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An anniversary review and critique: The tylenol crisis
Leonard Snyder
An Anniversary Review and Critique: The Tylenol Crisis Despite widespread coverage of and acclaim for Johnson & Johnson's handling of the Tylenol crisis that began Sept. 29, 1982, when the first of seven persons died after taking cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules, the author of this article gives Johnson & Johnson's public relations effort a less than good rating. At the same, time, however, the author confers an " A " on the work of Jolmson & Johnson's marketing apparatus. Dr. Snyder works closely with San Francisco State University's Office of Research and Graduate Studies as managing director of the independent unit, The 2rid Opinion Co.
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he Tylenol crisis that rocked the U.S. last fall ~reinforces the soundness of some basic public relations principles and demonstrates the need, once and for all, to recognize public relations as a top-management, independent function. The crisis also shows how public relations relates to marketing and sales promotion practices and illustrates the functional interdependence of these disciplines in day-to-day practice. As of this writing, nearly a year later, the psychopathic killer who laced 44 capsules of Extra-Strength Tylenol with deadly doses of cyanide poison has yet to be identified. However, there have been arrests of persons alleged to have made extortion attempts against Johnson & Johnson, the health care products giant whose subsidiary, McNeil Consumer Products Co., manufactures Tylenol. 2 Since the seven deaths, scores of sporadic reports of "hard-core, true tamperings"--from sulfuric acid-laced eye drops to mercuric chloridetainted Excedrin Extra-Strength capsules and strychnine-contaminated ExtraStrength Tylenol--have posed public relations problems of the first magnitude for government and corporate managements alike2 First: Identify the PR Problems For Johnson & Johnson (J&J), there was also a mammoth marketing problem touched off by the senseless killings. But before the full impact of
The Tylenol Review
the marketing problem could be determined, J&J's major public relations problem had to be identified. That fact-finding job was the initial responsibility of Lawrence G. Foster, J&J's vice president of public relations. Foster had to cope with several sub-problems, however, including finding out w h e t h e r McNeil used cyanide in its Tylenol manufacturing process. J&J says it told reporters that no cyanide was used in the manufacturing process. This was true. But, in a journalistic sense, it was an incomplete truth, and a media relations problem surfaced as a result. As some readers may recall, after the deaths Chicago authorities had begun to check out mounting reports of psychosomatic illnesses and an epidemic of Tylenol-related rumors. One unconfirmed news report--a rumor not known to Foster until Saturday, Oct. 2, two full days after the first Tylenol capsule death because of cyanide poisoning--was that the deadly chemical was used as an analytical agent to test both Tylenol raw materials and the finished product. The media had independently verified this fact despite J&J's attempts to explain the presence of a "small quantity" of cyanide in the laboratory (for testing samples of raw materials). However, J&J's credibility was temporarily tarnished because it was forced to further explain--after allegedly telling the media that cyanide was not used at all--that it was used in the lab but not in the Tylenol manufacturing process itself. While no corporate public relations staffer k n e w that cyanide was used in the McNeil laboratory until someone there casually mentioned it to a reporter, J&J's subsequent "public relations problem" was to make clear to reporters that no cyanide was used in the manufacturing process or was present in the manufacturing area. s It was later established that the tampering of Tylenol capsules occurred at the retail--not at the manufacturer-level. The Tylenol Recall To its credit, J&J lost little time in recalling millions of bottles of its ExtraStrength Tylenol capsules in the United States and abroad 6 while it spent a reported half million dollars warning physicians, hospitals, and distributors of its action. All product advertising also was stopped. Decisions to do so were made during the second day of the crisis, Friday, Oct. 1, after a sixth cyanide-contaminated Tyl.enol death had occurred. To J&J's strategic top management g r o u p / w h i c h met twice daily during the crisis to keep abreast of developments and to hammer out decisions, a paramount issue of concern was brewing: Would the general public link McNeil's Tylenol with J&J, since the parent company had not hitherto been promotionally identified with its subsidiary? A possible consequence, it may have been feared, were negative repercussions by millions of consumers of J&J's products, many of J&J's 38,200 stockholders, and even a loss of morale among J&J's 77,000 employees. But if anyone seriously doubted then that J&J might possibly not be linked to 25
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the Tylenol tragedies, it was only because none could then predict the brewing national news storm over the terrifying nature of the deaths. The company estimated that the "'communications media monster" during the three-day crisis period and the ensuing weeks resulted in 80,000 news stories in U.S. newspapers alone and hundreds of hours of national and local television radio coverage. 8 Contrast this with only 250 media contacts during all of 1978, 337 in 1979, 573 in 1980, 687 in 1981, and 401 during the first six months of 1982. The scope and intensity of the murder media blitz was unprecedented in the 97-year history of J&J. Virtually the whole country was aware of the Tylenol hysteria, a fact brought out by J&J chairman and chief executive officer James E. Burke on Nov. 11. Burke told a national news conference (transmitted via Westar-IV satellite to 29 cities from New York) that 90 percent of the American public k n e w that only Tylenol capsules--not tablets--were involved. The surveys, which were undertaken by J&J's long-standing agency, Young & Rubicam, also indicated that 93 percent of the public believed "'the problem could occur for any capsule" and that 90 percent felt "the maker (of Tylenol) was not to blame." Surveys as Research Tools The value of opinion surveys as a research tool, well established by the giant marketer, was evident by the oft-repeated company references to the polls during and after the crisis. While none has publicly implied otherwise or even suggested that J&J's surveys might have been improperly designed, it's self-evident that surveys done with built-in biases are always suspect, as they should be. Therefore, it would have been prudent for J&J to seek out an independent opinion research firm whose survey methods and techniques were as readily available to the news media as the company's news releases which mentioned J&J's survey results. It could be argued, of course, that under the pressure of deadlines, journalists will rarely question how surveys are conducted. But the issue here is not the proprietary nature of the research findings but the credibility of the survey sponsors, particularly w h e n the public interest is of overriding concern. Polls, after all, have long been used by politicians and others for self-serving ends. Without conclusive assurances as to the validity of research findings, especially w h e n a company proclaims its "first responsibility" is to those who "use our products and services, "'9 polls must stand the test of any challenge. Distinctions should be made between surveys used for proprietary interest and those whose results are publicly reported to support a position, especially a marketing one. It is one thing for J&J to conduct surveys to gauge consumer attitudes on using Tylenol and its "new triple safety-sealed tamper-resistant" packaging, and another when survey data are used to allay public doubt and give credence to implied assertions that J&J's top management decisions merit public "trust" and stockholder support. 1~Social 26
T h e T~'lenol R e v i e w responsibility and ethical practice mandate full disclosure of survey techniques and methods as a matter of course. In updating major institutional -investors and others about J&J's stock prospects, for example, Prudential-Bache Securities, New York, bolstered its own research reports with data from on-going consumer attitude surveys conducted for it by the independent research firm of Leo Shapiro and Associates. "'These (Shapiro) data suggest the need t o s t e p up promotional efforts (by J&J) for purely defensive purposes," Prudential-Bache researcher Richard R. Stover said on Feb. 18. The planned promotion was foreshadowed three months earlier by Foster, who disclosed that $4 million would b e spent for national coupon advertising--sales promotion--"to say 'Thank you, America' for your continuing confidence and support.'" The coupons were redeemable for $2.50 towards the purchase of any Tylenol product. Consumers who telephoned a toll-free number also received the coupon. Commending the news media for doing its job "so well" to warn the public and help J&J dispel fears, Chairman/CEO Burke said the entire effort to warn the public and recall Tylenol capsules would cost J&J $100 million. However, J&J could not have bought the public recognition given by the media to Tylenol for another $100 million.
J&J's Public Relations Philosophy Foster claims the decision to put concern for the public ahead of business losses was easy for the financially-strong J&J. Written for all to see at its red-brick headquarters building is its credo, the nearest thing J&J has for a written plan or policy to deal with emergencies. The credo, which mandates that J&J's first concern must be for the public and its customers, whether professionals or laymen, has "served the company well during the Tylenol crisis," Foster says. This may be, but is a credo a substitute for a good public relations crisis plan, which J&J concedes it does not have? So what, from the perspective of effective public relations, can be learned from the Tylenol disaster? "We learned that when public safety is an issue, full disclosure and cooperation with the media is an effective way to disseminate practical information quickly," says J&J assistant public relations director James A. Murray." As a principle of contemporary public relations management, this seems somewhat archaic because it is reactive, not proactive. "We didn't really have a crisis plan. We reacted to what happened dayto-day as information came in. It was like groping in the dark. The first day we weren't exactly sure what was going on out there. As information unfolded, we responded to it," Murrary told pr reporter, the weekly newsletter of public relations, public affairs and communication22 However, effective crisis communication must embrace planning for coping with possible and often unforeseen situations that can adversely affect
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an organization. This managerial responsibility is as crucial to the fate and welfare of a corporation as it is to a government. Consider the underlying effects of the Tylenol death scare with the rupture of a gas pipe line which threatens thousands, the two million manufacturer callbacks of potentially unsafe cars and trucks in the United States last year, the revelations of environmental carcinogens which contaminate sizable residential areas, or the possibility of nuclear war which threatens to obliterate nations. "'It's wise to operate on the theory that if the sky isn't falling right now, it will do so at any moment," says Grant Home, vice president-public relations for Pacific Gas & Electric Co., which has three and a half million customers within a 10-million population base in Northern and Central California. "'It doesn't do to say, 'Let's get together and talk about it when things calm down.' Sound public relations calls for a fully-developed (communication) plan for crisis management, including a well-conceived and agreed-upon organizational arrangement for carrying it out in the public relations department. ''~3 The Three Ps of PR: Philosophy, Policy, Practice
J&J's "credo philosophy," written some 40 years ago by the son of the company's founder, is a noble tribute to the measure of Robert Wood Johnson's managerial expertise and knowing ways. Having pointed throughout the Tylenol crisis, with justifiable pride, to this credo about business and social responsibility, his successors apparently now need to interpret and define the credo with policies and practices relevant to each and every facet of J&J's pt/blic relationships. This on-going activity, which should be as advanced as tomorrow, goes far beyond mere promotional activities, to be sure. Marketing and public relations, as separate and distinct disciplines, should neither dominate nor domineer one another's respective managerial activities, which must be defined and made clear. That is, neither has exclusive jurisdiction over "the public interest," for instance, although perspectives do and will understandably differ given the operating restraints and expediencies of the enterprise. For example, it remains the prerogative of J&J's top management to determine the potential dangers and benefits of product labeling--something that has been traditionally within the marketer's province. Yet on March 4, barely five months after the Chicago-area Tylenol deaths, J&J was forced to temporaril}; remove its prescription drug Zomax from the market when five people died after reportedly taking the anti-inflammation painkiller. The U.S. Food & Drug Administration, the regulatory agency responsible for assuring product safety, said the five victims were allergic to Zomax and should not have taken it. The deaths may have been the result of misuse, perhaps because of inadequate labeling of the product. In any event, the FDA suggested a stronger label message be put on Zomax and J&J, following much the same public policy as with Tylenol, withdrew the drug temporarily "until everyone is happy with the labeling." 28
The T~lenol Review Zomax was withdrawn while J&J's "trust us" mass advertising comeback campaign for Tylenol was underway. And, like Tylenol's crisis situation, Zomax also adversely affected the price of J&J stock on the New York Stock Exchange, which had halted trading on the company's stock for a time. 14 Foster's staff lost little time in getting out two news releases on the latest setback for the company, perhaps giving reassurance to institutional investors that panic was not warranted. The linkage between such marketing flmctions as product labeling and advertising and public relationsfimctions points to one of countless ways the two disciplines interface. Each of the "four-P" elements of the marketing mix--product, price, promotion and physical distribution--interface with public relations because each requires knowledge about why, when, and how to communicate in the first place. Marketing, w h e n defined as movement of goods from point of origin to point of ultimate use, approaches effectiveness w h e n targeted messages relevant to the "'four Ps" attract and sustain listener/reader interest. Ultimate communication effectiveness, however, can be measured by the degree to which message receivers are motivated or persuaded to act in accord with the sender's intent. Obstacles to effective communication, is which abound in product labeling, of course, will impede the marketer's objective if they do not help influence behavior positively.
The Confluence of Public Relations and Marketing It is at this juncture, at the confluence of public relations and marketing, that their given objectives can dovetail. At the same time, their independence as separate and distinct disciplines is preserved. For public relations, this should mean serving as a corporate guardian of the public interest. This may often clash with the marketer's principal aim of serving special interests to gain and maintain corporate profits sometimes, unfortunately, at the public's expense. Public relations professionals must recognize and identify their opportunities for maintaining and preserving sound public relationships for their organizations. This does not mean one must combat members of senior management who need professional allies with public relations knowledge and skills for promoting sales and leads to them; nor does it mean that the public interest should be allowed to be shunted aside by competitive market and sales pressures. When the public interest is involved in organizational affairs, the burden of proving adherence to social responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of senior management. At best, this provides an opportunity for public relations professionals to plan for specific ways and means of dealing with possible communication crises that can do irreparable damage to their organizations. At the least, this affords an opportunity to help ward off costly legal battles where possible punitive damages can readily be assessed. This happened recently to J&J, for instance, w h e n it said it would appeal a California superior court jury's $10.5 million award to a woman who said 29
Public Relations Review
she was hospitalized for toxic shock syndrome in 1980 after using o.b. tampons. The award, a record in toxic shock legal actions, is the first in which punitive damages were added to compensatory damages. Procter & Gamble Co., with worldwide sales of nearly $12 billion for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1982, also faces similar court battles. These stem from a reported 1,660 toxic shock cases including 88 deaths, between 1970 and April 30, 1982 allegedly connected to use of Rely tampons, and recorded by the U.S. Public Health Service's Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Ga. A spokesman there said, "Nobody should die of toxic shock syndrome."16 Corporate size or financial muscle aside, the credo expressed by J&J's late chairman is one that should apply equally to small firms as well as giant ones: 9 . . In a business society, every act of business has social consequences and may arouse public interest. Every time business hires, builds, sells, or buys, it is acting for t h e . . , people as well as for itself, and it must be prepared to accept full responsibility...17 J&J has been credited with positioning itself as a champion of the consumer, giving meaningto the concept of corporate social responsibility and of demonstrating that its communication expertise will be hard to equal for years to come. TM This sugar-coated judgment, about as solid as a J&J placebo, can't be justified in light of the facts. Tylenol was already banned from sale by Chicago authorities and many local, independent outlets across the country had already begun to remove the product from their shelves, knowing full well that Tylenol, as then packaged, would gather dust because of consumer fears about possible contamination. And as for J&J's giving meaning to the concept of social responsibility, did the company volunteer to pay for funeral and burial expenses for any of the seven Tylenol murder victims? Did the conglomerate even offer a public reward for the arrest and conviction of the murderer(s)? While the term "social responsibility" implies responsibility for an organization's members and even accountability for their misdeeds, a corporate executive might satirically define it as doing whatever must be done to keep the masses believing the company is in business for reasons other than making a profit. Perhaps J&J construes the term to mean doing everything a company can do and should do in the public interest, without sacrificing profitability. The point is that its behavior since the first anniversary of the Tylenol crisis seems to point in this direction. Today, social responsibility is generally accepted as a duty to act morally, ethically and responsibly, regardless of profitability, which does not mean that profit is a dirty word, of course. Being mindful of the public interest means acting above and beyond the niceties of legal expectations; it implies 30
The T~lenol Review adhering to a code of standards through acts carried out away from the glare of a spotlight. A first anniversary review of the Tylenol case indicates no evidence to justify any exaltation that J&J "gave meaning to the concept of corporate social responsibility." Acting responsibly, as J&J certainly did, is not the lesson of social responsibility for business executives who might be confronted with a similar situation. Leaders are expected to lead; J&J seemed to follow a norm, as it were. By next Feb. 6, all drug products, including imports, must comply with FDA tamper-proof, safety package regulations. While J&J managed to get the jump on its competitors by its marketing prowess in repackaging Tylenol as fast as it did, to imply it did so because of its social responsibility--as a New Jersey-based free lance and public relations consultant specializing in health care did19--is to overstate the truth.
J&J's Accolades from the Press J&J culled editorial opinions from five U.S. newspapers as a sample of comments from throughout the nation on how they viewed the company's handling of the Tylenol crisis. 2~ Here are excerpts, followed by another point of view on business and the media: Wall Street Journah... the company chose to take a large loss rather than expose anyone to further risk. The anti-corporation movement may have trouble squaring that with the devil theories it purveys. Washington Post: Though the hysteria and frustration generated by random m u r d e r have often obscured the company's actions, Johnson & Johnson has effectively demonstrated how a major business ought to handle a disaster. From the day the deaths were linked to the poisoned T y l e n o l . . . (J&J) has succeeded in portraying itself to the public as a company willing to do what's right, regardless of cost. Express and News (San Antonio, Texas): In spite of the $100 million loss it was facing, the c o m p a n y . . , never put its interests ahead of solving the murders and protecting the public. Such corporate responsibility deserves support. Evening Independent (St. Petersburg, F l a . ) : . . . Some firms would have tried to cover up, lie or say "no comment." Johnson & Johnson knows better. Its first concern was to safeguard the public from further contamination, and the best way to do that was to let people know what had occurred by speaking frankly with the news media. Morning News (Savannah, Ga.): Tylenol's makers deserve applause for their valiant attempt to recover from the terrible blow they have suffered... First, did J&J "'choose" to lose Tylenol profits or did its astute management act to maintain credibility, avoid possible losses from other products and cooperate with both government and the media in efforts to preserve
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i&J's "conservative, ultra-righteous, high-integrity" image? I submit that if J&J did have a choice (to take a loss), which I question, it was to minimize further risks. Moreover, at a time w h e n local authorities in Chicago and elsewhere, and the U.S. government as weU, p u s h e d for new drug safety laws, J&J saw a new marketing opportunity--and took itmby edging out its competitors in the $1.2 billion analgesic category: It was the first in the industry, after the recall, to respond to the "national mandate" for tamper-resistant packaging and the new regulations imposed by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration. Despite the Tylenol crisis, J&J could well afford to do what it did: Its extraordinary after-tax charge of approximately $50 million, or 27 cents per share in the third quarter, was the result of the Tylenol capsule withdrawal. Net earnings were $2.52 per share for the year on sales of $5.76 billion compared to $2.51 per share on sales of $5.40 billion in 1981, an increase of 6.7 percent. It is worth noting, too, that product sales by Tylenol's competitors in the industry were also way off because of the poison-tampering hysteria. The issue raised here, therefore, is not whether J&J deserved or did not deserve its press accolades. The issue is whether a company merits praise for doing what it may reasonably be expected to do. After all, it is one thing to act in accord with social responsibilities--to act in accord with social n o r m s - - a n d quite another to pretend nothing is wrong as Firestone Tire and Rubber Company officials did w h e n Firestone 500 tires were disintegrating. When J&J promptly recalled Tylenol capsules from the market, as it later did with Zomax, the company did indeed demonstrate its concern for consumers' health. It also demonstrated prudent marketing decision-making. The marketing perspective which prevails today views profits as an ancillary of consumer benefits, whereas u n d e r yesterday's concept of marketing, profits are considered a function of sales. Unfortunately, too many companies, both national and multinational, still predicate their marketing strategies as sales and profit activities. The marketing mix, which embraces all elements used in the marketing of goods and services, should focus not only upon profits but also on pressing societal concerns such as product safety, the physical environment, and other consumer-related benefits; this is the modern concept of marketing71 Both public relations practitioners and marketers need to understand and appreciate this contemporary concept. Meanwhile, the practicalities of doing business pose ripe opportunities for public relations professionals, especially for those who identify themselves as planners for "'communication crisis contingencies." This activity alone justifies recognition of the public relations discipline as an independent, top-management function. To its credit, that's t h e w a y the corporate public relations department is set up at J&J, where vice president Foster reports directly to its chairman and CEO. However, considering the size 32
The T~'lenol R e v i e w and scope of J&J's world-wide operations, its five-man corporate public relations department appears to be woefully understaffed. However, public relations' and marketing's promotional functions are separate and distinct activities within J&J. For instance, product public relations work--publici t y - i s done by J&J's operating companies through external agencies. J&J's headquarters corporate public relations staff, while available for consultation, only publicizes products in an institutional way, such as announcing a scientific achievement. For its own marketing achievement in rebuilding Tylenol as the leading product in its class, J&J rates a 10 on 1-to-10 scale (10 being the equivalent of an A). For its performance in the public relations area, the Public Relations Society of America awarded one of its silver anvils to J&J. A more critical view, based upon this writer's second opinion, is that J&J's public relations handling of the Tylenol situation rates a 5--about a C +. Principal reasons for the less than "good" rating: Foster, as vice president of public relations, must be faulted for: 9 operating a smalldepartment with no emergency plans for handling a crisis situation, although the literature abounds with sound reasons and examples for such crisis needs. The media had independently learned that cyanide was in fact used by McNeil, J&J's manufacturing subsidiary, despite denials to the contrary by Foster and his staff, prompting them to subsequently "explain" its use for testing purposes only; 9 the lack of an operational plan that interprets and details a working procedure based upon J&J's philosophical credo. Such a plan would, of necessity, make operationally clear how and to what degree social responsibility options could be initiated; such a public relations plan should also lay the groundwork for the use of opinion surveys as strategic public relations (not just marketing) tools. References lTylenol death stories ranked as the second top news of 1982 in terms of headline impact, according to American daily newspaper editors polled by United Press International. The economy, with unemployment and high interest rates affecting millions, was the top news story of the year. Other stories ranked for headline impact after the Tylenol deaths were, in order, the Middle East, the war in the Falklands, and the death of Leonid Brezhnev. Zfylenol is a non-aspirin,over-the-counter, non-prescriptiondrug which was first discovered to have analgesic (pain-killing) and antipyretic (fever-reducing) properties in 1886. ~A public relations problem is defined as any major situation that adversely affects an organization which is capable of b.eing resolved or addressed through communicative means. ~Quoted by Michell Osborn, USA Today, Oct. 15, 1982, and reprinted by Editor & Publisher, Oct. 23, under "Tylenol crisis tests public relations staff," p. 15. SOnly one public relations staffer was employed at J&J's McNeil company. ~Not all of McNeil's product was recalled; bottled tablets of Tylenol shipped prior to supplies packaged in new, "tamper-proof" boxes were sold in retail outlets after the recall. ~Iembers, by title, included J&J's chairman and CEO, president, company group chairman, executive committee member, general counsel, chairman of McNeil, and the corporate vice president for public relations. 8From an undated special report by the editors of Worldwide, a publication of J&J corporate public relations distributed to stockholders, employees, and others with a strong, upbeat "comeback" theme.
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Public Relations Re~4ew 9From J&J's "credo," sometimes irrevently called "The Ten Commandments according to Robert Wood Johnson," the last scion of the family that founded Johnson & Johnson. 10j&j did publicize its Tylenol market share before and after the poisonings: Before, the share was estimated at 37 percent; immediately after the murders this dropped to 13 percent. But by the first week of December, J&J said it had recaptured 65 percent of its pre-crisis share. By the beginning of 1983, J&J reported it had regained its market leadership. npersonal correspondence, Feb. 25, 1983. 12Vol. 26, No. 7, Feb. 14, 1983. 13pr reporter, Vol. 25, No. 46, Nov. 22, 1982. 14The cost of J&J's recall of Zomax is expected to cut J&J's 1983 earnings by $20 million, and lost Zomax sales will further reduce profits. Last year, Zomax accounted for less than two percent of J&J's $5.8 billion sales in the United States and more than a score of other countries. 15Effective communication is defined as influenced behavior--the transmission and reception of ideas, feelings, and attitudes, both verbally and nonverbally--which produce a favorable response, i.e., one intended or desired by the communicator. This is virtually tantamount to effective public relations inasmuch as the intended effect of "'public relations communication" is to gain organizational support, goodwill, and understanding, etc. ~6Nan Robertson, "Toxic Shock," New York Times Magazine, Sept. 19, 1982, p. 32. 17The Tylenol Comeback, a special undated report by J&J, p. 4. 'SMitcheU Leon, "Tylenol Fights Back," Public Relations ]ournal, March 1983, 10-13. ~gMitchell Leon, op. cit.
~~
Tylenol Comeback, op. cir., p. 8.
21Warren J. Keegan, Multinational Marketing Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. PrenticeHall, 1980), p. 4.
Tylenol's Vice President Responds
I
t would be bad advice to follow the conclusions drawn by Leonard Snyder in this article for the following reasons: 9 A small but efficient PR staff is an asset not a liability if it can deal effectively with routine assignments and the major challenges. We feel we can do both well. No plan could have been written to meet a crisis of the magnitude of Tylenol. We do have written plans to cover other types of emergencies. 9 The key to effectively handling a crisis is direct access to corporate management, in order to listen and to be heard, and to apply staff skills to what is decided. Our 20 years of reporting to the chairman of the board resolves this problem for us. 9 The need for an "operational plan" for the Johnson & Johnson Credo is perhaps most ridiculous of all. The beauty of the Credo is that it sums up company philosophy in four paragraphs that are clearly understood by all of us in management. The thought of complicating a concise, well comprehended corporate philosophy with a detailed "operational plan" shows a surprising lack of knowledge about what management expects from its PR staff. 9 The contrived objective of this article may not be evident. Dr. Snyder conducts a consulting business and is using reprints of a similar article (August issue of the International Public Relations Association Review) to solicit business for his firm. On September 30 he wrote to the chairman of Johnson & Johnson, enclosing a copy of the article, and suggesting that his firm be retained as consultants to correct our shortcomings. Other companies that may be solicited in the same way may wish to know that our management considered the article "selfserving." It is unfortunate that so much space is devoted in a professional journal for this purpose. Lawrence G. Foster Corporate Vice President Public Relations Johnson & Johnson
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An Anniversary Review and Critique: The Tylenol Crisis Despite widespread coverage of and acclaim for Johnson & Johnson's handling of the Tylenol crisis that began Sept. 29, 1982, when the first of seven persons died after taking cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules, the author of this article gives Johnson & Johnson's public relations effort a less than good rating. At the same, time, however, the author confers an " A " on the work of Jolmson & Johnson's marketing apparatus. Dr. Snyder works closely with San Francisco State University's Office of Research and Graduate Studies as managing director of the independent unit, The 2rid Opinion Co.
T
he Tylenol crisis that rocked the U.S. last fall ~reinforces the soundness of some basic public relations principles and demonstrates the need, once and for all, to recognize public relations as a top-management, independent function. The crisis also shows how public relations relates to marketing and sales promotion practices and illustrates the functional interdependence of these disciplines in day-to-day practice. As of this writing, nearly a year later, the psychopathic killer who laced 44 capsules of Extra-Strength Tylenol with deadly doses of cyanide poison has yet to be identified. However, there have been arrests of persons alleged to have made extortion attempts against Johnson & Johnson, the health care products giant whose subsidiary, McNeil Consumer Products Co., manufactures Tylenol. 2 Since the seven deaths, scores of sporadic reports of "hard-core, true tamperings"--from sulfuric acid-laced eye drops to mercuric chloridetainted Excedrin Extra-Strength capsules and strychnine-contaminated ExtraStrength Tylenol--have posed public relations problems of the first magnitude for government and corporate managements alike2 First: Identify the PR Problems For Johnson & Johnson (J&J), there was also a mammoth marketing problem touched off by the senseless killings. But before the full impact of
The Tylenol Review
the marketing problem could be determined, J&J's major public relations problem had to be identified. That fact-finding job was the initial responsibility of Lawrence G. Foster, J&J's vice president of public relations. Foster had to cope with several sub-problems, however, including finding out w h e t h e r McNeil used cyanide in its Tylenol manufacturing process. J&J says it told reporters that no cyanide was used in the manufacturing process. This was true. But, in a journalistic sense, it was an incomplete truth, and a media relations problem surfaced as a result. As some readers may recall, after the deaths Chicago authorities had begun to check out mounting reports of psychosomatic illnesses and an epidemic of Tylenol-related rumors. One unconfirmed news report--a rumor not known to Foster until Saturday, Oct. 2, two full days after the first Tylenol capsule death because of cyanide poisoning--was that the deadly chemical was used as an analytical agent to test both Tylenol raw materials and the finished product. The media had independently verified this fact despite J&J's attempts to explain the presence of a "small quantity" of cyanide in the laboratory (for testing samples of raw materials). However, J&J's credibility was temporarily tarnished because it was forced to further explain--after allegedly telling the media that cyanide was not used at all--that it was used in the lab but not in the Tylenol manufacturing process itself. While no corporate public relations staffer k n e w that cyanide was used in the McNeil laboratory until someone there casually mentioned it to a reporter, J&J's subsequent "public relations problem" was to make clear to reporters that no cyanide was used in the manufacturing process or was present in the manufacturing area. s It was later established that the tampering of Tylenol capsules occurred at the retail--not at the manufacturer-level. The Tylenol Recall To its credit, J&J lost little time in recalling millions of bottles of its ExtraStrength Tylenol capsules in the United States and abroad 6 while it spent a reported half million dollars warning physicians, hospitals, and distributors of its action. All product advertising also was stopped. Decisions to do so were made during the second day of the crisis, Friday, Oct. 1, after a sixth cyanide-contaminated Tyl.enol death had occurred. To J&J's strategic top management g r o u p / w h i c h met twice daily during the crisis to keep abreast of developments and to hammer out decisions, a paramount issue of concern was brewing: Would the general public link McNeil's Tylenol with J&J, since the parent company had not hitherto been promotionally identified with its subsidiary? A possible consequence, it may have been feared, were negative repercussions by millions of consumers of J&J's products, many of J&J's 38,200 stockholders, and even a loss of morale among J&J's 77,000 employees. But if anyone seriously doubted then that J&J might possibly not be linked to 25
Public Relations
Review
the Tylenol tragedies, it was only because none could then predict the brewing national news storm over the terrifying nature of the deaths. The company estimated that the "'communications media monster" during the three-day crisis period and the ensuing weeks resulted in 80,000 news stories in U.S. newspapers alone and hundreds of hours of national and local television radio coverage. 8 Contrast this with only 250 media contacts during all of 1978, 337 in 1979, 573 in 1980, 687 in 1981, and 401 during the first six months of 1982. The scope and intensity of the murder media blitz was unprecedented in the 97-year history of J&J. Virtually the whole country was aware of the Tylenol hysteria, a fact brought out by J&J chairman and chief executive officer James E. Burke on Nov. 11. Burke told a national news conference (transmitted via Westar-IV satellite to 29 cities from New York) that 90 percent of the American public k n e w that only Tylenol capsules--not tablets--were involved. The surveys, which were undertaken by J&J's long-standing agency, Young & Rubicam, also indicated that 93 percent of the public believed "'the problem could occur for any capsule" and that 90 percent felt "the maker (of Tylenol) was not to blame." Surveys as Research Tools The value of opinion surveys as a research tool, well established by the giant marketer, was evident by the oft-repeated company references to the polls during and after the crisis. While none has publicly implied otherwise or even suggested that J&J's surveys might have been improperly designed, it's self-evident that surveys done with built-in biases are always suspect, as they should be. Therefore, it would have been prudent for J&J to seek out an independent opinion research firm whose survey methods and techniques were as readily available to the news media as the company's news releases which mentioned J&J's survey results. It could be argued, of course, that under the pressure of deadlines, journalists will rarely question how surveys are conducted. But the issue here is not the proprietary nature of the research findings but the credibility of the survey sponsors, particularly w h e n the public interest is of overriding concern. Polls, after all, have long been used by politicians and others for self-serving ends. Without conclusive assurances as to the validity of research findings, especially w h e n a company proclaims its "first responsibility" is to those who "use our products and services, "'9 polls must stand the test of any challenge. Distinctions should be made between surveys used for proprietary interest and those whose results are publicly reported to support a position, especially a marketing one. It is one thing for J&J to conduct surveys to gauge consumer attitudes on using Tylenol and its "new triple safety-sealed tamper-resistant" packaging, and another when survey data are used to allay public doubt and give credence to implied assertions that J&J's top management decisions merit public "trust" and stockholder support. 1~Social 26
T h e T~'lenol R e v i e w responsibility and ethical practice mandate full disclosure of survey techniques and methods as a matter of course. In updating major institutional -investors and others about J&J's stock prospects, for example, Prudential-Bache Securities, New York, bolstered its own research reports with data from on-going consumer attitude surveys conducted for it by the independent research firm of Leo Shapiro and Associates. "'These (Shapiro) data suggest the need t o s t e p up promotional efforts (by J&J) for purely defensive purposes," Prudential-Bache researcher Richard R. Stover said on Feb. 18. The planned promotion was foreshadowed three months earlier by Foster, who disclosed that $4 million would b e spent for national coupon advertising--sales promotion--"to say 'Thank you, America' for your continuing confidence and support.'" The coupons were redeemable for $2.50 towards the purchase of any Tylenol product. Consumers who telephoned a toll-free number also received the coupon. Commending the news media for doing its job "so well" to warn the public and help J&J dispel fears, Chairman/CEO Burke said the entire effort to warn the public and recall Tylenol capsules would cost J&J $100 million. However, J&J could not have bought the public recognition given by the media to Tylenol for another $100 million.
J&J's Public Relations Philosophy Foster claims the decision to put concern for the public ahead of business losses was easy for the financially-strong J&J. Written for all to see at its red-brick headquarters building is its credo, the nearest thing J&J has for a written plan or policy to deal with emergencies. The credo, which mandates that J&J's first concern must be for the public and its customers, whether professionals or laymen, has "served the company well during the Tylenol crisis," Foster says. This may be, but is a credo a substitute for a good public relations crisis plan, which J&J concedes it does not have? So what, from the perspective of effective public relations, can be learned from the Tylenol disaster? "We learned that when public safety is an issue, full disclosure and cooperation with the media is an effective way to disseminate practical information quickly," says J&J assistant public relations director James A. Murray." As a principle of contemporary public relations management, this seems somewhat archaic because it is reactive, not proactive. "We didn't really have a crisis plan. We reacted to what happened dayto-day as information came in. It was like groping in the dark. The first day we weren't exactly sure what was going on out there. As information unfolded, we responded to it," Murrary told pr reporter, the weekly newsletter of public relations, public affairs and communication22 However, effective crisis communication must embrace planning for coping with possible and often unforeseen situations that can adversely affect
27
Public Relations Review
an organization. This managerial responsibility is as crucial to the fate and welfare of a corporation as it is to a government. Consider the underlying effects of the Tylenol death scare with the rupture of a gas pipe line which threatens thousands, the two million manufacturer callbacks of potentially unsafe cars and trucks in the United States last year, the revelations of environmental carcinogens which contaminate sizable residential areas, or the possibility of nuclear war which threatens to obliterate nations. "'It's wise to operate on the theory that if the sky isn't falling right now, it will do so at any moment," says Grant Home, vice president-public relations for Pacific Gas & Electric Co., which has three and a half million customers within a 10-million population base in Northern and Central California. "'It doesn't do to say, 'Let's get together and talk about it when things calm down.' Sound public relations calls for a fully-developed (communication) plan for crisis management, including a well-conceived and agreed-upon organizational arrangement for carrying it out in the public relations department. ''~3 The Three Ps of PR: Philosophy, Policy, Practice
J&J's "credo philosophy," written some 40 years ago by the son of the company's founder, is a noble tribute to the measure of Robert Wood Johnson's managerial expertise and knowing ways. Having pointed throughout the Tylenol crisis, with justifiable pride, to this credo about business and social responsibility, his successors apparently now need to interpret and define the credo with policies and practices relevant to each and every facet of J&J's pt/blic relationships. This on-going activity, which should be as advanced as tomorrow, goes far beyond mere promotional activities, to be sure. Marketing and public relations, as separate and distinct disciplines, should neither dominate nor domineer one another's respective managerial activities, which must be defined and made clear. That is, neither has exclusive jurisdiction over "the public interest," for instance, although perspectives do and will understandably differ given the operating restraints and expediencies of the enterprise. For example, it remains the prerogative of J&J's top management to determine the potential dangers and benefits of product labeling--something that has been traditionally within the marketer's province. Yet on March 4, barely five months after the Chicago-area Tylenol deaths, J&J was forced to temporaril}; remove its prescription drug Zomax from the market when five people died after reportedly taking the anti-inflammation painkiller. The U.S. Food & Drug Administration, the regulatory agency responsible for assuring product safety, said the five victims were allergic to Zomax and should not have taken it. The deaths may have been the result of misuse, perhaps because of inadequate labeling of the product. In any event, the FDA suggested a stronger label message be put on Zomax and J&J, following much the same public policy as with Tylenol, withdrew the drug temporarily "until everyone is happy with the labeling." 28
The T~lenol Review Zomax was withdrawn while J&J's "trust us" mass advertising comeback campaign for Tylenol was underway. And, like Tylenol's crisis situation, Zomax also adversely affected the price of J&J stock on the New York Stock Exchange, which had halted trading on the company's stock for a time. 14 Foster's staff lost little time in getting out two news releases on the latest setback for the company, perhaps giving reassurance to institutional investors that panic was not warranted. The linkage between such marketing flmctions as product labeling and advertising and public relationsfimctions points to one of countless ways the two disciplines interface. Each of the "four-P" elements of the marketing mix--product, price, promotion and physical distribution--interface with public relations because each requires knowledge about why, when, and how to communicate in the first place. Marketing, w h e n defined as movement of goods from point of origin to point of ultimate use, approaches effectiveness w h e n targeted messages relevant to the "'four Ps" attract and sustain listener/reader interest. Ultimate communication effectiveness, however, can be measured by the degree to which message receivers are motivated or persuaded to act in accord with the sender's intent. Obstacles to effective communication, is which abound in product labeling, of course, will impede the marketer's objective if they do not help influence behavior positively.
The Confluence of Public Relations and Marketing It is at this juncture, at the confluence of public relations and marketing, that their given objectives can dovetail. At the same time, their independence as separate and distinct disciplines is preserved. For public relations, this should mean serving as a corporate guardian of the public interest. This may often clash with the marketer's principal aim of serving special interests to gain and maintain corporate profits sometimes, unfortunately, at the public's expense. Public relations professionals must recognize and identify their opportunities for maintaining and preserving sound public relationships for their organizations. This does not mean one must combat members of senior management who need professional allies with public relations knowledge and skills for promoting sales and leads to them; nor does it mean that the public interest should be allowed to be shunted aside by competitive market and sales pressures. When the public interest is involved in organizational affairs, the burden of proving adherence to social responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of senior management. At best, this provides an opportunity for public relations professionals to plan for specific ways and means of dealing with possible communication crises that can do irreparable damage to their organizations. At the least, this affords an opportunity to help ward off costly legal battles where possible punitive damages can readily be assessed. This happened recently to J&J, for instance, w h e n it said it would appeal a California superior court jury's $10.5 million award to a woman who said 29
Public Relations Review
she was hospitalized for toxic shock syndrome in 1980 after using o.b. tampons. The award, a record in toxic shock legal actions, is the first in which punitive damages were added to compensatory damages. Procter & Gamble Co., with worldwide sales of nearly $12 billion for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1982, also faces similar court battles. These stem from a reported 1,660 toxic shock cases including 88 deaths, between 1970 and April 30, 1982 allegedly connected to use of Rely tampons, and recorded by the U.S. Public Health Service's Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Ga. A spokesman there said, "Nobody should die of toxic shock syndrome."16 Corporate size or financial muscle aside, the credo expressed by J&J's late chairman is one that should apply equally to small firms as well as giant ones: 9 . . In a business society, every act of business has social consequences and may arouse public interest. Every time business hires, builds, sells, or buys, it is acting for t h e . . , people as well as for itself, and it must be prepared to accept full responsibility...17 J&J has been credited with positioning itself as a champion of the consumer, giving meaningto the concept of corporate social responsibility and of demonstrating that its communication expertise will be hard to equal for years to come. TM This sugar-coated judgment, about as solid as a J&J placebo, can't be justified in light of the facts. Tylenol was already banned from sale by Chicago authorities and many local, independent outlets across the country had already begun to remove the product from their shelves, knowing full well that Tylenol, as then packaged, would gather dust because of consumer fears about possible contamination. And as for J&J's giving meaning to the concept of social responsibility, did the company volunteer to pay for funeral and burial expenses for any of the seven Tylenol murder victims? Did the conglomerate even offer a public reward for the arrest and conviction of the murderer(s)? While the term "social responsibility" implies responsibility for an organization's members and even accountability for their misdeeds, a corporate executive might satirically define it as doing whatever must be done to keep the masses believing the company is in business for reasons other than making a profit. Perhaps J&J construes the term to mean doing everything a company can do and should do in the public interest, without sacrificing profitability. The point is that its behavior since the first anniversary of the Tylenol crisis seems to point in this direction. Today, social responsibility is generally accepted as a duty to act morally, ethically and responsibly, regardless of profitability, which does not mean that profit is a dirty word, of course. Being mindful of the public interest means acting above and beyond the niceties of legal expectations; it implies 30
The T~lenol Review adhering to a code of standards through acts carried out away from the glare of a spotlight. A first anniversary review of the Tylenol case indicates no evidence to justify any exaltation that J&J "gave meaning to the concept of corporate social responsibility." Acting responsibly, as J&J certainly did, is not the lesson of social responsibility for business executives who might be confronted with a similar situation. Leaders are expected to lead; J&J seemed to follow a norm, as it were. By next Feb. 6, all drug products, including imports, must comply with FDA tamper-proof, safety package regulations. While J&J managed to get the jump on its competitors by its marketing prowess in repackaging Tylenol as fast as it did, to imply it did so because of its social responsibility--as a New Jersey-based free lance and public relations consultant specializing in health care did19--is to overstate the truth.
J&J's Accolades from the Press J&J culled editorial opinions from five U.S. newspapers as a sample of comments from throughout the nation on how they viewed the company's handling of the Tylenol crisis. 2~ Here are excerpts, followed by another point of view on business and the media: Wall Street Journah... the company chose to take a large loss rather than expose anyone to further risk. The anti-corporation movement may have trouble squaring that with the devil theories it purveys. Washington Post: Though the hysteria and frustration generated by random m u r d e r have often obscured the company's actions, Johnson & Johnson has effectively demonstrated how a major business ought to handle a disaster. From the day the deaths were linked to the poisoned T y l e n o l . . . (J&J) has succeeded in portraying itself to the public as a company willing to do what's right, regardless of cost. Express and News (San Antonio, Texas): In spite of the $100 million loss it was facing, the c o m p a n y . . , never put its interests ahead of solving the murders and protecting the public. Such corporate responsibility deserves support. Evening Independent (St. Petersburg, F l a . ) : . . . Some firms would have tried to cover up, lie or say "no comment." Johnson & Johnson knows better. Its first concern was to safeguard the public from further contamination, and the best way to do that was to let people know what had occurred by speaking frankly with the news media. Morning News (Savannah, Ga.): Tylenol's makers deserve applause for their valiant attempt to recover from the terrible blow they have suffered... First, did J&J "'choose" to lose Tylenol profits or did its astute management act to maintain credibility, avoid possible losses from other products and cooperate with both government and the media in efforts to preserve
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Public Relations Review
i&J's "conservative, ultra-righteous, high-integrity" image? I submit that if J&J did have a choice (to take a loss), which I question, it was to minimize further risks. Moreover, at a time w h e n local authorities in Chicago and elsewhere, and the U.S. government as weU, p u s h e d for new drug safety laws, J&J saw a new marketing opportunity--and took itmby edging out its competitors in the $1.2 billion analgesic category: It was the first in the industry, after the recall, to respond to the "national mandate" for tamper-resistant packaging and the new regulations imposed by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration. Despite the Tylenol crisis, J&J could well afford to do what it did: Its extraordinary after-tax charge of approximately $50 million, or 27 cents per share in the third quarter, was the result of the Tylenol capsule withdrawal. Net earnings were $2.52 per share for the year on sales of $5.76 billion compared to $2.51 per share on sales of $5.40 billion in 1981, an increase of 6.7 percent. It is worth noting, too, that product sales by Tylenol's competitors in the industry were also way off because of the poison-tampering hysteria. The issue raised here, therefore, is not whether J&J deserved or did not deserve its press accolades. The issue is whether a company merits praise for doing what it may reasonably be expected to do. After all, it is one thing to act in accord with social responsibilities--to act in accord with social n o r m s - - a n d quite another to pretend nothing is wrong as Firestone Tire and Rubber Company officials did w h e n Firestone 500 tires were disintegrating. When J&J promptly recalled Tylenol capsules from the market, as it later did with Zomax, the company did indeed demonstrate its concern for consumers' health. It also demonstrated prudent marketing decision-making. The marketing perspective which prevails today views profits as an ancillary of consumer benefits, whereas u n d e r yesterday's concept of marketing, profits are considered a function of sales. Unfortunately, too many companies, both national and multinational, still predicate their marketing strategies as sales and profit activities. The marketing mix, which embraces all elements used in the marketing of goods and services, should focus not only upon profits but also on pressing societal concerns such as product safety, the physical environment, and other consumer-related benefits; this is the modern concept of marketing71 Both public relations practitioners and marketers need to understand and appreciate this contemporary concept. Meanwhile, the practicalities of doing business pose ripe opportunities for public relations professionals, especially for those who identify themselves as planners for "'communication crisis contingencies." This activity alone justifies recognition of the public relations discipline as an independent, top-management function. To its credit, that's t h e w a y the corporate public relations department is set up at J&J, where vice president Foster reports directly to its chairman and CEO. However, considering the size 32
The T~'lenol R e v i e w and scope of J&J's world-wide operations, its five-man corporate public relations department appears to be woefully understaffed. However, public relations' and marketing's promotional functions are separate and distinct activities within J&J. For instance, product public relations work--publici t y - i s done by J&J's operating companies through external agencies. J&J's headquarters corporate public relations staff, while available for consultation, only publicizes products in an institutional way, such as announcing a scientific achievement. For its own marketing achievement in rebuilding Tylenol as the leading product in its class, J&J rates a 10 on 1-to-10 scale (10 being the equivalent of an A). For its performance in the public relations area, the Public Relations Society of America awarded one of its silver anvils to J&J. A more critical view, based upon this writer's second opinion, is that J&J's public relations handling of the Tylenol situation rates a 5--about a C +. Principal reasons for the less than "good" rating: Foster, as vice president of public relations, must be faulted for: 9 operating a smalldepartment with no emergency plans for handling a crisis situation, although the literature abounds with sound reasons and examples for such crisis needs. The media had independently learned that cyanide was in fact used by McNeil, J&J's manufacturing subsidiary, despite denials to the contrary by Foster and his staff, prompting them to subsequently "explain" its use for testing purposes only; 9 the lack of an operational plan that interprets and details a working procedure based upon J&J's philosophical credo. Such a plan would, of necessity, make operationally clear how and to what degree social responsibility options could be initiated; such a public relations plan should also lay the groundwork for the use of opinion surveys as strategic public relations (not just marketing) tools. References lTylenol death stories ranked as the second top news of 1982 in terms of headline impact, according to American daily newspaper editors polled by United Press International. The economy, with unemployment and high interest rates affecting millions, was the top news story of the year. Other stories ranked for headline impact after the Tylenol deaths were, in order, the Middle East, the war in the Falklands, and the death of Leonid Brezhnev. Zfylenol is a non-aspirin,over-the-counter, non-prescriptiondrug which was first discovered to have analgesic (pain-killing) and antipyretic (fever-reducing) properties in 1886. ~A public relations problem is defined as any major situation that adversely affects an organization which is capable of b.eing resolved or addressed through communicative means. ~Quoted by Michell Osborn, USA Today, Oct. 15, 1982, and reprinted by Editor & Publisher, Oct. 23, under "Tylenol crisis tests public relations staff," p. 15. SOnly one public relations staffer was employed at J&J's McNeil company. ~Not all of McNeil's product was recalled; bottled tablets of Tylenol shipped prior to supplies packaged in new, "tamper-proof" boxes were sold in retail outlets after the recall. ~Iembers, by title, included J&J's chairman and CEO, president, company group chairman, executive committee member, general counsel, chairman of McNeil, and the corporate vice president for public relations. 8From an undated special report by the editors of Worldwide, a publication of J&J corporate public relations distributed to stockholders, employees, and others with a strong, upbeat "comeback" theme.
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Public Relations Re~4ew 9From J&J's "credo," sometimes irrevently called "The Ten Commandments according to Robert Wood Johnson," the last scion of the family that founded Johnson & Johnson. 10j&j did publicize its Tylenol market share before and after the poisonings: Before, the share was estimated at 37 percent; immediately after the murders this dropped to 13 percent. But by the first week of December, J&J said it had recaptured 65 percent of its pre-crisis share. By the beginning of 1983, J&J reported it had regained its market leadership. npersonal correspondence, Feb. 25, 1983. 12Vol. 26, No. 7, Feb. 14, 1983. 13pr reporter, Vol. 25, No. 46, Nov. 22, 1982. 14The cost of J&J's recall of Zomax is expected to cut J&J's 1983 earnings by $20 million, and lost Zomax sales will further reduce profits. Last year, Zomax accounted for less than two percent of J&J's $5.8 billion sales in the United States and more than a score of other countries. 15Effective communication is defined as influenced behavior--the transmission and reception of ideas, feelings, and attitudes, both verbally and nonverbally--which produce a favorable response, i.e., one intended or desired by the communicator. This is virtually tantamount to effective public relations inasmuch as the intended effect of "'public relations communication" is to gain organizational support, goodwill, and understanding, etc. ~6Nan Robertson, "Toxic Shock," New York Times Magazine, Sept. 19, 1982, p. 32. 17The Tylenol Comeback, a special undated report by J&J, p. 4. 'SMitcheU Leon, "Tylenol Fights Back," Public Relations ]ournal, March 1983, 10-13. ~gMitchell Leon, op. cit.
~~
Tylenol Comeback, op. cir., p. 8.
21Warren J. Keegan, Multinational Marketing Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. PrenticeHall, 1980), p. 4.
Tylenol's Vice President Responds
I
t would be bad advice to follow the conclusions drawn by Leonard Snyder in this article for the following reasons: 9 A small but efficient PR staff is an asset not a liability if it can deal effectively with routine assignments and the major challenges. We feel we can do both well. No plan could have been written to meet a crisis of the magnitude of Tylenol. We do have written plans to cover other types of emergencies. 9 The key to effectively handling a crisis is direct access to corporate management, in order to listen and to be heard, and to apply staff skills to what is decided. Our 20 years of reporting to the chairman of the board resolves this problem for us. 9 The need for an "operational plan" for the Johnson & Johnson Credo is perhaps most ridiculous of all. The beauty of the Credo is that it sums up company philosophy in four paragraphs that are clearly understood by all of us in management. The thought of complicating a concise, well comprehended corporate philosophy with a detailed "operational plan" shows a surprising lack of knowledge about what management expects from its PR staff. 9 The contrived objective of this article may not be evident. Dr. Snyder conducts a consulting business and is using reprints of a similar article (August issue of the International Public Relations Association Review) to solicit business for his firm. On September 30 he wrote to the chairman of Johnson & Johnson, enclosing a copy of the article, and suggesting that his firm be retained as consultants to correct our shortcomings. Other companies that may be solicited in the same way may wish to know that our management considered the article "selfserving." It is unfortunate that so much space is devoted in a professional journal for this purpose. Lawrence G. Foster Corporate Vice President Public Relations Johnson & Johnson
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