An analytical history of EIA

An Analytical History of EIA

Calvin A. Kent*

This article traces the development of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) from 1974, the inception of its precursor, an office within the Federal Energy Administration, to its current form as an independent agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). EIA amalgamated the energy-related activities of over 50 separate agencies, when it was chartered in DOE in 1977, “to collect, evaluate, assemble, and analyze energy information.. .” Six tensions have characterized the agency during its history: data quality, the role of modeling, confidentiality of data, resources and requirements. the independence of EIA, and timeliness vs. accuracy.

INTRODUCTION For the past 15 years the Energy Information Administration (EIA) has been the Nation’s primary source of energy data, analysis, and forecasts. EIA’s record is one of considerable accomplishment, as it has had to blend the activities of over 50 separate agencies into a comprehensive and cohesive system. EIA has been able to build consensus on what its mission is by continuous work with Congress, all facets of industry, the public, consumer groups, and the media. It is well known and held in highest regard for its objectivity and reliability. It has not been easy for EIA to either attain or maintain its status. What follows is a critique of the agency as illustrated by the historical events that shaped it. This review of the history of EIA reveals that there are six tensions which have characterized this agency in the past, and which continue to the present. Data Quality

EIA was established beginning EIA pulled

to obtain energy data of the highest possible quality. At the together, from many diverse sources, data which were not

Government Information Quarterly, Volume 10, Number 1, pages 3-24 All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0740-624X

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comparable and which ranged widely in the quality and timeliness of their collection. Producing a comprehensive and consistent dataset has been one of EIA’s major achievements. However, throughout EIA’s existence, the issue has been whether it devotes enough resources to insuring the quality of its data. Potential as well as actual problems with EIA data are highly visible because of its own Office of Statistical Standards, which does quality audits and the reports of the independent Professional Audit Review Team (PART). This tends to highlight the negative without proper emphasis on the accomplishments of the agency in providing reliable data. Quality, not just in terms of accuracy but in terms of timeliness and usability, is the goal of those within as well as outside EIA. While there has been a tendency in the past to reduce quality efforts during periods of budget stringency, much has been accomplished and EIA can stand tall among Federal statistical agencies. Maintaining the quality of energy data must be the top priority for EIA, because without quality data, the value of its other efforts is reduced dramatically. The Role of Modeling EIA is unique among the major statistical agencies in the Federal Government, because a portion of its legislative mandate is to forecast future developments in energy markets. This has been a responsibility that EIA has assumed at times without enthusiasm. There have been those who do not see the value in energy forecasting, particularly long term, and feel its lack of precision and its potential misuse by policymakers reduce its attractiveness. There are others who believe that while the future should be forecast, it should be done by methods other than economic modeling. Still others see economic modeling as a tool for centralized energy planning. EIA has now launched a major new modeling effort with the development of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). This is done recognizing that models are only one of the many tools that analysts should use as they view the energy future, and that modeling can, within well-defined limits, provide useful insights as to the policy consequences of proposed initiatives. EIA must ensure that its models remain transparent and its assumptions clearly stated, recognizing always the truth in the adage that it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong. Confidentiality of Data There has been a continuing conflict over the use of statistical data in EIA’s custody; those data might be used for non-statistical purposes, principally regulation. In the beginning, EIA had to serve twin masters, and still does. EIA’s data served both regulatory and statistical purposes. Initially, it was widely suspected that EIA’s inability to assure confidentiality to respondents of its statistical inquiries limited its effectiveness and ability to interact with other statistical agencies whose data were given that assurance. EIA sought to draw a clear line of demarcation between those data collected for each purpose. A recent challenge from the Department of Justice has again raised the issue as to what constitutes legitimate uses for EIA’s proprietary data.’ A legal opinion has concluded that EIA must provide statistical information in its possession to other Federal departments, agencies, and officials for their official use. Without relief, the EIA data collection program is exposed to the likelihood of complying with requests for sensitive statistical data for uses that are regulatory and not statistical.

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Resources and Requirements Because EIA has responsibilities both to the Executive and Legislative Branches. conflicts have developed between what has been expected of EIA and the resources that have been made available to accomplish its missions. Immediately after its establishment EIA grew quickly in both financial and human resources. As Table I shows, by 1981 EIA’s budget had reached $150.6 million in 1992 constant dollars with a staff of 769. For the next decade both dollars and people declined by almost 50 and 36 percent, respectively. Only in the past 2 years has EIA received any real increases in resources. While technically the Administrator is to determine the agenda for EIA, in fact legislative mandates, departmental objectives, and industry requests have created pressures for EIA either to gather more data or to do additional analyses. Every EIA Administrator has attempted to reduce the legislatively mandated burden with relatively little success. In fact, additional requirements tend to be included each year, so that internal prioritization has been an ongoing process. Legislated mandates, departmental and congressional requests for special studies, the need for EIA personnel to be involved in studies such as those conducted by the National Petroleum Council and the National Coal Council, as well as the need to serve on National Energy Strategy (NES) task forces, have further exacerbated the conflict. Clearly the system is now under severe stress. Since EIAS program is basically demand driven, responding to the expressed needs of its consumers, this conflict is unlikely to abate.

Table 1.

EIA Budget History Targcst Currwt Do//do

Ywr

1992 Constdnt Dolldrs

FTE

5 I .o 55.6

1978

49. I

1979

65.6

I

60.3

I980

90.8

150.6

769 (FTP)

66.2

1981

90.4

136.6

677 (FTP)

70.4

1982

7x.9

112.1

584 (FTP)

73.2

19X3

58.6

80. I

75.9

19X4

56.4

74.3

505

7X.2

I985

60.9

77.9

490

80.3

I986

60.3

75. I

4X5

80.3

1986*

57.7

71.9

485

X2.4

1987

60.3

73.2

470

84.9

I988

61.4

72.3

470

96.3

654 (FTP)

IX.0

692 (FTP)

520

XX.5

1989

62.9

71.1

469

92.0

I990

65.2

70.9

46X

92.0

1990*

64.3

69.9

46X

1991

68.9

71.7

480

1992

76.5

76.5

490**

I 100.0 96.

* Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

sequestrations

** This was cut to 465 in 1992. Source: 197%FY

Department 1993.

of Energy,

Energy

Information

Administration.

Congressional

Budget

Requests.

FY

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of EIA

EIA was established because of the express concern that neither industry nor the Administration would supply data or analysis that were untainted. For that reason, the Administrator has a degree of independence. That degree, however, is severely limited. ElA’s budget is processed through the Department and is not separate from the overall Departmental submission. Even though DOE is a single department, its appropriations are divided among many committees in both the House and Senate; this division reflects the historical antecedents of the DOE. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies considers EIA’s budget, while other Subcommittees handle the vast majority of the Department’s budget. While EIA must engage in a process of trade-offs within the Department for its Departmental submission, the scope of its trade-offs is entirely different when it competes before Congress. Additionally, EIA’s resources are basically a cost-free resource for users. Requests for special studies, as well as for short-term analyses generally are not foreseen at the time a budget request is made and must be squeezed into the existing process. In addition, the Administrator is a political appointee who, unlike the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, does not serve a fixed term, but “at the pleasure of the President.” This tends to make the job more political. It is to the credit of both the Executive Branch and the Congress that neither has used its potential power over appropriations or appointments during the 15 years of EIA’s life to undermine its independence-but the potential exists. Timeliness versus Accuracy

If energy information is to be useful, it must be available when needed by decision makers. Both Congress and the Executive Branch have expressed a need for rapid turnaround when requests for analysis have been sent to EIA. This does not always allow for the agency to do the detailed analysis or to run the quality checks which it might want to complete before issuing results. EIA has taken major steps to keep its data current, particularly through its weekly fuels collections. Statistical techniques are widely used to fill in data gaps and to make estimates. By anticipating problems, EIA has a reservoir of knowledge which can be quickly applied. The Persian Gulf war demonstrated EIA’s ability to deal with a major crisis by supplying extremely rapid data and analysis. But, EIA will never have the capacity to deal quickly with every situation which may arise. The ability to provide quick response is contingent upon having a solid core of quality information. The Weekly Petroleum Status Report, for instance, could not provide reasonable estimates if it were not closely tied to EIA’s monthly figures and periodically evaluated against those data. Thus, if a choice must be made for a rapid response, analysis may suffer because it will lack solid data for support.

THE NEED

FOR ENERGY

INFORMATION

The Energy Information Administration can trace its antecedents to the chaos that resulted from the two energy crises of the 1970s. In 1973 the Arab States, in retaliation for the United States’ and certain European countries’ support of Israel, embargoed oil for export to the United States, and in 1979, the Iranian revolution and the following

war between Iran and Iraq dramatically threatened As the Congressional Research Service noted, government

the supply of oil on world markets.’ an underlying expectation of the

following the Arab oil embargo of 1973, was that the key ingredient needed for effective energy policy was better energy information. When the Energy Information Administration (EIA) was established in 1977, Congress sought to centralize responsibility for the collection of all important energy information, give the agency independence from the policy process so that it would not be compromised (as its immediate predecessor agency, the Federal Energy Administration, was thought to have been). and to give it the analytical capability to make forecasts and answer key analytical questions.’

EARLY LEGISLATION

REGARDING ENERGY INFORMATION

The Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 in direct response to the 1973 oil crisis, established the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) which was one of the principal predecessor agencies of the Department of Energy. Among the responsibilities which were assigned to the FEA Administrator, was to “assess the adequacy of energy resources to meet demands in the immediate and longer range future for all sectors of the economy and for the general public’d and to collect, evaluate, assemble and analyze energy information on reserves, production, demand and related economic data.“’ The FEA Administrator was further directed to: Collect, assemble, evaluate, and analyze energy information by categorical groupings established by the Administrator of sufficient comprehensiveness and particularity to permit fully informed monitoring and policy guidance with respect to the exercise of the functions under this Act.”

In addition, the law granted to the Administrator of the FEA subpoena power, powers of investigation to verify data, the power to require reporting by companies, and the authority to collect energy data in the possession of other Federal agencies. FEA was required to publish an annual report, containing an analysis and projections of energy production along with the assumptions. In addition, the Administrator was to: (1) perform economic analyses of proposed government energy policies (2) establish and maintain a database with information on the exports of fossil fuels. The Energy Conservation and Production Act’ further extended and amended the FEA Act, by spelling out, in considerable additional detail, requirements for energy information and collection. Perhaps the most significant portion of the Act established an Office of Energy Information and Analysis (OEIA) with a Director who was to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Administrator was to delegate to this Director the authority to carry out the legal powers relating to the gathering and reporting of energy information.’ One additional requirement of this Act specified that the OEIA should establish a national energy information system to provide “a description of and to facilitate analysis of energy supply and consumption within and affecting the United States.‘” The Office

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was to supply whatever information might be needed, either by the FEA, Congress. or other officials of the U. S. Government who had responsibilities for energy policies. This Act specifically provided that the Office establish scientific, engineering, statistical, and other technical capabilities to verify the accuracy of its information and to develop iorecasting models for energy futures.“’ The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 granted basic authorities to the FEA, which subsequently were transferred to the DOE, for obtaining and verifying information. Companies were specifically required to report information, and subpoena power was given to the FEA. In addition, there were requirements for energy information that would be published regularly. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)” provided for the exchange of information among members of the newly formed International Energy Agency. In order to comply with the data-sharing requirements of this Act, producers of oil and natural gas were required to retain certain energy information in accordance with the procedures outlined in EPCA and to submit those reports to the Congress and to the President. The Federal Power Act” is the basic authority for the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) and required that body to keep data and information with respect to electric utilities and water power facilities. The FPA‘s power was broad enough to allow investigations regarding generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity, and to keep information regarding the ownership, operation, management. and control of all electric generation facilities in the United States.” The Natural Gas Act” required the Federal Power Commission to gather data on the production of natural gas.

THE FORMATION

OF EIA

EIA was the offspring of these duplicative, conflicting and overlapping energy information requirements. EIA was established in its current form by the Department of Energy Organization Act in 1977.‘” This law provided a broad and comprehensive centralization of Federal energy information and data functions within the EIA. Some of these were transferred directly to EIA and others to the Secretary, who, in turn, was to delegate the responsibility to EIA. The law requires that EIA “continue and improve the effectiveness and objectivity of a central energy data collection and analysis program within the Department.“” Section 205 establishes that the EIA will be headed by an Administrator who has been appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate. The Administrator must have a professional background and unique experience to qualify. The Administrator will have the responsibilities of carrying out a central, comprehensive, and unified energy data and information program which will collect. evaluate, assemble, analyze and disseminate data and information which is relevant to energy resource reserves, energy production. demand, and technology, and related economic and statistical information, or which r’r relevant to the adequacy of energy resources to meet demands in the near and longer term future for- the nation’s economic and social needs.”

The

Act

Department,

provided

the

Administrator

with

a degree

of independence

from

the

by stating that the Administrator

shall not be required to obtain the approval of any other officer or employee of the Department in connection with the collection and analysis of any information; nor shall the Administrator be required prior to publication to obtain the approval of any officer or employee of the United States with respect to the substance of the statistical or forecasting technical reports which he has prepared in accordance with the law.”

This mandate for objectivity and independence has always been the key to EIA’s operation. Its first Administrator, Lincoln Moses, was in the statistics program at Stanford University in 1977 when President Carter brought him to Washington. Moses wrote: Language gives EIA the freedom and lays upon EIA the obligation to develop and publish energy information independent of the energy policies of the Department. This legislative provision reflects the high value placed upon objective energy statistics and information which can be trusted by Congress, the Executive Branch, and the public as the basis for debate, deliberation and decision making in the field of energy policy. I”

THE EARLY YEARS The Early Structure of EIA

The first structure of EIA followed very closely the existing OEIA organization, since the major portion of EIA’s activity represented functions, personnel, and budget from that predecessor organization.“’ Several modifications had to be made to accommodate the additional responsibilities which had been transferred from the Bureau of Mines, the lnterstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The original structure of EIA” consisted of three major program offices, each headed by an Assistant Administrator, responsible for energy data, applied analysis, and energy data validation. The Assistant Administrator for Energy Data was responsible for providing correct and timely energy data and information to the Department, Congress, other Federal agencies, state governments. and the public. In addition, this Assistant Administrator had a special responsibility to regularly provide much of the data to be used for regulatory agencies. specifically the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA). Two offices within the Energy Data organization would later become separate units in their own right. The Office of Energy Data Standards and Statistical Design was to develop and enforce statistical standards and related procedures which would ensure the consistency of energy data collected by DOE.” The Automatic Data Processing Office was established to serve the data needs of both EIA and its clients. These components were originally housed within the Office of Energy Data“in order to ensure

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primary dedication of its attention to the basic data products of EIA and the related needs of its regulatory clients.‘“3 The Office of Energy Data Interpretation produced and interpreted the official energy data series of the Department. It produced over 3 I data publications which included information on production and use of all fuels. The Office of Energy Data Development, on the other hand, had as one of its major responsibilities to provide the data needed by the regulatory clients of EIA. In addition, it was to develop ways of recording and analyzing energy end use and patterns of energy consumption. The lack of quality end-use data was recognized as a major EIA defi~iency.24 The Assistant Administrator for Energy Data Validation provided increased emphasis on the energy data quality issue, as was required by both the FEAA and the ECPA, which had dictated that such a discipline be established within the OEIA. This office was not only to verify the accuracy of EIA data, but also to perform periodic audits of the data and to validate the analytical methodologies employed. It also was responsible for ensuring the comparability of energy information within EIA and was charged with making its results public.” The Assistant Administrator for Applied Analysis was given the responsibility for all analytical activities of EIA “which (go) beyond statistical interpretations, but (stop) short of expressing judgmental preference or recommendations on policy analysis.‘“2” Such activities were required under various provisions of predecessor legislation.” The major function of this office in its initial year was directed towards preparing forecasts and analyses of energy markets. This organization was changed with the development of the Project Independence Evaluation System (PIES) which was a major computerbased model used to prepare integrated mid- and long-term forecasts, as well as to do policy evaluations. It was first used in the mid-1970’s in response to President Nixon’s call for Project Independence-a plan to eliminate U.S. oil imports by 1980. This project became the primary focus of pre-EIA analytical work. The Office of Energy Information Services was also established, to be responsible for the operation of the National Energy Information Center (NEIC) and the Energy Information Administration Clearinghouse (EIAC). An Office of Program Development was established with responsibility for the development of two projects which had been mentioned in law, the Financial Reporting System (FRS) and the Oil and Gas Reserves Information System (OGIS). Other offices were responsible for the overall management of the agency. Professional Audit Review Team In response to Congress’s perception of “cooked” numbers being used in previous government analyses, e.g., President Carter’s National Energy Plan, the Energy Conservation and Production Act required the establishment of a Professional Audit Review Team (PART) to do a “thorough annual performance review audit” of EIA.‘X PART was to prepare an annual report discussing its investigation and to file that report with the President and the Congress. The first PART report listed five areas of needed improvements which included (1) increased attention to the verification of the accuracy and validity of the energy data, (2) insurance that the needs of Congress and the public for energy information were given priority and that the independence of the agency

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was maintained, (3) improved documentation for data and models, (4) implementation of a resource accounting and project control system, and (5) establishment of a technical advisory committee in the modeling area.29 The first annual report of the Administrator makes it clear that the PART recommendations were taken seriously and definitive steps were instituted to deal with each of them.30 The First EIA Annual Report The first required EIA Annual Report was issued in three volumes. Volume I gave an account of the work of each of the components of EIA, including major undertakings, publications, and studies produced and a documentation of energy data systems and models used by EIA. That report continues to be published each spring. Volume 11 presented forecasts of energy supply and demand in the short, medium, and long term. Beginning in 1982, Volume II became a free-standing publication entitled the Annual Energy Outlook. Lincoln Moses, EIA’s first Administrator, showed a healthy skepticism for forecasting in an area as complex as energy markets when he wrote “ . . .any volume of forecasts could well begin with a warning: ‘There are no facts about the future.““’ This first volume of forecasts established the approach which is still used by EIA today. That approach consists of first, basing all forecasts on existing government policy rather than attempting to determine what changes might be enacted by the government over the forecast period; and, second, assuming there would be no major technological breakthroughs other than those known at the time the report was written. By taking this policy and technologically neutral stance, EIA evaluates scenarios under which alternative policies and technologies are developed and introduced. This report also preserved the FEA analytical practice of presenting not a single forecast, but several forecasts reflecting different assumptions regarding economic growth, level of reserves, prices of product, and prices of fuels. It is interesting to note that the first report concluded with a discussion of unresolved analytical issues.32 That chapter highlighted the agenda for EIA analysis and forecasting for the future. Some of that agenda has yet to be completed, e.g., investor expectations in exploration and production decisions; long-range resource depletion, technological change and economic growth; and national and regional energy impacts. Volume III contained the various energy statistics gathered by EIA from the past and the present. Since 1982, this material has been transferred to a separate report, the Annual Energy Review. This statistical compilation continues to be among the more valuable sources of reference data used by policy makers, analysts, and academics. Development of Data Systems The early years of EIA were characterized by continued consolidation of analytical efforts, surveys, and other information systems. EIA’s second report to Congress, which covered its first full year of operation, noted the difficulties in conforming disparate databases and information systems and reforming teams of people into new effective working units.33 This was accomplished by exhaustive consultations over a 18-month period with Congress, other Federal departments, energy industries, trade associations, and the states. During this period, the vast majority of EIA’s efforts were directed towards energy data and acquisition, which took 62 percent of the personnel and 58

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percent of the budget. In 1978, one of the achievements of EIA was to operate 49 major primary data-gathering systems, which required the processing of 650,000 individual survey forms. This represented a significantly reduced respondent burden from what had been imposed by the separate agencies. Also, during this period, EIA continued to develop, on a parallel path, its gathering of regulatory energy information for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Economic Regulatory Administration, which were required to implement major post-1970 energy laws such as the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, the Natural Gas Policy Act, and the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Act. In addition, a significant program to validate the energy information contained in El A’s data systems was begun. By 1979, the efforts were beginning to bear fruit.j4 In testimony before Congress, Administrator Moses indicated the five principal programs on which EIA’s efforts would be concentrated in the coming years: (I) the Oil and Gas Reserves Information System, (2) the Financial Reporting System, (3) the Energy Consumption Data Systems, (4) the National Energy Information System, and (5) the Fuels Data Gathering System.” The Oil and Gas Information System was to be designed to assess adequately the domestic supply situation by the annual collection and independent verification of oil and gas reserves and production. The Financial Reporting System was to be designed to obtain information concerning the financial structure and operation of the energy industry in order to provide a basis for determining the degree of competition in the industry and to permit analysis of the impact of Federal policy on the energy industry. EIA identified accurate and comprehensive data on how energy was consumed as one of the major gaps in energy information. As originally envisioned, there would be a single energy consumption data system, encompassing residential, industrial, and commercial sectors (later these were to become three separate surveys): (I) the Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS), (2) the Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS), and (3) the Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS)). The 1979 report from the Administrator indicated that the Oil and Gas Information System had been completed and preliminary reports issued as was also the case with the Financial Reporting System, which had compiled comprehensive financial data on 26 major energy companies for 1976. An interim energy consumption survey for the residential sector had also been completed. In addition, a significant effort had been made to improve the quality of EIA data through the establishment of the Office of Energy Information Validation. The year 1979 also saw EIA begin the publication of its own weekly estimates for oil and gas supply and demand. Previously, the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the American Gas Association (AGA) had been the sole sources for such data. Because they had come from industry sources, they were generally mistrusted by Congress and other policymakers who had asked EIA to assume the responsibility.‘h EIA had also made several improvements to its data system which had allowed it to reduce respondent burden. The first was to impute responses for those not received in a timely fashion, thus eliminating delays in the release of EIA material. The second was to increase the use of sampling, which allowed results to be obtained from the scientifically designed statistical samples of respondents rather than from surveys of all potential entities.

13

Criticism of EIA Despite these achievements EIA continued to receive criticism from both the PART and from Congress. Both the 1979 and 1980 PART reports3’ gave EIA high marks for having established itself as an independent entity, a deficiency which they had noted in their 1977 and their 1978 reports. However, despite the efforts of EIA to improve the quality of data and modeling, both PART reports remained highly critical. The I979 report indicated: Recent actions including the development of program plans for the Office of Energy Information Validation, the Office of Applied Analysis, and the Office of Energy Ini’ormation Services, the establishment of Interim Model Documentation Standards, and Model Validation Procedure Development efforts indicate that EIA 15 making progress towards improving the quality and reliability of Federal energy data and analysis activities. However, these are only the first steps and much more needs to be done.‘”

A workshop conducted by the Congressional Research Service further documented criticism of EIA. That workshop highlighted four problems.” The first problem was the need to design a good energy data collection system which could be trusted as both accurate and reliable. Workshop participants from Congress, Federal agencies, and industry saw this as the most important single consideration. Considerable discussion centered around the data collection techniques used by EIA and problems with the design of the data-gathering systems. It was also noted that EIA data were difficult to combine with economic data collected by other Federal agencies, principally because of EIA’s mandate to collect both regulatory and statistical data which resulted in “keeping the agency out of the mainstream of federal data collection efforts.“’ Linked closely to good design of the energy data collection system was the second problem of assuring the credibility of energy information. Energy data once collected need to be validated if they are to be reliable. Particular attention was paid to EIA’s perceived inadequate efforts to resolve inconsistencies among their own published data. The third problem concerned the timeliness and accuracy of EIA’s work. The congressional staff who participated in this workshop indicated that their two primary concerns were with EIA’s ability to provide a quick response and a clear explanation of what was happening in energy markets.4’ These comments reflected the congressional need not so much for data, but for forecasts and for analyses that could predict the consequences of policy actions. EIA Administrator Moses took exception to this, noting that there was “a very sharp trade-off between quality and timeliness in the forecast area. There are several ways to be timely with a forecast-but most are adverse.“’ This conflict still exists, even in the current time frame. A fourth problem was the need to resolve the conflict between regulatory and statistical data collection. The essence of this point was that the requirement of EIA to collect both regulatory and statistical information compromised its ability to receive timely and accurate responses and was “very defeating of a valid statistical program.“” When Dr. Moses left in August, 1980, to return to his teaching position at Stanford, he had guided EIA through a tremendous period of growth and consolidation which

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saw 290 energy information systems previously overseen by 23 different Federal agencies consolidated into EIA. Following Dr. Moses, Acting Administrator Albert Linden continued one of EIA’s most popular publications, the Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPSR), which provided weekly data on petroleum production, imports, and refinery usage, and established the Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), a quarterly publication offering 1g-month forecasts of energy supply and demand covering a range of possible energyIn addition, a Departmental Disclosure Policy, which was related situations.44 completed after 3 years of debate, set forth the conditions and terms by which individual respondent information would be shared with other DOE offices, Congress, the General Accounting Office, other Federal agencies, States, and the public. In 1991, the Department of Justice turned aside this important statement.45

THE PERIOD OF CONTRACTION The New EIA Administrator

The year 1981 brought substantial changes to EIA. President Reagan had campaigned on a platform of allowing the market to set energy policy.46 This meant abolishing the Department of Energy, and while EIA was to survive, it was to be transferred to the Department of Commerce and vastly reduced in scope and size.47 EIA’s resources and staffing did begin to decline dramatically during this period. Acting Administrator Linden attempted to assure Congress that EIA could function with these dramatic reductions by eliminating reports and data collection surveys, particularly those which collected information at the State leve1.48 In addition, model updates, documentation, and simplification were to be stretched out over longer time periods and mid- and longterm forecasting efforts would be either reduced or eliminated. In fact, EIA was fighting for its life. J. Erich Evered, a petroleum engineer and geologist, became at age 27 EIA’s new Administrator. In a letter to the White House he responded to criticism from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that the energy data EIA was collecting were used principally for regulatory and central planning purposes. In his letter, Evered stated, “I believe it is important to the workings of the free market for the government to provide credible, relevant information about the energy sector.‘49 He noted that most of EIA’s surveys and reports were required by legislation, and “had an information base been available to provide an understanding of the energy market place, demands for government intervention may well have been curbed.“50 Evered acknowledged that EIA had “its share of excesses,“‘i that its analytical models were too complex to be managed effectively, many of its reports were of marginal utility, and that its data-gathering systems were burdensome and costly. He concluded by noting that EIA’s performance presented an opportunity: to have unbiased, low cost accounting of the status and effects of the free energy market-it is cheap insurance. The EIA offers no threat to the Administration’s policies and should not be treated as it does. A return to ignorance on energy matters on the other hand, would pose a serious threat to the free market environment unencumbered by government intervention.‘*

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Faced with shrinking resources the new Administrator was confronted with an EIA reorganized from function-related offices to comprehensive program offices based on fuel types. Four new program offices were created: Oil and Gas; Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels; Energy Markets and End Use; and Statistical Standards. Remarking on the fuels offices the 198 1 Annual Report said, “They operate on a ‘cradle to grave’ basis, combining data collection, program development and analysis for each energy source or use.“53 In order to meet the squeeze between resources and responsibilities EIA continually sought to achieve reductions in its legislative mandates for data collection and reports. Two pieces of legislation were introduced to accomplish this objective, the Energy Information Administration Amendments Act of 1981 and the Energy Information Administration Reports Reduction Act of 1983, neither of which Congress passed. These proposals would have eliminated several mandated programs, including the Financial Reporting System, all mid- and long-term forecasting, middle distillate reporting system, coal exports file, and a raft of other lesser studies.54 During this period EIA based its budget submissions upon the expectation that the mandates laid upon it would be reduced. This led to accusations that EIA was “jaunting (sic) the law.“55 Congress, in most instances, refused to grant the relief requested. Equally poorly received were EIA’s attempts to eliminate its mid- and long-term forecasting efforts. The Administrator made it clear that in a period of declining resources, he considered forecasting to be of less value than “accurate data on what is happening”56 It is not surprising that with this controversy raging over forecasting, EIA sponsored in August, 1982, a symposium which brought together more than 180 energy analysts from industry, government, academia, and consulting firms to review EIAS new Intermediate Future Forecasting System (IFFS), which had become operational but was still being developed.57 The purpose of IFFS was to replace the PIES which had served as EIA’s forecasting tool but was both too unwieldy to continue under reduced resources and no longer adequately addressed the current energy issues. A third major area of reduction concerned the effort expended on data and model quality and verification. The 1983 budget represented the second year in a row in which EIA postponed a formal request for quality maintenance investment projects. While making such a recommendation the Administrator indicated that he could not “guarantee that EIA’s information products will be of the same quality that EIA has produced in the past.“’ This theme was repeated in the 1983 Annual Report to Congress, where the Administrator wrote, “EIA cannot assure as high a quality in areas of its stated collection systems and models as it had 2 years ago due to resource reductions.“59 While Congress did appropriate $1 million for this function in EIA’s 1984 budget, the 1985 budget request was for $3 million. In those hearings the Administrator admitted that this was less than half the amount that he had requested, and he felt the requested amount was necessary to restore the credibility of EIA’s energy data.(‘O The issue of data quality did not go unnoticed by the PART. Their 1982 report noted the pervasive reorientation of EIA’s activities and the scaling back of major information validation functions and recommended that the Administrator “expedite the implementation of a comprehensive quality assurance program to ensure the continued credibility of EIA’s data.‘“’ PART was even more critical in the 1984 report and found,

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“Because EIA has made little progress in its quality control and assessment activities since our last review we continue to believe that the quality of much of its data remains uncertain.h2 PART’s analysis was basically accepted by the Administrator, who detailed a comprehensive plan to deal with each of its specific recommendations, including frequent quality audits, improved documentation for models and frames, and a clear assignment of the responsibility for quality assurance with the Office of Statistical Standardsh’ The first half of the 1980’s had seen significant belt-tightening in EIA due to a genera1 emphasis of the Reagan administration on reduction in government spending and reduction of deficit, combined with a reduction in the requirements for energy data due to the deregulation efforts of the period. Between FY 1980 and FY 1986, EIA’s budget had been reduced from $91 to $58 million and its staff was cut from 769 to 485. EIA absorbed these reductions not only by consolidating publications, which decreased by 60 percent between 1978 and 1984,h4 but also by streamlining data collection, terminating long-term integrating modeling projects, scaling back some midterm modeling, eliminating low priority data series, reducing the scope of surveys and services, and reducing quality maintenance activities.h’

PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION In May 1985, Helmut Merklein became the new Administrator after previously holding the post of Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs and Energy Emergencies. Prior to coming to Federal Government, Dr. Merklein, who was trained as a petroleum geologist and economist, had been a professor of economics and an academic dean. The 5-plus years that he served as Administrator of EIA were characterized by a focussing of EIAS activities on improving the quality of services received by EIA’s stakeholders. The following summarizes the major thrusts of activities during this period. ( I) Significant emphasis was placed on upgrading EIA’s primary publications, including the ~#~i~l.v Energy Review (MER), the Annual EnergJr Review (AER), the Annual I5zerg.r ~tl~~[~k (AEO), the Short-Tern Energy ~t~ook (STEO), and the international Energy Outlook (IEO). In addition to the improvements and the enhancement of these integrated publications, there were major revisions in both the form and content of the fuels-specific publications, such as the Electric Power Monthl_v, the Natural Gas Monthly, the Petroleum Supply Month&, and the Petroleum

marketing Mo~lth~v. (2) The Administration

and Congress increasingly called upon ElA to provide analyses of current energy issues and policy proposals, and Dr. Merklein placed this work high among EIA’s priorities. In 1985, EIA produced a detailed assessment of the impacts of the Administration’s tax reform proposal on the energy industries at the request of Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and investigation, House Committee on Energy and Commerce.6h Chairman Dingell praised the analysis and cited it as evidence of the continuing need for an independent government organization to analyze the effect on energy of various government policies and proposals. During 1986 and 1987 six major Service Reports were produced,

An And/ytrcc~/

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17

discussing various aspects of the regulatory reforms under consideration in the natural gas industry, including contract terms for various gas categories, open-access transportation, and removal of “old” gas ceiling prices6’ EIA was also called upon to provide data and analytical support to both the House and Senate during deliberations leading to the decontrol of wellhead prices in 1989.68 In 1987, EIA produced an independent assessment of the potential in-place and recoverable crude oil volumes in the Arctic Natural Wildlife Refuge at the request of Congress.h9 (3) Increased emphasis was placed on energy end-use and ElA’s energy consumption surveys. In 1986, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act’O required EIA to conduct triennial surveys of energy consumption in manufacturing industries in the linited States. The results of the first MECS, using 1985 data, were released in 1988 and estimated the consumption of energy by 30 different manufacturing groups according to geographic regions.7’ A companion report on fuel switching provided details of the extent to which manufacturers were capable of replacing current energy sources with alternate fuels.” (4) During this period increased attention was also given to the improvement of the quality of ElA’s data and more thorough documentation of EIA’s models. Despite noting the increased quality activities of EIA, PART continued to recommend better documentation of data collection systems and improved quality control and quality assessment activities.‘” In his response, Administrator Merklein noted the budget constraints under which EIA had operated and indicated that the approaches being used by EIA would be sufficient to ensure the quality sought by PART. In his testimony on the 1986 budget, the Administrator requested that additional funding be made availabie to expand the quality investment program and to reduce the backlog of projects necessary to restore and maintain the quality of EIA’s information products.” The 1988 PART report included even sharper criticism of EIA’s efforts at quality maintenance. Citing a perceived reduction in the quality control budget of 25 percent from 1986 to 1988, PART recommended an increase in the scope and frequency of quality activities and recommended that if EIA determined that its quality programs were not sufficient because of funds being used for other priorities it should disclose this fact in any of the affected published reports.75 In a sharply worded response, Dr. Merklein noted several fundamental errors in the PART report, particularly the failure of PART to recognize that quality maintenance investments were only a small subset of the overall EIA quality control programs. He noted that the data figures cited by PART as reflecting a decline in EIA’s spending on quality maintenance were a result of the quality maintenance activity being conducted by the program offices and those expenditures appeared in their budgets. The Administrator also noted that most of PART’s information had been obtained without adequate consultation with EIA senior management and basically was derived from EIA’s internal evaluations of its own data systems and models. In addition, the Administrator cited impressive statistics on the increased emphasis which EIA had placed upon developing new and innovative ways of ensuring the quality of its data.76 (5) EIA made a continuing effort to reduce the amount of congressionallymandated reports and studies. In his budget testimony, the Administrator consistently recommended discontinuance of the State Energy Data System (SEDS) and the State Energy Price and Expenditure Data System (SEPEDS). As did his predecessor, he

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called for the elimination of the FRS noting that this survey had resulted from concern about windfall profits during the oil crisis of the 1970’s. Citing the depressed conditions in the oil industry due to the collapse of oil prices in 1986, he felt that continuation of the report was unnecessary and inconsistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 USC 3501). He also pointed out that the survey considered only 22 of the major petroleum companies and, therefore, did not present a comprehensive picture of the activities of the industry and the same data could be more easily and economically obtained from a larger number of respondents using publicly available data.” None of these requests was to be granted. Criticisms of EIA EIA did not stand above congressional criticism during this period. EIA was criticized for not quickly enough recognizing the fall in crude oil produ~ion as a result of the dramatic decline of crude oil prices in the first six months of 1986. 78In the 1988 report to Congress, the Administrator noted the roller coaster ride which oil prices had taken in the past 2 years, dropping from $26 per barrel in January, 1986, to less than $10 six months later; recovering to over $20 a barrel by mid 1987, leading to massive world-wide overproduction, and then falling to $13 a barrel by October, 1988. This led to difficulties in predicting domestic output. But the Administrator did agree to take steps to make sure that EIA’s publications contained the most up-to-date isolation on oil production.79 The record-breaking cold of December, 1989 to January, 1990, brought additional criticism to EIA for not having sufficient data about propane available for use in responding to the crises.” Also, Congress was extremely concerned about the possibility of anti-competitive behavior which may have exacerbated the price spike experienced during that period. As a result, EIA published a report of its investigation into the causes of the price increases and concluded that it was the impact of the cold weather on demand, in conjunction with breakdowns in the transportation and refining system, which had lead to the price increasesx’ Other Activities Conditions in the oil industry led the National Petroleum Council to undertake and complete in 1987 a strategic study on petroleum storage and transportation.82 The Administrator served as Government co-chair for the study and a significant number of EIA personnel were involved. Additionally, President Reagan directed that the Department of Energy conduct a review of America’s energy-related security interests. The resulting reportB3 was prepared with input and cooperation from more than a dozen Federal agencies and was based on four EIA Service Reports.84 What is impressive during this period is the increased requests for special reports which EIA furnished along with its core publications and analyses. If one were to summarize the period of consolidation, it would be that EIA did more with less and did it well.

THE CURRENT PERIOD When in August of 1990 this author was selected to become EIA’s fourth chief, he was given two predominant tasks by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The first was to

An

hd/yticd/

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19

of EIA

increase EIA’s ability to provide rapid responses to policy questions concerning world energy markets. The second was to develop the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). In addition, the new Administrator inherited the work being done by EIA in support of President Bush’s National Energy Strategy (NES). The Gulf War

EIA’s ability to provide rapid response was immediately put to the test during the Persian Gulf crisis. The new Administrator was sworn in on August 6, 1990, three days after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the following day testified three times before congressional bodies.85 EIA was engulfed in a flood of activities pertaining to the war which have been detailed in a previous article in this journal.86 Existing EIA petroleum supply data collection served as the backbone for timely information and analyses as the situation evolved in the Gulf. Of particular usefulness were the Weekly Petroleum Status Report and the Petroleum Supply Monthly. EIA began publishing, on a daily basis, the Energy Situation Analysis Report (ESAR), which was a concise and timely collection of data and analyses of energy-related impacts of the Persian Gulf situation. The ESAR was disseminated via electronic facsimile transmission to a select audience, principally congressional offices, executive departments, State energy offices, and the news media. This report continued until the cease fire at the end of February 1991. EIA’s National Energy Information Center (NEIC) saw an incredible increase in inquiries from the public seeking timely data on petroleum prices and supplies. One of the more controversial issues during the war was the apprehension that oil companies were “ripping off” the American public. At the request of the Deputy Secretary, EIA prepared a special report on the change in petroleum markets and presented it at a news conference to the general public.*’ The study showed that in the time period covered, the higher prices paid for petroleum products did not result in significantly higher profits for U.S. companies. EIA continued, through a variety of ways, to keep the public, Congress, and the press informed during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The National

Energy Strategy

In July, 1989, the President ordered the Department of Energy to prepare a comprehensive National Energy Strategy (NES), which would provide a framework for informed debate and decision making on energy policy issues. EIA was requested to lead the analytical effort defining the probable paths of energy development in the United States over the next several decades. Modeling sub-groups were formed to address five main subject areas: (1) Energy Demand and Conservation, (2) Electricity and Nuclear Technology, (3) Coal, (4) Oil and Gas, and (5) Renewable Supplies and Technologies. Each of these was co-chaired by EIA staff, with each subgroup consisting of representatives from the various departments throughout DOE. Working in conjunction with the Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, the subgroups created a baseline projection of America’s energy future that extended to the year 2030. This baseline case was then supplemented by excursions from the baseline projection which tested what might happen if particular technological or regulatory assumptions were introduced. These various excursions were then lumped into scenarios

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which could be used to analyze various policy alternatives. The DOE Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis using this work as a base produced a wide array of policy changes which the President endorsed.” As this Administrator testified before Congress, EIA’s role in the NES was primarily consultative.xy EIA did not participate in the selection of policy alternatives which were ultimately advanced by the President in the NES. EIA did produce seven reports which summarize the excursions and discussed the scenario resultsgo The National Energy Modeling System lmmediately prior to the arrival of the new Administrator, DOE’s Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis had contracted with the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a Committee on the National Energy Modeling System to advise DOE and the EIA on the development and application of a modeling system to support energy policy analysis and strategic planning. The Committee, having issued an interim report,“’ sent their final recommendations and findings to the Secretary early in 1992.” The principal findings of the NRC report were: l

l

l

ETA’s existing models constituted a reasonable starting point for the building of the NEMS; NEMS, when completed, should interact with both public and private groups concerned with energy analysis; and The success of NEMS would require the Secretary and the Administrator to i‘. . . establish and foster an environment that is outward 1ooking”and that ensured greater institutional commitment to its development.

The report also contains 11 major, and a host of minor recommendations, most of which concerned the structure and architecture of the NEMS. The report recommended that the NEMS be applied to policy issues, the Administrator be held accountable for NEMS, that a user committee be established and particular attention be paid to uncertainty. NEMS was also to be modular, transparent, and useful in making rapid responses to policy questions. At the same time, EIA had instituted a small but effective National Energy Modeling System Project Office which reported directly to the new Administrator. This office worked very closely with the NRC and developed a series of internal working papers on its own.

To better facilitate ETA’s analysis and modeling efforts EIA underwent its first major reorganization in over a decade on October 6, 1991. This reorganization brought the analysis and modeling efforts, which had been dispersed throughout the fuels offices, into a single cohesive unit that would have responsibility not only for the development of the NEMS but also for the publication of the Annual Energy ~tlook and the international Energy Outlook with their projections for energy markets in the future. In addition to the mid- and long-term forecasts of integrated energy markets, the new office prepares analytical studies of international markets, environmental, and macro-

economic issues, and the effects of various energy policies. The new office was organized into two divisions: the Energy Demand and Integration Division and the Energy Supply and Conversion Division.“” Clean Air Act Amendments One of EIA’s more significant recent responsibilities has been its work relating to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. EM was given the responsibility of providing assistance to Congress in analyzing the proposed Clean Air Act Amendments and provided data and analytical support to the staff of the House Energy and Commerce Committee during their deliberation on those Amendments. Over a dozen reports, summarizing the results of these efforts, were prepared.“4 EIA provided the Environmental Protection Agency with the data used in the development of the National Ahowance Data Base which will be used to determine the allocation of SOZ emission allowances among utility powerplants in the United States. Those same Clean Air Act Amendments have also significantly expanded EIA responsibilities in the area of data collection and analyses regarding transportation fuels. EIA is modifying virtually all current petroleum data collection forms and developing new ones to capture the production and distribution of reformulated gasolines and desulfurized fuelsY5 EIA personnel are also extensively invoived in two National Petroleum Council studies, one dealing with refineries and the other with natural gas.

CONCLUSION EIA is a creature of the Congress, born and raised with legally mandated overseers. It has often been said that other agencies might not survive with EIA’s successes if the same level of daily scrutiny was imposed. These few pages are not enough to tell the full tale of a 15-year effort in designing an information program that has enjoyed the recognition and cooperation of EIA clientele, not the least of whom are Congress and the Executive Branch. The result has been the formation of the preeminent energy data and analysis source in government.

NOTES AND REFERENCES I.

2. I 4. .5 6. 7.

x. 9.

IO. I I.

Memorandum from James F. Rill to Michael Luttig (October 4, 1990) discussing request for legal opinion: Section 12, Federal Energy Administration Act. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Que.s~.fbr Oil, Monqv, and Pwer (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) 606-662 and 7 I t-7 14. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Energy Information Workshop on Current Progress and Problems, 96th Gong., 2d Sess. (1980). Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, P. L. 93-275, IS USC 761, Section 5(b)(2) (1974). 15 USC 761. Section 5(b)(9). Ibid., Section 13(a). Energy Conservation and Production Act. P. L. 94-385.42 USC 6801 (1976). Section 5 I of the Federal Energy Administ~tion Act. Ibid.. Section 52(a). Ibid.. Section 54. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, P. L. 94-163.42 USC 6301 (1975).

22 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

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The Federal Water Power Act. P. L. 66-280, I6 USC 792 (1920). Ibid., Section 31 I. The Natural Gas Act, P. L. 75-688, I5 USC 717 (1938). Department of Energy Organization Act, P. L. 95-91.42 USC 7101 (1977). Ibid., Section 102(7). ibid., Section 205(a)(2). Ibid., Section 205(d). Energy Information Administration, Annual Repporr fo Con,qress, Vol. I (Washington,

111993

DC, 1977) pp.

Ill-1”. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 21. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

4x.

49. 50. 51.

Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 48. Section 13(d) of the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974; and sections 54(a), 54(b), and 56(a) of the Energy Conservation and Production Act. Annual Reporr 1977, Vol. I. p. 58. Section 205 of the Energy Organization Act of 1977; Sections 13, 18. 31. 52, 54, 57 of the Federal Energy Administration Act; and sections 1 I3 and 142 of the Energy Conservation and Production Act. Section 55(a) of the Energy Conservation and Production Act. Professional Audit Review Team, Report IU The President and The Congress, Activiries qf the Energ), Inforrnafion Administration (Washington, DC, 1979). Annual Report 1977, Vol. 1, p. 40. Energy Information Administration, Annual Reporl 10 Congress. Vol. 11 (Washington, DC, 1977) p. 111. Ibid., pp. 285-287. Energy Information Administration, Annual Report fo Congress, Vol. I (Washington, DC, 1978). pp. 2-30. Energy Information Administration, Annual Reporr to Congress, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1979). Hearings on the Energy Information Lincoln E. Moses (EIA Administrator), ‘Statement,” Administration FY 1979 Budget Request Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Regulation, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978). Annual Reporr 1979. Vol. I, p. 25. Professional Audit Review Team, Report (Washington, DC, 1979); Report fo the Presidenf and the Congress on Acfivifies of’ the Energy Irzf’rmarion Adrninisfrafion (Washington, DC, 1980). PART Report (1979) p, ix. Congressional Research Service, Ener,g, Information: A Workshop on Current Progress and Problems (Washington, DC, 1980). pp. 7-35. Ibid., p. 18. Ibid., pp. 15 and 35. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid., p. 45. Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 1980) pp. iii and iv. See infra this volume. Yergin, p. 70 I. J. Erich Evered (EIA Administrator),“Statement,” Hearings on the Energy Information Administration FY 1983 Budget Request Before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, 97th Gong., 2d. Sess. (1982). Hearings on the Energy Information Albert H. Linden, Jr. (EIA Acting Administrator), “Statement,” Administration FY 1982 Budget Request Before the House Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Letter from J. Erich Evered to Craig L. Fuller (November I, 1981). discussing use of EIA data. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 4.

An Analyticdl History of E/A

52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76 77

78. 79.

23

Ibid., p. 5. Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress (Washin~on, DC, 1981). p. 2. J. Erich Evered, “Statement,” Hearing on the Proposed FY 1984 Budget for EIA Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Supply. 98th Gong., 1st Sess. (1983). 55 Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 24 Ibid., p, 33. National Bureau of Standards, Intermediate Future Forecasting System, NBS Special Publication 670 (Washington, DC, 1982). J. Erich Evered (EIA Administrator), “Statement,” Hearing on the Energy Information Administration FY 1985 Budget Request Before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, 98th Gong., 2d. Sess. (1984). Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 1983). See note 58, FY 1985 budget request, pp. 33-35. Professional Audit Review Team, Report to the Presidenr and the Congress, Performance Evafuarion ~$‘the Energy inf~~rmarion Administration (Washington, DC, 1982). Professional Audit Review Team, Report to the President and the Congress, Performance Evaluation qfthe Energy Informarion Adminisfrution (Washington. DC, 1984). Ibid.. pp. E-2 and E-3. Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 1984). Energy Information Administration, Annual Report fo Congress (Washington, DC, 1986), p. 3. Energy Information Administration, lmpacf of the Admjnjsfrafion i Tux Reform Proposal on Energy Zndus~r.~(Washin~on, DC, 1985). Energy Information Administration: An Analysis of Narurul Gas Contracts, Volume i: Old inrerstate Gas (Washington, DC, 1986); An Analysis of Natural Gas Contracrs, Volume 2: Old lntrasrare Gas (Washington, DC, 1986); An Analysis of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERN) Order 436 (Washington, DC, 1986); An Analysis of the Department qf Energy’s Notice ef Proposed Rulemaking(NOPR), “Ceiling Prices: Old Gas PricingSirucrure”(Washington, DC, 1986); An AnaJvsi of ~utural Gas Contracts: Volume 3, Contract Prov~ions Covering ~oduc~ion of New Gas (Washington, DC, 1987): An Analysis of the State-Level E#ects qf FERC Order 451 (Washington, DC, 1987). Energy information Administration, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 1989) p, 6. Energy Information Administration, Potential Oil Production From the Coastal Plain qf the Arctic, National Wildlife Reficse (Washington, DC, 1987). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, P. L. 99-509, 15 USC 4502 (1991). Energy Information Administration, ~anufucfuring Energy Consumpfi~~n Survey: Co~umpiion of Energy 1985 (Washington, DC, 1988). Energy Information Administration, Manufacturing Energy Consumption Surve_v: Fuel Switching 1985 (Washington, DC, 1988). Professional Audit Review Team, Report 10 the President and the Congress. Pecformance Evaluation of rhe Energy Information Administration (Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 20-24. Hermut Merklein (EIA Administrator), “Statement,” Hearings on the Energy Information Administration FY 1986 Budget Request Before the House committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Professional Audit Review Team, Report 60 rhe Presidenr and the Congress, Performance Evaluation of’the Energ.v Information Administration (Washington, DC, 1988) pp. 8-18. Professional Audit Review Team, Report (Washington, DC, 1988). pp. 27-36. Helmut Merklein (EIA Administrator), “Statement,” Hearings on the Energy Information Administration FY 1987 Budget Request Before the House Committee on Appropriations, Su~ommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, 99th Cong., 26. Sess. (1986). Hearing on EIA Domestic Oil Production Estimates, before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 1988), p, I.

24

80.

GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION

Energy

Information

(Washington, x2.

National

DC.

An

Administration, Petroleum

of Energy, February.

x3.

Office of the President. &ergj.

X4.

Energy information Petroleum

Storage

Supporting

( 1987);

Indu.c/rj.

and Supply Situation.

2d. Sess. X6.

Calvin

Quarter!),,

E. Rodekohr.

(Washington,

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X9.

Hearing

on the National

Committee

9 ( 1992): DC,

AnaiJsis

Oufkd.

Capabilities of the United Fee (Washington,

of an Oil Imporr DC,

DC.

1987).

on Economic Stabiliration,

House

IOlst Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990); Hearing on Oil Price on Energy and Power, House Energy and Commerce on Oil Price and Supply

Science. and Transportation

Situation.

before the

Committee.

IOlst Gong.,

“The Role of Government

S/ra/egj,

The Narional

Energ_v Strategy,

Improving

(Washington,

DC,

SupporrinX

Ana[vsi.t ,fbr /he ,Ya/ional

E.wur.sion:

.Suppor/ing

Ou/look

(Washington,

./or

1990); Energ!

l02d Cong.,

f&r the National

No/w-al

EnerR>, Modeling Research Council,

Periods of

Governmmt

Straregy

(Washington,

Energy

Strategy

Energ_v Futures.@ and DC,

the National Potentid:

C‘onservarion 1991); Renewable

(Washington,

S/ra/eg.v (Washington,

Supporring

(Washington,

Committee System.

Anuiysis

National

93.

Enet-gy lnformatton

Admintstration.

94.

Energy Information

Y5.

Calvin A. Kent (EIA

.fbr the Resouwe

Energ.\,

199 I); Elrctric,

DC,

DC, 1991); The Potential Nationul

DC. 199 I );

Energ!

Srruregj.

Buse: SupportrnX

Anuhw.\

1991).

on the National

Energy Modeling

First Advisory Report (Washington,

The Nutionul

92.

DC,

1991).

I st Sess. ( 199 I).

L‘onsumprion

Energ),

DC,

and Oversight,

Ana/F.sis f&r the National Enrrg~, Struteg~ (Washington,

Gas lmporrs:

Energy, Strategy

Research Council.

on Investigation

Energ),

Ana/~.si.\ .f;w the Notional

Anu/J.sb

During

1991-92 (Washington,

Tec~hnolugr Modeling:

DC. 199 I ); The Domestic, Oil and Gus Recoverable

/or the Natiunul u Nurionul

1st edition

Energy Strategy, before the Subcommittee

Administration,

Supporting

information

and the Persian Gulf War,”

Petroleum Pric,es and Prqfits in the 90 Days Following the invasion

on Science. Space and Technology,

Energy Information

National

Administration

1990).

for Coal Liyuef:fac~/ion: Supporring

91.

the World Energ)

I l-34.

Administration,

X8.

The

DC.

1987).

Fuels Tax (Washington,

Hearing

Senate Commerce,

Crisis: The Energy Information

of &waif

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1989-I990

( 1990).

Energy Information

Energ>,

DC,

before the Subcommittee

2d. Sess. (1990);

A. Kent and Mark

/@mu/rrm

90.

Behavior.

Volumes I-V (Washington.

DC, 19X7); Fu/ure Supply

C‘O.SIand Ben@/

before the Subcommittee

IOlst Gong.. Subcommittee.

National x7.

Market

Ana[y.si.s Appendix,for

Finance and Urban Affairs Committee,

Consumer

Fuel

and Transportation,

Src,uri/~’ (Washington,

Administration,

Hearing on the Iraq, Kuwait Oil Situation,

Committee.

Heating

1987).

1987); and Co.s/ and Benqfit Ana!r:vis of a Motor Banking,

Subcommittee

pp. 101-l 12.

Anal~si.c qf

Ecwnomic~ and Sec,uri/j, /mplica/ion.\ (Washington, S/a/eb

l/lYYI

1990).

Petroleum Council,

Department

x5.

Vol. IO/No.

Hearings on Fuel Price Increases, before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, on Energy and Power. IOlst Gong., 2nd Sess., (1990)

81.

QUARTERLY

Energ?. Modeling

Srsrem

System, Development DC.

o/

199 I).

(Washington,

DC,

1992).

Annuu/

Report

IO (‘on,yrtw

(Washington.

DC.

1991). p. 20.

Administration.

Annual

Report

10 Congw.t.s (Washington,

DC.

1990). pp. 12-13.

Administrator).

“Statement,”

Hearings on the Energy Information

FY 199.1 Budget Request Before the House Committee and Related Agencies. lO2d Cong., 2d. Se\s. (1992).

on Appropriations.

Administration

Subcommittee

on Interiot-