every potential source is possible or desirable, more aggressive investigation of feasible alternatives by indigenous NGOs in the business, banking and government sectors is in order, in the view of many in the international NGO community. The Philippine experience (as described by Ernest0 Garilao elsewhere in this volume) is a testimony that more domestic financing by indigenous NGOs is, in fact, possible and even desirable.
5. CONCLUSIONS 4. RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION
A final area over which there is some disagreement among NGOs is in the area of resource mobilization. There is almost unanimous feeling among indigenous NGOs that generation of significant resources in their own countries from public or private donors is not possible due to scarcity. Even when such funds are available, NGOs are reluctant to accept them due to the danger that indigenous political and economic elites would put far more restrictions on the use of such funds than foreign donors. A growing number in the international NGO community, however, want to see more initiative on the part of indigenous NGOs in generating domestic resources. They are concerned that long-term dependency relationships are being created by such a heavy reliance on outside funding year after year. They also feel that the availability of foreign support can at times give indigenous NGOs an excuse for not linking into domestic development plans and efforts, thus limiting the leverage and multiplier effect of the projects they support. If international NGOs are to play less of a role in the future in deciding priorities and approving projects, they are likely to expect in return more resource mobilization by indigenous NGOs in their own countries. This obviously cannot be made an across-the-board rule. In some situations this will be difficult to achieve for economic reasons, and in others the possibility of political manipulation by domestic donors is a grave danger. It is an issue, however, that needs more careful assessment in the years ahead. If international NGOs are to maximize their capacities to provide seed money to new and innovative strategies in development they need to “let go” of projects after a time and move on. If indigenous NGOs are to become more rooted in their contexts and the projects they support are to be viable after international NGO support
It may very well be that the roles of international and indigenous NGOs may change in the coming years. Much more responsibility may be delegated to indigenous NGOs in deciding funding priorities, approving projects and exercising administrative oversight. If this is to occur, however, several issues need clarification regarding the definition and empirical verification of effectiveness, the amount and quality of disclosure, and the source of financing. In each of these areas there are differences of perspective in the NGO network with cleavages often, but not always, running between international and indigenous NGOs. Growing pressures on international NGOs in their home context in the direction of more professionalization and disclosure of information are creating greater need on their part to show to private and public donors at home that they are supporting processes in developing countries which are having a measurable impact on alleviating poverty among the hard-core poor. In exchange for greater delegation of authority to indigenous NGOs in the South, international NGOs will want to see progress in evaluation and accounting procedures (a task both international and indigenous NGOs must work on together). International NGOs will also expect indigenous NGOs to pursue more aggressive efforts to generate local funds in their own countries. Just as there are dangers in too much emphasis on quantitative solutions to these challenges, so too are there dangers in vagueness and lack of definition. For better or for worse, more attention is being focused on NGOs now than in the past and more is being expected of them. They must not lose their flexibility, innovative thrust and capacities of building trust across national borders. They also cannot avoid facing up to some critical institutional challenges as the third decade of partnership in development begins between international and indigenous NGOs.
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DEVELOPMENT NOTES
1.
Van der Heijden
(1987)
Table
1.
2. Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary ance, AID (1986). pp. 4-5; Commission of the pean Communities (CEC) (1981) pp. iii, 2, Crombrugghe, Howes and Nieuwkerk (1985), 19.
AssistEuro10; de pp. 8,
3. De Crombrugghe, p. 8.
(1985),
Howes and Nieuwkerk
4. Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, AID (1986). pp. 6-7; Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (1981), pp. 10-13, 15-17. 5. Tendler 105-109.
(1982).
pp. 11-14,
25-28,
48-50.
84-93,
6. Hendrik van der Heijden, former head of the Aid Management Division in the Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD, concludes in reviewing the major evaluative studies of NGO project performance that “designing and scaling-up programs which are replicable and cost-effective remains the greatest challenge to NGOs” in the future. To accomplish this goal he believes greater institutional management support must be provided by indigenous NGOs to grassroots projects and greater collaboration among indigenous NGOs and between indigenous NGOs and larger private and public agencies engaged in development must occur. Van der Heijdcn (1985). pp. 21-22. 7. Save the Children Federation (SCF) in the United States in 1986 was criticized in print and on national television for being deceptive in its fundraising techniques since the children sponsored by donors never
receive the money sent to them. It is spent on community develooment aroiects that benefit. but most often do not involve the specific children. Behar, Richard, “SCF’s little secret,” Forbes (21 April 1986). pp. 106-197; 1986 (NBC-TV). 29 July 1986. 8. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the United States raised more money than it could spend (due to administrative problems in Ethiopia) during fundraising efforts during the height of the Ethiopian famine crisis. It banked much of the $50 million donated to it between October 1984 and mid-1985 to be used on longer-term agricultural projects in Africa. The agency was criticized for misleading donors since one could have received the impression from advertisements that all contributions would go to feeding hungry Ethiopians as quickly as possible. Blumenthal, Ralph, “Catholic Relief Services involved in dispute over spending in Ethiopia aid,” The New York Times (7 August 1985), p. A8; Filiteau, Jerry, “Famine relief in Ethiopia: CRS has nothing to hide,” The Wifness (Dubuque, IA: 24 November 1985) p. 1. 9. Isaac, Rael Jean, “Do you know where your church offerings go?” Reader’s Digest (January 1983), pp. 120-125; “The gospel according to whom?” 60 Minutes (CBS-TV), 23 January 1983; Maury, Guillaume, “Charite chretienne ou subversion marxiste?” Figaro Magazine (Paris: 26 October 1985), pp. 25-34; Leclerc, Gerard, “L’argent des chretiens au service de la revolution,” Quoridien de Paris (Paris: 25 March 1986). p. 23. IO.
Barrett
11.
Ibid.,
(1986),
p. 23.
p. 22.
REFERENCES Barrett, David B., “Annual statistical table on global mission: 1968,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Januarv 1986). DO. 22-23. Boiling, Landrum R., Private Foreign Aid: U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Deveioomenr (Boulder. CO: We&ew Press,- 1982). ‘ ’ Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance, US Agency for International Development (AID), Developmenr Effectiveness of Private Volunrary Organizations (PVOs) (Washington, DC: AID, 1986). Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Comparative Evaluation of Projects Cofinanced with NGOs and Microprojects: Indicative Synthesis (Brussels: CEC, 1981). De Crombrugghe, Genevieve, Mick Howes, and Mark Nieuwkerk, An Evaluation of CEC Small Developmenf Projects (Brussels: CEC, 1985). Gorman, Robert F. (Ed.), Privafe Volunrary Organizations as Agents of Developmen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). Lissner, Jorgen, The Politics of Ahruism: A Smdy of the
Poliiical Behaviour of Voluntary Development Agencies (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1977). Padron Castillo, Mario, Cooperation al Desarrollo y Movimiento Popular: Las Asociaciones Privadas de Desarrollo (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promotion de1 Desarollo [DESCO], 1982). Smith, Brian H., “U.S. and Canadian PVOs as transnational development institutions,” in Gorman (1982), pp. 115-164. Smith, Brian H., ‘*Nonprofit organizations (PVOs) as transnational development agents: Donor institutions in North Atlantic co&rtries and recipient groups in Colombia,” Mimeo (Cambridge. MA: Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1985), 600 pp. Smith, Brian H., The Politics of Inrernational Charities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). Sommer, John G., Beyond Charity: U.S. Volunlary Aid for a Changing World (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1977). Tendler, Judith, Turning Private Voluntary Organiza-
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lions Into Developmew Axetries: Questions for Evaluafion (Wash&ton, DC: AID, i982). . Van der Heiiden, Hendrik, “Develoument imnact and effectiveness of nongovernmental organisations: The record of progress in rural development cooperation,” Mimeo (Paris: Aid Management Division, Development Cooperation Directorate, Organis-
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ation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD), September 1985). Van der Heiiden, Hendrik. “The reconciliation of NC0 autonomy: Program integrity and operational effectiveness with accountability to donors,” World Developmenr, Vol. 15, Supplement (Fall 1987).